JOURNAL OF Near Eastern Studies OCTOBER 1967 » VOLUME 26 - NUMBER 4 EIGHTY-FOURTH YEAR ALFARABI AGAINST PHILOPONUS, -MUHSIN MAHDI, Oriental Institute, University of Chicago I “Tix survival of the scientific and philosophic tradition of classical antiquity in the middle ages could not have been assured without the willingness and the ability of those who championed its study to show that that tradition was not inseparable from pagan religious beliefs and that it could be reconciled with revealed religious doctrines. Medieval authors expounded this theme with skill and confidence in different ways and on a number of levels. But they were not the first to do so. They were the heirs of an ancient art that was originated in the early centuries of the Christian era by thoughtful men who came to question the necessity or desirability of the uneasy alliance into which Greek philosophy and pagan cults had been forced by the spread of Christianity, and that gained considerable ground in the period extending from the third to the sixth century A.D. when Christian as well as pagan thinkers questioned the unavoidability of conflict between Neo-Platonism and Christianity. It was in part with a view to facilitate the reconciliation between Greek philosophy and Christianity that the tradition of Aris- totelian commentaries (which had been somewhat dormant since the masterly com- mentaries of Alexander of Aphrodisias in the early part of the third century and the works of Themistius in the fourth) was revived toward the end of the fifth century and made the core of the philosophic syllabus in the school of Alexandria. During the sixth century, this school produced an impressive series of new commentaries which fill most of the volumes of the Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, and form the basis of the Islamic philosophic tradition founded by Alfarabi and, through it, of the entire medieval tradition of Aristotelian commentaries. ‘The head of the new school in Alexandria was the Egyptian Hermias, who had gone to Athens to study under the “great” Syrianus, married the master’s daughter or niece, and returned to Alexandria to occupy the chair of philosophy at the Museum and introduce + The information on the subsequent history and Akademie der Wissenschaften, Phil.-hist, Klasse, the “Arabization’” of the school of Alexandria has XXIII (1930), 389-429. It inchides fragments from & boon studiod by Max Meyerhof, “Von Alexandrien work by Alfarabi entitled “On the Riseof Philosophy.” nach Baghdad," Sitsungaberichte der Preuasiachen 233234 Journat or Near Eastern Srupres the method and doctrines of the Athenian school. In Athens, Syrianus was succeeded by Hermias’ fellow student, the “divine” Proclus. Hermias’ successor in Alexandria was his son Ammonius. He, too, went to Athens, where he studied under Proclus, and came back to guide the philosophic school of Alexandria through the crucial period at the end of the fifth century and the beginning of the sixth, during which it faced the alternative of accommodating itself to the “prevailing doctrine” —that is, Christianity— or suffering the same fate as the school of Athens, which remained staunchly attached to paganism and was closed by Justinian in 529. Ammonius was a distinguished and suc- cessful teacher at the Museum; he trained, not only those who were to continue his tradition in Alexandria (Philoponus, Asclepius, and Olympiodorus), but also two leading figures of the Athenian Academy (Damascius and Simplicius) and probably the famous teacher of philosophy in Rome, Boethius. The population of Alexandria was by now overwhelmingly Christian. Had the school continued to consist of pagan masters teaching philosophy to pagan students alone, it would have isolated and starved itself in a city ‘that might not have tolerated its existence and certainly would not have continued to supportiit from public funds. Sometime in the closing years of the fifth century, Ammonius must have reached an understanding or entered into a formal agreement with the bishop of Alexandria, probably patriarch Athanasius II (ea, 489-496).? While the specific terms of the agreement are not known, it is known that the school continued to receive public financial support, that students adhering to the “prevailing doctrine” were allowed by ‘the religious authorities to enrol in it, and that Ammonius made a determined effort to prune the syllabi of whatever might offend their sensibilities and introduced certain views designed to help them reconcile what they read with their religious beliefs. The syllabi emphasized Aristotle’s works on logic and natural science,? and Ammonius pro- posed that Aristotle’s final cause is the efficient cause, artificer, or creator of the world as well. In addition, Ammonius avoided possible public controversy over his own works through the old practice of delegating the task of editing and publishing his lecture notes to his students. The majority of these lecture notes (consisting of great commentaries on Aristotle's writings on logic and natural science) were edited by one of his Christian students, a professional grammarian and rhetorician named John: it was evidently 2 Damascius, Ammonius' student and the head of the echool of Athons, to whom we owe the information than that of Aristotle (see below, n. 9). This difficulty was solved in part by attributing Platonic and Neo- about this “arrangement,” describes it as unscru: pulous and attributes it to Ammonius’ shameful lust for money. His judgment reflects the uncompromising paganism of the achool of Athens and is not to be taken as an accurate account of Ammonius’ motives See Paul Tannery, ‘'Sur la période finale dela philos: ophic Grocque," ‘Mémoires scientifiques, ed. J. L. Heiberg, Vol. VII (Toulouse: Edouard Prival; Paris: Gauthier-Villarda, 1925), pp. 225 f. 9 Tho choice of Aristotle's works, rather than the works of Plato (the main philosopher whom Ammo- nius studied under Proclus), is significant, Plato's writings seem to have become too controversial through their use by the Neo:Platoniste as the bas of their “philosop! "The “scientific charactor of Aristotle's writings, and the fact that ‘they had been rather neglected earlier, made them ook more neutral take long, however certain questions, such as the ore Plato takes a position that is closer to Christ Platonie writings to Aristotle. (See H. D. Saffrey, “Le chrétien Jean Philopon et la survivance de Pécole a'Alexandrie au VIF sidele," Revue des drudes Greoques, LXVIT [1954], 409-10.)'This did not mean that serious students of Aristotle were not able subse- quently to distinguish between Aristotle's scientific works and such writings as the “Theology of Aris- totle.” ‘Once Aristotle's works became the core of the philosophic syllabus and were studied intensively: over a long period, it was no longer possible to ignore those questions; and Aristotle could no longer provide the basis for a reconciliation between philosophy and religious doctrines. Plato's writings, which had been neglected and had ceased to be associated with an Active and living sophie tradition, had to jotle had to be presented fs being essentially in agreement with Plato. This the theme of Alfarabi's Harmonisation (al-Jam°, ed. Fr. Dieterici in Alfarabt's philosophiache Abhand- lungen (Leiden, 1890),Auraranr Acarysr PHILoronvs 235 convenient to have as an intermediary or a mouthpiece a Christian who was a competent judge of public opinion to make sure that nothing offensive to public sensibilities met the public eye. Partly because of this editorial work and partly because he intervened shortly after the closing of the school in Athens in a manner that may have helped the school of Alexandria to avoid the fate of its sister (by publishing two works attacking Proclus and Aristotle), John the Grammarian, or Philoponus, as he is called by a less reliable tradi- tion, came to occupy, both in the medieval tradition and in modern studies, a position of importance that does not seem to be justified either by his philosophic contribution to the Alexandrian tradition or by his contribution to the basic question of the relation between philosophy and the revealed religions. To begin with, the commentaries of which he is said to be the author are fundamentally the work, not of Philoponus, but of Ammonius. Admittedly, Philoponus edited them and added “some observations of his own.” But until a detailed investigation shows with relative certainty which parts of these commentaries are definitely the work of Philoponus or why they could not have been the work of Ammonius, the attribution of the doctrines contained in them to Philoponus will continue to rest on shaky grounds indeed. It is also not sound to assume that all or most of the modifications or criticisms of Aristotle that are found in these commentaries, whether dealing with natural science or the reconciliation of philosophy and Christian doctrines, must be the work of Philoponus and could not have been the work of Ammonius. Furthermore, Philoponus’ position in the philosophic school of Alexandria was a marginal one. He did not occupy the chair of philosophy after Ammo- nius’ death. The next philosopher to occupy this chair, Olympiodorus, was still a pagan. And neither Olympiodorus, nor his successors, Elias, David, and Stephanus, who were Christians, were in any real sense Philoponus’ disciples—they simply continued the tradition of Ammonius.® Finally, Philoponus’ independent works (his refutations of Proclus and Aristotle on the question of the eternity of the world) were ignored by, and must have been a source of embarrassment to, the school of Alexandria. They were too controversial to suit the new temper inculeated by Ammonius, their restatement of Plato’s and Aristotle’s positions on the question of the eternity of the world lacked the thoroughness and competence that came to be expected from the representatives of the new tradition of Aristotelian commentaries, and they were too rhetorical in the way they disposed of important scientific questions and appealed to public prejudices. Matters were complicated further by Philoponus’ involvement in the Monophysitic con- troversy and his espousal of tritheism, which made him suspect in the eyes of the religious authorities too. The hero of the philosophic school of Alexandria, the man who was responsible for its survival and who established the tradition it followed in recon- ciling philosophy and Christian doctrines, was not the Christian rhetorician Philoponus but the pagan philosopher Ammonius.