Self-Knowledge, Elenchus and Authority in Early Plato

Author(s): Fiona Leigh

Source: Phronesis , 2020, Vol. 65, No. 3 (2020), pp. 247-280
Published by: Brill

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26952097

REFERENCES
Linked references are available on JSTOR for this article:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26952097?seq=1&cid=pdf-
reference#references_tab_contents
You may need to log in to JSTOR to access the linked references.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
https://about.jstor.org/terms

Brill is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Phronesis

Th�s content downloaded from

5.47.241.132 on Wed, 12 Jun 2024 04:18:59 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
   () -

bri.om/phro

Self-Knowledge, Elenchus and Authority

in Early Plato

Fiona Leigh
Universi Coee, London
ona.leigh@ucl.ac.uk

Abstract

In some o Paos ear diaoes e nd a onern ih orre aserainin he
onens o a pariar kind o ones on pshooia saes, oniive saes.
Indeed, one o he ahievemens o he eeni mehod is o aiiae oniive se-
knoede. In he Alcibiades, moreover, Pao inerpres he Dephi injnion, ‘kno
orse, as ria reqirin oniive se-knoede, and endin in knoin one-
se as sbje o pariar episemi norms. pisemi ahori or se-knoede
is, or Pao, onerred on he basis o orre appiaion o norms o oniive se-
asripions, and no onned o he rs-persona perspeive. This impies rs-
persona plural episemi ahori or se-knoede.

Keywords

se-knoede – eenhs – episemi ahori – diaoe – Alcibiades – Apology –

Laches – Gorgias

1 Introduction

In onemporar disssions o he opi ha has beome knon as ‘se-

knoede, phiosophers no inreqen ask heher knoin he onens
o ones on hoh is ike perepion or somehin more disinive and spe-
ia, or orr abo privieed aess o ones on saes. B onras, shoar

1 ee or exampe, Re , h. , vans , Bohossian , hoemaker , Cassam ,
OBrien , Gerer .

©   , ,  | :./-

Th�s content downloaded from

5.47.241.132 on Wed, 12 Jun 2024 04:18:59 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 g

invesiaion ino se-knoede in anien hoh has in are par osed

on ineres in knoin hins abo onese, mos imporan he sae o ones
mora haraer, so ha se-knoede beomes, in efe, a mora imperaive.
The onras is nie, i someha aeios, apred b Qassim Cassam,
ho ries: ‘On a phiosopher od hink o ain m knoede ha I
beieve ha I am earin a pair o soks “se-knoede”; is erain ar re-
moved rom anhin ha he aniens … od reonize as se-knoede.3
In his paper, I i are or a onepion o se-knoede in some o Paos
ear diaoes—he Apology, Alcibiades, Laches and Gorgias—ha in impor-
an respes ndermines he dissonane hoh o haraerise he respe-
ive objes o se-knoede or anien and onemporar phiosophers. In
hese diaoes, e nd evidene or a onern ih orre aserainin he
onens o, and in ha sense arrivin a knoede abo, a pariar rop
o ones on pshooia saes, hih I sha a oniive saes. Coniive
saes are hose he aen akes o be rh-ap, saes she desribes or exam-
pe as beies or opinions, ho hins seem (seemins), appearanes or saes
o knoin. One o he ahievemens o he eeni mehod as ond in hese
diaoes is o aiiae oniive se-knoede—or so I i are.
In addiion, I i mainain ha in he Alcibiades e an read Pao as se-
onsios inerprein he Dephi injnion o ‘kno orse in sh a
a ha obein is ommand ria reqires oniive se-knoede, and
ends in omprehension o onese as inheren raiona and sbje o raio-
na norms. I his is rih, Paos on onepion o se-knoede, ‘Paoni
se-knoede, and he oa o his eeni mehod boh have oniive se-
knoede a heir ore: Paoni se-knoede is in are par onsied b
oniive se-knoede, ndersood as orre aserainin ha one rea
hinks. I is disinive self-knoede in vire no on o ariin he on-
en o ones on oniive saes b aso b doin so onese, b a o he
aive and se-onsios exerise o ones on apai or reason.
In he rs o seions o he paper I aemp o esabish his readin.
In eion , I examine passaes rom he reevan diaoes and are ha
oniive se-knoede is on dispa. I hen rn in eion  o Paos on
onepion o se-knoede in he Alcibiades and ofer a readin o i as on-
sisin in oniive se-knoede and knoede o orseves as inheren
raiona. ine he readin proposed oes aains he orhodox readin o he
ee-so anao a he end o he Alcibiades (aordin o hih he so is

2 Prominen exampes inde Grisad , nnas , Rappe , herman , Remes
, Kamekar , Renz . ee aso MCabe .
 Cassam , .

  () -

Th�s content downloaded from

5.47.241.132 on Wed, 12 Jun 2024 04:18:59 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
S-wg, Ecu  Autty  Ey t 

someho releive), I bein eion  ih an armen aains ha readin.

In eion , I i ses ha on he readin proposed episemi ahori
or se-knoede is no, or Pao, onerred simp on he basis o op-
in he rs-persona viepoin, b on he basis o appin episemi norms
in sh a a ha makes room or he vies and ahori o ohers hroh
diaoe. This in rn impies rs-persona plural episemi ahori as
reards se-knoede.

2 Cognitive Self-Knowledge in the Apology, Alcibiades, Laches

and Gorgias

2.1 The Apology and the Alcibiades

The re a he hear o ha I have aed oniive se-knoede in he
ear diaoes is oraes, in o respes: Pao depis oraes as himse
havin oniive se-knoede—i.e. havin a orre esimaion o he on-
en o he oniive saes o his on so—and as he praiioner o he
mehod ha aiiaes his on and ohers arriva a oniive se-knoede.
oraes ives an aon o his oniive se-knoede and o he mehod,
oen reerred o in he shoarship as he eeni mehod, in he Apology.
In his deene speeh, oraes assers ha are o ones on so (heautou
epimeleisthai) onsiss in ensrin i is as ood and ise as possibe (-),
and ha his reaes o benes onsiss in disssin vire and esin one-
se and ohers, and hereb ivin an examined ie (a-). oraes ie has
in his a been an examined one, and eviden one res o his examina-
ions is ha he has a disinive oniive kind o se-knoede: he deares
no on ha he does no kno (e.. ha he vires are), b aso ha he does
no hink ha he knos (d-). This aareness is, i seems, a dire res o

4 Apol. -: ‘b I en o eah o o privae and onerred pon him ha I sa is he
reaes bene, b rin o persade him no o are (ἐπιμεεῖσθαι) or an o his beon-
ins beore arin (ἐπιμεηθείη) ha he himse shod be as ood and as ise as possibe (r.
Grbe). C. e, b, b.
5 Apol. a-: ‘On he oher hand, i I sa ha i is he reaes ood or a man o disss vire
ever da and hose oher hins abo hih o hear me onversin and esin mse and
ohers, or he nexamined ie is no orh ivin or men, o i beieve me even ess (r.
Grbe).
6 Apol. d-: πρὸς ἐμαυτὸν δ’ οὖν ἀπιὼν ἐογιζόμην ὅτι τούτου μὲν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐγὼ σοφώτερός
εἰμι· κινδυνεύει μὲν γὰρ ἡμῶν οὐδέτερος οὐδὲν καὸν κἀγαθὸν εἰδέναι, ἀλ’ οὗτος μὲν οἴεταί τι εἰδέ-
ναι οὐκ εἰδώς, ἐγὼ δέ, ὥσπερ οὖν οὐκ οἶδα, οὐδὲ οἴομαι· ἔοικα γοῦν τούτου γε σμικρῷ τινι αὐτῷ τούτῳ
σοφώτερος εἶναι, ὅτι ἃ μὴ οἶδα οὐδὲ οἴομαι εἰδέναι (‘o I ihdre and hoh o mse: “I am
iser han his man; i is ike ha neiher o s knos anhin orhhie, b he hinks

  () -

Th�s content downloaded from

5.47.241.132 on Wed, 12 Jun 2024 04:18:59 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 g

devoin his ime o examinin eah maer, hih examinaion is depied in

he diaoes as akin pae b a o riia onversaion, ih homever
he is abe, henever he is abe. Care o ones on so reqires, or onsiss
in, ross-examinaion as praised b oraes—he eeni mehod. nd a-
hoh he praie proved os o him, oraes sess in he Apology ha
his aim is o brin abo his se-are in his eo henians b sbjein
hem o ross-examinaion (-). I an o ses ha one o he enra
aims o he eeni mehod in he diaoes ha e i ons rom he
ear period—he Alcibiades, Laches and Gorgias—is o ao his inero-
ors o arrive a oniive se-knoede oo, in ha ike oraes he ome
o aserain orre he onens o, and so ome o a orre esimaion o,
heir on oniive saes.
The opi o he Alcibiades is he re sess and lorishin o ibiades
himse, a opi o sh imporane o he mh-êed on man ha he is
iin o onverse ih oraes on is promise aone. oraes qesions
are oniive saes (beies, and saes ha ibiades akes o be kno-
ede) ha ibiades aribes o himse on he opi o jsie and inerna-
iona afairs, ih he res ha ibiades ends p dobin he onen o
his beies and repdiain his aims o knoede. For insane, a -d,
ahoh he onsiders himse o have knoede on hese maers, indeed o
kno beer han he henians, i rns o ha he anno sa ha i is or

he knos somehin hen he does no, hereas hen I do no kno, neiher do I hink I
kno; so I am ike o be iser han him o his sma exen, ha I do no hink I kno ha
I do no kno” : r. Grbe). C. , e.
7 Doe  has ared ha oraes knos himse o ak knoede prior o embarkin
on he proje o ross-examinin ohers and ies a-b (, -). B here oraes
od mean mere ha he embarked on he proje o onrmin o himse ha he Orae
as ron o imp ha he possessed he isdom o someone ho knos, hih proje
reqired a are-sae efor o onsin he aims o ohers o kno ver ide. I so,
hen he ex is onsisen ih he sesion ha, sine oraes always ndersood ha
his ‘hman isdom as orhess, and has on been onerned ih rh and isdom,
and he are o his so (b, e-b, b-d, a; . impii d-), he has simiar on
been enaed in ross-examinaion o his on hohs, and ha o hose he ares or, his
riends, in onversaion.
8 The preise deais o he eeni mehod have been mh disped. Here, i is sfien
or m prposes o adop a minimais—and so, I hope, nonroversia—onepion o he
mehod: an ineroor makes a aim, sa (b no aas) a sbsanive or deniiona
aim abo one o he mora vires; oraes, or he qesioner, hen seres he inero-
ors areemen o rher aims hih aken oeher onradi he oriina aim.
9 I ake i ha Nihoas Dener has shon ha he armens aains aribin he diaoe
o Pao are ess han ompein (, -; . nnas , - and Jirsa . For a re-
en expression o dob, see mih ).

