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Econ1003 201819 01 Econ1003w1
Econ1003 201819 01 Econ1003w1
Student number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
PART A carries 60/100 points and you should aim to spend about 75 minutes
on it. This part consists of 20 equally weighted multiple choice questions. Write
your answers for this part on the multiple choice answer sheet; use a treasury
tag to join it to this sheet.
PART B carries 40/100 points and you should aim to spend about 45 minutes
on it. This part consists of 4 equally weighted questions. Explain your
answers in the space provided. Use the answer book for any extra material
if you find that the space provided for your answer is insufficient; use a treasury
tag to join it to this sheet.
(a) Consumer A has (5, 3), and Consumer B has (6, 2).
(b) Consumer A has (5, 3), and Consumer B has (3, 1).
(c) Consumer A has (3, 5), and Consumer B has (1, 3).
(d) Consumer A has (4, 2), and Consumer B has (4, 2).
(a) Decreasing returns to scale and diminishing marginal returns are just
two different ways of saying the same thing.
(b) Returns to scale pertains to the impact on output of changing a single
input while holding all other inputs constant; diminishing marginal
returns pertains to the impact on output of increasing all inputs
simultaneously.
(c) Returns to scale pertains to the impact on output of increasing all
inputs simultaneously; diminishing marginal returns pertains to the
impact of changing a single input while holding all other inputs con-
stant.
(d) Returns to scale can be identified by calculating the slope of an
isoquant.
(a) will not affect the price that producers receive because the demand
is so inelastic.
(b) will result in the consumer tax incidence of 0%.
(c) will result in the consumer tax incidence of 100%.
(d) may result in a consumer tax incidence between 0% and 100%, but
its size will depend on whether the tax is paid by consumers or
producers.
(a) no player would want to change her action, given actions of others.
(b) no group of players would want to change their actions through co-
operation.
(c) it is efficient.
(d) there is no other Nash equilibrium.
(a) 660
(b) 50
(c) 80
(d) 100.
A7 (3 points) A firm has a long run total cost T C(q) = 160 + 10q 2 and
the corresponding marginal cost M C(q) = 20q. What is the Minimum
Efficient Scale (MES) for this firm?
(a) indeterminate.
(b) 0.
(c) 2.
(d) 4.
TURN OVER
(a) always earns a profit in the long run and the short run.
(b) always earns a profit in the long run but never in the short run.
(c) can incur losses in the short run.
(d) can incur losses in the long run.
A11 (3 points) Which of the following changes would cause a competitive equi-
librium price and quantity to move along the market supply curve?
A12 (3 points) A consumer purchases two goods. The second good is inferior.
Suppose that all the prices and her income double. Which of the following
is true?
(a) the long run average cost is at a minimum (i.e. at the Minimum
Efficient Scale).
(b) the marginal revenue is greater than marginal cost.
(c) the marginal revenue is lower than price.
(d) the market demand is inelastic.
(a) decrease the equilibrium price of beef by 8% and decrease the quan-
tity demanded by domestic consumers by about 4%.
(b) decrease the equilibrium price of beef by 8% and leave the quantity
demanded by domestic consumers unchanged.
(c) decrease the equilibrium price of beef by 2% and decrease the quan-
tity demanded by domestic consumers by about 2%.
(d) decrease the equilibrium price of beef by 2% and leave the quantity
demanded by domestic consumers unchanged.
TURN OVER
A17 (3 points) Consider a competitive market for housing in the short run.
Suppose that due to new health and safety regulations, 1% of the initial
housing stock (fixed in the short run) is declared uninhabitable and with-
drawn from the market without any compensation. Which changes occur
in the short-run
A18 (3 points) When the British public is asked whether they want Soft Brexit
or Hard Brexit, they would choose Soft Brexit; when they are asked
whether they want Remain or Soft Brexit, they would choose Remain;
finally, when they are asked whether they want Hard Brexit or Remain,
they would also choose the Hard Brexit. Which of the following is true?
TURN OVER
(a) Judging from Figure 1, what is the firm’s optimal quantity? Indicate
the profit of the firm. Explain in a sentence.
£
MC
AC
50
40
AV C
30
20
10
(b) Suppose that the government introduces a per unit tax of t pounds.
