Chairman's Case Digests (Poli)

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BAR CHAIRMAN’S CASE DIGESTS

Constitutional Law I
Topic: Doctrine of separation of powers
Commission on Audit v. Hon. Pampilo

G.R. Nos. 188760, 189660, and 189333 (June 30, 2020) |Hernando, J.
Doctrine
It is the DOE-DOJ Joint Task Force that has the sole power and authority to monitor,
investigate, and endorse the filing of complaints, if necessary, against oil companies.
Considering that such remedy against cartelization is already provided by law, the RTC
exceeded its jurisdiction and gravely abused its discretion when it ordered the COA, the BIR,
and the BOC to open and examine the books of account of the Big 3 and allowed private
respondent Cabigao to become a part of the panel of examiners.
Facts
The Social Justice Society (SJS) filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief against Pilipinas
Shell Petroleum Corporation (Shell), Caltex Philippines, Inc. (Caltex), and Petron
Corporation (Petron), collectively referred to as the "Big 3." SJS challenged the practice
of increasing the prices of their petroleum products whenever the price of crude oil
increases in the world market despite that fact that they had purchased their inventories
at a much lower price long before the increase. It alleged that the practice constituted
monopoly and combination in restraint of trade, prohibited under Article 186 of the
Revised Penal Code, and violated Section 11(a) of R.A. No. 8479, otherwise known as
the Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Act of 1998.
The RTC directed the parties to refer the matter to the Joint Task Force of the
Department of Energy and the Department of Justice (DOJ). The Joint Task Force found
no clear evidence the Big 3 violated Article 186 of the RPC or Section 11 (a) of R.A. No.
8479.
Despite this finding, the RTC then ordered the Commission on Audit (COA), Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR), and the Bureau of Customs (BOC) to open and examine the
books of account of the Big 3 to determine whether there was indeed a violation of
Section 11(a) of R.A. No. 8479. The COA, BIR, and the BOC challenged the RTC Order
before the Supreme Court as it was beyond the mandates of the government agencies to
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examine the accounts of the Big 3.
Issue
Whether it is within the mandate of the COA, BIR, and BOC to examine the books of
account of the Big 3
Held + Ratio
The Court held that the DOE-DOJ Joint Task Force is duly authorized to investigate and
to order the prosecution of cartelization, pursuant to Sections 13 and 17 of R.A. No.
8479. Upon receipt of the report of the DOE-DOJ Joint Task Force that there was no
violation committed by the Big 3, the RTC, instead of dismissing the case, ordered the
COA, the BIR, and the BOC to open and examine the books of accounts of the Big 3 and
allowed private respondent Cabigao to be part of the panel of examiners. In doing so,
the trial court divested the DOE-DOJ Joint Task Force of its power and authority and
vested the same to the COA, the BIR, the BOC and private respondent Cabigao.
The RTC’s argument of the doctrine of parens patriae cannot be applied in this case,
considering that Congress by enacting RA 8479 has already provided for the mechanism
to protect the interest of the Filipino consumers. Furthermore, it is beyond the mandates
of the COA, the BIR, and the BOC to open and examine the books of accounts of the Big
3. The case of the Big 3 would not fall under the audit jurisdiction of COA, as they are
not public entities nor are they non-governmental entities receiving financial aid from
the government.
With respect to the BIR, its Commissioner is authorized to examine books, paper,
record, or other data of taxpayers but only to ascertain the correctness of any return, or
in making a return when none was made, or in determining the liability of any person
for any internal revenue tax, or in collecting such liability, or evaluating the person's tax
compliance. The BOC, on the other hand, is authorized to audit or examine all books,
records, and documents of importers necessary or relevant for the purpose of collecting
the proper duties and taxes. However, since there are no taxes or duties involved in this
case, the BIR and the BOC likewise have no power and authority to open and examine
the books of accounts of the Big 3.
It is the DOE-DOJ Joint Task Force that has the sole power and authority to monitor,
investigate, and endorse the filing of complaints, if necessary, against oil companies.
Considering that such remedy against cartelization is already provided by law, the RTC
exceeded its jurisdiction and gravely abused its discretion when it ordered the COA, the
BIR, and the BOC to open and examine the books of account of the Big 3 and allowed
private respondent Cabigao to join the panel of examiners.
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Topic: State Immunity; Basis
BPI v. Central Bank of the Philippines

G.R. No. 197593 (October 12, 2020) |Hernando, J.
Doctrine
The State in the performance of its governmental functions is liable only for the
tortious acts of its special agents.
Facts
BPI Laoag City Branch discovered outstanding discrepancies in its inter-bank
reconciliation statements in CBP in the amount of PHP 9 million. It was found that
among those parties to the scheme were employees of CBP: Valentino, a Bookkeeper,
and Estacio, a Janitor-Messenger Estacio. The RTC convicted the CBP employees of 3
counts of estafa thru falsification of public documents and held that CBP is liable for the
damages caused as their employer. The CA reversed and ruled that the State may be
held liable.
Issue
Whether the CBP may be held liable for the fraudulent activities committed by its
employees.
Held + Ratio
No, CBP may not be held liable for the fraudulent activities committed by its
employees, as they were regular employees performing tasks pertaining to their
offices, namely, bookkeeping and janitorial-messenger. They are not special agents of
the State.
The State in the performance of its governmental functions is liable only for the tortious
acts of its special agents [Article 2180, New Civil Code]. In Merritt v. Government of the
Philippine Islands, the Court defined a special agent as “one who receives a definite and
fixed order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office. Evidently,
both Valentino and Estacio are not considered as special agents of CBP during their
commission of the fraudulent acts against petitioner BPI as they were regular
employees performing tasks pertaining to their offices, namely, bookkeeping and
janitorial-messenger. Thus, CBP cannot be held liable for any damage caused to
petitioner BPI by reason of Valentino and Estacio's unlawful acts.
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Even on the assumption that CBP is performing proprietary functions, still, it cannot be
held liable because Valentino and Estacio acted beyond the scope of their duties. An
employer shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees acting within the
scope of their assigned tasks. An act is deemed an assigned task if it is "done by an
employee, in furtherance of the interests of the employer or for the account of the
employer at the time of the infliction of the injury or damage." The fraudulent acts of
CBP's employees Valentino and Estacio, were evidently not pursuant to their functions
and were in excess of or without authority; therefore, any injury or damage caused by
such acts to petitioner BPI shall be Valentino's and Estacio's own personal liabilities
which should not be imputed to CBP as their employer.
Topic: Public Trust Doctrine
Maynilad v. DENR Secretary

G.R. No. 202897 (August 6, 2019)|Hernando, J.
Doctrine
While the Regalian Doctrine provides for state ownership over natural resources,
police power provides fro state regulation through legislation, and parens patriae is the
default state responsibilityto look after the defenseless, the Public Trust Doctrine
brings these doctrines into a cohesive whole by enshrining the objects of public
interest, and backing the security of the people, rights, and resources from general
neglect, private greed, and even from the own execesses of the State.
Facts
DENR filed a complaint before the PAB (Pollution Adjudication Board) charging MWSS
and its concessionaires with violating of the Clean Water Act (CWA) for having failed
to comply with the mandatory sewer connection of houses and establishments as
prescribed under Sec. 8, and construct sufficient wastewater treatment facilities
satisfactory enough in quantity to meet the standards and objectives of the law,
notwithstanding court orders and the lapse of the five-year period provided by the
Clean Water Act.
MWSS argues that its obligation under Section 8 of the Clean Water Act has yet to
accrue given the lack of required coordination and cooperation by the lead and
implementing agencies under Section 7 of the law. Further, Maynilad avers that the
Court extended the 5-year compliance period in MMDA v. Concerned Residents of Manila
Bay. Manila Water asserts the supremacy of the Concession Agreements executed with
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MWSS, which was spread over 25 years. The PAB and the Secretary of DENR found
MWSS and its concessionaires liable for violating the Clean Water Act, and imposed a
fine of PHP 29M.
Issue
Whether the petitioners violated the Clean Water Act.
Held
Yes, the petitioners violated Sec 8 of the Clean Water Act. The obligation in the Clean
Water Act which requires water utility companies to provide for sewerage and
septage management services within five years of the law's passage is demandable at
once.
Preliminarily, however, the Court discussed the Public Trust Doctrine. While the
Regalian Doctrine provides for state ownership over natural resources, police power
provides fro state regulation through legislation, and parens patriae is the default state
responsibilityto look after the defenseless, the Public Trust Doctrine brings these
doctrines into a cohesive whole by enshrining the objects of public interest, and backing
the security of the people, rights, and resources from general neglect, private greed, and
even from the own execesses of the State.
In this framework, a relationship is formed – "the [s]tate is the trustee, which manages
specific natural resources the trust principal - for the trust principal for the benefit of
the current and future generations - the beneficiaries." "[T]he [S]tate has an affirmative
duty to take the public trust into account in the planning and allocation of water
resources, and to protect public trust uses whenever feasible." But with the birth of
privatization of many basic utilities, including the supply of water, this has proved to be
quite challenging. The State is in a continuing battle against lurking evils that has
afflicted even itself, such as the excessive pursuit of profit rather than purely the
public's interest.
These exigencies forced the public trust doctrine to evolve from a mere principle to a
resource management term and tool flexible enough to adapt to changing social
priorities and address the correlative and consequent dangers thereof. The public is
regarded as the beneficial owner of trust resources, and courts can enforce the public
trust doctrine even against the government itself.
It is in this same manner that the right to distribute water was granted by the State via
utility franchises to Maynilad and Manila Water, under express statutory regulation
through its delegated representative, the MWSS. The State conferred the franchise to
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these concessionaires, working under the firm belief that they shall serve as protectors
of the public interest and the citizenry. In this regard, water rights must be secured to
achieve optimal use of water resources, its conservation, and its preservation for
allocative efficiency.
Given that a decade has passed following the effectivity of the Clean Water Act, both
Maynilad & Manila Water’s compliance to Section 8 at this current year do not reach
20% sewerage coverage. They have fully complied with the proviso in Section 8, only
that they are authorized under the Service Obligations under the Agreements to
impose sewerage services charges and fees for the connection of the existing sewage
line to the available sewerage system. They still found space in their private contract to
prolong compliance thereto for fifteen more years. The completion of the septage and
sewerage connections have already been lagging for fifteen years past the effectivity of
the Clean Water Act. There is no one else to blame but petitioners' neglect. The public
has already suffered because of this delay, and no further extensions could possibly be
accommodated without inflicting additional disadvantage to the already aggrieved.
Also, the Court did not amend the 5-year compliance period with the ruling in MMDA
v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay. The court ruled there that as mandated by Sec. 8 of
RA 9275, the MWSS is directed to provide, install, operate, and maintain the necessary
adequate wastewater treatment facilities in Metro Manila, Rizal, and Cavite where
needed at the earliest possible time," and that it shall "submit to the Court a quarterly
progressive report of the activities undertaken. Section 8 requires "the agency vested to
provide water supply and sewerage facilities and/or concessionaires in Metro Manila
and other highly urbanized cities (HUCs) as defined in RA. 7160, in coordination with
LGUs, to connect the existing sewage line found in all subdivisions, condominiums,
commercial centers, hotels, sports and recreational facilities, hospitals, market places,
public buildings, industrial complex and other similar establishments including
households to available sewerage system xxx" within five (5) years from effectivity of
the Clean Water Act or from May 6, 2004.
The Court in the MMDA case was simply exercising its constitutional power and duty
to interpret the law and resolve an actual case or controversy. While judicial decisions
applying or interpreting the law or the Constitution form part of the legal system of the
Philippines, the Court does not dabble in judicial legislation and is without power to
amend or repeal Section 8 of the Clean Water Act.
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Topic: Powers, Functions, and Jurisdiction; Common Provisions of Constitutional