  () -

Th�s content downloaded from

5.47.241.132 on Wed, 12 Jun 2024 04:18:59 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
S-wg, Ecu  Autty  Ey t 

a i o a orre or o do he beer hin in reaion o ar and peae
(d f.). nd a d-e he assers ha he knos ha jsie and injsie
are, e he anno ive an aon o ho he earned i, rom hom, and a
ha prior poin he reaized ha he did no in a kno i (-d), and he
does no sa ha jsie onsiss in.
 d, hen oraes asks heher i has rned o on he basis o heir
onversaion ha ibiades in a has knoede (eidenai, d) o jsie
and injsie, ibiades sas ha i is no ver ike ‘rom ha o sa. nd
here, sinian, oraes makes a rea dea o ss, insisin a some enh
and ih he aid o severa exampes rom e-b ha i is ibiades ho is
makin varios aims, no him.  b- he aain repeas ha he saemen
ha ibiades aks knoede o jsie and injsie is no somehin he,
oraes, sas, b ha ibiades himse is sain (b-; r. Hhinson):

o.: We, hen, hih o s said ha as said?

.: From ha eve areed, oraes, i seems ha I did.
o.: nd ha as said as ha ibiades, he handsome son o Cinias,
doesn ndersand jsie and injsie—hoh he hinks he does—
and ha he is abo o o o he ssemb o advise he henians on
ha he doesn kno anhin abo. Wasn ha i?
.: pparen.

oraes poin is ha i is ibiades himse ho omes o his hiher-order

vie, a vie abo his on rs order saes. oraes hen oes on o persade
ibiades o he beie ha he js is aas advanaeos and never disad-
vanaeos. B oraes mehod o persasion is no o onvine ibiades
o aep some vie o oraes on, on oraes ahori. Insead, he s-
ess ha ibiades od be mos onvined o a aim i i is one he arrives
a himse, and is aare o arrivin a i himse, ein him: ‘I o don hear
orse sa ha js hins are aso advanaeos, hen don beieve anhin
ese I sa (e-). s beore, he exras his opinion rom ibiades on he
basis o is bein enaied b a series o oher beies ha he, ibiades, ap-
pears o hod aread, prior o his qesionin b oraes. ome o hese prior
beies, or exampe, are ha orae is vaed as ood b is possessor, ha
i is ood insoar as i invoves doin ood hins and is admirabe bease o
his, and ha i is probemai o sa ha somehin is ood and bad in he
same respe (d-a). Moreover he rh o hese previos hed beies

10 This as is no expii saed in he ex. I ms, hoever, be read as impied b
(a) ibiades (sre nomorabe) admission o he onsion ha, in sain ha

  () -

Th�s content downloaded from

5.47.241.132 on Wed, 12 Jun 2024 04:18:59 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 g

is somehin ha, pon releion, ibiades eiher reards as erain or as

ear: he is erain ha he vaes orae as a ood (d-e: he od raher die
han be deprived o i), and i seems ear o him ha savin ones riends in
bae is admirabe bease i is an a o somehin ood, orae (e). The
inerenia onneions beeen hese beies and he onsion ha nohin
admirabe insoar as i is admirabe is bad are, on he mos smpahei read-
in, vaid. nd as, he inonsisen beeen his onsion and his previ-
os spposiion a a ha some admirabe hins are bad is made apparen o
him: a he end o he passae, a e, ibiades deares himse beidered,
sain ha he rs hinks one hin and hen anoher. When oraes diano-
ses his sae as one o averin (planasthai, a; . d, d-e) beeen
onliin beies, a sae broh abo b no knoin b hinkin onese
o kno, ibiades one more arees.
Throho his ross-examinaion b oraes, ibiades riia aze is
no on seered b oraes oards he objeive maers menioned in he
disssion, e.. ha jsie is, b aso oards his oher pre-exisin or bak-
rond beies and knoede-aims reevan o sh maers. He is direed
o ari heir onen, and o onsider ha oos rom hem. Conernin
hese objeive isses, proress in a neaive sense is made onernin
ibiades rs-order beies, insoar as some o hem beome ess ompein
o him. Posiive proress is aso made, sine oher beies abo jsie (e..
ha i is aas advanaeos), hih he has rond o ake o be re, ome
o ih. I ake i ha, sine sh resh ariaed beies oo rom ha
ibiades apparen hoh in advane o oraes qesionin, raher han

resin ones riends in bae is admirabe b bad, he mean exa he same as i he
had aed i ood b bad (a-), oeher ih (b) oraes rher onsion ha
‘nohin admirabe, o he exen ha i is admirabe, is bad, and nohin disrae o
he exen ha i is disrae, is ood (a-). (xep here saed oherise, rans-
aions o he Greek are m on.)
11 Contra Dener , - ho, ahoh he seems o reard he reasonin in his passae
(rom a-a) as on he hoe vaid, nds ha o e- probemai. The robe, he
hinks, is ha rom he aims ha orae is admirabe (a-b) and ha orae is ood
(-e) i does no oo ha i is admirabe bease, or insoar as, i is ood. We an
see ha oraes reasonin is deensibe, hoever, b rs noin ha Pao has oraes
empo he aoris a e: ‘o called (προσεῖπας) resin or riends in bae ne, o
he exen ha i is ne, in ha i is an a o a ood hin, name orae (e-). This
ear ooks bak o b-, here ibiades areed o oraes ariaion o his (i.e.
ibiades) vie o orae as a ne hin: ‘o o a a rese o his sor ne, in ha
i is an aemp o save hose i is neessar o save, and his is orae—rih? o i as
ibiades beie a aon ha orae is ne insoar as i is doin somehin, e.. res-
in oved ones, here he (a aon) ndersands sh aions o be ood.

  () -

Th�s content downloaded from

5.47.241.132 on Wed, 12 Jun 2024 04:18:59 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
S-wg, Ecu  Autty  Ey t 

rom ne inormaion or rom he aqisiion o a ne piee o knoede,

he are or Pao in an imporan sense rs-order beies he aread had.
B, in addiion—and sinian or m prposes—Pao akes are o
sho ibiades aso bein ed o se-onsios examine and orm e-
reasoned, i.e. vaid, hiher-order jdemens abo his on rs-order beies
and ha he enai. He rs earns ha he hods a se o beies he rh-
vae o hih, pon releion, he deides is arraned. He aso earns ha
hese beies, proper aried, on heir on enai he beie ha jsie is
aas advanaeos, and so ha he has e-ronded reasons, and in a si-
nian sense aas did have sh reasons, o endorse his beie as his on.
From his he aso earns ha, even hoh he previos se-onsios
avoed he opposie as his beie, in he absene o sron reasons or evidene
in avor o his opposie beie, and in ih o soid reasons or he ne
reveaed beie, he in a has reason o ive p ha previos avoed beie.
Fina, rom hese he earns ha ahoh he deared himse knoedeabe
abo jsie, he no has reason or he vie, hih he endorses, ha he is
no knoedeabe on he sbje, b inoran.3 In idin his hinkin his
a, oraes has ed him o oo a nmber o episemi norms, sandards b
hih he an ome o a orre esimaion o his on beies, and o himse as
knoedeabe (or inoran): his asserions shod exhibi oia onsisen,
his beies oh o be raiona ronded in reasons ha, pon releion, he
akes o be nqesionab or obvios re, he oh o dispa ommimen
o reaions o enaimen beeen aims, and sensiivi o ondiions nder
hih a aim ma be ase, indin an absene o spporin reasons, and
inonsisen ih a e-ronded aim.
 his poin i ma be se o pase and briel ari ha I am not
aimin. I do no an o aim, as ohers have done, ha ibiades earns

12 Noe he emphasis on ibiades anserin qesions abo his on, someha seed,
hohs and onviions rom d-a (. b-d). oraes repeaed asks him ha he
hinks (d, e, e-), ha he is prepared o sa or has said (d, e-, e-), based
on ha he od be iin o aep and ha he ishes (d-, e), and ibiades
repeaed ansers in he rs person, asribin aims, onviions or iinness o him-
se (d, d, d, e, e; a). (The rren debae onernin heher or no doxa
maps on o ‘beie as ha erm is ndersood (roh) in onemporar phiosoph is
orhoona o he onerns o his paper: he oniive saes I i reer o as beies are
saes o akin or endorsin sh-and-sh o be he ase, or o be re, or saes in hih
hins appear as r bein hs-and-sh endorsed b he sbje, reardess o he par-
iar Greek erms sed o express his. ee Moss and hab ).
1 e-b; . a-b.
14 arier in he diaoe as e, oraes had direed him o ake are ha aims he en-
dorses as beonin o himse are no inonsisen ih one anoher (d; . b).

  () -

Th�s content downloaded from

5.47.241.132 on Wed, 12 Jun 2024 04:18:59 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 g

ha he oh o beieve onsisen ih his oher beies, b hih he did
no previos beieve. He earns insead ha he does beieve, ai, a he
eve o rs-order beie, e.. ha jsie is advanaeos. Nor am I aimin,
hoever, ha ibiades a aon had ha is ndersood in he ierare as
he enra kind o ase o ai beie, hih as broh o ih b orai
qesionin. For i is enera aken as a ommon eare o ai beies, sh
as e.. m beie, never previos enerained, ha m siser is arer han an
an, ha he are readi and immediae areed o b he sbje o beie.
The aions o he aen aso enera onorm o he beie rearded as a-
i hed in he pia sense o he erm. Neiher o hese eares, hoever,
haraerize he beies ha oraes reveas his ineroor o possess. When
asked a he ose, his ineroors reqen avo he opposie beie and
oen disavo he beie in qesion, and he are eviden more ike o be-
have in aordane ih ha opposie beie oo. Noneheess he reveaed be-
ies do seem o be some kind o, i.e. some sb-se o, ai beies, insoar as
he sbje is no previos aare o hodin hem, and b he ineroors
on ihs he oo immediae, or ihin a ver sma nmber o ineren-
ia seps, rom ha she is aare o beievin in advane. We mih sa ha i
is a ai beie in he sense ha i is par o he a he sbje aneeden
ook he ord o be, iho havin previos aended o ha par.  rea
nmber o beies beonin o his apia (or non-paradimai) sbse o
ai beie, moreover, i be aribabe o an one o s, a an ime (he
inde haever immediae oos rom oraes ineroors iniia
avoed b evena dob beies). oraes ineres, hoever, is osed
on hose ai b disavoed beies ha i pon releion, and in ih o
he episemi norms menioned above, seem o he ineroor o beon o
him as one o his on. In his a he omes o kno ha he rea hinks or
beieves, and so o have oniive se-knoede.

15 ee or insane, Brikhose and mih , -.

