Em TUN UEC V3 WILLIAM HITLER The Fuhrer's nephew ae S Fo who joined the US Navy TT a EIGHTH ARW mia ‘W Deception &camouflage ¥ LADG: Monty's eyes Operation Superchar J that fooled the Axis Se em CT PY | = Blow-by-blow account of the battle for New York province | a Inside Scotland's steadfast “sm bastion that defied the Jacobitesz= KING & COUNTRY Be Oren TPM CEy BEV EaFN CG A of Pe CO ie ener ee NEE ye — among the German divisions launching Bt the Ist. Panzer Comps and few» Speer aren cee ey paren ballad one of the youngest and most notorious rr nqriakhon usocst nour ‘ 5 eee eer nena) neces sarin eel shocked even many other German units. Recruited exclusively from 17 and 18 year : ai akon PAvMUastey ate elec ‘These 12 all-new King & Country Mt ee ee ed feces el Ye ee ee er are ae aed Mi a eee nL Tey oeneric 7 wer beg Gained in *2vuncng Pete ed Canaan troops ee a cree) ape ERR ‘mixed’, a combination of typical Wafen SS Pek eee ee et Oa ou reo T aay ore ear Ce Ym ee Breda Neat Peeper ety S$ division, ‘Leibstandarte EN = Pismo About King & County's figures and fighting ae” wv ae ‘vehicles or any of their other historical series ee ae ees 7 Pa) & eee : Pilg rea ers ae er ee acd ae Dee a Erg pe Pee Cetra miner) SE GRE WEEE Bay shop: Manchester House Collectables eer omen eed@ te of Ase t &. em % i i ; : : i : i ae ae) id ‘Av SMITH Das on aarti eay Amacan 1 pot bt they exo nual of Nt e538, mck soon ‘cet fat aks wei oe wo comes a alas hoe iad huge le caf rund Welcome = a -\ ery yer gots moth, the iat warn tne Westen Dosen Le ee ia conn re Second bale of Aso nasa esr sp fr Bernard iortgamery andthe En Amy bye are of 882th Nea foes sgn ae on netting tw The resundngeetcae afer wets and monte of ae paring teuerat agence ard recesearo edb Long Serer Group. ha sve istrans Gave Hore no So recount how these erical missions made victory nthe desert S , ren FOLLOW THE HISTORY OF WAR TEAM Q@/HISTORYOFWARMAG Q@HISTORYOFWARMAGCONTENTS issue na EIGHTH ARMY'S TRIUMPH IN THE DESERT Inside the deception missions and special forces operations that sealed victory over RommelFRONTLINE R Frome Crimean War fo Wires hhavebeen core to confiotsaoross the centuries 16 FIRST M AILWE Eetyral nerworks were cic for ensporing ‘men, mate and even mounting atiiry The Great War saw te inreased use of ‘mowed ins and huge away cannon 20 HO INS Pall csv rasp fom erences bank ofngand save coumlsslvas Theswansorgotrainayguismatedite =» OW O treaionof he lester erly eves Sturningtnager from hcuohau history ‘24° SECOND BATTLE OF N Inside hectic nisin hat mad ghth Amy desert vitor posse 38 GE, 1755 BishandFrenchamies lsh inthebd 0 ‘anole Province of NewYork The str of anestanged nephew who ured is back on‘Unle Aa jon eUS Kany ‘ 8 Il — x Dung the Second Boer War his medical officer b S| saves wounds comvadeunderinesefire Ins Bras armoured personel carrie tat gene lotleeagiion oro in el he Troubles ‘Story of Scottand’s iconic Medieval fortification a Tl HOMEFRONT roundup of etitons endcalectons 4 = Teatst itary istory fs andtonks 18 0 Key Ween thismonh 80 years ano Anatigha RenentrancePoooyNCA aoa} ~ oe erWAR. WAR. CARRYING CHARLES XIWAR. FOCUS UT DAN BAND-Fyontline MILITARY. RAILWAYS | Rail ransportation and artillery played an important part in military planning from the mid-19th century to the Cold War I PRUSSIAN ES " a: fe 12MILITARY RAILWAYS esta impertant for sup HEJAZ RAILWAY The Hears a steatosis important Otoman controll rainy that rns fam Damascus o Medina, ‘tis epeatedy attacked and damage during Word ofthe Arab Revol, including by Arab commanded by TELawence. Bish alert th Aican mineral wealth logistical routes es. Boer commandos often attack ais, demo ges rs, with the Bish responding with armoured Wai.aT aL ae 1p n [ren aunonno Cy * Ca ea eae TTT ae: TRAINS IN THE BLOODY CIVIL SO RUSSIAN REVOLUTION” RUSSIAN CIVIL WARMILITARY RAILWAYS During the Cuban Nevers 3300"sGvonlaline basa calm ee Some of the earliest railway networks became critical to conflicts around the world, transporting men and materielhroughout the 19th century, the steam engine dove the Industria Revolution and the railways it brought transtormed societies, Tortunes and even landscapes. Its inuence was powerful and arreaching and it dian’ take maltary thinkers long to start ‘teaming up ways to repurpose ths mighty ‘commercial tool to fight ware, Initial tains were recognised as an ofciont means of transporting lage amourts of men ‘and materiel to battlefields. The Prussian, Russian and Austrian armies were the st to bo this in the 1840s. The British, to, were teary adopters and ducing the Crimean War (4883-56) bul the tst ever miltaryraway When they constructed a 13hm track fom the Port of Balahava to resupply troops besieging the city of Sevastopol e wasn't unt the American Givi War (1861 65), however, thatthe full military potential of ralways and steam engines began to be feolised. K was the fst confit to eae rail lines and rallway junctions become strategie objectives, and also the fst in which tains were weaponised, ‘The Union army was the fst to make use of armoured trains. Deploying them In 2 defensive role, they patrolled ral ines north ‘0f Baltimore to protect them Irom Souther ‘saboteurs. The Confederates, meanwil, were the first to use them in an offensive {ole In June 1862, atthe Batle of Savage's Station, Union troops found themselves UP ‘against a force that included a 32-paunder Brooke naval rite, encased in an Won clad carriage, being shunted into action ahead of a steam engine. ts use inspired the Union to develop its ovn version: a sicinch cannon ‘mounted on a revolving patform, within a 32: foot armoured carriage, built bythe Baldwin Locomotive Works in Pittsburg, Despite intial soepticism from some atthe War Department's new US Miltary Rairoads ‘agency, several were in use bythe end ofthe War. One even proved critical in helping to fend the Sioge of Petersburg and capture the ‘strategically vital all hub there “THE PRESENCE OF AN ARMOURED TRAIN HAD AGREAT MORALE EFFECT” MILITARY RAILWAYS ‘The fst major deployment of armoured trans, however, wouldnt occur untl the Secend ‘oer War (1899 ~ 1902) when Britain deployed ‘total of 20, Primitive at et, these became increasingly sophstested, nt least because of ‘3 huiitng cident early on in the conic. In November 1899, Boer guering ambushed a Betish armoured tain in Estcourt in KwaZulu-Natal. By the time the fgting was over, four rsh solders wore ‘dead. 14 were wounded and a further 58 had Been taken prisoner, including a young Winston Chueh n his book The Boer War, (Churenil deserined the tain a “avery puny specimen, having nether gun nor Maxims [machine guns), wth no root tots trucks and ro shutters fo its loophole “The tain Churchill was on consisted of {8 locomotive sandwiched between two sets of four wagons, tee of which were armoured. Is ‘main weapon, meanwhile, was a seven pound fatty gun an antiquated toy”, according to Church), that was so old fashioned it was, muzzle-joading rather than breech ioacing. ‘As the war progressed, Brtsh trains became bettor armed and better protected By Its end, one would iypoaly consist of 9 locomotive amid a string of alcars, where it was deemed less vulnerable Behind it would pull a heauly armoured eariage containing 1 22-pound gun, wile two further armoured Carriages atthe front and rear caried sold ‘armed with rifles and machine guns. Other wagons would carry equipment for repairing sabotaged lines, while a wagon at the front had a cow catcher fted to I, to clear ‘bstacles from the track and detonate mines. 'A report published atthe end ofthe war documented the sucessful ole armoured trains had played in the confit nit, one officer reealiet: “There Is no doubt thatthe fenemy dstived them intensely and thatthe presence ofan armoured tran had 2 groat ‘morale effect." The report also listed seven Uses for armoured tain in future confit, These included infantry support. intercepting ‘enemy troops, flanking protection, einfoccing ‘allway tations and camps, palin, reconnaissance and rainay protection. The Second Boer War, however, would be the las ime the British army fled ‘armoured trains in any signicant way. Not that twas the end ofthe line for them ~ on the contrary, ther real heyday would arrive with Worts Wi ‘A i sein al gon mote naa ck rps dy tote Messer er Stason tng he Sond Boer Wn ©1000 a7~ Frontline The outbreak of the Great War saw the rapid development of armoured trains — formidable weapons that played a pivotal role in the conflict he war the Brtish Ary found Itself ghting onthe Western Front In 1914 hore Ite resemblance tothe confit itnag won in South africa just 15 years waren. ‘ough mobile a st, ft soan Became bogged down in a quagimice of trenches and barbed wite. In such a static conlet, there as no significant role for armoured wrains to play. However, by late 1914 the need for ‘mabile heavy artillery that could stike deep behind enemy lines was apparent, and rallway funs were soon being considere. ‘The dea of mounting aileron vains haa been ted befor. n 1882, during the Argo. Egyptian war, the British hae mounted naval guns conral tucks te sene as heavy artilery suppor ‘nd