876C-04-00-B-RP-006_K1

PETROCEDEÑO Documento No: 876C-04-00-B-RP-006
Página / Archivo: 1/876C-04-00-B-RP-006_K1

Rev./ Fecha: K1/ August 26, 2009
PDVSA PETROCEDEÑO
Ingeniería de Detalle para las Interconexiones de los Sistemas de la Planta de Compresión y
Acondicionamiento de Gas con la Estación Principal y la Estación de Recepción de Gas de PDVSA
“Safety Philosophy”
ADDENDUM
REVISION INDEX:
This Document Consists of 35 Pages
This document is issued herewith as an Addendum to the document (Upstream Surface

Facilities Design Basis Specification, 876BCA04-04-00-B-RP-006_X1). The type of
modification is defined and indicated in subsequent text as follows:
(Addition) Indicates the following statement(s) is/are added to the document referenced text
(Deletion) Indicates the following statement(s) is/are deleted to the document referenced text
(Modification) Indicates the following statement(s) is/are revision(s) to the document referenced text.
The modification(s) is/are indicated with bold the letters.
Aprobación
Proyecto
Preparado por / Revisado PDVSA Razón para la
Rev. Aprobado por /
Fecha por / Fecha PETROCEDEÑO Revisión
Fecha
/ Fecha
H. López P. Gentile F. Salazar F. Malpica Issued for
M0
July 06, 2009 July 06, 2009 July 06, 2009 July 06, 2009 Approval
H. López P. Gentile F. Salazar F. Malpica
Issued for
M1 August 04, August 04, August 04, August 04,
Approval
2009 2009 2009 2009
K0 August 12, August 12, August 12, August 12,
2009 2009 2009 2009 Construction
K1 August 26, August 26, August 26, August 26,
2009 2009 2009 2009 Construction
TABLE OF CONTENTS
SECTION Nº PAGE
1. INTRODUCTION................................................................................................................ 4
1.1 Purpose and Scope................................................................................................................ 4
1.2 Objectives............................................................................................................................... 4
1.3 Main Principles........................................................................................................................ 4
1.4 Developing the SAFETY CONCEPT at Project Stages..........................................................5
1.5 Handing-over the SAFETY CONCEPT at the End of the Project...........................................5
2. SAFETY ASSURANCE......................................................................................................5
2.1 Scope of SAFETY CONCEPT................................................................................................5
3. APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS.............................................................................................8
3.1 List of Applicable Documents..................................................................................................8
3.2 Prevailing Order, Scope and Deviations of/from Applicable Documents................................8
4. RISK ASSESSMENT..........................................................................................................8
4.1 List of Reference and Applicable Documents to Risk Assessment.........................................8
4.2 Description of the risk Assessment Studies............................................................................9
5. LAYOUT........................................................................................................................... 15
5.1 Applicable Documents to Layout..........................................................................................15
5.2 Particular Requirements and Description of the Layout........................................................15
6. HAZARDOUS AREAS CLASSIFICATION AND EXTENT..............................................20
6.1 Applicable Documents to Hazardous Areas..........................................................................20
6.2 Particular Requirements and Description of the Hazardous Areas.......................................21
7. ELECTRICAL POWER.....................................................................................................21
7.1 Applicable Documents to Electrical Power............................................................................21
7.2 Particular Requirements and Description of Safety to Electrical Power................................21
8. FIRE AND GAS................................................................................................................ 22
8.1 Applicable Documents to Fire and Gas.................................................................................22
8.2 General Requirements of Fire and Gas................................................................................22
9. PRESSURE PROTECTION AND RELIEF, SHUT-DOWN AND BLOW-DOWN..............25
9.1 Applicable Documents to PPR, SD and BD..........................................................................25
9.2 Particular Requirements and Description of the PPR, SD and BD.......................................25

10. DRAINAGE................................................................................................................... 26
10.1 Applicable Documents to Drainage Systems........................................................................26
10.2 Description of the Drainage Systems....................................................................................26
11. FLARING AND VENTING.............................................................................................27
11.1 Applicable Documents to Flaring and Venting......................................................................27
11.2 Particular Requirements and Description of Flaring and Venting.........................................27
12. ACTIVE FIRE-FIGHTING..............................................................................................30
12.1 Applicable Documents to Active Fire-fighting........................................................................30
12.2 Particular Requirements and Description of the Active Fire-Fighting....................................30
13. PASSIVE FIRE AND BLAST PROTECTION................................................................31
13.1 Applicable Documents to Passive Fire and Blast Protection................................................31
13.2 Requirements and Description of Passive Fire and Blast Protection....................................31
14. EMERGENCY RESPONSE...........................................................................................32
14.1 Applicable Documents to Emergency Response..................................................................32
14.2 Description of the Emergency Response Features...............................................................32
15. Requirements in charges lifting process..................................................................33
15.1 Lifting Operation Planning.....................................................................................................33
16. ESCAPE, EVACUATION AND RESCUE......................................................................33
16.1 Applicable Documents to Escape, Evacuation and Rescue.................................................33
16.2 Particular Requirements and Description of the EER Features............................................33
17. HUMAN FEATURES (HEALTH AND PERSONNEL PROTECTION, TRAINING).......34
17.1 Particular Requirements and Description of Human Features..............................................34
18. PIPELINES....................................................................................................................34
18.1 Applicable Documents to Pipelines.......................................................................................34
18.2 Requirements for Pipelines...................................................................................................34
19. STORAGE.....................................................................................................................35
19.1 Applicable Documents to Storage Systems..........................................................................35
19.2 Requirements and Description of Storage Systems.............................................................35
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Purpose and Scope
(Addition)
The purpose of this document is to define the basic SAFETY CONCEPT for the SINCOR
Upstream Surface Facilities which concern mainly:
 Clusters,
 Main Station,
 Associated flow-lines, trunk lines and pipeline systems,
 Gas Delivery Facilities.
1.2 Objectives
1.3 Main Principles
A SAFETY CONCEPT was prepared by SINCOR at the pre-project phase.
The present document is the up dated of the original SAFETY CONCEPT from the pre-basic
engineering and was developed during the basic engineering phase by OTEPI-FOSTER
WHEELER; rev. 2 is an update which includes some minor modifications and “Short term
Water Upgrade Project”
This document was updated during detail engineering phase of water upgrade project by
JANTESA-PROYCCA Consortium and issued as revisions X1 approved by Sincor.
Any issue or modification to the SAFETY CONCEPT shall be either prepared by, or formally
approved by SINCOR.
(Addition)
This document was updated by PDI / EXTERRAN during the basic/detail engineering
phase for “Main Station Gas Delivery Facilities Project”.
This document is intended to list-out the requirements of SINCOR regarding, Safety concerns
for the whole life cycle of the installation, and to define which options have been selected at
the basic-project stage. The Health and Environmental concern are included in the document
CA04-04-00-B-RP-008 (Replaced old Sincor Doc. No. 1020-13-00-2210-IN-002) “Health and
environmental philosophy”.
At each engineering phase, the SAFETY CONCEPT shall be developed, by engineer and
SINCOR, explaining how safety is taken into account in all areas according to the risks
inherent to the project and shall state in writing the safety principles adopted.
As a consequence, the SAFETY CONCEPT naturally evolves in the course of the project.
In any phase it shall serve as the prevailing support document in matters of the requirements
and the principles applied, dealing with Safety.
At the end of the project, the SAFETY CONCEPT shall constitute the key document in the
safety dossier that shall be handed-over to the operator for the rest of the life cycle of the
installation.
1.4 Developing the SAFETY CONCEPT at Project Stages
1.5 Handing-over the SAFETY CONCEPT at the End of the Project
2. SAFETY ASSURANCE
2.1 Scope of SAFETY CONCEPT
(Addition)
The extent of scope of the SAFETY CONCEPT is:
 The Upstream Surface Facilities Project (SINCOR):

