444 8 555 suschco no 444 78 74 195-444-014-4 318-509-447-8

The main challenge for Moroccan agriculture is investment, according to conference attendees. Agriculture in Morocco is developing steadily, however. The Green Morocco Plan, which was implemented in 2008, "is intended to make agriculture a real driving-force for growth over the next 15 years by doubling agricultural GDP, which is currently estimated at $12 billion". Morocco also plans to increase its agricultural exports to $8 billion in 2020, experts at the forum said.

http://www.magharebia.com/cocoon/awi/xhtml1/en_GB/features/awi/features/2011/11/28 /feature-04 .. IMPORTANT: Morocco Compensation Fund (originally set up during French protectorate to encourage French imports) Sept 2011: Morocco triples subsidies.. mostly butane gas.. Wheat ($0.41 to $0.15) and sugar (from $1.1/kg to $0.84) are subsidized.
In Morocco, the consumer-goods giant Procter & Gamble has built an entire network of wholesalers and agents and subagents to sell diapers and soap through merchants in villages so remote that they have no retail stores. (Wall Street Journal, 15oct2011) A sugarloaf is traditionally given as a present when visiting someone. RISK IN MOROCCO: The rising global food prices. Wheat is one of the most important food items in Morocco and if the prices are liberalized, that would cause an uproar in public as it happened in 80s. The question: Is it subsidies efficient system?

Subsidies are 16% of the total expenditures Free trade agreements with 55 countries reaching out to a billion consumers http://www1.oxfordbusinessgroup.com/economic_updates/maroc-vers-plus-d %E2%80%99%C3%A9nergie-verte

En mai, la capacit totale de production dlectricit au Maroc tait de 6405 MW, dont 67% a pour source le charbon et les hydrocarbures. Le pays importe galement 15 20% de son lectricit dEspagne. La demande est en rapide croissance la consommation dlectricit a augment de 6,9% par an en moyenne entre 2002 et 2010, atteignant 26,5KWh la fin de cette priode. Selon les prvisions du gouvernement, la demande pourrait atteindre le double de son niveau actuel dici 2010 et quadrupler dici 2030. Les subventions du gouvernement visant maintenir la stabilit du prix du fuel, qui est actuellement la source de 27% de la production dlectricit, font galement pression sur le dficit budgtaire.

Souks face increasing competition from supermarkets as private firms both domestic and foreign plan openings and expansions in Morocco, changing the nature of the marketplace. The supermarket segment is currently dominated by local players, but foreign firms are showing increasing interest and appear set to help drive expansion. In March Turkish no-frills low-cost supermarket chain BIM announced plans to almost double the size of its existing store network in Morocco, from the current 45 to 80. It reportedly has plans to further expand to 150 stores by the end of 2012. The discount retailer entered Morocco in 2008 and all of its current stores are located in Casablanca and the surrounding areas, meaning there is ample room for the company to expand in Morocco. Low-cost chains such as BIM, which sell discounted bulk items, are well-placed to succeed in Morocco, where 51% of people buy groceries in large quantities to save money, according to a survey published by Moroccan business news weekly La Vie Eco in January. BIMs expansion plans would make it one of the largest players in the country in terms of outlets, though, given the size of its stores, not in terms of total floor space. Other major companies in the sector include the locally owned Hanouty group, which runs a chain of convenience stores, and Marjane Holding, which is currently the largest player in the supermarket segment in terms of both outlets and floor space with a network of 52 stores. Marjanes stores include its 21 own-brand hypermarkets located on the outskirts of urban areas, which have a combined floor space of around 140,000 sq metres and currently dominate the hypermarket segment, as well as its 31 Acima supermarkets, a chain of smaller stores usually found in town centres. While local conglomerate ONA-SNI currently has a 100% stake in Marjane Holding, it reportedly intends to reduce its interest in the firm later this year as part of plans to lower its ownership levels in some of its subsidiaries.

Morocco's relations with neighbouring Algeria will remain tense, largely owing to the dispute over Western Sahara, which Algeria would like to see become independent. Morocco is committed to its plan for limited autonomy for the

territory, but the Sahrawi national liberation movement, the Polisario Front, which is backed by Algeria, demands a referendum on sel determination