had done the some thing with coastal {etence guns dung the Socond Boor Wr. In Europe, mesnuhil, the French became the first nation to purposely design and build 2 railway gun. By 1900, its army had 48 te. ‘ang sicinch guns mounted on narrow gauge wagons called Peigné-Canet carriages in Serve as fortress artilery at Verdun, Toul, Epinal and Belfort. By the outbreak of war, however, no army possessed a heavy weapon on wheels that Could reach deep behind enemy lines. Tis ‘meant the eariest examples of ths new “OUR INFANTRY IS POWERLESS breed of gun had to be improvised. The French ete fst again when, in the autumn of 1814, ‘they mount an obsolete coastal defence {un onto existing commercial olin stock ‘he Briish, Germans and Americans followed sult and by the time the war ended, raltway guns were In operation al along the Western Front. They appeared on othe fronts, oo, wth both the Raliane and Russians developing them, witha total of 600 eventual involved inthe conti. As the war raged on, alway guns became increasingly sophisticated, deveoping nia bespoke weapons systems complete with specialised roling stock for ammunition personnel and technical stores. They grew In size and power to, wth the biggest ever built being ritsh. Nicknamed Scene Shiftr ‘and Bache Buster, the BL 14ineh allay {uns boasted 52-metre bares and coulé hit 2 targot over 32km avay with a shell weigring, ‘almost 1,500 “Te role of armoured trains onthe Western Front was largely nited othe Germans’ use ‘of them to patio occupied terttory behind their ‘ownlines. On the Eastern Front, though, where ‘2 more fie confer was being fought 9 vast, ‘open landscape, it was a ciferent story From the start, the Russians in particular made good use of armoured train, helping AGAINST ENEMY ARMOURED TRAINS” the Tzar's troops to secure victory against the Austro-Hungarlans atthe Battle of Galicia In 1914, Their successful use so impressed the Austro-Hungariana that, they went on to produce their own fleet of rall-basea fighting machines and, by 1916, had ten deployed on ther fronts in Russia, Romania and Italy ‘Athough the German armies inthe east also deployed some armoured trains, it was the Russians whe really specialised in their evelopment and use. Early on inthe fihting Russian armoured tens were rudimentary, generally consisting ofa locomotive pushing {3nd puling armoured box cars vith fing sits in the side. By 1915, though, they nad begun to more closely resemble bateships ‘These so-called land cruisers were cloaked in thiek armour pating and brsted with {reed arilery weapons and machine guns. ‘Te Kounruz clas, for example, nad 2 lacomote atthe heart of various carriages ‘ant wagons, was protected by 10m armour plate, anc was armed witha threench ‘mountain gun and 12 heavy machine guns. “The Tzar's army had a total of 15 armoured train in serie, frm Fniane down tothe ‘Caveasus. They were used primarily fo surprise attacks and for transporting troops into the heat of combat.MILITARY RAILWAYS Wien the Easter Font collapsed in 197 and the Bolshewk Revolution gave wey tothe chaos of evil war, the armoured train went from being an important weapon toa vital one. And it would go on to playa ey olen deciaing the country's tture, “The Russlan Gil War was brutal, long and bed. Dragging on unt 1923, iteventualy cost around 13 milion Wes, ana was fought and won largely along te railway lines that link the country’s major cies. At st, the Tear's ‘eet of tains was sezed by various ieqular militias. Before tong however, both the ed Army and the eounterrevoutonary frees of the ‘white Amy were producing hel oon. A wide vatety of models appeared, but the favoured ‘system tonded to see a locomotive wedged between two armoured wagons and a varety of otrer wagons, armed with one or two artilery pieces and a dazen machine guns. 'ACthe height ofthe confit, the Red Army had as mary as 300 armoured trains in serve, while the Whites bad around 80. t wasnt unknown for these steel behemoths to sug it ut ithey met on some remote bit of rack, but the Ree Arm's prefered role for thom was as a weapon of shock and awe. Using them to transport aiing teams made up of 4165 infantrymen, 47 cavalrymen and a machine fun detachment, they were driven into enemy terior, where they wreak havoc. The Woops they caried served not only to protect tutto fextended is range, Once a tain had punched Its way though the fronvine defences, these {1o9ps could thon be unieashed to assault enemy postions. The sight and sound ofthese beasts ‘approaching on a batlfield engine snorting, Whistle shrieking, guns blazing ~ could Nave ' demoralising impact onthe enemy. AS ‘ne Polish solcier who faced them during the PolishSoviet war of 1920 recalled: “Inthe Fecent battles armoured tains were the most Serious and teible adversaries, They are Wwelldesigned, act shocking and, decisively, hoo lrg amounts of fepower [They] a the (Our infantry Is powerless against enemy Perhaps the mast famous train ofthe period was the Zeamurets, But in 1946, boasted tno turreted thee.inch guns and ‘lant machine guns. it was protected by 10cm fof armour and powered by two Fiat petrol ‘motors that gavo ita top speed of 45k, Having served on the Eastem Front, it was ‘Aon, ete: psn France are sated by a erarmaus fnotconsanmante gen e288 flmottages any aileron. 1817 ‘Ato Viewer amon oo sent in May 1918 to take on the Czechosiovak Legion in soutnem Russia. Ths force of approximately 40,000 men, whe had become Stranded inthe county atthe end ofthe war, were ow trying to fight thelr way home any way thoy coud. In the fighting that followed, they captured Zaamurets and used it to fight thei way east along the Tans Siberian Raiiway. By September 1920, they'd reached Vladivostok on Russia's fr eastern edge and, after handing the train over tothe White ‘my, set sal for Europe. When the White ‘my was driven out ofthe region in 1922 into neighbouring Manchuria, they took Zaamurete with them. The tain then took part in 2 Contlet Between local warlords before being Fequisitioned bythe Chinase Army twas. Used ints strugele against Japanese backed forces, who captured tin 1931. While the Zaamirets’ place in history is secure, what became of itafter that remains @ mystery. ‘is rman rayon was cape tesa he Bate hon i ape 1829hile hospital vains can also have clan purposes, since ther advent they have mostly been used by armed forces aroun the wort, to treat wounded and il itary persons! Their use stetehes back almost as far as the Ineoduetion of military ralways and were frst Used during the Crimean War (2853 56), ‘Opened in 4855, the Grand Crimean Central alway was bull by the Bish to inialy supply ammunition and provisions to Aled soldiers ‘artng the Russians tthe Slege of Sevastopol IReventual stretched to 23km in length —_— Frontline ——— These long military medical trains were first developed in the 1850s and reached the zenith of their effectiveness during World War | between Sevastopol and the British itary Peacauarers at Balaklava. A major factor nthe Aled success rng ho siege, tho ralway was ‘mostly horse-drawn, an from Apri 1855 the British soon resised they could use empty trains to take inured and sick elders avy tom the frontines. The roling stock was unsuitable ‘and untygienc fom earying supples but nevertheless the rataay was effectively the frst touse hospital tans During the American Cl War (1861-65), hospital trains began to be used on a larger scale because fighting was often fought to Control strategically important alvay cenres. “TRAINS WERE UP TO 1,600 FEET LONG AND CONVERTED TO HAVE WARDS, PHARMACIES, OPERATING ROOMS, KITCHENS AND STAFF QUARTERS”MILITARY RAILWAYS ‘Asin the Crimea, casuaties had to be removed ta the rear of active operations, with the Union Army establishing Sanitary Commissions to ensure that carlages were clean. The cariages ‘were hardly modified from chin ling staok, fathough some had rubber sings to support Stretchers in an attempt to minimise the scomfor ot the wounded sors ‘After Crimes the Beth continued to use hospital rain forthe rest ofthe 204h canary for their colonial wars, including the Anglo ZuK ‘War ana Second Boer Wor. Butt would take a _lobal confit for them to come into their own, ‘World War I Because ofthe mass casuaties created bythe industrial scale of WM, many more wounded soles had tobe transported away from the front ines. Tench warfare complicated an already dificult process, with casualty clearing Stations and field hospitals being a common ature along all parts ofthe Wester Font. AS in previous cones, tains wee the fastest ‘way treat the wounded but they were much ‘more medica sophisticated, “The British One® again led the way in utlising hospital rains during the war. Trains ‘were Up 10 2,600 fae long and converted onave wards, pharmacies, operating roms, kitchens and staff quarters. Each ambulance tain could transport and care for approximately 500 wounded solders and be staffed by 50 medics, including medical officers, nurses and oréerles ‘ecalse the Western Front was so cose to the Brtsh mainiana, casualties could be LWanstered fom hospital ships at Southampton to dozens of receiving stations across