 Clusters,
 Main Station,
 Associated flow-lines, trunk lines and pipelines systems,
 Gas Delivery Facilities.
 Short term Water Upgrade Project and minor modifications:
 Main Station.
 Minor modifications in clusters
 Water Upgrade Project:
 Main Station.
2.1.1 Statement of Requirements
2.1.2 Operating Philosophy
Main Station Process Operating and Control Philosophy Doc. No. CA04-04-00-B-DC-004 has
been issued by CPO as per Sincor letter No. SPUC/CA004-4/L/MSCR/CPO/111 dated May
26, 1999. This document was update by CJP to include the facilities associated with Main
Station Upgrade Project.
(Addition)
However, it has been decided by Sincor that:
 Clusters are unmanned,
 The Main Station is permanently manned.
 The Gas Delivery Facilities is permanently manned.
Operating Philosophy for Short term Water Upgrade Project was issued as a separate
document and included in the Design Basis Specification, which is:
3045-05-13-B-DC-001, dated May 13,2002.
The Operating Philosophy for Gas Delivery Facilities was issued as a separate
document N° 876C-04-18-B-DC-003.
2.1.3 HAZID
2.1.4 HAZAN
2.1.5 HAZOP
Hazards and Operability (HAZOP) studies were carried-out by COMPANY during Upstream
Surface Facilities basic and detailed engineering projects, also during Short term Water
Upgrade Project and some modifications such as Mod 055 (Pressurization Console for P-
3001´s), recirculation lines to slug catchers, etc.
During Main Station Water Upgrade Project a HAZOP for the new Production Water
Treatment Plant and oil treatment plant modification, were developed during basic and
detailed engineering phases.
(Addition)
During the Basic Engineering for Gas Delivery Facilities Project was carried out a
Hazards and Operability Study (HAZOP). The report of this study is available in
Document N° 207028-1-R-HAZ-SINCOR-EXTERRAN-PDI rev_0 September 05, 2007

“Interconexión de Paquetes de Compresión y Acondicionamiento de Gas”.
2.1.6 QRA
According to the Safety concepts and the Statements of Requirements issued during the pre
basic engineering phase “No Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) study is required for this
project”.
(Addition)
For Gas Delivery Facilities Project a Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) was
developed During Basic Engineering Phase (See Document N° 209001-R-ACT-ACR-
PETROCEDEÑO-EXTERRAN “Análisis cuantitativo de Riesgos Interconexión de
Paquetes de Compresión y Acondicionamiento de Gas”). 1
2.1.7 WHAT IF
(Addition)
What If studies were carried out during the following modifications:
- Mod M812. Diluent System Evaluation.
- Mod M876C. Gas Delivery Facilities.
2.1.8 PTR
3. APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS
3.1 List of Applicable Documents
3.2 Prevailing Order, Scope and Deviations of/from Applicable Documents
3.2.1 Prevailing Order
1
The find issue of quantitative risk assessment is by others. PDVSA PETROCEDEÑO trust that results
shown in this addendum are obtained from the last issued updated of this assessment.
4. RISK ASSESSMENT
4.1 List of Reference and Applicable Documents to Risk Assessment
The applicable document to Risk Assessment is PDVSA IR-S-02 “Criterios para el análisis
cuantitativo de riesgos”.
A Consequence Analysis study has been carried out during “Upstream Surface Facilities
Project” basic engineering and Main Station Water Upgrade Project (MSWUP) Detail
Engineering. The report regarding Upstream Surface Facilities project is provided in
Attachment 2 and the main assumptions, criteria and results are summarized in next section,
including results associated with MSWUP. For more detail regarding consequence analysis
and calculation for MSWUP see document nº CA04-00-13-K-RP-113.
(Addition)
During the Basic Engineering for Gas Delivery Facilities Project was carried out a Risk,
Assessment and Consequence Analysis. The main assumptions, criteria and results
are summarized in the next section. A report of this study was provided in document
N° 209001-R-ACT-ACR-PETROCEDEÑO-EXTERRAN “Análisis Cuantitativo de Riesgos-
Interconexión de Paquetes de Compresión y Acondicionamiento de Gas”. 1
4.2 Description of the risk Assessment Studies
4.2.1 Scenarios
Ambient Conditions: Pasquill Stability Class D (neutral), wind speed
5 m/s or 20 m/s.
Clusters: Clusters: Vents dispersion:

Case1:
Number of well per cluster= 6
Max. Design flow per cluster of wet diluted
crude oil: 8500 BOPSD
GOR= 300-250=50 SCF/BBL
Volumetric flow per cluster: 425.000 SCFD
Considering 12 Wells per Cluster
Volumetric flow per Cluster: 850.000
SCFD=772 KG/HR=0.21KG/SEC
Other Cases
For the cases: Test of one well and Annulus
gas production venting, and Over pressure
from a well, the volumetric flow resulted also
1
less than 1 KG/SEC.