RSK 1: Fas Bat Saharann zerklik istemesiyle ba aryabilir. RSK 2: Ortadoudaki gergin ortam FasI da vurabilir. Morocco pulled out of the organisation's predecessor, the Organisation of African Unity, in 1984 following the latter's decision to admit the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR; the name given to the Western Sahara region by those advocating its independence from Morocco), as a member. Morocco's relations with the AU and with African states supportive of the demands Polisario Front (PF) for independence for the Western Sahara, which Morocco has occupied since 1975, has remained difficult, particularly as the ousted Libyan leader, Muammar Qadhafi, was a fervent supporter of the Western Sahara liberation movement and one of the AU's main sponsors. Morocco's candidacy has also hurt relations with neighbouring Mauritania. According to Mauritania's Al Akhbar news agency, Mauritania's president, Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, postponed his visit to Morocco on three consecutive occasions and is planning to visit Algeria (which sides with the PF) instead. Phosphorus is one of the primary nutrients essential for plant growth and crop production. It is a non-renewable resource that must be mined from nature. It cannot be artificially produced. We do not, however, mine phosphorus. We mine phosphate minerals. The phosphates sector has benefited from higher international prices. Raw phosphates exports rose by 38% in JanuaryStock exchange weakness hurts Casablanca Finance City Trade deficit widens as oil and wheat import costs rise September compared with the same period of 2010, to Dh6.5bn while phosphates derivatives earnings were up by 30.5% to Dh6.1bn. Phosphoric acid exports grew by 12% to Dh7.7bn. The state phosphates company, OCP, is mplementing a sizeable investment programme (October 2011, Economic performance) that aims to raise gross phosphate production from 28mtonnes to 47m tonnes by 2020. Humans get phosphate from the foods they eat. These examples show the amount of phosphorus* (mg/100 grams) in various foods.
Milk 93 Lean Beef 204 Potatoes 56 Broccoli 72 Wheat Flour 101 Cheddar Cheese 524

The bulk of the phosphate we mine - about 90% - is used to produce phosphate fertilizers. Another 5% is used to make animal feed supplements. The remaining 5% goes into making a variety of products from soft drinks to toothpaste to metal coatings.

"The International Strategic Minerals Inventory Summary Report - Phosphate" (USGS Circular 930-C) is a cooperative effort of this international group and published in 1984 by the U.S. Geological Survey. It describes Phosphorus as "an important component of the cell tissues of plants and animals; it is necessary for the structure, growth, and propagation of living organisms. Phosphorus enters the organic food chain from the soil through the roots of plants. The human body contains about 1 percent by weight phosphorus, most of it in the bones and teeth. The human body requires a daily intake of 0.6-0.7 g of phosphorus."
Diammonium phosphate: US $600 Phosphate rock: Morocco $200..ileyip 3 katna satyorlar. Trade and investment, Jan-Sep (Dh m unles s otherwise indicat ed) 2010 2011 % change Exports (fob) 107,618 125,568 16.7 Exports excl phosphates 81,197 90,583 11.6 Phosphates & derivatives exports 26,421 34,985 32.4 Imports (cif) 219,042 263,578 20.3 Crude oil 18,532 23,171 25.0 Imports excl crude oil 200,511 240,407 19.9 Petrol & other hydrocarbons products 9,645 12,335 27.9 Gas & fuel oil 14,431 24,184 67.6 Wheat 4,010 7,079 76.5 Other non-hydrocarbons imports 172,425 196,809 14.1 Trade balance -111,425 -138,010 Exports as % of imports 49.1 47.6 Tourism revenue 42,771 45,024 5.3 Inward remittances of Moroccans from abroad 40,737 44,096 8.2 FDI & portfolio investment 21,420 16,889 -21. Toplam ihracatn yzde 20sini fosfat ve trevleri oluturuyor.

North Africa Business Forecast Report January 1, 2012 Sunday

Morocco
Core Views

Despite not possessing hydrocarbon wealth, the economy will remain a relative outperformer in North Africa over the medium term. On top of a very low base, strong interest from foreign investors in terms of developing the country into an export-oriented manufacturing hub for the European market, coupled with a burgeoning tourism industry, should bode well for underlying growth momentum through 2015. Anti-government demonstrations will continue into 2012, as some of the largest protest groups (including the February 20 movement) are unlikely to be satisfied by the constitutional reforms introduced in July 2011. While we do not consider King Mohammed's position to be under threat, these demonstrations could nevertheless obstruct business activity.

Major Forecast Changes

We have revised down our projection for Morocco's budget deficit in 2012 from 5.3% of GDP to 4.3% of GDP. Recent pledges of foreign aid from the GCC - coupled with signals from the government that it intends to resume its fiscal consolidation drive in the near future - are likely to ease the country's fiscal position going forward. On the back of sharply-declining food prices, we now expect CPI to come in at 1.5% in 2011, down from our previous forecast of 2.0%. We are sticking to our forecast for inflation of 2.0% in 2012.