Commissions
San Felix v. Civil Service Commission

G.R. No. 198404 (October 14, 2019) | Hernando, J.
Doctrine
The Civil Service Commission embraces every branch, agency, subdivision, and
instrumentality of the government, including every government-owned or controlled
corporation.
Facts
Petitioner Melvin San Felix (San Felix) was charged with dishonesty by the Civil Service
Commission (CSC) for allegedly conspiring with another person to take the Police
Officer I Examination held on March 29, 1998 on his behalf. After the CSC found that
San Felix’s picture and signature in the application form and seat plan were not
identical with those in his Personal Data Sheet (PDS), they concluded that he conspired
with someone else to take the exam for him.
San Felix denied the accusation, insisted that he took the exam personally, and that the
disparity in the documents is due to a mix-up. Thereafter San Felix filed a Motion to
Dismiss, arguing that by virtue of the ruling in Civil Service Commission v. Court of
Appeals, the CSC had been divested of its authority and jurisdiction to conduct entrance
exams or promotional exams to members of the PNP.
The CSC Regional Office found him guilty of dishonesty. That decision was affirmed by
the CSC Proper and the Court of Appeals. The intermediate appellate court sustained
the jurisdiction of the CSC to investigate the alleged exam taken by San Felix and to
impose upon him the appropriate penalty or sanction.
Issue
Whether the CSC has jurisdiction to conduct investigations and render administrative
decisions based on alleged anomalies in police examinations despite the creation of the
National Police Commission.
Held + Ratio
Yes, the CSC has the authority and jurisdiction to investigate anomalies and
irregularities in the civil service examinations and to impose the necessary and
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appropriate sanctions. The Constitution grants to the CSC administration over the
entire civil service. As defined, the civil service embraces every branch, agency,
subdivision, and instrumentality of the government, including every
government-owned or controlled corporation.
As the central personnel agency of the government, the CSC under Article IX-B, Section
3 of the Constitution shall:
[E]stablish a career service and adopt measures to promote morale,
efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil
service. It shall strengthen the merit and rewards system, integrate all human
resources development programs for all levels and ranks, and institutionalize
a management climate conducive to public accountability. It shall submit to
the President and the Congress an annual report on its personnel programs.
Specifically, Section 32 of R.A. No. 6975 grants CSC the power to administer qualifying
entrance examinations for police officers on the basis of the standards set by NPC.
Under such law, the CSC issued Resolution No. 96- 5487. Such resolution provided that
to be appointed to police officer and senior police officer positions in the PNP, the
applicant is required to pass any of the following examinations: (a) INP Entrance
Examination; (b) Police Officer 3rd Class Examination; and (c) CSC Police Officer
Entrance Examination.
In case of irregularities or anomalies connected with the examinations, Section 28, Rule
XIV of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations specifically conferred upon the
CSC the authority to take cognizance of said cases
Based on the foregoing, the CSC undoubtedly, has jurisdiction to take cognizance of
cases involving examination anomalies and irregularities which the commission itself
administered. However, it bears noting that on March 6, 1998, R.A. No. 8551, which
amended R.A. No. 6975, became effective transferring the power to administer and
conduct entrance and promotional examinations to police officers from the CSC to the
NPC on the basis of the standards set by the latter. Thus, as of March 6, 1998, the CSC
had no more authority to administer entrance and promotional examinations for police
officers. This has been affirmed in our Minute Resolution dated September 25, 2001 in
G.R. No. 141732 in which we sustained the authority of the NPC to administer
promotional examinations for police officers. However, the lack of authority of the CSC
to conduct the examinations for Police Officer I on March 29, 1998 should not be used as
a shield to San Felix’s wrongdoing as he was not in good faith.
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Constitutional Law II
Topic: Bill of Rights; Due Process; Procedural and Substantive
Ante v. University of the Philippines Student Disciplinary Tribunal

G.R. No. 227911, (March 14, 2022) | Hernando, J.
Doctrine
To satisfy due process requirements in relation to student tribunals, what is crucial is
that official action must meet minimum standards of fairness to the individual, which
generally encompass the right of adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to be
heard.
Facts
A certain Mendez died due to hazing activities/initiation rites conducted by the
Sigma Rho Fraternity. Because of this, disciplinary actions were prompted against
Ante et al. Later on, they sought for the quashal of the formal charges, arguing that the
preliminary inquiry was invalid for violating Section 1, Rule III of the Rules
Governing Fraternities, which requires that the preliminary inquiry be conducted "by
any member of the Tribunal” and that SDT is guilty of prejudging the case against
Ante, thereby violating the latter's right to due process. The tribunal denied the same.
According to SDT, it emphasized that the word "by," as utilized in the Rules
Governing Fraternities, meant "through the means, act, agency, or instrumentality" of
any member of the SDT.
Issue
Whether there was a violation of due process due to alleged prejudgement of the
student tribunal in a disciplinary action
Held + Ratio
No. As correctly held by the CA, simply because SDT stated in the formal charges that
the preliminary inquiries were conducted "before" them, does not mean that they
themselves did not conduct nor participate in the same. Moreover, the
interchangeability of the terms "by" and "before," when being used in rules or in
statutes, and provided it would not cause grammatical confusion, is actually not
unheard of.
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We further wish to point out that Ante's argument of due process violation is
premature. There are withal minimum standards which must be met to satisfy the
demands of procedural due process; and these are, that (1) the students must be
informed in writing of the nature and cause of accusation against them; (2) they shall
have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel, if
desired; (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them; (4) they shall have the
right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly
considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school
authorities to hear and decide the case.
In the present case, we fail to see how can there be a violation of Ante's right to due
process when formal proceedings are only yet to begin. SDT is in fact asking Ante to
participate — the very essence of due process — but the latter so stubbornly refuses to
do so and instead resorts to procedural devices meant to avoid the proceedings.
Manila International Ports Terminal Inc., v. Philippine Ports Authority

G.R. No. 196199 (December 7, 2021) | Hernando, J
Doctrine
While due process has no exact definition, the standard in determining whether a
person was accorded due process is whether the restriction on the person's life,
liberty, or property is consistent with fairness, reason, and justice, and free from
caprice and arbitrariness. This standard applies both to procedural and substantive
due process. As applied to procedural due process, the question to be asked is
whether the person was given sufficient notice and opportunity
Facts
The Manila International Ports Terminal Inc (MIPTI) is a private corporation who was
granted a franchise through PD 364 to provide ports related services at the North
Harbor of the Manila International Port Terminal Complex. MIPTI entered into a MOA
with the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) for the operation and management of the
port.
PPA directed the MIPTI to answer the allegations of illegal acts committed by it. The
following day, President Aquino then issued Executive Order No. 30 revoking MIPTI’s
franchise due to substantial violations of the MOA, resulting in the deterioration of port
services.
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Issue
Whether MIPTI’s right to due process was violated
Held
Yes. Consequently, EO30 is unconstitutional for violating the plaintiff's right to
procedural due process. A franchise is broadly defined in jurisprudence as a special
privilege that is not demandable as a matter of right, and when granted, is subject to
amendment, alteration, or repeal by Congress. But a franchise is a property right and
cannot be revoked or forfeited without due process of law.
The 1987 Constitution provides that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law. This provision guarantees protection against any
form of arbitrariness on the part of the government, whether committed by the
Legislature, Executive, or the Judiciary. There are two components of due process. The
first, procedural due process, pertains to the procedures that the government must
follow before it deprives a person of life, liberty, or property; the second, substantive
due process, to the justification for the denial or restriction on life, liberty, or property.
While due process has no exact definition, the standard in determining whether a
person was accorded due process is whether the restriction on the person's life,
liberty, or property is consistent with fairness, reason, and justice, and free from
caprice and arbitrariness. This standard applies both to procedural and substantive due
process. As applied to procedural due process, the question to be asked is whether the
person was given sufficient notice and opportunity to be heard. On the other hand, as
applied to substantive due process, the question is whether such deprivation or
restriction is necessary and fair to the affected parties.
There was sufficient notice to MIPTI. EO 30 was published in the Official Gazette on the
same day that PPA implemented the order. Considering that EO 30 expressly provides
for immediate effectivity, and considering further that jurisprudence recognizes the
effectivity of laws that provide for immediate effectivity upon publication, the
publication requirement was deemed satisfied when EO 30 was enforced.
Nevertheless, the revocation of the franchise was still unconstitutional as it was done
without regard to the rudiments of fair play and the standard of freedom from
arbitrariness. The swift turn of events from the time MIPTI was notified to answer the
charges on 18 July 1986 up to the time EO No. 30 was issued revoking the franchise on
19 July 1986 only showed a predetermined plan of driving the company out of business
without affording it reasonable opportunity to present its defense.
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While the PPA had the power to recommend the revocation of the franchise, the PPA
was required to conduct a proper investigation or showing of any violation. While PPA
insists that its decision to recommend was justified under the impression that MIPTI
indeed committed the violations, such violations remain to be mere allegations, the
veracity of which could have been ascertained had PPA simply conducted the required
investigation.
Topic: Nature of due process in administrative proceedings
University of the Cordilleras v. Lacanaria

G.R. No. 223665 (September 27, 2021) | Hernando, J.
Doctrine
There are two aspects to due process under the Labor Code: first, substantive — the valid and
authorized causes of termination of employment under the Labor Code; and second,
procedural — the manner of dismissal.
With regard to substantive due process, according to Article 294 of the Labor Code, an
employer may only dismiss an employee upon just or authorized causes and has the burden
to prove that the dismissal was valid. "If the employer fails to meet this burden, the
conclusion would be that the dismissal was unjustified, and, therefore, illegal."
To comply with procedural due process and validly dismiss an employee, the employer is
required to follow the two-notice rule. In general, first, an initial notice must be given to the
employee, stating the specific grounds or causes for the dismissal. It must direct the
submission of a written explanation answering the charges. Second, after considering the
employee's answer, an employer must give another notice providing the findings and reason
for termination.
Dismissal for a just cause but without observance of procedural due process entitles the
defendant to an award of nominal damages as compensation.
Facts
A student filed a complaint against Benedicto Lacanaria, an Instructor-Associate
Professor at the University of the Cordilleras. The complaint was filed in relation to
Lacanaria’s acts against the student who was compelled to join a dance performance,
despite having a persistent cough, at the risk of getting a grade of zero. Lacanaria also
prevented other students from helping when said student collapsed in the middle of the
dance performance, and shouted insults at the student who reported afterwards that he
was rushed to the hospital after the dance performance.
Lacanaria was eventually dismissed by the University, upon the recommendation of its
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Grievance Committee. Lacanaria field a complaint for illegal dismissal. The Executive
Labor Arbiter (ELA) and National Labor Relations Committee (NLRC) both found valid
just cause for the dismissal, given that his actions violated his oath as a professor and
amounted to serious misconduct. In addition, both the ELA and NLRC ruled that the
University observed due process requirements as Lacanaria was given notice of the
charge and opportunity to present his defense. However, the Court of Appeals reversed
and set aside the NLRC ruling as there was no just cause for the termination. It added
that Lacanaria was not afforded due process
Issue
Whether the University observed due process requirements in the dismissal of
Lacanaria
Held + Ratio
The Court found that Lacanaria was not afforded procedural due process. There are
two aspects to due process under the Labor Code: first, substantive — the valid and
authorized causes of termination of employment under the Labor Code; and second,
procedural — the manner of dismissal.
According to Article 294 of the Labor Code, an employer may only dismiss an employee
upon just or authorized causes and has the burden to prove that the dismissal was
valid. "If the employer fails to meet this burden, the conclusion would be that the
dismissal was unjustified, and, therefore, illegal." To release the employer from this
burden, substantial evidence must be presented which is "that amount of relevant
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion,"
and ''not based on mere surmises and conjectures."
In this case, Lacanaria’s actuations clearly showed him unfit to continue working for the
University, considering his daily interaction with the students. He acted with wrongful
intent and not mere error of judgment since his statements were tainted with mockery
and insult. He consciously uttered insults with full knowledge that he was conversing
with a student whom he exercises authority over. Hence, he failed to display
professionalism and decency in dealing with his students.
The University exercised its management prerogative in good faith and without malice,
with no blatant attempt to defeat Lacanaria's rights as an employee, since it endeavored
to substantially comply with the requirements of due process. However, while
Lacanaria's dismissal was attended with just cause, it was marked with several
procedural due process errors.
To comply with procedural due process and validly dismiss an employee, the employer
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is required to follow the two-notice rule. In general, first, an initial notice must be given
to the employee, stating the specific grounds or causes for the dismissal. It must direct
the submission of a written explanation answering the charges. Second, after
considering the employee's answer, an employer must give another notice providing the
findings and reason for termination.
The Charge Sheet with Notice of Investigation charged Lacanaria with serious
misconduct and a violation of the Code of Ethics for Professional Teachers then
enumerated the imposable penalties without however specifying which provisions
were violated. But it did not inform Lacanaria of the date, time, and place of the
hearing, even if required by the University’s grievance procedure. Nonetheless, he was
provided with a copy of Flores' Complaint and other documents which supplemented
the details and reason for the charges.
In addition, Lacanaria did not receive any formal written notice of the first hearing, and
belatedly received notice of the second hearing. However, it is settled that actual
hearing or conference is not a condition sine qua non for procedural due process in
labor cases because the provisions of the Labor Code prevail over its implementing
rules. In this case, it may be said that Lacanaria was given the opportunity to be heard
since he was able to file his answer to the student’s complaint as well as a Motion for
Reconsideration on the decision terminating him from employment. Additionally, while
the notice of termination was issued by the Vice-President for Administration, rather
than the President as required by the University’s grievance procedure, the President
ratified the issuance when the President denied Lacanaria’s motion for reconsideration.
The Court also noted that when Lacanaria was not given a teaching load while the
investigation was pending amounted to preventive suspension without the appropriate
or required notice.
Given the University’s lapses on procedural due process, Lacanaria must be awarded
nominal damages as compensation, notwithstanding the finding of a just cause for
his dismissal.
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Topic: Bill of Rights; Arrests, Searches, and Seizures, Requisites of a Valid Warrant;
Search Warrant
Merlina R. Diaz vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 213875 (July 15, 2020) | Hernando, J.
Doctrine
The test of whether the requirement of definiteness or particularity has been met [in
the issuance of a search warrant] is whether the description of the place to be searched
under the warrant is sufficient and descriptive enough to prevent a search of other
premises located within the surrounding area or community.
Facts
Judge Morga issued Search Warrant No. 97 against Diaz for a violation of RA 9165 by
virtue of possession and control of an undetermined amount of shabu in her house at
Gitna, Brgy. Cuyab, San Pedro[,] Laguna. Consequently, the police searched the
residence of Diaz, found approximately 9 grams of shabu, and immediately arrested
then detained her. Diaz filed a motion to quash Search Warrant No. 97 on the ground
that the same was in the nature of a general warrant which failed to describe with
particularity the place to be searched. However, the RTC denied petitioner's motion to
quash for lack of merit considering that the description of the place as stated in the
search warrant was sufficient. The petitioner elevated the case before the CA, but its
petition was also denied.
Issue
Whether Search Warrant No. 97 (12) is a general warrant for failing to describe the place
to be searched with sufficient particularity.
Held + Ratio
No, the search warrant clearly complied with the standard since it particularly
described the place to be searched, which is the petitioner's house at Gitna, Brgy.
Cuyab, San Pedro, Laguna. The address and description of the place to be searched in
the Search Warrant was specific enough since there was only one house located at the
stated address (the accused-appellant's residence) consisting of a structure with two
floors with several rooms.
The test of whether the requirement of definiteness or particularity has been met [in
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the issuance of a search warrant] is whether the description of the place to be
searched under the warrant is sufficient and descriptive enough to prevent a search
of other premises located within the surrounding area or community. A "place" may
refer to a single building or structure, or a house or residence, such as in the case at bar.
The subject search warrant sufficiently described the place to be searched with clear
indication that the same was intended to authorize a search of the entire house of
petitioner, albeit confined to the area of her house, to the exclusion of the other two
structures or buildings similarly located along the street of Gitna. Simply put, the
constitutional requirement of definiteness has been met.
This Court found that the omission of the warrant to (a) indicate that the place to be
searched contained five rooms which were separately occupied by petitioner and her
siblings; and (b) confine the search to petitioner's unit is inconsequential and, therefore,
does not affect the warrant's validity. The units or rooms where petitioner and her
siblings lived all form an integral part of the house, which was sufficiently described
with particularity under the warrant. The rooms inside the house, which were in fact
occupied by family members of petitioner, cannot be treated separately as they form
part of the house where petitioner actually resided.
Topic: Bill of Rights; Rights of the Accused; Right to Speedy, Impartial and Public Trial
Salvacion Zaldivar - Perez v. Sandiganbayan

