Civil Society and Global Governance:

Exploring Transscalar Connections

Jan Aart Scholte

Introduction

This book develops a conversation between, on the one hand, research on

interest groups in the feld of comparative politics (CP) and, on the other

hand, research on nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in the feld of

international relations (IR). The collection of chapters assembles contrib-

utors from the two felds in broadly equal measure and asks each side to

integrate insights from the other. What fruits has this cross-

fertilization borne?

My response to this question comes from an IR (or in my case perhaps

better described as global studies) side of the dialogue. Here, two decades

of my own research on civil society and global governance have clearly had

J. A. Scholte (*)

Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs, Leiden University,

Leiden, The Netherlands

Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences, Leiden University,

Leiden, The Netherlands

e-mail: scholteja@vuw.leidenuniv.nl

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature

Switzerland AG 2023

L. M. Dellmuth, E. A. Bloodgood (eds.), Advocacy Group Effects in

Global Governance,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-27864-8_11

310

a blind spot for CP. Although my investigations have encompassed many

different countries, the analysis has mostly overlooked domestic politics

and has lacked systematic comparison between national contexts.

Commenting on this volume has therefore pushed me to enter into a

neglected (stimulating and helpful) cross-disciplinary exchange with CP.

My commentary makes four main points. First, and preliminarily, one

can refect critically on this volume’s framing concepts of ‘advocacy

groups,’ ‘global governance,’ and ‘opportunity structures.’ Second, as the

preceding chapters so effectively demonstrate, research on civil society and

global governance needs to give serious attention to national as well as

global dynamics. Third, as regularly intimated across the book, studies

need to fully examine the interrelation of national and global spheres in

world politics; the two are not ontologically discrete. Fourth, on a point

that earlier chapters perhaps underplay, it is important to dissect both the

national and the global, particularly in order to expose the social stratifca-

tions that shape these arenas.

Framing Concepts

Analytical signposts are, of course, necessary to give direction to research,

as Darren Halpin also underlines in Chap. 2. However, going down cer-

tain paths also means not going down other avenues. In this sense, to

choose is to lose. Some insights are gained, while others are bypassed.

Inevitably, it is thus with this collection also. Conceptual choices empha-

size certain kinds of knowledge while marginalizing others.

For instance, the chapters describe their object of study varyingly as

‘advocacy groups,’ ‘interest groups,’ ‘lobbyists,’ and ‘(international) non-

governmental organizations.’ The volume seems to treat these terms as

synonymous and offers no particular refection on their implications and

relative merits. For example, does the language of ‘interest’ suggest that

these politics are mainly driven by utilitarian calculation, with little or no

role for identity orientation or affective forces? Do ‘advocacy’ and ‘lobby-

ing’ suggest that these activities always follow deliberate aims and strategic

plans, with only secondary, if any, place for unconscious dynamics and

unintended consequences? Does ‘nongovernmental’ mainly say what the

phenomenon in question is not, rather than what it is? Does ‘organization’

tend to restrict the scope of actors involved to formal, legal, professionally

staffed entities, when much citizen engagement of global governance also

occurs through informal and, in some cases, illicit channels?

J. A. SCHOLTE

311

To avoid such a priori assumptions, my own work has favored the con-

cept of ‘civil society,’ a notion that is absent from this collection, except in

a few bibliographical references. The omission seems rather surprising,

given two decades of substantial literature on civil society and global poli-

tics (e.g., Florini 2000; Batliwala and Brown 2006; Development Dialogue
2007; Scholte 2011). By civil society, I have in mind a political arena

where associations of citizens seek, from outside political parties, to shape the

rules that govern one or the other aspect of their common life (Scholte 2007).

This conception avoids some limiting presumptions, built into alternative

vocabulary, about institutional forms and causal drivers. To be sure, the

idea of ‘civil society’ has its own drawbacks, including potential Euro-

centrism and possible political co-optation by ruling authorities. Still,

given its noted positive aspects, the notion of civil society arguably war-

rants a hearing that this book does not give. In line with my own concep-

tual preferences, the rest of this chapter favors the language of ‘civil society’

and ‘civil society associations’ (CSAs) rather than ‘interest groups’ and

‘advocacy.’

