IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION

{Order XVI Rules 4(1) (a)}

(Under Article 136 of the Constitution of India)

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO. _______ OF ______

[Arising out of the Impugned Final Judgment and Order dated 10.08.2005 passed
by the High Court Judicature at Chhattisgarh in Misc. Appeal Nos. 889 of 2004 and
Misc. Appeal No.890 of 2004]

In the matter of:

BHARAT ALUMINIUM CO. Petitioners

versus

KAISER ALUMINIUM TECHNICAL SERVICE, INC. Respondents

FOR THE PETITIONER: Arghya Sen

 SYNOPSIS AND LIST OF DATES

The instant SLP is being filed against the judgment/order dated 10.08.2005 delivered
by the High Court Judicature at Chhattisgarh wherein the appellant's miscellaneous
appeals challenging the dismissal of their applications under Section 34 of the Indian
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 against two foreign awards dated 10.11.2002
and 12.11.2002 were dismissed.

In the matter at hand, dated April 22nd, 1993, an agreement was entered into between
the appellant and respondent for the procurement and installation of a computer-
based system. Said agreement contained a provision for arbitration to settle disputes,
stipulating that Indian law governed the agreement, and arbitration proceedings were
to be conducted in London in accordance with English arbitration law. Disputes
arose concerning performance, leading to arbitration in England and subsequent
awards rendered in November 2002.

The appellant submitted applications under Section 34 of the Arbitration and

Conciliation Act, 1996, seeking to annul the awards in the District Court of Bilaspur,
which were dismissed in July 2004. Appeals against this decision were lodged in the
High Court of Chhattisgarh, Bilaspur, which similarly ruled against the appellant in
August 2005.

Subsequent to these adjudications, the appellant contested the rulings in the Supreme
Court, initiating a sequence of directives culminating in an instruction for the matters
to be presented before a Constitution Bench on January 10th, 2012. At the crux of
the matter lies the question of the applicability of Indian law in annulling foreign
awards pursuant to Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
LIST OF DATES:
1. April 22, 1993: Agreement executed between the appellant and the
respondent.
2. November 13, 1997: Respondent issues a written notice of request for
arbitration to the appellant.
3. November 10-12, 2002: Arbitral tribunal in England makes two awards.
4. July 20, 2004: District Judge, Bilaspur, dismisses the appellant's
applications under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1996.
5. August 10, 2005: Division Bench of the High Court of Chhattisgarh
dismisses the appellant's miscellaneous appeals.
6. January 16, 2008: Two Judge Bench orders the appeals to be placed before
the Chief Justice of India (CJI) for listing before another Bench.
7. November 1, 2011: Three Judge Bench directs the matters to be placed
before the Constitution Bench on January 10, 2012.
SIMILAR MATTERS PENDING:
This Honorable Court is currently seized with petitions including, but not limited
to:
• CIVIL APPEAL NO.6284 OF 2004
• CIVIL APPEAL NO.3678 OF 2007
• TRANSFERRED CASE (C) NO.35 OF 2007
• SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) NOS. 3589-3590 of 2009
• SPECIAL LEAVE PETITON (C) NOS. 31526-31528 of 2009
• SPECIAL LEAVE PETITON (C) NO. 27824 of 2011
• SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) NO. 27841 of 2011

The aforementioned cases before this Honorable Court pertain to similar subject
matter. We respectfully pray for the consolidation of these matters to ensure the
efficient dispensation of justice.
 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

{Order XVI Rules 4(1) (a)}
(Under Article 136 of the Constitution of India)

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO. OF 20__

[Arising out of the Impugned Final Judgment and Order dated 10.08.2005 passed
by the High Court Judicature at Chhattisgarh in Misc. Appeal Nos. 889 of 2004
and Misc. Appeal No.890 of 2004]

IN THE MATTER OF:

POSITION OF PARTIES

District Court High Court Supreme Court

BHARAT ALUMINIUM CO Petitioner No. 1 Petitioner No. 1 Petitioner No. 1

VERSUS

KAISER ALUMINIUM
Respondent No. 1 Respondent No. 1 Respondent No. 1
TECHNICAL SERVICE, INC.