® + An excoption was made in the ease of the lecture notes on Aristotle's Metaphysics. Theso wore entrusted to Ammonius' pagan student Asclepius. Ammonis’ (Paria: Presses Universitaires de France, [Bibliotheque Byzantine,” Btudes 3), p. 149. ® Soo. G. Westerink’s introduction to Anonymous 1962 success in avoiding public serutiny of his lecture notes can be gauged from the following description of the “Daz 517... il (Philo- s08 [Philoponus't] travaux sous forme de notes prises aux cours d’Ammonius, associant ainsi le nom de son maitre paion au sien.” Wanda Wolska, La Topographie Chrétienne de Commas Indicopleustés Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Co., 1962), pp. x-xxv. ® Zacharias of Mytilone’s fictitious dialogue Ammonius ended with Ammonius’ conversion. (Cf. ibid, p. xi.) But while Ammonius himself did not go through the formality of being baptized, he did some- ‘thing much more important: he baptized Aristotle,236 JourNar or Near Eastern STupres Yet Philoponus’ literary activity as editor of Ammonius’ lecture notes and the con- troversy generated by his Against Aristotle (especially its refutation by Simplicius in two of his great commentaries) assured him of a permanent, if marginal, place in the tradition of the philosophic school of Alexandria. His influence can be traced in the subsequent transmission of this tradition through translation into Syriac, Arabic, Hebrew, and Latin. The history of the controversy over Philoponus in the Arabic tradition is yet to be written. Broadly speaking, it is the history of two opposing camps. On the one hand there is the pro-Philoponus camp represented by Alkindi, Alrazi, the Christian philo- sophie school of Baghdad in the tenth and the eleventh centuries, Algazel, and Abul- barakat al-Baghdadi. The anti-Philoponus camp is headed by Alfarabi, who is followed by Avicenna in the East, and Avempace and Averroes in the West. Of these, only Alfarabi, the Christian philosophic school of Baghdad, and Avicenna,’ seem to have had direct access to Philoponus’ Against Aristotle. While Philoponus’ Against Aristotle is lost, his contemporary, Simplicius, provides enough descriptions of, and quotations from, this book to enable one to form a relatively clear idea of its contents. It consisted of six books. In the first four books Philoponus attacked Aristotle’s new “first body” as presented in On the Heaven i, 2-3. In the fifth book he attacked Aristotle's view that circular movement has no contrary, as presented in On the Heaven i. 4. In the sixth book, finally, he attacked Aristotle’s view of the eternity of movement and time as presented in Physics viii Alfarabi dealt with Philoponus’ attacks against Aristotle as contained in Against Aristotle in at least four of his works: his commentary on Aristotle's On the Heaven, his commentary on Aristotle's Physics, a book entitled On Changing Beings, and Against John the Grammarian. Of the first two we have only a few quotations by Averroes. Of On Changing Beings we have extensive descriptions and quotations by Avempace, Averroes, and Maimonides, from which we can tell that it dealt primarily with the sixth book of Philoponus’ Against Aristotle and with Aristotle’s doctrine of movement and time in the Physics.* Alfarabi’s Against John the Grammarian is the first of these four works to be recovered, and it deals exclusively with the first five books of Philoponus’ Against Aristotle or with his attack on Aristotle’s On the Heaven, Like Aristotle and Simplicius, Alfarabi prefers to separate the question of cosmogony or the generation of the world from the question of the origin of movement and time, and to treat them independently. He upholds Aristotle’s position that the world as a whole is not subject to generation and destruction. And he reconciles this position with the doctrine of the creation of the world by proposing with Ammonius that Aristotle's doctrine of movement and time does not exclude the possibility that the world as a whole, together with time, were created from nothing by a God who is the world’s final and efficient cause.® He is thus able to isolate and destroy Philoponus’ position while "It is tempting to notice a parallelism between Alfarabi's Against John the Grammarian (Sees. 14-15) the early history of the school of Alexandria and the school of Baghdad. Alfarabi, like Ammonius, is the founder of the new tradition. His Christian student Yahya (John) Ton ‘Adi defended the position of his namesake. Avicenna’s aavage attack on the Christian school of Baghdad reminds one of Simplicius ® Soo the fragments assembled by Moritz Stein. schneider, AI-Farabi (St. Petersbourg, 1869), pp. 119-23, 135-38. The fragment from Averroes’ In De Coelo T, Com. 8 (ibid., p. 123) is a quotation from land not from On Changing Beings ° Alfarabi Harmonization 24-25, where he speaks of Ammonius’ special treatise on God as the “maker” or “artficer” (sdni‘, aition poittikon): “Ammonius hhas written short work (risdlah) devoted entirely to ‘stating the arguments of these two wise men [Plato and Aristotle] on the proof of the artifloer (ft ihbdt al-sani*), which we have not discussed here beeause it is well known. Were it not for the fact that the method he follows in this treatise (magdlah) is theAuraraBr AGaryst PHILoponvs 237 continuing the tradition of reconciling Aristotle with revealed doctrines, which was initiated by Ammonius and the philosophic school of Alexandria. This paper is devoted to an analysis and interpretation of Alfarabi’s Against John the Grammarian, of which an annotated translation is given in an appendix. IL According to Alfarabi (Sec. 1), Philoponus’ intention in his Against Aristotle is nega- tive or destructive. He does not intend to establish the view that the world is created, but to refute or destroy the statements in On the Heaven by which he believed Aristotle had intended to establish the eternity of the world. Alfarabi’s answer begins with the sweeping assertion that Aristotle did not intend any of these statements to establish the eternity of the world. The first difficulty, then, is this. If Philoponus intended to defend the creation of the world by attacking the most illustrious exponent of the thesis that the world is eternal, why did he devote five of the six books of his Against Aristotle to attacking three chapters in On the Heaven (i. 2-4) in which Aristotle did not intend to establish the eternity of the world? Since Philoponus’ intention, as presented by Alfarabi, is far from unequivocal, the question cannot receive a simple answer. It is possible, for instance, that Philoponus did not intend to refute, but only to give the impression that he was refuting, the view that the world is eternal, and therefore devoted most of his book to refuting or apparently refuting statements not intended by Aristotle to establish the eternity of the world in the first place. That is, he might have made a judicious choice of statements whose real or apparent refutation leaves unrefuted the eternity of the world as established by Aristotle elsewhere in this book or in his other books. Again, Philoponus could have misunderstood Aristotle’s intention from these statements. He may have thought that they established the eternity of the world when they did not. But it is also possible that Philoponus, like Alfarabi, was aware of the fact that these statements in On the Heaven were not intended by Aristotle to establish the eternity of the world, and yet thought that they were sufficiently relevant to the defense of the view that the world is eternal—as presented by Aristotle in On the Heaven i. 10-12 or in Physics viii, for instance. By refuting them, he meant to refute the basis upon which the defense of the eternity of the world rests. Before pursuing this question further, however, it is necessary to turn with Alfarabi from Philoponus’ intention to Aristotle's intention. In general, Alfarabi states that Aristotle's intention from these statements is, not to establish, but to explain something.1° He divides Aristotle’s statements into four groups. middle [or moderate] way (al-tarig al-aweat) from which if we deviate we would be like the man who disapproves of a habit and practices it, we would have spoken at length. .."" (24.24-25.3).. Simplicius In Aristotelis Physicorwm Commentaria (ed. H. Diels (Berlin, 1882-1895] ['Commentaria in Ariatotelem Gracea," IX-X]) 1363.8-10, In Aristotelis De Caelo Commentaria (ed. I. L. Heiberg (Berlin, 1894] ["Com- mentaria in Aristotelem Gracoa,” VIt)) 271.19-21, ‘mentions this work and explains that it is devoted to proving that Aristotle's god is not merely the final cause of the world but its efficient cause or artificor .¢ Alfarabi, finds this interpreta- " Ie is perhaps an exaggeration wy that ho “ne parait pas soupgonner la gravité une pareille innovation dans Pexégése aristotélique,”” or that he was introducing “de confusion dans les idées”” (Tannery, op. eit. 226-27). Rather, this was ‘an effort to “interpret” Aristotle by introducing the minimal modification necessary to render his view acceptable to the followers of the revealed religions ‘and make Philoponus’ Againet Aristotle unnecessary. 3° To intend to explain something is, of course, not the same thing as actually explaining it: one may explain something without intending to explain it, and one may very well intend to explain something without actually doing a0. This complicates further the eurious relation between Philoponus’ intention land Aristotle's intention. Aristotle tm the eternity of the world evident—1238, JournaL or Near Easter Stupres In the first three, Aristotle “intends to explain” (a) that the world is not a homogeneous thing, but is made up of “parts”—that is, bodies—that possess different substances, (0) that these parts or bodies must be “simple,” and (c) what these simple parts or substances are. It is only in this third group of statements that Aristotle proceeds beyond the “intention to explain” and actually “explains” something (starting with the body that moves in a circle, he “explains” that its substance cannot be the same as those of the other four bodies that make up the world, and supports his explanation by the fact that this “first” body does not share with the rest of the bodies in anything that renders it substantial). (d) In the fourth group of statements, finally, Alfarabi is silent about Aristotle’s “intention” to explain. He states that Aristotle simply “explained” that there cannot be still another body outside the five bodies of which we find the world to be made up today. After recalling what Aristotle had “explained” in the Physics (that the substance of every natural body consists of its form and material), Alfarabi concludes that Aristotle has “explained” in the above statements that the form of the body moving in a circle is not the same as the form of any other part of the world, and that it “becomes plain” or evident that its material, too, cannot be the material of any other body. ‘The first four books on Philoponus’ Against Aristotle were directed against this “first” body. According to Alfarabi, then, Philoponus has attacked, not what Aristotle had intended” to explain, but what he had in fact “explained,” that is, that this first body exists and that it is totally—both in form and material—different from the other four bodies. Philoponus and Alfarabi seem to disagree regarding Aristotle's intention in general, whether or not he made evident his view with respect to the existence and nature of this first body, and the relevance of this view to the establishment of the eternity of the world. Philoponus seems to think that Aristotle’s intention is to establish the eternity of the world, and that his defense of the existence and uniqueness of the first body was meant to support the contention that the world is eternal. Furthermore, he thought that Aristotle's first body, were it to be accepted as established or evident, will commit one irrevocably to the eternity of the world. His defense of the creation of the world must, therefore, begin by refuting Aristotle's view regarding the first body. Alfarabi, on the other hand, insists that Aristotle's intention was not to establish the eternity of the world but to explain the nature and structure of the world. He believes also that Aristotle has made evident his view regarding the first body. And he is not convinced that Philoponus’ attack succeeded in destroying what Aristotle had made evident. He does not believe that the first body as established by Aristotle is necessarily incompatible with the doctrine of the creation of the world. For Alfarabi the Muslim, as for Philoponus the Christian, it was necessary to affirm the creation of the world. Philoponus chose to defend the doctrine of the creation of the world by destroying what Aristotle had made evident regarding the first body and, as far as Alfarabi could judge, he failed in this attempt. To the extent that his defense of the doctrine of the creation of the world depended on the success of his refutation of Aristotle's view of the first body, his failure to refute Aristotle could be construed as a failure to defend the doctrine of the explained it—without intending to do so. And Philo- —evider ponus may have intended to refute what