For the Vent Dispersion study was assume a
Volumetric flow of 1 Kg/s
For this flow a vertical 6” at 11 meters above
grade is Ok.
(See calculations in the attachment)
- Vents dispersion: 1 kg/s (4.1 MMSCFD), vertical 6” at 11 meters
above grade.
Main Station: Flare Relief Load Summary

LP Flare
(Refer to doc. CA04-04-22-B-RP-001,
summarizing flare loads)
Case 1: Maximum gas production at
maximum crude oil production.
GOR=250 SCF/BBL
Gas Maximum flow = 58.2 MMSCFD
Case 2: Overpressure in D-3001
Maximum gas production= GOR=250
SCF/BBL
Maximun production = 210.000 BBLD
Volumetric flow: 250 SCF/BBL*210000
BBLD=5250000000 SCFD= 46642 Kg/h
Volumetric flow= 13.25 Kg/s.
Case 3: Fire in D-3001
Fire case is not the sizing case (Refer to doc.
CA04-04-22-B-RP-001, Flare load Summary).
Case 4: Flame Out
For flaring through a vertical 24” at 21.4
meters above grade is OK for gas dispersion
in case of flame-out.
(See calculations in the Attachment 4).
LLP Flare
(Refer to doc. CA04-04-22-B-RP-001,
summarizing flare loads)
Case 1: Maximum gas production from
degassing boot. Gas flow = 16.9 MMSCFD
For this flow a vertical 24” at 21.4 m above
grade is acceptable for radiation and gas
dispersion in case of flame out.
 Gas dispersion for ¼”, 1”, and 4” diameter leak on a 24” and 20”
Separators pipe, horizontal at 1 meter above grade. Refer
to Attachments1 and 2.
 Gas dispersion for ¼”, 1” diameter leak on a 6” pipe, horizontal at

Compressor discharge 1 meter above grade. Refer to Attachment 4.
 Diluent tank pool fire: Equivalent pool diameter = 39.56 m,
Radiation level of significance for spacing =
13.5 kW/m2
 Offspec Storage tank: Equivalent pool diameter = 36.58 m,
Radiation level of significance for spacing
=13.5 kW/m2.
 Separators pool fire: Equivalent pool diameter = 21.14 m,
Radiation level of significance for spacing =
13.5 kW/m2.
Burning liquid Diluted Crude
P-3001A/B/E and C/D/F
Pool Diameter 18 m
Crude spill volume 41 m3
(Refer to attachment 4).
Production Water and
Treatment Plant
- D Mass Released 0.1138 kg/s
ispersion and Radiation Piping Diameter 0.1524 m
for Separation Tank T Release Height 8.2 m
3930 Pressure 1.01325 bara
(Refer to document number CA04-00-13-K-
RP-104).
ispersion and Radiation Piping Diameter 0.254m
for Skimmer tank T 3900 Release Height 12 m
A/B. Pressure 1.0130 bara
RP-104).
for Clear Water Tank T Release Height 18.4 m
3920 Pressure 1.0130 bara
RP-104).
for IGF X-3900 Release Height 5.3 m
Pressure 1.0130 bara
RP-104).
- P Burning liquid Diluted Crude
-3950 A/B Pool Fire Pool Diameter 5.3 m
Crude spill volume 2.5 m3

RP-113).
- P Burning liquid Diluted Crude
-3960 A/B Pool Fire Pool Diameter 3.9 m
Crude spill volume 0.75 m3
RP-113).
(Addition)
Gas Delivery Facilities
- P Mass Flow (Kg/h) 41570

re Cooler A-2710 Duty 346.73 kW
Inlet Temperature 55°C
Outlet Temperature 43°C
Pressure 2.8 barg
- I Mass Flow (Kg/h): 20785
nlet Scrubber Drum Volume (m3): 113.83
D-2710 A/B Liquid Level (m): 1.45
Pressure (barg): 2.45
Operation Temperature (°C): 43
Released Phase: Gas at Top, Liquid at
Bottom.
Pipelines Diameter (pulg): 12 in the Top, 2
in the bottom.
- C Mass Flow (Kg/h) 13870
ompression Skids (each compressor)
X-2710 A/B/C Inlet Pressure (Barg) 2.45
Outlet Pressure (Barg) 74.3
- E Mass Flow (Kg/h) 40650
xchanger Skid X-2713 Inlet Pressure (Barg) 74.3
Duty Exchanger Gas/Gas 1270 kW
Duty Exchanger Gas/Liquid 2.37 kW
- S Mass Flow (Kg/h) 40650

eparator Skid X-2712 Inlet Pressure (Barg) 73.9
Outlet Temperature -3.3°C
4.2.2 Methods and Software
4.2.3 Criteria
Toxic gas: 10 ppm H2S for restricted area.
Flammable gas: 100 % LFL
Radiation levels, inclusive about 1 kW/m2 (300 BTU/hft2) for sun radiation:
 13.5 kW/m2 (4281 BTU/hft2) for equipment, tanks, spacing

 4.73 kW/m2 (1 500 BTU/hft2) for flare spacing and flare K.O Drum
 3.15 kW/m2 (1000 BTU/hft2) for fence
The criteria of 13.5 KW/m2 for equipment and tanks spacing has been taken
from PDVSA IR-S-02 “Criterios para el analisis cuantitativo de riesgos”, the
others criteria come from the original safety concepts.
- In Main Station:
- The criteria assumed for tank spacing is a pool fire in the tank
surface. This is the criteria used by PDVSA. IR-S-02
- The safety distance between tanks is:
56 m for Offspec Storage tank
66 m for diluent tank.
- The safety distance between tanks and process is same
In the rest of the areas have been taken in account the results of the
dispersion analysis from the assessment studies were:
Clusters vents:
Vent 10 ppm H2S 0.4 m
Vent 100 % LFL 2.1 m
Vent 50 % LFL 4.1 m
Main Station:
Offspec Storage Tank pool fire 13.5 56 m
kW/m2
kW/m2
kW/m2
Diluent Tank pool fire 13.5 kW/m2 66 m
Pump P-3001 pool fire 13.5 Kw/m2 26 m
Skimmer Tank T 3900, vent fire 13.5 13 m