England, Scoland and Wales. Suh was the necessity for ambulance and supply trains thet thousnds. cof raay workers wore refused entry into the armed Torees. There were 20 ambulance twain operating in Brtaln ana they were so ‘successful that 31 more were bul to operate in France to assist the beleaguered French railway network When soldiers ware wounded atthe front they wee initially rescued by stretcher bearers, who took them behind the lines. They might then be transporte on nacrow-éauge "trench ‘allways such a the Brtish War Department Light Ralways, the French Dacauil light railways or the German Feldbahns (els tallwaj}. Only then would they be sent to field hospitals or ambulance ain. ‘Although they wore designed to provide ai, ‘ambulance trains could be uncomfortable Journeys for casualties. Each man had a ramped bunk and thoso with broken bonos would feel every movement of the vain. The Cariagos were also unhygenic because the ‘wounded solders eame straight rom ity trenches or No Man's Land. Medical sta would Sometimes work 24-hour tits an they were at risk of catching battlefield diseases or le. When the war poet Robert Graves was severely wounded in 1916 he recalled his journey on the ambulance vain as “a nghtmare. My back was sagging and I could not aise my knees to relieve the eam, the bunk above me ony 2 few inches away” Nevertneless, hospital tains were a great asset for tho Alied mica! effort, They ‘enabled thousands of soars tobe evacuated fon avast scale, almost as a counteroaiance forthe huge losses suffered onthe batt For example the fst day of the Battle of Somme, 1 uly 1916, saw the greatest loss of Ife in one day forthe British Army. By contrast 7 duly 1916 was the busiest doy of ambulance train atic during the war, with mary ofthe casualties lives being saved, Hospital rains served much the same purpose during Wl as they had caring YAW ‘and were used by all major combatants. For ‘example. they transfered many casualties to UK mitary hospitals that were located ‘away rom Luftwaffe bombing aids. Today, ‘obile motor ransport and aerial evacuation has largely replaced the hospital ain on the Datel but some countries stil use them for Cinian purposes. This includes Russa, Inc, China ana South Aca, 2aFrontline = In the second great global conflict, railways were mounted with some of the biggest artillery pieces the world had seen s early as 1934, Nazi Germany Not thatthe guns were ever used for this ‘manufacturer Krupp, these atilery pieces began developing an arsenal” purpose, When the Wehrmacht invaded France were the largest ever Dut. itig 20 via the dense Ardennes “Te Schwerer[iterally heavier Gustav, for ‘example, weighed 1.350 tonnes, was over 447 metres long and had @ 33-motre barrel Because ofits gargantuan proportions, its elevation range was only 48 degrees and, as, vas the case with earlier heavy railway guns, 1s horizontal targeting required the use of guns with enough power to smash thelr way ‘through the Magina's thick conerete walls, and Dora, Designed by the German a Seer ston tnsonnet a z “THEIR PRESENCE PROVED SO NOTORIOUS AND CAUSED SO MANY CASUALTIES THAT THE ALLIED TROOPS TRAPPED THERE NICKNAMED THEM ANZIO ANNIE AND THE ANZIO EXPRESS” curved tracks to move ile or right. Each ofits ‘igh explosive shells woighod soven tonnes and could nit target almost SOkm away. Butts ‘sheer size also meant that it required its own set of tracks to move into range, These had to be special assembled, demanding not only ' vast workforce but an adetional set of cuter {racks forthe cranes needed to build them. ‘Norew of 250, meanwhile, was then requires to setup the gun, a process that could take up totvee-andshal days, ‘Because of this, the weapons saw litle combat. Sehwerer Gustav's mast notable contribution eame during the Siege of ‘Sevastopol in June 1942. After had taken ‘around 3,800 men to bul the tracks required tomove it nto positon It ted around 300 shells over a fourneek period, eventually helping to shatter Soviet resistance inte cy ‘Dora, meanwhile, was Brety deployed on the ‘outskirts of Stalingrad in August 1942 but was ‘withdrawn betore the counterattacking Soviets MILITARY RAILWAYS ‘could capture it. Both guns were destroyed by the Germans towards the end ofthe war before ‘hey could fal into enemy hands. Germany's most successful use of ts railway super guns during the war was in tay In 1944, The Ltnch Krupp KS weighed in at 215 tonnes and could fre 2 536ib shell almost ‘5k, Twenty.ive were bult nthe lead to the war and, m February 1944, two were used to counter the Aled invasion at Ano, 65k ‘Stationed in the Alban Hils above the beachhead, the KBs, known bythe Germans 88 Leopold and Robert, rained fire down on the Bish, American and Canadian troops coming, ashore thre. Typical fring an eight sho Saho before being shunted back ito tunnel to avoid detection ftom the ait, thay held un the Aled advance unt the end of May. Their presence proved $0 notorious and caused $0 ‘many casuatves that the Alied troops trapped there nicknamed them Anzio Amie and the /Anaio Express. Id take a total of three months forthe Ales to ight ther way of the beaches. When they pushed inand, they eiscovered the two guns hidden In thelr allway tunnel and, ‘despite the Germans’ best efforts, managed to capture them largely ntact. Despite these successes, technological agvanoes had rendered miliary tains largely Fedundantby the close ofthe war. AOU the Russians would develop ra-mounted clear weapons dung the Cold War and even resurect the use of armoured rains in 2022's invasion of Ukraine its days as a dominating, battle wining weapon were long over 23END 10 THE BEGINNING SECOND BATTLE OF EL ALAMEL 0 942 N ) Fighty years ago, the Allied 8th Army launched a decisive offensive against the Axis forces in North Africa. It saw the tipping point of a long struggle for dominance over the region and precipitated the Axis collapse in the Mediterranean———— ier dia not want to tent for North Africa in 194, his eyes were staring eastwards towards steppe not desert. Egypt was the prize his ally Benito Mussolini coveted. Yet I Duce’s judged invasion of Greece was ‘compounded by failure n Libya when Generals Wavell and (O'Connor's strike in December 1940, Operation Compass, heralded disaster fray. Erwin Rommel was sent in wih rmeayse forces, and grudging, to stem the rot. But this tortoige tuned ita a hare, To Desert Fox —gonorally at ‘odds with is hosts and nominal superiors, not to mention High Command, was a maverick genius who began to rapidly turn the tide. ft kept turning. The pendulum of war Inthe Westem Desert began to swing, and t swung back {and forth through abortive British offensives, Brevity and Battleaxe, then more toingly with Claude Auchinieck’s| Crusader offensive, ‘But Rommel wasn't daunted. He stuck back, harying the Ales eastwards, past Gazala and Mersa Matruh, into Egypt and the El Alamein Line. Auchinleck saw him off in the Fst Battle of EI Alamein (2.27 bly 1942) but tlle to mount a successful counterstoke. By now Church sporate fora convincing victory, ad had enough of The ‘ule and his mereurial Chief of Stat Ere Dorman Smith He ‘pointed General Harold Alexander to overall command ‘and gave sth Army, frst to Willam Gott, whose death ina lane crash then cleared the path for Beara Montgomery. ‘Alexander’ Instructions were plan, as set out n 1 Girective on 10 August Your prime and main ty wil be to take or destroy atthe earlest opportunity the German talan army commanded by Fle-Marshal Rommel together with all Its supplies and establishments in Egypt and Libya. ‘You wil discharge or cause tobe alscharged such other duties as pertain to your Command without prejudice to {he task described in paragraph 4 whicn must be considered rameount in His Mast’ interest ‘Monty was the new broom, a described in the Offical story (Volume 3: “General Montgomery... et t0 work at ‘once t inspire confidence and enthusiasm in his Army. His address tothe officers of Army headquarters made ‘a vemendous Impact, of which word soon spread. The ‘THE SECOND BATTLE OF EL ALAMEIN efence of Egypt lay a El Alamein he said, andi the th ‘Amy could nat stay there alive t would stay there dee. ‘There would be no more backward looks.” "He fst fought Romme! to a stands at Alam Hatfa (30 ‘August ~ 5 September 1942) but made no immediate moves te riposte. Caution prevailed, and is offensive when it ‘came would be based on significant superrty in men and materiel. Rommel was being starved of resources party by Hil (already Operation Barbarossa was in ifcuities) ‘ana party by Ultra as Enigma ineligence enabled the Royal Navy to target Italan supply corvoys. New Aled tanks (Ma Shermans) and improved sixpounder A/T guns eroded Drevious Ass tactical weapons superiorty. Montgomery was what | call ait of @bulshitr, but | tink that was part of his at, and very effective, | think” ‘observed Sergeant J Longstatt ofthe 2nd Battalion Rite Brigade. “He nad to publicise himseif and buid up a ‘eputation against Rommel, whose reputation was extemey high. We allthouant the word of Rommel. I you were ‘opposite Rommel, you expected something te happen. He id have avery