Key Risks To Outlook

Our forecasts for both economic activity and fiscal policy assume that Morocco will benefit from significant inflows of foreign aid from the GCC and other organisations in 2012. Should this assistance fail to materialise, it would pose serious downside risks to the country's outlook. Overexposure to the southern European market, particularly Spain, could prove problematic given the ongoing sovereign debt concerns of the eurozone.

Political SWOT Analysis Strengths

Reverence for the monarchy has helped minimise anti-regime sentiment in the key institutions of government and throughout much of the broader population. This has proved useful in weakening the risks of a 'Tunisia-style' revolt during the ongoing Arab Spring, while helping to ensure the loyalty of the security services should such a scenario unfold. Strong diplomatic ties with the US government and increasingly closer relations with wealthy states throughout the Gulf should help anchor increased investment from these regions over the long term.

Weaknesses

As the eruption in anti-government demonstrations since the start of 2011 has made clear, antipathy towards the reign of King Mohammed is strong among certain segments of the population. As such, protest activity should be expected to continue as the fervour of the Arab Spring rumbles on heading into 2012. Decision-making power rests within a small circle of the royal family and political elite. This alienates large segments of the population, and clouds the trajectory of policy formation for many investors.

Opportunities

Recent overtures to Algeria that have sought to resolve the underlying issues that resulted in the closure of the land border between the two countries could strengthen Morocco's political risk profile should they bear fruit. The inclusion of opposition groups in negotiations over possible amendments to the constitution could dampen anti-regime sentiment over the longer term.

Threats

As the terrorist attack in Marrakesh in April 2011 highlighted, security risks for foreign visitors remains elevated, despite the government's ongoing efforts at diminishing the power of extremists.

Economic SWOT Analysis Strengths

TABLE: MOROCCO CORE FORECASTS 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Real GDP growth, % change y-o-y 2 GDP per capita, US$ 2 Population, mn 3 Private final consumption, MAD real growth % y-o-y 2 Fixed capital formation, MAD real growth % y-o-y 2 Budget balance, % of GDP 4 Current account, % of GDP 5 4.8 2,939 32.0 3.6 e 2,897 e 32.4 e 4.1 f 2,777 f 32.8 f 5.1 f 5.0 f 4.7 f 4.7 f 2,896 f 3,092 f 3,227 f 3,394 f 33.2 f 33.5 f 33.9 f 34.3 f

4.1

3.5

5.0

5.0

f 5.0

f 5.0

f 5.0

19.3 -0.8 -5.0

4.0 -4.4 -4.5

e e

6.0 -7.7 -7.4

f f f

6.0 -5.3 -6.3

f 6.0 f -3.7 f -5.1

f 6.0 f -2.3 f -4.3

f 6.0 f -1.0 f -2.3

f f f

Consumer prices, % y-oy, ave 1,2 Central Bank policy rate, %6 Exchange rate MAD/US$, ave 7 Exchange rate MAD/EUR, ave 7

1.1 3.30 7.80 10.90

1.0 3.20 7.90 11.00

2.0

2.0

f 2.0

f 2.0

f 2.0

3.20 f 8.60 f 12.60 f

3.20 f 3.20 f 3.20 f 3.20 f 8.80 f 8.70 f 8.80 f 8.80 f 12.10 f 11.30 f 11.00 f 11.00 f

A low base (GDP per capita is estimated at around US$2,800) and strong growth potential in the tourism, renewable energy and exportoriented manufacturing industries, are making the economy an increasingly attractive destination for foreign investment. The central bank has proven relatively effective at tackling inflation, despite the limited monetary policy tools at its disposal. Given the unprecedented events that have emerged across North Africa concomitant with the ongoing Arab Spring, Morocco is projected to be a relative economic outperformer over the coming five years.

Weaknesses

Dependence on the agricultural sector means growth remains prone to volatile swings in accordance with unpredictable weather patterns. Reliance on southern Europe as the main destination for exports provides little cause for optimism given the eurozone's weak mediumterm growth outlook. Increased government expenditure on subsidies will not only widen the budget deficit but also crowd out more productive capital investment.

Opportunities

Low wages and linguistic ties with both southern Europe and the Gulf should make the economy an attractive destination for investors. The banking system remains relatively underdeveloped, which could see financial institutions from more developed economies enter the market over the coming years.

Threats

A more prolonged and pronounced slowdown in eurozone growth could see Morocco's export industries suffer over a longer time horizon than currently expected.

Business Environment SWOT Analysis Strengths

Proximity to the more developed markets of Europe make the economy an attractive destination for outsourcing.