G.R. No. 204739 (November 13, 2019) | Hernando, J
Provision Involved/Relevant Law

Section 16, Article III, 1987 Constitution
Doctrine
The concept of speedy disposition is relative or flexible. A mere mathematical
reckoning of the time involved is not sufficient. Particular regard must be taken of the
facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. Hence, the doctrinal rule is that in the
determination of whether that right has been violated, the factors that may be
considered and balanced are as follows: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the
delay; (3) the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and (4) the
prejudice caused by the delay.
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Facts
In May 17, 2006 a complaint for unlawful appointment, under Art. 244 of the Revised
Penal Code, was filed with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of San Jose, Antique
(OPP-Antique) against petitioner Perez, then Provincial Governor of Antique. It alleged
that the petitioner appointed Atty. Fortaleza as the Provincial Legal Officer despite
knowing that he did not meet the minimum requirement of five years in the practice of
law for the position, as required under the Local Government Code of 1991.
Three years later, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Antique (OPP-Antique)
issued a resolution finding sufficient evidence to establish probable cause and
forwarded the resolution to the Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas. Another three years
later, the Ombudsman filed an Information before the Sandiganbayan against Perez.
Perez filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground the protracted delay in the
preliminary investigation violated her constitutional right to a speedy disposition of the
case. The Sandiganbayan denied her motion, given that she only raised the issue of
delay after her arraignment was set. Thus, her inaction was tantamount to a waiver of
her right.
Issue
Whether the petitioner’s right to speedy disposition of cases was violated
Held + Ratio
Yes, such right was violated. The Court emphasized that the right to speedy disposition
of cases enshrined in Section 16, Article III of the Constitution declares in no
uncertain terms that all persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their
cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies. This demands the
swift resolution or termination of a pending case or proceeding. The right to a speedy
disposition of cases is deemed violated only when the proceedings are attended by
vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays. What the Constitution prohibits are
unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive delays which render rights nugatory.
In Dela Peña v. Sandiganbayan, it was held that a mere mathematical reckoning of the
time involved is not sufficient. Particular regard must be taken of the facts and
circumstances peculiar to each case. Hence, the doctrinal rule is that in the
determining whether that right has been violated, the factors that may be considered
and balanced are as follows: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3)
the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and (4) the prejudice
caused by the delay.
As to the length of delay, approximately six years passed from the filing of the
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complaint before the OPP-Antique in 2006 until the case was filed before the
Ombudsman in 2012. This period to conduct and complete the preliminary
investigation is already excessive. Such a long delay was unreasonable and inordinate
so as to constitute an outright violation of the speedy disposition of petitioner Perez's
case.
As to the reason for the delay, valid reasons for the delay identified and accepted by the
Court include, but are not limited to: (1) extraordinary complications such as the degree
of difficulty of the questions involved, the number of persons charged, the various
pleadings filed, and the voluminous documentary and testimonial evidence on record;
and (2) acts attributable to the respondents. The prosecution offered no explanation why
a simple charge for unlawful appointment would require a lengthy preliminary
investigation, especially when the case only involved Perez.
As to the assertion of the right, it is not for the petitioner to ensure that the wheels of
justice continue to turn. Rather, it is for the State to guarantee that the case is disposed
within a reasonable period. Thus, it is sufficient that she raised the constitutional
infraction prior to her arraignment before the Sandiganbayan.
As to the prejudice caused by the delay, the inordinate delay over her case caused Perez
anxiety, suspicion, and even hostility. This defeats the salutary objective of the right to
speedy disposition of cases, which is "to assure that an innocent person may be free
from the anxiety and expense of litigation or, if otherwise, of having his guilt
determined within the shortest possible time compatible with the presentation and
consideration of whatsoever legitimate defense he may interpose.” To perpetuate a
violation of this right would result in Perez's inability to adequately prepare for her case
and the defense witnesses would be unable to recall accurately the events of the distant
past, leading to the impairment of petitioner Perez's possible defenses. Thus, the
petition was granted and the case against Perez was dismissed.
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Topic: Bill of Rights, Procedural or Substantive; Warrantless, Searches, Warrantless

Arrests; Exclusionary Rule
Uy v. People
G.R. No. 217097, (February 23, 2022) | Hernando, J.
Doctrine
1. Checkpoint searches are considered valid provided that it is limited to routine
inspection. When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search,
instead of routine, it remains valid provided that the officers doing the search
have a reasonable or probable cause to believe before the search that they will
find instruments pointing to a crime in the vehicle being searched.
2. The procedure laid out in Section 21 of RA 9165 is considered substantive law
and not merely a procedural technicality.
Facts
Under the power of COMELEC Resolution No. 6446, San Fernando, Pampanga PNP set
up a mobile check point to ensure the implementation of the COMELEC gun ban.
There, they flagged down Petitioner Sayon (Sayon). He was asked to produce the
Official Receipt (OR) and Certificate of Registration (CR) of his motorcycle, which he
was not able to comply with. Finding this suspicious, the officers asked him to open his
tools compartment and driver seat where they found 5 bundles of marijuana. He was
then taken to the police station where they interviewed him and marked the confiscated
items which were sent to the PNP Crime Lab. Upon examination, it was confirmed that
the seized items were positive for marijuana.
Sayon denied the allegations. He testified that he was on his way to Mabuhay when the
motorcycle he was driving had a flat tire. While changing it, armed men in civilian attire
arrived telling him that they will be inspecting his bag. Despite his opposition, SPO 2
Ricardo Llorin searched his bag but found nothing illegal. The officers then asked for
the OR and CR of his motorcycle. He explained that he left them at home. It was then
when the police arrested him and brought him to the police station in San Fernando. An
Information was later filed against Sayon for Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs.
The RTC found the petitioner guilty of said crime, which the CA affirmed.
Issue
1) Whether the warrantless arrest and search were valid
2) Whether the rule on chain of custody was adequately followed
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Held + Ratio
1) The warrantless arrest and search were valid. A military/police checkpoint set up
are considered variants of searching moving vehicles, which are not illegal per se.
Checkpoint searches are considered valid provided that it is limited to routine
inspection. When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search,
instead of routine, it remains valid provided that the officers doing the search
have a reasonable or probable cause to believe before the search that they will find
instruments pointing to a crime in the vehicle being searched.
The Court has established in jurisprudence the general rule that motorists as well as
pedestrians passing through checkpoints may only be subjected to a routine
inspection, vehicles may also be stopped to allow authorized personnel to conduct
an extensive search when there is probable cause which justifies a reasonable belief
on the part of the law enforcers that either the motorist is a law offender, or that the
contents of the vehicle are, or have been, instruments of some offense.
As applied in the present case, Sayon passed by the mobile checkpoint where SPO2
Llorin was stationed. He was subsequently flagged down, and SPO2 Llorin
requested him to present his OR and CR. The petitioner, however, failed to present
the documents. The police authorities were then suspicious that the vehicles may
have been stolen. And upon that probable cause, the officers conducted the search
which led them to find a bundle of marijuana inside the compartment and driver’s
seat of his motorcycle.
2) The Rule on Chain of Custody was not complied with. Section 21 of RA 9165
requires the apprehending officers to immediately conduct the marking, physical
inventory and photograph of the seized drugs. Physical inventory and taking of
photographs shall be conducted in the presence of: (a) the accused or the persons
from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel; (b) a representative from the media; (c) a representative from the
Department of Justice (DOJ); and (d) an elected public official, after seizure and
confiscation.
The procedure laid out in RA 9165 is considered substantive law and not merely a
procedural technicality. It requires that the police authorities implementing RA
9165 strictly comply with the chain of custody procedure, although failure to strictly
do so does not, ipso facto, render the seizure and custody over the illegal drugs as
void and invalid if: (a) there is justifiable ground for such noncompliance; and (b)
the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized evidence were preserved.
A review of the evidence submitted by the parties show that an inventory report
was not accomplished by any of the police officers. In fact, an inventory report was
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never mentioned in all the transmittal documents accomplished by the concerned
authorities. Absent the inventory report, the required presence of the insulating
witnesses cannot be considered to have been complied with. Consequently,
rendering a judgment of conviction without being able to establish that petitioner,
along with the required witnesses under Section 21 of RA 9165, were able to
personally see the movement of the seized drugs amounts to a violation of
substantive law.
Topic: Rights of the accused; Right to be Informed of the Nature and Cause of
Accusation
Villanueva v. People
Doctrine
The fact that the petitioner was able to mount a defense belie his allegations of the
violation of his right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him.
Facts
Petitioner Rodrigo Villanueva (Villanueva) assailed his conviction by the