demoralsing eect on sh troops. He ‘was a bloody good general" Monty had much to prove. ‘Out ofthe chaos of eaerrotoats, the forced ‘andonmert and destruction of mater, oder was re-emerging. Wit communication lines shor and a great ‘quantity of supplies flooding into Suez, losses wore being ‘made good. From Alamein tothe main depot at EI AMV was a barely 100km and inks between thee and Suez ‘were functioning. Wavel's realisation tht Egypt could be {own as a vast workhorse had, by 1942, become a tangible realty The Nile Deka was 2 thriving warhased economy. Food was gro and eared, combining witha sophisticated industrial expansion aimed at maximum war production, ‘These vita fnetions, undertaken respectively by the Roya Amy Service Corps (RASC) and Royal Army Ordnance Corps (RAOC), provided Monty with the sinews of war in the desert ‘As the autumn dew on the moment of decsion grew nearer. This batie would be akin toa Great War “beak ‘offensive with the Alles chewing ther way trough deep Axis fences and sucking their eserves ino a cauldron where ‘sheer numbers would decide, But mere might, however crushing, can always use a Pelping hand. “THIS IS NOT THE END. IT 1S NOT EVEN THE BEGINNING OF THE END. BUTTS, PERHAPS, THE END OF THE BEGINNING” Winston Churchill 25‘AN END TO THE BEGINNING Deception — Operation Bertram ‘As Montgomery deseribed in his Montgomery o Alamein rmemor the object ofthe deception plan was twofold p] To conceal fom tho enomy a5 lang as possible cur DD inerion to tone tne offensive. Wen this coud no longer be concealed, to mislead him ‘about Both the date and the sector in which our main thrust was to be made. DDecet in war isa old as confit tse from the Trojan Horse to Operation Fortitude which sought to confuse the Axis as to flied intentions uring the ulle-up to 0-Day in the spring af 1944. In the case of Operation Lightoot, a5 the Deakin phase of te planned battle was called, deception was a significant part of overall preparation. In the noth, 30 Corps sector, where the main attack was planed, a great mass of dummy vehices, tanks and guns had been fabricated to create an impression of densty. Immediately prior t the attack, under cover of darkness, these were replaced by the rea thing and dummies transported tothe rear In this way the static tion was. ‘maintained. At the same time, Lt Cal Charis Richardson, ‘th Army wizard masterminding te whole show, had to conceal vast supply dumps being created. That they were Satlsfactoriy kept hidden wats a masterpiece of disguise brought into being by Lieutenant Colonel Geottrey Barkas, director of Camoufage at GHO Middle East. ‘Dumps, such as that at may, covered very large areas, In this oase some eign square klometres. Oummy vehicles ‘wore again employed to canceal the crates of ammunition within the timber and canias frames, and fuel cane were hiéen in existing yet ostensibly abandoned trench nes. The cstinctive 25 pounders, with their equally ecognisable Below To dss the Carman zero lanes tinker and came frames worse tse Ae oie ad tanks teks ‘Aton it owe fe an my manga oie pee ce ‘Ahora: ne vetre recaed how hy séanced companied the srt a echasval mos othe cones nein tb ene (quad tractors tobe concealed in the forward area, were artful disguised by fang a false soction tothe tractor to ‘make I resemble an oainary vuok, ang by bunching gun {and ibe then placing a fake screen over te top. “we were engaged in ‘creating a concourse of tanks ‘and fries and even an HQ to confuse the enemy reconnaissance planes." recalled one solder in Alamein Fecalloctions of tho Heroes. it was al done by hessian some string and some very light wood, poles et. The dummy ‘amp and vehicle sites were erected st ght with the hela ‘of moonlight and during dayight gave the appearance of busy military areas to very high-yng ener planes. Vehicles ‘waved around and about creating clouds of dust ain ety morning every encouragement to beewing up amongst the dummy blouse was ven, ad ofcourse, round the vohieles, or tanks, outined in bessian, supported by thin ‘wooden poles o ‘cats’ cadies of strong tine. To provide an impression thatthe main effort waste be ‘recs toward the southern sector, part ofthe deception InvoWed the construction of 30km of dummy ‘Diamond’ water Pipetne. "The piperench was excavated in te normal Way, ‘explained Montgomery in Montgomory of Alamein. ve mies [km of dummy raiway tack, mage from pevol cans, were Used for ping Te ‘ping’ was stung ut along the open teench, Wen each fve-mile section of the trench was filed In, the ‘piping’ was cobectod and lad out alongsce the next section. Dummy pump houses wore erected at three points;‘THE SECOND BATTLE OF EL ALAMEIN Anov lft Fe Marsal rn Ror at and Canara Race ‘ice torte Saco Bat of Aart. ‘nov, gh Operation Uta sa Ale aks pour rou ae ‘nto stones create ty ne any water points and overhead storage reservis were made at ‘wo ofthese points.” He deemes Bertram a success bu this is hard to evaluate, Nonetheless, Axis intetigence remained convinced te main iow must fallin the south. One vital area, wherein Sth Army's perfomance improved exponential, was that of signals ‘nd wieless communication Ura interoepts betrayed every [Ais move and Rome's ears had been cipped wit the clmieation ois elt inteeeptors. “Ghost radio vais was ‘added tothe wed of deception to mask troop movements. “We were tol thatthe lat battle ofthe Alamein line ~ of Romme's attack - would take place right inthe sector that ‘we were infront of ~ at Alam Half,” said Lonestaff. "We had something unique. We had magicians in charge of our camoufage. Large tins that had held potatoes were mage to look asi they were ant-tank guns, vehicles were made with nessian to look ke tanks ~ tanks were made to look he ‘vehicles. Petrol supplies were made out of any old rubbish. ‘Water points were mage whore there were na water pons.” “WE HAD MAGICIANS IN CHARGE OF OUR CAMOUFLAGE. LARGE TINS... WERE MADE TO LOOK AS IF THEY WERE ANTI-TANK GUNS” Operation Braganza (On the nit of 29 September Lewtenant General Brian Horrocks commanding 13 Corps tothe south eunched 3 preliminary min‘-offensivo. Mis objective was to soo ground by Deir el Munassio union wou fecatate wider deployment ‘of Alle guns prior to the main push. One infarsy Brigade, 4131st (Queens), together wih element rom tn Armoured "supported by nine ted arilry regiments and one medi battery, made up te contingent. atte commenced at 05.25 hours when 4/6 Bataion, Quoen's Royal Regiment (West Surrey) stuck the nortnem shoulder with 1/7 battallonniting ‘the east. Opposton was relatively weak but 1/5 Battalion ran int tough talon paras rom 185th Folgore’ Division ‘hen they atacked south. Overall, gains were meagre Horrocks tried a Second push to capitalise on these limited successes, especially inthe north where 13nd (Kend Brigade made further gains. erica, mare ‘casuales resulted fom heatstroke rather than wounds Inthe south the British stil managed ite Needway and Horrocks called ofthe attack, 9} ot LUeutenant General Over Lese with 30 Corps would be responeibe forthe main effort inthe north, where infantry ‘would punch two corridors trough Axis defences along ‘which General Heroert Lumsden could send 20 Corps ‘armour. The intention was that Aled tarks would pour {through the gaps and draw Rommel’ panzers into 8 melee, ‘wnere tay eouls be etevably ground down, Horrocks, in the southern sector with 13 Corps, would tack the enemy postions and operate with 7th Armoured Division to draw German armour in that diction. The aim‘AN END TO THE BEGINNING idas to make it easier fr 10 Corps to break into the open {othe north. The Desert Rats were not to get orawn into atrtional “dogfights, they were to husband thelr strength for pus once the breakout was achieved. Monty allowed himself ful eet forthe idea of delivering the main blow in the north and avoiding the red tactic ofa flanking attack from the south I planned to attack neither on my let fan for on my right Nank, but somednere right of centre; having broken in, could then direct my forces to the ight ort the loft as soomed most profitable, Leese was to put four divisions into the attack. Nearest the coast the 9th Australian would have the extreme righ, breaking in eastwards from Tel el Elsa, Nox, the 61st Highiana division was charges with assaulting towards Kidney ig. Then the 2nd New Zealand Division woule slike Towatds the western extromiy of Mitoitva Ridge with, the far lf, the 1st South Mrican Division attacking the ‘entre, The font stetched fr 7km witha depth, onthe ‘ht, of Sk svinking to 4km onthe let. Horrocks Was to fensive, versions aside, ona narrower font rmouod and th Dision striking ou Sout) ‘of Ruwelsat Rise. In the main ths was to convince the Axis forces that the main blow was indeed fang in the south ana 10 fx 2’st Panzer’ ful attention here. Secondary objectives included attacks on Himeimat and Taga Plateau but these were nat fo be pressed home Inthe face of strong ‘opposition. An intense artilery barrage, the most potent ‘ever seen since 1818, would begin the fight at 21.40 on 23 October. The guns would deluge German ater with {3 weight of counterbattery fre before