Respondent No.1 and 2 are contesting PETITION UNDER ARTICLE 136 OF

THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
To
The Hon’ble Chief Justice of India and His Hon’ble Companion
Justices of The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India

The humble Special Leave Petition of the Petitioner above named:

MOST RESPECTFULLY SHEWETH:

1. The Petitioner is filing the present Special Leave Petition against the
impugned Final Order dated 10.08.2005 passed by the High Court of
Judicature at Chhattisgarh in Misc. Appeal Nos. 889 of 2004 and Misc.
Appeal No.890 of 2004 whereby the High Court had dismissed the Appeal. It
is submitted that no intra-court appeal or LPA is maintainable against the
impugned order/judgment since it is passed by division bench and under High
Court of Chhattisgarh Rules, no appeal lies against division bench order.

2. QUESTIONS OF LAW
The following questions of law arise for consideration by this Hon'ble Court:

2.1. What is meant by the place of arbitration as found in Sections 2(2) and 20 of
the Arbitration Act, 1996?

2.2. What is the meaning of the words “under the law of which the award is
passed” under Section 48 of the Arbitration Act, 1996 and Article V(1)(e) of
the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards (hereinafter referred to as “the New York Convention”)?
 2.3. Does Section 2(2) bar the application of Part I of the Arbitration Act, 1996
(Part I for brevity) to arbitrations where the place is outside India?

2.4. Does Part I apply at all stages of an arbitration, i.e., pre, during and post stages
of the arbitral proceedings, in respect of all arbitrations, except for the areas
specifically falling under Parts II and III of the Arbitration Act, 1996 (Part II
and Part III hereinafter)?

2.5. Whether a suit for preservation of assets pending an arbitration proceeding is

maintainable?

3. DECLARATION IN TERMS OF RULE 4 (2)

The Petitioner state that no other Petition seeking leave to appeal has been filed

by them against the final judgment and order of the Hon’ble Division Bench

of the High Court of Judicature at Chhattisgarh, dated 10.08.2005 passed in

Misc. Appeal Nos. 889 of 2004 and Misc. Appeal No.890 of 2004 titled

Bharat Aluminum Co. v. Kaiser aluminum technical service, inc.

4. DECLARATION IN TERMS OF RULE 6

The annexures produced along with the SLP are true copies of the
pleadings/documents, which formed part of the record of the case in the High
Court below against whose order leave to appeal is sought for in this Petition.
 5. GROUNDS

A. That the Appellant in the present case is an Indian company, as delineated by

Section 2(20) of the Companies Act, 2013, while the respondent qualifies as a
foreign company under the purview of Section 2(42) of the aforementioned
act. The arbitration proceedings between the appellant and the respondent were
conducted in accordance with the provisions outlined in Article 17.1, 17.2, and
22 of the agreement dated April 22, 1993. Consequently, this renders the
current appeal adjudicable and within the jurisdiction of the court below
pursuant to the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

B. That the High Court erred in its decision to uphold the orders issued by the
learned District Judge, Bilaspur, as numbered MJC Nos. 92 of 2003 and 14 of
2003, dated July 20th, 2004. The said district judge's order was passed in
contravention of established precedents set forth by a three-Judges Bench
decision of the apex Court in Bhatia International Vs. Bulk Trading S.A. &
Anr., (2002), as well as a two-Judges Bench decision in Venture Global
Engineering Vs. Satyam Computer Services Ltd. & Anr. (2008). Furthermore,
the District Judge overstepped by imposing his interpretation of Clause (2) of
Section 2 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, by wrongfully
declaring this Section 34 application filed by the appellant as “not tenable”,
contrary to the stance taken by the apex court.

C. That this Hon’ble Court in regard to the application of Part I of the Indian
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 applies to international commercial
arbitrations held outside of India, unless any or all of the provisions have been
excluded by agreement between the parties, reaffirmed the legal principle and
 held:-
"If a language used is capable of bearing more than one construction, in selecting
the true meaning. regard must be had to the consequences, resulting from adopting
the alternative constructions. A construction that results in hardship, serious
inconvenience, injustice, absurdity or anomaly or which leads to inconsistency or
uncertainty and friction in the system which the statute purports to regulate has to
be rejected and preference should be given to that construction which avoids such
results."