Sandiganbayan under, what he claims is, a “fatally amended” information for violation
of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019. The amended information for the violation of RA 3019
consists of averments of "evident bad faith" and "manifest partiality" in giving
"unwarranted benefit" to the petitioner in conspiracy with the public officers.
Issue
Whether the petitioner’s right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him was violated
Held + Ratio
No, his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him was not violated. The Court agreed with the Sandiganbayan as to its
finding that the petitioner, when he allowed himself to be arraigned and proceeded to
trial after entering his plea under the Amended Information, is now estopped from
claiming, after his conviction, that the Amended Information is "vague," and that he
was deprived of the said rights. The fact that Villanueva was able to mount a defense
belie his allegations.
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Topic: Bill of Rights, Nature of Conditional Arraignment
Radaza v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 201380 (August 04, 2021) | Hernando, J.
Doctrine
An accused who travels abroad with the provisional conformity of the Sandiganbayan
is considered to have positively invoked and already validated the same judicial
power that permitted his travel outside the Philippines during the pendency of the
criminal proceedings. By the principle of estoppel, the accused's own actuations
countered and nullified any dispute on the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over the
person of such accused.
Facts
Arturo O. Radaza, as mayor of Lapu-Lapu City, and several other co-accused, were
charged with violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The charges
stemmed from alleged anomalies in pricing in the street lighting project for the 2006
ASEAN Summit. Radaza allegedly colluded with officers of DPWH, the government
agency tapped to facilitate the project, to overprice the contracts relative thereto.
Ombudsman-Visayas found prima facie evidence of overpricing and collusion, and

recommended the institution of criminal charges and administrative cases against the
persons and government officials allegedly involved before the Sandiganbayan. Radaza
filed a motion for reconsideration of the OMB’s resolution. During the pendency of said
motion, Radaza filed several motions before the Sandiganbayan, one of which was an
Urgent Motion to Travel Abroad. As a condition to granting the said motion, Radaza
was provisionally arraigned.
Pursuant to a Sandiganbayan order, the OMB conducted a reinvestigation and moved to

amend the complaint against Radaza and his co-accused. Radaza moved to quash the
said amended information, alleging lack of a preliminary investigation as a ground. a
motion which was denied by the Sandiganbayan. Hence, he filed a Rule 65 petition for
certiorari before the Supreme Court, raising several issues, one of which was the
Sandiganbayan’s acquisition of jurisdiction over his person in light of his provisional
arraignment.
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Issue
Whether the Sandiganbayan acquired jurisdiction over the person of Radaza as an

accused.
Held + Ratio
Yes, the Sandiganbayan has acquired jurisdiction over Radaza. Unlike the regular
courts, the Sandiganbayan sanctions conditional arraignment of the accused under
Rule VIII, Sec. 2 of the Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan.
Under paragraph (c)c of the said section, when an accused seeks to travel outside the
Philippines, the Sandiganbayan may arraign said accused, subject to certain conditions,
one of which was “[t]hat the accused will not lose the right under the rules to question
in a motion to quash the amended or new information filed subsequent to the
conditional arraignment.” Due to this section, the Court found it imperative to clarify
the grounds to quash an information that is amended after the conditional arraignment
thereunder.
Paragraph (c) thereof indeed secures the right to question in a motion to quash the
amended or new information filed subsequent to the conditional arraignment, which
may rest upon the grounds enumerated under Section 3, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.
However, the accused shall now be proscribed from assailing the amended or new
information against him for lack of jurisdiction over his person, as originally available
to him under Paragraph (c), Section 3, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. An accused who
travels abroad with the provisional conformity of the Sandiganbayan is considered to
have positively invoked and already validated the same judicial power that
permitted his travel outside the Philippines during the pendency of the criminal
proceedings. By the principle of estoppel, the accused's own actuations countered
and nullified any dispute on the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over the person
of such accused.
In the present case, Radaza prayed that he be allowed to travel to USA to visit his
brother, terminally ill and confined in a hospital in California. The Sandiganbayan
granted his Urgent Motion for Permit to Travel and he was arraigned under the original
Information charging him with violation of Section 3 (g) of RA 3019. As such, Radaza is
deemed to have acquiesced to the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction over his person in the
case before the anti-graft court. He should not be permitted to assail the very
authority that indulged in his personal privileges that ordinarily are unavailable to
an accused such as himself.
Radaza is now deemed a proper subject under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as
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an accused. He had benefitted far too much from the positive reliefs that he had sought
from and granted by the Sandiganbayan. Whether in civil or criminal actions, prayers
for affirmative reliefs constitute a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the defending party, as by doing so the latter is then deemed to have
voluntarily appeared and submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court.
Topic: Bill of Rights; Writs of Habeas Corpus, Kalikasan, Habeas Data, and Amparo
Miguel v. Director of the Bureau of Prisons

UDK-15368 (September 15, 2021) | Hernando, J.
Facts
In 1991, Gil Miguel was charged and found guilty of Murder. He was subsequently
delivered to the New Bilibid Prison. In 2015, Miguel filed the present petition for the
issuance of the writ of habeas corpus alleging that his continued detention no longer
holds legal basis in view of Rep. Act No. 10592 or the Good Conduct Time Allowance
Law (GCTA Law).
Issue
Whether Miguel’s direct invocation of the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction over petitions
for the issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus was proper.
Held + Ratio
No, the direct resort to the Court was not proper as it ran afoul the principle of
hierarchy of courts. Miguel should have filed his petition before the RTC.
In Cruz v. Gingoyon, the Court held that “[a] direct invocation of the Supreme Court’s
original jurisdiction to issue extraordinary writs should be allowed only when there are
special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition.”
Further, under Sec. 2, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, it is clear that the [trial courts], the
[Court of Appeals], and this Court exercise concurrent jurisdiction over petitions for the
issuance of the writ of habeas corpus. However, this does not mean that parties are
absolutely free to choose which court to file their petitions.
Mere concurrency of jurisdiction does not afford parties absolute freedom to choose the
court with which the petition shall be filed. Petitioners should be directed by the
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hierarchy of courts. After all, the hierarchy of courts general determinant of the
appropriate forum for petitioners for the extraordinary writs.
Fe J. Morada vs. Randy Rias, Ex-O Rolly Cebu, Desk Officer Romy Donaldo, Desk
Officer Fernando Domingo, and Other John Does of Barangay 176, Caloocan City
GR No. 222226 (February 14, 2022)|Hernando, J.
Doctrine
For the issuance of the writ of amparo, it is not sufficient that a person’s life is
endangered. It is not even sufficient to allege and prove that a person has
disappeared. It has to be shown by the required quantum of proof that the
disappearance was carried out by, or with the authorization, support, or acquiescence
of the government or a political organization, and that there is a refusal to
acknowledge the same or to give information on the fate or whereabouts of the
missing persons.
Facts
Morada received a text message that her son, Johnson, was arrested and detained by the
barangay tanods of Barangay 176, Caloocan City for the alleged theft of a mobile phone
in the house of barangay tanod Randy Rias. Morada went to the barangay hall where
she was informed that Johnson was already released on that same day from the custody
of barangay as evidenced by the entry in the barangay blotter, signed by Johnson
himself; however, Johnson was still nowhere to be found. Due to circulating rumors that
Johnson had been extrajudicially killed and that his body was mixed in cement to
conceal the incident, Morada instituted a petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo to
determine whether respondents had violated or threatened to violate Johnson’s right to
life, liberty, and security, and to compel them to determine the whereabouts of Johnson,
and the persons responsible for his disappearance or possible death. The RTC denied
the petition on the ground that there was no showing of any refusal on the part of the
tanods to acknowledge or give information on Johnson’s whereabouts such that there
was no intention to remove him from the protection of the law for a prolonged period
Issues
Whether the RTC should have granted the writ of amparo.
Held + Ratio
No, the RTC should not have granted the writ of amparo as there was a lack of
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substantial evidence that would warrant the issuance thereof.
The elements constituting enforced disappearance as defined under RA 9851 are:

a) That there be an arrest, detention, abduction, or any form of deprivation of
liberty;
b) That it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of,
the State or a political organization;
c) That it be followed by the State or political organization’s refusal to acknowledge
or give information on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the
amparo petition; and
d) That the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the protection
of the law for a prolonged period of time
The Court agrees with the RTC that the third and fourth elements are sorely lacking. In
this case, while it is admitted that Johnson was arrested for the alleged theft, it was
sufficiently established by the tanods that he was already released from their custody on
October 14, 2015, as evidenced by the barangay blotter, signed by Johnson himself.
Morada neither denied nor refuted the said document of release.
Further, by her own admission, Morada disclosed that when she inquired about her son
at the barangay hall, she was immediately informed that Johnson was captured but was
also released from detention the same day. In support, she was shown the barangay
blotter which bore Johnson’s signature showing his release. Thus, it is clear that there
was no refusal to give information on the whereabouts of Johnson. Accordingly, there
was no intention to remove Johnson from the protection of the law for a prolonged
period of time as he had been released already. Morada’s claim of lack of cooperation is
also lacking as it was shown that the tanods conducted an investigation, which was
however dismissed due to the lack of witnesses willing to help. The documentary
evidence provided by the tanods are accorded greater weight over the
unsubstantiated allegations of Morada. Hence, there was no enforced or involuntary
disappearance that would warrant the issuance of the writ of amparo.
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Topic: Who are Citizens of the Philippines
Uy-Belleza v The Civil Registrar of Tacloban

G.R. No. 218354 | September 15, 2021 | Hernando, J.
Doctrine
1. The requirement of electing Filipino citizenship when a child reached the age
of majority under Article IV, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution, the governing
law when Adelaida was born on November 24, 1942, and Section 1 of
Commonwealth Act No. 625, applied only to legitimate children. These would
not apply in the case of Adelaida who is an illegitimate child.
2. A passport proves that the country which issued it recognizes the person
named therein as its national. In fact, the very first page of a Philippine
passport explicitly recognizes the bearer as its citizen. The government's
issuance of a Philippine passport, in effect, is a recognition of her Filipino
citizenship.
Facts
Petitioner Sheila Marie G. Uy-Belleza (Uy-Belleza) filed a Petition for Correction of
Entry in the Civil Registry before the RTC of Tacloban to rectify the stated nationality of
her mother, Adelaida Go (Adelaida), in her birth certificate from Chinese to Filipino. To
support her petitioner, Uy-Belleza submitted her birth certificates from the NSO and
from the Local Civil Registrar; her parents’ marriage certificate stating Adelaida is a
Filipino citizen; Adelaida’s certificate of registration as a voter issued by the COMELEC;
her brother’s birth certificate stating that Adelaida is “Fil”; and Adelaida’s expired
Philippine passport. Upon the documents presented, the RTC granted the petition and
ordered the Civil Registry of Tacloban, the Civil Registrar General, and the NSO to
rectify the error. The OSG appealed the case before the CA which reversed the RTC’s
decision on the ground that the evidence Uy-Belleza presented has not “satisfactorily
and conclusively established that her mother Adelaida is a Filipino citizen so as to
warrant the petition to change the entry in her birth records. [...] Other than the bare
claim of Adelaida that she is an illegitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipina
mother, no evidence was presented to corroborate the same.”
Issue
Whether the evidence presented by the petitioner is satisfactory and conclusive enough
to prove that her mother is a Filipino citizen
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Held + Ratio
Yes. Records reveal that petitioner was able to sufficiently establish her petition for
correction of entry as to her mother Adelaide's citizenship.
First, Adelaida was issued a Philippine passport, the genuineness and authenticity of
which was not disputed at all by the OSG.
A passport is an official document of identity of Philippine citizenship of the holder

issued for travel purposes. It proves that the country which issued it recognizes the
person named therein as its national. In fact, the very first page of a Philippine passport
explicitly recognizes the bearer as its citizen. The government's issuance of a
Philippine passport to Adelaida in effect, is a recognition of her Filipino citizenship.
Second, the certificate of live birth of the petitioner's brother, whose genuineness and
authenticity was also not disputed by the OSG, stated the citizenship of Adelaida as
"Fil". Hence, to disallow the correction in petitioner's birth record of her mother's
citizenship would perpetuate an inconsistency in the natal circumstances of the siblings
who are unquestionably natural children of the same mother and father.
Contrary to the findings of the appellate court and the contention of the OSG, petitioner
need not prove that her mother complied with the constitutional and statutory
requirements to become a Filipino citizen.
The requirement of electing Filipino citizenship when a child reached the age of
majority under Article IV, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution, the governing law when
Adelaida was born on November 24, 1942, and Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No.
625, applied only to legitimate children. These would not apply in the case of
Adelaida who is an illegitimate child, considering that her Chinese father and Filipino
mother were never married. As such, she was not required to comply with said
constitutional and statutory requirements to become a Filipino citizen. By being an
illegitimate child of a Filipino mother, Adelaida automatically became a Filipino
upon birth. Stated differently, she is a Filipino since birth without having to elect
Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of majority.
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Administrative Law, Election Law, and Law on Public Officers
Topic: Administrative Law; Nature of an instrumentality of the national government
BCDA v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