moving to plaster the forward defences. A rling barrage would coset ‘the attacking infant battalions, proceeding in is \Witna sufficiency of ant tank gina in theatre, the whole ‘THE SECOND BATTLE OF EL ALAMEIN ‘weight of eld artery could be brought to bear unde a centralised fre plan As ovr, the oops saw things ina rather more immediate and personal ight: "We set off, Exeteg, breathless. And ‘that sort of orchestral muse ofthe continuous aun inthe background.” recalled one soir. "We wondered ithe Jerry saw itthat way! remember seeing 9 captain waking behind a Scorion Itenton supervising the ob. This tank had a bare fastened across its nose which revolved Fastened by one end were chains which whied round and ‘thumped the ground anead. Supposed t blow up any mines. ints path Something seemed to wory the captain and he ierally soreamed at the crew and someane nearby. On ge, poor devi Some job!” Another man recounted: “So we set of late one evening, two battalions, two companies up line abreast across a thousand yards of mines, le by an offeer on a ‘compass bearing ang Leutenant Colonel East using a stick 88 result of @ First World War wound, We were to sdvance behind a barrage fa thousand guns. There were casualties inthe piatoon on my rit trom one gun fring short or ossiby ftom the enemy repyng. | cn stil remember the Shrek from one ef my platoon when a booby trap en tho barbed wie Iterally blew him to pieces... Eventual our leading platoon andthe 1st /th Queens on our left arrived in the middle ofthe talian positions and some 20 to 30 Talians cheertuly gave themselves up and remaines forthe next 24 ous, withdrawing wen us atthe end ofthat time. ‘The remainder ofthe Felgore Division, however, positions. I remember young O'Connell both legs severed by 8 mortar bom, sereaming fr help and then forhis mother before ne merifuly ded” “T REMEMBER YOUNG O'CONNELL, BOTH LEGS SEVERED BY A MORTAR BOMB, SCREAMING FOR HELP AND THEN FOR HIS MOTHER BEFORE HE MERCIFULLY DIED”‘AN END TO THE BEGINNING 30 Operation Supercharge After the intial sound and fury of Lightfoot, oiowed by @ petiod of atutonal dogfighting (‘crumbing”, a8 Monty called I) there was stil no sign of a breakthrough. Rommel was ‘retehed but not bursting Its impossible to overstate the ‘vantages that accrued to the Alles through control ofthe Skies and the havoc wrought by Desert Ai Force. Though ‘armoured formations were most safe, movement of som Skinned Axis vehicles during ths erica! ‘dogg phase was continual inerdetd by attack fom the at Nor should the corrosive effect on morale be overlooked, as Montgomery himself observed: “The morale effect ofa action is very great and out of al proportion tothe material ‘damage infeed. In overse direction, tne sight and sound of our own air forces operating agaist the enon nave ‘an equaly satisfactory effect on our oan oops. The ‘damage inflicted upon Axis shipping was steal increasing the pressure on Rome's jugular. On 1 November two ‘more Italian shies, Tipoling and Ostia, laden with uel and ammunition, were sunk, Because the Germans were tying tory in fuel stocks fom Crete, Maleme ari, ste ofthe As landings in May 1841, was also bombed ‘That there was progress and that, ina battle of atrton the Alles were winning, could not be denied. But there was no great vletory that could set the chureh nels, so long. Sent, ging out. Moreover, as & November, the date fixed for the Operation Torch landings approached, Chui Said about the long soewcriver applied by Whitehal to the desert campaigns, usualy to dovimentaleftect.Taciion Inthe Betis Army's for the lees commander, while he receives his general orders from hs superiors, to be permitted discretion as to how he puts thes into etfect. “itwas flr clear to me that there had been consternation n Whitehall when | began to craw divisions Intareserveon the 27th and 28th October, when | was, _etting ready forthe fnal blow,” said Montgomery. “Casey had been sent up to ng out what was going on: Whitehall thought | was giving up, when In point of fect | was jst about to win... tod him all about my plans and that | was Certain of success; and de Gulngand spoke to him very blunt and tld him to tll Whitehall not to belvache I never heard what signal was sent to London after the visit and ‘vonage Ror! vert (Grove ter cr ma treet tos desi trang pti (ieee borer camps “WHITEHALL THOUGHT I WAS GIVING UP, WHEN IN POINT OF FACT | WAS JUST ABOUT TO WIN” was too busy to other about it. Anyway, Iwas certain the (IGS [Chet ofthe imperat General Stat would know whet Iwas upto He then went on to assess the tactical position aE! Alamein an the manner in which he Intended to deliver his next major assault I decided onthe night of 30/3 ‘October the Sth Australian Division woul attack strony northwards te reach the sea; his would keep the enemy looking northwards, Then on the next right, 21 Octover/ ‘November, | would blow a deep hoe inthe enemy front ust to the north ofthe orginal corridor; this ole would be made by 2nd New Zealané Division which would be reinforcea bythe Oth Armoured brigade and two infant brigades: the operation would be under the command of 30 Corps. Through the gap | would pass 10 Corps with its armourea Gisions... We already had the necessary disions in reserve, and they had been resting and refiting... Wha in fect, | proposed to do was to deliver @ had biowwith the right and otow the next night wth knock-out blow mth the left. The operation was christened SUPERCHARGE!" This decisive phase ofthe battle lasted from 29 October to 4 November and effectiely continued the process of attition, Monty was aided by Hier, who issued an order {hat no foot of ground shouldbe yielded, Wisely, Rommel eventually ignored him. Monty switched his main deve to the orth and gradualy the weight of attacks fractured the Axis lines. Tis Um the rupture was fatal For Rommel, te scale of this defeat was enormous Assessments differ, but the Axis had lost something inthe ‘order of 30,000 prisoners, two thirds allan, and pernans ‘3s many a5 20,000 dead and wounded. Most of his alan formations hac been decimated and such transport as could be found reserved for German survivors. Out of nesey 250 tanks thoy could barely eld three dezon, and though the taians nad more runners these were inferioe and no match for Shermans. it was indeed not just the end ofthe beginning but for Nazi Germary the beginning ofthe end ‘heme he reste aN a OUR rend PU eae eon Cooper 199) Oem od er ete a) De Aad te Ere eemeeTSUBSCRIBE NOW Give the gift that keeps on delivering Over 80 magazines to choose from Free delivery straight to your doorEYES ON THE SAND THE LONG RANGE DESERT GROUP AT EL ALAMEIN Watching and reporting enemy movements, the LRDG served as Monty's eyes and ears in the build up to the decisive battle oro cu WORM, Beeptember 1942 was one ofthe worst ‘months thatthe Long Rane Desert Group (LRDG) had experienced in North Avia, A srs frais launched by Bish special forces including the Special Ar Service (SAS) andthe Special Boat Service (SBS) against Libyan ports hae resuted inthe death, capt o iy of several ofthe LADG's most experianced soldiers, “Two offeers, David Lia Owen and Nick Wilder, ‘wer in hospital beds recovering fom wounds and one of the unit's best navigator, Mike Car Fad been captured ty the Italians atl. The raids ed been hastiy planned and wore ‘a0 ambitious in sea, 20 tas a rei forthe LROG's commanding officer Lieutenant Colonel Guy Prendergast, that her next ask was a reversion to what they ci best: reconnaissance. ‘That was the LRDG's orignal purpose, the ea whien ther founder, Ralph Bano, ha Sold to General Archibald Waveln June 1940. He had submited a proposal tote offer commanding the Middle East Command for 2 light reconnaissance fore to penetrate deep Into Libya to gather intligence on the enemy: "Ever vehicle of wich, wih a crew of tee and 8 machine gun, was to cary is awn supplies Of o0d and water for twee Weeks, and ts ‘nn petal for 2500 miles [4,000kn] of travel ‘across average soft dosort surface ~ equivalent in petro cansumotion to some 2,400 mules [3.860%] of roaa” Bagrala had writen, a A ‘THE LONG RANGE DESERT GROUP AT EL ALAMEIN, Wavell thought ita splendid idea and tla ‘Bagnoid to have his unt operational within six weeks. Prendergast suoceeded Bagrold as the LRDG's CO inthe summer of 1943 but the pair both pre-war desert exolorers~ shared the same vision thatthe unt was essentially a reconnaissance force and nota raiding one, though Itned the capability to launch stacks necessary. ‘litle over a year since the founding of the UROG, the Desert War hac ven Birth to another special forces unit the SAS, and while there was mutual respect there was also on the part ofthe LRDG a growing lrtaion with the SAS. "They were a gung-ho lt,” remarkod ‘one LADG man, Arthur Argr, about the SAS. “They were very good at whet they cid but they coulent stop ut forthe length of ime we i,t we were going todo something for the Tength of time we di, we were gong to do ‘Something lke the SAS, we would go further ‘afield and dt, and then go further ail stil ‘and do ft But the SAS could ony do one thing “THE SAS COULD ONLY DO