was general believed to be Aristotle's intention rather than A\ totle's real intention or the things that he mi On the problematic character of Aristotle's “intention to explain,” see Alfarabi Harmonization 658.Aurarasr Agaryst PHiLoponus 239 creation of the world. Alfarabi, in contrast, does not choose to defend the necessary doctrine of the creation of the world by disregarding what Aristotle has made evident. He must, therefore, attempt to harmonize what is evident and what is necessary or make a serious effort to find out whether what is evident and what is necessary are incompatible in every respect. His assertion that Aristotle did not intend his statements to establish the eternity of the world is meant to leave open the possibility that it may not be necessary to choose between Aristotle’s view of the world and the doctrine of the creation of the world. We have seen that the things Aristotle “intended” to explain are the existence, the simplicity, and the substances of the bodies that constitute the primary parts of the world, including the first body; while the things that he in fact “explained” are the radical oneness and uniqueness or otherness of the first body, which is argued primarily by contrasting it to the other four bodies. A moment’s reflection shows that the second group of statements cannot be considered as having been adequately explained without first adequately explaining the first group of statements—that is, no explanation of the radical uniqueness or otherness of the first, body can be adequate without first explaining that the world is made up of different bodies, that they are simple, and what their substances are; only then can the explanation of the otherness of the first body be made evident. Therefore, if it is true that Aristotle merely intended to explain, but in fact did not explain, things that are necessary for the explanation of the uniqueness and otherness of the. first body, then he seems to have committed a blunder and provided Philoponus with an easy weapon with which to destroy his statements, both the ones he intended to explain but did not—for they were not made evident in any case—and the ones that explained his view of the first body—for these can be destroyed by showing that the otherness of the first body is untenable since the other four bodies are not what Aristotle held them to be. To save Aristotle's statements, Alfarabi cannot leave it at the distinction between what Aristotle intended to explain and what he in fact explained. He must explain Aristotle's intention and why he did not explain what he intended to explain. He must explain, further, why Philoponus is not justified in destroying these unexplained statements. And he must, finally, prove his accusation that Philoponus does not distinguish between those statements in which Aristotle “intends” to explain and those in which he in fact “explains” certain things, or that Philoponus takes every statement by Aristotle as a statement in which Aristotle claims to explain whatever he says, or that he takes literally everything that Aristotle says." TIL Philoponus begins his attack against Aristotle (Secs. 4-5) by expressing certain doubts about Aristotle's views regarding the four sublunary bodies in On the Heaven i. 2-3. According to Alfarabi, Aristotle proceeds here as follows. He begins with what his pre- decessors had “thought” or “believed” regarding “simple” bodies. Since all those who believed that there are such things as simple bodies believed also that they are one or 2 On the dangers involved in this manner of willing to disregard. Ari understanding Aristotle, see Alfarabi Harmonization concerning the uses of 6.10 ff, from which it becomes plain that it is ex- complication” (6.9), tremely simple to refute Aristotle, provided one is otle's doctrine (madhhab) ‘losedness, blinding, and240 Jounwat or Near Easrern Srupres more of only four bodies, which they called earth, water, air, and fire, Aristotle “em- ploys” or “makes use of” these four bodies in his exposition. Aristotle does not believe that these four bodies, as conceived by his predecessors, are in fact “simple” or “univer- sal” or the real “elements” out of which all other bodies are made; nor does he “employ” ‘them in this place on the ground that they had been explained, either here or earlier in this book, as being in fact simple, and so forth. Later on, in On the Heaven iv and in On Generation and Corruption, he will undertake a critique of his predecessors’ views regarding these bodies, refine these views, and make it evident that it is necessary that there be four real elements, which must be simple and universal. Although he will con- tinue to call them earth, water, air, and fire, he will explain that these are the real elements; that they are not identical with the four so-called elements of his predecessors, which were only believed to be simple while they are not; and that the so-called elements or simple bodies of his predecessors bear a certain resemblance or analogy to his own truly simple elements or bodies. These explanations are not found in On the Heaven i. 2-8. Here he employs the terms used by his predecessors, the analogues of his own real elements, as if they were his own real elements as he will explain them, being fully aware of the shortcomings of the views of his predecessors Philoponus disregards this peculiarity of Aristotle’s practice and usage. He thinks that Aristotle is using his predecessors’ four bodies on the ground that these four bodies, as conceived by the predecessors, are the truly simple, universal, four elements. By so doing, Philoponus adopts the pre-Aristotelian (e.g., Empedoclean) views of the four bodies, and expresses certain doubts about them; and without taking into account Aristotle's own critique of these views and his explanation of what the real elements are, he thinks he is destroying Aristotle’s statements. The result is that his criticism of Aristotle's statements is neither adequate nor to the point: first, because he adopts the pre-Aristotelian views about the four elements when Aristotle will show that these views are untenable; and second, because the doubts he expresses have to do with Aristotle's apparent views of the four elements and do not take into account Aristotle's “verified” or “corrected” opinions or explanations in On the Heaven iv and in On Generation and Corruption. He is deceived about what Aristotle is doing and thinks that Aristotle is employing his predecessors’ four bodies on the ground that they are the true simple elements. He takes the “analogues” to be the real simple bodies Having shown the importance of distinguishing between what Aristotle “intends” to explain and what he actually “explains,” and the consequences of attempting to destroy Aristotle's statements without taking this distinction into account, Alfarabi proceeds to destroy Philoponus’ credibility as a critic of Aristotle by questioning another procedure he follows in refuting Aristotle (Sec. 6). In On the Heaven i. 2-3 Aristotle makes use of many things he had demonstrated in the Physics, without finding it necessary to repeat his earlier demonstrations; and he speaks in general about certain things he had pre- sented in the Physics with more careful and precise formulations. Philoponus seeks to destroy these statements in On the Heaven i. 2-3 without referring to the demonstrations or the more specific formulations given in the Physics. Since Aristotle presents On the Heaven as a sequel to the Physics, Philoponus’ practice is hard to explain. Alfarabi offers two possible explanations: Philoponus is doing this either unintentionally or intentionally. If he is doing it unintentionally, then he is simply not competent to answer Aristotle, for an adequate understanding, let alone an adequate criticism, of OnAurarasr Acarnst PHILoronus 241 the Heaven i. 2-3 requires that these chapters be placed in the context of what has preceded in the Physics and what will follow in On the Heaven and in On Generation and Corruption. If he is doing it intentionally, then he is a litigant and not a judge: he is trying to conceal Aristotle's real position in order to appear to destroy it or to present Aristotle’s case in a manner that will facilitate his refutation of it. Aristotle's first body, for which he used the old name aithér, was a new or “fifth” element which he added to the four “simple” bodies of the Pre-Socraties—the water of Thales, the air of Anaximenes and Diogenes, the fire of Hippasus and Heraclitus, and the earth of Empedocles. (Empedocles had added earth to the first three and thus was the first to recognize four eternal bodies that merely change when combined or dissociated.12) Alfarabi devotes the main body of his Against John the Grammarian, (Secs. 9-19) to stating and refuting Philoponus’ attempt to disprove Aristotle’s statement that, were his hypotheses or assumptions to be trusted, it would be clear that the first body is “eternal, suffering neither increase nor diminution, but is unaging, unalterable, and impassive.”** ‘The main assumptions underlying this statement are that there are such things as simple bodies and simple movements, that the movement of a simple body is simple and that simple movement is the movement of a simple body, and that there is one sort of simple movement natural to each of the simple bodies or that each simple body possesses a principle of natural simple movement of its own.!* Thus one way to determine the number of simple bodies is to begin with an analysis of the kinds of simple movements. Simple movements are either straight or circular, and straight movement is either upward or downward movement. Fire and air, being “light,” are assigned to upward movement, and water and earth, being “heavy,” to downward movement, as the movement natural to them; and to circular movement has to be assigned the new “fifth” element or the first body. It is immediately clear that this analysis seems to result in five simple bodies and three simple movements or that, as it stands, it does not, seem to bear out Aristotle's assumption that each simple body possesses a principle of natural simple movement of its own. If this is the case, then Aristotle must either reduce the four elements into two rather than four “species” (earth-water and air-fire) and thus abandon the Empedoclean and Platonic fourfold division of these elements, or show that the two kinds of straight movements are generic and in fact consist of four “specific” types of simple movement. One does not need to be a profound reader or interpreter of Aristotle's On the Heaven iv and On Generation and Corruption to know that he does the latter, indicating that his analysis and enumeration of simple move- ments (as well as his explanation of “heavy” and “light”) in On the Heaven i. 2 is incom- plete. Upward and downward movements need to be subdivided by taking into account, not merely the direction of the movements, but also its starting point and goal or the place where it terminates. For, while both fire and air move upward, air stops at a place beyond which it will not proceed, while fire will proceed beyond this place to its own 12 Aristotle On the Heaven i. 3. 270b20-25, ii. 19. 204026, ii. 3. 302b4, Metaphysics i, 3. 983b18-084al 1 39 Aristotle On the Heaven i. 3. 