Kw/m2
Kw/m2
Kw/m2
Clear Water Tank T 3920 vent fire 13.5 15 m
Kw/m2
Kw/m2
Kw/m2
Separation Tank T-3930 vent fire 13.5 8m
Kw/m2
Separation Tank T-3930 vent fire 4.73 10 m
Kw/m2
Separation Tank T-3930 vent fire 3.15 11 m
Kw/m2
IGF X-3900 vent fire 13.5 Kw/m2 8.5 m
IGF X-3900 vent fire 4.73 Kw/m2 11 m
IGF X-3900 vent fire 3.15 Kw/m2 12 m
Pump P-3960 pool fire 13.5 Kw/m2 9m
Considering the above,
 Cold vents at clusters are not an area of main concern.
 In Main Station:
 The impacted area extends 133 m from the tank for Offspec storage.
151 m from the tank for diluent storage.
 The restricted area extends 106 m from the tank for Offspec storage.
122 m from the tank for diluent storage.
 The safety distance between tanks and process is
56 m for oil export tank.
66 m for diluent tank.
(Addition)
Gas Delivery Facilities:
Pre-Cooler A-2710 9.2 m

13.5 kW/m2
4.73 kW/m2
3.15 kW/m2
Inlet Scrubber D-2710 A/B 8.9 m
13.5 kW/m2
4.73 kW/m2
3.15 kW/m2
Compression Skids X-2710 A/B/C 22.8 m
13.5 Kw/m2
4.73 Kw/m2
3.15 Kw/m2
Exchanger Skid X-2713 33.1 m
13.5 Kw/m2
4.73 Kw/m2
3.15 Kw/m2
Separator Skid X-2712 31.1 m
13.5 Kw/m2
4.73 Kw/m2
3.15 Kw/m2
Considering the above,
In Gas Delivery Facilities:

 The impacted area extends 47.9 m from the Exchanger Skid X-2713.
37.8 m from the Separator Skid X-2712.
 The restricted area extends 43.8 m from the Exchanger Skid X-2713.
34.6 m from the Separator Skid X-2712.

 The safety distance between process equipment is
33.1 m for the Exchanger Skid X-2713.
31.1 m for the Separator Skid X-2712.
5. LAYOUT
5.1 Applicable Documents to Layout
5.2 Particular Requirements and Description of the Layout
5.2.1 Impacted Area
5.2.2 Restricted Area
Main principles:
The restricted area is defined as the area where, in the event of a major gas
leak, gas may be present at a concentration up to 100 % LFL and/or the
distance limit of 4.73 kW/m2 (1500 BTU/h.ft2). All potential ignition sources
located in a restricted area shall be suppressed if this event occurs.
The restricted area concept is used to define the ignition prevention measures
to be taken for an equipment, located inside the restricted area, which can be a
potential source of ignition. For instance, particular attention shall be given to
the shut-down control facilities of electrical equipment, open fire
furnaces/heaters and engines not suitable for use in explosive atmosphere.
It will not be noted that the restricted area generated by an hydrocarbon unit is,
generally, far greater than the hazardous area defined by the Codes.
Flares not controlled by the Operator (ignition prevention measures and

evacuation) shall not be located in the restricted area generated by the other
areas.
Description:
For the clusters, the restricted area around well has been estimated as 30 m.
For the Main Station, the restricted areas around the installations are defined
by the preliminary Consequence Analysis study, the basic and detailed
engineering calculations whose report is provided in Attachment 2 and 4, and
whose main assumptions, criteria and results are summarized in previous

section 4.
(Addition)
For the Gas Delivery Facilities the restricted area around its installations
were defined by the Consequence Analysis study from the basic
engineering project, whose report is provided in document N° 209001-R-
ACT-ACR-PETROCEDEÑO-EXTERRAN: “Análisis Cuantitativo de
Riesgos- Interconexión de Paquetes de Compresión y Acondicionamiento
de Gas” 1 the main assumptions, criteria and results are summarized in
previous section 4.
Property limits shall be materialized by security fences and shall include the
restricted area limit drawn all around any process equipment including the
open drain or API basins. Distances to heat radiation limit to 4.73 kW/m 2 (1
500 BTU/h.ft2) shall also apply to flare when emergency flaring, and to tanks in
case of fire.
5.2.3 Split into Fire Zones
Main principles:
Installations are split into fire zones in order to separate risks and limit the
probability of escalation.
Simultaneous independent hazardous events in two separate fire zones have

not been considered.
It can be considered as an independent fire zone only if an accident occurring

within the zone will not spread to any adjacent zone. This can be achieved by
physical separation, by fire and/or blast resistant walls, separation distances or
water curtains.
It shall be possible to completely isolate the hydrocarbon inventory within a

single fire zone by Emergency Shut-Down Valves (ESDVs) and de-pressurize it
by Blow-Down Valves (BDVs).
Distances used between separate fire zones are based on a credible leak
ignition and explosion consequence limits of:
 Maximum fire radiation: 13.5 kW/m2 (4281 BTU/h.ft2).
1
 Maximum over-pressure from explosion: 0.15 bar.
According to PDVSA IR-S-02 2 Criterios para el análisis cuantitativo de

riesgos.
Fire zones have been defined as follows:
a) Clusters:
Each cluster split into fire zones consists in:
Z1: Wells.
Z2: Vent.
Z3: Utilities and buildings.
b) Main Station:
Main Station split into fire zones consists in (New equipment for MSWUP-
Basic Engineering are included):
Z1: Generation station.
Z2: Safe utilities.
Z3: Control room and administration buildings.
Z4: Accommodation camp.
Z5: Other utilities.
Z6: Fuel Gas System.
Z7: Production train A
Z8: Production train B
Z9: Flare.
Z10: API basin.
Z11: Diluent storage.
Z12: Diluent and Oil Export Pumps.