16 Rahana Kamekar seems o ses ha disoverin ones beies in Paos ear dia-
oes via eeni qesionin amons o disoverin ones ai beies in he sense
desribed above. he ries: ‘b aso he doesn kno abo an o he spei beies …
heher he beieves hem or no—i beievin i invoves aepin is enaimens, a-
in on i, and so on (, ). o oo Vasos ,  ih n. . For an overvie and rii-
a disssion o ai beie, see Lan . Hoever, Kamekar aso seems o ake he
ne ariaed beies, ih e.. Brikhose and mih, as hose one oh o beieve
b did no previos. he ries: ‘In a sense, ha one does beieve is deermined (pro-
ded as e as disovered) b ndin o ha to beieve hroh ross-examinaion
(, ).
17 Tha is, he ineroor himse disovers ha his kind o ai beie, hoh iniia dis-
avoed (or is opposie avoed), is raiona ronded and onsisen ih or enaied

  () -

Th�s content downloaded from

5.47.241.132 on Wed, 12 Jun 2024 04:18:59 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
S-wg, Ecu  Autty  Ey t 

2.2 The Laches and the Gorgias

We rn no o he Laches, here, as in he Alcibiades, e aain nd Pao de-
iberae drain aenion o he disinive sbjeive nare o one iem
o orai srin: he oniive saes o his ineroors in reaion o he
objeive maer nder disssion, orae. o aain, oraes ineroors
rh-assessabe hohs abo he expii obje o invesiaion, orae,
are hemseves ear presened b Pao as a enine obje o invesiaion.
This ms ome as no srprise o Niias: prior o he disssion o orae,
he expains o Lsimahs ha he knos rom persona—b apparen no
bier—experiene ha ineviab a disssion ih oraes is imae an
inqir ino nohin oher han onese (e-).  nea exampe o oraes
sbjeive are is iven a b- (r. prae):

La.: We hen, I hink [orae] is a sor o endrane o he so, i i is

neessar o sa ha is nare is in a hese ases.
o.: B i is neessar, a an rae i e are o ive an anser o or
qesion. No his is ha appears (phainetai) o me: I hink (egōimai)
ha o don reard (phainetai) ever kind o endrane as orae. The
reason I hink so (tekmairomai) is his: I am air sre (oida), Lahes, ha
o reard (hēgēi su) orae as a ver ne hin.

oraes oes on o dra o Lahes rher, akin are o sere he eneras
releive areemen a eah sep ha he premise nder onsideraion is a-
eped as one o Lahes on aims: oraes sas ha Lahes vaes one kind
o endrane, ha ih isdom, as ne and nobe (-); ha Lahes a he
same ime diferen evaaes a diferen kind, ha ih ooishness, as harm-
 and injrios (d-); ha Lahes od no a ha is harm and in-
jrios ne, and od no ao ha kind o endrane o be orae sine
orae is ne (d-); and na assers ha Lahes aon (logos) rea
is ha oos rom hese aims, ha ise endrane is orae (d-).
Lahes onrms a eah poin ha hese are his on hohs on he maer,
indin he onsion.
No, prior o his ross-examinaion o his beies abo orae, Lahes had
aimed o have knoede o ha orae as ().  is ose, hoever,

b oher e-ronded beies he hods, hih are a he same ime inonsisen ih
he ineroors iniia avoed beie or aim, on he maer o siniane bein in-
vesiaed. The exen o hih he iniia avoed beie onorms o hese episemi
norms, or as o o ohers, e.. in bein vnerabe o an objeion or havin a bes
eak reason in sppor o is bein he ase, is e or he ineroor o appreiae, or
o invesiae.

  () -

Th�s content downloaded from

5.47.241.132 on Wed, 12 Jun 2024 04:18:59 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 g

Lahes arees ha someone isenin o heir onversaion od no be on-
vined ha he have knoede o orae—ha he parake o i ih heir
ords (e). Noneheess he is no prepared o sa ha he aks knoede o
orae, exaimin insead ha he seems o himse o kno ha i is (noein
emoige dokō) b o his rsraion anno nd a a o seize hod o i ih
ords (a-b). He is reded b orai qesionin o dearin hones
ha he si beieves himse o kno, b sine he anno ariae his rs-
order sae, he ai aeps ha he anno jsi he hiher-order beie-
aim abo ha oniive sae (knoin), and so he an no oner aim o
possess i ih erain.
s ih he Alcibiades, Lahes is repeaed direed o hink abo and
make aims abo his on oniive saes, heher he be prpored saes
o knoin, or saes o akin somehin o be he ase, varios desribed as
hinkin i is he ase or is appearin o him o be he ase. nd, as ih he
Alcibiades, ahoh arab no sbsanive proress is made onernin he
objeive iem o onsideraion, orae, he emerene o he apparen ase-
hood o Lahes and Niiass rs-order beies onernin orae onsies
neaive proress. B onras, hoever, onsiderabe proress is made in he
ndersandin he ineroors have in reaion o heir on rs-order oni-
ive saes. In he ase o Lahes in he passae disssed above, or exampe,
he omes o he reaisaion ha his pre-exisin beies (ha orae is a ne
hin, ha ooishness is no ne), hih pon releion seem o him o be ob-
vios re, enai he rher beie ha ooish endrane is no orae. o
he omes o reaise ha in an imporan sense he had ha beie—hih as,
moreover, a raiona ronded beie—a aon, ahoh he did no kno
i. This in rn enabes him o see he impiaion ha his previos aim, ha
orae is endrane, o he exen ha i appies o ooish endrane, as
ase. nd sine no reasons or rher onsideraions are in vie as sppor or
ha previos aim (aken in is  enerai), adherene o he episemi
norms o onsisen, raiona rondin, ommimen o enaimen rea-
ions and sensiivi o ondiions o asehood jsi (and, e mih hink,
expain) his no reardin i as ase. In he proess, Lahes aso omes o
he reaizaion ha he anno raiona deend his beie ha he has kno-
ede o ha orae is, and so ha he anno jsiab aim o kno ha
he knos.

18 Thoh here is no sope o se o and deend he aim here, he Charmides seems o
provide rher exampes o se-onsios examinaion o he kind desribed aimed a
reveain oniive se-knoede, mos noab in he exhane ih Charmides (a-
a), b arab aso ih Criias (e-d;  f.).

  () -

Th�s content downloaded from

5.47.241.132 on Wed, 12 Jun 2024 04:18:59 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
S-wg, Ecu  Autty  Ey t 

This proess o aqirin oniive se-knoede is aain on dispa—

even more poined—in he Gorgias, here a onden and se-assred Pos
is broh b he same mehod o qesionin o a hiher-order aareness o
he onens o his beies abo jsie. In a srikin exhane a b, oraes
deares ha he, oraes, beieves (oiomai) ha Pos, he himse, and indeed
everbod ese beieves (hēgeisthai) ha i is orse o perperae injsie han
sfer i. Pos, in rern, deares ha or his par he beieves ha he does no
(i.e. beieve ha i is orse o ommi injsie han sfer i), and neiher does
anone ese, indin, he impies, oraes. The exhane is noabe or he
emphasis i paes on he sbjeive nare o he poin o onenion beeen
he o. For eah deares heir hiher-order beies onernin he onens
no on o his on rs-order beies, b aso hose o his opponen—and
indeed everone ese—onernin he reaive vaes o ommiin and s-
erin injsie. To resove heir dispe over he onen o heir on and eah
ohers rs-order beie saes, oraes ses abo qesionin Pos. The re-
s o he exhane, in hih he episemi norms menioned above are aain
in pa, is ha Pos arees ha he hods a series o oher beies ha in rn
ommi him (or so he akes i—he meris o he ner poins o he armen
need no deain s) o he rher beie ha perperain injsie is orse
(b-a). oraes onines o qesion Pos in order o sho him ha
he aso hods addiiona beies ha revea his ommimen o si rher be-
ies. s in he Alcibiades and he Laches, oraes qesionin is desined o
revea o his ineroor oniive saes ha beon o him, he exisene and
onens o hih he had been naare.
Laer, Caies oes on o haene oraes, aimin ha Pos (and be-
ore him, Gorias) did no sa ha he rea hoh o o shame (-e).
Here, Pao inensies he os o inqir, inviin he reader no on o qes-
ion he imae vaidi o oraes reaions o Gorias and Pos, b aso
inviin her o ask: ‘Did he, Gorias and espeia Pos, kno heir on
beies aer a and ere simp ashamed o admi hem, or ere he inoran

19 b-: ΣΩ. ἐγὼ γὰρ δὴ οἶμαι καὶ ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ καὶ τοὺς ἄλους ἀνθρώπους τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖ-
σθαι κάκιον ἡγεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ μὴ διδόναι δίκην τοῦ διδόναι. ΠΩΛ. Ἐγὼ δέ γε οὔτ’ ἐμὲ οὔτ’ ἄλον
ἀνθρώπων οὐδένα (‘o.: For I do beieve ha o and I and everbod ese onsider doin
has njs orse han sferin i, and no pain ha is de orse han pain i.
Po.: nd I do beieve ha I don, and ha no oher person does, eiher; r. D. J. Ze).
20 Noe ha oraes emphasises ha his is Poss on opinion, poinin o ha a he,
oraes, needs is a iness o one, viz. Pos, and nderinin ha i is ‘or (hēmin) ver-
di on he maer a hand (e-a).
21 For exampe, he beie shared ih oraes and earier rejeed b Pos as no his on,
ha i is no he ors hin o pa ones de in reompense or an injsie, b ha e-
in aa ih i is orse (e).

  () -

Th�s content downloaded from

5.47.241.132 on Wed, 12 Jun 2024 04:18:59 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 g

o a eas some o heir beies, aer reveaed o hem b oraes? oraes,

o orse, oes on o qesion Caies ih he same ress.  one poin,
aer Caies assers ha oraes does no aree ih him ha he peasan
and he ood are he same, oraes repies a e- ha he does no, and
he ein adds: ‘and I beieve ha Caies doesn eiher hen he omes
o see himse rih.3 s ih he oher diaoes disssed, in addiion o
se-knoede o heir oniive saes, Pos and Caies are inroded o
episemi norms, and are hereb iven he resores o earn—even i he
so resis he esson—ha he are in a inoran abo maers he de-
are hemseves o kno, and o be abe o eah.