Weaknesses

Morocco continues to score poorly on indicators of corruption. In Transparency International's 2010 Corruption Perceptions Index, the country was ranked 85th in the world, behind Lesotho and Colombia. Human capital is generally very low, posing an obstacle to firms wishing to invest in higher value-added industries.

Opportunities

The government has announced its intention of selling off its stake in several high-profile companies as it seeks to finance a burgeoning budget deficit. Morocco has considerable reserves of oil shale, with the government claiming that there could be as much as 50bn barrels across three basins in the country.

Threats

Reform momentum could slow precipitously as the government becomes more focused on short-term survival and appeasing the mass of anti-government demonstrators. There is a risk that the government will seek to increase taxes on businesses as a means of reining its budget deficit. pril 01, 2011

SECTION: COUNTRY ANALYSIS LENGTH: 1983 words MOROCCO HEADLINE: POLITICS BODY: PUBLISHED BY THE PRS GROUP MOROCCO RISK ASSESSMENTS One Year Ahead Five Years Ahead

Year Current Worst Best Worst Best Risk Category Ago 4/11 Case Case Case Case Political Risk 70.0 67.5 64.0 73.5 60.5 77.5 Financial Risk 40.0 39.5 37.0 40.5 35.0 42.5 Economic Risk 35.0 31.0 29.0 32.0 25.0 36.0 Composite Risk 72.5 69.0 65.0 73.0 60.3 78.0 Risk Band Low Mod. Mod. Low Mod. Low POLITICS Government Stability/Internal Conflict Monarch Staying Ahead of Unrest Three months after a popular rebellion toppled Tunisias autocratic president from power, unleashing a contagion of political unrest across North Africa that quickly spread throughout the Middle East, conditions in Morocco remain comparatively stable. Two days of national protest held on February 20 and March 20 drew tens of thousands of demonstrators in cities across the country voicing demands for democratic reforms, a crackdown on government corruption, and more aggressive steps to address poverty, housing shortages, and high youth unemployment, but there have been few episodes of violence, and King Mohamed VI has taken concrete steps to address popular demands for change before the situation spirals out of control. Morocco shares many of the problems that fueled the fires of discontent elsewhere in North Africa, but it differs from its regional neighbors in important ways. Morocco is a monarchy, which for most of the population imbues Mohameds rule with an inherent legitimacy that the strongmen who headed the governments in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya could never claim. In addition, Morocco boasts a fairly competitive political environment, with numerous parties representing a variety of interests typically winning a share of seats in the elected Parliament. That said, the power of elected representatives is limited. The appointment of the prime minister is a royal prerogative, and, for all intents and purposes, it is the king who determines both the composition and the policy agenda of the government. Moreover, the trappings of democracy belie a rather poor human rights record, which includes rather rough handling of journalists who criticize the monarchy, and the royal establishment has been accused of using all means at its disposal, including electoral fraud and legal harassment, to keep the moderate Islamist Party for Justice and Development (PJD) out of power. For those reasons, officials in Rabat are taking the signs of

domestic discontent very seriously. In the early stages of the regional uprising, state authorities began to stockpile basic food items, with the aim preventing a steep rise in prices for basic necessities, which was an important catalyst for the spread of protests in Tunisia. However, that strategy, which has been repeated elsewhere in the region, has driven global food prices even higher. The government has promised to maintain subsidies on staple goods, but that pledge could become too expensive to keep if market prices continue to rise. More substantively, Mohamed has addressed calls for greater democracy by launching a constitutional reform program, and he has ordered the Parliament to approve legislation designed to reduce corruption within the state apparatus. In April, he approved the release of more than 90 political detainees (many of them arrested for their participation in the recent protests) and shortened the sentences of dozens of others. In a speech to the nation delivered on March 9, King Mohamed announced the formation of a committee responsible for drafting amendments to the constitution, which is to present proposed changes in time to present them to the public by the end of June 2011. The monarch stated that the process would result in the increased independence of the judiciary, an acceleration of the timetable for the introduction of fully direct elections for filling local offices, and, most significantly, ending royal appointment of the prime minister, who in the future will be the leader of the party that wins the most seats in the Parliament, and abolishing the kings power to dissolve the Parliament. If approved and implemented, those changes alone would greatly facilitate the process of democratization in Morocco. However, the youth activists in the February 20 Movement, the group that has taken the lead in organizing the recent protests, have expressed skepticism regarding the process of constitutional reform. Mohamed personally chose all of the members of the committee responsible for drafting the changes to the constitution, and no proposals will be presented to voters without first gaining the approval of the monarch. As such, there is ample cause to doubt that the exercise will result in a meaningful shift in the balance of power between the king and the elected Parliament. Significantly, the king made no mention of any plans to repeal Article 19 of the constitution, which is one of the protesters key demands. Article 19 designates the monarch to be Moroccos highest religious authority, and effectively empowers him to take any action he deems necessary to fulfill the obligations of that role.

