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Convoy PQ 17
British Intelligence in the Second World War, by F.H. Hinsley et al., Vol. II (London: H.M.S.O.,
1981). Excellent and authoritative short accounts of both PQ 12 and PQ 17, including, in Appendix II,
a list of the Ultra signals sent to the Home Fleet between 30 June and 8 July. I am not sure whether all
the purely U-boat signals sent by the Submarine Tracking Room (as opposed to the Ultras sent by
Denning) are included. Hinsley’s judgement is that, even if Pound had delayed ordering the convoy to
scatter until there was more positive evidence the Tirpitz was about to sail (i.e. at 1517/5), he would
then have had to do so. I am not sure that I agree. The alternatives are not examined.
The War at Sea, Vol.II by S.W. Roskill (London: H.M.S.O., 1957). Roskill saw, but was then not
permitted to refer explicitly to, at least some Ultras. His account is, therefore, necessarily muted so far
as Intelligence is concerned, but is otherwise all that one would expect from this great naval historian.
The Destruction of Convoy PQ 17 by David Irving (London: Cassell, 1968; revised ed. William
Kimber, 1980). First published by Cassell & Co. in 1968, this book resulted in a successful and very
expensive libel action brought by Broome against the author and publishers. It was, moreover, written
without any access to or precise knowledge of Special Intelligence. A second edition, published by
William Kimber in 1980, has been revised to take account of these failings. Like all Irving’s books, it
is the result of the most painstaking research and claims to be the result of interviews with many
participants now dead. I have relied on it for the account of Pound’s staff meeting on the evening of 4
July, the only published account of which I am aware. It rings true to me, but I am bound to issue the
caveat that, in acknowledging help from many individuals, including myself, Irving names one or two
who I know were either unwilling or unable to give him information. Nevertheless, this is a most
valuable source.
Convoy is to Scatter by Jack Broome (London, 1972). A personal account by the commander of the
close escort. It includes many signals made during the course of the operation, although not any
Ultras. It is very anti-Pound, but brings out clearly the reactions of those at the ‘sharp end’.
Room 39 by Donald McLachlan (London, 1968), McLachlan served in NID (although not in OIC) and
was subsequently Deputy Editor of the Daily Telegraph and Editor of the Sunday Telegraph. He
was able to talk to many of the participants, particularly those in the Intelligence Division and was
given access to some records then secret, but was forbidden to make any reference to Special
Intelligence. He therefore had the difficult task of writing Hamlet without once referring to the
principal character. Not to be relied on implicitly for detail, but excellent for atmosphere.
PQ 17 Vice-Admiral Sir Norman Denning. Typescript, 1979, Churchill College Archives, Cambridge.
Copy in my possession. My old friend and boss in OIC from 1940 until the end of 1941 was always
most reluctant to record his wartime experience. However, about 1978, I persuaded him to attempt to
set out his recollections of his innvolvement in PQ 17. He produced a number of drafts which he sent
to me for comment, but sadly died suddenly, in 1979, just as he had completed what I believe would
have been the penultimate version. The quotations in this paper are from that draft which, with the
permission of his brother, Lord Denning, and with the help of Stephen Roskill, I passed to Hinsley,
who made good use of them in his official history. Old men’s memories are notoriously fallible, but
Ned was a great intelligence officer and well aware of this danger. I believe that his account forms an
accurate record of the events which had taken place 36 years previously.
I am grateful to Lord Denning for permission to quote from his brother’s account and to Her
Majesty’s Stationery Office for permission to reproduce the map from S.W. Roskill’s War at Sea.