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Chapter 1 Modern Systems Analysis and Design 9th edition Instructor’s Manual

2. Explain how an organization’s objectives, structure, and processes are essential in the
development of systems to meet their needs.
3. Explain that the SDLC process is not sequential but cyclical and that the order is adaptable as
required for different projects; also, to emphasize that often analysts and designers may go
backwards to the previous step to complete unfinished products or to correct errors or omissions
discovered in the next phase.
4. Explain the difference between the logical design and the physical design as it relates to systems
development.
5. Discuss the problems with the waterfall SDLC and explain the different approaches analysts,
designers and developers have developed to improve the Systems Analysis and Design process.
6. Discuss Agile methodologies and eXtreme programming and how these compare to the
traditional Systems Development Life Cycle (SDLC).
7. Explain and discuss object-oriented analysis and design (OOAD) and the Rational Unified
Process (RUP).
8. Show students that the life cycle is a flexible basis for systems analysis and design and that it
can support many different tools and techniques, such as Agile methodologies and eXtreme
Programming.
9. Compare and contrast the various development approaches introduced in Chapter 1 and depict
how they all use an iterative approach.
10. Finally explain that the boundaries and divisions of the 5 steps in Figure 1-2 when imposed to
explain the steps are neither hard nor fast and that in many real-world situations phases or sub-
phases may be combined to improve efficiency and understanding. The cycle is an organizing
and guiding principle; however, in companies and software development teams will adapt it to
suit their needs for specific projects.

Classroom Ideas
1. Figure 1-1 depicts that methodologies, techniques, and tools drive organizational approaches to
systems analysis and design. Ask students to identify the names of methodologies, techniques, and
tools. List them on the board under the heading that they suggest; then after they have identified 5
or 6 in each heading, review and emphasize the differences among the three and move any from an
incorrect category to the correct one and explain why it is one and not the other.
2. When introducing the systems development life cycle model featured in the textbook, discuss other
life cycle models using actual ones from existing organizations. Show that the basic model
presented (Planning, Analysis, Design, Implementation, and Maintenance) are broken down into
smaller phases by many companies but that in the end they could be categorized into one of the
basic five explained. This reinforces to students that no one standard life cycle model exists and the
model they will use as a systems analyst will likely differ from the textbook’s life cycle model. The
point is that the life cycle represents activities that must be done; and the phases are a way to
introduce, in an organized way, the methods, techniques, tools, and skills necessary for successful
systems analysis and design.
3. Provide a brief overview of the activities and outputs from each of the five life cycle phases, based
on your own experience or from reading the rest of the textbook. Table 1-1 summarizes the
products, outputs or deliverables of each phase based on the in-text descriptions.

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Chapter 1 Modern Systems Analysis and Design 9th edition Instructor’s Manual

4. Figure 1-9 illustrates the RUP life cycle. Discuss RUP, and its benefits and drawbacks as it relates
to OOAD. Discuss the differences between RUP and the traditional SDLC. Table 1-2 presents the
Agile Manifesto.
5. Ask students to compare Agile methodologies to traditional S DL C (see Table 1-3 Five Critical
Factors that Distinguish Agile and Traditional Approaches to Systems Development). Introduce a
case study project where Agile methodologies were employed. Ask students to identify problems
that the project ran into using Agile methodologies as well as any benefits gained by this approach.
6. This chapter introduces eXtreme programming. If your students have sufficient background, assign
students to programming pairs and have them work on a small programming problem, including
testing. Ask students to report upon their experience.
7. Discuss IBM’s Rational Unified Process (RUP) shown in Figure 1-9. This Web site
https://www.ibm.com/search?q=rup&lnk=mhsrch&v=18&en=utf&lang=en&cc=us should help
with background information.

Answers to Key Terms

Suggested answers are provided below. These answers are presented top-down, left to right

1.5. Information systems analysis and design

1.2. Application software
1.15. Systems analyst
1.17. Systems development methodology
1.16. Systems development life cycle
1.13. Planning
1.1. Analysis
1.3. Design
1.7. Logical design
1.12. Physical design
1.4. Implementation
1.8. Maintenance
1.11. Object-oriented analysis and design (OOAD) (RAD)
1.9. Object
1.6. Inheritance
1.10. Object class
1.14. Rational Unified Process (RUP)

Answers to Review Questions

1.18. Information systems analysis and design is the complex organizational process whereby
computer-based information systems are developed and maintained.
1.19. In the early years of computing, analysis and design were considered an art. However, with the
growing importance and changing nature of information technology and its usage in the work

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Chapter 1 Modern Systems Analysis and Design 9th edition Instructor’s Manual

environment, work methods have evolved, making analysis and design a disciplined process. The
analysis and design of computer-based information systems began in the 1950s with emphasis
placed on automating existing processes. All applications were developed in machine language or
assembly language and developed from scratch. The 1960s saw the first procedural, or third-
generation languages, become available. Computers were still large and expensive, and storage
was at a premium. In the 1970s, systems development became more disciplined as many people
worked to make it more like engineering. In the 1980s, microcomputers became key
organizational tools, the software industry expanded greatly, fourth-generation languages were
used more and more to write applications, and CAS E tools were developed. In the 1990s, the
focus shifted to system integration, and developers were using visual programming environments
to design user interfaces. Databases began residing on servers, as well as the application logic.
Companies began purchasing enterprise-wide systems and more and more systems development
focused on the Internet, particularly the Web. The current focus is on Web-based systems
development and wireless components. Additionally, many system implementations use a three-
tier design. Currently, companies may assemble their systems using off-the-shelf components or
by using application service providers.
1.20. The five systems development life cycle phases are planning, analysis, design, implementation,
and maintenance. During the planning phase, an organization’s total information system needs are
identified, analyzed, prioritized, and arranged. During the analysis phase, requirements are
gathered from users. The requirements are then studied and organized with any redundancies
eliminated. The output of this phase is a solution recommended by the analysis team. During the
design phase, the description of the recommended solution is converted into logical and then
physical system specifications. During the implementation phase, the information system is
coded, tested, installed, and supported in the organization. During the maintenance phase, the
system is systematically repaired and improved. Another problem was that roles of system users
or customers was narrowly defined with users relegated to the requirements determination or
analysis phase where it was assumed that all requirements could be specified in advance. In
addition, hard dates were set for the early phases and were judged successful if the dates were met
leaving little time to incorporate important changes. The end result of these problems is that the
focus on deadlines led to systems that did not match users'.
1.21. There have been several problems with the traditional waterfall SDLC identified in the literature.
One is that the “downhill” nature of the SDLC process treats each phase as separate and complete
unto itself and feedback is often ignored, resulting in locking users into requirements that had
been previously determined, even though those requirements might have changed. Another
problem is that roles of system users or customers were narrowly defined with users relegated to
the requirements determination or analysis phase where it was assumed that all requirements could
be specified in advance. In addition, hard dates were set for the early phases and were judged
successful if the dates were met leaving little time to incorporate important changes. The end
result of these problems is that the focus on deadlines led to systems that did not match users'
needs and that required increasing development costs.
1.22. Agile methodologies promote a self-adaptive software development process. While other
methodologies focus on roles that individuals play in a project team, Agile methodologies focus
more on the individual. As software is developed, the process used to develop it is refined and
improved through a review process done by the development team through iteration.
1.23. eXtreme programming is an approach to software development distinguished by short
development cycles, an incremental planning approach, a focus on automated tests written by
programmers and customers to monitor the development process, and reliance on an evolutionary
approach to development that lasts throughout the lifetime of the system. This methodology uses
an evolutionary approach to software development. Coding and testing are part of the same

