Bernstein Rideshare TAM

23 June 2022
US Emerging Internet
UBER and LYFT: Where are we on the rideshare adoption curve?
The addressable market for rideshare has been a point of contention since the stocks went
Nikhil Devnani, CFA
+1 212 969 6331 public. Unlike eCommerce and food delivery, which have well-known market sizes (e.g.,
nikhil.devnani@bernstein.com total retail and restaurant spending), rideshare isn't clear-cut, and in core US markets it has
already eclipsed the taxi industry. The companies have often pointed to car ownership as
Eva Zhang the TAM -- a notion we haven't subscribed to. We offer our own bottom-up math and
+1-212-969-1485
eva.zhang@bernstein.com rideshare penetration curve in today's note. While the focus right now is on driver supply
and recovering from the pandemic, we expect investor attention to eventually shift back
to demand, which is where we dig in today. Certainly, for long-term investors, sizing the
opportunity is a key consideration in underwriting a thesis on either Uber or Lyft.
For the exclusive use of bkm@uber.com.
TAM is so 2020. We recently held a conference call with investors, on which one of the
questions was “does TAM even matter anymore?” We appreciate the sentiment in this
market. However, this is primarily an exercise in building a medium-term outlook on the
growth rate of rideshare post-COVID.
Our approach. We start with an addressable population (15-64, non-rural, top 65% of
income distribution) and make some general assumptions around frequency of trips and
price per trip based on Uber's reporting and PPP data. We estimate the North American
rideshare TAM to be ~$140B and the global market (ex-China, Russia, and Southeast Asia)
to be ~$585B. We believe penetration rates are 30%+ in North America and mid-
teens globally.
Implications of our analysis. The most notable takeaway is that our math suggests
the US rideshare market is mid-cycle. This doesn't mean that growth is tapped out.
Several eCommerce categories have penetration rates north of 30% while advertising
is 70% online today. These markets are still growing double-digits. However, we think
it's reasonable to assume the US market will grow slower than international once we get
past the COVID recovery period, in the 10-15% ballpark. Faster international growth will
likely allow the overall industry to continue compounding at 15-20% per year. As a global
business, we believe Uber is better positioned than Lyft.
Are we too aggressive or too conservative? Time will tell, TAM math has its limitations.
Nonetheless, we think there are some additional data points that validate our general
sentiment on US rideshare: (1) mobility growth was slowing at the companies and even
more so in big urban markets like NYC pre-pandemic; (2) the focus has been shifting from
new customer acquisition to engagement, especially with margins a priority; and (3) ride
price inflation and moderating rider incentives could impact growth.
The emphasis on profitable growth. Like much of emerging Internet, rideshare has been
supported by years of access to cheap capital. It's now at a pivotal moment where it has to
prove the underlying earnings power and durability of the model. The increasing focus on
profitability suggests that Uber and Lyft may have to make some trade-offs between growth
spend and margin expansion. The industry can no longer buy growth, which is a good thing
for capital discipline, but it could weigh on the top-line. We believe rideshare has staying
power and will prove itself on profitable growth. Uber is our preferred way to play the space.
See the Disclosure Appendix of this report for required disclosures, analyst certifications and other www.bernsteinresearch.com
important information.
First Published: 23 Jun 2022 04:00 UTC Completion Date: 23 Jun 2022 03:46 UTC
Nikhil Devnani, CFA +1 212 969 6331 nikhil.devnani@bernstein.com 23 June 2022
BERNSTEIN TICKER TABLE

22 Jun 2022 TTM Adjusted EPS Adjusted P/E (x)
Closing Price Rel.
Ticker Rating Price Target Perf. 2021A 2022E 2023E 2021A 2022E 2023E
UBER O USD 21.50 35.00 (44.7)% USD (0.71) (0.10) 0.63 (30.4) (211.8) 34.2
LYFT M USD 14.83 22.00 (63.4)% USD (0.25) 0.14 0.59 (60.2) 106.8 25.0
SPX 3,759.89 203.71 223.05 246.04 18.46 16.86 15.28
O - Outperform, M - Market-Perform, U - Underperform, N - Not Rated
Source: Bloomberg, Bernstein estimates and analysis.
INVESTMENT IMPLICATIONS
We estimate the North American rideshare TAM to be ~$140B and the global market (ex-China, Russia, and Southeast Asia) to
be ~$585B. We believe penetration rates are 30%+ in North America and mid-teens globally. The most notable takeaway is
that our math suggests the US rideshare market is mid-cycle. This doesn't mean that growth is tapped out. However, we think
it's reasonable to assume the US market will grow slower than international once we get past the COVID recovery period, in the
10-15% ballpark. Faster international growth will likely allow the overall industry to continue compounding at 15-20% per year.
Uber's international exposure is a positive, and we think it could support a more durable growth runway relative to Lyft, where
we worry more about deceleration in North American rideshare. Over and above this dynamic, we prefer Uber for the scale
advantage and cross-platform potential. Keep in mind our estimates do not embed a recession.
EXHIBIT 1 : We believe that Uber has a more durable growth outlook than Lyft given its global model.
Expected Rideshare Growth at Uber and Lyft (Y/Y)

80%
68%
60%
38% 36% 40%

40% 29%
20% 23% 24%
19% 17% 17% 15%
20%
0%
-20%
-40% -35%
-46%
-60%
2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Uber Mobility Gross Bookings Lyft Revenue
Source: Company reports, Bernstein estimates and analysis
US EMERGING INTERNET BERNSTEIN 2

DETAILS
RIDESHARE DEMAND CONTINUES TO RECOVER FROM THE PANDEMIC

Before we dig into our analysis on the addressable market, we take stock of the ongoing recovery in rideshare from the troughs
of COVID. Encouragingly, we continue to see a broad-based improvement in mobility trends and use cases. Globally, Uber's
Mobility gross bookings finally exceeded 2019 levels in April, putting an important milestone behind us. And Uber called out
further M/M improvement in May. The mix of bookings is starting to look normal as well, despite WFH challenges and YTD
headwinds on travel. Importantly, it's not all just higher prices, with Uber's global trips 95% recovered as of April (high 70s in
the US). Unlike most other Internet companies, rideshare should see improvement in demand this year, so long as consumer
spending holds up. Key drivers:
• Regional green shoots: The US market is 70-80% recovered on a trips basis, but there have been regional differences.
While West Coast markets are ~55% recovered as per Lyft, East Coast markets are at least 10ppts ahead with big centers
like NYC and Miami 90%+ back to normal. Several international markets are further along, with Uber's operations in Latin
America and EMEA back to growth vs. 2019 levels. It may take a little longer for the lagging regions to catch up, but they
offer green shoots to recovery curve.
• Travel recovery: Rideshare services should see strong demand for airport trips in 2022, particularly on the leisure front.
Corporate T&E is also showing signs of life, which is encouraging. While the durability of this travel wave remains to be seen,
it is one of several legs for the rideshare recovery curve to stand on.
• Social use cases: Like with travel, we think rideshare will see a tailwind from increased spending on services and
experiences this year. Consumers are going out again, though the use case hasn't fully recovered on rideshare. Lyft called
out “party hours” as one of the largest areas left for improvement with a low-20% of its ride mix attributable to the use case
today vs. 25% pre-COVID.
• Commuting: Making up roughly ~1/3 of rides pre-pandemic, we have been concerned about the future of commute trips in
a work-from-anywhere world. However, there are some offsets from higher ride prices and demand being spread out across
broader hours of the day (off-peak rides are more profitable too). Both Uber and Lyft have called out that share of commute
and workday trips look normal again, a sign that: (1) consumers may have developed new mobility habits around their hybrid
work schedules; and (2) new cohorts have turned to rideshare (e.g., healthcare workers and blue collar workers that cannot
work from home).
• Market share gains can stick: Uber and Lyft took market share from public transit services and taxis during COVID, and we
think these gains will hold, even with rideshare prices relatively high (we're seeing this play out in NYC). Structurally, we think
it's difficult for taxis to mount a real competitive threat given supply is even more constrained.
• Driver supply: This has been a key constraint on growth, with the supply gap putting upward pressure on ride prices. The
ongoing return of drivers should help moderate ride prices and improve conversion rates. But this will take time. We estimate
that rideshare supply is 60-70% of pre-pandemic levels in the US, with Uber 70% recovered and Lyft likely closer to the
lower-end of the range (over-indexed to slower-recovering West Coast). Uber and Lyft are spending more to reactivate
drivers, but incentive spending isn't spiraling out of control given the emphasis both companies are placing on profitability.
This helps preserve margins, but also explains why the pace of recovery has been somewhat gradual sequentially. That's the
trade-off being made.