G.R. No. 205466 (January 11, 2021) | Hernando, J.
Doctrine
The BCDA is a government instrumentality because it falls under the definition of an
instrumentality under the Administrative Code of 1987, i.e., "any agency of the National
Government, not integrated within the department framework, vested with special functions
or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special
funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter."
Facts
The Bases Conversion and Development Authority (BCDA) filed a petition for review
before the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) involving its refund claim against the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR), with a request for exemption for payment of
docket fees, for being a government instrumentality pursuant to Section 22, Rule 141 of
the Rules of Court, as amended. It based its status as a government instrumentality on
Executive Order No. 596, s. 2006.
The CTA maintained that the BCDA was not a government instrumentality and was,
therefore, not exempt from payment of docket fees. While the BCDA paid the fees
under protest, the CTA ruled that it did not acquire jurisdiction since the fees were not
paid on time.
Issue
Whether the BCDA is a government instrumentality that is entitled to exemption from
payment of docket fees
Held + Ratio
Yes, the BCDA is a government instrumentality. In a previous case of BCDA v. CIR, the
Court had already determined that the BCDA is a government instrumentality vested
with corporate powers. As such, it is exempt from the payment of docket fees. The
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BCDA is a government instrumentality because it falls under the definition of an
instrumentality under the Administrative Code of 1987, i.e., "any agency of the National
Government, not integrated within the department framework, vested with special functions or
jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds,
and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter."
It is vested with corporate powers under Section 3 of RA No. 7227. Despite having such
powers, the BCDA is considered neither a stock corporation because its capital is not
divided into shares of stocks, nor a non-stock corporation because it is not organized for
any of the purposes mentioned under Section 88 of the Corporation Code. Instead, the
BCDA is a government instrumentality organized for the specific purpose of owning,
holding and/or administering the military reservations in the country and
implementing their conversion to other productive uses.
Thus, it was erroneous for the CTA En Banc to affirm the CTA Second Division's
dismissal of the BCDA's Petition for Review based on the belated filing of the docket
fees, as it was exempt from payment in the first place.
Topic: Administrative Law, Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies, Denial of Claims
Philippine Health Insurance Corporation v. Urdaneta Sacred Heart Hospital

G.R. No. 214485 (January 11, 2021) | Hernando, J.
RA 7875, or the National Health Insurance Act of 1995, and its IRR.
Doctrine
Exceptions to the doctrine on exhaustion of administrative remedies include:
- When strong public interest is involved
- When to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be
unreasonable
- When there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial
intervention
Facts
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The Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (Philhealth or PHIC) contested the lower
courts’ ruling which granted the Urdaneta Sacred Heart Hospital’s (USHH)
reimbursement claims for cataract treatments or surgeries.
The PHIC Board of Directors originally denied the claims on the ground that the
treatments were incompensable for being conducted during medical missions or
through recruitment schemes, in violation of RA 7875, or the National Health Insurance
Act of 1995, and its IRR.
The RTC noted that the USHH did not comply with the procedural rules in RA 7875
and PHIC Circular No. 3, s. 2008, when USHH filed a complaint directly before the RTC
instead of filing a claim before PHIC Regional Office (RO) and appealing its findings
before the PHIC Protest and Appeals Review Department (PARD). However, there
being strong public interest involved, the trial court took cognizance of the case and
resolved to grant the USHH’s reimbursement claims.
Issue
Whether the non-exhaustion of administrative remedies was justified
Held + Ratio
Yes, it was justified. USHH's filing of the complaint with the RTC without first
exhausting available administrative remedies is justifiable in light of the denial of its
claims by the PHIC's Board itself, the body superior to the PHIC RO or the PARD,
where USHH was supposed to file an MR or appeal. The Board is composed of several
cabinet secretaries, or their permanent representatives, and representatives of different
stakeholders. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that the PHIC Board exercises a higher
authority than the ROs or the PARD, and that to file an MR or appeal to it would be
futile since the PHIC Board already directed its denial.
The trial court and the appellate court also correctly considered USHH's Complaint
as an exception to the application of the doctrine on exhaustion of administrative
remedies on the basis of strong public interest. Alternatively, the case may also fall
under the following exceptions: (a) "when to require exhaustion of administrative
remedies would be unreasonable" and (b) "when there are circumstances indicating
the urgency of judicial intervention.
But the "public interest" angle would only excuse USHH's failure to avail of
administrative remedies which would in turn merit the trial court's review of its case,
so as not to dismiss it outright due to procedural infirmities or lack of jurisdiction.
Despite admitting that the case falls under the exception to the doctrine, the Court
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reversed the RTC and CA rulings granting the reimbursement claims due to its finding
that the hospital and its personnel involved in the cataract screenings and subsequent
operations or treatments indirectly violated the PHIC's rules prohibiting the conduct of
cataract operations during medical missions or other means analogous therein.
Thus, PHIC's denial of USHH's claims was justified since the hospital actively
employed means or methods to recruit cataract patients under conditions which are
prohibited in Circular No. 19, series of 2007. Even if the surgeries or treatments were
strictly not performed during a medical mission, it appeared that the cataract patients
were actively recruited by USHH.
Topic: Administrative Law, Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies, Fraudulent

Qualifying Eligibility as a Public School Teacher
Professional Regulation Commission v. Alo

G.R. No. 214435 (February 14, 2022) | Hernando, J.
Doctrine
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is grounded on practical
reasons, including allowing the administrative agencies concerned to take every
opportunity to correct its own errors, as well as affording the litigants the opportunity
to avail of speedy relief through the administrative processes and sparing them of the
laborious and costly resort to courts.
Facts
Dayamon Didato Alo was charged with unprofessional conduct and/or unbecoming
conduct before the Board for Professional Teachers (Board) after allegedly using fraud
or deceit in obtaining a certificate of registration and professional license. The Board
found her guilty of such charge and revoked her certification of registration and license
as professional teacher. Instead of elevating the case to the PRC, Alo filed a petition for
review under Rule 43. The appellate court reversed the Board’s decision. Hence, this
appeal by the Board and PRC.
Issue
Whether the CA had jurisdiction to directly review the case
Held + Ratio
Yes, the CA had jurisdiction. There is no law granting the PRC exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over cases decided by the Board, nor is there any law excluding such
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cases from being taken cognizance by the CA through a petition for review under
Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. However, Alo’s case must be dismissed for lack of
cause of action, following her failure to exhaust all administrative remedies.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is grounded on practical reasons,

including allowing the administrative agencies concerned to take every opportunity to
correct its own errors, as well as affording the litigants the opportunity to avail of
speedy relief through the administrative processes and sparing them of the laborious
and costly resort to courts.
In Republic v. Lacap, the Court pronounced the general rule that general rule is that
before a party may seek the intervention of the court, he should first avail of all the
means afforded him by administrative processes. The issues which administrative
agencies are authorized to decide should not be summarily taken from them and
submitted to a court without first giving such administrative agency the opportunity to
dispose of the same after due deliberation. This general rule is subject to certain
exceptions, provided for in the case of The Roman Catholic Bishop of Malolos, Inc. v. The
Heirs of Mariano Marcos, to wit:
(a) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine;
(b) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to
lack of jurisdiction;
(c) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will
irretrievably prejudice the complainant;
(d) where the amount involved is relatively so small as to make the rule
impractical and oppressive;
(e) where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be
decided by the courts of justice;
(f) where judicial intervention is urgent;
(g) where the application of the doctrine may cause great and irreparable
damage;
(h) where the controverted acts violate due process;
(i) where the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been
rendered moot;
(j) where there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy;
(k) where strong public interest is involved; and
(l) in quo warranto proceedings.
None of these exceptions, however, apply to the present case. The Court thus reversed
the CA and reinstated the Board’s Decision.
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Topic: Recovery of Ill-gotten wealth; Award of Temperate Damages
Disini v. Republic
G.R. No. 205172, June 15, 2021 | Hernando, J.
Doctrine
Republic is entitled to temperate damages for the pecuniary loss and the Filipino
people suffered on account of one’s illegal acquisitions of substantial amounts of
money, albeit the amount thereof not being proven with certainty.
Facts
This case involves the recovery of ill-gotten wealth against Disini, a close associate of
former President Ferdinand Marcos Sr., in relation to the Bataan Nuclear Power Plant
(BNPP) project. Sandiganbayan issued a decision declaring the commissions received
by Disini in relation to the BNPP project to be ill-gotten wealth. However, it dismissed
the Republic’s claim for actual, temperate, nominal and exemplary damages, attorney's
fees and other judicial costs.
Issue
Whether the government is entitled to the award of temperate damages despite failure
to present sufficient proof on the amount of money constituting ill-gotten wealth
Held+Ratio
Yes, the government is entitled to the award of temperate damages. The Court
recognized that the Republic preponderantly proved that Disini indeed received
substantial commissions and thus, it is entitled to recover even without a definite proof
of its total amount. In lieu thereof, the Court granted the Republic's claim for temperate
and exemplary damages.
While it is true that the Republic failed to prove the amount of commissions received,
this does not mean, however, that Disini is free from any liability under this civil action
for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages. Thus, under the
principle of unjust enrichment, the Court upheld the Republic's right to recover these
commissions in favor of the Filipino people. No one should unjustly enrich himself by
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receiving commissions in connection with a government project when clearly he has no
right for it nor entitled to retain the same.
Since recovery thereof cannot be effected due to the absence of a definite amount, the
Court deemed it proper to award the Republic temperate damages for the pecuniary
loss and the Filipino people suffered on account of Disini's illegal acquisitions of
substantial commissions from Westinghouse and B&R, albeit the amount thereof not
being proven with certainty. Under Article 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate or
moderate damages, which are more than nominal but less than compensatory damages,
may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but
its amount cannot, from the nature of: the case, be determined with certainty.
Here, the Republic is entitled to recover temperate damages as there is no doubt that
Disini trampled on the rights of the Filipino people to benefit from, and make good use
of, these ill-gotten wealth, i.e., substantial commissions or kickbacks he acquired; and
that the whole nation significantly suffered pecuniary loss due to Disini's illegal
acquisition of these public funds.
Considering the relevant circumstances of this case, the amount of One Billion Pesos
(P1,000,000,000.00) as temperate damages is reasonable and justified.
Topic: Liability of a Private Person under R.A. 3019
Villanueva v. People
Doctrine
The fact that the petitioner was able to mount a defense belie his allegations of the
violation of his right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him.
Facts
Petitioner Rodrigo Villanueva (Villanueva) assailed his conviction by the