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process and are done by a two-person programming team. Code is tested shortly after it is written
and integrated into the system within a few hours of being written. All phases of the life cycle
converge into a series of activities based on coding, testing, listening, and designing.
1.24. Scrum originated in 1995 and is a popular methodology for agile development. Scrum was
designed for speed development and multiple functional product releases. The primary unit is the
Sprint, which will run for 2-4 weeks. Each Sprint is a complete project, which starts with an eight-
hour planning meeting focusing on two questions, namely 1) what will need to be delivered by
the end of the Sprint, and 2) how will the team accomplish that work? A Daily Standup 15-minute
meeting during the Sprint to evaluate progress made within the previous 24 hours. When the Sprint
is completed it is followed by two additional meetings. The first one, the Sprint Review will last
4 hours, while the second one, the Sprint Retrospective, lasts three hours. The three primary
artifacts in the Sprint process are: 1) the Product Backlog (an ordered list of everything included
in the product), 2) the Sprint Backlog (a subset of the Product Backlog that lists only those items
that are to be addressed in a particular Sprint), and 3) the Increment (which is the sum of the
Product Backlog items completed during a sprint).
1.25. A study of Agile in practice has revealed three primary success factors. The first is a delivery
strategy resulting in the continuous delivery of working software in short time scales. The second
is that by following agile software engineering practices managers and programmers continually
focus on technical excellence and simple design. The third is team capability of building projects
around motivated individuals. It was also found that agile methods can lead to improved job
satisfaction and productivity on the part of programmers.
1.26. Agile methods would be more likely to be employed instead of a more engineering-based
approach when the project or team is relatively small; when the products are neither critical nor
safety oriented, and design is relatively simple with relatively minimal documentation necessary;
when agile-experts are continuously available in a critical mass; and in environments where the
culture is one in which people thrive on chaos and are comfortable with several degrees of
freedom.
1.27. Object-oriented analysis and design (OOAD) consist of methodologies and techniques based on
objects (which combines data and processes) with activities (methods) rather than the traditional
data description (data analysis) separate from processes (programming).

Answers to Problems and Exercises

1.28. The importance of using a systems analysis and design methodology is that a systematic step-by-
step approach is taken which, if done correctly, results in a system that has fewer errors and is
used with confidence by the users of the system. If shortcuts are taken for quick and easy
development there is a greater chance for errors, as well as a system that does not meet user needs.
The value of using an engineered approach results in a system that meets user needs while
operating the way it was intended and built.
1.29. The similarities between the two figures are that they both contain the five phases of the SDLC.
Figure 1.2, though, reveals a circular life cycle in which the useful life of one system leads to the
beginning of another project that will lead to an improved or new system. Figure 1.3 is looked at
as more of a spiral, in which phases are constantly cycling through at different levels of detail
based on a Go/No Go axis where a decision is made to go through another cycle.
1.30. While figure 1.2 is circular in design, figure 1.4 is simply a vertical listing of steps that seem to
indicate it is a one-time through methodology that may not necessarily be the case. Many of the
same SDLC techniques and tools are used. Many different companies have their own SDLC steps
but in the end, they are the same with some breaking them down into smaller sections to meet

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their own needs. For example, the U.S. Department of Justice’s S DL C would break down as
follows: 1) Planning: Initiation, System Concept Development, Planning; 2) Analysis:
Requirements Analysis; 3) Design: Design; 4) Implementation: Development, Integration and
Test, Implementation; 5) Maintenance: Operation and Maintenance, Disposition.
1.31. Figure 1.2 reveals a circular life cycle in which the useful life of one system leads to the beginning
of another project that will lead to an improved or new system. Figure 1.7 has the same SDL C
with one major exception. Figure 1.7 reveals an iterative relationship between the Analysis and
Design phases that allows a design to be tested and revised until correct between the analysis and
design steps. This design overcomes one of the main problems of the SDL C, in that it does not
treat these two phases to be separate and complete.
1.32. Object-Oriented Analysis and Design (OOAD) differs from the SDLC in that this methodology
is based on objects rather than data or processes. The object (a structure that combines both
attributes and methods) is an abstraction of a real-world thing in which data and processes are
placed together to model the structure and behavior of the real-world object. Putting the data and
processes together in one place recognizes the fact that there is a limited number of operations for
any given data structure. The main goal is to make system elements more reusable, thus improving
system quality and the productivity of systems analysis and design. The four phases of the
Rational Unified Process (RUP) –– inception, elaboration, construction, and transition ––are not
presented as a cycle because the objects are not part of an iterative design but carefully developed
and tested together with both the data and process.

Guidelines for Using the Field Exercises

1.33. It should not be too difficult for students to list the various “systems” for an organization, perhaps
for their university. These may include standard computer-based information systems, such as a
transaction processing system for recording point of purchase sales or for registering for a course.
They should also include systems that are not computer-based, such as a physical filing system
for receipts or for transcripts. Instruct students to place each of their “systems” on their diagram
and show how they (should) interact. Discuss the diagrams with students and have them evaluate
whether they think that the systems interact well with one another. This enables students to
determine whether the systems are well integrated (be sure that students have a clear idea on what
it means for systems to be integrated). If their diagrams do not reflect well-integrated systems, ask
them to draw a new “proposed” diagram in which they would interact in a better fashion. This is
useful to get them thinking in terms of as-is and to-be systems.
1.34. Urge students to use their imaginations. You might have them imagine what would happen to the
system design if one or more of the steps of the SDLC were ignored. For example, have students
imagine what would happen if the planning phase was ignored. They might imagine elegant,
costly systems that do not solve the right problem and, as a result, are not used. Alternatively, they
might imagine a system where a database is kept redundantly in several different locations, or
where information is re-keyed into one part of the system while it already exists in another format
in another part of the system. They might describe a system that is lost completely because no
proper backup and recovery procedures exist. The useful part of this exercise is that no matter
what disasters or problems they imagine, they have probably already happened in one setting or
another.
1.35. This is a useful exercise, particularly for beginning information systems students. This exercise
enables students to see how information systems are used throughout an organization. Frequently,
in smaller organizations, information systems development is more informal, and the various
information systems roles are played by one or a small number of people. It is interesting to see
how people in smaller organizations find creative ways to develop and implement technology on