2.3 The Elenchus and Self-Knowledge

Beore movin on o disss Paos on ndersandin o he Dephi in-
jnion o ‘kno hse in he Alcibiades, i i be se o nderine he
sbsanive ahievemen o he eenhs, orre depoed, as reards se-
knoede. I has been ho debaed b shoars heher Pao oneived o he
eenhs as enabin is praiioner o esabish he rh o an aims abo,
or aain knoede in reaion o, he rs-order objeive maer o inqir.
In reaion o se-knoede, i has aso been observed more han one in he
ierare ha he eenhs enabes he ineroor o ome o kno her on
inorane. Wha has been overooked in his debae, and ha I hope o
have shon here, is ha one oa and ahievemen o he mehod is o brin
he ineroor o knoede o—a orre rasp o he onens o—heir
pre-exisin beies reevan o he enra objeive iem o invesiaion—
pia, in he ear diaoes, he nare o some vire. These beies need
no be saes hih he ineroor has previos enerained (he need no

22 oraes es Caies o anser qesions abo his on beies, and seres areemen
rom him, a imes berdin, o aims he had earier disavoed, noab ha peasre
and oodness are no he same hin (a; . d-e).
2 e-: Οὐχ ὁμοογεῖ· οἶμαι δέ γε οὐδὲ Καλικῆς, ὅταν αὐτὸς αὑτὸν θεάσηται ὀρθῶς (‘He
doesn aree. nd I beieve ha Caies doesn eiher, hen he omes o see himse
rih).
24 These inde Greor Vasos, ho amos ared ha Pao did so oneive o he
eenhs, hoh he as no, sri speakin, enied o (; . ), Terene Irin
(, - n. ; -) and Gai Fine (, esp. ), eah o hom have aso ared
ha Pao rearded he eenhs as enabin he ineroor o arrive a rh, and Hh
Benson (), ho has ared renhan ha he did no.
25 For insane, Benson , esp. -. More reen Kamekar has sesed ha
oraes knoede o his on inorane is arrived a as a res o his appiaion o he
mehod o ross-examinaion or eenhs o himse, and ha he mehod is apabe o
brinin an ineroor o rasp his on inorane (, -).

  () -

Th�s content downloaded from

5.47.241.132 on Wed, 12 Jun 2024 04:18:59 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
S-wg, Ecu  Autty  Ey t 

have been orren saes a some ime), b are sh ha b he inero-
ors on ihs, and in onormi ih he episemi norms empoed b he
mehod, he immediae oo rom ha she has previos enerained,
and has reason o ee sere in. In ha sense hese beies beon in he iner-
oors beie se, and nmber amon her ommimens. nd ahoh he
ineroor as previos inoran o ha a, he eenhs an ead her o
rasp i, and so o have se-knoede o hose oniive saes. Indeed, as e
have seen, i is this se-knoede ha makes possibe he ineroors reai-
saion o her onradior vies—and hene her on inorane—and ps
her in a posiion o raiona re-evaae hose vies.
One ore nion o he eenhs, hen, is posiive: he ork o he mehod
is direed oards invesiain he ronds or reasons he ineroor has
or beies hidden rom her on vie. B onras, he ronds or moive or
her opposin, avoed beies or onden aims o knoede are no hem-
seves he objes o srin via eenhs in he diaoes. The pervasive s-
esion, hoever, is ha hese opposin, avoed vies are adoped on some
basis oher han raiona releion: Lahes knoede-aims abo orae
seem o rele ra aeped paradims, Niias profered deniion is
one he assers as based on somehin he one heard oraes sa, hie Pos
and Caies onsisen propond aims ih hih, he ake i, he major-
i od aree. nd, as Dener has sesed, ibiades beie ha he ne
and he advanaeos an someimes ome apar as probab earned rom
he oraors, hom he dobess ook o be ahoriaive.  he end o he
eeni enoner eah has ih oraes, hese iniia avoed beies are
serios haened and he ineroor rasps (or is in a posiion o rasp)
his on inorane. This is no simp bease he vie ha has emered
and opposes he iniia avoed vie is seen as raiona ronded, b be-
ase he ineroor no sees ha he more e-ronded vie is a beie
o his on (and in an imporan sense as his on a aon). Wha is more,

26 Laches e, -e, -d. For he vie ha Lahess deniions o orae, pariar
his rs deniion o i as ‘sandin rm in bae ariaes a paradim o orae aive
in hens a he ime, see Rabbås .
27 Gorgias e-; e-a; e-a.
28 Dener ,  observes ha he onras o he advanaeos ih he ne as, as
risoe noes, a ihé or he oraors, and as nea israed b he exampe o
hies neein his on bene in order o oraeos rese Paros and so
a ne (risoe, Rhet. b-a, . Isoraes .). Noe ha Ompiodors,
In Alc. - aims ha oraes insrs ibiades no o aep vies rom sores
oside himse, riin ‘so ha his armens od no be ormed rom iho, ike
a ieess vesse ha hods aer [pored] rom oside (as ransaed and disssed in
Coope ).

  () -

Th�s content downloaded from

5.47.241.132 on Wed, 12 Jun 2024 04:18:59 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 g

he se-onsios riia releion on ones on oniive saes demanded

b he eeni mehod res boh he adopion o episemi norms as ones
on, and he aareness o onese as raiona, ha is, as ormin beies on he
basis o ones on deensibe reasons (I rern o his in eion . beo).
oraes eeni mehod hereore aiiaes se-knoede o oniive
saes, and enoraes he rasp o onese as an inheren raiona aen sb-
je o raiona norms.

3 Plato on Knowing Oneself in the Alcibiades

3.1 Interpretive Issues

The Dephi oraes injnion o ‘kno orse (gnōthi sauton) is menioned
in a nmber o Paos diaoes hroho he orps, rom he Charmides—
enera hoh o be rien ear in Paos areer—o he Laws—enera
hoh o be rien ae. In one so-aed ear diaoe, hoever, he
Alcibiades, he oraes exhoraion is expii inked o an exended riia
disssion o knoin onese.3
The Dephi injnion is menioned in assoiaion ih hree diferen
passaes in he diaoe.  b, oraes admonishes ibiades o kno
himse as i ommands. In response, ibiades admis ha he needs o -
ivae or are or himse (epimeleomai, b; . -d f.). oraes nex

29 ppor or js his vie o he eenhs is ond in he desripion o ha mehod in
he Sophist. There, he eai raner desribes a ‘nobe sophis ho eanses sos b
a o riddin peope o heir ase beies in heir on isdom (b-b). He rs
exras he ineroors beies and as hem side b side, exposin he opposiions
or onradiions beeen hem. This makes he ineroor read o expe he robe-
some beies, desribed b he raner as ‘randiose and sbborn (μεγάων καὶ σκηρῶν
δοξῶν, ) and obsaes o knoede. The nobe sophis is desribed as ‘expein
hose beies ha are an impedimen o earnin, and makes him [i.e. he ineroor]
eansed, hinkin himse o kno on hose hins he does kno, and no more (d-
: τὰς τοῖς μαθήμασιν ἐμποδίους δόξας ἐξεών, καθαρὸν ἀποφήνῃ καὶ ταῦτα ἡγούμενον ἅπερ
οἶδεν εἰδέναι μόνα, πείω δὲ μή). s e have seen rom he ear diaoes, some o he
hins ha peope rih ake hemseves o kno aer eeni qesionin i be rs-
order, sh as Lahes vie ha on endrane ha is no oo-hard od be ora-
eos. B ohers i be hiher-order, sh as Lahes aim, shod he are o asser i,
ha his is indeed somehin ha he knos.
0 There is aso a ink beeen Criias onepion o se-knoede—a onepion ha
is reveaed o be someha zz and dif o ndersand—hih he proposes as his
aon o ha emperane onsiss in, and he Dephi oraes prononemen in he
Charmides. I onsider some o hese dif passaes beo, b or rher disssion,
see MCabe .

  () -

Th�s content downloaded from

5.47.241.132 on Wed, 12 Jun 2024 04:18:59 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
S-wg, Ecu  Autty  Ey t 

appeas o he injnion a a, hen he sess ha in order o efe sh
se-are, ibiades oh o heed he orae so as o kno ha he himse is,
mos o a (. e). This rns o o be his so. For he hird and na ime,
he injnion is smmoned o indiae ha se-knoede sri speak-
in invoves he apprehension o ha par o he so ih hih one knos
and ndersands, and in hih isdom is oaed (, b-). The some-
ha rpi passae ha desribes he sos se-knoede, onainin he
imae o an ee seein is imae in he ppi o anohers ee and presened as
an anao o he se-knoin so (-), is dif and ambios. o
ha Paos inerpreaion o he Dephi oraes prononemen imae
amons o in he diaoe—Paos onepion o se-knoede, or ‘Paoni
se-knoede—ise reqires inerpreaion.
We sar b noin ha he insripions inrodion ino he diaoe a
b marks he rnin poin or he vainorios ibiades. B his poin,
as e have seen, oraes has shon he on man ha his opinions abo
himse ere misaken: he did no kno ha he rea beieved or ha he
beieved himse o kno onernin jsie and injsie, and he ood o he
polis. s e as akin a proper rasp o his oniive saes, he is aso shon
o ai o appreiae his enera sae o bein nknoin, nedaed and on
moderae eah—ha is, as naare o his abiiies and maeria resores
in omparison ih oher prospeive naiona eaders. er he rs appear-
ane o he Dephi insripion, hen, se-knoede in Paos hands appears
o inorporae knoin ones on oniive saes as js one par o ha i is
o kno onese. On his readin, he obje o Paoni se-knoede od
be broader han oniive se-knoede, aso inorporain knoede o
reaiona and poiia as abo onese, sh as ones soia sandin and
maeria resores (as some shoars have onended).3 In ine ih his om-
pex and oard-ookin vie o he se and se-knoede, he majori o
shoars ake he seond and hird invoaion o he insripion oeher as
sesin ha e see a releion o orseves in or reaions or ineraions
ih ohers, and hereb ain se-knoede. This hoh an be leshed o
in a nmber o as. The sos se-knoede od be rearded as nees-
sari aiiaed b he sbjes oniive rasp, via diaoe ih anoher,
o he onen o ha oher persons hoh or knoede abo he sbje
herse—abo her so, is onens, is abii o reason, or is aivi o
knoin. On his readin, he onen o he oher persons hoh is aken as
an imae or represenaion o he se-knoers so, or is onens, abiiies
or aiviies: he so sees ise or is onens in he mind o anoher, as i i

1 .. nnas ; Remes .