Likewise, Mohamed has given no indication that he intends to honor the demand to dismantle the Authenticity and Modernity Party (PAM), which is led by Fouad Ali El Himma, a former interior minister and a close ally of the king. Although PAM does not formally hold any seats in the Parliament (as it was established as a party after the 2007 elections), it has attracted dozens of defectors from other parties (in violation of laws prohibiting floor-crossing), and is currently the largest grouping in the Parliament, claiming 55 seats. The protesters contend that PAMs success at poaching members from other parties highlights the widespread recognition that the kings favor is a ticket to power, a point that is further underscored by the failure of authorities to punish lawmakers who defected to PAM. Democracy activists argue that unless that link is broken, the shift to an elected prime minister will be meaningless, as PAM will win the election and El Himma will head the next government. For all of these reasons, the leaders of the February 20 Movement have rejected an offer to meet with the constitutional reform committee to present proposals for amendments, opting instead for more protests to press their demands for democratization. Another day of national protest is planned for late April. Generally Calm, But Risks Present At present, there does not appear to be an immediate danger of widespread rebellion. However, there are some signs that point to the possibility of greater difficulties for the government in the coming months. Owing to the fragmentation of representation in the Parliament, forming a majority government typically requires the formation of a coalition made up of four or more parties. As a result, most of the countrys parties are part of the existing establishment, a fact that reduces the likelihood that they might lend their support to a grassroots anti-government movement. In that regard, it is worth noting that the Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP), which has been a mainstay of the governing coalition for nearly two decades, has announced that it intends to participate in the protest demonstrations planned for later this month. Somewhat more ominously, the Foreign Policy Research Institute recent published a report suggesting that a dissident member of the royal family residing in New Jersey is forging links with Justice and Charity, an Islamic charity organization that is immensely popular among Moroccos urban poor. Although Justice and Charity is officially a non-political organization, its leader, Nadia Yassine, has expressed views that are consistent with Prince Hishams

anti-monarchical position. Were Justice and Charity to join the PJD in launching a campaign with the explicit aim of toppling the monarchy, the military could have a real challenge on its hands. That said, fear of the Islamist designs of the PJD and Justice and Charity among more secular elements of the population would pose an obstacle to creating the type of broad-based anti-government movement that toppled Hosni Mubarak from power in Egypt in mid-February. Thus, while there is the clear potential for an escalation of domestic political unrest, the risk of a revolutionary restructuring of the political systemwhether through the abolition of the monarchy or a significant reduction of the kings political roleis low. Specific grievances notwithstanding, the available evidence suggests that Mohamed is genuinely popular. Moreover, the existence of a broadly representative elected legislature provides a target for deflecting blame for the states failures, and the possibility of calling an early election is a potentially useful safety valve in the event of a real political crisis. Finally, in a worst case scenario, there is no reason to doubt the willingness of the military to defend the institution of the monarchy if it came under threat. Investment Profile Vested Interests Pose Obstacle to Competition Foreign investors would clearly derive indirect benefits from reforms that help to ease social tensions, but some of Mohameds proposals also hold the potential to directly enhance the climate for business in Morocco. In particular, as part of an effort to reduce corruption, the king has promised that the Competitiveness Council will be granted both more independence and greater access to information related to contracts signed by government agencies. The changes will create a more level playing field by bringing greater transparency to the state procurement process and empowering the Competitiveness Council to dismantle monopolies. It remains to be seen whether that promise is honored. Just as Mohameds failure to mention Article 19 has contributed to skepticism regarding the substance of political reforms, government opponents have pointed to the absence of any discussion of SNI, a holding company controlled by the royal family, as cause for doubting the sincerity of Mohameds commitment to enhanced transparency and competition. SNI controls majority stakes in the countrys largest cement producer and dairy company, as well as Moroccos sole producer of refined sugar. It also controls a near majority of shares in the countrys