EXHIBIT 2 : Uber's bookings mix now looks in-line with pre-COVID, an indication that use cases are recovering
across the board. Some regions (e.g., LatAm and EMEA) have come back faster than others (e.g., the US).
Source: Company reports
EXHIBIT 3 : Rideshare bookings at Uber were back to EXHIBIT 4 : Despite higher ride prices, Uber and Lyft have
>2019 levels in April, a benefit of the global model. taken share from taxis in NY through the pandemic.
Uber Mobility Bookings (Annualized and NY Rideshare vs. Taxi Market Share (%)
Indexed to 2019)
100%
1.20x 1.14x
90%
1.08x
1.04x
1.00x 80%
1.00x 83%
0.91x 70%
0.88x 0.86x 75%
0.80x 60%
0.80x
0.70x 50%
40%
0.60x 0.55x0.55x
0.48x 30% 25%
17%
0.40x 20%
0.25x 10%
0.20x 0%
Jan-15
May-15
May-17
May-20
May-16
May-18
May-19
Jan-20
May-21
Jan-22
Jan-16
Jan-17
Sep-17
Jan-18
Jan-19
Sep-19
Jan-21
Sep-15
Sep-16
Sep-18
Sep-20
Sep-21
0.00x
Rideshare Taxi
Source: TLC, Todd W. Schneider, Bernstein analysis

Source: Company reports, Bernstein estimates and anlaysis

EXHIBIT 5 : Drivers are also coming back, albeit this EXHIBIT 6 : App data suggests that the supply recovery
remains a work in progress for the industry. has been flat-to-up on a sequential basis.
Y/Y Growth in Total Drivers US Driver App Downloads (Millions; Monthly

Average)
90%
1.2 0.30
78%
80%
70% 1.0 0.25
70%
0.8 0.20
60%
0.6 0.15
50%
40%
0.4 0.10
40%
30% 0.2 0.05
20% 0.0 0.00
10%
0% Uber US Driver (LHS) Lyft US Driver (RHS)

Uber Mobility N. Uber Mobility in N. Lyft (1Q)
America (MAY) America (APR)
Source: Apptopia, Bernstein analysis
Uber's driver app includes delivery; quarterly data shown as monthly average
Source: Company reports, Bernstein analysis
TAM ISN'T THE FOCUS RIGHT NOW, BUT COULD RESURFACE

For now, investors are pre-occupied with the availability of rideshare drivers and the potential for operating leverage in 2022.
However, higher ride prices have also raised questions about the durability of demand. NYC, which has done well to bounce
back from COVID, saw a M/M step-down in trips per day in April. One market doesn't make a trend, but it's an important market.
It also hasn't gone unnoticed that Lyft missed on Active Riders the past three quarters, which the company attributes to micro-
mobility (tough comps + seasonality) and lagging West Coast markets. But the outstanding question on price elasticity remains.
In fact, we are below consensus for 2022 revenue growth at Lyft (modeling 29% vs. the Street at 33% and management at 36%
+). To the extent that the company has to moderate its outlook on the upcoming earnings call, it would spur further debate on
demand trends. We see less risk of this at Uber given the strength of international.
Understanding the addressable market for rideshare is a crucial building block to underwriting a longer-term thesis on Uber or
Lyft. And while TAM math certainly has its limitations, the exercise is helpful in informing our opinion on the runway for growth
over the next 3-5 years, once we get past this COVID normalization period. In particular, given the slower recovery in domestic
trips, the penetration rate and growth profile of the US rideshare market is of utmost importance. It is inevitably the region that
investors pay closest attention to.

EXHIBIT 7 : NY rideshare trips were flat sequentially in EXHIBIT 8 : Lyft's miss on Active Riders the past few
April on a M/M basis. quarters has raised some demand questions.
NY Rideshare Trips per Day Lyft Active Riders (Millions)

900 25
Missed the past 3 Qs
800
1-Apr-22, 592 20
700
1-Mar-22,
600
595 15
500
400 10
300
5
200
100
0
0
Jul-15
Jul-17
Jul-19
Jul-21
Jul-16
Jul-18
Jul-20
Nov-15
Nov-17
Nov-19
Nov-21
Nov-16
Nov-18
Nov-20
Mar-15
Mar-16
Mar-17
Mar-18
Mar-19
Mar-20
Mar-21
Mar-22 Actual Consensus Expected

Source: TLC, Todd W. Schneider, Bernstein analysis

Source: Company reports, Bloomberg, Bernstein analysis
CAR OWNERSHIP IS NOT THE TAM, BUT THE END MARKET IS LARGE ENOUGH
The addressable market for rideshare has been a point of contention since the stocks went public. Unlike eCommerce and food
delivery, which have well-known market sizes that investors can anchor on (e.g., total retail and restaurant spending), rideshare
isn't clear-cut, and in core US markets it has already eclipsed the taxi industry.
The companies have often pointed to car ownership as the TAM -- a notion we have not subscribed to. Even ignoring recent ride
price inflation, the service has always been more expensive than car ownership (per mile basis) and less reliable (particularly as
you move into the suburbs). Until autonomous vehicles change the value proposition (i.e., dramatically bring ride prices down
and improve supply), we think this thesis will hold. Nonetheless, rideshare services can still offer a solid complimentary service
to car ownership and public transit for consumers that are willing to pay up for the convenience and ease of access on various
occasions. The model works best in (large) cities, which make up the majority of rideshare bookings -- prior research showed
that the 9 biggest cities in the US used to make up 70% of national trips. Directionally, we think this still holds.
Taking those factors into account, we run our own math on the underlying TAM:
• Step #1: To estimate this, we start with an addressable population based on people aged 15-64 that live in non-rural
areas and are most likely to be able to afford rideshare on a semi-regular basis (i.e., top 65% of income distribution). These
thresholds are hard to perfectly define, and studies have shown usage of rideshare can extend beyond the typical perception.
For example, Lyft called out in its S-1 that 44% of rides start or end in low-income areas. Nonetheless, we think it prudent
to make some haircuts given consumers that are urban, better-off, and younger tend to make up the bulk of ridership as per
independent studies.
• Step #2: We then also make some general assumptions around potential frequency of trips (5 per month based on Uber's
reporting) and average ride prices, which we estimate to be ~$18 in the US. We use PPP data to translate this $18 to an
international equivalent.
• Takeaway #1: We estimate the North American TAM to be ~$140B and the global market (ex-China, Russia, and Southeast
Asia) to be ~$585B. Based on the size of Uber, Lyft, and other competitors, we believe North America is 30%+ penetrated
and the global market is 15%+ penetrated today.
• Takeaway #2: These penetration rates inform our view that beyond 2022 (COVID normalization year), rideshare can
compound at 15-20% per year, led by higher growth abroad. We think the US is likely to settle into a range of 10-15% annual

growth. Earlier on the adoption curve and less supply-constrained, we think international will outgrow the US (adding to our
pick of Uber > Lyft).
EXHIBIT 9 : We do not agree with the view that car ownership and all miles on the road are the TAM for rideshare.
The assumptions underlying the TAM math in the Uber (below) and Lyft S1s were too aggressive, in our view.
EXHIBIT 10 : Rideshare does best in urban markets where EXHIBIT 11 : Higher income, urban consumers are the
density of driver supply adds to the value proposition. most frequent users of rideshare services.
Regional Breakdown of US Rideshare Trips per Person (Annual; 2017)