270b1-4, ‘ts Aristotle's first body and continues to believe X4 Those assumptions are elaborated in the Physics, in On Generation and Corruption, and in On the Heaven iv; they are merely stated in On the Heaven i. 2. ‘Phe rejection of Aristotle's first body need not necessarily lead to the Empedoclean view that the heavens do not possess individual eternity, in the individual eternity of the celestial realm, Plotinus Enneads TI. i, 2; of. Proclus In Platonis ‘Pimaeum Commentaria (ed. B. Diehl [3 vole; Leipzig, 1903-1906)) I, 287.25 ff; Philoponus De deternitate Mundi Contra’ Procium (ed. H. Rabe (Leipzig, 1899)) iil 15, 524.19,242 Jourwar or Near Easrarn Srupres place, which is higher; similarly, both earth and water move downward, yet earth pro- ceeds downward beyond the place at which water stops in its downward movement. This analysis of the kinds of simple movements, which is obviously Aristotle’s own (and was assumed by him in On the Heaven i, 2-3, since he refers the reader to On the Heaven iv, where it is stated), was schematized by his commentators as follows. Simple circular movement is one generically as well as specifically and individually. Simple straight movement, on the other hand, consists of two ‘genera’ —upward and downward move- ments—each of which is subdivided into two “species” according to the distance travelled or the place where the movement terminates.?® Formal as it may seem, this schematization was an attempt to make more explicit the fact that in On the Heaven i Aristotle is using simultaneously two approaches to the analysis of simple movements and simple bodies without explicitly relating them to each other. The tripartite analysis of simple movements in On the Heaven i. 2 (like the analysis of magnitudes into three dimensions—line, surface, and body—that precedes it in On the Heaven i. 1, and with which the tripartite analysis of movements “seems to be in exact accord” *) is initially geometrical rather than physical: it is based on the analysis of simple magnitude or of one-dimensional continuous quantity into the straight and circular line. But this analysis cannot lead far. For Aristotle is not concerned here with objects of mathematies but with physical bodies, which are in space, and he cannot speak of their locomotion without speaking simultaneously of that which moves, that from which it moves, and that to which it moves. We are first told that there are only two simple movements (the straight and the circular). Then the physical qualities “light” and “heavy” are made the basis for dividing straight simple movement into “upward” and “downward” movements, leading to the conclusion that all simple movement is movement either about, or away from, or toward, the center. The result is a quasi- geometrical account that shows that these are the only simple movements that simple bodies can have, and that combinations of these movements are not simple but compound movements. But while this analysis shows that there cannot be a simple body whose movement lies outside these three, it does not explain what simple body has which movement or why, and it does not show whether each of these simple movements is, the movement of only one simple body or of more than one. To know this, one must begin elsewhere, from what is known empirically about physical bodies, give a physical account of the number of simple bodies and explain why there are so many of them and not more or less, and find out what qualities in these simple bodies require that they have one or another of the simple movements established through the preceding quasi- geometrical analysis. Should it turn out that two or more simple bodies share in one of those three simple movements, it will then be necessary to explain what characterizes 2 This schematization, which is used by Sim- Press, 1960), pp. 283-85, 386-52, 363-67. After plicius and Avicenna in their polemic against Philo. onus, ia based on stich statements as that in On the Heaven i, 2. 268b13, where Aristotle speaks of the parts of the whole that are “specifieally” different or Aifferent as to their “species” (eidos), and iv. 4. 811018, whore he speaks of the “generio™ character of “light” and “heavy.” The question of the “deriva- tion” of the four elements in Aristotle continues to pose interesting questions to Aristotle's interproters. See Friedrich Solmsen, Aristotle's System of the Physical World (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University “looking behind the curtain and trying to recon- struct the working of Aristotle's mind,” Solmsen finds that: “It is more than probable that Aristotle's mind worked ‘back’ from the conclusion to the sup: porting propositions” (pp. 386-67). The problem of the relation between “simple movements” “simple bodies” has been subjected to a careful analysis by Gustav Adolf Seock, Uber die Elemente in der Kosmologie des Aristoteles ("Zetemata,” Heft 34; Munich: C. H. Beok, 1964), esp. pp. 142-52. 38 Aristotle On the Heaven i. 2. 268b24-25Auraranr Acarysr PHILOPONUS 243, the specific movement of each of these simple bodies. For example, the qualities “heavy” and “light” assign the elements that have them to movement toward the center and away from the center, respectively. “Absolutely heavy” and “relatively heavy” charae- terize two specific kinds of movement within the generic simple movement “toward the center,” and so forth. None of this can be done by simple deduction from the initial geometrical analysis (just as “upward” and “downward” movements could not be so deduced). The physical account of simple bodies and their movements must somehow be harmonized with the geometrical account, but it cannot be deduced from that account. From the start, Alfarabi is aware of this problem and of the fact that it is either the source of Philoponus’ difficulty or that Philoponus exploits it to his own advantage. ‘Therefore, in the general account of On the Heaven with which Alfarabi starts, he points out specifically that while Aristotle “intends” to explain the simple parts of the world, he begins with only one of these parts or bodies, the one that moves with a circular movement; that this is the only part he actually “explains”; and that even the expla- nation of this part “becomes plain” only if one takes into account what had preceded in the Physics (Secs. 1-3). That Aristotle does not completely “explain” the four sublunary bodies is again emphasized by Alfarabi immediately afterward (Sees. 4-6), where he notes that Aristotle's “verified” opinions are to be found in On the Heaven iv and in On Generation and Corruption, not in On the Heaven i as Philoponus assumes. On the Heaven i gives a complete account—that is, both a geometrical and a physical account—of one simple body only, namely the first body. This account begins with the geometrical analysis of simple magnitude and proceeds to show that the body that moves by nature with a circular movement is one in its substance or that it does not share “anything” of its form or material with any other body (Sec. 3). Here, at least, we have a one-to-one correspondence between a simple movement and a simple body. This is perhaps the reason why Aristotle can proceed here from the geometrical account to the physical account without running the danger of seeming to “derive” the physical from the geom- etrical: he is dealing with the only case in which a specific simple movement is the move- ment of a specific simple body and of no other, and with a specific simple body having a specific simple movement and no other. Philoponus’ attack on Aristotle's first body” is based on the assumption that Aris- totle’s incomplete analysis of simple movement is complete, or that the direction of straight movement (upward and downward) is sufficient for the definition of the simple movements of the four sublunary bodies. He interprets Aristotle’s analysis of simple movement to mean that there are two genera of movements, circular and straight, and that the latter is divided into two “species” (upward and downward), thus eliminating the possibility of subdividing these further. This interpretation leads to one of two alter- natives. (1) That Aristotle thought that fire and air, the direction of whose movement 27 Philoponus’ attack on Aristotle's natural _nius' lecture notes which were edited by Philoponus ce in general, and on his frst body in particular, ‘was based on observations and assumptions that dif. fered from those of Aristotle and wore developed through a Iong tradition that sought to dot Aristotelian views or accommodate seientifie data not known to Aristotle. This aspect of Philopontis’ attack does not concern us here because it does not seem to have dominated his Against Aristotle and because Alfarabi, who certainly knew about it from Ammo. (for example, the great commentary on Aristotle's Physics) and from Simplicius, ignores it in his anawer. The most striking aspect of Philoponus’ Against Aristotle is the attempt to attack Aristotle as an in- consistent thinker, to destroy Aristotle's statements by showing that tions contradict each other or that his conehasi t follow from his ‘assumptions, and to use t ‘as a justifion- tion for the author's own assumptions.244 Journat or Near Eastern Srupres (and hence, according to Philoponus, the “species” of their movement) is the same, must: be one simple body or must have the same nature; and, similarly, water and earth. (2) ‘The assumption that each simple body possesses a principle of natural simple movement of its own must be abandoned. Philoponus rejects the first alternative on the ground that Aristotle and his followers had “admitted” or “confessed” that there are four simple bodies distinct from each other in the species and not reducible to two."* If this is the case, then there is no need to insist on a one-to-one relation between simple bodies and simple movements. If simple bodies that are by nature different in the species move with a movement that is one in the species, then why could not the contrary of this proposition be true? Indeed, Philoponus thinks that it must follow from this that the same simple body should move with movements that are different in the species. The body whose movement is circular and the body whose movement is straight need not be two bodies different in the species. Therefore, the existence of simple circular movement does not require that there be a simple body, different from the four sublunary bodies, which is naturally so constituted as to move in virtue of its own nature with such a movement. Aristotle's first body is superfluous, and we ean return to Empedocles’ four bodies. ‘This attack on Aristotle begins by exposing the dichotomy between the quasi- geometrical and physical accounts of simple movements and demands that they be harmonized by abandoning the physical account and making a strict deduction from the quasi-geometrical account. It requires that the quasi-geometrical account be considered, not as a generic account that can be modified and supplemented by the physical account but as a complete and final account of the “specific” kinds of possible simple movements, so much so that one should be able to convert the proposition “bodies that move with movements that are specifically different have different natures” to the proposition “bodies whose movement is the same have the same nature” (Sec. 9). Alfarabi suggests that, provided we are speaking of simple rather than compound bodies, this conversion is valid only if we are speaking of specific rather than generic movements, and that it is up to Philoponus to show that simple bodies that are specifically different can have the same specific movement, or that he must begin, not with the quasi-geometrical, but with the physical account of simple bodies and their movements. All that Philoponus does, however, is to identify the movements of fire and air, and earth and water, respectively, and from what he considers to be their respective “specific” movements he deduces that they must have one specific nature (Sec. 10). To show that the movements away from and toward the center are “specific” movements, he resorts again to Aristotle's quasi- geometrical analysis of simple movements, from which he deduces that there can be only two “specific” straight movements, and he introduces the generic qualities “light” and “heavy” as the only determinants of the movements of sublunary bodies (Sec. 11). He ignores Aristotle's physical account of the specifie movements of the four simple bodies, which goes beyond the distinction between movement away from and toward the center and the distinction between “light” and “heavy,” and accounts for the specifie movement that is, the natural place, the starting point, and the goal—of fire as distinguished from air, and of earth as distinguished from water. For, the quasi-geometrical analysis of % Philoponus again has in mind the four bodies in Aristotle's sense, they do not need to move to their used by Aristotle as “analogues” of his own simple “natural” places, and they ean be mixed together and bodies—that is, the pre-Aristotelian or Empedoclean in # gense have the same movements: view of the four elements. Since these are not “simple”Atrarast AGarnst Putoponus 245 simple movements and the generic qualities “light” and “heavy” cannot explain the empirical fact that air and water occupy places that are intermediate between fire and earth, or why water does not move to the center while earth does so and why air does not move to the circumference while fire does so, although both fire and air are “light” and move away from the center and both earth and water are “heavy” and move toward the center. Philoponus assumes—and this is an assumption that is again a deduction from the quasi-geometrical analysis of simple movements and is not based on a physical analysis of the movements of simple bodies—that this is the case because earth prevents water from sinking all the way to the center and because fire presses on air and prevents it from ascending all the way to the cireumference..