REPORT

MOORING INCIDENTS OVER

THE PAST YEARS, THEIR
ROOT CAUSES AND HOW
THEY CAN BE AVOIDED

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REPORT MOORING INCIDENTS

INTRODUCTION

FPSO Mooring line(s) failure is a common threat FPSO operators faced today especially in deeper
water and harsh weather environment. Studies1 shown that there can be 1:50 (2%) chance of single
line failure per asset per annum with as many as 5 events taking place per year, and 1 event per year
for multiple lines failure.

The typical design life of mooring system is up to 25 years and the longer the design life of the
floaters, the higher chance of failure during its life cycle. Consider a 25 years design life of a FPSO,
there can be 50% chance of failure during the lifetime of a mooring line. According to historical
data published by the HSE (Morandini and Legerstee, 2009, with reference to DNV Industry AS,
2003)2, mooring failures in UK happened once in every seven operating years for FPSOs, about
once for every 17 years for FSOs.

The consequences of mooring line failure are undesirable. It is not just the danger of lines breaking,
but damage caused to the risers and other subsea equipment can make reinstatement extremely
costly too. The reputation of the operator will be at stake, there can be disruptions to production
and most important of all, lead to possible loss of lives and environmental issues.
REPORT MOORING INCIDENTS
GRYPHON ALPHA FPSO
Maersk’s operated Gryphon Alpha FPSO was one of the
longest serving permanently moored FPSO in Europe. It
is located off the coast of Aberdeen in the UK North Sea
and has a design life to remain on station since 1993 for
up to 20 years.
On February 2011, Gryphon FPSO saw four of the ten
mooring lines parted due to a heavy storm. The turret
moored floating facility drifted 180 metres off station
and ripped all of the eleven gas lift risers out of the
bottom of the ship and causing significant damage to the
subsea equipment. According to a paper (Statoil, 2013,
page 29, and Brown, 2013), the first line failure on the
Gryphon Alpha was probably caused by fatigue failure of
a flash butt weld in a chain below its design capacity.
Gryphon Alpha FPSO underwent an extensive
refurbishment at the Damen shipyard in Rotterdam.
The repair and upgrade work includes, replacements of
mooring system with capacity 20% stronger than the
original mooring system, new marine control system
installed, Turret was refurbished, power management
and process control systems upgraded, thrusters and
motors overhauled, class renewal certification and some
550 tonnes of steel were replaced to extend vessel’s
structural life.
The anchor reconnection was completed on 8 September
2012 with FPSO moored on ten stronger anchor lines.
Commissioning and hook up was finalized on May 2013
more than two years after the mooring incident. The
overall cost of reinstatement was estimated to be US$1.8
billion.
PETROJARL BNAFF & VARG FPSOS
Nearby the Gryphon field at the Canadian Natural
Resources’ Banff field in the North Sea, it was also
reported that Teekay-operated, 20,000 dwt FPSO
Petrojarl Banff lost two of ten permanent mooring lines
securing it at its position on January 2011.
Another Teekay FPSO, Petrojarl Varg, operated by former
Talisman energy, now owned by Repsol suffered a single
line mooring line failure towards the end of 2012. The
ten points turret moored FPSO located in Norway North
Sea was delivered in 1998. The same mooring line 4 also
failed in 2006.
According to a report from Norwegian Continental Shelf2,
the root cause of the failure is due to high-cycle, low-
stress fatigue initiated on the external surface of the link.
The upper chain segment was led via a seven- pocket
fairlead wheel at the lower side of the turret through
a chain pipe up to the chain stopper on a turret deck
level with the main deck. General surface corrosion was
obvious, with extensive localized corrosion, significant
wear and cracks on the external surface around the
fracture surfaces. General and severe localized corrosion
would have acted as stress intensifiers and initiation
spots for fatigue cracks owing to roughening and pitting
of the external surface (DNV, 3 Apr 2013). Teekay Petrojarl
concluded that the direct cause was the broken chain
link being exposed for out of plane bending (OPB). This is
bending in fairlead or rotation of chain (twist) over time in
a fixed position of the fairlead.
REPORT MOORING INCIDENTS
NORNE FPSO
In another incident, Statoil’s Norne FPSO located in an
area with very harsh weather conditions had mooring
line failure in November 2012 with the chain having
installed on the same location since 2007. According to
Statoil, there are two failures to the turret moored facility.
The first failure was caused by fatigue from the bending
of chain during abnormal load conditions close to the
weld. This can be either caused by incorrect location of
the chain in the fairlead or by the failure of the fairlead
to rotate i.e. OPB effect. The second failure took place
in the same chain link immediately afterwards as a
consequence of overload caused by the fatigue failure.
Other findings show that the crew on board had been
unable to change the length of the lines monthly to
redistribute stress, and the chain member had
unintentionally spent too long in each position. The chain
was 114mm of the NV K4 stud less type, with a breaking
load of 12,420kN. The winch of the mooring lines had not
worked as it should since May 2012 too.
There is no deviation in the material quality was found in
testing.
FPSO GIRASSOL BUOY
Total E&P FPSO Girassol, which was installed in offshore
area of Angola in Sep 2001 had a CALM (catenary anchor
leg mooring)-type offloading buoy anchored by means of
3 groups of 3 anchor legs, located approximately one mile
away from the bow of the FPSO in depth of 1350m.
235 days after the buoy installation, the buoy had anchor
legs B4, B5 and B6 broke almost simultaneously, followed
one month later by the rupture of the anchor leg B1. The
anchor legs were composed of co-linear segments of
81 mm studded chains and 130 mm diameter polyester
ropes. The ruptures in B4, B6 and B1 occurred exactly at
the same location, i.e. at the 5th link of the Upper Chain
Segment connected to the Buoy inside SBM standard-
type “curved chain hawses”, while Leg B5 broke in the
upper rope segment.
This incident led to the study of OPB (out-of-plane
bending)-induced failure of mooring chain which was
identified as one of the root cause of chain failures due to
fatigue.
REPORT MOORING INCIDENTS
OTHERS
Other major mooring incidents reported are as
follows:
 2011 Volve – 2 of 9 lines parted, no damage to riser.
 2010 Jubarte – 3 lines parted between 2008
and 2010.
 2009 Nan Hai Fa Xian – 4 of 8 lines
parted; vessel drifted a distance, riser broken.
 2009 Hai Yang Shi You – Entire yoke mooring column
collapsed; vessel adrift, riser broken.
 2006 Liuhua (N.H.S.L.) – 7 of 10 lines parted; vessel
drifted a distance, riser broken.
References:
1. BP’s Guy Drori 24 March 2015 - Underlying Causes of Mooring Lines Failures across the Industry
2. Report - Anchor line failures Norwegian continental shelf 2010-2014
THE CAUSES
From the above-mentioned incidents, we infer that the
root causes of mooring failures can be most commonly
caused by OPB effect, high-cycle low stress fatigue,
localized corrosion, equipment design etc.
Other factors contributing to the mooring failures
include chain interaction with the seabed (soil properties,
stiffening, damping etc.) and inadequate procedures,
negligence and skills-deficiency relating to procurement,
manufacturing, quality control, approval, storage, logistic
handling, installation, operation and maintenance etc.
For example, material properties, welding, bending,
heating, traceability for quality assurance, inspection
and testing methods, certification authority’s approval
process, perseveration after manufacturing, storage,
handling and loading during transport, operator skill
levels, inappropriate deployment leading to anchors mis-
aligned, wires kinking or twisted etc, incorrect tension
in lines, lack of proper maintenance, re-tensioning of
lines, re-using of mooring components, lack of proper
monitoring systems etc.
REPORT MOORING INCIDENTS