In contrast, and positively, this volume adopts a notably open interpre-

tation of ‘global governance.’ Past research in both CP and IR has often

limited this concept to the conventional multilateralism of formal inter-

governmental organizations (FIGOs). While several chapters in this vol-

ume follow that tradition, already the editors’ introduction broadens the

scope of global governance institutions (GGIs) to include also transgov-

ernmental networks (such as the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision,

BCBS) and multistakeholder arrangements (such as the Marine Stewardship

Council, MSC). In addition, several chapters in the book underline that

much governance of global concerns occurs through agencies with

regional and national remits. In that sense, the European Union (EU) and
individual states—and one could further add substate authorities—also

undertake ‘global governance.’

Alongside descriptive framings around ‘advocacy groups’ and ‘global

governance’ comes the volume’s explanatory framing around the notion

of ‘opportunity structures.’ This latter concept offers both the merits and

the limitations of openness. On the plus side, one can treat the idea of

opportunity structure broadly and fexibly. Thus, it can encompass, in the

words of the editors, ‘institutional arrangements, resource confgurations,

and policy environments that may shape advocacy group mobilization,

strategies and effects.’ However, on the minus side, such a notion is not

very discriminating and indeed can cover almost every possible social

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force. Formulated on these lines, ‘opportunity structure’ is open to liber-

alist, Marxist, poststructuralist, and pretty well any other theoretical inter-

pretation. Indeed, by fronting a rather amorphous notion of opportunity

structure, the explanatory analyses across the book tend to diverge as

much as converge. Different authors develop different interpretations of

what constitute ‘institutional arrangements,’ ‘resource confgurations,’

and ‘policy environments’—or indeed do not directly mention these cat-

egories at all.

Also, one may wonder if, potentially, the concept of opportunity struc-

ture focuses attention on just that—the opportunities—with a concomi-

tant tendency to neglect that which is excluded and made impossible.

What about the absent opportunities, that is, the goals, the strategies, and
the outcomes that prevailing (opportunity) structures render unavailable

for CSAs? In other words, should one not consider the disabling, restric-

tive structures as well as the enabling, opportunity structures? Is it acci-

dental in this regard that the book includes no studies of deeper resistance

movements, that is, strivings that fnd little ‘opportunity’ in the estab-

lished political order? Hence, none of the chapters address, for example,

anti-capitalist, eco-centric, or religious revivalist streams of civil society

engagement of global governance. The studies instead focus on business

groups, NGOs, and other status quo actors that generally play within the

range of available ‘opportunities.’

The National and the Global

Having noted certain limitations that are consequent upon the adopted

analytical framing, we can stress the very positive contributions that result

in this volume when combining a CP concern with national politics and an

IR concern with global politics. Each feld on its own tends to highlight

one scale of politics to the neglect of the other. Thus, my own work on an

IR/global studies side has often downplayed the national sphere.

For example, I and other IR scholars readily fail to appreciate adequately

the importance of national context in shaping the aims and strategies of

CSAs concerned with global issues. To be sure, these actors wish to affect

planetary problems, such as climate change, corporate social responsibility,

fnancial stability, sustainable fsheries, and trade. However, as this volume

underlines, CSAs often formulate their goals and orient their campaigns

on global affairs in nationally specifc ways. Thus, for example, Nina Hall,

in Chap. 8, shows that digital advocacy platforms address a global issue

J. A. SCHOLTE
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(such as refugee fows) with a distinct national favor. Moreover, CSA

strategies frequently aim to obtain policy action on global problems ‘closer

to home,’ from their ‘nearby’ nation-state, as much as, if not more than,

from ‘faraway’ GGIs.

In addition to shaping CSA visions and goals, national contexts also

affect civil society actions on global issues. Clearly, a country’s regime type

makes a difference to how CSAs in, say, Canada and Myanmar, engage

with human rights questions. As Andrew Heiss in Chap. 10 indicates,

national legal environments do much to enable or constrain CSA capacity.

Meanwhile, Kirsten Lucas and colleagues, in Chap. 6, argue in their con-

tribution that domestic regime type affects the ways and extents that poli-

cymakers reach out to advocacy groups. Likewise, variation in national

economic circumstances infuence how far CSAs in, say, Bolivia and

Denmark have the resources to access GGI policy processes. Differentials

in national population size between, say, India and Lebanon furthermore

impact the weight that CSAs from these respective countries have in global

governance arenas. In sum, as expressed by Laura Henry and co-authors

in Chap. 4, ‘features of a country’s domestic political opportunity struc-

ture shape NGO capacity.’