Z13: Offspec Storage tank.
Z14: Deleted
Z15: LLP Flare.
(Addition)
Z16: Gas Delivery Facilities (Gas Compression and Conditioning Skids).
The Zone 16 was divided in Zone 16A and 16B in order to optimize the
use of Main Station fire water system. The thermal radiation effects inside
of zone 16A (Gas Conditioning Skids) during a fire event will not affect the
zone 16B (Gas Compression Skids).
The fire zone 16A includes:

 Exchanger Skids X-2713 (V-401, E-101 and E-102)
 Separation Skids X-2712 (V-402)
 Glycol Regeneration Skid X-2711
The fire zone 16B includes:
 Inlet Scrubber D-2710 A/B
 Air Cooler A-2710
 Skid Compressor X-2710 A/B/C
5.2.4 Spacing
The safety distances required here-after do not induce separate fire zones but
however improve the overall safety of the plant:
a) ESDV location:
(Modification)
Fire resistance and the effects of blast over-pressure has been considered
when locating the ESDVs and BDVs, associated cabling, piping, valves and
actuators. The location of the ESDVs shall be carefully studied to find a
compromise between the hydrocarbon inventory between valves and the
remote location to avoid any damage to the valves in case of fire and/or
explosion as well as a possible passive fire and blast protection. ESDVs and
BDVs location shall afford maximum mechanical protection. Trunk-lines and
export line ESDVs shall be at 30 m minimum distance from any other process
equipment. ESDV`s installed on Inlet line and outlet line of Delivery Gas
Facilities shall be at 39.1m of distance from all borderlines of Exchanger

Skid X-2712 in the Gas Delivery Facilities. Fire and blast protection of these
ESDVs and pipes shall be provided if they can be exposed to a heat radiation
of more than 9.47 kW/m2 (3 000 BTU/h.ft2) or an over-pressure of more than
0.2 bar based on the credible leak scenario.
b) Oil heaters:
c) Process units:
d) Special provisions:
e) Equipment in the new production water treatment plant
(Addition)
f) Gas Delivery Facilities
For the case of Gas Delivery Facilities is recommended maintain the

distances proposed at the Plot Plan (See drawing N° 876C-04-47-L-DR-
003_K2). This plot plan includes the distances for equipment installation
and maintenance activities. The distances affected by thermal radiation
meet the required separation based on a radiation level of 13.5 kW/m2.
For more details see Document N° 209001-R-ACT-ACR-PETROCEDEÑO-
EXTERRAN “Análisis Cuantitativo de Riesgos- Interconexión de Paquetes
de Compresión y Acondicionamiento de Gas”. 1
5.2.5 Location of Rooms
Clusters:
The local unmanned electrical building of each cluster has been located at 30
m minimum distance from the wells.
Main Station:
The technical building of Main Station has been located at:
 30 m minimum distance from the process equipment.
 177 m minimum distance from the diluted oil storage area.
1
 102 m minimum distance from the diluent storage area.
The main control room of Main Station has been located at:
 60 m minimum distance from the process equipment.
 177 m minimum distance from the diluted oil storage area.
 102 m minimum distance from the diluent storage area.
(Addition)
The Electrical Sub-Station (TS-03) shall be located at 33.1 m minimum

distance from scrubber Exchanger Skid X-2713 and 22.7 m minimum
distance from 3st Stage Compressor Skid.
For more details see 876C-04-25-B-DR-001_K2 Restricted Area & Fire

Zone and Document N° 209001-R-ACT-ACR-PETROCEDEÑO-EXTERRAN
“Análisis Cuantitativo de Riesgos- Interconexión de Paquetes de
Compresión y Acondicionamiento de Gas”. 1
6. HAZARDOUS AREAS CLASSIFICATION AND EXTENT
6.1 Applicable Documents to Hazardous Areas
The classification of locations with regard to hazard of explosion or fire and selection
of suitable type installation must be in accordance with IEC 79-10 Electrical Apparatus
for Explosive Gas Atmosphere. Definition of degree of mechanical protection shall be
in accordance with IEC recommendation (see document CA04-04-33-P-DC-001
instead of Sincor Doc. No. 1020-13-00-1602-ET-001,”Electrical system design”).
The maximum temperature of any equipment located in a hazardous area, under

normal operating and abnormal conditions shall not exceed 250°C.
Wet oil and diluted crude were considered as stabilized crude oil (Cat. C).
(Addition)
The maximum identified temperature in the Gas Delivery Facilities is 160 °C,
under normal operating conditions. The attachment “D” of document N° 209001-
R-ACT-ACR-PETROCEDEÑO-EXTERRAN “Análisis Cuantitativo de Riesgos-
1
Interconexión de Paquetes de Compresión y Acondicionamiento de Gas” 2,

shows the normal operating conditions of the facilities gas compression
equipments.
6.2 Particular Requirements and Description of the Hazardous Areas
6.2.1 Hazardous Areas Around Accumulator Batteries
The battery used for the project are sealed type. No special room ventilation is
required.
7. ELECTRICAL POWER
7.1 Applicable Documents to Electrical Power
7.2 Particular Requirements and Description of Safety to Electrical Power
7.2.1 Essential Electrical Power
7.2.2 Emergency Electrical Power
Emergency electrical users will be supplied from rechargeable batteries (UPS

system), with 1 hour autonomy.
In the Production Water Treatment plant, the emergency electrical users will be
supplied from rechargeable batteries (DC system), with 1 hour autonomy.
The following are typical emergency loads:
 Fire and Gas detection and alarms.
 ESD and Blow-Down system.
 (Part of) telecommunications systems.

(Addition)
Inside the Gas Delivery Facilities the emergency electrical loads will be
supplied from rechargeable batteries (UPS systems), with 1-hour of
autonomy. These UPS System is fed from the electrical substation TS-03.
For Gas Delivery Facilities the following are typical emergency loads:
2
 Fire and Gas detection and alarms.
 ESD (all levels) and Blow-Down system.
 (Part of) telecommunications systems.
7.2.3 Vital Electrical Power
8. FIRE AND GAS
8.1 Applicable Documents to Fire and Gas

(Addition)
PDVSA IR-I-01: Sistema automático de detección y alarma de incendio
PDVSA IR-I-02: Sistema de detección de gases inflamables
PDVSA K-336 Alarms and Safety System
CA04-04-35-J-SW-001 Fire & Gas System Functional Design Requirements.
1020-13-00-1602-ET-019 Fire alarm system for building
CA04-04-35-J-SP-032 Alarm and protection system job specification

(instead of Sincor Doc. No.
1020-13-00-1500-ET-009)
Panel de Detección de Incendio Caseta de

876B-04-35-J-SP-003_0
Compresores
8.2 General Requirements of Fire and Gas
Fire and gas detection shall be installed in the vicinity of the following locations:
CLUSTERS:
MAIN STATION:
Fire Detection
Fire detection shall be installed in the vicinity of the following locations:
Z1: generation station

Z3: control room and administration buildings
Z6: Fuel gas system
Z7: Production Train A
Z8: Production train B
Z9: flare
Z10: API basin
Z11: Diluent storage
Z13: Offspec Storage Tank

(Addition)
Z16: Gas Delivery Facilities (Gas Compression and Conditioning Skids).
Fire detection for:
Zone 16A: Conditioning Skids

 Exchanger Skids X-2713 (V-401, E-101 and E-102)
 Separation Skids X-2712 (V-402)
 Glycol Regeneration Skid X-2711
Zone 16B: Gas Compression
Inlet Scrubber D-2710 A/B

Air Cooler A-2710
Skid Compressor X-2710 A/B/C
Inhibitor Corrosion Package U-2710
H2S Gas Detection
Flammable gas detection
Flammable gas detection shall be installed in the vicinity of the following locations:
Z1: Generation station.