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Chapter 1 Modern Systems Analysis and Design 9th edition Instructor’s Manual

a limited budget and with a limited information systems staff. It is also useful to discuss how
smaller organizations can integrate with systems outside the organization. For example,
investigating how organizations, large and small, connect to credit card companies might provide
students with a relevant task. Many instructors also find this is a way to inject service learning
into this course as there are many well-deserving organizations out there that cannot afford
systems consulting but are desperately in need of systems assistance. Many of these projects could
be the foundation for a course-long project that mirrors the concepts being taught in the course.
1.36. Encourage students to perform a search on the Web using search engines such as Google. A report
or presentation as a deliverable from this exercise might be appropriate. Encourage students to
consider how Agile methodologies differ from engineering-oriented process. The nice thing about
presentations to the class is that students have the opportunity to hone their communications skills
and knowledge is shared amongst the class.
1.37. Journals are an effective teaching and learning tool. It is useful to collect these journals from time
to time and provide direct feedback to each student, commenting on their experiences and
answering their questions. You might also periodically have students share their journal comments
and questions with the rest of the class and use this as fuel for class discussions. Even if students
do not share actual comments, have them discuss the sources of their comments, such as
newspaper articles, conversations with other faculty and students, advertisements, new topics they
read in this textbook, or comments made by a parent. It might be interesting to note how students’
thoughts on systems analysis and design change over the course of the semester. This exercise
allows students to practice written communication and retrieval skills that will be necessary as
they move out into the world of work and become project leaders and managers.