° But he offers no explanation why this should be the case or what specific qualities make earth and fire behave in this fashion. Alfarabi has little difficulty in showing that Philoponus’ internal critique of Aristotle is poorly executed and can hardly stand critical examination. It ignores Aristotle’s definition of simple body and Aristotle’s definition of the “specific” simple movements of the elements. Consequently, its conclusions regarding the relation between simple bodies and simple movements neither follow from Aristotle’s assumptions nor destroy these assumptions. The same is true of Philoponus’ statement that water, if not ob- structed, will sink until it reaches the “center of the All” (See. 18). For this, too, assumes that water and earth, while two different bodies, have the same movement. Given Aristotle's definition of simple bodies and what constitutes specific simple movement, Philoponus’ view that there are simple bodies that are specifically different, yet their movements are specifically the same, does not follow, which means that none of Philo- ponus’ other statements, based as they are on this conclusion, can be entertained. Vv Assuming for the time being that he is acting unintentionally, Philoponus’ attempt to destroy Aristotle's statements had led him to commit serious blunders as a reader and interpreter of Aristotle. His crude view of Aristotle's style and method of presenta- ‘tion led him to imagine that he had destroyed statements that he in fact had not under- stood, either in themselves or in the broader context of Aristotle's writings on natural science. Instead of destroying Aristotle’s statements, he destroyed his own credibility as an expert on Aristotle. But his apparent lack of refinement is not restricted to his understanding of Aristotle, he also gives the impression of being pompous, pretentious, and rude. Unlike Simplicius before him and Avicenna after him, Alfarabi is too gentle and restrained to make such charges. Instead, he offers the reader what he must have considered an excellent example of the Grammarian’s art. Philoponus’ main purpose of his Against Aristotle is to destroy Aristotle's proof that the world is eternal. Since Aristotle nowhere proves that the world is eternal in On the Heaven, Philoponus turns (Sec. 7) to the nearest thing he can find to such a proof—that is, to Aristotle's “reasonable assumption” that the first body should be “ungenerated and indestructible,” and perhaps also to Aristotle’s discussion of his predecessors’ views on the question whether the world is generated or not, destructible or not, a discussion 18 Anaxagoras used aitkér for fre and made no distinotion between thom. Aristotle On the Heaven i 3. 270b24-25, ii. 3. 90204.246 Journat or Near Eastern Srupres that tends to favor the view that it is more reasonable to assume that the world is ungenerated and indestructible. Having “destroyed” Aristotle's view of the four bodies (Sec. 4), Philoponus now promises his reader that he will destroy Aristotle's “proof” that the world is ungenerated and indestructible in Book IV of his Against Aristofle—an obvious attempt to impress on his reader that this is a serious matter requiring a great deal of preparation. When he gets to Book IV, again he gives the impression of pro- ceeding cautiously and methodically: he says that he will first present Aristotle's “proof” that the heaven (that is, the first body that moves in a circle) is ungenerated and indestructible; then he will examine Aristotle's “proofs”; then he will give the views of Aristotle’s commentators on the subject. The upshot of all this elaborate preparation, however, is the following questions. Suppose that the heaven is, as Aristotle says, ungenerated and indestructible, why does Aristotle suddenly say that the entire world is ungenerated and indestructible? Why does he not distinguish between the part and the whole, between the heavenly body and the other four elements? “Either uninten- tionally or intentionally” Aristotle is shifting his ground from one particular body to the whole world, Aristotle is either confused or he is acting as a sophist. He stands con- demned by his own works (the Topics and On Sophistical Refutations) in which he has explained that to shift one’s ground in this manner is to take a sophistical position. Alfarabi restricts himself to the observation that what Philoponus does here is very strange, something one must look at and wonder about.2? For the most elementary examination of Aristotle’s “verified” views of the four elements should have taught Philoponus that Aristotle’s four simple bodies, too, are ungenerated and indestructible, and that when suggesting the view that the entire world is ungenerated and indestrne- tible, Aristotle meant all the five simple bodies that make up the world. Philoponus is thinking of his own pre-Aristotelian or Empedoclean bodies, the “analogues” of Aris- totle’s simple bodies; it was Aristotle who explained that the former are always subject to generation and destruction. Philoponus has only himself to blame for his confusion. Aristotle would indeed have been a sophist had he accepted the Empedoclean view of the four bodies and yet assumed that they are ungenerated and indestructible. But what must have amazed Alfarabi most is that Philoponus should have arrived at the conclu- sion that Aristotle—who taught him what sophistry is all about—eould have taken a sophistical position on such a crucial issue. ‘The argument between Philoponus and Aristotle has degenerated to a point at which Alfarabi finds it wiser to remain silent. He could have easily returned the charge by accusing Philoponus of being the sophist, but he refuses to go so far. That he believed that Philoponus had been acting as a sophist all along is clear from Alfarabi’s description of his tactics. He has intended to demolish a position that Aristotle had not intended to establish. He has attempted to refute Aristotle without taking into account the original point that Aristotle meant to prove or the manner in which he had asserted it. He has ignored Aristotle's demonstrations. And he has attempted to refute Aristotle by taking absolutely what Aristotle had given with qualifications. Nevertheless, Alfarabi does not treat Philoponus as an ordinary ignoramus who is motivated by sheer contentiousness. ‘The very fact that Alfarabi singles out Philoponus as the only man against whom he finds % Averroes addresses Philoponus with the state- Bouyges (Beirut, 1936-1952}) 1629.1 (reading: ‘ment: “0, strange man!" in the Commentary on the ayyuhd al-ajib) Metaphysics (Tafelr Ma Ba‘d al-Tabt-ah, ed. MauriceAzrarasr Acarxst ParLoponvs 247 it necessary to defend Aristotle on such an important subject is an indication that he con- sidered Philoponus a man, if not the man, who must be reckoned with in any attempt to clear up the difficulties involved in Aristotle’s position on the eternity of the world, when it is considered from the point of view of a revealed religion. This may be hard to believe from Alfarabi’s account of Philoponus’ refutations of Aristotle, for it does not show him as a formidable opponent and cannot explain why Alfarabi should single him out as an opponent of Aristotle who deserves a special treatment. ‘The importance of Philoponus must, then, lie elsewhere—not in what he does, but in what Alfarabi calls “his intention [purpose or goal] from what he does” (Sec. 8). This means that as one moves from considering a few particular points to considering Philoponus’ position as a whole, the alternative that Philoponus is acting “either unintentionally or intention- ally” can no longer remain an open question. On the whole, his ignorance and sophistry are not unintentional but intentional, He merely pretends to be ignorant and to be a sophist. But this does not mean that Philoponus was an Aristotelian at heart who for some reason was making a show of anti-Aristotelianism. Philoponus is not an ordinary ignoramus, nor is he merely a contentious man who enjoys raising objections against Aristotle, He has a position. He considers doubts that may be raised against his own position. And he attempts to free himself from these doubts. His attack against Aristotle is not merely negative or destructive. It is meant, at least partially, as a defense of his own position. And he is not uncritical of his own position. He is willing to consider objections against it and he attempts to overcome these objections. What is his position? We shall confine ourselves to the information supplied by Alfarabi. Philoponus adopts the pre-Aristotelian, especially the Empedo- clean, view of the elements or simple bodies. He disregards Aristotle’s critique of his predecessors’ views in general and of the views of Empedocles in particular. He dis- regards Aristotle’s explanations of what such bodies must be to qualify as the simple elements or constituent parts of the world. He disregards Aristotle’s definition of the simple movements of these bodies, which takes into account the starting points and the goals of their movements. And he disregards Aristotle's new first body. However, Philoponus does not simply go back to the pre-Aristotelian or Empedoclean view of simple bodies and of the world as a whole, and he does not disregard Aristotle com- pletely. He recovers the pre-Aristotelian or Empedoclean views from Aristotle’s account of them and from Aristotle’s use of them as “analogues” of his own views. And he attri- butes the starting-point of his own position—his views of the elements and of their movements—to Aristotle. Consequently, he presents his position as a correction or modification of Aristotle's position. Starting from a view of the simple bodies and of their movements which he believes to be that of Aristotle, he attempts to destroy what he considers false conclusions or consequences that cannot legitimately be drawn from the original view. Philoponus’ objections to Aristotle are not, however, based on purely philosophic or scientific views or on a consideration of the “nature of things.” He bases his objections to Aristotle on religious doctrines as well. Although Philoponus employs religious doctrines in “many” of his objections to Aristotle, and although his objections to Aristotle’s views on the eternity of the world (the guiding theme of Philoponus’ attempt