Z3: Utilities and Buildings
Z6: Fuel Gas System.
Z7: Production train A.
Z8: Production train B.
Z10: API Basin.

(Addition)
Z16: Gas Delivery Facilities
Zone 16A: Skid Conditioning

Exchanger Skids X-2713 (V-401, E-101 and E-102)
Separation Skids X-2712 (V-402)
Glycol Regeneration Skid X-2711
Inlet Scrubber D-2710 A/B
Air Cooler A-2710
Skid Compressor X-2710 A/B/C
Inhibitor Corrosion Package U-2710
Smoke Detection:
Smoke detection shall be installed within the following locations:
Z1: Generation Station
Z3: Control room and administration buildings.

Z6: Instrument satellite house
Z10: API Basin
(Addition)
Z16: Gas Delivery Facilities

Electrical Substation TS-03
9. PRESSURE PROTECTION AND RELIEF, SHUT-DOWN AND BLOW-DOWN
9.1 Applicable Documents to PPR, SD and BD
9.2 Particular Requirements and Description of the PPR, SD and BD
The ESD system shall include the following functions:
ESD level 0, Black shutdown:
ESD Level 1, Fire Zone Emergency Shutdown

ESD Level 2, Unit Shutdown:
ESD Level 3, Process and/or equipment trip or individual process shutdown:
For Causes and actions summary, refer to CA04-00-35-J-RP-005 (instead of Sincor

Doc. No. 1020-13-00-1516-IN-002) ESD Philosophy and 1060-13-10-1590-ET-001
Integrated Control System.
(Addition)
For Gas Delivery Facilities, the ESD system must include the following
functions:
ESD Level 1, Fire Zone Emergency Shutdown (Z16A or Z16B)
ESD Level 3, Process and/or equipment trip or individual process shutdown
For Causes and Effect Diagram, refer to 876C-04-35-J-DR-030_K0.
10. DRAINAGE
10.1 Applicable Documents to Drainage Systems
10.2 Description of the Drainage Systems
Closed drainage:
Close drainage system of process effluents
All the process effluents from the process equipment and from the Fuel Gas Drum are
drained by means of a closed drain system to a Closed Drain Drum.
Additionally, the thermal relief valves located in the diluent trunklines in Main Station
discharge to this system. This slop is used for feed the Oil Heaters Feed Pumps by
routing back to slug catchers.
(Addition)
For Gas Delivery Facilities, all the process effluents from the process equipment
are drained to a Closed Drain Drum D-3301.
Open drainage:
Open drainage system of contaminated water:
Adequate containment and drainage has been provided around each equipment
involving hydrocarbon. Appropriate provision has been made for draining rain water
from those parts of the installation. First 10 min rain water from any area where liquid
hydrocarbon may be present will be drained into API feed sump via open drain system
and sent to an API Separator. After that the treated water are conduced to a Trim Oil
Separator and finally to an Observation Pond before the final disposal to the storm
basin. Any rain water more than first 10 min will bypass the API Separator direct into
the observation pond and storm basin.
For Producction Water Treatment plant, the contaminated rain water drainage is sent
toward the Diversion Manhole at existing open drain system. But all process efluents
from the process equipment of Producction Water Treatment plant are drained by
means of a Open Drain system to a Open Drain Sump T-3940 and then recycling to
Skimmer tank T-3900
(Addition)
All process effluents from Gas Delivery Facilities plant will be drained on the
way to the Open Drain Sump T-3940 and then recycled to Skimmer tank T-3900.
For Gas Delivery Facilities an adequate containment and drainage will be

provided around each equipment involving hydrocarbon. Appropriate provision
will be made for draining rainwater from those parts of the installation to the
existing facilities.
Open drainage system of Rainfall effluents
Drainage system of domestic effluents

Domestic drainage has been done independent from open drainage and closed
drainage. The domestic effluents from buildings are conduced by mean a closed drain
system to a Treatment Plant of domestic effluent (Sewage Treatment plant) before the
final disposal to the ditch.
(Addition)
Condensate of Gas Delivery Facilities
For Gas Delivery Facilities, the condensates liquids are coming from the
Scrubber D-2710 A/B, Skid Compressor Inter-stages Scrubber (X-2710 A/B/C),
and inlet Gas Scrubber of the Exchanger Skid X-2713. These liquids are
collected through Drain Header to finally flow to the Water Treatment Plant
(Skimmer Tank T-3900 A/B).
Additionally, the condensate liquid obtained from the Low Temperature

Separator V-402-Skid X-2712 (basically light hydrocarbon NGL *), is sent to the
Main Station Inlet Separator (Slug Catcher D-3001 A/B).
(*) Doc. N° 876B-04-18-B-RP-003_3 Drain Stream Summary.
11. FLARING AND VENTING
11.1 Applicable Documents to Flaring and Venting
11.2 Particular Requirements and Description of Flaring and Venting
11.2.1 Emergency De-Pressurization
The emergency depressurizing systems facilitate the rapid shutdown of a

plant in case of a mechanical failure and/or fire. The purpose of these systems
is to reduce, in a rapid and controlled manner, the pressure in equipment and
operational systems to avoid breaks due to mechanical failures and prolonged
releases. In general, the objective of emergency depressurizing systems is to
facilitate the control of a fire within 1 hour in conjunction with the other fire
protection systems.
Depressurizing systems are installed in high pressure equipment, such that

the material fatigue of the vessels and the risk of failure due to fire exposure,
may be reduced in an emergency situation. These vapor relief systems must
be installed in equipment operating above 17.9 kg/cm2 (254 psi).
At the Main station there is no high pressure equipment, so it is not necessary

to consider a emergency depressurizing system, except the fuel gas
compression system.
(Addition)
Inside the Gas Delivery Facilities, there are high-pressure equipment

