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Po 222. Lecture Seven
Po 222. Lecture Seven
Po 222. Lecture Seven
Ever since the publication of A Theory of Justice,1 John Rawls has been
modifying his conception of justice as fairness. He realized that the kind
of stability that would be needed in a democratic society that is marked
by a pluralism of reasonable, but comprehensive moral views was
inconsistent with the account of stability given in Theory. In Theory,
Rawls had conceived of his principles of justice as an alternative
systematic conception that was superior to utilitarianism. (PL xv; Martin
737-8) But conceived in this way, justice as fairness turned out to be
simply another reasonable comprehensive doctrine that was
incompatible with other reasonable doctrines, such as utilitarianism and
Kantian moral theory. This meant that the well-ordered society of justice
as fairness was an unrealistic ideal for a democratic society. What Rawls
came to realize is that the failure of Theory was that it did not
distinguish between two very different kinds of moral conceptions: that
of a comprehensive moral theory which addressed the problem of
justice, and that of a political conception of justice that was independent
of any comprehensive theory. (Martin 738)2 This distinction is crucial in
understanding the transformations that have taken place in Rawls's
theory of justice. But it is also the focus of his new book, Political
Liberalism.3 In what follows it is worth explain this distinction and how
it functions and shapes his new theory of justice.
These features of a political conception of justice are the basis for how
Rawls proposes to solve the problem of political stability. Since a
political conception of justice has its basis in ideas that are "latent in the
public political culture," it is noncontroversial in nature. It is possible for
persons with conflicting, but reasonable comprehensive views to agree
that it should be the account of justice that is most compatible with their
own views. As such the political conception would then be the object of
an overlapping consensus about justice. (PL 15).
But what are these latent ideas? According to Rawls there are three
fundamental ideas underlying a democratic society. The 'central
organizing idea' is that of "society as a fair system of cooperation over
time, from one generation to the next." It is accompanied by two
companion ideas: the idea of citizens as free and equal persons, and the
idea of "a well-ordered society as a society effectively regulated by a
This change in the role of the original position means that there is also a
change in the process of justifying justice as fairness. It is now a two-
stage process. Recall that the original position now has the less
ambitious task of specifying that justice as fairness is the only
conception that is fully compatible with the fundamental ideas of a
democratic society. But even though this is a more modest task, it is still
a very important one. For in showing that justice as fairness is the most
compatible conception, Rawls has shown that it is also a 'freestanding
view,' one that is independent of any comprehensive moral theory or
doctrine. This independence means that it can also be linked to a variety
of reasonable comprehensive views.
But this is still not sufficient to solve the problem of stability mentioned
at the outset. Rawls must go one step further and show that his political
conception would be preferred by reasonable persons over any other
political conception. Rawls argues for this point by introducing the idea
of an overlapping consensus. An overlapping consensus "consists of all
the reasonable opposing religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines
likely to persist over generations and to gain a sizable body of adherents
in a more or less just constitutional regime, a regime in which the
criterion of justice is that of political conception itself." The necessity of
an overlapping consensus arises because those with comprehensive
moral views must seek some common ground for reaching consensus
about principles of justice. The actual circumstances of living in a
democratic society then provide individuals with the motivation for
accepting a political conception that is not in conflict with each other's
comprehensive views. Rawls's political conception is noncontroversial
for two reasons. The first is that because it has its basis in the
fundamental ideas of a democratic society that all citizens share, it is
acceptable to the wide variety of comprehensive views. The other reason
is that the political conception makes no controversial claims about any
reasonable comprehensive views. It is neither skeptical nor indifferent to
the claims made by these views. Instead, it seeks to provide a basis for
citizens to determine what issues can be removed from the political
agenda and those that cannot. Given these considerations, Rawls claims
that his principles of justice would then be the object of an overlapping
consensus by those persons holding reasonable, but incompatible
comprehensive views.
For the past two centuries, there has been a sort of consensus throughout
a large area of political thought, centered around the 'primacy of the
individual' over the state. This can be seen especially in the philosophy
permeating both the French and American Revolutions. There have been
a few exceptions to this, but these tend to either be marginalized or
viewed with scorn. In the later half of this century, with the Cold War
between the liberal democracies of the West, and the Communist Soviet
Bloc, the rhetoric of the West centered around the essence of liberal
democracy - freedoms and rights of the individual. In the last ten years,
however, with the end of the Cold War, it is easier for political
philosophers to question these so-called 'foundations' of liberalism, and
in doing so, putting forward a doctrine which suggests that 'community'
is far more important than is considered under traditional liberalism.
This is communitarianism.
The solution to this problem put forward by Sandel and others is to place
value on the community. Although this has been put forward by a
number of political theorists, there can be found a common ground to
help find a workable definition of communitarianism. The most
important feature is that they place a positive value on community. This
has a number of implications. Firstly, a clear advocacy among all
communitarians for involvement in public life, in the form of increased
The University of Dodoma
Department of Political Science and Public Administration
7
participation in small associations. This is one way in which
communitarians avoid the accusation that their theory in practice could
be an excuse for oppression and totalitarianism. In participating in small
groups, each individual can have their case heard, and be taken into
account. Also, the existence of many small groups would help prevent
one particular group building up a great deal of power.