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Another random document with
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bickering along the Pisuerga with French outposts; on the 6th those
at the head of the advance had a distant glimpse of a great review of
the Army of the Centre, which King Joseph was holding outside
Palencia, from the heights which overlook that city from the west. In
front of Dueñas there was an exchange of letters under a flag of
truce between Wellington and Gazan—a most odd proceeding at
such a moment—from which both parties thought they had derived
useful information[498]. The British parlementaire reported to the
Commander-in-Chief that Dueñas was still held by French infantry—
which was good to know: the French, on the other hand, got a reply
to Gazan’s letter to Wellington within four hours—which proved that
British Head-Quarters must be a very short way from them—which
was equally a valuable scrap of knowledge.
The King had now waited three days in the temporary position
behind the Pisuerga, without being attacked, though he was in the
close neighbourhood of the enemy. The quiescence of such an
adversary made him uncomfortable, and at last he guessed part of
what was going on opposite him. The British must be pushing up
northward parallel to his line, and preparing to turn his right flank
(which extended no farther than Palencia) by way of Amusco and the
upper Carrion. Whereupon Joseph on the 7th hastily resumed his
retreat, and got behind the defile of Torquemada. There was danger
in waiting—nothing had been heard of Clausel, but news were to
hand that Lamartinière, with one of the missing divisions of the Army
of Portugal, was nearing Burgos from the north. The main body took
post on the Arlanzon—but Reille with his two divisions at Castroxeriz
on the Odra. Jourdan went forward to report on the condition of
Burgos, where important new works had been commenced in the
spring, and to choose good defensible positions in its
neighbourhood. It was expected that the British army would follow in
pursuit, up the great chaussée from Palencia to Torquemada.
And at first it looked as if this might be the case: entering
Palencia on the same day that the King had left it, Wellington pushed
up the chaussée part of Hill’s column—Grant’s and Ponsonby’s
cavalry brigades and the Light Division, which kept in touch with the
enemy’s rear. The rest of the right column had got no farther forward
than Palencia. But the main body of the army continued its north-
westerly turning movement, Graham’s infantry that day reached
Grixota, five miles north of Palencia; the Galicians were up parallel
with Graham farther west, somewhere near Becceril. The
movements of June 8 and 9, however, were the decisive revelations
of Wellington’s intentions. He moved his head-quarters not up the
Torquemada road, but to Amusco on the Carrion river, and continued
to urge his columns straight northward—Graham to San Cebrian and
Peña on the 8th and Osorno on the 9th, the main body of Hill’s
column to Amusco and Tamara, the Galicians to Carrion. He was
thus getting his army well north of any positions which the enemy
would be likely to take up in the neighbourhood of Burgos, giving it
very long marches, but still keeping it closely concentrated.
On the 10th he judged that he had got sufficiently round the
enemy, and turned all his columns due east towards the upper
Pisuerga—Graham’s and Wellington’s own divisions crossing it at
Zarzosa and Melgar, Hill at Astudillo, some miles farther south.
Head-quarters were fixed that night at Melgar. With the passage of
the Pisuerga ended the long march through the great flat corn-
bearing plainland of Northern Spain, the Tierra de Campos. The next
ten days were to be spent among rougher paths. The triumphant and
almost unopposed advance from the Esla to the Pisuerga, executed
in one sweep and at high speed, was an episode which those who
were engaged in it never forgot.
‘From the time of our crossing the Esla up to this period,’ wrote
one diarist, ‘we have been marching through one continuous
cornfield. The land is of the richest quality, and produces the finest
crops with the least possible labour. It is generally wheat, with a fair
proportion of barley, and now and then a crop of vetches or clover.
The horses fed on green barley nearly the whole march, and got fat.
The army has trampled down twenty yards of corn on each side of
the roads by which the several columns have passed—in many
places much more, from the baggage going on the side of the
columns, and so spreading farther into the wheat. But they must not
mind their corn if we get the enemy out of their country!... The
country gives bread and corn, and hitherto these have not failed, and
this is a region that has been plundered and devastated for five
years by the enemy! It was said before our march that until the
harvest came in, not a pound of bread by way of supplies for the
army could be procured[499].’
A Light Division diarist writes in a more romantic frame of mind:
‘The country was beautifully diversified, studded with castles of
Moorish architecture, recalling the chivalric days of Ferdinand and
Isabella. The sun shone brilliantly, the sky was heavenly blue, and
clouds of dust marked the line of march of the glittering columns.
The joyous peasantry hailed our approach and came dancing to
meet us, singing, and beating time on their small tambourines; and
when we passed through the principal street of Palencia, the nuns,
from the upper windows of a convent, showered down rose-leaves
upon our dusty heads[500].’
The dry comment of the Commander-in-chief, in his report to the
War Minister at home, contrasts oddly with this enthusiasm: ‘I
enclose the last weekly and daily states. We keep up our strength,
and the army are very healthy and in better order than I have ever
known them. God knows how long that will last. It depends entirely
upon the officers[501].’
While Wellington’s columns were hurrying northward, the French
remained for two days (June 7-9) in position behind the Pisuerga—
Reille on the right at Castroxeriz, the rest of the army holding the
heights down to Villadiego and the Arlanza river. Only British cavalry
scouts appeared in front of them. ‘The position was excellent,’ says
Jourdan, ‘and it was hoped to hold it for some days. But the generals
commanding the armies represented to the King that the troops
lacked bread, and that they dared not send out large detachments
far afield to requisition food from the peasantry, wherefore the whole
force retired on Burgos.’ No doubt the country was bare; and, when
the enemy is known to be near, it is unsafe to make large
detachments: but it may be suspected that the real cause for retreat
was the continuous uncertainty as to Wellington’s northward
movement. Yet it is clear that the French Head-Quarters had no
suspicion how far that movement was going.
For on the 9th, when they retreated, they took up position on a
very short line north and south of Burgos. Reille’s two divisions lay
behind the Hormaza river, ten miles west of the fortress—with the
right opposite Hormaza village, the left at Estepar—forming a front
line. The Army of the South was on both banks of the Arlanzon, five
miles behind Reille—right wing behind the Urbel river, left wing
behind the Arcos river. The Army of the Centre and the King’s
Guards were in reserve, billeted in Burgos itself. But already
Wellington’s columns were aiming at points far north of Reille’s
position. That day the northernmost divisions of Graham’s infantry[502]
were at Osorno, next day (June 10th) at Zarzosa, beyond the
Pisuerga, a point from which they could easily march round the
Hormaza position, and on June 11th, at Sotresgudo, where they
halted for a day[503]. The centre[504], with Wellington himself, on the
same day had reached Castroxeriz on the Odra river, while Hill was
close by at Barrio de Santa Maria and Valbases. Nothing had been
sent south of the Arlanzon save Julian Sanchez’s lancers, who were
scouring the country in the direction of Lerma, on the look-out for
belated French convoys or detachments. The Galician army, keeping
(as always) far out on the left wing, had reached the Pisuerga at
Herrera, ten miles north of Graham’s extreme flank. They were now
within two marches of the upper Ebro, and there was absolutely no
enemy in front of them for scores of miles—the nearest Frenchmen
in that direction were the columns with which Foy was scouring the
roads of Biscay, after his capture of Castro-Urdiales.
The halt of the French army in the neighbourhood of Burgos was
not to mark the end of its retreat, and the commencement of
offensive operations, as King Joseph had hoped. The only cheering
features in the general outlook were that Lamartinière’s division of
the Army of Portugal was now in touch—it was reported coming up
from Briviesca—and that a bulletin of the Grand Army was received
from Germany, telling of the victory of the Emperor at Bautzen. But
