Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Terrorism
Terrorism
Terrorism
Adnan Farooqus
LEARNING OBJECTIVES
To explore the fundamental issues
To represent a clear picture of the involved in the evolution of terrorism historically
To trace different phases in the complex nature of contemporary terrorism
To mark out history of terrorism worldwide
differences between terrorism and insurgency
ABSTRACT
This chapter examines terrorism as a tactic
the modern era, terrorism began and an ideology Terrorism is as old
during the French Revolution. It was viewed then asasrecorded history In
which was useful in consolidating power and apositive concebl,
current form, terrorism is imposing order in the nascent revolutionary state. In its
both the terrorist and the pejorative term. Terrorismn can become apoitical weapon in the arsenal of
terrornzed.
lerrorism has been viewed as a major
T things to
The term
ifferent people.
disruptive force by governments as long as
history. It has helped shape world history in a variety of ways and has
'terrorism' is notoriously difficult to define. For one
turies since terrorist tactics were first
recorded
long meant different
thing, it has evolved over the cen
began during the French Revolution as a used. As will be explained shortly, modern-era 'terrorism
positive
nascent revolutionary state consolidated power and concept, referring to the means whereby the
evolved through numerous phases and imposed order (Hofman, 1998: 15). It has
its current form (Hoffman, 1998: meanings since then, but it is
15)( Second) some historical actorsobviously
who
a pejorative term in
doned 'terrorist' acts have achieved have
in the international system. The committed or con
in legntimacy
weapon the political arsenal of both the term can become a
abused by the status quo actor, usually a state, terrorist and the terrorized, and is often
that finds the motivations of the especially
terrorist' to be
Terrorism 28
against its interests. But beyond thosc problenms, the term is subjective and hard to define because
it is usually associated with trying to create public fcar. Terrorists have no power if thcy da not
inspire fear in the minds of their onlookers. The more outragcous, shocking, unexpected and
attention-grabbing an attack is, the more the terrorist gains, or belicves he gains, power. Thu_, ter
rorism at a minimum contains three important elements: the crcation of fear, the seemingly
random useof violence and attacks on the innocent (Frey and Morris, 1991: 3).
Ideology and motivation also influence the objectives of terrorist operations, especially regarding m
the casualty rate. Groups with secular ideologies and non-religious goals will often attempt highly -
Yselective and discriminate acts of violence toachieve a specific political aim.This oftenrequires them,
okeep casualties at theminimum amount necessary to attain the objective. This is both to avoid a
backlash that might severely damage the organization and alsomaintain the appearance of a ratio
nal group that has legitimate grievances. By limiting their attacks, they reduce the risk of undermin
ing external political and economic support. Groups that comprisea'wing' of an insurgency, or are
affiliated with aboveground, sometimes legitimate, politicalorganizations often operate under these
constraints. The tensions caused by balancing these considerations are oftena prime factor in the
development of splinter groups and intern¡l factions within these organizations.
In contrast, religiously oriented anmillenariardgroupstypically attempt to inflict as many casu
alties as possible. "Because of the apocalypt, frame of reference they use, loss of life is irrelevant
and more casualties are better. Losses among their coreligionists are of littleaccount, because such
casualties willreap the benefits of the afterlife. Fear of backlash rarely concerns these groups, as it
is often one of their goals to provoke overreaction by their enemies, and hopefully widen the
conflict.
The type of target selected willoften reflect motivations and ideologies. For groups professing
secular political or social motivations, their targets are highly symbolic of authority government
offices, banks, national artlines and mulinational corporations with direct relation to the established
order. While religious groups also use much of this symbolism, there is a tendency to add religiously
affiliated individuals, such as missionaries, and religious activities, such as worship services, to the
targeting equation.
Another common form of symbolis1m utilized in terroristtargeting is striking on particular anni
versaries or commemorative dates. Nationalist groups may strike to commemorate batles won or lost
during a conventional struggle, whereas religious groups may strike to mark particularBy appropriate
observances. Many groups will attempt to commemorate anniversaries of successful operations or the
executions or deaths of notable individuals related to their particular conflict. However, terrorism
should not be confused with traditional warfare. In was, atarget is selected because it has militarv
value and wit achieve aspecific military objective. In terrorism, the target is of little interest, per se.
What is important is that the target will elicit a certain reaction on the part of the greater sOCietry.