Sandiganbayan under, what he claims is, a “fatally amended” information for violation
of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019. The amended information for the violation of RA 3019
consists of averments of "evident bad faith" and "manifest partiality" in giving
"unwarranted benefit" to the petitioner in conspiracy with the public officers.
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Issue
Whether the Sandiganbayan erred in convicting the petitioner under COA Circular No.
92-386, when it is not a penal law
Held + Ratio
No, the Sandiganbayan did not err. A charge under Sec, 3(e) of RA 3019 may be hinged
from acts also penalized under other provisions of law, and when the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense are alleged in the Information,
conviction is proper.
The elements of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 are: (a) the accused must be a public
officer discharging administrative, judicial, or official functions; (b) he/she must have
acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence; and (c)
his/her action caused undue injury to any party, including the government, or gave any
private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
functions. The allegations mentioned in the Amended Information consist of averments
of "evident bad faith" and "manifest partiality" in giving "unwarranted benefit" to the
petitioner in conspiracy with the public officers. Thus, the parameters set by the rules
were fulfilled. The assailed Decision is clear that petitioner was found to have violated
Section 3(e) of RA 3019, specifying the instances of his connivance in order to obtain
unwarranted benefits, and was consequently unduly awarded the contracts for the
purchase of medicines.
The assailed Decision also cited the provisions of the then prevailing Circular No.
92-38648 of the Commission on Audit on the instances when public bidding is a failure,
viz.:
Section 95- When Public Bidding Deemed a Failure - For purposes of these rules and
regulations, public bidding(s) is deemed to have failed under any of the following
circumstances:
a) When no or only one qualified bid is received on or before the schedule date of
the opening of bids; or
b) When all the bids submitted are defective and/or non-complying bids or not
responsive to the terms, conditions and specifications of the tender documents.
The citation is a direct reference to how petitioner and his co-accused public officers
violated Section 3(e) of RA 3019. The accused public officers' noncompliance with the
COA Circular, and their willful omission to declare that the bidding that took place was
a "failed bidding" were badges of "manifest partiality" and "giving of unwarranted
benefits" to the petitioner, whose acquiescence to the award constituted the offense
charged.
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The prosecution satisfactorily established that there was a failure of bidding, since at the
time of the public bidding on January 15, 2001, the accreditation of Europharma and
Pharmawealth were still suspended by the DOH as shown by the November 23, 2000
letter and September 29, 2000 Memorandum of DOH Undersecretary Ma. Margarita M.
Galon. Consequently, only Mallix Drug is supposedly qualified. Although, petitioner
averred that such accreditation was not relevant to the bidding, he recognized that
Europharma's accreditation was non-existent at the time of the bidding since the
accreditation was issued only on January 17, 2001.
Topic: Law on Public Officers: Jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman
Dormido v. Ombudsman
G.R. No. 198241 (February 24, 2020)| Hernando, J.
Doctrine
Higher tribunals may disturb the findings of a fact-finding body and its ensuing
conclusions upon a determination of grave abuse of discretion through the writ of
certiorari.
Facts
Respondent Adobo, then LMB OIC-Director of Lands, sought the opinion of the
Undersecretary for Legal Affairs of the DENR regarding the validity of Respondent
Manahan’s claims of ownership over Lot 823 among others. Thereafter, Adobo issued
the Deed of Conveyance over the subject lot in favor of Spouses Manahan.
Consequently, Petitioner Dormido filed a Complaint before the Ombudsman charging
the respondents with conspiracy and violation of Section 3 (e) in relation to Section 4 (b)
of RA 3019. She alleged that respondents disregarded the basis of her claims on Lot 823,
particularly the existence of the Manotoks' titles thereto. The Ombudsman dismissed
Dormido's Complaint, holding that while the Complaint charged respondents with
violation of RA 3019, the main issue therein was who between the Manotoks and the
spouses Manahan hold a valid title over the disputed property.
Issue
Whether or not the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing Dormido's criminal complaint against
respondents for alleged violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019.
Held + Ratio
No, the Ombudsman did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in dismissing Dormido’s criminal complaint against
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respondents for alleged violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 because the
arguments presented by Dormido do not allege errors of jurisdiction
The Court held that for certiorari to issue against the public officer, court, or tribunal
complained of, the standard is “grave abuse of discretion”. It occurs when such
"capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction,
or [an] exercise of power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility, or an exercise of judgment so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act
in a manner not at all in contemplation of law."
Dormido complains that Adobo and De la Peña, in the exercise of their official duties,
gave the spouses Manahan an unwarranted benefit, and that despite prima facie
showing of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, the Ombudsman dismissed her
Complaint. Such accusations against respondents, without more, cannot be seen as
grave abuse of discretion amounting to an evasion of a positive duty. At most, these
only express mere disagreement with the Ombudsman's judgment that do not proceed
from grave abuse of discretion.
Plainly, the Petition contained no allegations of the Ombudsman's supposed acts of

grave abuse of discretion adequate to reverse the latter's pronouncements and indict
respondents instead for the charges of graft and corruption. Even if so alleged, there is
no clear showing of arbitrariness on the part of the Ombudsman in dismissing
Dormido's Complaint.
Topic: Law on Public Officers; Gross Neglect and Grave Misconduct
Civil Service Commission v. Beray

G.R. No. 191946 and 191974 (December 10, 2019) | Hernando, J.
Doctrine
In cases involving public officials, there is gross negligence when a breach of duty is
flagrant and palpable.
Facts
Due to their participation in anomalous transactions, respondent Beray was found
guilty of gross neglect of duty and was met with the penalty of dismissal from service
while respondents Espina and Tadeo were found liable for inefficiency in the
performance of official duties, and were suspended for six months and one day. Upon
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appeal, the CA held that (1) Espina and Tadeo were liable for inefficiency and
incompetence in the performance of their functions as Accountant III, and (2) Beray was
only liable for simple neglect of duty.
Issue
Whether or not Beray’s acts constituted simple neglect of duty
Held + Ratio
No, Beray’s acts of not examining the alteration in the ROA and not paying much
attention to the absent countersignatures thereto did not only amount to simple
neglect of duty. He is guilty of gross negligence, which is a grave offense punishable
by dismissal even for the first offense.
The Court defined gross neglect of duty – or gross negligence – as "negligence
characterized by the want of even slight care, or by acting or omitting to act in a
situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally,
with a conscious indifference to the consequences, insofar as other persons may be
affected. It is the omission of that care [which] even inattentive and thoughtless men
never fail to give to their own property." [Office of the Ombudsman v. De Leon]. In cases
involving public officials, there is gross negligence when a breach of duty is flagrant
and palpable.
As Chief of the Subsidiary and Revenue Section, Beray supervised the recording and
control of the Notice of Cash Allocation issued by the DBM and exercised a delegated
authority to sign, on behalf of the Chief Accountant, the payment of supplies, materials,
furniture and equipment not exceeding PHP 200,000. In this case, the Court found that
the ROA was altered from PHP 24,980 to PHP 269,350 and that there were no
countersignatures affixed to the ROA. The Court held that Beray was a public official
holding a supervisory position and as such, he had a discretionary power to examine
the documents brought to his desk for approval. His position requires him to be
meticulous in the approval of disbursement of public funds and to be more circumspect
in examining the documents for his approval.
Thus, Beray is guilty of gross neglect of duty as he miserably failed to efficiently and
effectively discharge his functions and obligations. His acts of heavily depending on his
subordinates without carefully examining the documents presented to him for
disbursement of funds clearly exhibit his flagrant and culpable unwillingness to
perform his official duties with the exactitude required of him. As such, the penalty of
dismissal from service is also proper.
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Topic: Law on Public Officers: Liability for Splitting of Contracts
Miñao v. Ombudsman
G.R. No. 231042. February 23, 2022 | Hernando, J.
Doctrine
Whatever form splitting has been resorted to, the idea is to do away with and
circumvent control measures promulgated by the government. It is immaterial
whether or not loss or damage has been sustained by, or caused to, the government.
Facts
An audit report shows that the 1st Engineering District of the DPWH in Sta. Isabel,
Dipolog City committed splitting of contracts in procuring guardrails and guardrail
posts amounting to P5.5M under the Special Allotment Release Order issued by the
DBM for certain national roads. In particular, it (1) resorted to splitting of contracts by
awarding 11 purchase orders worth P500k each to AUF Enterprises without public
bidding; (2) purchased overpriced guardrails and guardrail posts from AUF
Enterprises; and (3) left guardrails and guardrail posts at the project site resulting in
wastage of government resources in the amount of P40.1M. Defendants claimed that
under the SARO, the main project was split into 11 projects, and that said projects, with
an aggregate amount of P5.5M were already divided in the amount of P500k per project
under the SARO. Hence, it just implemented the same in good faith.
Issue:
Whether the acts committed by the 1st Engineering District constitutes spitting of
contract
Held + Ratio
Yes. Section 54.1 of the IRR of RA 9184 expressly prohibits the splitting of government
contracts.
In order to determine whether the division of the procurement project into two
packages amounts to splitting of contract, it must be clearly shown that the act must
have been done for the purpose of circumventing or evading legal and procedural
requirements, i.e., there should be a determination that, despite resorting to public
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bidding for both packages, the division into two packages was done to circumvent or
evade the legal and procedural requirements under RA 9184 and its IRR.
In this case, nothing in the SARO states that the rehabilitation or improvement of the
National Roads should be implemented through 11 separate projects, which would
thereby necessitate the execution of eleven 11 separate contracts. Nor does it appear that
DBM had this supposed directive in mind to petitioner when it issued the SARO. In
fact, it is not within the mandate of DBM to dictate the manner by which DPWH should
implement the rehabilitation or improvement of the national roads.
Furthermore, since the same materials and same specifications were procured for the
National Roads' rehabilitation and improvement, common sense dictates that there
could only be ONE procurement contract for all sub-sections of the project.
The Court also agreed with the findings of the OMB-Mindanao that the 11 sections
enumerated in Annex "A" of the SARO merely refer to locations along the national
roads, and the amount of P500,000.00 indicated opposite the 11 sections pertain to the
budget allocation for each of the locations along said national roads.
Finally, Petitioner maintains that he did not commit splitting of contracts since he did
not circumvent or avoid the requirements of public bidding under RA 9184 or its IRR.
He merely resorted to the use of the simplified bidding process under the old
procurement law. On this point, the Court emphasized that petitioner cannot simply
disregard prevailing statutory requirements on bidding and procurement processes on
the basis of his personal sentiment that they are difficult to carry out. This argument is
unacceptable if not absurd.
Taken all the matters discussed above, it is apparent that petitioner's intent in entering
into 11 identical contracts with AUF Enterprises was all too obvious – to avoid the
requirements of public bidding as required under RA 9184 and its IRR. Petitioner is
found guilty of Grave Misconduct, Gross Neglect of Duty, Serious Dishonesty and
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service.
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Topic: Law on Public Officers: Good Faith as a Defense to Falsification of Public

Documents
People v. Palma Gil-Roflo et al.

G.R. Nos. 249564 and 249568-76 (March 21, 2022)| Hernando, J.
Doctrine
If what is proven is mere judgmental error on the part of the person committing an
act, no malice or criminal intent can be rightfully imputed to him.
Facts
A media practitioner in Davao filed a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman
regarding the alleged ghost employees in the office of Roflo, who was then a
Sanggunian Panlalawigan member of the Provincial Government of Davao Oriental,
Province of Davao Oriental. Criminal charges against Roflo and his employees Jerico,
Norman, Derrick, Sergio, and Chona were filed with the Sandiganbayan for violation of
Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, and Estafa Through Falsification of Public Documents.
Thereafter, the Sandiganbayan found the accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crimes of violation of Sec. 3 (e), RA 3019 and falsification of a public
document under Article 171 (4) of the RPC.
Issue
Whether or not the accused-appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 and for Falsification of Public Documents under
Article 171(4) of the Revised Penal Code.
Held + Ratio
No, the accused-appellants are not guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 and for Falsification of Public Documents under
Article 171(4) of the Revised Penal Code, since they were clearly entitled to their
salaries having rendered actual services in the satellite office.
The Court clarified that "[b]ad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or
negligence; it imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious
doing of a wrong; a breach of sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill will; it
partakes of the nature of fraud." Moreover, "evident bad faith" connotes not only bad
judgment but also palpably and patently fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do moral
obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for some perverse motive or ill will. It contemplates
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a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive or
self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purposes.
As sufficiently established by the evidence on record, they were actually engaged by the
provincial government of Davao Oriental under job contracts as evidenced by their
service records and the testimony of Bicoy who signed as a witness to their contracts of
services. Thus, they were legitimate job order employees of the agency.
Anent their contested DTRs, Roflo signed the same under the honest belief that the
entries therein are what the Accounting Office require for the processing of the salaries
of the concerned job order employees. Similarly, she signed their ARs on the notion that
the statements therein were accurate and all that are required to support the claim of job
order employees for compensation. Clearly then, Roflo's actions do not necessarily
reflect fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious
wrongdoing for some perverse motive or ill will.
Topic: Law on Public Officers: Claim of Mitigating Circumstance of 33 Years of Service;

Dismissal as an Indivisible Penalty
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas v. Bool