to demolish Aristotle's statements) were apparently motivated by religious considera- tions, Alfarabi has preferred until now (See. 8) to ignore this question. By asserting that248 Jovrnar or Near Eastern Sropres Aristotle did not intend his statements to establish the eternity of the world, and by concentrating on the nonreligious basis of Philoponus’ objections to Aristotle, Alfarabi brings to light the fact that Philoponus’ position is not a religious but a philosophic or scientific position, Having established this point, he now supplements his account of Philoponus’ position by adding that Philoponus resorts to religious doctrines in many of his objections to Aristotle, and he hurries back (Secs. 9-19) to consider and criticize the philosophic basis of Philoponus’ objections, as though the religious basis of his objections is not worthy of detailed consideration. Similarly, Philoponus’ consideration of the doubts he raises against his own position and from which he attempts to free himself, is not based exclusively on religions doctrines; for he does not use religious doctrines to free himself from all the doubts he raises against his own position, but only from “many” of them. That there were philosophic doubts against his position that Philoponus had to consider is evident. He had adopted the pre-Aristotelian views of the simple bodies as presented by Aristotle. Aristotle himself had raised many objections to the views of his predecessors, especially those of Empedo- cles. And the Peripatetics after Aristotle continved to raise objections to any attempt to revive the pre-Aristotelian views. But what kind of doubts could Philoponus consider against his own position that were not philosophic but religious doubts whose solution required his resorting to religious doctrines? The answer to this question comes to light if one considers Philoponus’ initial real or apparent intention to refute the doctrine of the eternity of the world. The apparent motivation of this attack was to defend the religious doctrine that the world is created. Yet Aristotle's analysis of the position of his predecessors in On the Heaven shows that the rejection of the Aristotelian position in favor of a pre-Aristotelian position, especially if it is the position of Empedocles, does not directly and unequivocally establish the doctrine that the world is created. On the contrary, it was the common opinion of the “physicists” that “nothing is generated from not-being,” that everything that is generated is generated from existent things or things that are already present.* The view that the world is generated need not, then, mean that it is created from not-being or from what is not, but can very well mean—and all the “physicists” before Aristotle agreed that it did mean—that it is generated out of existent things, which they held to be eternal, just as they held the process of generation and destruction to go on eternally.2? (Alfarabi points to the same difficulty by suggesting at the outset that the question of the eternity of the world cannot be the real theme of Philoponus’ Against Aristofle and by not mentioning the question of “creation” explicitly anywhere in his entire answer.) Philoponus’ philosophic position, too, is subject to doubts from the religious point of view, and these are the doubts he was forced to consider and attempt to solve on the basis of religious doctrines. We are, then, before two philosophic positions, both of which are doubtful as far as religious doctrines are concerned—perhaps not equally doubtful, but doubtful neverthe- less. We must observe, however, how Philoponus employs religious doctrines to deal with the doubtful character of the two positions. In the case of Aristotle’s position, he employs religious doctrines to support his own philosophie objections and to fortify his effort to 3 Aristotle Physics i 4. 187a27-37, of. i. 8 — generated without qualification from not-being, 191a24-84, and contrast the view of the Platonists Aristotle Physics ii. 1. 199426-28, (i 9 101635 ff) who allow that a thing may beAurarai AGaryst PHILOPONUS 249 demolish Aristotle's statements. In his own case, he employs religious doctrines to free himself from the doubts raised against his position.2° v The argument between Philoponus and Aristotle is conducted on two different levels which must be disentangled from each other. On the philosophic level, the question of the eternity or the creation of the world is not the real issue between the two opponents; the real issue is the nature of the simple bodies that constitute the world or the nature of things simply. On the religious level, the question of the nature of the simple bodies that constitute the world is not the real issue; the real issue here is adherence to certain opinions or doctrines laid down or legislated as binding on the members of a religious community. As Philoponus shows, such religious doctrines can be employed to refute one philosophic position—that of Aristotle—and to defend another philosophic position —his own—even though the two philosophic positions may not be so far apart on the question of the eternity or the creation of the world. This can be done because “these {religious] doctrines” are “far removed from the nature of things.” Alfarabi considers it “unlikely that he [Philoponus] did not understand” this. Philoponus’ understanding of the disjunction or distance between religious doctrines and the nature of things is attested by the efficient way in which he employs religious doctrines to refute Aristotle and defend himself. Since this is the only kind word that Alfarabi has to say on Philoponus’ behalf, we must not let its implications escape us. In all likelihood, Philoponus understood the fact that religious doctrines are far removed from the nature of things and hence that religion is far removed from philos- ophy. Therefore, he was pursuing not one but two intentions in refuting Aristotle, the one philosophic and concerned with the nature of things, the other religious and concerned with the doctrines held by his community; and these two intentions could have been as far from each other as religious doctrines are from the nature of things. In his philosophic intention, his main concern was to inquire into the nature of things. He was willing to pursue this investigation wherever it led him, regardless of whether it agreed or disagreed with the religious doctrines of his own community. In his religious intention, on the other hand, he was concerned with the religious doctrines held by his community. Here he was faced with a clear and urgent choice. Finding that the results of his investigation of the nature of things presented certain difficulties on this level, he made such use of religious doctrines as was necessary to remove these difficulties, Alfarabi and Philoponus may not have shared the same view of philosophy or the same view of religion, but they seem to have shared a common understanding of the relation between philosophy and religion, of the gulf that separates the two and the necessity of somehow bridging this gulf. Far from objecting to Philoponus on this point, Alfarabi secks to defend or at least explain Philoponus’ “intention from what he does.” As for Philoponus’ use of religious doctrines to clear up the difficulties or the doubts raised against his own position, this is a matter that does not need defense or explanation: even a guilty man has the right to defend himself. The difficult thing to explain is what he does in refuting Aristotle, e.g., when he accuses him of being a sophist. This is hard to defend or explain on the philosophic level. % Alfarabi attempts to do for “Aristotle what Philoponus does for himself, ef. above, nn. 3, 9250 Jourwat or Near Easreen Srupres Alfarabi cannot find a satisfactory defense or explanation, from his own point of view, of Philoponus’ action in this regard. But he has certain suspicions about Philoponus’ intention from what he does and about what may lie behind this intention. Philoponus may have intended to “defend” the view of the world that was laid down in (or that was the nomos of) his religion. It is part of Alfarabi’s dissatisfaction with Philoponus’ inten- tion that he does not say that Philoponus had to defend the doctrine of the “creation” of the world because his religion demanded such a defense—not because he did not know of the Christian view of the creation of the world, but because what he knew about this and similar doctrines®* did not convince him that they left one with no choice but to do what Philoponus did in his refutation of Aristotle.2 If Philoponus’ religion sets down the creation of the world as a basic doctrine and Aristotle defended, or was believed to have established, its eternity, then it is under- standable why Philoponus had to side with his religion and defend it against Aristotle. But this is only one, and perhaps not even the most interesting, possibility. The other possibility is that Philoponus’ intention was to remove “from himself” the suspicion that he was in disagreement with the doctrines held by the “people of his religion” and approved by or pleasing to “their rulers.” This second possibility is not wholly in agree- ment with the first and does not necessarily follow from it. For, if Philoponus was engaged in defending the doctrines laid down in his religion, what possible grounds could there be for this suspicion? Or did Philoponus’ difficulties arise from the fact that he was engaged, not in the defense of the doctrines of his religion, but in the investigation of the nature of things—which are far removed from all religious doctrines—and the defense of such investigation by himself and others (for example, the teachers and students of philosophy in the pagan school of Alexandria, which was actively engaged in the study of Aristotle at that time)? Or was Philoponus engaged in the defense of the doctrines of his religion, not as held by the people of his religion or as approved by their rulers, but as he understood and interpreted them so as to be able to employ them to support his own philosophic position and clear himself from the doubts to which he was exposed in the eyes of the people of his religion and their rulers? ‘Whatever the case may have been, the defense of the doctrines of one’s religion does not necessarily mean accepting the same doctrines as those held by the people of one’s religion or approved by their rulers. The people of one’s religion and their rulers may not be satisfied with one’s defense of his religion, and may demand conformity to the reli- gious doctrines as they hold them or approve of them. Since, in this case, what was held by the people of the religion pleased or was approved by their rulers, Philoponus was faced with an alliance of popular religion and civic authority that may have made the risk of disagreement too great and a show of conformity unavoidable. Alfarabi is now ready to point to the ultimate ground of Philoponus’ “intention from what: he does” in refuting Aristotle on this level: he did what he did “so as not to suffer the same fate as Socrates.” The fear of death leads men to desperate measures. There remain the question whether these measures were prudent or effective, and beyond this the question whether they were in the best interest of philosophy (for the sake of which Philoponus took this supreme risk) or of his religion, whose best interest he surely had at heart. 24 Cf. Alfarabi Harmonisation 25.6 ff. jomonstrating them. Alfarabi Enumeration of the % It goes without saying that, for Afarabi, the Sciences (Zhg@ al-"Ulam, ed. Osman Amine (24 eds “defense” of religious doctrines is not the same thing Cairo, 1949]) 107 &,,ef, Harmonisation 1.16 ff. 26.6-11-Atrarasr Acaryst PHILoPonvs 251 VI Before proceeding to discuss his predecessors’ views on the question whether the world is generated or ungenerated, Aristotle says that “all say that it is generated.””