The Hon’ble Court, while holding the above view upheld the
judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court while refusing to interfere with
the impugned judgment. (Bhatia International v. Bulk Trading S.A.,)

D. That the Hon’ble High Court ignored that the dismissal of the Misc. Appeal
Nos. 889 of 2004 and Misc. Appeal No.890 of 2004 goes against the settled
basic legal principles of interpretation of statues “Same words, same meaning”
and “Same Words in Statutes Pari Materia”, i.e. where a Legislature uses same
expression in the same statute at two places or more, then the same
interpretation should be given to that expression.
If one construction will lead to an ambiguity while another will gives effect to
was obviously Intended, the construction which would defeat the ends of the
Act must be rejected even if same words used In the same section and even in
the same sentence have to be construed differently. A word which occurs more
than once in the same Act should be given the same meaning throughout the
Act, unless the context shows that the legislature has used the word in a
different sense. This is made clear by the legislature inserting in the
interpretation clause words such as ‘unless the context otherwise requires’.
E. That the Hon’ble High Court ignored that the dismissal of the Misc. Appeal
Nos. 889 of 2004 and Misc. Appeal No.890 of 2004 goes against the settled
basic legal principles of interpretation of statues “Same Words in Statutes Pari
Materia”, i.e:-Word defined in a statute may have the same meaning in another
statute which is in pari materia therewith. If the language of the two statutes in
all respects is identical no question of construing one Act with the assistance
of the other Act can arise. Similarly in the present case the court below cannot
assume the meaning of the words provided in the statute which were intended
to be read and construed in its literal sense, meaning and application

F. The Honorable High Court, in its judgment, failed to adhere to legal principle
as laid down in Bhogilal v. State of Bombay (1959), i.e., the same expression
must have the same meaning. Further in Lal Chand v. Radha Krishan 1977
SC, the Court observed: “where the same expression is used in the same statute
at different places the same meaning ought to be given to that expression as far
as possible.

G. That the judgement by Hon’ble high court dated 10.08.2005 can be termed as
“Construction”1 and the court below Judges had framed the law as they would
like to have it. The intention of the Legislature is primarily to be gathered from
the language used which means that attention should be paid to what has been
said, as held in - Gwalior Rayon Silk Mfg.Co.Ltd v. Custodian of Vested
Forests, AIR 1990 SC 1747. Further a construction which requires for its
support addition or substitution of words, or which result in rejection of words

1
The term ‘construction’ has been explained in CWT vs. Hashmatunnisa Begum to mean that something
more is being got out in the elucidation of the subject-matter than can be got by strict interpretation of
the words used.
 as meaningless has to be avoided2.

H. That the Courts Can Imply A Term Only If Literal Interpretation Fails To Give
The Result Intended By Parties - Adani Power & Gujarat Urja Vikas 2019

I. That the judgement by Hon’ble Chhattisgarh high court dated 10.08.2005,

considers Part I and Part II of 1996 act are parallel as Part II resembles to
UNICITRAL Model Law, whereas it is common knowledge that the
Arbitration Act, 1996 has not “adopted or incorporated the provisions of Model
Law”, It has merely “taken into account”, one of the strongest examples is the
omission of the word “only” in Section 2(2), which occurs in corresponding
Article 1(2) of the Model Law. The absence of the word “only” in Section 2(2)
clearly signifies that Part I shall compulsorily apply if the place of arbitration
is in India. It does not mean that Part I will not apply if place of arbitration is
not in India.

J. That the judgment issued by the Honorable Chhattisgarh High Court on August
10, 2005, appears to perceive Part I and Part II of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996, as parallel constructs, drawing a comparison with the
UNICITRAL Model Law. However, it is important to respectfully note that
the Arbitration Act, 1996, does not explicitly "adopt or incorporate the
provisions of the Model Law," but rather "takes into account" certain elements.
An example of this is the omission of the word "only" in Section 2(2),
diverging from its counterpart in Article 1(2) of the Model Law. The exclusion
of the word "only" in Section 2(2) indicates that Part I is mandatory when the

2
Shyam Kishori Devi v. Patna Municipal Corporation, AIR 1966 SC 1678
 place of arbitration is in India. However, it's essential to humbly acknowledge
that this doesn't imply3 that Part I is inapplicable if the place of arbitration is
outside India.