G.R. No. 207522 (April 28, 2021) | Hernando, J.
Doctrine
Length of service cannot also be considered as a mitigating circumstance when the
offense committed is found to be serious.
Facts
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) awarded the contract for the supply and delivery of
finished banknotes to Francois Charles Oberthur Fiduciare (FCOF). In relation to this,
the BSP authorized respondent Bool to travel to France to ensure that the quality of the
printed sheets conformed to the BSP's prescribed specifications for the 100-Piso and
1000-Piso denominations before the start of the actual production Later on, it was
discovered that the surname of former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in the
100-Piso outsourced notes was misspelled as "Arrovo" instead of "Arroyo." Hence, the
BSP formally charged Bool with gross neglect of duty. He was found guilty and was
meted out the penalty of dismissal from service, with forfeiture of retirement benefits,
cancellation of civil service eligibility, and perpetual disqualification from
reemployment in the government service. Upon appeal, CA partly ruled in favor of Bool
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and modified the penalty recommended by the CSC from dismissal from service to
suspension from office for one year.
Issue
Whether length of service should be considered as mitigating circumstance in cases of
gross of neglect of duty
Held + Ratio
No. The Uniform Rules prescribe the penalty of dismissal from service for gross neglect
of duty even if committed for the first time. We affirm the factual findings of both the
CSC and the CA that Bool was indeed guilty of gross neglect of duty. However, We
deviate from the conclusion of the appellate court that Bool's length of service, good
faith, and the fact that it was his first offense served to mitigate his liability.
Length of service is an alternative circumstance that can either be considered as

mitigating or aggravating depending on the factual milieu of each case. It is "not a
magic word that, once invoked, will automatically be considered as a mitigating
circumstance in favor of the party invoking it." xxx Length of service cannot also be
considered as a mitigating circumstance when the offense committed is found to be
serious.
The Court agrees with the BSP that it was precisely because of Bool's length of service
and experience that he was chosen as BSP's representative to France. The CSC correctly
held that the fact that Bool had been in the service for 33 years should have made him
"more meticulous and prudent in discharging his responsibility.
Topic: Law on Public Officers: Appreciation of 23 Years of Government Service

to Modify Penalty
Marzan v. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 226167 (October 11, 2021) | Hernando, J.
Doctrine
The elements of Section 3 (a) of RA 3019 are:
- The offender is a public officer;
- The offender persuades, induces or influences another public officer to perform
an act or the offender allows himself to be persuaded, induced, or influenced
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to commit an act;
- The act performed by the other public officer or committed by the offender
constitutes a violation of rules and regulations duly promulgated by
competent authority or an offense in connection with the official duty of the
latter.
Facts
Petitioner Marzan, a Senior Jail Officer 3 of the Bureau of Jail Management and
Penology, was charged with violation of Sec. 3(a) of R.A. 3019 for releasing a certain
Cyrus and Pascua from detention, absent a Court Order. Cyrus and Pascua were
previously arrested in flagrante delicto for attacking a certain Butic who suffered a
broken teeth after being hit with a bottle of beer. Although Jail Officer Liliw received
custody over the two, they were later released by virtue of a Recognizance and without
any court order therein. Cyrus and Pascua were later re-arrested as their release
violated the NJMP Manual on the Release of Detention Prisoners (“BJMP Manual”).
Meanwhile, administrative charges and criminal complaints were filed against Marzan
who asserted that (1) the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that he
allowed himself to be persuaded, induced or influenced by Atty. Rupisan to release
Cyrus and Pascua from detention; and (2) he released Cyrus and Pascua pursuant to his
superior’s order.
Issue
Whether all the elements of Sec. 3(a) of R.A. 3019 have been proven to warrant
Marzan’s conviction
Held + Ratio
Yes, the Court held that the prosecution has duly established the existence of all the
elements of Sec. 3(a) of R.A. 3019. Hence, the Sandiganbayan did not err in convicting
Marzan for violating the same law.
The elements of Section 3 (a) of RA 3019 are:
(i) The offender is a public officer;
(ii) The offender persuades, induces or influences another public officer to perform an
act or the offender allows himself to be persuaded, induced, or influenced to commit
an act;
(iii) The act performed by the other public officer or committed by the offender
constitutes a violation of rules and regulations duly promulgated by competent
authority or an offense in connection with the official duty of the latter.
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In the instant case, all the elements of the offense under Section 3 (a) of RA 3019, were
established his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Contrary to Marzan's claim, there was a
Commitment Order duly signed and issued by the Acting MTC Judge of Bayombong,
Nueva Vizcaya for the detention of Cyrus and Pascua. He then released them without a
proper court order but by virtue of the Recognizance signed by Atty. Rupisan. These
acts were in blatant violation of the procedure provided by law for the issuance of a
recognizance and contrary to the BJMP Manual.
With respect to the second requisite, the crime of violation of Sec. 3(a) of R.A. 3019 may
be committed in the following modes: (1) when the offender persuades, induces or
influences another public officer to perform an act constituting a violation of rules and
regulations duly promulgated by competent authority or an offense in connection with
the official duties of the public officer; or (2) when the public officer allowed himself to
be persuaded, induced or influenced to perform said act which constitutes a violation
of rules and regulations promulgated by competent authority or an offense in
connection with the official duties of the public officer.
In this case, Cyrus and Pascua were arrested and detained pending their preliminary
investigation. They were released without a court order and only based upon the
Recognizance signed by Atty. Rupisan. The Sandiganbayan found Atty. Rupisan guilty
under the first mode, in view of his unauthorized intervention in the processing of
Cyrus and Pascua’s release in the form of a Recognizance, despite the pendency of the
preliminary investigation. Meanwhile, Marzan is liable under the second mode for
allowing himself to be persuaded, induced, or influenced by Atty. Rupisan, who
unlawfully issued the Recognizance. It is immaterial whether the person who induced
him was a public officer or a private individual.
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Topic: Law on Public Officers: Remuneration of Public Officers under the Salary
Standardization Law
Lumauan v. COA
G.R. No. 218304 (December 9, 2020) | Hernando, J
RA 6758, Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989
Doctrine
A law is self-executing, and its validity cannot be affected by the nullity of its
implementing rules.
Facts
Petitioner Lumauan was the Acting General Manager of Metropolitan Tuguegarao
Water District (MTWD), a government owned and controlled corporation. In 2009, the
Board of Directors of MTWD issued a resolution approving the payment of accrued
Cost of Living Allowance (COLA) to qualified MTWD employees for calendar years
1992 to 1997, for a total amount of PHP 1,689,750.00. The payment of the COLA was
disallowed by the Commission on Audit (COA) on the ground that it was already
deemed integrated into the basic salary of government employees, by virtue of Section
12 of RA 6758, or the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
COA asserted that the Supreme Court has upheld the inclusion of COLA in the
standardized salary rates and has resolved that the non-publication of DBM Circular
No. 10 did not render ineffective the validity of Section 12 of RA No. 6758.
Issue
Whether Section 12 of RA 6758 remains valid despite the nullification of the DBM
circular
Held + Ratio
Yes, the subject section remains valid despite the nullification of the DBM Circular. The
Court ruled that the disallowance of the payment of COLA was correct. In Torcuator v.
CA, the Court upheld the disallowance of the payment of COLA because it was deemed
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already integrated in the compensation of government employees under Section 12 of
RA 6758.
Pursuant to the Section 12 of RA6758, the DBM issued a circular discontinuing all
allowances and fringe benefits, including COLA, to government employees over and
above their basic salaries. However, in 1998, the DBM circular was declared without
force and effect due to its failure to meet the publication requirement. In 1999, the DBM
re-issued the DBM circular in its entirety and complied with the publication
requirement.
Nonetheless, in several occasions, the Court has consistently held that Section 12 of the
RA 6758 is self-executing, and the absence of any DBM issuance was immaterial. The
nullification of the DBM Circular did not indicate any intent to suspend the effectivity
of the law. Therefore, the validity of RA 6758 is not affected by the nullification of its
implementing rules. Thus, there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of COA in
disallowing the payment of the accrued COLA. However, petitioner is only required to
reimburse the amount actually and individually received.
Topic: Law on Public Officers: Separation form Government Service; Award of

Retirement Benefits and Survivor Pension
Re: Letter of Mrs. Ma. Cristina Roco Corona

AM. No. 20-07-10-SC (January 12, 2021) | Hernando, J.
Doctrine
[Impeachment] is purely political, and it is neither civil, criminal, nor administrative
in nature. No legally actionable liability attaches to the public officer by a mere
judgment of impeachment against him or her, and thus lies the necessity for a
separate conviction for charges that must be properly filed with courts of law.
The nature and effect of impeachment proceedings is so limiting that forum shopping
or alleged violation of the right against double jeopardy could not even be
successfully invoked upon the institution of the separate complaints or information.
An action for quo warranto will likewise proceed independently of the impeachment
proceedings.
Facts
Chief Justice Renato Corona was impeached on May 29, 2012. He died on April 29, 2016.
His widow, Mrs. Corona, wrote a letter to the SC requesting for the grant of Corona’s
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retirement benefits, pension, as well as other benefits as a long time member of the
judiciary. She claimed Corona’s impeachment merely divested him of his capacity to
enter public office, not to receive benefits for the work he had already rendered. The
contentious portion was that he had pending criminal charges for graft and corruption,
as well as tax evasion and forfeiture cases, which would wipe out any benefits he
would be entitled to, had he not passed away.
Issue
Whether retirement benefits and other gratuities should be accorded to Mrs. Corona as
the spouse of the late CJ Corona despite the latter’s impeachment
Held + Ratio
Yes, the benefits should still be accorded to the Mrs. Corona.
Impeachment is designed to remove the impeachable officer from office, not punish
him. The Framers of the Constitution have made it clear that impeachment is not the
means intended to redress and punish offenses against the State but rather a mere
political safeguard designed to preserve the state and its system of laws from internal
harm. It is purely political, and it is neither civil, criminal, nor administrative in nature.
No legally actionable liability attaches to the public officer by a mere judgment of
impeachment against him or her, and thus lies the necessity for a separate conviction for
charges that must be properly filed with courts of law.
The nature and effect of impeachment proceedings is so limiting that forum shopping or
alleged violation of the right against double jeopardy could not even be successfully
invoked upon the institution of the separate complaints or information.
An action for quo warranto will likewise proceed independently of the impeachment
proceedings. In Republic v. Sereno, it was held that while both impeachment and quo
warranto seek the removal of an incumbent government officer, there are differences
between the two as to nature, jurisdiction, grounds, and applicable procedural rules,
and limitations:
Impeachment is political; quo warranto is judicial. In impeachment, the

Congress is the prosecutor, the trier, and the judge, whereas quo warranto
petitions are instituted either by the Solicitor General in behalf of the
Republic of the Philippines or by an individual claiming the public office
in issue, both of which petitions are cognizable only by the Supreme
Court. Impeachment proceedings seek to confirm and vindicate the
breach of the trust reposed by the Filipino people upon the impeachable
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official, but quo warranto determines the legal right, title, eligibility, or
qualifications of the incumbent to the contested public office. The 1987
Constitution, as supplemented by the internal rules of procedure of the
Congress, directs the course of impeachment proceedings. Quo warranto
cases, on the other hand, are dictated by the Rules of Court. The end result
of an impeachment proceeding is the removal of the public officer, and his
or her perpetual political disqualification from holding public office. On
the other hand, when a quo warranto petition is granted, ouster from
office is likewise meted, but the Court can likewise impose upon the
public officer additional penalties such as reimbursement of costs
pertaining to the rightful holder of the public office and such further
judgment determining the respective rights in and to the public office,
position, or franchise of all the parties to the action as justice requires.
Consequently, an impeached public officer whose civil, criminal, or administrative

liability was not judicially established, thus, may be considered involuntarily retired
from service, and thus without forfeiture of his retirement benefits and other
allowances.
Retirement is the termination of one's own employment or career, especially upon

reaching a certain age or for health reasons. To retire is to withdraw from one's position
or occupation, or to conclude one's active working life or professional career. The term
may refer to judges and justices who "retire" due to permanent disability, whether total
or partial, or who died or were killed while in actual service. Retirement then may be
voluntary or involuntary. Retirement is voluntary when one decides upon one's own
unilateral and independent volition to permanently cease the exercise of one's
occupation. Retirement is deemed involuntary when one's profession is terminated
for reasons outside the control and discretion of the worker. Impeachment resulting
in removal from holding office falls under the column on involuntary retirement.
Having been removed by the Congress from office with a lifetime ban from occupying
any and all future public posts, but without a proper determination of or even a basis
for any recoverable liability under the law due to causes beyond his control, Chief
Justice Corona may be considered involuntarily retired from public service, and thus
entitled to his benefits.
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UP Law Center
Law on Public Corporations
Topic: Tests Applied to Establish the Validity of an Ordinance; Ultra Vires Acts
MERALCO v City of Muntinlupa and Nelia A. Barlis