Trips (2017)
50
11 Large/Less Dense 45
Metros, 10% 40
35
30
25
Rest of US, 20
20%
15
9 Largest/Dense 10
Metros, 70%
5
0
Urban (9 Metros) Other Ubran Suburban/Rural
Less than $15K $15K to $49.9K $50K to $99.9K

$100K to $199.9K $200K+
Source: Schaller, Bernstein analysis

Source: Schaller, Bernstein analysis

EXHIBIT 12 : Our math points to a $585B TAM globally (ex-China, Russia, and SEA) with North America contributing
$140B.
Population Breakdown by Region
Population in Millions and Addressable Market in USD Millions
(A) (B) (C) (D) = (A) x (B) x (C) (E) (F) (G) (H) = (D) x (E) x (F) x (G)
2022 Population Income Addressable

Country % Non-Rural PPP GB/Ride Rides/Month TAM ($M)
(15-64) Haircut Population
US 215 83% 35% 116 100% $18 5.0 124,170

Canada 25 82% 35% 13 100% $18 5.0 14,353
North America 240 83% 35% 129 138,523 Lyft's TAM
Latin America and Caribbean 446 82% 35% 236 35% $6 5.0 88,591
EU and the UK 327 77% 35% 163 84% $15 5.0 146,585
South Asia 1,135 36% 35% 264 27% $5 5.0 76,376
Middle East and Africa 521 61% 35% 207 30% $5 5.0 66,405
Australia/NZD 20 87% 35% 11 110% $20 5.0 13,293

Japan/South Korea 110 88% 35% 63 80% $14 5.0 54,158
RoW (Uber Regions) 2,559 57% 35% 945 445,408
Total 2,799 1,074 583,931 Uber's TAM
Source: World Bank, CIC, Bernstein estimates and analysis

EXHIBIT 13 : We believe the US rideshare market is mid-cycle (30%+ penetration), with adoption rates much lower
globally relative to the massive international addressable population.
Rideshare Penetration of Bottom-up TAM (%)

50% 47%
42%
45%
38%
40%
31% 33%
35%
30% 25% 24% 25%
24%
25% 22%
18% 19%
20% 15% 16%
13% 12% 12%
15% 11%
8%
10% 6%
5%
0%
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022E 2023E 2024E 2025E
North America Global ex-China, Russia, and Southeast Asia
Source: World Bank, CIC, Bernstein estimates and analysis

EXHIBIT 14 : We think North America rideshare can grow EXHIBIT 15 : ...and the global market can grow to $150B+
to almost $70B by 2025... over the same time frame.
North America Bookings ($B) and Growth (%) Global Bookings ($B) and Growth (%)
ex-China, Russia, SEA
80 60%
53% 180 70%
70 67 62%
50% 160 153
60 60%
43%
60 140 131
39% 54 49%
37% 40% 50%
50 45 120 111
42 38%
100 91 40%
40 30%
33 81 31%
30 80 33%
30 27 23% 30%
18% 59 68
20% 22%
21 60 52
18%
20 13% 12% 16% 20%
39
14 40
10% 24
10 10%
20
0 0% 0 0%
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022E 2023E 2024E 2025E 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022E 2023E 2024E 2025E
Source: Company reports, Bernstein estimates and analysis Source: Company reports, CIC, Bernstein Autos Team, Google, Bain, Temasek,
Bernstein estimates and analysis
ADDITIONAL DATA POINTS THAT INFORM OUR VIEW ON RIDESHARE GROWTH

We can debate the methodology and underlying assumptions of our TAM math, but we believe our conclusion of 15-20%
growth post-COVID is generally consistent with a couple additional data points: (1) growth rates pre-COVID; and (2) Uber's own
outlook for the Mobility business.
Data point #1: Pre-COVID growth

We would naturally expect to see an inverse relationship between penetration rates and growth rates. Prior to the pandemic,
rideshare growth was moderating at both Uber and Lyft.
To be clear, 2019 was still a healthy year of growth -- Uber's Mobility bookings were up 20% on a global basis, reaching ~$50B
and Lyft grew revenue 68% Y/Y to $3.6B. However, the hyper-growth of years past was behind us, more evident at Uber's scale.
In New York, trip growth slowed to low-double-digits, partly reflecting Uber's efforts to rationalize low-calorie shared rides.

EXHIBIT 16 : Y/Y growth at Uber and Lyft was starting to EXHIBIT 17 : Growth was also slowing in NY, partly
normalize pre-pandemic. reflecting a rationalization of shared rides.
Y/Y Top-Line Growth NY Rideshare Trips Y/Y Growth

250%
140%
209% 123%
200% 120%
100%
150%
80% 71%
103%
100%
74% 60%
68% 47%
50%
32%
40%
20%
20% 10%
0%
2017 2018 2019
0%
Uber Mobility GB Lyft Revenue
2016 2017 2018 2019

Source: Todd W Schneider, TLC, Bernstein analysis
Assumes Mobility GB of $18B in 2016 for Uber
EXHIBIT 18 : App data showed downloads starting to EXHIBIT 19 : ...a sign of decent adoption levels and a
moderate a little... growing focus on engagement.
Uber US App Downloads and Engagement Lyft US App Downloads and Engagement
(in Millions) (in Millions)
30 25
25
20
20
15
15
10
10
5
5
0 0
1H15 2H15 1H16 2H16 1H17 2H17 1H18 2H18 1H19 2H19 1H15 2H15 1H16 2H16 1H17 2H17 1H18 2H18 1H19 2H19
Downloads MAU Downloads MAU
Source: Apptopia, Bernstein analysis Source: Apptopia, Bernstein analysis
Data point #2: Uber's 2024 targets

We believe our view is generally consistent with Uber's gross bookings targets outlined at Investor Day, though closer to the
lower-end of the range than the high-end. The company guided to a gross bookings range of $165B to $175B by 2024, which
implies a consolidated CAGR of 22% to 25% over the next 3 years. Within that, management expects Mobility growth to be in
the “high 20s” and Delivery growth of roughly 20% per year.
This is a growth rate from 2021 to 2024, and the higher assumption on Mobility is partly a function of elevated growth in 2022
as the rideshare business recovers from COVID. We can work backwards to solve for Uber's outlook for normalized rideshare
growth. To start, we lay out the implied 2024 output if Mobility grows in the high-20s. Assuming a CAGR of 26% to 29%, the
implied range for Mobility gross bookings would be $73B to $79B by 2024. Assuming our forecast for $51B in FY22 gross

bookings is right, the implied CAGR from 2022 to 2024 would be 19% at the low-end and 24% at the high-end. Our industry
forecast for global rideshare bookings is in a similar place, at 22% in 2023 and 18% in 2024.
Consistent with our thinking, Dara also recently commented at an industry conference: “We've always seen the core Uber
business grow in double digits, the teens to the twenty's, and we don't expect that that is going to change at all.”
EXHIBIT 20 : Uber's 2024 guidance implies high-20% EXHIBIT 21 : Assuming a Mobility recovery in 2022, the
growth in Mobility, boosted by the COVID recovery. targets imply 19-24% growth post-COVID.
Uber Mobility Gross Bookings ($B) Uber Mobility Gross Bookings ($B)
79 24% CAGR 79
29% CAGR
73 73
51.1 19% CAGR