Yet, CP scholars can also overplay the national to the neglect of the

global. In this vein, for example, CSA aims do not emerge only from one

or the other national context. Important too are the global norms (e.g., of

gender justice, human rights, and sustainable development) that substan-

tially shape CSA agendas. GGI arrangements (or lack of arrangements) for
CSA engagement likewise matter for strategy and impact, whatever the

country of origin. For example, if the BCBS refuses to consult civil society,

then it does not matter in what country a CSA has its base. In more sys-

temic terms, global political economy plays a major part in determining

the relative resource levels that are available to CSAs in different countries.

Meanwhile, global history has usually had a large role in determining the

borders and sizes of nation-states (e.g., through colonialism, trade, wars,

and other ‘international’ relations). Hence, it is important that CP preoc-

cupations with country particularities do not go too far.

As the CP-IR dialogue in this book suitably suggests, the better

approach is for civil society research to examine both the national and the

global, each in their due measure. IR scholars need to ask CP questions,

and vice versa. Neither is adequate without the other. One wants a CP-IR

synthesis.

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That said, even a CP-IR dialogue may not go far enough, inasmuch as

this two-sided approach to the national and the global can overlook fur-

ther relevant spheres of politics, say, on local and regional scales. (NB:

Here, a region may take either a micro form within a single country or a

macro form involving several contiguous countries.) Subnational politics

of localities and micro-regions often have their own dynamics, distinct

from the country as a whole (Criekemans 2010). Similarly, macro-regional

politics (e.g., through the EU) can follow different tracks from both the

national and the global. CP research has given some attention to the EU

context of civil society activism, but comparatively little regard to other

regional governance institutions. Meanwhile, neither CP nor IR has much

considered the local as a sphere of global civil society, that is, where locally

based CSAs address global issues, access global networks, deploy global

discourses, and so forth.

Then, there is the ‘scale’ of the actor as such. In this vein, Mette

Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, in Chap. 5, makes little mention of either national

or global contexts and instead stresses the importance of ‘organizational-

level factors’ to explain variation in CSA repertoires of strategy and tactics.

Likewise, Heiss highlights that internal characteristics of the particular

CSA also matter alongside the national scene (Chap. 10). Henry et al.

might on these lines have invoked the person Oded Grajew and the orga-

nization Instituto Ethos to help explain the high level of participation

from Brazil in the Global Compact (Chap. 4).

In sum, the puzzle of scale is far more complex than the global-national

binary that receives particular emphasis in this volume. Excellent though

it is to deepen the dialogue between the national/CP and the global/IR,

the scope of inquiry could proftably widen still further to encompass a

fuller range of scales.

Transscalarity

As the preceding point has already intimated, scales of civil society activ-

ity—like scales of politics more generally—are in practice overlapping and

interrelated. Research makes one important advance when analysis consid-

ers both the national and the global spheres—and preferably other scales

also. A still further advance occurs when research examines the intercon-

nections—and to that extent the indivisibility—of these spheres. This

book is very strong with regard to the frst contribution, but the work

could possibly want an extra push with regard to the second.

J. A. SCHOLTE

315

My vocabulary would therefore distinguish between ‘multilevel’ and

‘transscalar’ analyses. A multilevel approach explains politics by examining

several geographical spheres that are constructed as being ontologically

separate. On these lines, one adds up or compares discrete local factors,

national factors, regional factors, and global factors. In contrast, a transs-

calar approach explains politics by treating spatial scales as overlapping,

interrelated, and mutually constitutive. In this case, one looks at a single

local–national–regional–global complex.

Thus, for example, a multilevel approach would identify a municipal

government as being ‘local,’ a state as being ‘national,’ the EU as being

‘regional,’ and the United Nations (UN) as being ‘global.’ In contrast, a

transscalar approach would see a municipal government to be local–

national–regional–global, inasmuch as it can and does operate across the

geographical spheres. The UN likewise engages local, national, and

regional as well as global spaces. In a transscalar conception, a political

actor does not reside on any level (except legally), but rather spans them.

Whereas an actor may be formally assigned to one or the other jurisdic-

tional ‘level,’ in practical terms, its activities fow across scales.