K. That the absence of the word "only" in Section 2(2) of the Arbitration Act,
1996, does not constitute a case of "casus omissus." This omission serves as a
clear indication that the Act did not adopt the Model Law in its entirety.
L. That the Arbitration Act, 1996, should be interpreted by discerning
Parliament's intention from the language and words employed within the
statute. Thus, it is imperative to interpret the provisions of the Act literally,
without adding or inserting any additional words. Consequently, judicial
interpretation cannot supply the missing word "only”, as assumed by the
Chhattisgarh High court, in its judgement dated 10.08.2005.

M. That the Arbitration Act, 1996, does not completely adopt the territorial
criterion but duly recognizes party autonomy. They argue that this is evident
from various provisions such as Sections 2(1)(e), 2(5), 2(7), 20, and 28.
Limiting Part I's operation solely to arbitrations within India would necessitate
adding words to or reading into several provisions within the Act, they contend.

N. That the term "place" in Sections 2(2) and Section 20 should bear the same
meaning. Section 20 allows parties to agree on the place of arbitration outside
India, suggesting that arbitrations under Part I may have a geographical
location beyond India.

3
Rajendra prasad Gupta vs Prakash Chandra Mishra 2011 - Every procedure is permissible unless it is
prohibited by the law
O. That, similarly, the inclusion of "Where the place of arbitration is situated in
India" in Section 28(1) would be superfluous if Part I applied only to
arbitrations within India. They argue that Section 28(3) applies even to foreign-
seated arbitrations if the parties have chosen the Arbitration Act, 1996, as the
governing law, indicating that the "seat" is not central to the Act but rather the
subject matter is.

P. That the definition of Court in Section 2(1)(e) implies that two foreign parties
cannot invoke Indian Court jurisdiction solely by selecting India as the seat of
arbitration for a dispute arising outside India and governed by foreign law.

Q. That that Section 9 is essential for interim relief, and without it, parties may be
left without recourse which is against the legislative intent of the act.

R. That held by this Hon’ble court in National Thermal Power Corporation Vs.
Singer Company & Ors., suggesting that Section 2(7) mirrors Section 9(b) of
the Foreign Awards (Recognition and Enforcement) Act, 1961, to conform
with Article V(1)(e) of the New York Convention, recognizing the jurisdiction
of courts in two countries to set aside awards.

S. That not giving effect to the words “under the law of which the award was
made”, will allow many awards to go untested in Court.

T. That the Model Law aims to introduce an era of localized or territorial

arbitration, as outlined in Article 1(2). Conversely, the Arbitration Act, 1996,
acknowledges and facilitates de-localized arbitration. It is emphasized that
under the Model Law, all provisions pertain to localized arbitration, except for
 the exceptions outlined in Article 1(2). In contrast, under the Arbitration Act,
1996, all provisions are de-localized unless specifically qualified by the term
"place."

U. That the interpretation of the term "place" in Section 2(2) should take into
account the provisions of Section 20, which grant parties the freedom to agree
on the place of arbitration. it's crucial to ensure that the interpretation of "place"
in Section 2(2) is consistent with the provisions outlined in Section 2(1)(e). the
interpretation of Section 2(2) must be considered in conjunction with the
provisions contained in Section 2(7), which indicate that the scope of Part I of
the Arbitration Act, 1996, extends beyond arbitrations conducted within India.

V. That whilst arbitrations conducted in India under Section 2(2) result in a

"domestic award," arbitrations held abroad under Section 2(7) lead to a
"deemed domestic award," provided that the parties have chosen the
Arbitration Act, 1996, as the governing law of arbitration.

W. That if Section 2(2) had not been enacted, there would be no ambiguity
regarding the applicability of Part I of the Arbitration Act, 1996, to arbitrations
governed by the Act. Under Section 2(7), regardless of the location of the
arbitral proceedings, they would be deemed domestic awards, subject to the
legal implications thereof.

X. That the inclusion of Section 2(2) extends the applicability of the Arbitration
Act, 1996, and Part I to cases where the seat or place of arbitration is in India,
even if the proceedings are not conducted in accordance with Indian Arbitral
laws. This effectively domesticates what would otherwise have been a non-
 domestic award, conducted under a Foreign Arbitration Act. Such provisions
reflect India's commitment under the New York Convention.