  () -

Th�s content downloaded from

5.47.241.132 on Wed, 12 Jun 2024 04:18:59 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 g

ere a releion. ernaive, he sos abii o kno ise od be aken
o depend pon he sbjes apprehension o he so o anoher person, or is
onens, abiiies or aiviies, oeher ih he reaizaion ha he o sos
are aike in his respe. On his vie he so sees ise or is onens as bein
js ike ha o anoher, hih hs as as a kind o releion.
ains hese readins, hoever, I i are or an aernaive inerpre-
aion. I bein b sesin ha a ose readin o he ex reveas ses-
sive renemens and so a narroin o he proper or ndamena obje o
Paoni se-knoede ha exdes he soia and he orporea, e reains
he mark o individai.3 eond, I i are ha he poin o he anao
ih he se-seein ee in he na passae is o esabish ha, anaoos
ih an ee, he sos aivi is on direed a ise i some mehanism
is empoed o aer is pia non-relexive reaion o is obje, so ha i
beomes relexive. In he ase o he ee, he mehanism ms be exerna,
and reqires an exerna releive srae, hie in he ase o he so, is
vie o ise is deivered b sandin in a hiher-order reaion o oer-order
aivi. ine he mehanism or he sos rasp o is bes and proper aivi
is releive, hiher-order hoh, i is abe o aompish his eiher dire
(i.e. on is on and iho reorse o anhin exerna o ise), or indi-
re, in onversaion ih anoher.
In reaion o he obje o se-knoede, noie rs ha oraes shis he
os rom he normaive aim ha one oh o kno onese o he qesion
o ha he proper obje o se-knoede is.  b he asks ho he mih
nd o ha he ‘ise aded o in he Dephi insripion is, in ise, and
proeeds o are ha his is ha onese is, raher han ha beons o one-
se.33 This is hen said o be he so as opposed o he bod or maeria pos-
sessions, hih are sed as beonins. He iners ha he injnion o kno
onese just is he ommand o kno ones so (e-; . b-), an expii
modiaion o he earier, mh broader haraerizaion o se-knoede
as inorporain a orre rasp o soia and maeria as abo onese.
The seond and na orreive renemen o he obje o se-knoede
is sinaed b he sesion ha he had previos misndersood he

2 Hene he proposed readin is o be disinished rom ha hih akes he Alcibiades
o ses ha se-knoede onsiss in apprehendin onese as a raiona bein in
onras o knoin eares o onese qua individa, sh as ones soia posiion, har-
aer, vaes, beies or desires. ee e.. Johnson .
 For deaied disssion o he vie ha he sbje here is he ‘ise, raher han some
noion o he ‘se more amiiar o modern or onemporar readers, see Gi .

  () -

Th�s content downloaded from

5.47.241.132 on Wed, 12 Jun 2024 04:18:59 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
S-wg, Ecu  Autty  Ey t 

insripion (-).3 oraes hen indiaes b a o he ee-so ana-

o ha se-knoede reqires he so o see (blepein) and proper rasp
(gignōskein) ha reion (topos) o ise in hih is ood aivi or vire
(aretē) ors (idenied as knoin, ndersandin, and isdom), as e
as o apprehend ndersandin (phronēsis). oraes sas ha a person ho
rasps his aso rasps himse mos o a (malista, ), and eviden ideni-
es his ih knoin onese (-). The na,  rened onepion o
he obje o se-knoede is, hereore, onned o he nes aivi o so,
vire, in onras o properies or eares o he sbje onsied b her
reaions o ohers or her orporeai. The prpose o hese renemens be-
omes ear in he onex o ibiades oa o se-ivaion (d-e, b,
d): i ibiades is mos o a he par o his so apabe o knoede and is-
dom, hen is exeene i be his exeene, he oa o se-improvemen.
Paoni se-knoede hs brins he oa o se-ivaion ino os. s I
i are beo (eion .), oniive se-knoede is a neessar ompo-
nen o Paoni se-knoede, as is he adopion o he episemi norms a
pa in he eeni mehod.

3.2 The ‘Relective Soul’ Reading of the Analogy

I rn no o he inerpreaion o he ee-so anao as poinin o he need
or a mehanism o ransorm he norma non-relexive reaion beeen
he so and is obje ino a relexive reaion. B sine his is a odds ih
he inerpreaion o he anao iven b mos ommenaors—indin a
ver reen onribor o his jorna, Danie Ferson ()—aordin o
hih he anao sess ha se-knoede reqires somehin exerna o
he so o rele or mirror i (or is onens or haraerisis) bak o ise, I
sha rs provide an armen aains ha readin.
The direedness o ineniona hoh invies an anao ih vision. ih
is aas direed a somehin, and seein is aas a seein o somehin, no
maer ho indeerminae or vae. o oo he oniive aivi o he so
exhibis direedness in bein ineniona, in bein abo somehin. In vi-
sion, he direed reaion beeen he seein ee and is obje is sri non-
relexive, so ha he ee reqires a mirrorin srae in order o see an imae
o ise releed bak o ise. B he ex oh no be aken o ses ha
he se-knoin reaion, ike he se-seein reaion, is neessari mediaed
b somehin exerna o he so hih afords a releed imae o he so

4 oraes sas: ‘B b he Gods, didn e ndersand ha admirabe insripion rom
Dephi, hih e ere js no akin abo? (ἆρα πρὸς θεῶν εὖ έγοντος οὗ νυνδὴ ἐμνή-
σθημεν τοῦ Δεφικοῦ γράμματος οὐ συνίεμεν;).

  () -

Th�s content downloaded from

5.47.241.132 on Wed, 12 Jun 2024 04:18:59 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 g

or is aivi, or o reasons. Firs, here is no exa evidene o releion or
mirrorin in he ase o he so. eond, a passae in he Charmides onsi-
es sron evidene aains aribin sh a vie (arab, a qesionabe
vie) o Pao. I bein b qoin he reevan seion rom he Alcibiades in
 (d-, r. Hhinson, modied):

o.: I e o ha I sspe ha insripion means, and ha advie
is ivin s. There ma no be man exampes o i, exep he ase o
sih.
.: Wha do o mean b ha?
o.: Yo hink abo i, oo. I he insripion ook or ees o be men
and advised hem, ‘ee orse, ho od e ndersand sh advie?
hodn he ee be ookin a somehin in hih i od see ise?
.: Obvios.
o.: Then es hink o somehin ha aos s o see boh i and or-
seves hen e ook a i.
.: Obvios, oraes, o mean mirrors and ha sor o hin.
o.: Qie rih. nd isn here somehin ike ha in he ee, ih
hih e see?
.: Cerain.
o.: Im sre ove noied ha hen a man ooks ino an ee his ae
appears in he ppi (opsis) o he one opposie, ike in a mirror. We a
his he ‘ppi (korē), or is a kind o imae o he man hos ookin.
.: Yore rih.
o.: Then an ee i see ise i i observes an ee and ooks a he bes
par o i, he par ih hih i an see.
.: o i seems.
o.: B i on see ise i i ooks a anhin ese in a man, or anhin
ese a a, ness is simiar o he ee.
.: Yore rih.
o.: o i an ee is o see ise, i ms ook a an ee, and a ha reion
o i in hih he ood aivi (aretē) o an ee aa ors, and his,
I presme, is a ppi (opsis).
.: Thas rih.
o.: Then i he so, ibiades, is o kno ise, i ms ook a a so,
and espeia a ha reion in hih he ood aivi (aretē) o he so,
isdom, omes abo, and a anhin ese hih is simiar o i.
.: I aree ih o, oraes.
o.: Can e sa ha here is anhin abo he so hih is more di-
vine ha ha here knoin and ndersandin ake pae?

  () -

Th�s content downloaded from

5.47.241.132 on Wed, 12 Jun 2024 04:18:59 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
S-wg, Ecu  Autty  Ey t 

.: No, e an.

o.: o his par o i is ike od, and one ho ooks o his and knos
everhin divine, boh od and isdom, od kno himse mos o a.
.: I seems so.3

I Pao had aned oraes o sa ha he so, or is haraerisis or a-
iviies ere releed bak o i, he od have ver easi done so. imiar,
he od have rien ha in order or he so o kno ise i ms ook o
anoher so i he had aned o. B in boh ases, he did no.
In response o his obsae o he ‘releive so readin, Ferson rs
onedes ha i ‘ms be admied ha nohin in he anao ise expii
haraerises he so as releive, beore arin ha eaker exa evidene
an be ond a ie aer in he diaoe.3  d, here is a desripion o
ha is amos erain he so as ‘brih (lampron), and hih ver ike
reers bak o he ee-so anao. ine Pao ses his erm esehere o de-
sribe a releive srae (Tim. b and  are ied), Ferson ondes
ha i an be read as makin expii ha (in his vie) as impii in he
anao, viz. he releive nare o he so. The sesion, hoever, is dbi-
os. hoh Pao does se lampron o desribe releive sraes, he mh
more oen ses i o desribe somehin as havin he proper o bein bri-
ian, minos or exepiona in some respe, and no as bein releive. o

5 d-: ΣΩ. Ἐγώ σοι φράσω, ὅ γε ὑποπτεύω έγειν καὶ συμβουεύειν ἡμῖν τοῦτο τὸ γράμμα.
κινδυνεύει γὰρ οὐδὲ πολαχοῦ εἶναι παράδειγμα αὐτοῦ, ἀλὰ κατὰ τὴν ὄψιν μόνον. ΑΛ. Πῶς
τοῦτο έγεις; ΣΩ. Σκόπει καὶ σύ. εἰ ἡμῶν τῷ ὄμματι ὥσπερ ἀνθρώπῳ συμβουεῦον εἶπεν “ἰδὲ
σαυτόν,” πῶς ἂν ὑπεάβομεν τί παραινεῖν; ἆρα οὐχὶ εἰς τοῦτο βέπειν, εἰς ὃ βέπων ὁ ὀφθαμὸς
ἔμελεν αὑτὸν ἰδεῖν; ΑΛ. Δῆον. ΣΩ. Ἐννοῶμεν δὴ εἰς τί βέποντες τῶν ὄντων ἐκεῖνό τε ὁρῷμεν
ἅμα ἂν καὶ ἡμᾶς αὐτούς; ΑΛ. Δῆον δή, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι εἰς κάτοπτρά τε καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. ΣΩ.
Ὀρθῶς έγεις. οὐκοῦν καὶ τῷ ὀφθαμῷ ᾧ ὁρῶμεν ἔνεστί ‹ τι › τῶν τοιούτων; ΑΛ. Πάνυ γε. ΣΩ.
Ἐννενόηκας οὖν ὅτι τοῦ ἐμβέποντος εἰς τὸν ὀφθαμὸν τὸ πρόσωπον ἐμφαίνεται ἐν τῇ τοῦ κατα-
ντικρὺ ὄψει ὥσπερ ἐν κατόπτρῳ, ὃ δὴ καὶ κόρην καοῦμεν, εἴδωον ὄν τι τοῦ ἐμβέποντος; ΑΛ.
Ἀηθῆ έγεις. ΣΩ. Ὀφθαμὸς ἄρα ὀφθαμὸν θεώμενος, καὶ ἐμβέπων εἰς τοῦτο ὅπερ βέτιστον
αὐτοῦ καὶ ᾧ ὁρᾷ, οὕτως ἂν αὑτὸν ἴδοι. ΑΛ. Φαίνεται. ΣΩ. Εἰ δέ γ εἰς ἄλο τῶν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου
βέποι ἤ τι τῶν ὄντων, πὴν εἰς ἐκεῖνο ᾧ τοῦτο τυγχάνει ὅμοιον, οὐκ ὄψεται ἑαυτόν. ΑΛ. Ἀηθῆ
έγεις. ΣΩ. Ὀφθαμὸς ἄρ εἰ μέλει ἰδεῖν αὑτόν, εἰς ὀφθαμὸν αὐτῷ βεπτέον, καὶ τοῦ ὄμματος
εἰς ἐκεῖνον τὸν τόπον ἐν ᾧ τυγχάνει ἡ ὀφθαμοῦ ἀρετὴ ἐιγνομένη· ἔστι δὲ τοῦτό που ὄψις; ΑΛ.
Οὕτως. ΣΩ. Ἆρ οὖν, ὦ φίε Ἀκιβιάδη, καὶ ψυχὴ εἰ μέλει γνώσεσθαι αὑτήν, εἰς ψυχὴν αὐτῇ
βεπτέον, καὶ μάιστ εἰς τοῦτον αὐτῆς τὸν τόπον ἐν ᾧ ἐίγνεται ἡ ψυχῆς ἀρετή, σοφία, καὶ εἰς
ἄλο ᾧ τοῦτο τυγχάνει ὅμοιον ὄν; ΑΛ. Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. Ἔχομεν οὖν εἰπεῖν ὅτι ἐστὶ
τῆς ψυχῆς θειότερον ἢ τοῦτο, περὶ ὃ τὸ εἰδέναι τε καὶ φρονεῖν ἐστιν; ΑΛ. Οὐκ ἔχομεν. ΣΩ. Τῷ θεῷ
ἄρα τοῦτ ἔοικεν αὐτῆς, καί τις εἰς τοῦτο βέπων καὶ πᾶν τὸ θεῖον γνούς, θεόν τε καὶ φρόνησιν,
οὕτω καὶ ἑαυτὸν ἂν γνοίη μάιστα. ΑΛ. Φαίνεται.
6 Ferson , . For rher disssion, see Tarran .