Terrorism is not defined by the fact that life is lost in an act of violence or the amount of life that is
lost. It is defined by the intended effect of the use of violence and the purpose of the terrorist act.
political party that enjoys significant popular support, largely as a result of its non-violent activities
such as providing much needed social services. (Hamas and Hezbollah arc examples of such
implanted organizations.)Such actors employ terrorism because it is a temporarily expedient means
without using terrorism. Other
of pressurizing a government. They can survive. even flourish,
groupS are more socially isolated. They may be splinter factions of larger organizations or small
than
groups that have been formed in order to use terrorism. Such groups have few options other
of both
terrorism and, over time, it may become an identity for them as much as a strategy. Groups leaders
common. Their
types are subject to internal strains and divisions, and factionalism is
struggle to maintain cohesion and loyalty.
Introducing this distinction raises another point: in some circumstances, terrorism may be seen
as legitimate by popular audiences, especially when they are it is discriminated against and access
may not only sup
to power is blocked. It cannot be denied that in some circumstances, the public
port the goals behind terrorism but the method itself.
16.2.1INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
in technology enhance the
The causes of terrorism are international as well as domestic. Advances
and externally.
mobility of terrorist groups and concomitant ability to communicate internally
Terrorism 291
Another source of concern at the level of the international system is state weakness, whether col
lapse or involvement in extensive civil conflict (the former often a result of the latter).Some-faied
or failing states-those without central governments or with governments that cannot maintain
control over their territory or populations-become hosts for radical conspiracies that both impede
stabilization and export terrorism to other targets and audiences. Prolonged civil conflict and insta
bility produce wavesof refugees and immigrantswho form alienated Diasporas in which terrorist
groups may find shelter.
Another consideration to note is that any type of regime, democratic or authoritarian, may be
involved in an asymmetric conflict outside its borders. Stable and well-developed democracies may
not face a seriousthreat from internally generated terrorism, butexternal intervention or political,
economic and cultural presence may provoke terrorism from the outside. Thus, a state's susceptibil
ity to terrorism is determined not just by how it treats its citizens at home but by its actions abroad.
When such actions lack international legitimacy and local populations perceive them as unjust,
radical groupscome to see terrorism as an appropriate response.
16.2.2 RELIGION
Alast question that must be addressed is the role of religion. Religious doctrine is a 'tool of mobi
lization' or a justification for terrorism rather than a direct cause. For example, discontent with the
political and economic status quo leads to support for radical Islamist groups. Religiosity itself is
not a cause of political radicalism. Appeals to religion are likely to be a way of framing or repre
senting a struggle in terms that a potential constituency will understand rather than the determi
nants of a strategic choice. Groups espousing similar goals often choose different methods,
disagreeing over the means more than over the ends. Rcligious justifications are often combined
with other, explicitly political, goals, such as nationalism or self-determination.
The following historical review attempts to show how modern terrorism and the use of terror have
developed. The goal of this section is not to provide a detailed review of each historical stage, but
to show that terrorism has a historical and theoretical developmental history.
after the
nationalist movements resisted European attempts to resume colonial business as usual
defeat of the Axis powers.
Often, these nationalist and anti-colonial groups conducted guerrilla warfare, which differed
from terrorism mainly in that it tended towards larger bodies of 'irregulars' operating along more
military lines than their terrorist cousins, and often in the open from a defined geographical area
conducted
over which they held sway. Such was the case in China and Indochina, where such forces
insurgencies against the Kuomintang regime and the French colonial government, respectively.
Elsewhere, such as with the fight against French rule in Algeria, these campaigns were fought in
both rural and urban areas and by terrorist and guerrilla means.
Still other such struggles like those in Kenya, Malaysia, Cyprus and Palestine (all involving the
British who, along with the French, bore the brunt of this new wave of terrorism-a corollary of
described as terrorist.
their large pre-war empires) were fought with groups that can more readily be media. They
These groups quickly learned to exploit the burgeoning globalization of the world's
their vio
were the first to recognize the publicity valuc inherent in terrorism and to choreograph
lence for an audience far beyond the immediate geographical loci of their respective struggles.
Moreover, in some cases (such as in Algeria, Cyprus, Kenya and Isracl), terrorism arguably helped
such organizations in the successful realization of their goals.