(254psi), therefore it was necessary to include an Emergency
Depressurizing system.
The Emergency Depressurizing System includes two blowdown valve,

one (27-BDV-507) for Skids Compression X-2710 A/B/C and other one
(27-BDV-514) for Gas Conditioning Skids X-2712 and X-2713.
11.2.2 Impact of Flaring and Venting Operations
At the basic phase some gas dispersion calculations and heat radiation
scenarios has been reviewed and recalculated.
Studies has been carried out for the maximum release rate (blocked outlet) and
for not ignited release (dispersion) and for ignited release (radiation).
The dispersion and heat radiation calculations has been performed using the
least favorable wind speed and direction.
Cold vent at cluster:
At the prebasic engineering Heat radiation limits in case of ignition, including

solar radiation, were defined as follows:
 9.47 kW/m2 (3 000 BTU/h.ft2) at ground level (vent bottom)
 4.73 kW/m2 (1 500 BTU/h.ft2) at fencing and adjacent cold vent.
Pre-basic maximum gas dispersion horizontal distance to 50 % LFL

irrespective of the plume height is estimated shorter than the distance resulting
from the heat radiation estimation.
Flares:
Dispersion studies are summarized in Attachment 2
Maximum gas dispersion horizontal distances to 100 % LFL irrespective to the

plume height are shorter than the distance resulting from the heat radiation
calculations at 4.73 kW/m2 (1 500 BTU/h.ft2).
Process Venting:
During “Short term Water Upgrade Project” a Gas dispersion and area
classification study associated with the venting system of the produced water
tank T-3802 and the frac tank was performed. The attachment 5 includes the
report.
During “Main Station Water Upgrade Project an Air Dispersion Modeling Report
(see document CA04-00-13-K-RP-104), a Quantitative Risk Analysis Report
(see document CA04-00-13-K-RP-113) and H 2S dispersion modelling report
(see document CA04-00-13-K-RP-107) were performed for venting system
associated with production water treatment plant.
(Addition)
The Main Station relief header is capable to handle the relief loads caused
by a fire inside of Zone 16A, that is 48.222 Kg/h (all flow handled for Gas
Compression Skids plus depressurization of Gas Conditioning Skids and
evaporation of liquid contained in the three phase separator). Under relief
conditions (pressure, temperature and flow), the velocity of the Main
Station Relief Header is below the established critical velocity.
The dimensions of the K.O. Drum D-3501, as well as the liquid levels
established, satisfy the conditions of Gas Delivery Facilities relief,
assuming that at the moment of the contingency the level of liquid within
the drum is 30% of its total level.
The Flare FL-3501 is capable to handle the relief flow when a fire is
present in Zone 16A (48.222 Kg/h), due to the flare design capacity is
54.080 Kg/h.
The radiation generated by the Flare FL-3501 for the Gas Delivery
Facilities relief (48.222 Kg/h) is below the maximum level of 4,73 kW/m2,
calculated with the design capacity (54.080 Kg/h) and same composition
gas.
For more details see documents N° 876C-04-18-B-CN-001_3 (Análisis de

Perturbaciones del Sistema de Alivio y Venteo de la Estación Principal).
12. ACTIVE FIRE-FIGHTING
12.1 Applicable Documents to Active Fire-fighting
12.2 Particular Requirements and Description of the Active Fire-Fighting
12.2.1 Fire-Water Demand
Total fire-water demand calculations, for the SINCOR Upstream Surface

Facilities Project and MSWUP is available in Attachment 3 and are based on
the basic layout and vessel dimensions (shell & heads) and the simultaneous
deluge and two fire hydrants.
Fire water monitor flow rate shall be included if required simultaneously with
the deluge system.
(Addition)
For Gas Delivery Facilities, total firewater demand calculations is

available in Doc. N° 876C-04-18-L-CN-001_0 (Memoria de Cálculo SCI)
and are based on the basic layout and equipment dimensions.
To supply the firewater demand will be installed a deluge system,

additional monitors, hydrants and portable extinguisher with the purpose
to minimize the effect of fire in the adjacent equipment.
12.2.2 Fire-Water Pump and Storage
12.2.3 Fire and Gas Detection and Protection for Technical Building
For detail see document no. CA04-04-35-J-SP-032, Fire and Gas Detection
and Protection Philosophy for Technical Building
For detail for Produced Water Treatment plant, see document Nº CA04-04-
35-J-SP-005 Fire And Gas Detection And Protection Philosophy For
Technical Buildings
The fire and gas detection system for the telecommunication building,
Instrument Satellite House (ISH), TS-01, TS-02 Electrical Substation and the
Main Station Control Room (MSCR) will detect fire by use of smoke detection
and automatic initiation of fire extinguishing system (FM-200). Offices and
Battery Rooms within these buildings do not require an automatic fire
suppression system, only portable extinguishers are used. None of these
buildings will have fixed firewater system installed.
(Addition)
Inside the Gas Delivery Facilities, the Telecommunication Building

(ISH-02) and Electrical Sub-Station (TS-03) can detect fire using a
smoke detection system. Fire extinguishing system for the ISH-02 and
TS-03 will be done by using of portable extinguishers of CO2 (Inert
Gas). None of these buildings will have fixed firewater system
installed.
13. PASSIVE FIRE AND BLAST PROTECTION
13.1 Applicable Documents to Passive Fire and Blast Protection
13.2 Requirements and Description of Passive Fire and Blast Protection
13.2.1 Passive Fire Protection

(Addition)
For gas delivery facilities the following services will be fireproofed:
 Pipe Rack (According to API 2218)
NOTE: Equipment do not require fireproofing because they are supported

by concrete foundations.
The materials that may be employing as a fireproofing are:
 Concrete
 Ceramic wool
 Light weight proprietary materials
See Document N° 209001-R-ACT-ACR-PETROCEDEÑO-EXTERRAN