  () -

Th�s content downloaded from

5.47.241.132 on Wed, 12 Jun 2024 04:18:59 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 g

Paos oasiona se o he erm o indiae releiveness in oher diaoes

on is on es s nohin abo his se o i a Alc. d.
Indeed, oser examinaion o his se o he erm esehere reveas ompe-
in evidene or readin i a d as indiain he non-releive sense o
bein briian as opposed o he releive sense. O he en-o oher ses
b Pao, eiheen ear arr he ‘briiane sense o lampron, heher ap-
pied o phsia or non-phsia objes.3 This sense o lampron is aso sed
o objes ha are divine. In he Sophist, he phiosopher is said o be hard o
disern bease o his proximi o he orm o Bein and he resin brih-
ness o he enera area (a). The raner hen remarks on he dif o
keepin he sos ees on he divine. In he Timaeus, Timaes sas he demi-
re made he divine ass (he sars) o o re in order ha he be as brih
as possibe (lamprotaton, a) and mos beai—he order o expanaion
sesin ha speraive briiane is mos in or he divine. B onras,
he or ses o lampron ha desribe a releive srae a reer o phsia
eniies, and ope he erm ih ‘smooh (leion): in he Timaeus, releion
is expained as re rom he releed obje meein he re o vision on a
‘smooh and brih srae (leion kai lampron, b); in a aer passae, hih
Ferson ies, he iver is desribed a b as ashioned as ‘brih and smooh
(leion kai lampron) so ha hohs move in i ‘as in a mirror, and a  i is
aain said o be brih and ikened o a mirror; in he Sophist, releions are
desribed as resin rom ih hiin sraes ha are ‘brih and smooh
(lampra kai leia) a .
No, a Alc. d-, oraes sas ha, as he have previos disssed
(d), ibiades and he i i ook oards ha is ‘brih and divine in be-
omin emperae and js, and in doin so i see and kno hemseves. The
bakards reerene sron sess he par o he so disssed earier in
he anao, hih as desribed as bein divine (; . , ). There is no
ak here a d- (or esehere) o releions or o nionin ‘as a mirror,
and he erm ‘smooh (leion) is aso absen. o, contra Ferson, here is no
evidene o he ‘releive sense o lampron. Moreover, he obje desribed,
he so, is presmab one ha Pao akes o be a non-phsia obje.3
These aors, oeher ih he opin o lampron ih he divine a d
(ehoin he assoiaion o he bes par o he so as divine a ), makes

7 In hese eiheen orrenes, lampron desribes somehin no as a releive srae

b as brih (e.. sonds, Phlb. d), briian (e.. he sn, Tht. d), minos (e..
ih, Rep. b, e; opper, Ti. ) or exepiona (e.. a person, Grg. e; ahons
isdom, Symp. e). ee aso Phd. , Sph. a, Phdr. b, Hipp. Mi. d, Ti.
a, a, a, b, , Rep. a, e.
8 The so is disinished rom and onrased ih he bod a e-.

  () -

Th�s content downloaded from

5.47.241.132 on Wed, 12 Jun 2024 04:18:59 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
S-wg, Ecu  Autty  Ey t 

i erain, in m vie, ha he ‘briiane sense o lampron is bein empoed.

We ms onde, hen, ha readin or ex as sesin ha he so, ike
he ees ppi, is releive, is speios.3
The seond probem or he ‘releive so readin is ha i reqires arib-
in a vie o Pao ha he Charmides shos him nike o have aeped.
On he releive so readin, js as an ee anno on is on dire see
ha par o ise ih hih i sees, so oo a so anno on is on dire
apprehend ha reion o ise ih hih i knos and is ise: in boh ases
anoher js ike i is reqired o rele i, or is bes aivi, bak o ise. On
his readin, Pao reards he sos dire knoin ise knoin as an im-
possibii. The Charmides, hoever, es aains his.
 - oraes asks heher an aies or poers an be appied o
hemseves. ah a has a propriear kind o obje: oor is he proper
obje o sih, peasre o desire, opinions o he opinabe, so ha e.. here
is no seein ha does no see some oor (-d, d-e). I e ndersand
he idea o a poer appin o ise as he exerise o ha poer a a hiher-
order eve direed o is exerise a he rs-order eve, hen he hiher-order
exerise o a poer od on be possibe i he rs-order aivi possessed
he reevan eares o he obje propriear o ha poer. o i seein o
seein is possibe, rs-order seein i have o be oored, and so visibe o
hiher-order seein, and i opinin o opinin is possibe, rs-order beievin
i ise have o be opinabe, and so avaiabe o he hiher-order aivi.
Nex, and imporan or m prposes in his paper, oraes ares aains
he appiaion o he aies o perepion o hemseves, in onras o he
appiaion o he a o knoin o ise. For, he reasons, i is dob
ha seein is ise oored, or ha hearin ise possesses sond (-d).
The perepa ase is sharp onrased ih he episemi ase: oraes
ives a are and redibe anasis o he hiher-order sae o knoin ones
on knoin, in hih he onen o rs-order knoin is embedded in he

9 noher, speaive, aernaive is o amend he ex in sh a a ha i does ses he
sos releiveness, an aernaive ared or b Tarran . Hoever, sine Tarrans
reasonin proeeds rom he assmpion ha he ‘releive so readin ms be orre,
he speaive emendaion anno on as a onsideraion in avor o ha readin.
40 oraes does no sa ha he denin haraerisi o he opinabe is—perhaps, e
mih hink, i is ha is rh-ap.
41 He aso poins o he maeria asa reaions invoved in sensaion, and reas hem, i
seems, eiher as ases o moion and hea, or as ike hose ases: i od prode disbe-
ie, he sas, o ses ha an sor o moion od move ise, or hea brn ise (e-
a). hoh his preise meanin here is no ear, his poin seems o be he pasibe
hoh ha a maeria aivi, onsied b asa reaions and ise an aaisaion
o a poer, anno a pon ise.

  () -

Th�s content downloaded from

5.47.241.132 on Wed, 12 Jun 2024 04:18:59 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 g

onen o he hiher-order sae. His exampe is he door ho knos, o his
on ords and deeds (and hose o ohers), ha he aord ih knoede
o heah. He hs knos himse o be a knoer o mediine in knoin what
he knos (as opposed o knoin mere that he knos) (b-d). This on-
epion o he hiher-order sae o knoin ones on knoin makes robe
or Criias (mos reen) aon o se-knoede in ha diaoe as kno-
in (mere) ha one knos. B he nare and possibii o he hiher-order
sae, and so his ase o a poer ha appies o ise, is never dobed.
On he dire appiaion o a poer o ise is onsidered in he passaes
rom he Charmides—seein indire, b a o mirrors, is no disssed.
This is bease oraes onern is ih heher and in ha a poers b
heir nare app o hemseves (a-). To his inqir, seein via rele-
ion is irreevan. For he obje o seein in his ase is no—and b deni-
ion anno be—he sbje o seein, sine a releion is an imae o ha
sbje. To be sre, i is visibe (i is oored), and i onsies sron visa
evidene onernin ha sbje (nder norma irmsanes). B i oh
no be onsed ih ha sbje: seein (an imae o) onese seein in a mir-
ror is no hiher-order seein. B onras, oraes sess, hiher-order
oniion an be direed a oer-order oniion. B a o embedded on-
en, he oer-order sae (o beievin, or knoin) is made avaiabe (beiev-
abe, knoabe) o he hiher-order sae. Wha Pao ares in he Charmides,
hen, is ha dire, relexive reaions beeen hiher- and oer-order saes
o knoin are possibe (and in some ases, aa), hie he are no possibe
in he ase o perepion. This in rn ass dob on he presmpion, ria
o he ‘releive so readin o he Alcibiades, ha in Paos vie, he so,
ike he ee, sands in need o an exerna mehanism o make ise avaiabe,
or is on knoin and ndersandin avaiabe, o ise, as somehin i an
rasp b a o an indire reaion.