biggest bank, along with minority stakes of various sizes in steel, telecommunications, and energy firms. The web of business interests controlled by SNI is complemented by the holdings of some of the kings closest political allies, including El Himma, a fact that points to a strong economic incentive within the political establishment to resist reforms that create a more level playing field for investors. On a somewhat more promising note, steps have been taken to create a more attractive climate for investment in the financial sector, in keeping with plans to transform Casablanca into a regional financial hub. Legislation approved by the Parliament in December 2010 sets the ground rules for the Casablanca Financial City (CFC) project. Companies designated by the Moroccan Financial Board, which was created last year to manage the project, will be eligible for generous tax incentives. The government estimates that CFC activities will boost GDP by 2% and create more than 30,000 jobs. opyright 2011 The PRS Group, Inc. The PRS Group/International Country Risk Guide April 01, 2011 SECTION: COUNTRY ANALYSIS LENGTH: 455 words MOROCCO HEADLINE: ECONOMY BODY: PUBLISHED BY THE PRS GROUP MOROCCO ECONOMY Food and Fuel Costs Will Swell Deficits Real GDP growth is estimated to have slowed to 3.2% in 2010, reflecting the impact of poor weather conditions on agricultural production. The positive impact of an increase in the output of phosphates was reinforced by a rise in prices, and the strong performance of the mining sector combined with healthy government spending to prevent a more pronounced slowdown. The fiscal deficit widened to more than 5% of GDP last year, and the shortfall will be

larger still in 2011, as pressure for increased government spending to address housing shortages and the rising cost of food and fuel subsidies discourages near-term moves to tighten fiscal policy. Assuming continued sluggish growth of the agricultural sector, the pace of economic expansion will remain well below potential once again in 2011, when real GDP growth is forecast to accelerate to 3.9%. The favorable response to an international bond issue in September 2010 raised hopes that the government might be able to tap global credit markets for budget financing, thereby increasing domestic financing opportunities for the private sector. The political uncertainty created by the generalized unrest across the region will undoubtedly reduce the appetite for Moroccan debt, but the country is not expected to find itself prices out of global credit markets as long as protesters continue to focus their demands on changes within the existing political structure. High levels of government spending on subsidies will help to contain the increase in domestic prices of food and fuel. No changes are expected to an exchange-rate system under which the dirham is permitted to float within a narrow band against the euro. The depreciation of the local currency against the US dollar (mirroring the expected trend for the euro) will create a limited risk of imported inflation, and the consumer price index is forecast to rise by an average of less than 3% in 2011. The current account deficit will widen to $10.4 billion (or about 11% of GDP) in 2011, as steep increases in global energy and food costs contribute to rapid growth of imports, and the threat of domestic unrest dampens tourism activity, resulting in a smaller services surplus. Foreign-exchange reserves are sufficient to provide about six months of import cover, a factor that in combination with a manageable debt-service burden will limit the danger of any serious balance of payments difficulties, assuming no further setbacks for the agricultural sector or external developments that lead to a fall in demand for phosphates. Copyright 2011 The PRS Group, Inc. The PRS Group/Political Risk Services April 01, 2011 LENGTH: 1235 words COUNTRY: MOROCCO (MIDDLE EAST & NORTH AFRICA) HEADLINE: ECONOMIC & SOCIAL DATA

BODY: PUBLISHED BY THE PRS GROUP MOROCCO SOCIAL INDICATORS 2010 Est.

ENERGY (KG. OIL EQUIVALENT) Total Consumption: 0.59 Per Capita Consumption: 0.02 POPULATION Annual Growth 1.2% Infant Deaths Per Thousand: 29 Persons Under Age 15: 28% Urban Population: 58% Urban Growth: 1.2% Literacy: 56% WORK FORCE DISTRIBUTION Agriculture: 45% Industry-Commerce: 20% Services: 35% Unions: 5% ETHNIC GROUPS: Arab (70%), Berber (30%) LANGUAGES: Arabic, Berber, French, Spanish, English RELIGIONS: Sunni Muslim (99%), Christian and other (1%) FACT SHEET: Morocco Apr 1, 2011 ECONOMIC INDICATORS 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Domestic GDP (Nominal, $bn) 37.72 40.42 49.82 56.95 59.52 Per Capita GDP ($) 1293 1370 1671 1889 1951 Real GDP Growth Rate (%) 7.6 3.3 6.3 4.8 3.0 Inflation Rate (%) 0.6 2.8 1.2 1.4 1.0 Capital Investment ($bn) 9.37 10.19 12.51 14.97 16.39 Investment/GDP (%) 24.8 25.2 25.1 26.3 27.5 Budget Revenues ($bn) 10.12 8.51 10.81 12.56 14.33 Revenues/GDP (%) 26.8 21.1 21.7 22.1 24.1

