Professional Documents
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Law of Contracts Irac
Law of Contracts Irac
Law of Contracts Irac
Another
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TABLE OF CONTENT
1. FACTS 3
2. ISSUES 4
3. RULES 5
4. ANALYSIS 6-8
5. CONCLUSION 9
6. REFERNCES 10
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FACTS OF THE CASE
In the case of Ajudhia Prasad and Others (Defendant) vs. Chandan Lal and Others
(Plaintiff), two children aging 18 to 21 years obtained cash from the plaintiff underneath
a mortgage deed on October 15, 1925, while wrongfully hiding the fact that a certified
guardian had been assigned for them.
However, at the period of the mortgage deed's execution, the defendants refuse to refund
the amount obtained, claiming that they were minors at the moment the contract was
formed, thereby invalidating the contract, and thus they are not lawfully obligated by the
legislation to reimburse the plaintiff's payment.
The lender then filed a complaint in court, requesting a decree for the restoration of the
principal amount under Section 65 of the Indian Contract Act, 1857, as well as an order
for the sale of the mortgaged asset.
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ISSUES
1. Whether the plaintiff can receive the principal amount from defendant
under Section 65 of the Indian Contract Act 1872, or under any other
equitable principle also can the plaintiff get a decree for sale of the
mortgaged property?
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RULES
“Who are competent to contract.—Every person is competent to contract who is of the age of
majority according to the law to which he is subject,1 and who is of sound mind and is not
disqualified from contracting by any law to which he is subject.”
“Obligation of person who has received advantage under void agreement, or contract that
becomes void.—When an agreement is discovered to be void, or when a contract becomes void,
any person who has received any advantage under such agreement or contract is bound to restore
it, or to make compensation for it to the person from whom he received it.”
“Estoppel. —When one person has, by his declaration, act or omission, intentionally caused or
permitted another person to believe a thing to be true and to act upon such belief, neither he nor
his representative shall be allowed, in any suit or proceeding between himself and such person or
his representative, to deny the truth of that thing.”
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ANALYSIS
Whether the plaintiff can receive the principal amount from defendant under
Section 65 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, or under any other equitable
principle also can the plaintiff get a decree for sale of the mortgaged
property?
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refunding money, except that the property can be identified, but cash cannot be traced.
That there is a clear difference is well recognized in England. Where a contract of
transfer of property is void, and such property can be traced, the property belongs to the
promise and can be followed. There is every equity in his favor for restoring the property
to him. But where the property is not traceable and the only way to grant compensation
would be by granting a money decree against the minor, decreeing the claim would be
almost tantamount to enforcing the minor's pecuniary liability under the contract which is
void. The distinction is too obvious to be ignored. The learned Chief Justice has
distinguished the case of Mohori Bibee v. Dharmodas Ghose 3 where restitution was not
allowed on the ground that the party who had lent the money to the minor was aware of
the minority. But that part of the judgment of their Lordships was with reference to a
claim by the minor under the Specific Relief Act, in which cases the Court would have a
discretion to impose terms before granting the decree. It would absolutely have no
application to the converse case where the defendant is being sued and is not himself
asking for any relief. I regret I am unable to appreciate the applicability of the remark of
Lord Kenyon quoted by the learned Chief Justice that the protection given by law to the
infant “was to be used as a shield and not as a sword”. Surely when the defendant is
being sued and sets up the plea of minority, he is not using his minority as a sword, but is
merely using it as a shield. I am unable to agree that because such a defense would
deprive a creditor of his money, the defendant infant is using his minority as a sword.”
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Whether the defendant was liable under the principle of estoppel?
1. After referring to the case of Khan Gul v. Lakha Singh it can be said that as the case
was considered under as an agreement or contract under Section 65 of Indian Contract
Act. Similarly, in this case even though the one of the party is minor it can be considered
as an agreement or a contract because there was a fraudulent concealment of the fact that
they were minor at the time of signing the mortgage deed and the principle of estoppel is
applicable to the defendants.
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CONCLUSION
1. After analyzing issue 1, it can be concluded that the plaintiff is liable to get either the
principal amount by the minors under Section 65 of Indian Contract Act or to get a decree
for sale of the mortgaged property.
2. After analyzing issue 2, it can be concluded that the defendants are liable under the
principle of estoppel as they have wrongfully hidden the fact that they were minor as they
were granted guardianship certificate.
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REFERNCES
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