3.3 The Proposed Reading of the Eye-Soul Analogy

 more araive and pasibe readin o he anao, I ses, is ha i is
desined o make o, reaed poins. One is ha in order or he sos ap-
prehension o be o ise, is oniive aze—hih, js ike ha o he ee, is
sa direed oards somehin oher han ise—ms beome relexive.
In he ase o an ee, a mirror is needed o mediae is seein an imae o ise.
In he ase o he so, hoever, as e have been shon in he earier, een-
i passaes in he diaoe, a hiher-order (and so dire relexive) orm o

42 Contra Zina Giannopoo, ho ries ha he ee-so anao in he Alcibiades de-
sribes a ase o seond-order seein (, -).

  () -

Th�s content downloaded from

5.47.241.132 on Wed, 12 Jun 2024 04:18:59 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
S-wg, Ecu  Autty  Ey t 

hoh, direed a oer-order hoh in he so, is possibe (and hih I

disss rher beo). o no sh mediaion or exerna mirrorin is needed
or he so, or hih reason none is speied.
The seond poin addresses he overarhin qesion ha rames he ana-
o a he sar o or passae: ho o e he eares knoede o orseves
(). In he onex o his qesion, oraes poins o ha or an ee o be
se-seein, i is no enoh ha i ooks a an ee, b raher ms ook a ha
par o i, he ppi (opsis), ih hih i enaes in is enra aivi, seein
(his is raked b he srin o daives rom a o b). In so doin i es he
eares vie o ha he ee rea is, sine i vies ha reion o i ih hih
is denin aivi ors. Moreover, as Jaqes Brnshi has poined o,
here is evidene ha he Greeks hoh ha he sma imaes ha appear on
he srae o he ee in he ppi, visibe hen ookin a ones on releed
ppi or dire a anohers ppi, ere hemseves asa impiaed in,
and so par o, he aivi o seein (, -). I so, seein an imae in an-
oher persons ppi od have been rearded as seein seein—seein he
ohers ppi enaed in seein. imiar, viein ones on imae releed
in ones on ppi b a o a mirror or releive srae, ha is, viein an
imae o ones on ppi, in hih an imae (o onese) is releed, od be
a ase o seein an imae, in he mirror, o onese seein.
naoos, hen, he so i kno ise proper hen i onizes ha
reion o ise ih hih i enaes in is enra or denin aivi, and
rasps ise enaed in his aivi. Neiher his aivi nor he reion or ee-
men in he so responsibe or i is named in or passae, b he exeene
o he so is idenied as isdom (sophia), and he reion or eemen in qes-
ion is desribed as ha in hih (or ih hih) knoin (to eidenai) and
ndersandin (phronein) arise (b-). Moreover, he so ha knos ise
mos o a is said o be ha hih apprehends his reion, and is on nder-
sandin (phronēsis). ine i is nmediaed, his rasp is presened as dire,
and is, I sbmi, he hiher-order sae o orre apprehendin ones on
oniive aivi direed a knoin and ndersandin, and he par o ones
so ha enaes in his aivi hen i is done e.
No, as e sa earier, as a res o orai qesionin in he eenhs,
ibiades ame o rele on his on aivi o beievin and saes ha he
ook o be hose o ndersandin or knoin. He aso beame onisan o
a nmber o his on beies ha ere previos hidden rom his aareness,
and in addiion, ndin himse avoin inonsisen beies, rasped his
on sae o inorane on qesions o jsie and he e-bein o he polis.
Throh he eenhs he ained oniive se-knoede, a hiher-order
and releive rasp o he onen o oer-order saes o hih he as

  () -

Th�s content downloaded from

5.47.241.132 on Wed, 12 Jun 2024 04:18:59 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 g

previos naare, and o himse as inoran abo maers he previos

ook himse o kno. Hoever, oraes ie-rened onepion o se-
knoede, desribed ih he aid o he anao—Platonic se-knoede in
he Alcibiades—shod no be idenied ih his hiher-order rasp. Tha is,
ahoh oniive se-knoede is a neessar ondiion or, and a ria
eemen o, Paoni se-knoede, i is no sfien or i. Wha is needed
in addiion, as e are od in he ee-so anao, is apprehension o he par
o he so apabe o knoin, and in hih is bes aivi and exeene,
isdom, ors.
hoh i is disin rom i, his rher rasp is noneheess aiiaed—
hoh no araneed—b oniive se-knoede, and he mehod a is
ore, he eeni mehod. For, as e have seen above, ha mehod invies and
enoraes is praiioner o se-onsios observe he episemi norms
ha inorm is se. We have aso seen ha he aen ho ses he mehod
omes o see or herse ha, b her on ihs, i.e. in aordane ih be-
ies she as aneeden ommied o and b her on reasonin, she in a
hods beies he opposie o hih she had previos avoed. The episemi
norms hs ied sbsania ress or he aen, and hereb provide her ih
a sron reason o adop hem as her on. I she does so, and i she depos
he mehod habia—as ibiades amos did no—she i, moreover,
deveop a paern o riia and releive hiher-order srin o her rs-
order hinkin direed oards he rh. Her rh-ap hinkin i beome
se-onsios, and se-onsios mediaed b norms ha reason es her
i res in vies ha onorm, as ar as he evidene avaiabe o her aos
i, o he a he ord in a is. The aen i hen be in a posiion o rasp
her on poer o raiona srinise he ronds or her vies, and o on-
ine o hod on hose ha are raiona ronded (on some iven sbje).
he hereb apprehends he disinive par o herse ih hih she enaes
in rh-direed oniion and ih hih she is abe, a imes, o do i e
or exeen. Tha is, she apprehends ha par or aspe o herse in vire
o hih she is a raiona aen, apabe o knoede and isdom. The aen
ho does his, as e as orre aserainin he onens o her on beies
on maers she akes o be sinian, eshes hose ha pon releion do
no seem o her o be raiona ronded, and has a orre esimaion o her
on saes o knoin (or o inorane), is he aen ho possesses Paoni
se-knoede.
The aon hs ar mih be aken o ses ha se-knoede in
Paos ear diaoes—boh oniive and Paoni—is he res o a sri
soo prsi. Hoever, he os on he roe o anae in he presenaion
o hoh in he Alcibiades sron sess oherise.  d-e oraes

  () -

Th�s content downloaded from

5.47.241.132 on Wed, 12 Jun 2024 04:18:59 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
S-wg, Ecu  Autty  Ey t 

aims ha he mehanism b hih one so is in ona ih anoher so
is inisi, b a o ords in onversaion (. b-).3 nd indeed he
medim in hih eenhs akes pae, b hih ibiades as abe proper
o rasp his oniive saes and ondiion o inorane, as inisi: b ar-
iain his vies in ords, he as abe o reard hese rs-order hohs a
a hiher-order eve. nd, ahoh ibiades aompishes his hiher-order
rasp o oer-order oniions in onversaion ih anoher, i od seem
rash o aribe o Pao he hih qesionabe aim ha one an on ap-
prehend ones on hoh b relein on is ariaion in onversaion
ih anoher person. We an insead read him as depiin oraes as id-
in ibiades in a praie o riia releion ha, one masered, an be
enaed on ones on, as e as ih ohers. I is orh noin ha Pao
od o on aer in his areer o haraerise hoh as he sos sien
onversaion ih ise (Tht. e-a, Sph. e-a, Phlb. d-b), and
in one diaoe expii o reard his inner onversaion as he exhane
o saemens (logoi, Sph. b-e). eni qesionin and oniive se-
knoede—and so aso Paoni se-knoede—an be prsed on ones
on, or oeher ih anoher.

4 Epistemic Authority and Dialogue

I rn no o he qesion o episemi ahori. Ths ar, I have ared ha
a he ore o Paos on onepion o se-knoede in he Alcibiades—
Paoni se-knoede—ies oniive se-knoede, a sae hih is
shon in a nmber o ear diaoes o onsis in a releed-pon, hiher-order

4 The onex o he sesion a d-e (and earier a b-) is oraes aim ha ha
a person rea is, and ha is hereore idenied as he proper obje o se-knoede,
is he so as opposed o he bod: a onversaion is no, sri speakin, o peope sa-
in hins o one anoher ae o ae, b o sos addressin one anoher ih ords.
44 Noe, oo, ha i se-knoede is ahieved via onversaion ih anoher, and so invoves
somehin exerna o he sbje, i is no he ase ha ones hohs are ‘mirrored
bak o onese in he onversaion: ords are adibe maniesaions or expressions o
hoh or Pao (Sph. e), no imaes o hem. I he are imaes (someimes, or a-
as), he are or Pao imaes o he ineniona objes o he hohs so expressed
(Sph. ).
45 In he Philebus, he aon is sppemened b he addiion o israive imaes in
he so, said o or aonside saemens or jdemens (b-). To be sre, hese dia-
oes are a hoh o have been rien mh aer in Paos areer. Hoever, here is
no reason ha I am aare o o hink ha his onepion o hoh represens a hane
o mind on Paos par.

  () -

Th�s content downloaded from

5.47.241.132 on Wed, 12 Jun 2024 04:18:59 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 g

relexive rasp o he onens o ones oniive saes. This rasp is, more-
over, a dire rasp, hoh i an be made possibe b onversaion ih an-
oher. nd e mih hink ha a pariar kind o episemi ahori omes
ih dire relexive, rs-persona se-knoede, name rs-persona
episemi ahori. s Mes Brnea observed some ears ao, hoever, i
od be a misake o aribe o Pao, or Greek hinkers enera, a om-
mimen o he kind o rs-persona episemi ahori hoh o oo
rom he disin Caresian onepion o sbjeive rh immne o hper-
boi dob. On he aon o se-knoede proposed here, oo, here is
no room or his kind o rs-persona ahori: e have seen ha in Paos
vie e an be misaken, as oraes ineroors reqen are misaken,
abo he onens o or on beies. The absene o episemi ahori in-
vesed in he rs-persona perspeive is srikin eviden, as Raphae Woo
has poined o (, -), in he exhane beeen Pos and oraes a
Gorgias b, disssed above. Pos response o oraes asserion ha he,
Pos, beieves ha i is beer o sfer injsie han perperae i is one o
indinan denia, b not bease he hinks he has speia rs-persona aess
o he onen o his on beies. Raher, Pos denies beievin i bease he
hinks nobod beieves i. Opin he rs-persona posiion does no on is
on oner episemi priviee or sere speia aess o he onen o beie.
No, Woo en on o ses ha Pao in a depied third-personal
episemi ahori in he ear diaoes enera, hereb ineroors,
pariar oraes, aim o kno, and indeed do kno, heir opponens or
ineroors beies beer han he do hemseves. Woo aso poins o ha
in he Apology ohers besides oraes are aso said o praie he mehod
(-d), and so, presmab, are simiar abe o disern heir ineroors
beies beer han he are hemseves. Woo en on o haene hose read-
ers o he diaoes ho, as I do here, ake Pao o sho his haraers omin
o kno heir on inorane via he eenhs, and so o enjo rs-persona
knoede o he onens o heir on minds (o ha exen, a eas). He
ared ha he ase o oraes, ho is presened as havin se-knoede
o his inorane, is rare b desin in he diaoes: Pao hoh—rih—
ha one anno simaneos asser and dob a proposiion, sine dob
reqires disavoa o he aim o be dobed as ones on. o, a person an-
no dob her on beies, and b a mehod o riia qesionin, ome o