ONETHING AND COME BACK. THEY WERE SHORT-TERM, WE WERE LONG-TERM” nein "Th StStotetosaneio Reltevare!3000kn and come back. They were shortterm, we were longterm, he commente. Tmoreasingy throughout 1942, the LRDG had been obiged to avert same of ts precious time ‘and resources to assist the SAS in logistics ‘and navigation. n one memorandum to GHO Cairo, Prendergast objected to being forced to lay “universal aunt to them, Eventual, on the ove of the Second Battle of Ei Alamein, Lieutenant Colonel ohn Hackett, recenty appointed officer in charge of ligt raiding forces in North fica, summoned the RDG and the SAS 0 his office. “One ofthe chit problems was to keep these ite armies (ut of each other's way,” he recalled. “There was the LRDG practising Is intricately caret Cautious, skiful reconnaissance... ut he SAS would come out to blow up some aeroplanes ‘and they were very careless about it. Lovely ‘men, but very careless and they would leave {tof stuf around, ane they would ste the thing uo no end and out would come the Ass forces to see what had stined up, and they would ind the LRDG.” Tt was imperative that this oid not happen ‘once the battle was underway; the LRDG was being tasked with conducting reconnaissance patrols ~ what they called toad-watehes vile the SAS's inttetions were to attack the Ais foes onthe coastal ads. Hackett therefore “arew aline down the map he ‘a medieval pope separating out the ItaliansEYES ON THE SAND ‘tom the Portuguese in the Aan. An I said west ofthis ine UROG only, east ofthis ine] ‘SAS only, and that kept them more o less out ofeach other's hair” The line designates by Hackett was the 20th rmerician of longitude eas, wich ran north to South trough Jedabia, and that necessitated ‘2 move n October forthe LROG ~ hose Strength was 25 officers and 278 other ranks ~ trom ther HO at Fayoum tothe oasis of Kuta, ‘thelr base n the spring of 1943 ‘One ofthe LROG officers sent to Kuta was ‘Captain Alastair Timpson ofthe Guards Patrol (On ating he earned “of the great victory at ‘Alamein... asthe ener recoled westwards {the road.watch was now of increased Importance”. Deprived of ther ports In eastom Libya a they withdrew, the Germans’ only ine ‘of supply and communication was in Tepaitania Inthe west ofthe county The frst LROG patrol deployed ona road watch had lt Kuta on the same day asthe ‘Second Alamein offensive began, 23 October, ‘and headed north, 100% wost of El Alamein ‘Under the command of Captain Ken Spicer, the patrols orders were to conduct a census ofthe Vohiles using the Benghazi Tipo road They began ther task at 7pm on 30 October nti lived by a New Zealand patra nine ays ater: Concealed within desert shrub in Darr at atime, one observed the road through Bineoulas and mad a vocal record of every vehicle that passee down the road in either ‘rection: motorbkes, staff cars, of tankers, Sew trucks, aOewt tucks and, f possible, what was inside. The ether solier nated ital In his journal, and atnightfal they trudged back {fo where the rest ofthe pavol was camped and {he iteligence was raced back to Kutra from 2 wireess tack Twas a strange exstonce for tho LOG. solders, a mix of tension when surveying the ‘oad and tedium when ofduty. “it was intensely boring because when you weren't actualy dow ‘ona woman roadwateh you were ok by the trucks, and all you could do was lay under them al day recalled Ron Cryer, one of Spices patrol. “You couldnt walk bout because you Imig attract attention from the read” ‘Spices patrol recorded an average of ust under 100 vehicles each day vaveling along the road in both erections, Within three days, the [New Zealanders were raioing back to LRDG HQ at Kuta that enemy vansport was stesming ‘Westward at arate of 3,500 vehles a dy. "Rs the Aus forces withdrew from the onslauant ofthe Eighth Army, the LRDG kept tap a continual fw of inteligence, noting in November that there were more afrika Korps heading west than traveling inthe other rection towards the enemy. twas also recorded thatthe Germans going west were “in much better form that those going east, Judging bythe shouts thay gave eachother when they passe” Each day hundreds, sometimes thousands, of Germans passed underneath their noses. On ‘ecasion they came even eoser- unpleasantly 0. Alexander Stewart and a comrade were camouflaged among some scrub ona road- watch when a German convoy putes off the roatiside. “About 100 yards fom us they got ut ofthe trucks and walked as I they were coming straight towards us," recalled Stewart ‘The two LRDG men watched as the Germans approached the seb, then tumed, unburtoned thelr breeches and answered the cal of nature. Stewart's patol was scheduled to be relieved by one commanded by Timpson atthe fend of November. By now the Eighth Army was in possession ofthe ports of Benghazi and ‘Agedabia ana hard on te Ax heels, The LRG \were only 160km west, watching the roa from ‘Agodabia to Nota, “Tere was an LRDG adage, recalled Car that you go 500 miles [800k] Denna the lines, though it sounds spectacular. you're as safe as houses because nobody's going to suspect you, I's when you're only 50 miles [50km behind the fontine that everyone is tiggernapoy.” Timpson’ patrol discovered the truth of that statement as they motored towards their observation point. On the morning of 24 November he spotted eight sowed cars tomar ft a “IFYOU GO 500 MILES BEHIND THE LINES, THOUGH IT SOUNDS SPECTACULAL YOU'RE AS SAFE AS HOUS! BECAUSE NOBODY'S GOING TO SUSPECT YOU"‘THE LONG RANGE DESERT GROUP AT EL ALAMEINEYES ON THE SAND “THELRDG, 20 MEN IN FIVE TRUCKS AND TWO JEEPS IN TOTAL, RESPONDED WITH BURSTS FROM THEIR TWIN VICKERS K MACHINE GUNS, BUT TIMPSON KNEW THEY WERE HOPELESSLY OUTNUMBERED” ‘Abo: 0 bie rom a te {06 on AS pcre a rth Aco fen an escarpment. Doubling back Timpson soon Spotted six more vehicles approaching, ns blazing. The LRDG, 20 men in fve tucks and two jeeps in total, responded with bursts from ‘het twin Vickers K machine guns, but Timpson knew they were hopelessly outnumbered and that thor ony hope was a breakout He drove his Jeep up and over an escarpment, followed by two ofthe five 30cwt Ford trucks. “wile bumping along we exchangod shots with the enemy at fry cose range, but gradually we pulled away rem them,” said Timpson. "Two chased us for about ten miles [16k We had to ty to lose our vacks as we wert so followed various old enemy tacks, tuning of them abruptly in a wadl bed an then dodging this ‘way and that behind sal his “Tepeon an nine of his men managed to escape but the other ha ofthe patrol had been captured, Undeterred, they continued to the raac.watch, which they undertook eto: Col Owen thon of pe ADs from behind a rocky outerop 360 metres fom ‘the road below. Now thatthe LADG were o far west they encountered andther dificult: the attitude ff the Becouln who, unike the Senussl inthe feast of Libya, considered themseles frends ff the Germans. On finishing ane oad watch, Timpson and the soler wit him walked into @ Becouin camp in search of wat “The Bedouin were suspicious of us," said Timpson. "They sat around us in aha cece and astod us treateningly i we wore British. (On assuring them we were Germans, they became less menacing,” ‘Another LRDG patra encountered two Bedouin who demanded tea and rations from the two men watching the rad. thoy werent forthconig, sais the Becoui, they waula report ‘ther poston tothe Germans, One ofthe LRDG ‘mon agreed tothe blackmal and backoned the Bedouin to foiow. Once they were out of sight of ‘the road, the LRDG men strangled the pa. "another danger was eneny reconnaissance aivratt. No Tar rom whore Timpson patrol was conducting ts road watch, A and B squacrons ofthe SAS rendenoused at ‘remote spot called Bir Zaten south ofthe Coastal town of El Agheila. Pade Mayne's. 1 Squadeon nad spent the last six weeks ‘aiding airelds and roads tothe east, but they ‘wore now instructed by Loutonant Colonol Dauia tiring to nary the Germans further ‘weston the road from Nofila to Site; Stings B Squadron would operate even furtner west, ‘around Tipo. The reconnaissance akratt het ‘ie slowy over the desert weren't loking for ‘the LRDG bust fr the SAS. By the second week of December, the Aus forces were withdrawingin such numbers that ‘the LRDG struggled to Keep up. “The density {of vat] grew so heavy that one could not ‘te fast enough” said Timpson. "It was only Bossibie to keep the record gong by auichy ‘aking alist every ton minutos of the diferent assifeatons of vehicies, troops, stores, ‘equipment and unit signals, and adding @ mack ‘against each type as it passed, Inthe manner of scoring at erekot.” ‘Neverteless, the German retest was clscipined andthe Arka Korps were fr fom ‘demoralized. Thore was also plenty oft lettin them, as they demonstrated on 22, December when they spotted a New Zealand LRDG patio, commanded by Leutonant Ron ‘Tinker, close tothe Tool Road. Inthe fight that ‘ensued six ofthe eight Kinis wore captured ‘The day before the New Zealanders were caught, Eighth Army ised fresh Instructions. {athe LRDG. The road.vatches were at an ‘end now they were to undertake topographical teconnalssance forthe next stage of the Desert War the