the discouraging news was appalling—the first instalment of it was
that Jourdan reported, after investigating the fortifications of Burgos,
that he considered the place untenable. During the spring building
and demolition had been taken in hand, for the purpose of linking up
the old castle, which had given so much trouble to Wellington in
1812, with the high-lying ‘Hornwork of St. Miguel’ on the rising
ground above. The scheme was wholly unfinished—the only result
achieved was that St. Miguel, as reconstructed, commanded the
castle, and that the alterations started in the enceinte of the latter,
with the object of linking it up with the former, had rendered it, in the
marshal’s opinion, incapable of holding out for a day. Yet this would
not have mattered so much if the army had been about to resume
the offensive, or to put up a stable defence in the Burgos region.
But it was declared that this was impossible—the governor
reported that the immense convoys which had been passing through
Burgos of late, and the recent stay of considerable bodies of troops
in the place[505], had brought his magazines to such a low ebb that he
could not feed an army of 50,000 men for more than a few days. The
town was still crammed with the last great horde of Spanish and
French refugees, who had come on from Madrid, Segovia, and
Valladolid, and all the King’s private train. They were sent on at once
towards Vittoria, under escort of Lamartinière’s division—which thus
no sooner became available than it was lost again. No news had
arrived either from Foy or from Clausel: but Sarrut’s division of the
Army of Portugal had been located north of the Ebro, and would be
coming in ere very long. The news that Clausel was undiscoverable
brought King Joseph to such a pitch of excitement that he took, on
June 9th, a step which he should have taken a fortnight before, and
threw over all his fears of offending the minister at Paris or the
Emperor in Saxony. He sent direct peremptory orders to Clausel to
join him at once, and told off a column of 1,500 men to escort the
aide-de-camp who bore them: it went off by Domingo Calzada and
Logroño. As a matter of fact the order reached the general in six
days—but it might have taken longer for all that Joseph could guess.
And the King came to the conclusion that if he were at all pushed by
Wellington within the next few days, he must abandon Burgos and
retire behind the Ebro. He might even have to go without hostile
persuasion, on the mere question of food-supplies.
But on June 12 the pressure was applied. Wellington had now
got all his forces over the Pisuerga, and his two southern columns
were concentrated between Castroxeriz and Villadiego: Graham was
farther off, but not out of reach. Having reconnoitred the advanced
position of Reille on the Hormaza river, and found that his supports
were far behind, he resolved to attack him in front and flank that
morning. Only the southern column—Hill’s troops—was employed,
the centre divisions being halted in a position from which they might
be brought in on the enemy’s rear, if the King reinforced Reille, but
not if the French showed no signs of standing. But the push against
the Army of Portugal, made by the 2nd Division, Silveira’s
Portuguese, and Morillo’s Spaniards, was sufficient to dislodge the
enemy: for while they were deploying against the French front, the
cavalry brigades of Grant and Ponsonby, supported by the Light
Division, appeared behind Reille’s right flank. The enemy at once
gave way, before infantry fighting had begun, and retreating hastily
southward got behind the Urbel river, where the Army of the South
was already in line. Reille then crossed the Arlanzon by the bridge of
Buniel and took post south of Burgos. The French loss was small—
the retreat was made in good order and with great speed, before the
British infantry could arrive. Grant’s and Ponsonby’s horse, already
outflanking the rearguard, got in close, but did not deliver a general
attack—by Wellington’s own orders as it is said[506]: for (despite of
Garcia Hernandez) he held to his firm belief that cavalry cannot
break intact infantry. A half troop of the 14th Light Dragoons, under
Lieut. Southwell, charged and captured an isolated French gun,
which had fallen behind the rearguard; but this was the only contact
between the armies that day. Jourdan says that Reille lost about
fifteen men only—an exaggeration no doubt, but not a very great
one.
The result, however, was to determine King Joseph to retreat at
once, and to abandon Burgos, before his obviously outflanked right
wing should be entirely circumvented. That night desperate
measures were taken—everything that could travel on wheels was
sent off by the high road towards the Ebro: the infantry followed,
using such side roads as were available. At dawn only cavalry
rearguards were covering Burgos. Jourdan explains the haste of the
retreat as follows. ‘It was easy to foresee that next morning that part
of the Army of the South which lay behind the Urbel river would be
attacked, and that being separated by the Arlanzon from the bulk of
the army, which lay on the south bank, it would be compromised.
Three choices lay open—first, to bring the whole army across the
Arlanzon and to fight on the Urbel; but this would have brought on
the general action which it had been determined to avoid, ever since
the King had made up his mind to call in Clausel. Second—to bring
the whole army across to the south bank of the Arlanzon, where
there was a good position: but this move would have allowed the
enemy to cut the great road and our communications with France—
and the same motives which had caused the rejection of the scheme
to retire south of the Douro on June 2 caused this alternative to be
disapproved on June 12. Third—to fall back by the great road to the
Ebro, and so secure the earliest possible concentration of all the
armies of Spain. This was the scheme adopted[507].’
It is said that Gazan was for fighting on the Urbel[508], while Reille
and D’Erlon opted for the second choice—that of abandoning the
high road to France, going south of the Arlanzon, and retreating by
the bad track to Domingo Calzada and Logroño, because Clausel,
being certainly somewhere in Navarre, would be picked up much
sooner at Logroño than at Miranda or other points higher up the
Ebro. But the Emperor’s orders that the direct communication with
France must be kept up at all costs, were adduced against them,
and settled the question.
Before leaving, the French made arrangements to blow up the
castle which had served them so well in the preceding October, and
to destroy a great store of powder and munitions for which no
transport could be procured. According to Jourdan the disaster which
followed was due to the professional ignorance of General
d’Aboville, the director-general of artillery, who maintained that shells
would do no great harm if they were exploded, not in a great mass
but placed in small groups, at distances one from another. He had
6,000 of them laid in parcels on the ground in the castle square, and
connected with the mines which were placed under the donjon keep.
Orders were given that the fuses were only to be lit when the last
troops should have left, and the inhabitants were told that if they
would keep to their houses they would incur no danger. But the
mines by some error were fired before seven o’clock in the morning,
and the effects of the explosion had been so badly calculated, that
not only were many houses in the city injured, all the glass blown out
of the splendid cathedral, and its roof broken in several places, but a
hail of shells fell all over the surrounding quarter, and killed 100 men
of Villatte’s division, who were halted in the Plaza Mayor, and a few
of Digeon’s dragoons who were crossing the bridge[509]. There were
casualties also, of course, among the unfortunate citizens. When the
smoke cleared away, and the fire had gone out, it was found that the
destruction of the donjon keep and upper works of the castle had
been complete, but that most of the outer wall was standing—as
indeed it is to this day. Wellington remarked that it was quite capable
of restoration, if the fortunes of the war made it necessary[510]. They
did not; and the skeleton of the castle still remains ruined and riven
on its mound, to surprise the observer by its moderate size. Those
who go round it can only marvel that such a small fortress should
have held all Wellington’s army at bay during so many eventful days
in 1812.
The British general, hearing at Castroxeriz, on the early morning
of June 13, that the French had evacuated Burgos and blown up its
works, did not even enter the town, and sent nothing more than
cavalry scouts to follow the retreating enemy, but ordered the instant
resumption of the north-westward march of the whole army. It was
now his intention to turn the line of the Ebro, in the same fashion that
he had turned the line of the Douro on May 31—by passing it so far
to the westward that any position which the enemy might adopt
