1974 WLN 463 . 1974 RAJLW 389 . 1974 RLW 389 . 1975 AIR RAJ 23 .

1974 SCC ONLINE

RAJ 41 . 1974 WLN 7 463 .

Hariram Fatandas v. Kanhaiya Lal

Rajasthan High Court (Jul 10, 1974)

CASE NO.

S.B Civil Revision Petition No. 379 of 1973

ADVOCATES

D. Shishodia and N.P Gupta, for Petitioners;

P.C Mathur and V.L Mathur, for Non-petitioners
JUDGES

Shinghal, J.

IMPORTANT PARAS

1. 6. I have gone through AIR 1964 Orissa 159 on which reliance has been placed by the
learned counsel for the petitioners. In that case, no common question of fact or law was
involved, so that it could not be said that the requirement of Order I. Rule 1, C. P. C. was
complied with. I have gone through AIR 1935 Cal 573 also, but it cannot avail the
defendants because it has been held there that the conditions which rendered the joinder
of several plaintiffs permissible under Order I, Rule 1. C. P. C. do not necessarily imply
that there can be only one cause of action in the suit in which the several plaintiffs join.
AIR 1953 Bom 112 was quite a different case which depended on different facts and
different conduct of parties where the fact of each case required a different approach and
analysis. It could not therefore be said to be a case in accordance with the provisions of
Order I, Rule 1 C. P. C.

2. 8. It has next been argued that the learned Munsiff failed to take notice of the provisions
of Order II, Rule 6, C. P. C. which provides that where it ap-pears to the court that any
causes of action joined in one suit cannot be conveniently tried or disposed of together,
the court may order separate trials or make such other order as may be expedient.
Reference in this connection has been made to the decisions in Haridas Nara-yandas v.
Jagannath Das. AIR 1939 Nag 256 and Hardwarilal v. Narain Das AIR 1951 Simla 233.
There is a two-fold answer to this argument. Firstly, the question of convenience in the

Printed by licensee : Shantanu Yewale (Student) Page 1 of 4

 trial or dis- posal of the suit was not raised in the court below, and is apparently an
afterthought. Secondly, even if it is assumed that the trial court did not follow the
provisions of Order II. Rule 6. C. P. C., this court cannot be expected to interfere with
that discretion. This is the view taken in Hardwarilal v. Narain Das, AIR 1951 Simla 233
and in AIR 1935 Cal 573 on which reliance has been placed toy the learned counsel for
the petitioners.

JUDGMENT

1. This revision petition of the defendants is directed against the finding of Additional
Munsif No. 2, Bhilwara. dated May 22, 1973, by which he rejected their plea regarding
mis- joinder of parties and causes of action, The controversy centres round the following
facts.
2. One Lal Mohammad, who is not a party to this case, was the owner of a plot of land
which he let out to the defendants on a rent of Rs 50/- per mensem, with effect from
October 1, 1968. The four plaintiffs (who joined in the suit) alleged that the said Lal
Mohammad sold four different portions of that Plot to them, by four separate sale-deeds
dated April 1, 1971, and asked the defendants, by a registered notice dated April 7. 1971,
to attorn to them. The plaintiffs thereafter instituted the suit which has given rise to the
present petition, on August 3. 1971, for the eviction of the defendants, on the ground that
they required their respective portions of the plot for their reasonable and bona fide use.
They also prayed for the ne-corvery of Rs. 150/- on account of arrears of rent, for a period
of three months, and damages. The defendants raised a number of pleas, one of which was
a plea relating to mis-joinder of parties and causes of action which gave rise to issue No. 8.
As that issue has been found by the trial court against the defendants, they have
approached this court by way of the present revision petition.
3. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the learned Munsiff has
acted illegally in the exercise of his jurisdiction in deciding issue No. 8 against the
petitioners by his impugned order dated May 22, 1973, because the suit suffered from the
defect of mis-joinder of causes of action within the meaning of Order II. Rule 3 C. P. C.
Reference in this connection has been made to the decisions in Hadu Sahu v. State of
Orissa. AIR 1964 Orissa 159; Haru Bepari v. Kshitish Bhusan Roy. AIR 1935 Cal 573 and
Mansukhlal Dhanii v. Jupiter Airwavs Ltd..AIR 1953 Bom 112.
4. As has been stated, four persons have joined in this suit as plaintiffs and the question at
the threshold is whether that could be said to be permissible? Rule 1 of Order I . C. P. C.
which deals with the question of joinder of plaintiffs, provides as follows,--
"All persons may be joined in one suit as plaintiffs in whom any right to relief in respect of
or arising put of the same act of transaction or series of acts or transactions is alleged to
exist, whether jointly, severally or in the alternative, where, if such persons brought
separate suits, any common question of law or fact would arise."