To be sure, the ‘boomerang’ notion has already conveyed something of

this transscalar fuidity for two decades of civil society research (Keck and

Sikkink 1998). Still, the metaphor suggests that a CSA stands on a national

level, and throws its boomerang to an international level. The implication

is that actors normally stay on their ‘home ground’ and only move else-

where when the national arena blocks them. In contrast, the principle of

transscalarity maintains that actors’ aims and activities inherently take

them across spheres of politics; hence, CSA operations can never be strictly

isolated and measured at any ‘level.’

The diffculties of multilevel analysis become apparent in this volume,

for example, in Chap. 3 when Joost Berkhout and Marcel Hanegraaff

attempt to calculate separate measures of business relations to national,

regional, and global institutions. In practice, many business associations

are simultaneously and with varying intensities engaging all three spheres

(plus local institutions, which this chapter does not consider). Moreover,

a business organization may pursue local aims via a regional institution,

global aims via a national institution, and so on: to what ‘level’ should the

researcher assign actions in such situations? As Berkhout and Hanegraaff

themselves note, many business group activities are ‘fuid and overlapping’

across scales (Chap. 3). So why persist in the apparently unviable exercise

of measuring would be discrete national, regional, and global behaviors?

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The presumption of ontologically separated levels also leads Henry

et al. to situate NGOs in a country of origin, according to the site of their

head offce. Yet transnationally active NGOs are hardly fxed at a ‘level,’ let
alone in a particular country. Is Greenpeace ‘Dutch’ because its secretariat

is located in Amsterdam? Is Action Aid ‘South African’ for having its head-

quarters in Johannesburg? Here again, the legal matter of level is less

important than the behavioral practice of transscalarity. In political terms,

CSAs tend to be primarily interested in the issue on which they advocate

and then engage whatever combination of levels/scales seems most effec-

tive to advance their cause.

Not only do CSA aims and activities not distribute neatly between lev-

els, but also their resources fow across scales. For example, global founda-

tions often disburse civil society funding locally, and nation-states often

disburse it transnationally. Similarly, CSAs obtain and deploy staff, infor-

mation, infrastructure, equipment, and so forth across scales. Thus, a CSA

website is at one and the same time global, regional, national, and local: it

fows globally on the World Wide Web; it is subject to regional and national

content and data regulations, and it is administered from one or the other

locality. Likewise, members and other supporters of a CSA interlink across

the scales. Hence, attempting to categorize and measure CSA resources

according to discrete levels becomes a futile exercise.

Finally, the social structures that are refected in and shaped by CSA

activities often have a distinctly transscalar quality. For instance, capitalism

is a social structure with coexistent and interrelated global, regional,

national, and local dimensions. There is not a separate national capitalism

that engages with a separate global capitalism. Rather, surplus accumula-

tion transpires across geographical spaces as one transscalar social ordering

dynamic.

The same general principle of transscalarity holds for other social struc-

tures. For example, securitization is a discursive structure that operates

across scales. Norms such as human rights and sustainable development

fgure locally to globally. So do social structures of modernity, militarism,

and nationalism. Similarly, social stratifcations (i.e., hierarchies inter alia

of class, gender, and race) do not fx at one or the other level, but rather

fow across and interlink different scales of social life.

In sum, it is not possible meaningfully to measure separate national and

global (as well as local and regional) aspects of civil society activity—and

on this basis to conclude that a phenomenon involves more of one ‘level’

and less of another. It is not viable to affrm, for example, that capitalism

J. A. SCHOLTE

317

is 40% global, 30% national, 20% regional, and 10% local. The dense inter-

relation of scales means that any division of discrete spaces is artifcial and

arbitrary: a reifcation.

So how, as this volume tends to suggest, could one distinguish onto-

logically separate global and domestic opportunity structures? After all, a

country has the regime type that it does not only because of national con-

ditions, but also because of the way that the country inserts into regional

and global spheres. Similarly, national economic development unfolds

within local, regional, and global arenas: it is not possible to extract and

isolate the national part, measure it, and assign it a discrete causal force.

Yet, so much conventional social science—including in this book—persists

in trying to do so.

Dissecting Spaces

In addition to exploring transscalar interconnections, research on civil

society needs to differentiate among people within a given social space.