26% CAGR
36.6
2021 2024 Scenario 2024 Scenario 2022E 2024 Scenario 2024 Scenario
A B A B
Source: Company reports, Bernstein estimates and analysis Source: Company reports, Bernstein estimates and analysis
EXHIBIT 22 : Uber's commentary on Mobility growth assumptions in the outlook.
Uber CEO Dara Khosrowshahi speaking on the 2024 Gross Bookings Target of $165B to $175B:
"As just general rule I would say that, the mobility business should grow in the high 20%s in terms of bookings and the
delivery business should grow at or around 20%. Those are, I would say our best guesses at this time. And the mobility
business growth is really going to benefit from a couple of factors. One is the reopening and it's happening fast and we see
right now, many, many countries well above 2019 levels. Obviously, the US is our biggest market and there is no reason why
the US isn't going to go above 2019 levels and then some. So, we think that'll be a nice positive growth factor. We've always
seen the core Uber business grow in double digits, the teens to the twenty's and we don't expect that that is going to change
at all.
And then we're investing in some pretty big growth opportunities. One is, generally lower cost opportunities, there's a share
high capacity vehicles. Second for us are hailables, two wheelers, three wheelers, taxis. This is a multi-billion dollar
opportunity. We want every single taxi on earth to be essentially on the Uber system by 2025. We can drive much higher
utilization there, much higher earnings for taxi drivers and there's no reason why our tech shouldn't be powering taxi's as well.
And then we are investing aggressively in the enterprise as well. U4B we think is a huge opportunity for us that we can lean
into."
Source: Bloomberg, Bernstein analysis

Bolded emphasis is ours

KEY LEVERS TO CAPTURE THIS OPPORTUNITY

• More riders: There's still room for these services to add more customers, both in existing markets and new regions. Lyft
still only has ~20M active riders. Expanding ride types and price points will likely be necessary to grow adoption, alongside
building more supply in less well-penetrated markets. However, with 50% of the adult US population having already used
Uber at some point and profitability top-of-mind, frequency of ridership is becoming increasingly important to bookings
growth vs. adding new riders. As per Dara's recent email to Uber employees, “The least efficient marketing and incentive
spend will be pulled back.”
• Engagement: Frequency of use can increase, even in core markets. In the US for example, only 3.9% of adults used Uber on
a weekly basis pre-pandemic. Assuming US ridership catches up to Australia over time, Uber could see an incremental $14B
of annual bookings. Different regions are at different stages of rideshare adoption, but we think underlying value proposition
and consumer preference for convenience are universal. Membership programs should help, with Uber well positioned
across Mobility and Delivery to offer customers a more cohesive platform experience vs. peers.
• New markets: While Uber is already a global business, there are still opportunities to scale in new countries that were
previously inaccessible due to regulatory hurdles -- e.g., Spain, Germany, and South Korea. Within North America more
growth will have to come from Tier 2 and Tier 3 cities.
• More options: Rideshare platforms are investing in lower cost alternatives -- shared rides (which are now being ramped
back up in the US post-COVID), high capacity vehicles, and two-wheelers and three-wheelers in emerging markets. It's not
just pricing, there's a growing variety of vehicle types and service levels (e.g., Uber Reserve, Wait & Save and Priority Pick-Up
at Lyft). This should further optimize the network and improve conversion rates.
• From competition to complimentary: Uber has set itself an ambitious goal of capturing all hailable cabs on its platform by
2025, and recently struck deals with NYC and SF. Don't expect 100% adoption, but this can be a useful source of consistent
supply on the network. Uber estimates there are 4M taxis globally vs. its current active earner base of 4.5M people.
• B2B: There's more to do on corporate adoption of rideshare services. Uber believes it can 5x the bookings contribution from
its Uber for Business platform by 2024 from $1.1B to $5-6B, led by Mobility services.
EXHIBIT 23 : There's further room to improve frequency of use even in core markets like the US.
Uber Weekly Active Customer Penetration (Average 4Q19 Weekly Actives % of Population 18+)
8.0%
7.0%
6.0% BR % in IND would add

AUS % in the US would
~$15B GB
5.0% add ~$14B GB
4.0%
7.2%
3.0% 6.5%
2.0% 4.1% 4.0% 3.9%

3.3%
1.0%
1.3% 0.4% 0.2%
0.0% 0.5%
Brazil Australia Mexico United United States Canada France India Spain Germany
Kingdom

ARE CONSUMERS GETTING PRICED OUT?

The most common anecdotal response we get on rideshare these days is that “Uber and Lyft are too expensive”. Depending on
the data source ride prices are up anywhere from 20-30% (or more in some markets) vs. pre-pandemic levels. The key concern
-- and this comes back to the addressable market math -- is that consumers are getting priced out of the service.
This is an area we intend to do more work. It remains unclear the extent to which the lagging recovery in US rideshare has been
a function of price and ETA deterioration vs. broad-based mobility trends. On the one hand, the anecdote of rides being too
expensive resonates. But there's been inflation across the board and the industry's market share gains vs. taxis and public
transit is still holding, which tells us that consumers continue to find value in these services despite the higher prices. And as
supply improves, prices should correct, even if they are unlikely to return to pre-pandemic levels.
Price elasticity is on everyone's minds. In the past, Uber has offered some data here, which we highlight below. This comes
from the company's own analysis around the potential impact of AB5 could've had on driver availability, prices, and rideshare
demand in California and was published in May 2020 (prior to the ballot initiative win). It shows that a 20-30% increases in price,
would typically result in a 20-30% decrease in trip volume. As such, on a gross bookings basis, the impact is still negative, albeit
relatively muted. A couple factors that help -- the most avid users of rideshare tend to be from higher income households and in
many cases rideshare prices are only now catching up to taxi pricing (NY is everyone's favorite example of taxis being cheaper
than rideshare, but it's an anomaly).
EXHIBIT 24 : Rideshare has gotten more expensive given EXHIBIT 25 : Of course, rideshare isn't alone. The cost of
the shortage of drivers. car ownership has also gone up.
Chicago Rideshare Price per Mile ($) US Gas Price ($ per Gallon)
4.0 6.0
3.44
3.5 5.0
5.0
3.0
4.0
2.6
2.5
3.0
2.0 2.4
2.0
1.5
1.0
1.0
0.5
0.0
2017-12-19
2018-12-19
2019-12-19
2020-09-19
2021-09-19
2017-06-19
2017-09-19
2018-03-19
2018-06-19
2018-09-19
2019-03-19
2019-06-19
2019-09-19
2020-03-19
2020-06-19
2020-12-19
2021-03-19
2021-06-19
2021-12-19
2022-03-19
0.0
Source: FRED, Bernstein analysis