Doctrine
For an ordinance to be valid it must be within the corporate of the LGU to enact and
must have been passed according to procedure prescribed by law. It should also
adhere to the following requirements: (1) not contrary to the Constitution or any
statute; (2) not unfair or oppressive; (3) not partial or discriminatory; (4) not prohibit
but may regulate trade; (5) general and consistent with public policy; and (6) not
unreasonable.
Legaspi v. City of Cebu explains the two tests in determining the validity of an
ordinance: the formal test which requires the determination of whether the ordinance
was enacted within the corporate powers of the LGU, and whether the same was
passed pursuant to the procedure laid down by law; and the substantive test which
primarily assesses the reasonableness and fairness of the ordinance and significantly
its compliance with the Constitution and existing statutes.
Facts
Section 25 of MO 93-35 or the Revenue Code of the Municipality of Muntinlupa
imposed a franchise tax on private persons or corporations operating public utilities
within its territorial jurisdiction at the rate of 50% of 1% of the gross annual receipts of
the preceding calendar year. Subsequently upon the enactment of RA 7926, which
converted Muntinlupa from a municipality to a city, Section 56 thereof adopted all
existing municipal ordinances of the Municipality of Muntinlupa as of March 1, 1995
and shall continue to take effect within the City of Muntinlupa unless its sangguniang
panglungsod enacts an ordinance providing otherwise.
Muntinlupa City Treasurer Barlis (Barlis) sent a letter to Meralco demanding payment
of the franchise tax it owed to Muntinlupa City from 1992 to 1999 pursuant to Section 25
of MO 93-35 and paragraph 7 of the Bureau of Local Government Finance Circular No.
20-98. Meralco ignored Barlis’ demand letters for payment of the franchise tax on the
premise that the City of Muntinlupa, then a municipality, did not have the power and
authority to impose and collect a franchise tax.
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Issue
Whether Section 25 of MO 93-95 is null and void for being ultra vires
Held + Ratio
Section 25 of MO 93-35 is null and void for being ultra vires. For an ordinance to be
valid though, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the LGU to enact and
must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it should also conform to
the following requirements: (1) not contrary to the Constitution or any statute; (2) not
unfair or oppressive; (3) not partial or discriminatory; (4) not prohibit but may regulate
trade; (5) general and consistent with public policy; and (6) not unreasonable.
Applying the Formal Test, the passage of the subject ordinance was beyond the
corporate powers of the then Municipality of Muntinlupa, hence, ultra vires. And
Based on the Substantive Test, it was evidently passed beyond the powers of a
municipality in clear contravention of RA 7160.
MO 93-35 was passed by the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Muntinlupa

and took effect on January 1, 1994. This is plainly ultra vires considering the clear and
categorical provisions of Section 142 in relation to Sections 134, 137 and 151 of RA 7160
vesting to the provinces and cities the power to impose, levy, and collect a franchise
tax. Muntinlupa being then a municipality definitely had no power or authority to
enact the subject franchise tax ordinance.
Section 56 of the Charter of Muntinlupa CIty has no curative effect on Section 25 of MO

93-35, the latter being null and void. A void ordinance cannot legally exist, it cannot
have binding force and effect. Such is Section 32 of Municipal Ordinance No. 25 and,
being so, is outside the comprehension of Section 45 of R.A. No. 7829. To stress, an
ordinance which is incompatible with any existing law or statute is ultra vires, hence,
null and void.
Topic: Authority of a Mayor to Enter into a Contract
Municipality of Corella v. Philkonstrak Development Corp.

Relevant Law
Sec. 22(c) of the Local Government Code - Corporate Powers.
xxx
(c) Unless otherwise provided in this Code, no contract may be entered into by the
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local chief executive in behalf of the local government unit without prior
authorization by the sanggunian concerned. A legible copy of such contract shall be
posted at a conspicuous place in the provincial capitol or the city, municipal or
barangay hall.
xxx
Art. 107(g) of the LGC IRR. Ordinances and Resolutions. — The following rules shall
govern the enactment of ordinances and resolutions:
(g) [...] Any ordinance or resolution authorizing or directing the payment of money or
creating liability, shall require the affirmative vote of a majority of all the
sanggunian members for its passage.
Sec. 37 of the Government Procurment Reform Act. Notice and Execution of Award
xxx
The Procuring Entity shall issue the Notice to Proceed to the winning bidder not later
than seven (7) calendar days from the date of the approval of the contract by the
appropriate authority. All notices called for by the terms of the contract shall be
effective only at the time of receipt thereof by the contractor.
Doctrine
Depending on the circumstances of the case, if the project is provided for in sufficient
detail in the appropriation ordinance, meaning the transactions, bonds, contracts,
documents, and other obligations the mayor would enter into in behalf of the
municipality, are enumerated, then no separate sangguniang bayan authorization is
necessary. On the other hand, if the project is merely couched in general and generic
terms, then a separate approval by the sangguniang bayan in accordance with law is
required
Facts
Philconstrak entered into a contract agreement with the Municpality of Corella, then
represented by its mayor Vito Rapal. By the time Philkonstrak completed 50% of its
essential work, Corella refused payment, now through its new mayor Nicanor Tocmo.
Tocmo denied liability, questioning the validity of the contract and further averring that
Rapal had no authority to enter into said contract. Philkonstrak lodged a complaint
with the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission. The CIAC ruled in its favor, a
decision upheld by the CA.
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Issue
Whether Rapal, as mayor, was authorized to enter into the contract with Philconstrak
Held + Ratio
No, Rapal was not so authorized. While there is no need for a separate sangguniang
bayan (SB) authorization if the project is laid out in sufficient detail in an
appropriation ordinance, the contract was not valid and binding for not obtaining the
affirmative vote of a majority of the SB members.
In Quisumbing v. Garcia, the Court held that, depending on the circumstances of the
case, if the project is provided for in sufficient detail in the appropriation ordinance,
meaning the transactions, bonds, contracts, documents, and other obligations the
mayor would enter into in behalf of the municipality, are enumerated, then no separate
sangguniang bayan authorization is necessary. On the other hand, if the project is
merely couched in general and generic terms, then a separate approval by the
sangguniang bayan in accordance with law is required (See Relevant Law). Further, in
Verceles, Jr. v. Commission on Audit, citing Quisimbing, it was further explained that
“sufficient authority” in an appropriation ordinance simply means specifically and
expressly setting aside an amount of money for a certain project or program.
However, there is a need for prior approval of all SB members. The general rule is that
no ordinance or resolution shall be passed by the Sanggunian without prior approval of
a majority of all members present. The exception is when it involves the payment of
money or creation of a liability. In such case, the affirmative vote of a majority of all the
sanggunian members is required, whether present or not. This case involved both the
payment of money and creation of a liability; hence it required the affirmative vote of all
11 Sanggunian members. However, the municipality was mistaken in thinking that its
vote of 5 out of 8 members was enough, thinking they only needed a quorum from
those present. As a result, the contract is not valid and binding.
Despite this, Corella is still obliged to pay Philkonstrak on the basis of quantum meruit.
Philkonstrak is still entitled to receive payment for the services it rendered as Corella
cannot be unjustly enriched and allowed to retain the benefits without payment being
made. Philkonstrak was proven to have entered the contract in good faith and for the
good interest of Corella.
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Topic: Reorganization of a Local Government Unit through an Ordinance
Bernadez, Jr. v. The City Government of Baguio

G.R. No. 197559, (March 21, 2022) | Hernando, J.
Doctrine
While city or municipal engineers shall also act as local building officials of their
respective cities or municipalities, it is still within the legislative discretion of city or
municipal governments to create and organize the office of the local Building Official
separate and distinct from the Office of the City Engineer pursuant to and in
accordance with the provisions and limitations set by law, particularly the LGC and
NBC, including their respective IRRs.
Facts
The City Council of Baguio enacted an ordinance appropriating funds for the purpose
of reorganization or restructuring of its local departments. Pursuant to this, the city
mayor issued AO 171 designating Engr. Flores as acting building official pending his
appointment as building official. Petitioner, being the City Engineer at that time, filed
a complaint for declaration of nullity of AO 171 on the ground that the functions
under AO 171 usurped and divested him of his functions as City Engineer.
Issue
Whether there can be a valid appointment of a local Building Official that is separate
and distinct from the City or Municipal Engineer.
Held + Ratio
Yes. While Section 477 of the LGC states that the City Engineer shall also act as the
Building Official, the appointment of a separate Building Official, vis-à-vis the
creation of the City Buildings and Architecture Office in this case, is not without legal
basis.
The LGC itself empowers City Governments to implement an organizational structure

and create staffing patterns for the effective management and administration of their
respective offices. Along the same lines, the LGC also empowers the Sangguniang
Panlungsod to create, through local ordinances, other offices or consolidate the
functions of any office with those of another in the interest of efficiency and economy.
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Furthermore, the appointment of a Building Official separate and distinct from a City
Engineer is supported by law pursuant to the IRR of the National Building Code
(NBC). xxx The appointment of a Building Official separate and distinct from a City
Engineer is practicable in light of the fact that their functions are delineated under the
IRR of the NBC, and LGC, respectively.
The local Building Official, on one hand, is responsible for the enforcement of the
provisions of the NBC. As such, he is responsible for issuing building permits and
ensuring compliance with the requirements of the NBC. xxx On the other hand, the
City Engineer is responsible for the infrastructure, public works, and engineering
matters within a local government unit. Clearly, these are two separate positions,
which can be independently exercised by different local officials or offices, more so
under circumstances when there is a need to address the operational demands of the
City Government in matters concerning construction and infrastructure, such as in
this case.
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UP Bar Review Institute

BAR CHAIRMAN’S CASE DIGESTS

Topic: Doctrine of separation of powers

Commission on Audit v. Hon. Pampilo

Topic: State Immunity; Basis

BPI v. Central Bank of the Philippines

Topic: Public Trust Doctrine

Maynilad v. DENR Secretary

Topic: Powers, Functions, and Jurisdiction; Common Provisions of Constitutional

San Felix v. Civil Service Commission

Topic: Bill of Rights; Due Process; Procedural and Substantive

Ante v. University of the Philippines Student Disciplinary Tribunal

Manila International Ports Terminal Inc., v. Philippine Ports Authority

Topic: Nature of due process in administrative proceedings

University of the Cordilleras v. Lacanaria

Merlina R. Diaz vs. People of the Philippines

Salvacion Zaldivar - Perez v. Sandiganbayan

Provision Involved/Relevant Law

Topic: Bill of Rights, Procedural or Substantive; Warrantless, Searches, Warrantless

Petitioner Rodrigo Villanueva (Villanueva) assailed his conviction by the

Topic: Bill of Rights, Nature of Conditional Arraignment

Ombudsman-Visayas found prima facie evidence of overpricing and collusion, and

Pursuant to a Sandiganbayan order, the OMB conducted a reinvestigation and moved to

Whether the Sandiganbayan acquired jurisdiction over the person of Radaza as an

Miguel v. Director of the Bureau of Prisons

The elements constituting enforced disappearance as defined under RA 9851 are:

Topic: Who are Citizens of the Philippines

Uy-Belleza v The Civil Registrar of Tacloban

A passport is an official document of identity of Philippine citizenship of the holder

Administrative Law, Election Law, and Law on Public Officers

Topic: Administrative Law; Nature of an instrumentality of the national government

BCDA v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

Topic: Administrative Law, Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies, Denial of Claims

Philippine Health Insurance Corporation v. Urdaneta Sacred Heart Hospital

Provision Involved/Relevant Law

Topic: Administrative Law, Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies, Fraudulent

Professional Regulation Commission v. Alo

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is grounded on practical reasons,

Topic: Recovery of Ill-gotten wealth; Award of Temperate Damages

Topic: Liability of a Private Person under R.A. 3019

Petitioner Rodrigo Villanueva (Villanueva) assailed his conviction by the

Topic: Law on Public Officers: Jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman

Plainly, the Petition contained no allegations of the Ombudsman's supposed acts of

Topic: Law on Public Officers; Gross Neglect and Grave Misconduct

Civil Service Commission v. Beray

Topic: Law on Public Officers: Liability for Splitting of Contracts

Topic: Law on Public Officers: Good Faith as a Defense to Falsification of Public

People v. Palma Gil-Roflo et al.

Topic: Law on Public Officers: Claim of Mitigating Circumstance of 33 Years of Service;

Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas v. Bool

Length of service is an alternative circumstance that can either be considered as

Topic: Law on Public Officers: Appreciation of 23 Years of Government Service

Marzan v. People of the Philippines

The elements of Section 3 (a) of RA 3019 are:

(i) The offender is a public officer;

Provision Involved/Relevant Law

RA 6758, Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989

Topic: Law on Public Officers: Separation form Government Service; Award of