Not only is it unsustainable to separate ‘levels’ of activity, but a social arena

(on whatever scale) is not monolithic either. In other words, behaviors and

experiences are not the same for all people who inhabit a particular local-

ity, a given country, a certain region, or the globe. Persons relate differ-

ently to civil society in world politics depending on their age, caste, class,

(dis)abilities, faith, gender, language, race, sexual orientation, and more.

Often these social categories matter as much as, if not more than, the per-

son’s geographical location.

This observation may state the obvious, but CP and IR researchers alike

may easily underestimate or forget the point, including in this volume.

The chapters concentrate on matters of geographical position, national

and global, with a tendency to neglect other social positions. For example,

Henry et al. examine a country’s civil society access to global governance,

without asking more specifcally who in the country obtains or lacks that

access. Apart from Chap. 8, the book lacks attention to social group mark-

ers and stratifcations. The analyses in effect treat national and global are-

nas as internally uniform and, by implication, as level playing felds.

Of course, actual political practice defes this assumption of socially

undifferentiated spaces. For example, men, women, and other genders

have structurally unequal possibilities in, and structurally different experi-

ences of, civil society activities. Overall, CSAs from Europe and the

Americas have a notable underrepresentation of people of color.

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Everywhere on the planet, civil society is predominantly a domain of privi-

leged classes. English speakers generally fnd it easier to impact the main

GGIs than activists without this language fuency. Youth tend to adopt

different aims, strategies, and tactics in civil society as compared with

middle-aged and older people—and youth generally have lower possibili-

ties of infuence.

So opportunity structures are not the same for everyone who inhabits a

particular geographical arena. In this sense, there is no ‘French’ opportu-

nity structure that applies in identical fashion to everyone living in France.

Likewise, it is not suffcient to situate a CSA in Buenos Aires: one must ask

whether the activists in question are rich or poor, white or indigenous,

able-bodied or otherwise. On a global scale, too, social stratifcations do

not give the same and equal opportunities to all persons. Hierarchies of

age, gender, race, and so forth do not stop at territorial frontiers and have
a transscalar character, too.

To get at these differentiations and inequalities, both CP and IR—and

their combination—would beneft from an expanded dialogue that also

encompasses sociology. Failure to dissect global, national, and other are-

nas of politics can leave research blind to social hierarchies and associated

questions of social injustice. The resultant knowledge by being silent on

structural inequality could (inadvertently) contribute to the reproduction

of the stark inequities of contemporary world society.

Conclusion: Taking Forward the Dialogue

As stressed above, this book makes a most valuable contribution to knowl-

edge of civil society and global governance by nurturing a previously

underdeveloped dialogue between comparative politics and international

relations. Citizen activism in global politics comes into fuller and sharper

focus when CP’s sensitivity to national context is combined with IR’s sen-

sitivity to world-order conditions. The empirical studies in this volume

richly demonstrate these benefts.

As ever, though, the achievement of certain knowledge improvements

prompts a search for still further advances. On these lines, this concluding

commentary has encouraged future work to build on this book by consid-

ering more scales, examining transscalar interrelations, and assessing social

group differentiations within and across scales of civil society activity.

J. A. SCHOLTE
319

Future research might also venture more beyond Euro-/West-centrism

than this volume has done, taking inspiration from the attention that

Chap. 4 gives to civil society and global governance in the BRICS

countries.
Toplum Sivil ve Küresel Yönetişim:

Transskalar Bağlantıları Keşfetmek

Jan Aart Scholte

Giriş

Bu kitap, bir yanda karşılaştırmalı siyaset bilimi (CP) alanında çıkar grupları üzerine yapılan
araştırmaları ve diğer yanda uluslararası ilişkiler (IR) alanında sivil toplum örgütleri üzerine yapılan
araştırmaları bir araya getiriyor. Bu kitap, katkıda bulunanların büyük ölçüde her iki alandan da geldiği
bir koleksiyon niteliğinde ve her iki tarafı da birbirine entegre etmelerini istiyor. Bu karşılıklı
etkileşimin meyveleri nelerdir?

