Thayer Consultancy Background Brief

ABN # 65 648 097 123

China Coast Guard
Administrative Law
Enforcement Procedures
June 1, 2024

We request your valuable insights on China's newly announced Coast Guard

Administrative Law Enforcement Procedures (CGALEP), which states that the China
Coast Guard (CCG) can arrest and detain foreigners illegally entering or exiting the
territorial boundaries of the People’s Republic of China for up to 30 days without trial.
The CCG has the option to extend detentions up to 60 days in “complicated cases.”
The procedures will come into force on June 15.
We preparing a report on the implications of these new regulations and would greatly
appreciate your expertise on this matter. We pose a few questions below and would
be grateful for your perspectives:
Q1. China's new regulation is widely seen as an effort to assert further control over
disputed waters in the South China Sea. How do you assess China's intentions with
repect to this new law?
ANSWER: China issued Procedural Regulations on Administrative Law Enforcement of
Coast Guard Agencies1 on 15 May. This is a procedural regulation based on China’s
2021 Law on Coast Guard and subsequent regulations. It is a prime example of
“lawfare,” or China’s use of domestic legislation to regulate maritime law enforcement
activities “within sovereign jurisdictional waters (Chapter 2).”
According to Li Hongiai and Sun Nanxiang writing in the China Daily on 31 May, “The
procedures are applicable to China’s jurisdictional waters and airspace…”
Q2. What do you believe is the purpose behind China's media strategy in announcing
these regulations? Is Beijing attempting to send a specific message?
ANSWER: President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. has been more assertive in defending
Philippine sovereign jurisdiction over waters within its Exclusive Economic Zone. The
Philippines has stepped up the deployment of Philippine Coast Guard vessels to
protect Filipino fishermen at Basjo de Masinloc (Scarborough Shoal) and vessels
supplying a small detachment of marines on the BRP Sierra Madre beached at Ayungin
(Second Thomas Shoal).
China has responded by stepping up the number of confrontations with the Philippine
Coast Guard. China’s new Procedural Regulations aim to provide a legal basis for

1
Also translated as Provisions on Administrative Law Enforcement Procedures of Coast Guard
Agencies or Regulations on Administrative Law Enforcement Procedures for Coast Guard Agencies.
 2

boarding, detaining and using force against foreign military and civilian personnel
operating in what China claims are its “sovereign jurisdictional waters.”
The timing of China’s Procedural Regulations appears to be related to activities carried
out by a private coalition of activists, Atin Ito (This is Ours) aimed at supporting Filipino
fishermen operating in the waters around Scarborough Shoal by providing food and
fuel.
China’s Procedural Regulations are the latest manifestation of its use of “three
warfares” (psychological, information and legal) to intimidate the Philippines
government and to send a warning to other claimant states not to challenge Chinese
sovereignty claims.
Q3. From the standpoint of international law, particularly the 1982 United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), how do you view China's new
regulations?
ANSWER: Under international law, including UNCLOS, China has every right to regulate
maritime law enforcement activities in its Exclusive Economic Zone.
China does not have the right to extend its jurisdiction over waters legally claimed by
other littoral states. China cannot impose its domestic laws and regulations over the
high seas. These actions are illegal under international law.
China is a signatory to UNCLOS and is acting as a rogue state in its rejection and
disregard for the 2016 Arbitral Tribunal Award. This Award stated categorically that
“China's claims to historic rights, or other sovereign rights or jurisdiction, with respect
to the maritime areas of the South China Sea encompassed by the relevant part of the
'nine-dash line' are contrary to the Convention and without lawful effect to the extent
that they exceed the geographic and substantive limits of China's maritime
entitlements under the Convention; and further DECLARES that the Convention
superseded any historic rights, or other sovereign rights or jurisdiction, in excess of
the limits imposed therein."
China has never defined what are its “sovereign jurisdictional waters” and continues
to use “historical rights” to justify its actions. For example, Li Hongiai and Sun Nanxiang
writing in the China Daily on 31 May assert: “China’s sovereignty and maritime rights
in the South China Sea have been established through historical practices and are fully
legitimate… China was the first country to discover and name Huangyan island
[Scarborough Shoal] and has been controlling and exercising jurisdiction over it and
the surrounding waters since then.”
Q4. Do you see this regulation as a foundational step for China to enhance its legal
framework and enforcement in the South China Sea? What subsequent actions might
we expect from Beijing?
ANSWER: The Procedural Regulations are just another step by China to reinforce its
claims over the four shas (Pratas, Macclesfield, Paracels and Spratlys) and adjacent
waters in the South China Sea.
China often passes laws and regulations exerting its sovereign jurisdiction over waters
in the East and South China Seas. These laws and regulations carry stiff penalties if
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they are violated. But China’s enforcement of these laws and regulations is often
uneven and spotty.
If an incident occurs, China will invoke its laws and regulations to justify its actions. It
has already mounted a campaign of information warfare against the Philippines to
make barefaced claims that China treats all transgressions of its laws whether by
foreigners or Chinese equally.
Q5. In your opinion, what measures or frameworks are necessary for the involved
parties to resolve the ongoing tensions in the South China Sea? How effective is the
negotiation of the South China Sea Code of Conduct (COC), and what impact could it
have?
ANSWER: All South China Sea claimant states should issue official statements rejecting
China’s new Procedural Regulations as illegal and warn that any attempt to impose
these restrictions in their Exclusive Economic Zones will be met by a response.
Claimant states who are members of ASEAN should strengthen the wording of ASEAN
declaratory statements supporting the 2016 Arbitral Tribunal Awards and call on China
to fully comply with the Award.
Claimant states should also issue and/or support statements of interested maritime
powers and states like the Group of 7, European Union, United States, Japan,
Australia, and the United Kingdom.
The Coast Guards of claimant states should exercise together among themselves and
Coast Guards from maritime powers with an interest in rules-based maritime order.
The current negotiations on the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (COC) need
to address four issues before the COC is adopted: (1) the geographic scope must be
clearly defined, (2) the COC must be legally binding as a treaty under international law,
(3) the COC must have enforcement provisions and (4) third parties must have the
right to accede to the COC.

Suggested citation: Carlyle A. Thayer, “China Coast Guard Administrative Law

Enforcement Procedures,” Thayer Consultancy Background Brief, June 1, 2024. All
background briefs are posted on Scribd.com (search for Thayer). To remove yourself
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Thayer Consultancy provides political analysis of current regional security issues and
other research support to selected clients. Thayer Consultancy was officially
registered as a small business in Australia in 2002.