would be outflanked, even before it was fully taken up. And he was
aiming not only at turning the Ebro line, but at cutting Joseph’s
communication with France: he was already taking Vittoria, far
behind the Ebro, as the goal for which he was making.
We have Wellington’s own word for the fact that it was the
collapse of the French opposition in front of Burgos which finally
induced him to develop his original plan of campaign, spoken of
above, into the more ambitious scheme for driving the French
completely out of the Peninsula, which he now took in hand.
Unfortunately his statement was taken down many years after the
event, and his memory of details was not all that it might have been
in his old age. But the story is so interesting and fits into the
psychology of the moment so well that it must not be omitted.
‘When I heard and saw the explosion (I was within a few miles,
and the effect was tremendous) I made a sudden resolution forthwith
—to cross the Ebro instanter, and to endeavour to push the French
to the Pyrenees. We had heard of the battles of Lützen and Bautzen,
and of the Armistice, and the affairs of the Allies looked very ill.
Some of my officers remonstrated with me about the imprudence of
crossing the Ebro, and advised me to “take up the line of the Ebro”,
&c. I asked them what they meant by “taking up the line of the Ebro”,
—a river 300 miles long, and what good I was to do along that line?
In short I would not listen to that advice, and that evening (or the
very next morning) I crossed the river and pushed the French till I
afterwards beat them at Vittoria. And lucky it was that I did! For the
battle of Vittoria induced the Allies to denounce the Armistice—then
followed Leipzig and all the rest.
‘All my staff were against my crossing the Ebro: they represented
that we had done enough, that we ought not to risk the army and all
that we had obtained, that the Armistice would enable Bonaparte to
reinforce his army in Spain, and we therefore should look for a
defensive system. I thought differently—I knew that the Armistice
could not affect in the way of quick reinforcement so distant an army
as that of Spain. I thought that if I could not hustle them out of Spain
before they were reinforced, I should not be able to hold any position
in Spain after they should be. Above all I calculated on the effect that
a victory might have on the Armistice itself, so I crossed the Ebro
and fought the battle of Vittoria.’
How far is this curious confidence, made to Croker in January
1837, and taken down by him in two separate drafts (Croker Papers,
ii. p. 309, and iii. pp. 336-7), a blurred impression, coloured by after
events? It is quite true that the Burgos explosion took place early on
the morning of June 13, that the orders dictated at Villadiego that
day (Suppl. Disp. vii, p. 637) give a sudden new direction to the
army, and that next evening (June 14) the heads of the columns
were over the Ebro. But Wellington’s own dispatches seem to show
that he did not know anything of the Armistice on June 13, for he
wrote to his brother Henry that day, ‘I have no news from England.
The French have a bulletin of May 24th, when Napoleon was at
Dresden—they talk of successes, but as he was still at Dresden on
the 24th, having arrived there on the 8th, they cannot have been
very important.’ Now the Armistice of Plässwitz was signed on June
4, and on the 13th Wellington’s latest news was of May 24. But on
the 17th, when he had been two days across the Ebro, he did at last
hear something. Again he writes to his brother:
 ‘I have got, by Corunna, English papers of the 3rd. There were
several actions in the neighbourhood of Bautzen on the 20th-22nd
May.... Bonaparte turned then, and they retired. The Allies have lost
ground but are unhurt. He has offered (before the battle) to consent
to a congress at Prague.... An armistice is to commence when the
ministers shall arrive at Prague.... I do not think that the Russians
and Prussians can agree to the armistice, unless they submit
entirely’ (Disp. x. p. 443).
Clearly, then, Wellington on the 13th knew nothing of any
armistice, since he introduces the proposal, not the accomplishment,
of it to his most trusted correspondent on the 17th, as the last news
to hand. He was committed to the advance on Vittoria long before he
could know of its subsequent political effects. And thus in his old age
he underrated his own prescience. But the fact that his officers
doubted the wisdom of the advance, and that he swept their
objections away, is probably correct. That he had considered the
possibility of an advance far beyond the Ebro seems, as has been
said before (pp. 301-3), to be proved by orders given in the spring,
before the campaign began.
On the evening of the 13th head-quarters were at Villadiego,
while the columns were all heading northward on parallel routes. The
Galicians were moving from Aguilar on the bridge of Rocamonde[511],
the highest on the Ebro save that at its source near Reynosa. The
bulk of Graham’s column was marching by La Piedra on the bridge
of San Martin, a few miles lower down than Rocamonde, though
some of its flanking cavalry crossed at the latter passage, ahead of
the Galicians. The Head-Quarters divisions and Hill’s column moved,
using all available secondary roads, from their position opposite the
lower Urbel, by Villadiego and Montorio respectively, on the bridge of
Puente Arenas, some fifteen miles below that of San Martin. All three
columns had on the 13th-14th-15th very hard marches, of four long
Spanish leagues on three successive days, across upland roads
where artillery had never been seen before. The move would only
have been practicable at midsummer. But the columns were
absolutely unopposed, and the upper Ebro country had been entirely
neglected by the French, as Wellington had foreseen. ‘One division
could have stopped the whole column at the bridge of San Martin,’
wrote an intelligent observer, ‘or the other at Rocamonde, where
some of our column likewise crossed—the enemy cannot be aware
of our movement[512].’ Graham was all across the Ebro by noon on
the 14th, Hill by the morning of the 16th. Wellington who had fixed
his head-quarters at the lost village of Masa in the hills, was able to
declare with confidence that the whole army would be over the river
by the night—‘and then the French must either fight, or retire out of
Spain altogether.’
The Ebro country was a surprise to the British observers who had
spent so many years in the uplands of Portugal or the rolling plains
of the Tierra de Campos. ‘Winding suddenly out of a narrow pass,
we found ourselves in the river valley, which extended some
distance on our right. The beauty of the scenery was beyond
description: the rocks rose perpendicularly on every side, without
any visible opening to convey an idea of an outlet. This enchanting
valley is studded with picturesque hamlets and fruitful gardens
producing every description of vegetation. At the Puente Arenas we
met a number of sturdy women loaded with fresh butter from the
mountains of the Asturias. We had not tasted that commodity for two
years, therefore it will be unnecessary to describe how readily we
made a purchase, nibbling by the way at such a luxury[513].’ Northern
or Pyrenean Spain is a very different country from the dusty wind-
swept central plateaux: above all the lack of water, which is the curse
of Castile, ceased at last to be the bane of marching columns.
After crossing the Ebro on the 14th Graham’s column made
another four-league march on the 15th to the large town of
Villarcayo, while the Galicians got to Soncillo on the main road from
Santander to Burgos; thus Wellington was certain of the new naval
base to which he had bid the Corunna transports sail only five days
before. Hill’s troops, who had a longer march during the last two
days than the other columns, were not so far forward, but nearing
the river had occupied the heights on the southern side of the
Puente de Arenas. The three columns forming the Anglo-Portuguese
army were, as a glance at the map shows, in close touch with each
other, and in a position where the whole 80,000 men could be
concentrated by a single march. Undoubtedly the most surprising
features of the advance is that Wellington’s commissariat was able to
feed such a mass of troops in such a limited area, after they had left
the plains of Castile and plunged into the thinly inhabited mountains.
The local supplies obtainable must have been very limited. Several
diarists speak of biscuit being short[514], though meat was not. But
somehow or other the commissaries generally contrived to find more
or less food for the army—the well-organized mule trains were not
far behind the infantry columns, and the long and difficult movement
was never checked—as earlier marches had been in 1809 and
1811[515]—by the mere question of provisions, though many brigades
got but scanty meals.
 SECTION XXXVI: CHAPTER VI
WELLINGTON ON THE EBRO.
JUNE 15-20,1813