Bu soruya verdiğim yanıt, IR (veya benim durumumda belki daha iyi bir şekilde küresel çalışmalar
olarak tanımlanabilir) tarafından geliyor. Burada, kendi araştırmalarımın iki on yılı, sivil toplum ve
küresel yönetişim üzerine olan, net bir şekilde CP için bir kör noktaya sahip olmuştur. Araştırmalarım
birçok farklı ülkeyi kapsamış olmasına rağmen, analizler çoğunlukla iç siyaseti göz ardı etmiş ve ulusal
bağlamlar arasında sistematik bir karşılaştırma eksikliği göstermiştir. Dolayısıyla, bu cilt hakkında
yorum yapmak, ihmal edilmiş (uyarıcı ve yardımcı) bir disiplinler arası değişimle CP ile girmemi istedi.
Yorumumun dört ana noktasını oluşturuyor. İlk olarak ve ön olarak, bu cildin çerçeve kavramları olan
"savunuculuk grupları", "küresel yönetişim" ve "fırsat yapıları"nı eleştirel bir şekilde
değerlendirebiliriz. İkinci olarak, önceki bölümler çok etkili bir şekilde gösterdiği gibi, sivil toplum ve
küresel yönetişim üzerine yapılan araştırmalar, ulusal ve küresel dinamiklere ciddi bir şekilde dikkat
etmelidir. Üçüncü olarak, kitap boyunca düzenli olarak ima edildiği gibi, çalışmaların dünya
siyasetinde ulusal ve küresel alanların birbirine tamamen bağımlı olduğunu tam olarak incelemesi
gerekir; ikisi ontolojik olarak ayrı değildir. Dördüncü olarak, daha önceki bölümlerin belki de ihmal
ettiği bir nokta olarak, ulusal ve küresel alanları dağıtmak önemlidir, özellikle bu alanları şekillendiren
sosyal tabakaları ortaya çıkarmak için.

Çerçeve Kavramlar

Analitik işaretler elbette ki araştırmaya yön vermek için gereklidir, Darren Halpin de Bölüm 2'de
vurguladığı gibi. Ancak, belirli yolları izlemek aynı zamanda diğer yolları izlememek anlamına gelir. Bu
anlamda, seçmek kaybetmektir. Bazı içgörüler kazanılırken, diğerleri göz ardı edilir. Kaçınılmaz olarak,
bu koleksiyon için de geçerlidir. Kavramsal seçimler belirli bir tür bilgiyi vurgularken diğerlerini
marjinalleştirir.
Örneğin, bölümler, nesnelerini "savunuculuk grupları", "çıkar grupları", "lobiciler" ve "(uluslararası)
sivil toplum örgütleri" olarak farklı şekillerde tanımlar ve bu terimleri eşanlamlı olarak ele alır gibi
görünür ve bunların sonuçları ve göreceli faydaları hakkında özel bir düşünce sunmaz. Örneğin,
"çıkar" kavramı, bu politikaların çoğunlukla faydacı hesaplamalarla sürüklendiğini, kimlik yönelimine
veya duygusal güçlere pek az veya hiç yer olmadığını mı ima ediyor? "Savunuculuk" ve "lobi"
kelimeleri, bu faaliyetlerin her zaman kasıtlı amaçları ve stratejik planları takip ettiğini, bilinçdışı
dinamiklerin ve istenmeyen sonuçların ise yalnızca ikincil bir yerde olduğunu mu öne sürüyor?
"Hükümet dışı" ifadesi, söz konusu olguyu ne olduğunu değil, ne olmadığını mı söylüyor? "Örgüt"
kelimesi, vatandaş katılımının küresel yönetişim üzerindeki etkisinin formal, yasal, profesyonel bir
şekilde çalışan kurumsal, yasal olarak sınırlı olduğunu mu öneriyor, oysa birçok sivil toplum
örgütünün küresel yönetişim üzerindeki etkisi aynı zamanda gayriresmi ve bazı durumlarda yasadışı
kanallar aracılığıyla da gerçekleşiyor mu?

Bu tür a priori varsayımlardan kaçınmak için, kendi çalışmam terim olarak "sivil toplum" kavramını
tercih etmiştir ve bu koleksiyonda bu kavramın yokluğu oldukça şaşırtıcıdır, zira sivil toplum ve
küresel politika üzerine iki on yıldan fazla bir süredir süregelen yoğun bir literatür bulunmaktadır. Sivil
toplum kavramını, yurttaşların siyasi partilerin dışından, ortak yaşamlarının bir ya da diğer yönünü
yönlendirmeye çalıştığı bir siyasi arena olarak anlıyorum.