® Aristotle's own view that the first body is ungenerated ran counter to the view of all, the philos- ophers as well as the people of his religion and their rulers. He, too, had to harmonize the results of his investigation of the nature of things with what “all men” think about the “nature of the gods.” Although his philosophic position and his religion were dif- ferent from those of Philoponus, he harmonized his philosophic position and his religion in essentially the same way. He attempted to interpret or reinterpret the views held by the people of his religion—their ancestral tradition—on the nature of the gods in a way that supports his philosophic position. We do not know how successful he was with his fellow pagans, but if we accept the judgment of contemporary experts in Greek culture, who speak of “the religious motive and the religious quality of Aristotle’s belief in the eternity of our world,” *’ we must admit that his reinterpretation of what all had said about the generation of the world must have been successful indeed. It was certainly successful to the extent that belief in the eternity of the world became a major tenet of that combination of philosophic and religious paganism with which Philoponus had to deal. Aristotle's success was partly due to the fact that he knew that the question whether the world is eternal or not is not only a philosophic problem but what he calls a “dialec- tical” problem as well, a problem about which both the wise and the many hold opinions either way.2* And because it is such a vast question, they will continue to inquire into it and find it difficult to give their reasons.2” Philoponus’ difficulties with the people of his religion and their rulers did not originate in his holding a particular philosophic position, but in his choosing to investigate the nature of things. He was bound to run into difficulties irrespective of the results of his investigation. He was in danger of suffering the same fate as Socrates, not because he held Socratic “doctrines,” but because he did not follow the doctrines held by the people of his religion and approved by their rulers. His failure to meet this danger adequately resulted from his peculiar understanding, or lack of understanding, of the relation between the nature of things and religions doctrines. Alfarabi informs us that it is unlikely that Philoponus did not understand how far removed the nature of things and religious doctrines are from each other, and he approves of Philoponus’ under- standing of the radical disjunction between the nature of things and religious doctrines. But while not wrong, this understanding is not sufficient: Philoponus lacked an adequate understanding of how one must travel the distance or bridge the gulf between the nature of things and religious doctrines. This is not to say that he did not intend or attempt to travel that distance and bridge that gulf. But he did it on the basis of insufficient knowledge, And the combination of insufficient knowledge and the fear of violent death led him to act foolishly. Alfarabi does not quarrel with Philoponus’ “intention” or with whatever he does in defending his own position on the basis of his religious doctrines, He merely disapproves 3° Aristotle On the Heaven i. 10, 279012-13. (asl al-Magal, od. George Hourani (Leiden, 1959)) 31 Solmaon, op. cit, p. 274. 12.18 ff. Maller, 2 And somo even maintain that the world need 9 Aristotle Topics i, 11; Alfarabi Harmonization not be either eternal or not, a position roported by 22-23. Aristotle and defended by Averroca Decisive Treative 99 Cf. Wolske, op. eit. pp. 148 ff252 Journat or Near Easrern Srupres of the way in which Philoponus chose to carry out his intention: his “amazing” refuta- tions of Aristotle and his use of religious doctrines in many of these refutations. Alfarabi does not commit himself either way on the question of the eternity of the world. He refuses to commit himself to the proposition that the world is eternal by asserting that Aristotle, whom he is undertaking to defend against Philoponus, did not intend to establish this proposition. And he refuses to accept Philoponus’ claim that he can establish the proposi- tion that the world is created by demolishing the basis of his refutation of Aristotle. As far as Alfarabi is concerned, then, this vast question has not been settled, and philoso- phers must continue to investigate it. Aristotle’s view and the pre-Aristotelian view (including the view of Empedocles and Philoponus, but above all Plato’s view) remain the most important alternatives that one must continue to study and understand. Any attempt to obscure Aristotle’s view obscures the real philosophic issue and obstructs the progress of one of the most crucial investigations into the nature of things. Were Philoponus’ Against Aristotle primarily a philosophic work, this would have been Alfarabi’s main objection to it. Since it is not primarily a philosophic work, but a work meant to bridge the gulf between philosophy and religion, we must distinguish between Alfarabi’s dissatisfaction with Philoponus’ refutation of Aristotle and his “intention from what he does” in refuting Aristotle. If the nature of things is far removed from religious doctrines, and we are dealing with an unfinished investigation of the nature of things in which we are aware of the main alternatives but need to continue the investiga- tion in the hope of finding the answer, then the most elementary requirement is to pre- serve the freedom of this investigation and do everything to avoid prejudicing the outcome. Religious doctrines (irrespective of what position happens to be held by the people of a religion or approved by their rulers) should not be made to decide the un- decided philosophic question or allowed to become arbiters between the alternatives with which the philosophic investigation is concerned. Philoponus was faced with a serious dilemma, and he chose the easy way out. He found disagreements among philoso- phers regarding an extremely difficult question and, finding himself in a precarious position, he tried to clear himself by claiming that his own position is in agreement with the doctrine of his own religion, and to condemn Aristotle’s position by claiming that it is in disagreement with the doctrine held by the people of this same religion and approved by their rulers. Doing so may have served his immediate purpose. But in the long run such attempts encourage the public and the rulers to fancy that they have the legitimate right and power to decide the outcome of investigations into the nature of things, limit the freedom of these investigations, and even decide the method that must be pursued in them. The nature of disagreements among philosophers and the reasons for them are easily misunderstood by the people of a religion and by their rulers, who tend to view philosophic disagreements in the image of religious or political disagreements. This view, in turn, tends to impair the attractiveness of philosophy and its power in the eyes of the nonphilosophic multitude. The people of a religion and their rulers will then interfere in what they think is a war of “sects” or “factions,” support whichever one they think is more congenial to their point of view or the one that is more willing to co-operate with them, and suppress or persecute the others. Religious doctrines, which are far removed from the nature of things, will determine the nature of things. Philoponus took % CE. Aristotle Nicomachean éhice i. 2, with ‘Thomas Aquinas Commentary on the Ethizs T, Lesson 2, paragraphs 25-31Avrarasr AGatnst PriLoponus 253 advantage of the distance between religious doctrines and the nature of things. He saved himself through a quick alliance, with little forethought about the consequences. He was only frightened by the fate of Socrates. He was not willing to do what Socrates did when faced by the people of his religion and their rulers, nor did he reflect long enough on the lesson of Socrates’ death to learn how to avoid getting into a similar situation. He was a Pre-Socratic in politics as well as in philosophy. APPENDIX* ) are used to set off additions to the Arabic text and square brackets ({ }) aro used to set off additions to the translation. Strictly, azali means “pre-eternal” or eternal a parte ante, in contrast to abadi or eternal a parte post (These two torms should perhaps be distinguished from ghayr mukawwoan {agenéton, ungenerated] and 1 yofsad {aphtharton, indestructible), which are used by Alfarabi in See. 7 below. Sections and footnotes of this Appendix.]) But Alfarabi seems to uso azali here in the same general sense ‘as qadim (aidiots), which he uses in Harmonizat (al-Jam', od. Fe. Dieterici in AYfardbt'e phil sophische Abhandlungen (Leiden, 1890)) 22-27, in con- transt to mukdath (“created”), In the Harmonization, Alfarabi defends Aristotle ageinst the acousation that he believed in the eternity (gidam) of the world without, however, denying the fact that he had stated in On the Heaven that “the All has no beginning in time.” Alfarabi Harmonization 23.3 ff-; of. Aristotle On the Heaven i. 9. 279al1-b3. ® On the Heaven i. 10-12 ia essentially an examina- tion of the views of Aristotle's predecessors. But even in On the Heaven ili. 2, whore he presente his funda- ing” the eternity of the world. This fact continues to baffle Aristotle's interpreters. Friedrich Solmsen, Aristotle's System of the Physical World (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1960), p. 274, poses some of the questions relevant to this difficulty and concludes that: “These questions are hardly capable of a satis- factory answer.” Cf. Wolfgang Wieland, “Die E keit der Welt (Der Streit zwischen Joannes Philo- ponus und Simplicius)," in Die Gegenwert der Griachen im neueren Denken, ed. Dieter Henrich et al (Tubingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1960), P. 296: “Krortert wird die Frage der Ewigkeit der Welt zwar auch im ersten Buch von de eaclo, doch findet sich dort kein positiver Beweis fir die Ewigkeit der Welt...” 9 That is, On the Heaven i. 2-4, which Philoponus sought to refute in Books I-V of his Againet Aristotle. CF. Alfarabi's account of On the Heaven in his Philo- sophy of Aristotle (Faleafat Aristitalis, ed. Muhsin Mabai (Beirut, 1961)) 97-16-09.16, ef. 108.1-17. The differences between the account given in the Philo- sophy of Aristotle and the account given here are to be explained in part by the fact that the former account refers to On the Heaven as a whole, while here Alfarabi concentrates on the parts selected by Philoponus for the purpose of refuting Aristotle,254 Journat or Near Eastern Srupres with a circular movement, and explains with respect to it that its substance cannot be the same as the substance of the rest of the bodies that make up the world: for this part does not share with the rest of the bodies of the world anything of what renders it sub- stantial.) (4) By others, [finally,] he explained that there cannot be another body outside the bodies of which the world is found to be made up today, with which this body [that moves with a circular movement] shares its substance.* (2) (He had explained in the Physics® that the substance of every natural body consists of its form and its material; that whenever the form and the material of a body are the same as the form and the material of another body, then their essences are the same; (and) that if (a body) shares something of its substance with another body, then it either shares its form—for example, the wall that is built of brick and the wall that is built of mud have a common form and different materials, and so do the wooden door and the iron door—or shares its material and differs from it in its form—for example, when the pitcher and the washbasin are both made of the same substance,® such as copper, silver, or gold.) (3) Thus by some of those statements” Aristotle explained that the form of that part of the world which is the body that moves with a circular movement is not the same as the form of any other part of the world; by others it becomes evident that not even its material is the same as the material of [any other part of the world]; and by [still] others it becomes evident that its material is not the same as the material of anything at all of the bodies in general, whether parts of the world or a body whose position is outside of these. IL (4) He [Aristotle] makes use of the bodies that were thought to be simple by many of those who engaged in philosophy before Aristotle. These are the bodies—that is, fire, water, air, and earth—that are alone believed to be simple by whoever believes that the sum-total of the world contains simple bodies. For they are the ones that many of the ancients who preceded Aristotle—for example, Empedocles*—used to believe were simple. So Aristotle used these as analogues® in place of the universal?® simple bodies 4 Alfarabi Philosophy of Aristotle 98.9-97.2, 97.9-13, where this point is treated, not in the ‘account of On the Heaven, but in the account of the 800b25-301620, ii. 8. 302028 f, ili. 4. 30223, ii, 6. B05a1-4, ili. 7. 80Sb1 f. Avorrocs Decisive Treatise (asl al- Magdi, ea. George Hourani (Leiden, 1959]) Physics. Cf. Aristotle On the Heaven i, 3. 270b13 fi 8-9, esp. i, 9, 278b21 ff 8 Ariatotle Physics i. 2, ii, 2-8, passim, Cf, Alfarabi Philosophy of Aristotle 89.11-22, 92.10-13; Aristotle On the Heaven i, 9, 27729-27831. © “Substance” (jawhar) ia evidently used here in a nontechnical sense to mean “material.” Pines notes that this is the original sonse of jawhar. 8. Pines, Beitrage sur islamischen Atomenichre (Berlin: A. Heine, 1986), pp. 3-4. 7 Of. Alferabi Philosophy of Aristotle 99.9-12 (whieh ‘refers to On the Heaven, not the Physica): Averroes Paraphrase of On the Heaven (al-Samd? wa al-Alam (Hyderabad, a.m. 1865)) 12.6-10. & Empedocles’ view of the elemente is presented 34,7, aand criticized by Aristotle in On the Heaven i iv. 2, and in On Generation and Corruption doctrine of the generation of the world is On the Heaven i. 10. 279b14-17, 28001 123-17 Miller, points to the similarity between the religious doctrine of ereation in time and the scientific viow of the generation of the world in time, CF. Alfarabi Harmonization 25.8-15. ® Seo, o.g. Aristotle On Generation and Corruption fi, 9. 880b28-80, Physics i, 5. 188al. Cf. Averroes Paraphrase of On the Heaven 14.19-15.16 (note the references to Alexander of Aphrodisias and to Aris- totle's On Generation and Corruption). 2° On the distinction between kullt (universal) and juz%t (particular), seo Alfarabi's Philosophy of Plato ‘and Aristotle, te. Muhsin Mahdi (New York: The Free Press, 1962), p. 195, Sec. 13, n. 2. The Arabic tra lation of On the Heaven (Fi al-Samd, ed. ‘A. Badawi ‘iro, 1961}) 286, uses the term full in translating fi, 18. 204631. Cf. Averroes Paraphrase of On the Heaven 29.3-7, 29.8-9 (referring to Aristotle On Generation and Corruption ii 9. 335429).Aurarasr Against Paroponvs 255 that Aristotle (mentioned) in this place in On the Heaven," but not on the ground that they have been shown in this place or earlier and air—are in Book IV of this book [On the Heaven]}® and others are in On Generation and Corruption,*? most (of) the doubts"® raised by John are in fact doubts that have to do either with what is contained in Book IV [of On the Heaven] or with what is contained in On Generation and Corruption.*® (6) And Aristotle uses in this place?? many things that had been demonstrated in the Physics," without stating their demonstrations here also; and sometimes he speaks about them in a general way without attaching to them the qualifications®? he men- tioned in the Physics.®® John the Grammarian, either unintentionally or intentionally,” 1 That is, On the Heaven i. 2. 268626 ff, of. 18 On the sophistical charactor of such doubts, of. 209028 ff. and the beginning of i. 3, where’ the Aristotle On Sophistical Refutations oh. 5, 16782135, sumption” refers to iv. 1-4. “In this place” in Sees. 4 and 6 refers essentially to On the Heaven i. 2-3. See. 7 deals with the end of On the Heaven i. 3. 12 On the Heaven iv. 4-5. CF. below, See. 6 9 i, 1-8, passim. Cf. below, See. 5. 3 CE. Simplicius In Aristoteli %8 Tt is possible that there is here @ gap that may have run as follows: “‘while he [Aristotle] had not used (these bodies in this place in On the Heaven on the ground that they are simple, ete.>.” In this case, the next phrase should be bracketed as a repetition of the boginning of the next paragraph or as a mar- inal title that was subsequently inserted in the text. ‘This phrase may bo rendered more literally as follows: totle, which ho [Aristotle] ver fied. [corrected, emended, rectified: sahhahaha] regarding bodies.” The context suggests that, these ‘opinions aro the corrected version of the opinions of Aristotle's predecessors. But the phrase oan also be xd to say that in On the Heaven iv and in On Generation and Corruption Aristotle presents a cor- rected or improved version of the opinions that he himself presents in On the Heaven i. 2-3. 48 See above, Sec. 4, n. 12. Averroes (Paraphrase of On the Heaven 65-67) says that, unlike the state- ments of Book IV of On the Heaven, the atatements of Book III are contentious (‘inddiyyah). #7 See above, Sec. 5, n. 13, ch. 26 Cf. Simplicius Jn De Caelo 20.15-18, 22.19 47.11, 61.3 (Aristotle On the Heaven i. 3. 369020-23), 09:29 ff, 86.25, 160.23, 168.26 ff, 169.20 fF. 29 Above, See. 4, n! 11 2. In On the Heaven i, 2. 26816 fi. 3. 270a16-18, Aristotle refers to Physics i, v-viii. Cf. Simplicius In De Caclo 144.10 #8, 200.23, and Index (pp. 178-79), In Aristotelis Physicorum Commentaria (od. H. Diels [Berlin, 1882-1895} [“Commentaria in Aristotelem Gracea,”” IX-X]) 1117.15-1118.4. Averroea Para- phrase of On the Heaven §.2-8.15 (note the reference 87-10, 10.16-18, 12.12 (Aristotle See. 2. ithout qualification, Aristotle On Sophistical Refutations ch. 5. 168b37~ 16720, eb. 25, 38 In On Generation and Corruption i, 3. 317032 31965, Aristotle discusses qualificc on and destruction, and this, in turn, restatement of Physics i. 6-9, Alfaral referring also to the question of movement in general. 24 Alfarabi knew, of course, that Philoponus was the author of (that is, the editor of Ammonis lecture notes which formed) a great commentary on Aris totle's Physics. This commentary was translated into Arabic. Seo Badaw!'s introduction to his edition of the Arabio text of Aristotle's Physics, al-Tabl‘ah (Cairo, 1964) I, 11-12, 19, 22. Note the confusion between John (Yabya) Philoponus and256 Jourwar or Near Easrarn Srupres seeks to destroy them as used here generally, without attaching to them the qualifica- tions that are given in the Physics.?° mW (7) One must also wonder about [the following]. He states that in his fourth Book?* he has refuted the proofs with which he [Aristotle] argues that the world was not generated and is indestructible.” When he reached the fourth Book he said there literally as follows, in the chapter in which he stated Aristotle’s proof. He said: “His proof that the heaven is ungenerated and that it is indestructible.” Then he said: “Examining the proofs that he stated and the explanations of some of those who commented on them.”?* And he literally said this: “If the Philosopher wants to demonstrate by these statements, which we stated before, that the world is not generated, on what ground did he transfer what he said about the heaven to the world? Is it because Aristotle applies [what he says about] the heaven (supposing that it is [ungenerated]) to the entire world?” For, according to John, he [Aristotle] had in mind here only the case of [that part of] the world which moves with a circular movement.*® “How, then, did he permit himself to speak of the entire world in place of this part of the world (for what is made evident about certain parts of the world, whether a state or anything else, need not necessarily be true of the entire world), and not distinguish between the two,*° and this either unintentionally, or intentionally as someone who employs sophistry? For to shift one’s ground from the particular to the universal and from one particular to another is one of the topics of sophistry, as he explained in Topics II*! and subsequently in Sophisticd.”®? Iv (8) Then, in many of his objections and in many of [the things] by means of which he seeks to free himself from the doubts that he raises against himself [or his own position], Yahya Thn ‘Adi (the Christian Monophysitie philos- opher and theologian, d. 924) in the comments reproduced with this edition, This confusion is par- ticularly difficult to disentangle because Ibn “Adt follows Philoponus in many of his doctrines. Avicenna ‘attacks both Philoponus and the Christian school of Baghdad, of which Ibn ‘Adi was the head, in On the Heaven (Shiff? (Tehran Lithograph, n. d.]). Maimoni- des points to the parentage of the kalZm (dialectical theology) of Ibn ‘Adi when he joins his name with that of Philoponus in The Guide of the Perplezed i. 11 (, 948 Sunk). % Alfarabi’s insistence in Sees. 2, 4-6, on placing (On the Heaven i. 2-4 in the broader context provided by the Physics, the rest of On the Heaven, and On Generation and Corruption, ia inapired by such pas- sages as Physice i. 9. 1921, and by Aristotle's references to the Physics, to’ Book IV of On the Heaven, and to On Generation and Corruption, in On the Heaven i. 22That is, Book IV of his Against Aristotle, on which see Simplicius In Physicorum 1171 ff, 1175.16 ff, 1175.33, 1326.38, 1329.58 ff, 1333.30-32, 1535.1 ff. On the composition of Philoponus’ Against Aristotle, see Simplicius In De Caelo 157.1 ff, In Physicorum 1117.15-1118.9. 27 Eig,, in On the Heaven i. 3. 270812, passim. 29 CF. Simplicius In Physicorum 1130.3-6. % That is, Philoponus is trying to show that Aristotle contradiete himself when he applies what he ‘says about the heaven (the first body) to the other four bodies or elements, which he himself admits are subject to generation and destruction. But Aristotle's real (simple or universal) four bodies or elements (above, Sees. 4-5) aro, of course, just as eternal as the first element (heaven). Aristotle On Generation and Corruption ii. 9. 335820 ff, ii. 11. 387H35 fF. % Cf. Simplicius In De Caelo $3.17 ff., 280-82, In (On the Fieaven i. 9. 278b10 ff, Aristotle explains the threo senses in which he uses “heaven”: (a) the body ‘whose place is at the extreme circumference (“first of “outermost” heaven), (b) the body continuous with the oxtreme circumference (including the planets), and (c) all body included within the extreme cireum: forence (the world or the universe). Cf. Physics iv. 5. 21218; Averroes Paraphrase of On the Heaven 28.18-35.11, 35.12-36.5 (answer to Themistius’ excuse for Plato), 38.7-8, 31 Aristotle Topics ii. 1-5. 82 Aristotle On Sophistical Refutations ch. 18. 176020 ff. For the substitution of for # in Sophistieg, see Moritz Steinschneider, Al-Farabi (St. Potersbourg, 1869), p. 55.Axrarast Acaryst Puttoronus 257 he makes use of the opinions [or doctrines] laid down®® [or legislated] in [various] reli- gions [or religious communities]** and whatever consequences follow from them [that is, from these religious opinions].** It is unlikely that he did not understand how far removed these opinions are from the nature of things.°* Therefore one may suspect that his intention from what he does in refuting Aristotle is either to defend the opinions laid down in his own religion about the world,” or to remove from himself [the suspicion] that he disagrees with the position held by the people of his religion and approved by their rulers, so as not to suffer the same fate as Socrates.** ‘The end of the Introduction.

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