HOW TO AVOID

Due to the rising number of mooring incidents over the years there is an increasing need to address the
root causes of the failures and how these incidents can be avoided.

Awareness of corrosion, wear, fatigue and relevant loading conditions during design will improve the
design and extend the service life of the structural components in the mooring system. Extensive
study had also been performed with variable design parameters to identify the stress ranges due to
OPB moments of the chains and fairleads using FEAs (finite element analyses). The results range from
redesigning of chain connection, improved designs in fairleads pocket styles to reduce the OPB effect.
There are also further tests still undergoing to determine more accurately the OPB stress relationship.

Aside from appropriate rules and regulation from the relevant authorities, the entire process starting
from design, manufacturing and eventually lead to installation and operation of new systems need
to be fit for purpose and fulfilling all quality and reliability requirements. This can be achieved by
honest and realistic expectations well communicated by all parties (operators, contractors, yard and
manufacturers). Operators should also continue to share their knowledge and experiences with the rest
of the industry.

The emphasis should also be on maintaining long term integrity rather than cutting upfront costs.
There must be competent supervision during installation and regular inspection and maintenance
programs devised over the lifetime of the mooring operation. In addition, monitoring systems should
be used as pre-emptive measures.
 ¡ 19- 22
September 2016
¡ Marina Bay Sands,
Singapore

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