Source: City of Chicago, Bernstein analysis

EXHIBIT 26 : Uber's estimates for rider price elasticity in California when evaluating the potential impact of AB5
(from May 2020).
EXHIBIT 27 : We plot Uber's price elasticity data points below. For our current scenario where prices are 20-30%
higher, it implies that rider trip demand may be 20-30% impaired.
Estimated Rider Price Elasticity -- Uber Assessing the Impact of AB5 in California
0%
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 120% 140%
-10%
-20%
Reduction in Trips
-30%
-40%
-50%
-60%
-70%
Increase in Price

THE EMPHASIS ON PROFITABLE GROWTH

Like much of emerging Internet, rideshare has been supported by years of access to cheap capital. It's now at a pivotal moment
where it has to prove the underlying earnings power and durability of the model. We believe rideshare has staying power and will
be able to deliver decent top-line growth even as incentive spending tapers and the emphasis switches to FCF generation.
Encouragingly, both Uber and Lyft appear to focused on the bottom-line, with the US market rationalizing in recent years. It's
easiest to see this with Lyft's financials, where sales and marketing as percent of revenue has gone from over 50% in 2017
to 14% in 1Q22. This partly reflects COVID, and a portion of this incentive spend has been re-allocated to drivers, but it also
highlights the increased discipline in the market today around customer acquisition. And while there is a trade-off being made
on growth, it's the right one.
This biases us towards the lower-end of Uber's gross bookings outlook by 2024, but we think that hitting the adjusted EBITDA
bogeys of $1B in 2022, $3B in 2023, and $5B in 2024 will be good enough for the stock to work, so long as the top-line is
within range. Proving this margin story out is critical for Uber to re-rate. There have been positive data points along the way with
recent incremental margins and profitable markets in Uber's portfolio. But investors now want to see that mantra of profitable
growth come to fruition, consistently and at the aggregate level.
EXHIBIT 28 : The US market has been rationalizing, as EXHIBIT 29 : We expect to see rideshare EBITDA inflect in
evidenced by Lyft's sales & marketing spend. the coming years -- this is key to the thesis.
Lyft Sales & Marketing % of Revenue (GAAP) Mobility Adjusted EBITDA ($M)
60% 10,000
50% 8,000
40% 6,000
30% 4,000
20% 2,000
10% -
0% (2,000)
2018 2019 2020 2021 2022E 2023E 2024E 2025E
Uber Lyft Grab Didi China Didi International Ola Yandex

Didi covered by Cherry Leung, Grab covered by Josh Levin; Ola and Yandex not
covered; Uber includes overhead allocation

EXHIBIT 30 : Dara's email to Uber employees highlights the philosophical shift happening within Internet. The
trade-off is likely to be moderation of growth spend, particularly the least efficient initiatives.
Team Uber --
After earnings, I spent several days meeting investors in New York and Boston. It’s clear that the market is experiencing a seismic shift and we
need to react accordingly. My meetings were super clarifying and I wanted to share some thoughts with all of you. As you read them, please bear
in mind that while investors don’t run the company, they do own the company—and they’ve entrusted us with running it well. We get to set the
strategy and make the decisions, but we need to do so in a way that ultimately serves our shareholders and their long term interests.
1. In times of uncertainty, investors look for safety. They recognize that we are the scaled leader in our categories, but they don’t know how much
that’s worth. Channeling Jerry Maguire, we need to show them the money. We have made a ton of progress in terms of profitability, setting a
target for $5 billion in Adjusted EBITDA in 2024, but the goalposts have changed. Now it’s about free cash flow. We can (and should) get there fast.
There will be companies that put their heads in the sand and are slow to pivot. The tough truth is that many of them will not survive. The average
employee at Uber is barely over 30, which means you’ve spent your career in a long and unprecedented bull run. This next period will be different,
and it will require a different approach. Rest assured, we are not going to put our heads in the sand. We will meet the moment.
2. Investors finally understand that we are a completely different animal than Lyft and other ridesharing-only platforms. They are incredibly
excited about the pace of our innovation, how quickly we are rebounding, and huge growth opportunities like Hailables and Taxi. While they
acknowledge that we are winning, they don’t yet know the “size of the prize.” Their questions run the gamut from, “Has anyone other than you
made money in on-demand transport?” to “Ridesharing has been around for awhile, why isn’t anyone else profitable?” They see how big the TAM
is, they just don’t understand how that translates into significant profits and free cash flow. We have to show them.
3. Investors are happy with Delivery’s growth coming out of the pandemic and see that we have performed better than many other pandemic
winners. I must admit that was a bit of a surprise for me because I firmly believe Delivery should be growing even faster. The primary questions
were: “Is Delivery a good business and why?” and “What happens if we enter a recession?” We need to answer both of these questions with
undeniably strong results.
4. Investors who asked about Freight love Freight. However, less than 10% of them asked about it. Freight needs to get even bigger so that
investors recognize its value and love it as much as I do.
5. Meeting the moment means making trade-offs. The hurdle rate for our investments has gotten higher, and that means that some initiatives that
require substantial capital will be slowed. We have to make sure our unit economics work before we go big. The least efficient marketing and
incentive spend will be pulled back. We will treat hiring as a privilege and be deliberate about when and where we add headcount. We will be
even more hardcore about costs across the board.
6. We have started to demonstrate the Power of the Platform, which is a structural advantage that sets us apart. As you know, our strategy here is
simple: bring in consumers on either Mobility or Delivery, encourage them to try the other, and tie everything together with a compelling
membership program. The advantage here is obvious, but we have to show the value of the platform in real dollar terms. We are serving multi-
trillion dollar markets, but market size is irrelevant if it doesn’t translate into profit.
7. We have to do all of the above while continuing to deliver an outstanding and differentiated experience for consumers and earners. Whether
someone is booking rides for a summer trip with friends, or a new parent relying on Uber Eats for everything from groceries to dinner and diapers,
it’s on us to make every interaction excellent. The same goes for anyone who comes to Uber to earn. We responded to the pandemic by becoming
earner-centric in a way we’d never been before. We are innovating for earners, thinking deeply about their experience, and putting ourselves in
their shoes—literally—by driving, delivering and shopping ourselves. Because of hundreds of improvements in this area, people who want to earn
flexibly are now coming to Uber first, where they benefit from our scale, diversification, and commitment to treating them with respect.
I’ve never been more certain that we will win. But it’s going to demand the best of our DNA: hustle, grit, and category-defining innovation. In some
places we’ll have to pull back to sprint ahead. We will absolutely have to do more with less. This will not be easy, but it will be epic. Remember
who we are. We are Uber, a once-in-a-generation company that became a verb and changed the world forever. Let’s write the next chapter of our
story, working together as #OneUber, and let’s make it legendary.
GO GET IT!
Dara
Source: Press reports, Bernstein analysis