Expenditures ($bn) 11.08 10.16 12.34 14.26 16.67 Expenditures/GDP (%) 29.4 25.1 24.8 25.0 28.0 Balance ($bn) -0.96 -1.65 -1.53 -1.70 -2.34 Balance/GDP (%) -2.6 -4.1 -3.1 -3.0 -3.9 Money Supply (M1) ($bn) 18.62 20.82 28.15 33.08 37.35 Change in Real Wages (%) 10.7 -2.9 8.9 6.3 2.9 Unemployment Rate (%) 12.3 11.3 11.4 11.1 11.3 International Direct Foreign Investment (%bn) 0.14 0.08 2.31 0.79 1.62 Forex Reserves ($bn) 8.26 9.92 13.63 16.11 16.01 Gross Reserves (ex gold, $bn) 8.47 10.13 13.85 16.34 16.19 Gold Reserves ($bn) 0.17 0.19 0.22 0.24 0.28 Gross Reserves (inc gold, $bn) 8.64 10.32 14.07 16.58 16.47 Total Foreign Debt ($bn) 15.90 15.77 16.40 16.20 17.68 Total Foreign Debt/GDP (%) 42.2 39.0 32.9 28.5 29.7 Debt Service ($bn) 2.47 2.56 3.11 2.56 2.39 Debt Service/XGS (%) 16.3 16.0 16.5 11.6 9.6 Current Account (%bn) 1.61 1.47 1.55 0.92 0.95 Current Account/GDP (%) 4.3 3.6 3.1 1.6 1.6 Current Account/XGS (%) 10.6 9.2 8.2 4.2 3.8 Exports ($bn) 7.14 7.84 8.77 9.92 10.69 Imports ($bn) 10.16 10.90 13.12 16.41 18.89 Trade Balance ($bn) -3.02 -3.06 -4.35 -6.49 -8.20 Exports Of Service ($bn) 4.03 4.36 5.48 6.71 8.10 Income, credit ($bn) 0.33 0.38 0.37 0.51 0.69 Transfers, credit ($bn) 3.67 3.44 4.21 4.97 5.44 Exports G&S ($bn) 15.17 16.02 18.83 22.11 24.92 Liabilities ($bn) 0.08 0.18 0.17 0.25 0.32 Net Reserves ($bn) 8.56 10.14 13.90 16.33 16.15 Liquidity (months import cover) 10.1 11.2 12.7 11.9 10.3 Currency Exchange Rate 11.303 11.021 9.574 8.868 8.865 Currency Change (%) -6.4 2.5 13.1 7.4 0.0 ECONOMIC INDICATORS 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Domestic GDP (Nominal, $bn) 65.64 75.20 88.88 91.37 90.28 Per Capita GDP ($) 2128 2409 2812 2856 2789 Real GDP Growth Rate (%) 7.8 2.7 5.6 4.9 3.3

Inflation Rate (%) 3.3 2.0 3.7 1.0 1.0 Capital Investment ($bn) 18.47 23.51 29.41 28.06 27.96 Investment/GDP (%) 28.1 31.3 33.1 30.7 31.0 Budget Revenues ($bn) 15.78 20.28 25.53 22.65 20.13 Revenues/GDP (%) 24.0 27.0 28.7 24.8 22.3 Expenditures ($bn) 16.80 19.86 25.13 24.63 24.80 Expenditures/GDP (%) 25.6 26.4 28.3 27.0 27.5 Balance ($bn) -1.02 0.42 0.40 -1.98 -4.67 Balance/GDP (%) -1.6 0.6 0.5 -2.2 -5.2 Money Supply (M1) ($bn) 44.06 56.12 63.46 65.59 63.72 Change in Real Wages (%) 2.5 3.0 3.1 2.4 7.0 Unemployment Rate (%) 9.6 9.5 9.6 9.1 9.1 International Direct Foreign Investment (%bn) 2.37 2.81 2.47 1.97 1.29 Forex Reserves ($bn) 20.18 23.98 21.98 21.92 21.06 Gross Reserves (ex gold, $bn) 20.34 24.12 22.10 22.80 21.91 Gold Reserves ($bn) 0.45 0.59 0.61 0.78 0.98 Gross Reserves (inc gold, $bn) 20.79 24.71 22.71 23.58 22.89 Total Foreign Debt ($bn) 17.47 19.59 22.41 24.64 25.01 Total Foreign Debt/GDP (%) 26.6 26.1 25.2 27.0 27.7 Debt Service ($bn) 2.11 2.45 2.35 1.76 1.79 Debt Service/XGS (%) 7.3 6.8 5.5 5.1 4.7 Current Account (%bn) 1.32 -0.22 -5.66 -5.36 -3.91 Current Account/GDP (%) 2.0 -0.3 -6.4 -5.9 -4.3 Current Account/XGS (%) 4.6 -0.6 -13.3 -15.5 -10.2 Exports ($bn) 11.93 15.15 20.33 14.04 17.43 Imports ($bn) 21.68 29.32 39.83 30.41 31.35 Trade Balance ($bn) -9.75 -14.17 -19.50 -16.37 -13.92 Exports Of Service ($bn) 9.79 12.17 13.42 12.34 12.45 Income, credit ($bn) 0.75 0.96 1.06 0.93 0.85 Transfers, credit ($bn) 6.41 7.79 7.85 7.28 7.46 Exports G&S ($bn) 28.88 36.07 42.66 34.59 38.19 Liabilities ($bn) 0.32 0.37 0.41 1.18 1.20 Net Reserves ($bn) 20.47 24.34 22.30 22.40 21.69 Liquidity (months import cover) 11.3 10.0 6.7 8.8 8.3 Currency Exchange Rate 8.796 8.192 7.750 8.057 8.490 Currency Change (%) 0.8 6.9 5.4 -4.0 -5.4