Through the 1960s and 1970s, the numbers of those groups that might be described as terrorist
Swelled to include not only nationalists but also those motivatecd by ethnic and ideological consid
erations. The former included groups such as the Palestinian Liberation Organization (and its many
affiliates), the Basque ETA and the Provisional Irish Republican Army, while the latter comprised
organizations such as the Red Army Faction (in what was then West Germany) and the Italian Red
Brigades. Like their anti-colonialist predecessors of the immediate post-war era, many of the ter
to
rorist groups of this period readily appreciated and adopted methods that would allow them
publicize their goals and accomplish1ments internationally, Forerunners in this were the Palestinian
groups that pioneered the hijacking of a chief symbol and means of the new age of globalization
the jet airliner-as a mode of operation and publicity. One such group, Black September, staged
what was (until the attacks on America of 11September 2001) perhaps the greatest terrorist public
ity coup then seen, with the seizure and murder of 1 1Israeli athletes at the 1972 Olympic Games.
Such incidents provided the inspiration for many of the new generation of terrorist organizations.
Many of these organizations have, today, disappeared or ceased to exist altogether, while others,
such as the Palestinian, Northern Irish and Spanish Basque groups, motivated by more enduring
mid-1980s,
causes, have taken recourse to political methods over terror tactics. Meanwhile, by the
state-sponsored terrorism re-emerged-the catalyst for the series of attacks against American and
other Western targets in West Asia. Countries such as Iran, Irag, Libya and Syria came to the fore
as the principle sponsors of terrorism. Falling into a related category were those countries, such as
North Korea, that directly participated in coverts acts of what could be described as terrorism.
Such state-sponsored terrorism remains a concern of the international community today,
although it has been somewhat overshadowed in recent times by the re-emergence of the religiously
inspired terrorist. The latest manifestation of this trend began in Afghanistan and was a by-product
of the Cold War between United States of America and erstwhile Soviet Union. The Soviet-Afghan
war (1979-89) was for all pracical purpose a war between Afghan Mujahideen, supported by
UnitedStates of America, and the Soviet armed forces, which gave a major fillip to selective use of
religion to further political ends. Before long, the trend had spread beyond Iran to places as far afield
Adnan Farooqui
Japan and the United States. and bevond Islam to every major world religion as wcll as many
hinor cults. From the Sarin attack on the Tokyo subway by thc Aum Shinrikvo in 1995 to the
Oklahoma burnbing the same year, religion was again added to the complex mix of motivations that
led to acts of terrorism. The AI-Qaeda attacks of 1 ISeptember 2001 brought home to the world.
and most particularlv the United States, just how dangerous this latest mutation of terrorism is.
The War on Terror is the common term for what the George W. Bush administration perceived or
presented as the military, political, legal and ideological conflict against Islamic terrorism, Islamic
militants and the regimes and organizations tied to them or that supported them, and was specifi
cally used in reference to operations led by the United States and were supported by separate opera
tions led by the United Kingdom and other countries since the 11 September 2001 attacks. It has
since been expanded beyond the Bush administration both in its scope and participating nation
states as well as in the interpretation of the term. The administration of President Barack Obama
for instance discontinued the use of the term War on Terror' and instead preferred the term
'Overseas Contingency Operation' in the fight against Al-Qaeda.
The stated objectives of the war was to protect the citizens of the United States and allies, to
protectthe business interests of theUnited States and allies at home and abroad, break up terrorist
cells in the United States and disrupt the activities of the international network of terrorist organi
zations made up of a number of groups under the umbrella of Al-Qaeda. Both the term and the
poicies it denotes have been a source of ongoing controversy; as critics argue, it has been used to
justify unilateral preventive, human rights abuses and other violations of international law.
Terrorism
295
The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria ([SIS) is a remnant offshoot of Al-Qaeda in Irag which
regrouped after Al-Qaeda's defeat against the US troops and allied Sunni forces in 2007. By 2011.
these former members of Al-Qaeda rechristened themselves as Al-Qaeda in Iraq and started
regrouping an endeavour in which they were also joined by former members of armed forces loyal
to the Baath party. They began in 2012 and 2013 by frecing a large number of prisoners from the
prisons controlled by the Iraq government which ended up joining and swelling the ranks of
Al-Qaeda in Iraq.
Sensing a military opportunity in Syria against the incumbent regime, the group joined the anti
governmnent resistance and renamed itself as the Islamic State of Irag and Svria. This was followed
by a decisive break between Al-Qaeda and its'offshoot in Iraq as the ISIS asserted its control over
the Al-Qaeda faction in Syria, independent of its parent outfit.
The fundamental difference between Al-Qaeda and ISIS is in terms of their vision. While
Al-Qaeda conceived of itself as a vanguardof global insurgency mobilizing against secular rule,
the ISIS seeks to create a state governed by a very narrow interpretation of religious text. In the
long run, they desire withering away of borders created by the colonial powers in West Asia and
assert its hold as a sole political and military authority.
MODEL QUESTIONS