Y. That the New York Convention, particularly in Articles V(1)(a) and V(1)(e),
recognizes the courts in both the country where the arbitration is held and the
country "under the law of which the award is made" as competent jurisdictions
to question the validity of arbitral proceedings and awards. However, it's
important to note that the jurisdiction of domestic courts is not conferred by
the New York Convention or Part II of the Arbitration Act, 1996. Part II
primarily deals with the enforcement or refusal of enforcement of awards.

Z. That the inclusion of two competent jurisdictions in the New York Convention
aims to mitigate the dominance of the "seat" over party autonomy. There is no
substantial basis for concern that the two competent courts might issue
conflicting verdicts on the same award. Even if parallel proceedings occur, it's
a matter of case management for the relevant courts to determine which
proceedings should continue and which should be stayed.

AA. That the assertion that the non-applicability of Part I to arbitrations conducted
outside India would leave parties remediless is entirely valid. In such cases, it
is not permissible for a party to initiate a lawsuit addressing the merits of the
arbitration. Any such lawsuit would inevitably be stayed pursuant to Section 8
or Section 45 of the Arbitration Act, 1996.

BB. That the only feasible manner to frame a lawsuit would be to seek an injunction
restraining the other party from disposing of property/(ies). However, if the
right to such property is already subject to an arbitration agreement, a lawsuit
 for the declaration of such right cannot be initiated. Consequently, the only
relief attainable would be to safeguard a property, the entitlement to which is
entirely contingent upon the outcome of another proceeding, potentially in a
foreign jurisdiction over which the Indian court has no jurisdiction.

CC. That initiating a lawsuit would encounter several legal obstacles. Firstly, since
no substantive relief can be sought as the dispute is to be resolved by
arbitration, the lawsuit would lack a pre-existing cause of action and could be
rejected under Order VII Rule 11a. Moreover, since no interim relief can be
granted unless it is ancillary to a substantive relief, a lawsuit merely praying
for an injunction could also be rejected under Order VII Rule 11.

DD. That the Indian Parliament's intention in enacting the Arbitration Act, 1996,
was not to render parties remediless. However, the absence of Part I's
applicability to arbitrations conducted outside India could inadvertently lead to
situations where parties are unable to seek effective legal recourse, thereby
necessitating a comprehensive review of the Act's provisions to ensure
adequate protection for all parties involved.

EE. That the pivotal issue in the present case revolves around whether domestic
courts are excluded from exercising supervisory control by entertaining
challenges to an award, in addition to challenges made in courts where the seat
is located. This issue becomes particularly pertinent when it is not feasible to
assume that the validity of the award is to be adjudicated according to the law
of the arbitration "place." The Arbitration Act, 1996, addresses this ambiguity
by clearly delineating that national courts retain residual jurisdiction over
challenges to the validity or enforcement of an award in matters where
 judicature courts have jurisdiction.

FF. That the Arbitration Act, 1996, is not seat-centric, as emphasized by the learned
senior counsel. This is evidenced by numerous provisions in both Part I and
Part II, as previously highlighted. Notably, the definitions of International
Commercial Arbitration in Section 2(1)(f) and international arbitration in
Section 2(1)(e) are party-centric and subject matter-centric, respectively, rather
than being indexed to the seat of arbitration.

GG. That the presence of the expression "the subject matter of the arbitration" in
Section 2(1)(e) indicates that jurisdiction is conferred based on the connection
of the arbitration with India, rather than solely relying on the seat. Therefore,
if the subject matter of an international arbitration falls within the jurisdiction
of an Indian court, irrespective of the seat, Indian courts would have
supervisory jurisdiction.

HH. That restricting the applicability of Part I of the Arbitration Act, 1996, solely
to arbitrations with seats in India cannot provide a coherent interpretation of
Section 2(1)(e) without distorting its language, according to Mr. Subramanium.
Furthermore, the inclusion of the qualifier "where the place of arbitration is
situate in India" in Section 28 implies that the legislature did not intend for
Section 2(2) to serve as a complete exclusion of Part I for arbitrations outside
India.

II. That Part II of the Arbitration Act, 1996 cannot be regarded as a comprehensive
code on its own, as it inherently relies on provisions from Part I. This reliance
underscores the interdependence between Part I and Part II, suggesting that
 they must be construed harmoniously to ensure the completeness of the
Arbitration Act, 1996. While Part I delineates the entire procedure for
arbitration, Part II specifically pertains to the recognition and enforcement of
certain foreign awards.