How is the firm affected and how does your answer depend on the
size of the tax? Explain briefly; you may use Figure 2 to illustrate
your point.
£
MC
AC
50
40
AV C
30
20
10
TURN OVER
(c) Suppose that instead of a per unit tax, the government introduces a
lump-sum tax of T pounds. How is the firm affected and how does
your answer depend on the size of the tax? Explain briefly; you may
use Figure 3 to illustrate your point.
£
MC
AC
50
40
AV C
30
20
10
B2 (10 points) Explain in a few bullet points how equality of opportunity may
achieve an outcome that is both Pareto efficient and envy-free. What is
the role of competition and transferable endowments?
TURN OVER
B3 (10 points) Suppose that there is a monopolist which produces its output
at a constant marginal and average cost of £10 per unit. Consumers’
willingness to pay for this product is described by the inverse demand
function p = 1110 − Q, where p stands for price and Q for the quantity
of product. (This demand function implies Marginal Revenue M R (q) =
1110 − 2Q).
(a) What is the monopoly optimal production and price? What is the
producer and consumer surplus?
(b) Now, suppose that the government intervenes and splits the monop-
olist into 100 independent firms. This number is so great that the
resulting market is perfectly competitive. What is the competitive
production and price? What is the producer and consumer surplus?
TURN OVER
B4 (10 points) Two players play a public good game. Each player starts with
a £10 banknote. The player can use this money in either of two ways.
She can Keep the banknote or Contribute it to a public project. All the
money that is contributed gets multiplied by 1.6 and then divided equally
among the two players.
(a) Fill out the following payoff matrix and find the Nash equilibrium.
Player 2
Keep £10 Contribute £10
Keep £10
Player 1
Contribute £10
(b) Is the Nash equilibrium efficient? What kind of externality does con-
tributing generate here? Give an example of government intervention
that could help with this type of externality and explain.
END OF PAPER
Module marks*
1 st (70% +) 33%
2.1 (60-69%) 28%
2.2 (50-59%) 22%
3rd (40-49%) 11%
Fail (25-39%) 5%
Uncompensatable Fail 1%
(<25%)
*not including repeat year students and students who did not write the exam.
B1 – part b. Most of the students mentioned that the tax shift all costs curve up, however many
students did not clarify that MC shift up and which are the consequences in terms of firm’s choice
and optimal quantity. Students referred generically to a loss in profit without specifying why that
happens. Very few students discussed the influence of the size of the tax on AVC and relative
shutdown decision. The students often got confused between a unit tax and a lump-sum tax and
indicated often that just the AC costs curve shifts up (and then the opposite in part c). Many
students discussed the consequences of the tax in equilibrium although the question required
an analysis at the level of single firm and its optimal choice.
B1 – part c. Most of the students mentioned that the AC curve would be the only one to shift up and
discussed reduction in profit as a consequence. Similarly to part b, few students clarified the
relationship between the curve shift and the magnitude of profit changes (e.g. break-even price
increases). Similarly to part b, they got confused between single-firm analysis and equilibrium
analysis.
B2 – The question is very standard. Many students learned a few definitions superficially and
obtained some points, but only those who understood the analysis behind this, could explain all the
points succinctly and obtained good marks.
B3 – part a. The solution of the first part of the exercise (identify quantity and price in equilibrium)
was done correctly. However, many students incorrectly reported MC=10q instead that MC=10 as
the text reported. The calculations of consumer surplus was correct most of the time, while when
calculating producer surplus they calculated a triangle area most of the time without realising that
they needed to calculate the area of a rectangle.
B3 – part b. The students that identified correctly the condition used to solve the exercise (p=MC)
showing the calculations, although often MC has been reported as equal to 10q instead of 10, as in
part a. Many students calculated producer surplus without subtracting production costs and they
were not able to identify that PS=0. Students that did not identify the correct condition that needed
to be used to solve the exercise often used the equilibrium quantities and prices calculated for the
monopoly equilibrium and re-arranged it for this exercise (e.g. Qm/100 firms). They did not show
equilibrium analysis for the two different markets.
B4 – the game itself was understood quite well and the Nash equilibrium presented correctly.
However, the interpretation of the fundamental economic problem of efficiency in part b was much
more problematic. This example could have been used to explain externalities, public goods,
pigouvian and coasian policies.