APPENDIX - FINANCIAL FORECASTS
EXHIBIT 31 : Our Uber earnings model

in millions except per share and percentage data
UBER 4Q19 1Q21 2Q21 3Q21 4Q21 1Q22 2Q22E 3Q22E 4Q22E FY2021 FY2022E FY2023E FY2024E FY2025E
GAAP INCOME STATEMENT
Revenue 3,747 2,903 3,929 4,845 5,778 6,854 7,923 8,240 8,320 17,455 31,336 38,159 45,371 53,409
Cost of Revenue (ex-D&A) 1,605 1,710 2,099 2,438 3,104 4,026 4,742 4,903 4,925 9,351 18,596 22,340 26,277 30,601
Operations and Support 506 423 432 475 547 574 632 657 642 1,877 2,505 2,791 3,186 3,652
Sales and Marketing 1,251 1,103 1,256 1,168 1,262 1,263 1,412 1,443 1,440 4,789 5,558 6,129 6,575 7,189
Research and Development 608 515 488 493 558 587 660 668 672 2,054 2,586 2,984 3,408 3,885
General and Administrative 647 464 616 625 611 632 639 646 643 2,316 2,560 2,748 3,189 3,754
Depreciation & Amortization 101 212 226 218 246 254 301 297 285 902 1,138 1,309 1,368 1,278
Total Expenses 4,718 4,427 5,117 5,417 6,328 7,336 8,385 8,614 8,608 21,289 32,943 38,301 44,003 50,360
EBIT (971) (1,524) (1,188) (572) (550) (482) (462) (374) (288) (3,834) (1,607) (142) 1,367 3,050
EBITDA (incl. SBC) (870) (1,312) (962) (354) (304) (228) (161) (77) (3) (2,932) (469) 1,167 2,736 4,328
Other Expenses (Benefits) 125 (1,416) (2,332) 1,852 (1,442) 5,448 124 123 123 (3,338) 5,818 493 621 875
Net Income to Common (1,096) (108) 1,144 (2,424) 892 (5,930) (586) (498) (411) (496) (7,425) (635) 747 2,175
Weight Avg. Diluted Shares 1,710 1,859 1,956 1,899 2,006 1,958 1,977 1,997 2,017 1,896 1,987 2,068 2,152 2,239
GAAP EPS (0.64) (0.06) 0.58 (1.28) 0.44 (3.04) (0.30) (0.25) (0.20) (0.29) (3.79) (0.31) 0.35 0.97
GAAP Margins:
Gross Margin 57% 41% 47% 50% 46% 41% 40% 41% 41% 46% 41% 41% 42% 43%
EBIT Margin -26% -52% -30% -12% -10% -7% -6% -5% -3% -22% -5% 0% 3% 6%
EBITDA Margin -23% -45% -24% -7% -5% -3% -2% -1% 0% -17% -1% 3% 6% 8%
Y/Y Growth (GAAP):
Revenue 40% -11% 105% 72% 83% 136% 102% 70% 44% 57% 80% 22% 19% 18%
NON-GAAP METRICS
Adjusted EBITDA (615) (359) (509) 8 86 168 250 346 420 (774) 1,184 3,106 5,041 7,042
Adjusted EBITDA Margin -16% -12% -13% 0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% -4% 4% 8% 11% 13%
Non-GAAP Net Income (loss) (841) (839) (315) (31) (158) 37 (175) (75) 12 (1,343) (202) 1,305 3,053 4,889
Non-GAAP EPS (0.49) (0.45) (0.16) (0.02) (0.08) 0.02 (0.09) (0.04) 0.01 (0.71) (0.10) 0.63 1.42 2.18
KEY METRICS
MAPC 111.0 98.0 101.0 109.0 118.0 115.0 120.3 124.3 129.8 118.0 129.8 146.7 167.2 190.6
MAPC Growth (Y/Y) 22% -5% 84% 40% 27% 17% 19% 14% 10% 27% 10% 13% 14% 14%
Mobility + Delivery Bookings 17,886 19,234 21,552 22,711 24,784 24,626 27,180 28,270 29,859 88,281 109,934 133,398 159,552 188,367
Core Bookings Growth (Y/Y) 27% 24% 115% 57% 47% 28% 26% 24% 20% 55% 25% 21% 20% 18%
Mobility + Delivery ANR 3,468 2,594 3,581 4,443 4,698 5,030 6,089 6,390 6,462 15,316 23,971 30,058 36,459 43,607
Core ANR Growth (Y/Y) 36% -13% 114% 78% 66% 94% 70% 44% 38% 53% 57% 25% 21% 20%
Core ANR Take Rate (%) 19.4% 13.5% 16.6% 19.6% 19.0% 20.4% 22.4% 22.6% 21.6% 17.3% 21.8% 22.5% 22.9% 23.1%
Freight & Other Bets Revenue 279 309 348 402 1,080 1,824 1,834 1,849 1,858 2,139 7,365 8,101 8,911 9,802
ARPU Growth (Y/Y) 104% 22% 45% 28% 220% 490% 427% 360% 72% 87% 244% 10% 10% 10%
BALANCE SHEET & CASH FLOW

Cash + Marketable Securities 6,154 4,295 4,184 3,918 3,518 3,313 2,735 3,266 3,593 4,295 3,313 3,957 6,672 11,234
All Other 22,740 34,479 28,628 28,903 29,515 30,101 30,690 30,732 31,116 34,479 30,101 31,508 33,232 35,266
Total Assets 28,894 38,774 32,812 32,821 33,034 33,414 33,425 33,997 34,709 38,774 33,414 35,465 39,904 46,500
FCF (1,981) (682) (398) 524 (187) (47) 91 (42) 151 (743) 153 2,073 4,143 5,990
FCF Margin -53% -23% -10% 11% -3% -1% 1% -1% 2% -4% 0% 5% 9% 11%

EXHIBIT 32 : Our Lyft earnings model

in millions except per share and percentage data
LYFT 4Q19 1Q21 2Q21 3Q21 4Q21 1Q22 2Q22E 3Q22E 4Q22E FY2021 FY2022E FY2023E FY2024E FY2025E
GAAP INCOME STATEMENT
Revenue 1,017 609 765 864 970 876 995 1,106 1,174 3,208 4,150 5,142 6,041 6,947
Cost of Revenue 503 412 347 392 551 440 451 500 524 1,702 1,914 2,248 2,583 2,891
Operations and Support 147 89 94 110 110 99 111 123 130 402 463 562 633 722
Research and Development 277 238 252 227 195 193 216 228 235 912 871 1,000 1,063 1,093
Sales and Marketing 194 79 100 109 124 126 152 164 169 411 611 729 814 880
General and Administrative 278 208 213 232 264 217 251 262 267 916 996 1,140 1,233 1,301
Total Expenses 1,399 1,025 1,005 1,069 1,244 1,075 1,180 1,276 1,324 4,344 4,855 5,680 6,326 6,887
EBIT (382) (416) (240) (205) (274) (199) (185) (170) (150) (1,135) (705) (538) (286) 59
D&A 24 34 35 37 33 32 32 35 35 139 134 164 183 210
EBITDA (incl. SBC) (358) (382) (206) (168) (240) (168) (153) (135) (115) (996) (571) (374) (102) 269
Other Expenses (Benefits) (26) 11 12 (105) 10 (2) 8 8 8 (73) 22 32 32 32