advance beyond Tina towards Tunisia, “The LRDG's contribution tothe Second Bate ‘of Alamein had been smal but signiteant, as ‘noted by the vector of miltary ineligence in Cairo, who in a report in December remarked: Not oly is the standard of acuracy and ‘observation exceptionally high But the patrols ‘re familiar with the most recent ihustration (of enemy vehicles and weapons... without ‘heir reports we should fequentiy have been in doubt as to the enemy’s mtentions, when nowedge of tem was all important.”The story of one of the most remarkable — FUR eS Se RO a a CORO Ma eT DN aia aa TNT ting TSS ay] NU PRAISE FOR THE CREW: ‘Price has given the bomber —_‘A fascinating and ‘Asobering andy offensive a human face’ —_ fast-paced account’ poignant book’ THE TIMES HERALD DAILY MAIL AVAILABLE ONLINE AND IN ALL GOOD BOOKSTORES38 Inthe mid-I6th century, with the European colonisation in North America, Britain found itself at war with its old rival France, Fought Over three separate engagements, the Battle of Lake George, in New York province, was amuch-needed Victory for the British and helped them regain the upper hand during the French and Indian War rossi he Battle of Lake George was actually three connected engagements, fought on & September 1755, which resulted ina etry for the Brith A British expedition to capture the {oat Crown Point, in the north-east of New Yorke province, became a catenamouse game with French forces, with roughly equal numbers fighting aierce and costly series of ations. Although the rene had the better of te early tgntng after ‘ambushing a marching column, the Brish tuned things around to claim a solid tacteal triumph and sola ther postin around Lake George. Background As the Freneh and Indian War (1754-63) got Underway, the British hae ambitious plans to tart the French out of North America once ‘and forall, A major expedition, under General onal for Nare-ups with neighbouring colonies an Native American bes, From the fry 18th century, therefore, the British had encouraged mass immigration into its North Great Battlesepg te en mor i Feats s ate LAKE GEORGE ‘American colonies. Large numbers of Germans. {and Scots irish poured into Americ, increasing the population ofthe colonies by 500 per Cent an turing them into a major economic Powerhouse for the mather country. “Although pleased atthe emergence ofthis new and lucrative empiee, Britain started toworry thatthe colonies might one day ‘make a bid for independence, especially ‘ow their Englishnoss' hag been dlisted by the Intux of ether Europeans, Of more immediate concem was the possibilty of the French or Spanish swooping In to take over the colonies, making it imperative tora the Continent of rial foreign influences, ‘When hostities broke aut once more between Britain and France in 1754, was seen as the perfect time to expel the French from North America and tighten conto over the Colonies. As the Seven Years’ War (1756-63) raged in Europe, the French and indian War {which began ate earier but i considered part of the some confi), would settle the {question of which European power was tobe ominent in North America General Braddock's expedition was intended to answer that question in Britain's favour \With a force of 2,400 men, he marches on Fort Duquesne, but was decisively defeated atthe Balto of the Monongahola on 9 tly 1755. The defeat sent shockaies through the colonies. Braddock had 3,000 ertish regulars under nis command, rom the 4th ‘and 48th Regiments of Ft, but they were comprehensively cutfought by the French and {herr Native American alles, Bitsh casualties were around 900, while the French lost fewer than 200. Ths was a blow to Gish miltary prestige 8 wel, s0 when @ second expedition was organised, loss than a month after Braddoek's disastrous deteat, there was an ‘fl lt rice ont Fort St Frederic, at Grown Pont, was considered the Hey to French contrl of Canada ‘and Colone Willam Johnson, an lnishman who had come to the colonies in 1738, was ordered to capture it. He ook command of a ealumn of around 3,000 men, including 200 Mohawk Indians. Johason, who was given a promotion to major goneral or the expedition, had fxcalent ties with tne Mohawks, Inlucing ‘one of ther ‘sachems’ (chiefs) Theyanoguin, naw tothe Brush as King Hendrick. | SND iA Pats) v3) eT) PU) ey Ls 39GREAT BATTLES Johnson's army was mage up exclusively of provincial solders, who had a poor reputation ‘the militia men wore reportedly ‘despised’ by the British fr ther lack of aiscptine ana ‘ating spin. The coming battle was tobe 2 vindication for them, “ohnson intended to mave his men via Lake St Sacrament and Lake Champlain to attack Crown Point, but it would be a perlous Undertaking the French outnumbered nin, ‘ith around 6,000 men inte for under the ‘command ofthe German-born Jean-Armand, the Baron de Dieskau. Forturatay forthe Brish, events would conspire to make the ‘ensuing battle far more evenly contested ‘The two sides reposition From his base at Albay, Jonnson planned his move against Crown Point. Major General Phineas Lyman was given the honour of leading the fst wave, a vanguard that advanced from Albany on August and bu fort on the approaches to Lake St Sacrament. This ‘strongpoint, orginally called Fort Lyman but later changed to Fort Edward in nonour of the king's brother, provided a springboard forthe expedition, but iso shaped the coming battle Johnson let Albany a few dys ater, passec Fort Lyman, and reached Lake St Sacrament on 28 August naming it Lake George. Whether for not the new name would stick would depend fon the events of the next few days. (on 3 September unaware ofthe British move, Dieskau detached a parton of his, ‘army to begin construction of defensive works between Lakes George and Champlain. These works would become Fort Carilon which would later be renamed Fart Teonderoga and would elon A dept f Gener! Wilom ban saving ‘tet ofveanduman baron de saat he ‘ane of Lake core LAKE GEORGE S SEPTEMBER 1755 Riverside Mechannieville Hadley \ FORT \ \ WILLIAM \ ENR | \ Saratoga \ Springs | Tame Round Lake Glens \ | \ Falls Sehenectady yy He ppeommon - O58 BEGINS (On 1 Avgst 185, Pinas Lym lens he est Bi itso une tovarde Lake St Sacrament ‘New dos ite, Wala ebason falons wth ha bl Ws foe. Jaye seane pay sepaes Gefenhe poston onthe tes othe Hudson ay town a Fort Lyn, ‘starts oat a ford wage depot ats aeveaped oe the coring So! UKE GEORGE (8 26 Aap. leving 500 mon at ‘rnc, Boron de Osha eens Learaing of th Bsn Johnson's ary, nang nosis Fart Uy an ste he Bish expen FORT EDWARD ‘Troy Greenwich Schuylerville ALBANY Salem f ICO! North Creek WhitechallLAKE GEORGE Ausable ORT S BEROGA Forks at a / Point cor Lake | \ 7 Placid ‘Movers Je, / 7 | MONTREAL \ | | / Plattsburg | | / \ | era \ \ | Lake \ | \ ‘Saranac \SSAULT ON THE CAMP Johnsons, wit ie stone of thee canon, fend of bart dome asa by French gonads, a Dest Canaan ag that Johnson Is a0 ok the mach, towards i Disa steam ambush at Recky Brook ough ot pet execs, te abs sends the provi ede Ephraim ans rein Bak GB tonars he main Bish cay at Late Goes ane [eS “THE MILITIA MEN WERE REPORTEDLY ‘DESPISED’ BY \ THE BRITISH FOR THEIR LACK Putnam OF DISCIPLINE AND FIGHTING Jeville \ SPIRIT. THE COMING BATTLE WAS in Westport 0 BEA VINDICATION FOR THEM” HenryGREAT BATTLES. play an important role in both the French and nolan War andthe War of Independence. While this work was going on, Dieskau was informed af the construction of Fort {man Recognising the danger this posed, he cotganised a force of 1.700 men, loaded them Into canoes, and set af down Lake Champiain, This detached French corps was very similar in strength to Johnson's expedition. in one of, the earliest accounts ofthe campaign, Moris Patterson Ferris detaled the makeup ofthe French force, explaining that there were 260 French grenadios (om the Regiment de la Reine and the Regiment de Languedoc), 800 Canadians and 700 Native American warriors mostly Iroquois and Caughnavaga Mohawhs. £8y the evening of7 September these men were within amie of Fort lyman and planning to attack the nextday The goal was to destroy as ‘much of the equipment Johnson has brought Porth with him as possible, frcing him to ‘bandon his exnediton “The Bish garrison at Fort lyman numbered ‘around 500, and Dieskau's corps would have been abe to take itbut for a csagreement withthe 300-strong oquols contingent of his ‘Command. The oqueis hed a conference and ‘eported that they would not attack the Bish fon thir onn sol This was a stated principle of {heir involvement withthe French, bat Dieskau they cid not relish the idea of attacking 2 efensive position boasting numerous cannon, Disappointed, Dleskau had no option but to call of his planned attack. At the same time, Johnson had earned of Dieskau's move ‘against Fort Lyman, although he nad been utmanceuvred, he hoped to stl be able to ‘Bet back in time to save the fort and sent 1,000 men southwards. He also dspatenes ‘2messenger to tel the fort that help was on its way, but this man fll into Dioskau's hands ‘and reveaies the Betis ps, ‘The Mohawk forces ing Hendrick was a Mota chet wh isthe subject of many colourulegends. His storys