After evacuating Burgos the French army had retired, at a

rather leisurely rate, down the high road which leads by Briviesca
and the defile of Pancorbo to the valley of the Ebro. The rearguard,
as we have seen, had left Burgos on the morning of the 13th, and
halted for great part of the day at Gamonal, a few miles east of the
city, on the spot where Napoleon had won his easy victory over the
Conde de Belveder on November 10, 1808. It was only followed by
Spanish irregular horse—some of Julian Sanchez’s ubiquitous
lancers. Head-quarters that night and the next (June 14) were at
Briviesca, and remained there for forty-eight hours: on the 15th they
were moved on to Pancorbo, an admirable position with a high-lying
fort in the centre, while the road is flanked for miles by steep slopes,
on which an advantageous rearguard action might have been fought.
But no pursuing enemy came in sight: this fact began to worry the
French Head-quarters Staff. ‘What could have become of Lord
Wellington? The French Army, in full retreat, was permitted to move
leisurely along the great route, without being harassed or urged
forward, not a carriage of any description being lost. It appeared
inexplicable[516].’ The French retreat was leisurely for two reasons—
the first was that King Joseph wished to gain time for the immense
convoys lumbering in front of him to reach Miranda and Vittoria
without being hustled. The second was that he thought that every
day gained gave more time for Clausel to come up: at the slow rate
at which he was proceeding he might almost hope to find the missing
divisions of the Army of Portugal converging on Miranda, at the
moment when he should arrive there himself. The Council of War at
Burgos had decided that Wellington must inevitably pursue by the
great chaussée. The routes from the Burgos region to the upper
Ebro had been reported both by French officers who claimed to
know the country, and by local Afrancesados, as presenting
insuperable difficulties to a large army. There was, it is true, the high
road Burgos-Santander by Santijanez, Pedrosa, and Reynosa—but
this led north-west in an eccentric direction, not towards Miranda or
Vittoria. That the danger lay on the rough mountain ways a little
farther east, which fall down to San Martin and Puente de Arenas,
seems not to have been suspected. Yet it was disquieting to find no
pursuit in progress: could the Allied Army possibly have been forced
to halt at Burgos for want of supplies?
On the 16th the French army descended from the defile of
Pancorbo to the Ebro, and proceeded to distribute itself in the region
round Miranda, in cantonments which permitted of rapid
concentration when it should become necessary. Nothing was yet to
be heard of Clausel—but on the other hand Lamartinière’s division
was again picked up—it handed over the duty of escorting the
convoys toward Vittoria to Joseph’s Spanish contingent, the small
division of Casapalacios. Sarrut’s division also came in from Biscay,
and reported that it had been lately in touch with Foy, who was
successfully hunting the local guerrilleros in the coast-land. But
neither Foy himself, nor the troops of the Army of the North which
had been co-operating with him of late, were anywhere near.
Strange as it may appear, that very capable officer had wholly failed
to understand the general situation: though apprised ere now of the
evacuation of Madrid and Valladolid, he had nothing in his mind save
his wholly secondary operations against the Biscay bands. His
dispatches of this period show him occupied entirely with the safety
of Bilbao, and the necessity for guarding the high road from Bergara
and Tolosa to France. There were 20,000 troops in Biscay, but they
were entirely dispersed on petty expeditions and convoy work. On
June 19, when he got from head-quarters the first dispatch that
caused him to think of concentrating and joining the main army, Foy
had only one battalion with him at the moment at Bergara. A column
of 1,000 men was moving to reinforce the garrison of Bilbao, a
brigade was at Villafranca escorting towards France the large body
of prisoners whom he had captured in his recent operations—
another brigade was waiting on the road between Vittoria and
Mondragon, to pick up a large convoy which, as he had been
warned, would be coming up the Royal Road and would require to
be protected as far as San Sebastian. He was making efforts to send
provisions by sea to Bilbao and Castro-Urdiales—a task in which he
was being worried by British cruisers off the coast—and was
preparing to go to Bilbao himself[517].
No doubt the main blame for this untimely dispersion of forces lay
with General Head-Quarters. Jourdan and Joseph ought to have
sent orders to Foy, after the evacuation of Madrid, ordering him to
cease all secondary operations, to leave minimum garrisons at a few
essential points, abandon all the rest, and collect as strong a field-
force as possible, with which to join the main army. But they had
written to the minister at Paris suggesting such moves, instead of
dispatching direct orders to that effect to the general himself. Foy
had been sent information, not orders, and had failed to realize the
full meaning of the information—absorbed as he was in his own
particular Biscayan problems. Events were marching very quickly: it
was hard to realize that Wellington, who had been on the Esla on
May 31, would have been across the upper Ebro with 70,000 men on
June 15. It had taken little more than a fortnight for him to overrun
half of Northern Spain. The fact remained that of all the French
troops operating in Biscay in June, only Sarrut’s division, from
Orduña, joined the King in time for the battle of Vittoria. Yet Foy had
under his orders not only his own division but the Italian brigade of
St. Pol, and the mobile brigade of Berlier from the Army of the North,
in addition to 10,000 men of the garrisons of the various posts and
fortresses of the North and the littoral. And he had no enemy save
the great partisan Longa in the western mountains, and the scattered
remains of the local insurgents under El Pastor and others, whom he
had defeated in April and May, and whom he was at present harrying
from hill to coast and from coast to hill. We are once more forced to
remember that the French armies in Spain were armies of
occupation as well as armies of operation, and that one of their
functions was often fatal to the other.
 But to return to the moment when the King’s army came back to
the Ebro. Head-quarters were, of course, established at Miranda,
where the royal Guard served as their escort. The Army of the South
sent three divisions across to the north bank of the river; they were
cantoned on the lower Zadorra about Arminion; but Gazan kept three
brigades on the south bank as a rearguard for the present, but (as
the King hoped) to form a vanguard for a counter-advance, if only
Clausel should come up soon, and an offensive campaign become
possible. A small observing force was left at Pancorbo, into whose
castle a garrison was thrown. Cavalry exploring parties, pushed out
from this point, sought for Wellington’s approaching columns as far
as Poza de la Sal on the right, Briviesca on the high road, and
Cerezo on the left; but to no effect. They came in touch with nothing
but detachments of Julian Sanchez’s Lancers. D’Erlon, with the
Army of the Centre, went ten miles down the Ebro to Haro: he had
now recovered his missing division, Darmagnac’s, which had been
lent to Reille for the last two months. For the Army of Portugal having
now three infantry divisions collected—Maucune’s, Sarrut’s, and
Lamartinière’s—was ordered to give back the borrowed unit to its
proper commander. Reille took the right of the Ebro position, having
Maucune’s division at Frias, Sarrut’s at Espejo, and Lamartinière’s at
the Puente Lara. He was ordered to use his cavalry to search for
signs of the enemy along the upper Ebro. The King had thus an
army which, by the junction of Sarrut and Lamartinière, had risen to
over 50,000 infantry and nearly 10,000 cavalry, concentrated on a
short front of 25 miles from Frias to Haro, covering the main road to
France by Vittoria, and also the side roads to Orduña and Bilbao on
the one flank, and Logroño and Saragossa on the other. His retreat,
though dispiriting, had not yet been costly—it is doubtful whether he
had lost 1,000 casualties in the operations of the last six weeks. With
the exception of the combats at Salamanca on May 26 and Morales
on June 2, there had been no engagements of any importance. The
army was angry at the long-continued retreat; the officers were
criticizing the generalship of their commanders in the most
outspoken fashion, but there was no demoralization—the troops
were clamouring for a general action.
 But on June 17, when the French armies settled down into their
new position, with no detected enemy in their neighbourhood, their
fate was already determined—the Ebro line had been turned before
it was even taken up. For on this same day Wellington had not only
got his whole army north of the Ebro, but was marching rapidly
eastward, by the mountain roads twenty miles north of the river, into