Net Income (356) (427) (252) (100) (283) (197) (193) (178) (158) (1,062) (726) (570) (318) 27
Weight Avg. Diluted Shares 300 326 332 338 343 347 352 357 362 335 354 376 399 424
GAAP EPS (1.19) (1.31) (0.76) (0.30) (0.83) (0.57) (0.55) (0.50) (0.44) (3.17) (2.05) (1.52) (0.80) 0.06
GAAP Margins:
Gross Margin 51% 32% 55% 55% 43% 50% 55% 55% 55% 47% 54% 56% 57% 58%
EBIT Margin -38% -68% -31% -24% -28% -23% -19% -15% -13% -35% -17% -10% -5% 1%
EBITDA Margin -35% -63% -27% -19% -25% -19% -15% -12% -10% -31% -14% -7% -2% 4%
Y/Y Growth (GAAP):
Revenue 52% -36% 125% 73% 70% 44% 30% 28% 21% 36% 29% 24% 17% 15%
NON-GAAP METRICS
Adjusted EBITDA (131) (73) 23 67 75 55 20 50 74 92 198 415 682 1,006
Adjusted EBITDA Margin -13% -12% 3% 8% 8% 6% 2% 5% 6% 3% 5% 8% 11% 14%
Non-GAAP Net Income (loss) (121) (114) (18) 18 32 25 (18) 9 33 (82) 49 223 472 769
Non-GAAP Net Income Margin -12% -19% -2% 2% 3% 3% -2% 1% 3% -3% 1% 4% 8% 11%
Non-GAAP EPS (0.41) (0.35) (0.05) 0.05 0.09 0.07 (0.05) 0.03 0.09 (0.25) 0.14 0.59 1.18 1.81
KEY METRICS
SCB Net Bookings Estimate 3,357 1,968 2,542 2,938 3,101 2,909 3,397 3,773 3,946 10,550 14,026 17,120 19,882 22,913
Bookings Growth (Y/Y) 44% -40% 124% 69% 64% 48% 34% 28% 27% 31% 33% 22% 16% 15%
Active Riders 22.9 13.5 17.1 18.9 18.7 17.8 20.0 22.3 22.9 18.7 22.9 26.0 29.2 32.4
Rider Growth (Y/Y) 23% -36% 97% 51% 49% 32% 17% 18% 23% 49% 23% 14% 12% 11%
Revenue per Rider 44 45 45 46 52 49 50 50 51 187 200 208 216 222

ARPU Growth (Y/Y) 23% 0% 14% 14% 14% 9% 11% 9% -1% 10% 7% 4% 4% 3%
BALANCE SHEET & CASH FLOW

Cash + Marketable Securities 2,850 2,237 2,246 2,382 2,254 2,237 2,397 2,424 2,463 2,254 2,463 2,739 3,363 4,280
All Other 2,841 2,309 2,326 2,442 2,520 2,532 2,558 2,586 2,615 2,520 2,615 2,805 3,006 3,212
Total Assets 5,691 4,546 4,571 4,824 4,774 4,768 4,955 5,010 5,077 4,774 5,077 5,544 6,369 7,492
FCF (96) (90) (47) 5 (49) (183) 160 27 38 (181) 42 276 622 917
FCF Margin -9% -15% -6% 1% -5% -21% 16% 2% 3% -6% 1% 5% 10% 13%

DISCLOSURE APPENDIX
I. REQUIRED DISCLOSURES
Autonomous Research US is a unit within Sanford C. Bernstein & Co., LLC , a broker-dealer registered with the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission and a member of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority ( www.finra.org) and the Securities
Investor Protection Corporation (see www.sipc.org). When this report contains an analysis of debt securities, such report is
intended for institutional investors and is not subject to all the independence and disclosure standards applicable to debt
research for retail investors under the FINRA rules.
VALUATION METHODOLOGY
We value companies in our coverage by triangulating a combination of our long-term DCF models (across all names) and a
comps-based approach on forward EV/Sales, EV/EBITDA, and P/E multiples (metric varies by stock).
Uber Technologies Inc
We value Uber based on an average of EV/NTM Sales multiple and our DCF calculation. We consider Uber a real-life services
platform and benchmark valuation to comparable peers in this industry set, as well as history.
Lyft Inc
We value Lyft based on an average of EV/NTM Sales multiple and our DCF calculation. We consider Lyft a real-life services
platform and benchmark valuation to comparable peers in this industry set, as well as history.
RISKS
• Global macro conditions: Our sector's revenues are primarily derived from consumer discretionary markets (e.g., retail/
eCommerce, mobility services, out-of-home restaurant consumption). Any sustained decline in economic conditions and
consumer spending can have a material negative impact on revenue growth across the sector.
• Rising rates: We cover growth stocks where much of the value is derived from expected cash flows in the terminal year. To
the extent that rates continue to rise, it can have an outsized impact on the multiples applied to our coverage given long-date
discounting.
• Regulation: While most of our companies are sheltered from the regulatory actions facing big tech, this increased level of
oversight can become an issue in the future as our coverage companies scale up. It can also restrict M&A in the near-term
(both as acquirers and targets). Gig economy marketplaces face pressing regulatory activity around the classification of
drivers and commission rate caps on the delivery side.
• Global competition: The Internet, more than any other industry, is susceptible to new and emerging competitive threats that
seemingly disrupt entire ecosystems and value pools. With emerging fast-growing tech companies domestically and abroad,
it stands the reason that new competitors will emerge that could reduce short-term revenue growth and destroy entire
revenue pools long-term. Stiff competition can also come from the big tech companies that have superior scale, distribution,
and CAC advantages; the mega-caps continue to diversify their revenue streams today.
• Cyber attacks: These attacks can severely impact the trust and engagement of platform users, resulting in a significant
impact to stock price.
Uber Technologies Inc
Downside Risks

• Gross Bookings could miss our forecasts if Mobility doesn't recover to the extent we expect and/or Delivery growth
decelerates against re-open and macro headwinds.
• Improving Adjusted EBITDA is key to our thesis on the stock. This inflection may not materialize if driver incentives remain
elevated and/or the industry struggles to pass costs on to customers.
• If the driver supply gap proves to be more of a structural challenge than a cyclical one, it could impair the growth and
profitability of the rideshare model.
• Uber faces regulatory overhangs regarding driver classification and fee caps on delivery commissions. Policy changes, losing
regulatory battles, and negative headlines are risks to the stock.
• On-demand is a highly competitive space, both on the Mobility side and the Delivery side. Irrational pricing could threaten
Uber's ability to compete successfully, potentially resulting in low/negative profitability and/or market exits.
• Autonomous robo-taxis create an economically superior alternative and existential threat.
Lyft Inc
Upside Risks
• Re-open is a tailwind to demand and revenue growth accelerates.

• Supply improves, and drivers stay engaged even as Lyft tempers incentives, disproving the view that driver supply is
structurally impaired.
• EBITDA inflects as driver incentives prove temporary and/or demand proves to be more inelastic than expected.
• Active Rider growth gets back on track and Lyft sees market share stabilize/improve.
• Regulatory wins (more markets reach third-way outcomes).
Downside Risks
• Revenue could miss our expectations if Mobility doesn't recover to the extent we expect and/or trends deteriorate against
macro headwinds.
• The market expects operating leverage. This inflection may not materialize if driver incentives remain elevated and/or the
industry struggles to pass costs on to customers.
• If the driver supply gap proves to be more of a structural challenge than a cyclical one, it could impair the growth and
profitability of the rideshare model.
• Lyft faces regulatory overhangs regarding driver classification. Policy changes, losing regulatory battles, and negative
headlines are risks to the stock.
• Rideshare is a competitive market and Lyft is the smaller player. Irrational pricing could threaten Lyft's ability to compete
successfully, potentially resulting in low/negative profitability and/or market exits.
• Autonomous robo-taxis create an economically superior alternative and existential threat.
RATINGS DEFINITIONS, BENCHMARKS AND DISTRIBUTION
Bernstein brand
The Bernstein brand rates stocks based on forecasts of relative performance for the next 6-12 months versus the S&P 500 for
stocks listed on the U.S. and Canadian exchanges, versus the MSCI Europe Index (MSDLE15) for stocks listed on the European
exchanges (except for Russian companies), versus the MSCI Emerging Markets Index for Russian companies and stocks listed
on emerging markets exchanges outside of the Asia Pacific region, versus the MSCI Japan (MXJP) for stocks listed on the
Japanese exchanges, and versus the MSCI Asia Pacific ex-Japan Index for stocks listed on the Asian (ex-Japan) exchanges -