Printed by licensee : Shantanu Yewale (Student) Page 2 of 4

Before any persons may join as plaintiffs, it is thus necessary that a relief in respect of or
arising out of the "same act" or "transaction or series of acts or transactions" should be
alleged to exist. This requirement has obviously been fulfilled in the present case as the
"same act" is that relating to the lease of the premises toy Lal Mohammad, to the
defendants, on October 1. 1968, on a rent of Rs. 50/-per mensem. The relief which the
-plaintiffs have claimed, jointly, against the defendants thus arises out of that basic fact, not
only in regard to that part of the suit which relates to the recovery of the arrears of rent and
damages, but also the other part relating to eviction from the suit premises. One essential
requirement of Order 1. Rule 1. C. P. C. has therefore been fulfilled in this case.
According to the other requirement of the rule joinder of plaintiffs would be permissible if
it could be shown that "any common question of law or fact" would arise if they brought
their suits separately. It is quite obvious in this case that the common questions of fact
which would arise on the filing of separate suits would be those relating to the existence of
the tenancy granted by Lal Mohammad and the nonpayment of rent by the defendants at
the rate of Rs. 50/- per mensem. It is therefore clear that both the essential requirements of
Order I . Rule 1, C. P. C. have been fulfilled and there is no reason why the four plaintiffs
should not have join-jed in their suit against the defendants. I am fortified in this view by
the decision in Sitaram Agarwalla v. Rajendra Chandra Pal, AIR 1956 Assam 7. which has
been noticed in iShambhoo Dayal v. Chandra Kali Devi. AIR 1964 All 350.
5. The question, nonetheless, remains whether joinder of causes of action could be said to
be permissible on fulfilment of the requirement of Order I , Rule 1 of the Code of Civil
Procedure? Rule 3 (1) of Order II bears on the point and provides as follows,--
"3. Joinder of causes of action.-- (1) Save, as otherwise provided, a plaintiff may unite in
the same suit several causes of action against the same defendant, or the same defendants
jointly; and any plaintiffs having causes of action in which they are jointly interested
against the same defendant or the same defendants jointly may unite such causes of action
in the same unit."

It has b'een urged by Mr. Mathur, on behalf of the non-petitioners, that Order I Rule 1. C.
P. C. applies to questions of joinder of parties as also of causes of action, and he has
supported his argument by a reference to Ramendra Nath v. Brojendra Nath. AIR 1918
Cal 858. It has been observed by Mookerjee J. in that case that Order I . Rule 1 C. P. C.
applies to the question of joinder of parties as also of causes of action and in taking that
view the learned Judge did not feel pressed by the phrase "save as otherwise provided"
occurring in Order II. Rule 3 (1). That view has been followed in M'onindra Lal v. Hari
Pada Ghose. AIR 1936 Cal 650 which has been approved by this court in Thakurji Shriji
v. Jagannath Das, 1950 Raj LW 328 . It may also be mentioned that the same) view has
been noticed and approved in Show Narayan Singh v. Brahmanand Singh . AIR 1950
Cal 479. I have therefore no hesitation in taking the view that as the suit conforms to the
requirements of Order , I . Rule 1 C. P. C., that by itself is quite sufficient to justify the
finding of the trial court against the defendants on the issue under consideration.

Printed by licensee : Shantanu Yewale (Student) Page 3 of 4

6. I have gone through AIR 1964 Orissa 159 on which reliance has been placed by the
learned counsel for the petitioners. In that case, no common question of fact or law was
involved, so that it could not be said that the requirement of Order I . Rule 1, C. P. C. was
complied with. I have gone through AIR 1935 Cal 573 also, but it cannot avail the
defendants because it has been held there that the conditions which rendered the joinder of
several plaintiffs permissible under Order I , Rule 1. C. P. C. do not necessarily imply
that there can be only one cause of action in the suit in which the several plaintiffs join.
AIR 1953 Bom 112 was quite a different case which depended on different facts and
different conduct of parties where the fact of each case required a different approach and
analysis. It could not therefore be said to be a case in accordance with the provisions of
Order I , Rule 1 C. P. C.
7. For the reasons mentioned above, there is no force in the first argument of the learned
counsel for the petitioners.
8. It has next been argued that the learned Munsiff failed to take notice of the provisions of
Order II, Rule 6, C. P. C. which provides that where it ap- pears to the court that any
causes of action joined in one suit cannot be conveniently tried or disposed of together, the
court may order separate trials or make such other order as may be expedient. Reference
in this connection has been made to the decisions in Haridas Nara-yandas v. Jagannath
Das. AIR 1939 Nag 256 and Hardwarilal v. Narain DasAIR 1951 Simla 233. There is a
two-fold answer to this argument. Firstly, the question of convenience in the trial or dis-
posal of the suit was not raised in the court below, and is apparently an afterthought.
Secondly, even if it is assumed that the trial court did not follow the provisions of Order
II. Rule 6. C. P. C., this court cannot be expected to interfere with that discretion. This is
the view taken in Hardwarilal v. Narain Das, AIR 1951 Simla 233 and in AIR 1935 Cal
573 on which reliance has been placed toy the learned counsel for the petitioners.
9. As I do not find any force in this revision petition, it is dismissed with costs. The parties
are directed to appear in the trial court on August 26. 1974.

Printed by licensee : Shantanu Yewale (Student) Page 4 of 4