the rear of Reille’s cantonments. Of all his troops only Julian
Sanchez and Carlos de España’s infantry division were left in
Castile.
The movements of the Allied Army on the 15th-16th-17th June
had been carried out with surprising celerity. The Galician infantry,
who had crossed the river first, at Rocamonde, the bridge highest up
on its course, on the 13th were hurrying northward, by cross roads
not marked on the map, and obviously impracticable for guns, to
Soncillo (15th), Quintanilla de Pienza (16th), Villasana (17th), and
Valmaseda in Biscay (18th). When they had reached the last-named
town they were threatening Bilbao, and almost at its gates. This was
the great demonstration, intended to throw confusion among all the
French detachments on the northern coast. Several of the stages
exceeded thirty miles in the day.
Meanwhile the three great columns of the Anglo-Portuguese
army were executing a turning movement almost as wide as that of
Giron’s Galicians. Converging from different bridges of the Ebro—
Rocamonde (where some of Graham’s cavalry passed), San Martin
de Lines (where the bulk of Graham’s force debouched northward on
the 14th), and Puente Arenas (used by the Head-quarters column on
the 15th and by Hill’s column on the 16th[518])—the whole army came
in by successive masses on to the two neighbouring towns of
Villarcayo and Medina de Pomar. At the latter place Longa turned up
with his hard-marching Cantabrian division, and joined the army.
These considerable towns are the road-centres of the whole rugged
district between the Ebro and the Cantabrian mountains. From them
fork out the very few decent roads which exist in the land—those
northward over the great sierras to Santander, Santoña, and
Valmaseda-Bilbao: those eastward across their foot-hills to Orduña-
Vittoria and to Frias-Miranda. These five roads are the only ones
practicable for artillery and transport: there are, however, minor
tracks which can take infantry in good summer weather.
From his head-quarters at Quintana, near the bridge of Puente
Arenas, Wellington dictated on the 15th the marching orders which
governed the next stage of the campaign. With the exception of the
Galicians, already starting on their circular sweep towards Bilbao, all
his columns were directed to utilize the road parallel to the Ebro, but
twenty miles north of it, which runs from Medina de Pomar to Osma,
Orduña, and Vittoria. He deliberately avoided employing the other
high road, which runs closer to the river from Medina de Pomar to
Frias and Miranda, even for a side-column or a flying corps: only
cavalry scouts were sent along it. The reason why the whole army
was thrown on to a single road—a thing generally to be avoided,
especially when time is precious—was partly that the appearance of
British troops before Frias, where the enemy was known to have a
detachment, would give him early warning of the move. But the more
important object was to strike at the French line of communication
with Bayonne as far behind the known position of King Joseph’s
army as possible. If the line Frias-Miranda had been chosen, the
enemy would have had many miles less to march, when once the
alarm was given, if he wished to cover his proper line of retreat. If a
fight was coming, it had better be at or about Vittoria, rather than at
or about Miranda. Moreover, the high road, for a few miles east of
Frias, passes to the south bank of the Ebro, which it recrosses at the
Puente Lara—there is only a bad track north of the river from Frias to
that bridge. It would be absurd to direct any part of the army to cross
and recross the Ebro at passages which might be defended.
So the whole force was committed to the Medina-Osma road,
except that the infantry occasionally took cross-cuts by local tracks,
in order to leave the all-important main line, as far as possible, to the
guns and transport. The three corps in which the army had marched
from the Pisuerga fell in behind each other, in the order in which they
had crossed the Ebro—Graham leading—the Head-Quarters column
following—Hill bringing up the rear. Longa’s Cantabrians went on as
a sort of flying vanguard in front of Graham, not being burdened with
artillery[519]. The road was one which could only have been used for
such a large force in summer—it hugged the foot-hills of the
Cantabrian sierras, crossing successively the head-waters of several
small rivers running south to the Ebro, each in its own valley. The
country was thinly peopled and bare, so that little food could be got
to supplement the mule-borne rations. For this reason, as also with
the object of granting the French as little time as possible after the
first alarm should be given, the pace had to be forced. The marches
were long: on the 15th the head of Graham’s infantry was at
Villarcayo: on the 16th at La Cerca (five miles beyond Medina de
Pomar): on the 17th at the mountain villages of San Martin de Loza
and Lastres de Teza: on the 18th it was due at Osma and at
Berberena—a few miles up the Osma-Orduña road. The Head-
Quarters column having no exploration to do, since the way was
reported clear in front, covered the same distance in three marches
instead of four, and was expected to reach the neighbourhood of
Osma on the 18th. Hill’s column had also to hurry—its leading
division was on that same day expected to be at Venta de Membligo,
a posting station six miles short of Osma, so that its head would be
just behind the tail of the preceding corps. But Hill’s rear would be
strung out for many miles behind. However, all the fighting army was
again in one mass—with a single exception. Wellington had ordered
the 6th division, commanded temporarily by his own brother-in-law
Pakenham, to halt at Medina de Pomar. The reason which he gives
in his dispatch[520] for depriving himself, now that the day of crisis
was at hand, of a good division of 7,000 men, is that he left it ‘to
cover the march of our magazines and stores.’ This is almost as
puzzling a business as his leaving of Colville’s corps at Hal on the
day of the battle of Waterloo—the only similar incident in the long
record of his campaigns. If this was his sole reason, why should not
a smaller unit—Pack’s or Bradford’s independent brigade—or both of
them—have been left behind? For that purpose such a force would
have sufficed. We are not informed that the 6th Division was more
afflicted with sickness than any other, or that it was more way-worn.
The only supposition that suggests itself is that Wellington may have
considered the possibility of Giron’s raid into Biscay failing, and
bringing down on his rear some unsuspected mass of French troops
from Bilbao. If this idea entered his head, he may easily have
thought it worth while to leave behind a solid reserve, on which Giron
might fall back, and so to cover the rear of his main army while he
was striking at the great road to France. But it must be confessed
that this is a mere hypothesis, and that the detachment of
Pakenham’s division seems inexplicable from the information before
us. It was ordered to follow when the whole of the transport should
be clear, if no further developments had happened to complicate the
situation. Carrying out this direction literally, Pakenham waited three
days at Medina de Pomar, and so only got to the front twenty-four
hours after the battle of Vittoria.[521]
The orders which Wellington issued upon the 17th[522] brought the
head of his columns into touch with the enemy. They directed that
Graham, with the 1st and 5th Division, Pack and Bradford, should
move past Osma on to Orduña, by the two alternative routes
available between those places, while the Head-Quarters column
should not turn north toward Orduña on reaching Osma, but pursue
the roads south-eastward by Espejo and Carcamo, which lead to
Vittoria by a more southerly line. The result contemplated was very
much that which was worked out in the battle of the 21st—a frontal
attack by the main body, with an outflanking move by Graham’s
corps, which would bring it into the rear of the enemy. But the route
via Orduña was not the one which the northern column was actually
destined to take, as the events of the 18th distracted it into a shorter
but rougher road to the same destination (Murguia), which it would
have reached by a much longer turn on the high road via Orduña.
But all the columns were not moving on the main track from
Medina de Pomar to Osma this day, for Wellington had directed the
Light Division to drop its artillery to the care of the 4th Division, and
cut across the hills south of the high road, by a country path which
goes by La Boveda, San Millan, and Villanan to a point, a few miles
south of Osma, in the same valley of the Omecillo in which that town
lies. And Hill, still far to the rear, was told to detach two brigades of
the 2nd Division, and send them to follow the Light Division along the
same line: if Alten should send back word that the route was
practicable for guns, Hill was to attach his Portuguese field battery to
this advance-column.
It was, apparently, on the morning of the 17th June only that the
French got definite indications of the direction in which the British