complicated by the fact that he shared @ramme ‘itn another chet whose We overlapped his, For {enerations, people thought he two men were ‘ctualy ne. Tis led tothe myth that Henrik as 95 years old atthe bate of Lake Geore, ‘hen ne was actually afer more sprighty 63 enciek was concemed atthe possibity ‘of Mohawk fighting Mohawk, and Nad talked to Johnson about this, crewing an assurance ‘that he would not be ordered to lead his New ‘York Mohawks against their anacian cousins Henerick was also a good enough English Speaker to function asa translator between the ‘wo groups in Johnson's free and he was widely respected by both British and Native Americans. Much of his reperted input into the Bate ‘of Lake George, however, is almost certainly ‘spoctyphal. One tale revalves around the size ‘ofthe relieving force sent south by Johnson Original, ne Is rumoured to nave detailed ‘only 500 men for the pay, which Hendrick allegedly sai: “I they are to fg, they are too ‘eu. 0 be klled, they are too many” Whether or not this exchange actualy 10k pace. Jonason eventualy decided to ‘his aw s9e ean-200 ay posters pete ne om“DIESKAU WAS WARY OF HIS NATIVE AMERICAN TROOPS LOSING DISCIPLINE AND URGED THEM NOT TO ‘AMUSE THEMSELVES’ WITH TAKING a UNTIL AFTER THE BATTLE” ‘send 1,000 men. He then proposed to split this force into three columns, at which point Hendrick allegedly chipped in again. Offering Johnson tree sticks (or thee arrows in some ‘versions ofthe legend) he said he could see how aicut they were to break If held together, Dut how weak they were if tackled separately. Johnson eventually sent his men in one column, although they were spilt into three ‘sions, with Separate commanders. The battle begins Dieskau prepared an ambush at Rocky Brook for tho advancing British. He placed Canadian troops tote left of the road and Native Americans to the right, ordering them too down and not open fe unt the French LAKE GEORGE frenadiers did, These were placed across the ‘oa, in full ew, but nearly 300 metres further back than the ambushing troops. Th idea was. ‘hat the British would advance carelessy when they sew the small umber of French solders, blocking their way and would then be caught in 2 letnal rossi. Dieskou was wary of his Native American twoops losing iscotine ana urged thom not to “amuse themselves” with taking scalps unt after the bate, not wanting them to be Gistracted. The plan appeared to be working Perfect asthe Grish advanced carelessly, ot botharing with scouts because they were sure the French were gathered around Fort gman. At he front was Hendrick, mounted fon one of Johnson's horses and leading his 200 Mohawks. Behind him came the column's ‘commander, Colonel Ephraim Wiliams, at the head of his Massachusetts Regiment ‘and Lieutenant Colonel Nathen Whiting ‘commanding the Connecticut Regiment ‘The ation that folowes has become known {98 "the bloody scout, butt would nave Deen far bloodier were tnt forthe intervention of fone ofthe Mohawi i the French ambush, ‘Spotting Hendrick and his New York Mohawks at te head ofthe column, st Teast one of the Canadian Mohawks WingGREAT BATTLES In ambush fred his musket into the ai In warning, though the trap hae been prematurely sprung, the British column was Stilin serious trouble, Hendrick himself went Gown inthe st hall of bulets, his horse ‘shot out from under him. Although he was Lnharmed, he found himself pinned Beneath Fis horse and was fatally bayonetted by one of his enemies, Colonel Wiliams was able to deploy his men on a hitop, but he quicly fell as wel, leaving commana to Waiting, who Auicky and sensibly ordered a retreat The noise ofthe ambush coud be heard back at the main Brtsh eamp, ana Johnson ‘uicky sent a further 200 provincial to ‘sist The remainder of his men began Dreparing defensive works, using wagons, beats and enopped-cown tees to ferm breastworks, This would be the stage for the second phase ofthe battle Before that, however, there was the small ‘matter of disengaging from the French ambush With the help ofthe 300 reinforcements, Whiting was able to stage a fighting withdrawal {and French losses were high as they pursued recklessly. Among the fallen was Jacques egardeur de Saint Pree, the commander ~S ooze, n ow Yor se “THEY WERE TAKEN COMPLETELY BY SURPRISE AND DECISIVELY DEFEATED, WITH THE BODIES BEING THROWN INTO THE BROOK. SO MANY CORPSES FOUND THEIR WAY INTO THE WATER THAT IT BECAME KNOWN AS THE ‘BLOODY POND” ofthe Canadians and Native Americans in Dieskau's force. ‘The second stage of the battie Despite the British recovery, Dieskau honed that his men would be abe to folon the Bish Into thee camp, so close behind them that the defenders would be unable to fe upon them, He was tobe disappointed once again Having sen his ambush alto delvor \ ‘2 decisive blow, his Natwve American troops ‘ow proved unwaling to storm into the Bish ‘camp. Deterred by the defensive works, which included tree canaene, ana demoralises by the loss of Saint Pere, they refused to ‘advance. Itwas let tothe small numberof French grenadiers to lead the assault Dleskau arranged them in column formation, but this was not the type of column that ‘would terrise European battlefields inthe Napoleonic Wars, being ust si men wide Nevertheless, it advanced bravely against the Biiish postion ‘Ndense column of men makes a fe target for cannon, andthe three British guns, ‘commanded by Captain Wiliam Eyre (the only regular British officer in Johnson's ite army, pummelied them mercilessiy wth grapeshet Shifting ther attack away from the guns and ‘against the British let, the grenasiers now ‘an up against determined resistance trom three regiments, “Jonson had been hit inthe thigh early in the action and taken to his tent. Next ofall ‘wounded was the French commander, making this an unusually costy battle inthe upper ‘echelons of both frees, Dieskau was frsthit in the lag, and while he was being treated by an aide (wn was washing the wound with brandy) he was hit again Inthe knee an thigh He was taken to Johnson's tent, wnere ne had tobe protected from Mohawks who were eager ‘to avenge thelr fallen commander. Lyman took command ofthe Brtish camp, but by now the fight had been knocked out ofthe French. Around 4pm, the provncials fand Mohawks stormed out oftheir detensive ‘works and forced their enemies Into 8 heaciong treat. The bloody pond ‘The nal at ofthe atte soled the Gritish tory. From Fort Lyman, the fighting couté ‘early ae heard and Colore! Blanchard, the ‘commanding officer, despatched 250 men to offer assistance. These men fell upon the French begnge, scattering the guard and then ‘aévancing to Rocky Brook, site ofthe French ‘ambush earler inthe day. Here, they found around 300 Canadians and Native Americans. Depening on wich report you rea, these ‘were either resting after the battle, or retreating from the British eamp in good order. ‘Whichever wes the ease, they were taken Tigi 2h completely by surprise and decisively defeated, withthe bodes being thrown into the brook. So ‘many corpses found ther way Inte the water that became known as the ‘bloody pon! The the: stage Battle of Lake George was over. Although it had started well forthe French, it had tuned ito a Solid British vetory ‘and recovered some ofthe pide lost onthe Monongahela two months ear The aftermath ‘The battle has long been overiooked by pistorians, Historian Wiliam R Grithweote that twas far mare sigifeant than s usualy alowed. “Stratagicaly athough the battle cit ‘ot capture the stone fort at Crown Poin.” he claimed, “it dd prevent he French from proceeding any farther south ito the interior ofthe colony of New York and sent them ‘scurrying back noth ‘Te victory also secured the use of Lake George (5thm long! 2s a condult forthe British tomove men and materiel northwards from [New York, waterborne transpert being far more convenient and speedy than traveling through the American wildemess on rough roads and forest paths, LAKE GEORGE Losses from the atte nave proved aitfeult to ascertain, and intial estimates of Frenen casualties appear far to high. Johnson himselt elleved ne has killed of waundes ‘ver 500 of the French force. Tis seems Unlikely, a5 that would be almost a third of the ‘men sent into battle that day. Even the French frenadiers, carved up bythe British arilery in the assault of Johnson's camp, had only lost thie of oir number Johnson reported 262 colonia solers killed or wounded, along with 38 Native ‘Americans. No fewer than 20 offioe Including Henerick and Willams, were killed It seems highly ikely thatthe Fronch suffered similar losses, though debate continues 2s to the exact amount Johnson soliies the British position by bilan Fort Willem Heney on the shores of Lake George, but he never did advance (on Crown Point as originalypianned. Fort Wiliarn Hency would fal tothe French late in the war and it was not until 1759, the ‘annus ‘mirabilis that British fortunes took a decisive tum and a string of victories saw them utimately eviet the French trom the North Ameren continent Lan Ana crams cnn bt song Beto: Mownaw ade Merona ok King Hendrick, Fp onthe thie ond wos bea bate Oe Cia Lc ILa Creer) Te eae Oe el