Principal exports: phosphates, oranges, tobacco, manganese, iron, clothing, fish, and leather goods; mainly to France, Spain, India, Japan, and Italy Principal imports: crude oil, food, consumer goods, raw materials, semi-finished products, and industrial and agricultural equipment; mainly from France, Spain, the US, Germany, Italy, and Saudi Arabia
Copyright 2010 The PRS Group, Inc. The PRS Group/Political Risk Services March 01, 2010 LENGTH: 350 words COUNTRY: MOROCCO (MIDDLE EAST & NORTH AFRICA) HEADLINE: BUSINESS BODY: PUBLISHED BY THE PRS GROUP MOROCCO Business The business community in the main supports the reformist policies implemented under Mohamed. The 2,000 or so families that dominate the private sector have played an important role in the development of a market-based economy, and their close ties to both the government and foreign business have helped them to benefit from liberalization. Urban families descended from Arabs expelled from Spain in the 15th and 16th centuries now largely control domestic commerce and foreign trade. Many settled in Fez, the center of business power until the early part of the 20th century. Members of the Fez economic elite control the textile industry and trade. They have also expanded into other areas. Their wealth, education, and skills have gained them positions of power within the government, further protecting their business interests. The Berber Soussi, people from the Sous River Valley, also exercise substantial economic power through their control of food retailing and wholesaling. Many retailers in the cities are descendants of Soussi tribe members who migrated to the urban areas and started small grocery businesses. The initial success of these ventures attracted many other Soussi families to the retail trade. After World War II, the more successful Soussi merchants became wholesalers

or moved into other businesses. Despite economic rivalries between the Arab Fez and the Berber Soussi, they often pool their funds to make joint investments. The leading business families are often represented in partnerships required for joint-venture equity investments, and the Fez and Soussi have also profited substantially from the nationalization of French-owned lands. They are often accused of flaunting their wealth. They are also criticized for refusing to encourage either political reform or the redistribution of wealth. In the view of many nationalists and fundamentalists, these wealthy and influential families epitomize the injustices of the monarchy.

Green Morocco Plan: Priority given to small farmers

21,000 ha were leased and 279 projects have been accepted

Within the framework of the agricultural reform programme known as the "Green Morocco Plan" (Maroc Vert), the third phase involving Sodea-Sogeta land has just been launched. The objective is to develop a competitive agriculture, duly adapted to the rules of the market, thanks to a new wave of private investments, organised around the leasing of state-owned land. In this third phase, more than 21,000 ha will be leased and there are a total of 279 projects. In 57 of these, the land area exceeds 100 ha, 139 are medium-sized projects (between 20 and 100 ha) and then there are 83 microprojects (less than 20 ha). The land is located in 12 regions, 2 of which are in the north of the country, Mekns-Tafilalet and Gharb-Cherarda Beni Hssen (an important 7,000 ha of Sodea/Sogeta land capital). The objective is that large-scale agricultural and agro-industrial complexes of an economically viable size will be established on the state-owned land. In a recent statement to the newspaper Le Matin, Mr. Ahmed Hajjaji, Director of Sodea, said: A new criterion has been introduced. The big buyers are going to play the role of aggregators and take some small farmers under their wing, regardless of whether or not they are organised in co-operatives. In this way, the government seeks to protect local agriculture. It appears that the land-value will be assessed according to the regional average, with a discount agreed by the State of 20% or approximately 175 per hectare per year.

The Green Morocco Plan has already played an important role through the concession of stateowned agricultural land in the first 2 phases, to be specific, 80,000 ha of farmland. It has enabled the creation of 296 projects with a budget of 1.1 billion euros, leading to the creation of 3,500 jobs. Pending the outcome of the tender in the third and final phase involving Sodea-Sogeta land, evaluation of compliance of specifications with the demands of the Green Morocco Plan is under way. S&G Brassicas Today - May 2010