“Análisis cuantitativo de Riesgos Interconexión de Paquetes de
Compresión y Acondicionamiento de Gas”. 1
1
13.2.2 Blast Protection
14. EMERGENCY RESPONSE
14.1 Applicable Documents to Emergency Response
14.2 Description of the Emergency Response Features
14.2.1 Alert to Personnel
The Main Station has been equipped with an alert system including:
 A General Alarm system to be audible in open areas and in any building

where personnel could be present in normal operations.
 Supplementary flashing beacons in all high noise areas.
 General Alarms will be activated from a panel located in the TS-02.
General Alarms will be activated from a panel located in the control room of the
Main Station.
The fire alarm will be initiated manually and automatically from the Fire and
Gas system.
The escape and muster alarm will be initiated only manually.
Public Address and General Alarm system has not been supplied on clusters.
(Addition)
The Gas Delivery Facilities will be equipped with an alert system

including:
 A General alarm system to be audible in open areas and Electrical

Sub-Station (TS-03), where personnel could be present in normal
operations.
 Supplementary flashing beacons in all high noise areas.
 General alarm in Gas Delivery Facilities Plant will be activated from a

panel located in the control room in the Main Station and in the
ISH-02.
The fire alarm will be initiated manually and automatically from the Fire
and Gas system. The escape and muster alarm will be initiated only
manually.
15. REQUIREMENTS IN CHARGES LIFTING PROCESS
15.1 Lifting Operation Planning
15.2 ESCAPE, EVACUATION AND RESCUE
15.3 Applicable Documents to Escape, Evacuation and Rescue
15.4 Particular Requirements and Description of the EER Features

15.4.1 EER Strategy
(Addition)
Escape, Evacuation and Rescue from the installations (Clusters, Main Station
and Gas Delivery Facilities) is an essential safety to life feature that shall be
made possible for any possible combination of:
 fire and explosion scenario
 weather conditions
 anticipated simultaneous operations.
The SINCOR Upstream Surface Facilities consists of onshore installations in

an open, non-aggressive environment with existing paths of traffic. Therefore
the EER strategy consists basically in ensuring the Escape of personnel to
safe muster areas outside the restricted areas.
The Evacuation of the personnel will normally be achieved by the normal

method of transportation, by road. Supplementary methods for Evacuation
and Rescue shall be required for sanitary evacuation purposes only.
See documents CA04-04-30-L-DR-016, Alarm, Escapes and Safety point for

Main Station, and CA04-00-13-K-DR-100. Safety Signal for Main Station
Produced Treatment Water plant.
15.4.2 Toxic Products
Hazardous material data sheets has been prepared for all materials used in the
processing. These include, but not limited to:
 corrosion inhibitors
 de-foamer
 Diesel oil
 lube and seal oils
 carbon dioxide and other inert gases

 battery electrolytes.
(Addition)
For Gas Delivery Facilities, hazardous material data sheets have been
prepared for all materials used in the processing. These include, but not
limited to:
- Glycol
- Lube and seal oils
- Corrosion Inhibitor
15.4.3 Hot Surface Temperature
15.4.4 Acids
16. HUMAN FEATURES (HEALTH AND PERSONNEL PROTECTION, TRAINING)
16.1 Particular Requirements and Description of Human Features
16.1.1 Ambient Noise
17. PIPELINES
17.1 Applicable Documents to Pipelines
17.2 Requirements for Pipelines
17.2.1 Shut-Down and Blow-Down of Pipelines
17.2.2 Integrity of Pipelines
17.2.3 Inspection and Repair of Pipelines
18. STORAGE
18.1 Applicable Documents to Storage Systems
18.2 Requirements and Description of Storage Systems
18.2.1 Diluent Tank
18.2.2 Offspec Storage Tank

876C-04-00-B-RP-006_K1

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PETROCEDEÑO Documento No: 876C-04-00-B-RP-006

Página / Archivo: 1/876C-04-00-B-RP-006_K1

This document is issued herewith as an Addendum to the document (Upstream Surface

9.2 Particular Requirements and Description of the PPR, SD and BD.......................................25

1.1 Purpose and Scope

 Associated flow-lines, trunk lines and pipeline systems,

 Gas Delivery Facilities.

1.3 Main Principles

A SAFETY CONCEPT was prepared by SINCOR at the pre-project phase.

1.4 Developing the SAFETY CONCEPT at Project Stages

1.5 Handing-over the SAFETY CONCEPT at the End of the Project

2.1 Scope of SAFETY CONCEPT

The extent of scope of the SAFETY CONCEPT is:

 The Upstream Surface Facilities Project (SINCOR):

 Short term Water Upgrade Project and minor modifications:

 Minor modifications in clusters

 Water Upgrade Project:

2.1.1 Statement of Requirements

2.1.2 Operating Philosophy

However, it has been decided by Sincor that:

 Clusters are unmanned,

 The Main Station is permanently manned.

 The Gas Delivery Facilities is permanently manned.

3045-05-13-B-DC-001, dated May 13,2002.

Document N° 207028-1-R-HAZ-SINCOR-EXTERRAN-PDI rev_0 September 05, 2007

What If studies were carried out during the following modifications:

- Mod M812. Diluent System Evaluation.

- Mod M876C. Gas Delivery Facilities.

3.1 List of Applicable Documents

3.2 Prevailing Order, Scope and Deviations of/from Applicable Documents

3.2.1 Prevailing Order

4.1 List of Reference and Applicable Documents to Risk Assessment

4.2 Description of the risk Assessment Studies

Clusters: Clusters: Vents dispersion:

less than 1 KG/SEC.

Main Station: Flare Relief Load Summary

 Gas dispersion for ¼”, 1” diameter leak on a 6” pipe, horizontal at

(Refer to document number CA04-00-13-K-

- P Mass Flow (Kg/h) 41570

- S Mass Flow (Kg/h) 40650

4.2.2 Methods and Software

 13.5 kW/m2 (4281 BTU/hft2) for equipment, tanks, spacing

Skimmer Tank T 3900, vent fire 13.5 13 m

Considering the above,

 Cold vents at clusters are not an area of main concern.

Pre-Cooler A-2710 9.2 m

Considering the above,

In Gas Delivery Facilities:

34.6 m from the Separator Skid X-2712.

5.1 Applicable Documents to Layout

5.2 Particular Requirements and Description of the Layout

5.2.1 Impacted Area

5.2.2 Restricted Area

Flares not controlled by the Operator (ignition prevention measures and

whose main assumptions, criteria and results are summarized in previous

5.2.3 Split into Fire Zones

Simultaneous independent hazardous events in two separate fire zones have

It can be considered as an independent fire zone only if an accident occurring

It shall be possible to completely isolate the hydrocarbon inventory within a

 Maximum fire radiation: 13.5 kW/m2 (4281 BTU/h.ft2).

 Maximum over-pressure from explosion: 0.15 bar.

According to PDVSA IR-S-02 2 Criterios para el análisis cuantitativo de

Fire zones have been defined as follows:

Each cluster split into fire zones consists in: