The Southern Voices Network for Peacebuilding

Research Paper No. 30 RudiErnst/Shutterstock.com

Simmering Inter-Ethnic Tensions in Ethiopia: Drivers and Regional

Implications
By Adane Tadesse, Southern Voices Network for Peacebuilding Scholar
January 2024

Introduction

The Horn of Africa has a paramount geopolitical significance to global peace and economic order. Its strategic
relevance emanates primarily from its proximity to Bab el Mandeb, the strait between Yemen on the Arabian
Peninsula and Djibouti in the Horn of Africa, and the Suez Canal. Moreover, the growing presence of the Gulf
States in the Horn of Africa shows that the region is eventually becoming an integral part of the broader
Middle East security complex. As a result, global powers like the United States, China, Turkey, and France have
established military camps in the coastal areas of the Horn of Africa not to mention Russia’s plan to set up
military bases in Sudan and Eritrea. The Horn of Africa also is one of the most volatile regions in the world.
Its volatility stems from recurring intra-state and inter-state conflicts, state fragility, and the presence of
fundamentalist groups.

The Southern Voices Network for Peacebuilding: Centering African knowledge and agency is key to building and
sustaining peace in Africa. The Southern Voices Network for Peacebuilding (SVNP) works with the Wilson Center’s
Africa Program to attain the most appropriate, cohesive, and inclusive policy frameworks and approaches for achieving
sustainable peace in Africa. Generously sponsored by Carnegie Corporation of New York since its establishment in
2011, the SVNP works to generate African knowledge to inform US and international peacebuilding policies on Africa;
help build the next generation of African peacebuilders through its scholarship program; and create a pan-African
network of African peacebuilding organizations, practitioners, and experts to collaborate and share knowledge, best
practices, and lessons learned on peacebuilding in Africa.

This publication was made possible by a grant from Carnegie Corporation of New York. The statements made and
views expressed in this paper are solely the responsibility of the author and do not represent the views of the Wilson
Center or Carnegie Corporation of New York. For more information please visit:
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/the-southern-voices-network-for-peacebuilding
For decades, Ethiopia has been an anchor of stability in the Horn of Africa [1]. Its stabilizing role in the region
involves facilitating peace negotiations, sending peacekeeping troops, and fighting terrorism. Ethiopia has
been instrumental in the signing of peace deals in Sudan and South Sudan. It also served as a backbone of the
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) led peace initiatives. In addition, Ethiopia’s participation
in the United Nations (UN) led peacekeeping missions in Sudan and South Sudan has helped to contain the
escalation of the Darfur and Abiye conflicts. In this regard, it is also one of the major contributors to the Africa
Union Mission in Somalia. Moreover, Ethiopia has been a valuable ally of the US in the War on Terror in which
it played a pivotal role in crushing Islamic fundamentalist forces like the Islamic Courts Union and Al-Shabab,
which openly expressed allegiance to global terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaida and ISIS [2].

However, the ever-escalating security crisis that was triggered by a bumpy and mismanaged political transition
that brought Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed in 2018 significantly diminished Ethiopia’s regional influence.
Simmering inter-ethnic tensions in Ethiopia that are fueled by the proliferation of ethno-nationalist insurgencies
and ethnic divisions within the ruling elite placed the country on the verge of protracted civil war and state
collapse. Despite the magnitude of inter-ethnic tensions in the country, existing policy approaches by both
domestic and international actors tend to fixate on addressing flaring security incidents such as the Tigray War
rather than addressing the structural factors that led to the current crisis. Moreover, the conversations revolving
around the regional implications of inter-ethnic tensions in Ethiopia lack nuanced understanding. Therefore,
this paper seeks to address this gap by exploring the drivers and regional implications of inter-ethnic tensions
in Ethiopia. The study is primarily informed by data collected from political party leaders, academia, civil society,
the diaspora community, and diplomats in Addis Ababa and Washington DC. Additional data was collected from
legal and policy documents, media reports, books, and journal articles.

Overview of Inter-Ethnic Tensions in Ethiopia

Existing ethnic tensions in Ethiopia can be traced back to the five years of Italian occupation that lasted from
1936 to 1941 [3]. As was the case with many other colonial settings, Italy employed divide-and-rule tactics that
portrayed Ethiopia as an Amhara state [4] and focused on pitting them against all other ethnic groups, especially
against the Oromos [5]. This policy also encompassed the introduction of ethnically designated administrative
structures. Though the Italian ethnic policy was abolished in 1941, the narratives advocated by the Italian
colonizers have been instrumental in shaping the debates of the 1960s Ethiopian Student Movement, as well as
the political programs of almost all ethno-nationalist armed groups that proliferated in the 1970s and 1980s.

In 1991, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democracy Front (EPRDF)’s victory against the Derg regime
led to the institutionalization of ethnic politics [6]. The victors reconfigured the Ethiopian state through the
mainstreaming of ethnicity as a basis for organizing political parties and administrative structures [7]. The
EPRDF rationalized the introduction of ethnic politics including ethnic federalism as a means of addressing
past injustices and laying a foundation for a democratic and peaceful political order [8]. As a result, the EPRDF
regime was extensively engaged in fostering ethnic consciousness and politicization of ethnicity. For instance,
the EPRDF encouraged the formation of ethnic-based political parties [9]. Consequently, each of the 83 ethnic
groups in Ethiopia has at least one party claiming to either represent or seek to liberate them.

Chart 1: Population distribution of major ethnic groups

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However, the mainstreaming of ethnic politics in post-1991 Ethiopia fostered inter-ethnic rivalries often
manifested in ethno-nationalist rivalry, ethnic violence, and conflicts [10]. Since 1991, ethnic violence has
been one of the manifestations of ethnic tensions in Ethiopia. During the initial years of ethnic federalism, the
Amharas living outside of the current Amhara region were the primary targets of ethnic violence. For instance,
since the 1990s ethnic violence and mass displacements against the Amharas have been recorded in different
parts of Oromia and Benishangul Gumuz regions [11]. Similar incidents of killings and evictions against the
Amharas also continued to the present day. For instance, as of November 2021, around 918,000 internally
displaced people who were displaced from the Oromia and Benishangul Gumuz regions were forced to move to
the Amhara region [12].
Map 1: Political Map of Ethiopia

Source: Yonas, 2021

Since 2015 the scope of ethnic violence has expanded to several ethnic groups whereby the Oromos in the
Somali Region; Tigrians in the Amhara Region; Gedos, Gamos, Amharas, Somalis, and Tigrians in the Oromia
Region; Amharas and Oromos in the Benshangul Gumuz Region became victims of ethnic violence. Particularly
the post-2018 period saw a dramatic increase in ethnically agitated mass killings and attacks. For instance, as of
June 2018 around 1.4 million Ethiopians were internally displaced because of ethnic violence [13]. The atrocities
that took place in Metekel, Wollega, and Maikadra illustrate how ethnic violence in Ethiopia is taking social roots.

Another notable aspect of inter-ethnic tensions in Ethiopia is the proliferation of ethnic conflicts. In most cases,
these incidents are linked to territorial contestation, past grievances, and competition for power. For example,
the Somali-Oromo, Afar-Somali, and Oromo-Sidama conflicts are directly related to competing territorial claims.
At the same time, the contentions between the Amharas, Tigrians, and Oromos are primarily driven by both
historical grievances and competition for political power. Previously inter-ethnic conflicts have been mostly
contained by the repressive and highly centralized rule of the EPRDF [14]. However, the 2018 transition that
led to the weakening of both the ruling party structures and the state apparatus left inter-ethnic conflicts
unchecked. For instance, between July 1997 and May 2015, around twenty inter-ethnic conflicts and clashes
covering six regional states were recorded [15]. Whereas, in the span of five years (between 2018 and 2023) the
incidents of ethnic conflicts have almost tripled compared to the previous two decades.

The radicalisation of ethnic-based regional para-militaries and the proliferation of ethno-nationalist armed
groups in Oromia, Benishangul Gumuz, Gambela, and Amhara regions also served as a fueling factor for such
conflicts [16]. Against the backdrop of the intensification of elite rivalries and territorial contestations, ethnic
groups like the Oromo, Amhara, and Tigray have been proactively engaged in expanding the size and capability
of their regional special forces. For instance, according to local news reports prior to the Tigray war, the region

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was able to train 200,000 regional para-militaries. Allegedly the Oromia region trained more than 500,000
members. At the same time, due to the threats generated by the extensive militarization of the Oromia and
Tigray regions, the Amhara regional government was also engaged in expanding its regional special police force.
On the other hand, non-state ethnic-nationalist armed groups like the Oromo Liberation Army in Oromia and the
Fano forces in the Amhara region are also involved in arm races. The result has been a steady evolution of inter-
ethnic conflicts from small-scale communal skirmishes into more structured warfare.

Drivers of Ethnic Tensions in Ethiopia

The bulk of literature on African politics tends to view ‘ethnic diversity’ as a curse and associate it with political
decay and security crises [17]. In the case of Ethiopia, analysts often identify ethnic federalism as the underlying
cause of ethnic tensions and conflicts. In both cases, the assertions are too simplistic. It is vital to understand
ethnic tensions as by-products of multiple but interrelated factors. In the case of Ethiopia, drivers of ethnic
tensions could be categorized into three sets of factors namely structural, historical, and socio-economic drivers.

HISTORICAL DRIVERS

First, the intense contestation over the processes that led to the modern Ethiopian state are at the center of
current inter-ethnic tensions [18]. The formation of the modern Ethiopian state is marked by war and conquest
[19]. In particular, the expansion of Emperor Menilik II (1889-1913) to the Southern half of present-day Ethiopia
has been underlined as an important historical factor that negatively affects the current state of inter-ethnic
interactions. For some, his expansion was merely a reunification while others portrayed it as an internal
colonization project. Ethnic groups that were incorporated during Menelik II’s expansion have developed deep-
rooted grievances against the Ethiopian state and the Amharas who are viewed as his descendants. However, the
injustice and marginalization of the Imperial regimes were more or less the same for all ethnic groups [20].

Second, writings and memories of Ethiopia’s history became an area of contestation between various ethnic
groups, hindering ethno-nationalist elites from engaging in constructive dialogue [21]. For instance, the tension
over Addis Ababa between the Amhara and Oromo elites under the framework of ‘Berera’ vs ‘Finfinfine’ could be
viewed as a reflection of competing historical interpretations of Ethiopia’s past. Moreover, the national flag, the
official language, and the nature of the existing federal arrangement of the country are also subjects of ethnic
contestation [22].

STRUCTURAL DRIVERS

First, the most crucial structural driver of ethnic tensions in Ethiopia is the mainstreaming of ethnic politics. This
phenomenon created a political space whereby ethnicity is a basis for establishing political parties and setting
administrative boundaries. As a result, ethnic entrepreneurs are engaged in intense competition for political
power and resources. Most importantly, the emergence of a new generation of radical ethno-nationalist parties
following the 2018 transition significantly increased the magnitude of ethnic antagonism. In addition, the
introduction of ethnic federalism that designated a homeland for each ethnic group contributed to territorial
contestation between ethnic groups. This has also contributed to the emergence of a ‘native’ vs ‘non-native’
dichotomy that paved the way for ethnic cleansing, evidenced in the mass displacement and killings of the
Amharas in Oromia and Benishangul Gumuz regions.

Second, the absence of an institutional mechanism that can accommodate competing demands and claims
of ethnic groups [23]. Due to the authoritarian nature of the Ethiopian state, such demands were not properly
addressed by state institutions. Instead, ethnic groups that have direct access to state power managed to exploit
that opportunity to satisfy their own demands, and undermine their counterparts. As a result, other ethnic
groups lacking such access tend to mobilize their ethnic kin against both the system and ‘privileged’ ethnic
groups.

Third, the weakening of the opposition bloc, which often serves to ventilate ethnic grievances, has served to
increase reliance on violent means to achieve political and economic goals. Fourth, the fragility and ethnic

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division within the Prosperity Party contributed to the radicalization of local ethno-nationalist elites, mainly the
Amharas and the Oromo elites. At the same time, the current leadership’s authoritarian turn has fueled the rise of
more ethno-nationalist armed groups.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC DRIVERS

First, rapid population growth is exacerbating ethnic tensions. Second, the depletion of natural resources and
shortage of arable land that stemmed from rapid population growth and environmental stressors like climate
change. Resource scarcity, especially shortage of land, is a major trigger for territorial disputes between adjacent
ethnic groups. Added to the mix are rural-urban and inter-regional migrations that can spark clashes. The third
socio-economic driver is the high rate of unemployment. Joblessness leaves young people vulnerable to ethnic
entrepreneurs who will enlist them to further their own political aims.

Implications Of Ethnic Tensions For Regional Peace And Stability

Given the fragility of the Horn of Africa, the current security crisis in Ethiopia affects the stability of the region in
several ways.

First, due to the resultant effects of ethnic tensions and rivalries, Ethiopia is no longer in a position to continue
its stabilizing role in the region. Ethiopia was long regarded as an ‘exporter of stability’ in the Horn of Africa,
which is the most volatile region in the world [24]. Contrary to its domestic mishaps, the EPRDF regime has
played a constructive role in regional peace by facilitating negotiations, sending peacekeeping forces, and
fighting Islamic fundamentalist forces like the ICU and Al-Shabab. For instance, Ethiopia played a key role in the
signing of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement that ended the civil war in Sudan. Ethiopia could also
be regarded as the backbone of all peace-building initiatives of IGAD. In addition, Ethiopia sent peacekeeping
troops to its neighbors such as Sudan, South Sudan, and Somalia. Moreover, since the mid-1990s Ethiopia played
a significant role in containing Islamic fundamentalists that were operating in Sudan and Somalia. Its fight
against fundamentalists scaled up following the 9/11 attack that triggered the US’s War on Terror. In this regard,
Ethiopia succeeds in hindering global and regional terrorist networks like Al-Qaeda, ISIS, and Al-Shabaab from
taking root in the Horn of Africa. Ethiopia’s commendable contribution to regional peace could be explained by
internal stability, and strong military and intelligence capability. Nevertheless, since April 2018 Ethiopia’s role as a
stabilizing actor in the Horn of Africa has gradually declined. Furthermore, for the past five years, the country has
been in turmoil whereby the country is ravaged by a civil war between ethno-nationalist armed groups and the
federal army.

Second, the preoccupation of the Ethiopian government and its army with domestic conflicts has created a
conducive environment for Al-Shabab to revive and expand its reach. Recent reports indicated that Al-Shabab
is expanding its presence in Somalia, Somaliland, and eastern Ethiopia. For instance, around 500 Al-Shabab
fighters entered Ethiopia with the objective of crossing to Bale Mountain, an area bordering Oromia and Somali
regions [25]. The most alarming aspect of this military expedition was that the majority of Al-Shabab fighters
who penetrated into the Ethiopian border were recruited from Ethiopia, mainly from Oromia and Somali regions.
This shows that the terrorist group may have placed its networks in the country and the incursion was a move
to scale up its engagement. The fact that Al-Shabab fighters managed to penetrate 100 km into Ethiopian
territory without major resistance indicates that the involvement of the Ethiopian Army in internal conflicts is
both depleting its capability and diverting its attention from its basic responsibilities related to regional affairs. In
addition, ethnic division among army members has severed its effectiveness. For instance, the decision of ethnic
Tigray members of the army to shift their loyalty to the TPLF-led Tigray Defense Force (TDF) negatively affected
the peacekeeping mission of the ENDF in Somalia [26] and Sudan.

Third, the ongoing conflicts in Ethiopia are dragging in neighboring countries. Since November 2020 Eritrea
has become an integral part and key player in the Tigray war. At the time of writing, Eritrean troops are still at
large in Tigray. Prior to the current Sudanese crisis, the Sudanese army also exploited the Tigray war to control a
contested area called Al-Fashaga [27]. In addition, allegedly Sudan was also involved in sheltering and training

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the Samri group, which is a sect of the Tigray army. The likelihood of reciprocal repercussions is high.

Fourth, the refugee crisis is another concerning implication of inter-ethnic tensions and conflicts in Ethiopia.
Escalation of these conflicts would likely force the growing number of IDPs to cross borders to neighboring
countries. Ethiopia currently hosts 930,000 refugees from Sudan, South Sudan, Somalia, and Eritrea [28]; if the
security situation worsens, these refugees are likely to flee to neighboring countries, particularly Kenya and
Djibouti. Fifth, given the increased interest of Russia, and Gulf countries in expanding their influence in the Horn
of Africa, there is a risk that these powers could exploit the ongoing conflict in Ethiopia to trigger domestic and
regional proxy wars.

countries. Ethiopia currently hosts 930,000 refugees from Sudan, South Sudan, Somalia, and Eritrea ; if the
security situation worsens, these refugees are likely to flee to neighboring countries, particularly Kenya and
Djibouti. Fifth, given the increased interest of Russia, and Gulf countries in expanding their influence in the Horn
of Africa, there is a risk that these powers could exploit the ongoing conflict in Ethiopia to trigger domestic and
regional proxy wars.

Assessing Existing Efforts To Address Ethnic Tensions And Conflicts In Ethiopia

Peacebuilding efforts by the Government of Ethiopia (GoE) and international actors to address the current
multifaceted crisis are grossly inadequate. Interventions by the GoE are too state-centric and focus on creating
flawed institutional remedies, which neglect the (fragile) political reality on the ground.

The establishment of the Ethiopian National Dialogue Commission is one of the notable interventions. The
commission was established by the FDRE House of People’s Representatives on December 29, 2021. Currently,
the Commission is in the process of soliciting agendas and participants. However, despite the support from the
international community, the commission is unlikely to succeed in addressing the challenge. The autonomy and
impartiality of the commission are being questioned by the opposition bloc. Moreover, its failure to commence
the dialogue as per the initial schedule (November 2022), and the lack of transparency regarding the process of
selecting participants and agendas, are negatively affecting public confidence.

Another government-led effort is the Transitional Justice initiative. In January 2023, the Ethiopian Ministry
of Justice introduced a document titled ‘Policy Options for Transitional Justice’ that is designed to initiate
conversations on possible alternatives for ensuring accountability and reconciliation. So far, the Ministry of
Justice is conducting various consultative meetings. From the outset, the initiative has been questioned by
local and international actors. The absence of an independent judiciary in Ethiopia is identified as one of the
potential bottlenecks of this initiative. In addition, the ever-declining public trust in the current government also
undermines the credibility of the process.

The third essential measure taken by the government is the dismantling of ethno-nationalist regional forces.
Following the conclusion of the Tigray War in November 2022, the government announced its decision to
integrate members of the Regional Special Forces into the Ethiopian National Defense Force and the Federal
Police. This decision could be explained by two factors. First, the role of the Tigray regional special force, which
subsequently evolved into the Tigray Defense Force, indicated the threat of such establishment to the central
government. Second, the fact that each region was building a special force that was loyal only to a certain
ethnic group led to an arms race between ethnic-based regions. Nevertheless, due to the lack of transparency
and inadequate preparation, the decision faced resistance from the public and members of the regional Special
Forces. The ongoing conflict in Amhara region was triggered by the move to disarm the regional force.

As for international actors, regional bodies like the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and
the Africa Union (AU) are focusing on appeasing the current government while global actors like the United
States (US) and the European Union (EU) emphasize sanctions and cutting-off monies. In all cases except IGAD,
the focus has been on reacting to the repercussions of inter-ethnic tensions like conflicts, humanitarian crises,
and human rights violations rather than proactively addressing the underlying drivers of ethnic divisions and
rivalries. IGAD is currently supporting the existing initiatives of the Ministry of Peace (preparation of peace-

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building manual) [29] and the Ministry of Justice (jointly organized high-level consultation workshop on
transitional justice) [30]. Despite playing a central role in the signing of the Pretoria Agreement that ended
hostilities between the GoE and the TPLF, AU’s peacebuilding role in Ethiopia is not proactive. As for US sanctions
and visa restrictions, perhaps the most dramatic move was to remove Ethiopia from the African Growth and
Opportunity Act (AGOA) eligibility list. For its part, the EU has previously postponed 90 million euros ($109
million) in budgetary support to Ethiopia [31].

The utility of sanctions is, as ever, an open question. Research suggests that they tend to impact (innocent)
people more than (guilty) ruling elites. In the current geo-political context, they may serve as a push factor for
African leaders to deepen their ties with China and Russia.

Conclusion

Ethnic tensions in Ethiopia are threatening regional peace and stability in the Horn of Africa and comprising
Ethiopia’s historic stabilizing role. Into the security vacuum, Al-Shabab is increasingly active. The involvement
of Eritrea in the Tigray conflict is an ominous sign. International actors need to take note: this has become a
regional problem, not merely a domestic, Ethiopian one. Thus far, peacebuilding efforts have been far from
adequate, from all parties, domestic and foreign. The roads to peace are narrowing. The absence of a strong
civil society and the recent ethnic divisions in the major religious institutions, such as the Ethiopian Orthodox
Church, amplify fears of escalation.

In the case of regional actors, IGAD and the AU must exert pressure on the GoE and ethno-nationalist insurgent
groups to de-escalate ongoing conflicts and commit to permanent cessation of hostilities, lest neighboring
states become more ensnared in the violence. Initiating a regional peace forum that deals with existing security
concerns in the Horn of Africa could help to enhance the positive engagement of neighboring states. The
international community should also play a more constructive role by prioritizing the protection of civilians,
stopping gross human rights violations and promoting accountability for those guilty of past crimes.

1. Mathews Kuruvilla and Adane Tadesse. 2022. ‘Implications of Ethiopia’s engagement in conflict resolution initiatives in the Horn of
Africa on its global positioning’, In Jeronimo Delgado. Handbook of Regional Conflict Resolution Initiatives in the Global South. London:
Routledge., Available at https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781003287018-18/implications-ethiopia-engagement-
conflict-resolution-initiatives-horn-africa-global-positioning-kuruvilla-mathews-adane-alemayehu-tadesse.

2. Negasa Gelana and Greg Simons. 2021. Security diplomacy as a response to Horn of Africa’s security complex: Ethio-US partnership
against al-Shabaab, Cogent Social Sciences, 7:1, DOI: 10.1080/23311886.2021.1893423

3. Andargachew Tiruneh. 2015. The Emergence and Proliferation of Political Organizations in Ethiopia. Los Angeles: Tsehai Publishers.

4. Andargachew, 2015.

5. Sbacchi Alberto .1985. Ethiopia Under Mussolini. Fascism and the Colonial Experience. London: Zed Books.

6. Young, John. 1996. ‘Ethnicity and Power in Ethiopia’. Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 23(70):531-542.

7. Asnake Kefale. 2013. Federalism and Ethnic Conflict in Ethiopia A Comparative Regional Study. Abingdon: Routledge.

8. Interview with Former U.S. Special Envoy for Sudan and South Sudan

9. Wondeson Teshome .2008. ‘Ethiopian Opposition Political Parties and Rebels Fronts: Past and Present’ in the Journal of International
Social Research Vol. 1/5

10. Legesse Tigabu. 2015. ‘Ethnic Federalism and Conflict in Ethiopia: What Lessons Can Other Jurisdictions Draw?’. African Journal of
International and Comparative Law, Vol.23(3): 462–475.

11. Bekalu Atnafu . 2017. Ethnic federalism and conflict in Ethiopia. African Journal on Conflict Resolution. https://www.accord.org.za/ajcr-
issues/ethnic-federalism-conflict-ethiopia/ (accessed on 03 January 2021).

12. https://addisinsight.net/internally-displaced-people-exceeding-to-2-million-in-amhara-region/

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13. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees .2018. Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2018. https://www.unhcr.org/dach/wp-
content/uploads/sites/27/2019/06/2019-06-07-Global-Trends-2018.pdf

14. Semir Yesuf. 2019. Drivers of ethnic conflict in contemporary Ethiopia. https://issafrica.org/research/monographs/drivers-of-ethnic-
conflict-in-contemporary-ethiopia

15. Bekalu, 2017

16. International Crisis Group.2020. ‘Bridging the Divide in Ethiopia’s North’. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/ethiopia/b156-
bridging-divide-ethiopias-north

17. Kuol, Luka Biong Deng (2020) When Ethnic Diversity Becomes a Curse in Africa: The Tale of Two Sudans, Journal of Diplomacy and
International Relations 21 (1): 15–35.

18. Interview with a Professor of Political Science Professor and leader of an Oromo opposition party, Addis Ababa

19. Bahiru Zewde. 1991. A History of Modern Ethiopia (1855-1991). Ohio: Ohio University

20. Interview with a Professor of Federalism Studies and Member of Addis Ababa City Administration Council, Addis Ababa

21. Interview with a Former senior official of Ethiopian Citizens for Social Justice Party, Addis Ababa.

22. Interview with Leader of Enat Party, Addis Ababa.

23. Interview with a Human rights advocate and Executive director of a local NGO, Addis Ababa.

24. Interview with Former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs.

25. https://www.voanews.com/a/why-did-al-shabab-attack-inside-ethiopia/6674783.html

26. https://www.criticalthreats.org/briefs/africa-file/ethiopia-crisis-update-al-shabaab-likely-exploits-infighting-among-ethiopian-forces-
in-somalia

27. https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2021/08/ethiopia-sudan-tension-rises-over-tigray-conflict

28. https://www.unrefugees.org/emergencies/ethiopia/

29. https://igad.int/igad-peace-and-security-division-and-the-ethiopian-ministry-of-peace-collaborate-for-sustainable-peace-as-they-
validate-the-draft-peace-building-manual/

30. https://igad.int/igad-conducts-a-consultative-workshop-on-ethiopian-transitional-justice-policy-development/

31. https://apnews.com/article/addis-ababa-ethiopia-europe-f74c70c42b7058a41c603477609531e4

Mr. Adane Tadesse is a Lecturer and Researcher of Political Science at Addis Ababa University in Ethiopia. Parallel
to his academic engagements, Adane has served as Director of the International Relations at Addis Ababa
Science and Technology University. Previously, Mr. Adane was a Southern Voices Network for Peacebuilding
Scholar for the Fall 2023 term in Washington, DC. Adane is also an alumnus of the Young African Leaders Initiative
(YALI). Currently, Adane is a Visiting Libra Scholar at University of Maine.

SVNP Policy Brief and Research Paper Series

For the accompanying Policy Brief and the full series of SVNP Research Papers and Policy Briefs, please see our
website at https://www.wilsoncenter.org/the-southern-voices-network-for-peacebuilding

Wilson Center - Africa Program | 8

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