JJ. That certain provisions in Part I find their mirror counterparts in Part II, but
crucial provisions necessary for arbitration are absent in Part II. For instance,
while Section 45 in Part II enables a court to refer a matter to arbitration, there
is no equivalent provision to resolve situations where an arbitrator is not
appointed as per the agreed procedure, such as Section 11(9) in Part I. The
phrase "notwithstanding anything contained in Part I" in Section 45 suggests
that Part II applies irrespective of any concurrent application of similar
provisions in Part I, indicating that provisions of Part I are intended to apply to
matters covered by Part II.

KK. That the absence of provisions in Part II for interim relief pending arbitration,
akin to Section 9 in Part I, further underscores the complementary nature of
Part I and Part II. Section 27 also indicates the possibility of seeking assistance
from Indian courts in aid of arbitration, both domestically and internationally.

LL. That Sections 34 and 48 of the Arbitration Act, 1996 should be construed
harmoniously, with the intent being to allow only one challenge to an award.
If an award is challenged under Section 34, enforcement proceedings under
Section 36 may be adjourned, and the court may order suitable security under
Section 48(3). Similarly, Section 51 suggests that rights under Part II are
additional to those under Part I, emphasizing the continued availability of
essential provisions like Sections 9, 11, and 34 to parties seeking recognition
 and enforcement of foreign awards.

MM. That Part I of the Arbitration Act, 1996 unequivocally applies to all arbitrations
arising between domestic parties and concerning domestic disputes. Even if
such parties opt for a foreign situs, Part I remains applicable, and Indian courts
retain jurisdiction over such disputes. In essence, contractual agreements
between two Indian parties cannot divest Indian courts of their jurisdiction over
legal disputes transpiring within India, as such agreements would contravene
Section 23 and Section 28 of the Indian Contract Act.

NN. That while the UNCITRAL Model Law adopts a broad interpretation of the
term "international," allowing parties to confer an international character to a
domestic relationship by selecting a foreign situs or labeling the arbitration as
international, Indian law, as embodied in Section 2(1)(f) of the Arbitration Act,
1996, opts for a nationality-based definition of international arbitration.
Sections 2(2), 20, and 28 further reinforce this stance by precluding Indian
parties from selecting a foreign place of arbitration for purely domestic
disputes.

OO. Furthermore, Mr. Kumar contends that when both parties involved in a dispute
are Indian, the substantive law governing the dispute must invariably be Indian,
irrespective of the arbitration situs or any contractual provisions to the
contrary. He argues that just as Indian parties cannot deviate from Indian
contract and evidence laws in a purely domestic context, they similarly cannot
circumvent Indian arbitration laws. Citing the case of TDM Infrastructure Pvt.
Ltd. vs. U.E. Development India Pvt. Ltd., Mr. Kumar underscores the
judiciary's stance on preserving the primacy of Indian law in domestic disputes,
 albeit acknowledging that the specific issue at hand was not directly addressed
in the mentioned case under Section 11.

6. GROUNDS FOR INTERIM RELIEF

The Petitioners seeks interim relief from this Hon’ble Court on the following
amongst other grounds:
A. That the Petitioners have a good case on merits and are likely to succeed
before this Hon’ble Court.
B. That irreparable harm or injury will be suffered by the Petitioners if interim
relief is not granted, as they stand to incur significant financial losses or
reputational damage.

C. That there is a prima facie case of violation of the Petitioners' legal rights,
which warrants immediate intervention by this Hon'ble Court to prevent
further harm or injustice.

D. That granting interim relief is in the interest of justice and equity, as it will
maintain the status quo and prevent any party from taking advantage of the
ongoing legal proceedings.
6. MAIN PRAYER
In the facts and circumstances, it is most respectfully prayed that this Hon’ble
Court may be pleased to:

A. Grant Special Leave to Appeal against the final judgment and order dated
10.08.2005 passed by the High Court Judicature at Chhattisgarh in Misc.
Appeal Nos. 889 of 2004 and Misc. Appeal No.890 of 2004

B. Pass such other order(s) as this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in
the facts and circumstances of the case.

7. INTERIM PRAYER
NIL

AND FOR THIS ACT OF KINDNESS THE PETITIONERS AS IN DUTY

BOUND SHALL EVER PRAY.

Arghya Sen
For the Petitioners

Date – 15/04/2024