unless otherwise specified.
The Bernstein brand has three categories of ratings:
• Outperform: Stock will outpace the market index by more than 15 pp
• Market-Perform: Stock will perform in line with the market index to within +/-15 pp
• Underperform: Stock will trail the performance of the market index by more than 15 pp
Not Rated: The stock Rating, Target Price and/or estimates (if any) have been suspended temporarily.
Autonomous brand
The Autonomous brand rates stocks as indicated below. As our benchmarks we use the SX7P and SXFP index for European
banks, the SXIP for European insurers, the S&P 500 and S&P Financials for US banks coverage, S5LIFE for US Insurance, the
SPSIINS for US Non-Life Insurers coverage, and IBOV for Brazil and H-FIN index for China banks and insurers. Ratings are
stated relative to the sector (not the market).
The Autonomous brand has three categories of ratings:
• Outperform (OP): Stock will outpace the relevant index by more than 10 pp
• Neutral (N): Stock will perform in line with the market index to within +/-10 pp
• Underperform (UP): Stock will trail the performance of the relevant index by more than 10 pp
• Coverage Suspended (CS) applies when coverage of a company under the Autonomous research brand has been
suspended. Ratings and price targets are suspended temporarily. Previously issued ratings and price targets are no longer
current and should therefore not be relied upon.
Not Rated: The stock Rating, Target Price and/or estimates (if any) have been suspended temporarily.
Those denoted as ‘Feature’ (e.g., Feature Outperform FOP, Feature Under Outperform FUP) are our core ideas. Not Rated (NR)
is applied to companies that are not under formal coverage.
For both brands, recommendations are based on a 12-month time horizon.
DISTRIBUTION OF RATINGS/INVESTMENT BANKING SERVICES

Rating Market Abuse Regulation (MAR) and Count Percent Count* Percent*
FINRA Rule 2241 classification
Outperform BUY 399 51.35% 1 0.25%
Market-Perform (Bernstein Brand)

HOLD 255 32.82% 0 0.00%
Neutral (Autonomous Brand)
Underperform SELL 121 15.57% 0 0.00%
Not Rated (Bernstein Brand)

NOT RATED 2 0.26% 0 0.00%
Coverage Suspended (Autonomous Brand)
* These figures represent the number and percentage of companies in each category to whom Bernstein and Autonomous
provided investment banking services.
As of Jun 22 2022. All figures are updated quarterly and represent the cumulative ratings over the previous 12 months.

PRICE CHARTS/ RATINGS AND PRICE TARGET HISTORY
Uber Technologies Inc (UBER) Rating History for Bernstein as of 06/22/2022

O:$40.00 O:$32.00 O:$35.00 O:$40.00 O:$48.00 O:$60.00 O:$70.00 O:$65.00 O:$60.00 O:$55.00
01/09/2020 05/05/2020 05/08/2020 08/07/2020 11/06/2020 12/22/2020 02/11/2021 05/06/2021 08/02/2021 02/07/2022
$80
$70
$60
$50
$40
$30
$20
$10
Jul 19 Oct 19 Jan 20 Apr 20 Jul 20 Oct 20 Jan 21 Apr 21 Jul 21 Oct 21 Jan 22 Apr 22
O:$45.00 I:O:$35.00
05/05/2022 05/23/2022
Closing Price Price Target
Outperform (O); Market-Perform (M); Underperform (U); Not rated (N)
Lyft Inc (LYFT) Rating History for Bernstein as of 06/22/2022

M:$48.00 M:$30.00 M:$33.00 M:$28.00 M:$40.00 M:$50.00 M:$60.00 M:$65.00 M:$50.00 M:$45.00
01/09/2020 05/05/2020 08/13/2020 11/03/2020 11/11/2020 02/04/2021 02/10/2021 04/21/2021 02/07/2022 02/09/2022
$70
$60
$50
$40
$30
$20
$10
Jul 19 Oct 19 Jan 20 Apr 20 Jul 20 Oct 20 Jan 21 Apr 21 Jul 21 Oct 21 Jan 22 Apr 22
M:$30.00 I:M:$22.00
05/04/2022 05/23/2022
Closing Price Price Target
Outperform (O); Market-Perform (M); Underperform (U); Not rated (N)
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23 June 2022

BERNSTEIN TICKER TABLE

Expected Rideshare Growth at Uber and Lyft (Y/Y)

38% 36% 40%

Uber Mobility Gross Bookings Lyft Revenue

Source: Company reports, Bernstein estimates and analysis

US EMERGING INTERNET BERNSTEIN 2

RIDESHARE DEMAND CONTINUES TO RECOVER FROM THE PANDEMIC

US EMERGING INTERNET BERNSTEIN 3

Source: Company reports

Source: TLC, Todd W. Schneider, Bernstein analysis

US EMERGING INTERNET BERNSTEIN 4

Y/Y Growth in Total Drivers US Driver App Downloads (Millions; Monthly

30% 0.2 0.05

20% 0.0 0.00

0% Uber US Driver (LHS) Lyft US Driver (RHS)

Source: Company reports, Bernstein analysis

TAM ISN'T THE FOCUS RIGHT NOW, BUT COULD RESURFACE

US EMERGING INTERNET BERNSTEIN 5

NY Rideshare Trips per Day Lyft Active Riders (Millions)

Mar-22 Actual Consensus Expected

Source: TLC, Todd W. Schneider, Bernstein analysis

US EMERGING INTERNET BERNSTEIN 6

Source: Company reports

Regional Breakdown of US Rideshare Trips per Person (Annual; 2017)

Less than $15K $15K to $49.9K $50K to $99.9K

Source: Schaller, Bernstein analysis

US EMERGING INTERNET BERNSTEIN 7

2022 Population Income Addressable

US 215 83% 35% 116 100% $18 5.0 124,170

Australia/NZD 20 87% 35% 11 110% $20 5.0 13,293

RoW (Uber Regions) 2,559 57% 35% 945 445,408

Total 2,799 1,074 583,931 Uber's TAM

Source: World Bank, CIC, Bernstein estimates and analysis

Rideshare Penetration of Bottom-up TAM (%)

North America Global ex-China, Russia, and Southeast Asia

Source: World Bank, CIC, Bernstein estimates and analysis

US EMERGING INTERNET BERNSTEIN 8

ADDITIONAL DATA POINTS THAT INFORM OUR VIEW ON RIDESHARE GROWTH

Data point #1: Pre-COVID growth

US EMERGING INTERNET BERNSTEIN 9

Y/Y Top-Line Growth NY Rideshare Trips Y/Y Growth

Source: Company reports, Bernstein analysis

Downloads MAU Downloads MAU

Source: Apptopia, Bernstein analysis Source: Apptopia, Bernstein analysis

Data point #2: Uber's 2024 targets

US EMERGING INTERNET BERNSTEIN 10

51.1 19% CAGR

EXHIBIT 22 : Uber's commentary on Mobility growth assumptions in the outlook.

Source: Bloomberg, Bernstein analysis

US EMERGING INTERNET BERNSTEIN 11

KEY LEVERS TO CAPTURE THIS OPPORTUNITY

6.0% BR % in IND would add

2.0% 4.1% 4.0% 3.9%

Source: Company reports, Bernstein analysis

US EMERGING INTERNET BERNSTEIN 12

ARE CONSUMERS GETTING PRICED OUT?

Source: FRED, Bernstein analysis

US EMERGING INTERNET BERNSTEIN 13