46 Brnea . For rher disssion in onneion ih he opi o se-knoede, see
Leih , -.

  () -

Th�s content downloaded from

5.47.241.132 on Wed, 12 Jun 2024 04:18:59 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
S-wg, Ecu  Autty  Ey t 

see he asi o her on beies, and her on inorane, b on he asi
o proposiions.
ains Woos readin, I hope o have provided a nmber o exa rea-
sons o dob he onenion ha oniive se-knoede as onsidered
rare or impossibe b Pao. No on does oraes repeaed insisene on
his aareness o his on inorane ses, pace Woo, ha Pao hoh
his rs-persona sae possibe, e have seen ha ibiades beomes aare
o his on inorane via eeni qesionin (a-b; a-b). o oo in he
Laches, Niias aknoedes his on inorane (e; a-) and, as e have
seen, ahoh Lahes onines o hink he rea has knoede o ha
orae is, he beomes aare ha he is no enied o aim knoede, sine
he anno sa ha i is. More imporan, I hope o have shon ha oniive
se-knoede in Pao is no prediaed on simaneos dobin and a-
rmin a sine proposiion. Raher, he eeni mehod eads he ineroor
o rasp—and in ha sense ome o kno—beies she possessed a aon,
some o hih onradi a beie she esposed a he ose, hih onradi-
ion reveas her inorane o herse. I is he se o raiona ronded posiive
beies ha are he dire are o eeni qesionin, he apprehension o
hih is is aim, no he enerainin o dob onernin he iniia avoed
beie. To be sre, dob seems erain o oo or he ineroor ho nds
herse hodin onradior beies, b as I ndersand i, i is no par o he
mehods proedre. There is no reason, hen, o ake Pao o hink ha some-
one armed ih he eenhs and opin he hird-persona viepoin is
in a speia oia or episemi posiion vis-à-vis he onen o heir iner-
oors hoh, and so no reason o read Pao as endorsin hird-persona
episemi ahori. nd na, e an be erain ha or Pao no speia
ahori is besoed simp b opin he hird-persona perspeive—
Pos hoh he kne beer han oraes ha he, oraes, hoh, b
rned o o be misaken.
I he oreoin is rih, he arran or aimin o kno ha one beieves,
or knos, does no lo rom inhabiin a pariar viepoin, aordin o
Pao.  he same, I have ared ha Pao did endorse rs-persona, hiher-
order knoede o oer-order oniive saes, i.e. oniive se-knoede.
On his inerpreaion, episemi arran and ahori los no rom vie-
poin, b rom he normaive nare o raiona releion and enqir, i.e.
rom he sbjes adherene o he episemi norms e have seen in opera-
ion in he ear diaoes disssed. The mehod o ross-examinaion is

47 o, Woo ares, Pao od no aon phiosophia or he se-knoede he de-
pis oraes as possessin: , -.

  () -

Th�s content downloaded from

5.47.241.132 on Wed, 12 Jun 2024 04:18:59 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 g

perormed e hen he episemi norms ariaed above are adhered o,
b enain in riia releion on he evidene or ronds or or aains he
rh o he individa aims or premises sed in he inqir, and raspin he
inerenia or expanaor onneions beeen hem. dherene o episemi
norms is, hereore, a neessar ondiion or eniemen o make a jdmen
abo he onen o oniive saes.
 rher ondiion an be read ino oraes emphasisin o ibiades
he imporane o on areein ih a aim hen he hears himse sa i
(Alc. e), ha is, o nderoin riia releion (aordin o he episemi
norms) himse: or self-knoede o oniive saes, he aen ms herse
are rele pon, and ome o rasp or herse, beies she hods or ood
reason, b raspin he arran or, and onneions beeen, premises her-
se. The onex o her doin so ma e be onversaion ih anoher b,
on he normaive sandards presened in he ear diaoes, he aen does
no proper rasp ha she beieves hs-and-sh ness she rasps in ha
a, iven her se o reevan ommimens, she beieves i and has, moreover,
releed riia on he raiona ronds, evidenia or onepa, or hose
ommimens. Wha is red o, hen, is her ainin se-knoede b a-
epin he ahori o anoher, even i he ohers reasonin abo he aens
oniive saes adheres pere o he episemi norms. To he exen ha
se-knoede o oniive saes reqires he aen herse o rasp he rea-
sons she has or her oer-order beies in order o se-onsios endorse
hem, hen, Pao is an inernais abo oniive se-knoede. On he in-
erpreaion ared or here, hen, a imied kind o rs-persona episemi
ahori—and ih i, responsibii—ares o he aen. I is imied in
he sense ha he aens viepoin is no in ise episemia privieed,
hih is h she ma be misaken abo he onens o her beies here
ohers are no. B sine se-knoede or Pao reqires ones on rasp o
ones on reasons, se-knoede demands ha she no abdiae episemi
ahori o anoher.
 he same ime, a roe or he oher remains, and aon ih i a erain
kind o (simiar imied) episemi ahori. I have ared ha he se-
knoin aen omes o enjo a riia releive and se-onsios aare-
ness o he onen o her se o rs-order beies onernin some objeive
maer and he ineronneed reasons she has or hem, evaaed in aor-
dane ih episemi norms. B even hoh she ma have spen onsider-
abe efor relein, and have releed e, he aen ma dob ha she
has aained oniive se-knoede. Perhaps, ahoh her rs-order beies
abo he objeive maer in qesion are pasibe iven her experiene and
he inormaion avaiabe o her, she made a sbe inerenia error iho

  () -

Th�s content downloaded from

5.47.241.132 on Wed, 12 Jun 2024 04:18:59 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
S-wg, Ecu  Autty  Ey t 

noiin, or aied o ideni a her beies reevan o he maer a hand be-
ase an objeive asa or expanaor onneion is as e obsre o her.
To be sre, in ases here here is an esabished bod o exper knoede
onernin he obje o inqir, i i be open o he aen o deermine he
rh or asehood o her vies b omparin hem aains he ahoriaive
vies o he expers, ho i in rn be abe o ofer expanaions and make
inerenia onneions ha on her on she anno, b hih she an n-
dersand. he i hen be in a posiion o rele on he inormaion she has
ahered and her se o beies a he rs-order eve in order o reappraise
hem. In onras o sh ases, hoever, in respe o he objeive areas o in-
vesiaion oraes deemed mos imporan—hose enra o mora and aes-
hei inqir—here are no expers or esabished bodies o knoede. o, as
reards these isses, he aen an never be sre ha she has adeqae rii-
a releed on her rs-order ommimens, and so ha she has ahieved
oniive se-knoede. Moreover, he se-onsios nare o he eeni
mehod and o Paoni se-knoede, as I have ndersood hese here, en-
sres ha he aen od be aare o his ak o erain.
In he ae o hese difies ihin he mora and aeshei domain, he
bes opion avaiabe o he aen is o enae in diaoe ih ohers on
he qesion a hand, and hereb examine her beies on he isse aonside
he beies o ohers. ine boh paries are eqa abe o evaae heir aims,
beies, inerenes and expanaions in erms o he episemi norms, he are
abe oeher o arrive a areemen abo ha he hink, pon riia re-
leion. Where he deiveranes o his diaeia or join se-examinaion
are a odds ih he ress o previos soo se-examinaion, and provided
he norms are adhered o, he ormer oh o be rearded as ahoriaive
ih respe o he aer. This is bease i I no, in akin ih o, ome o
ake mse o have had reason a aon o reard some vie as m on, his
sess here is somehin ha I had overooked beore, or no onsidered

48 ee Apol. d, here oraes sas he as abe o deermine b a o eeni qesion-
in ha rasmen ere knoedeabe in respe o heir ras, and iser han he (bein
nknoedeabe) in hese respes: he passae an be aken o imp Paos endorse-
men o a ondiiona kind o episemi ahori in he ase o esimon rom expers in
he ras (pasib exended o sienes, e.. media and mahemaia sienes). The
ahori is ondiiona, even in he ase o expers, on he aen bein abe o esabish
heir bein knoeeabe or herse, ahoh preise ho she is o deermine his is
no speied. (For a disssion o episemi ahori more broad, and he sesion
ha Ciero and Ompiodors, inspired b oraes in he Alcibiades and esehere, a-
ioned aains adopin beies as sh simp on he ahori o ohers even in he ase
o aknoeded expers in he reevan domain, hoh or ver diferen reasons, see
Coope .)

  () -

Th�s content downloaded from

5.47.241.132 on Wed, 12 Jun 2024 04:18:59 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 g

are enoh hen relein b mse. To be sre, I ma aer hane m

mind. B i I do so, I had beer be abe o o bak o o and onvine o o
he reasons or m hane o hear, in aordane ih he reevan norms. For
Pao, on his readin, riia releion on or on opinions and onviions
is mos proab nderaken oeher ih ohers, and he onsions e
ome o as a res o soo se-examinaion oh o be esed in diaeia
enaemen ih ohers.
This readin aso sess ha, hen resried o examinin orseves b
orseves, one episemia beneia a o proeedin od be o ima-
ine orseves in onversaion ih anoher, in order o imainaive adop a
perspeive oher han or on rom hih o riia appraise hose aims
e are inined o endorse, as ar as ha is possibe. h imainaive efors
od no be as ahoriaive as riia onversaion ih anoher, b od
mos ose approximae his idea episemi siaion. In rn his (admi-
ed speaive) sesion is abe o make sense o an oherise pzzin
eare o he diaoes in onneion ih se-knoede. Firs, as Woo
has poined o, Pao nohere depis oraes or an oher haraer in his
diaoes ainin se-knoede b nderoin soo se-examinaion in an
sraihorard a. We an no see ha his is no bease Pao harbored
dobs abo he possibii o se-knoede (oniive or Paoni): Pao
did no presen his readers ih a mode o soo rs-persona examinaion
bease his preerred mehod o inqir ino ones on saes, as e as ino
objeive maers, as ha o join inqir, and his is ha he modes, over
and over, o his reader. n israion o soo se-examinaion as approxima-
ion o examinaion oeher ih anoher is ond in he Hippias Major. Tha
diaoe ends ih oraes reporin a enh a riia onversaion he had
ih an nnamed person ho rns o o be none oher han oraes him-
se (b-e). The sene is erain srane: oraes seems rs o preend
(o himse) ha he is onversin ih someone ese, and hen o preend (o
himse) o be ha oher person in riiizin ha he, oraes, has js said.
For a is peiari, hoever, he preene is se-onsios—as oraes re-
por o Hippias makes pain, here an be no dob ha oraes as aare o
onversin ih himse. o, in onras o Woo, ho reads he sraneness o
he sene as indiain a resisane on Paos par o depi rs-persona on-
versaion, I ses e read he passae as deiberae modein a hih se-
onsios mode o rs-persona se-examinaion (and rea oraes remark
o Lahes, ha a hird person isenin o heir onversaion od no hink
he kne ha orae as, hereb sesin his se-onsios mode o

49 Woo , esp. , -, -.

  () -

Th�s content downloaded from

5.47.241.132 on Wed, 12 Jun 2024 04:18:59 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
S-wg, Ecu  Autty  Ey t 

examinaion o Lahes). B bein a seond-bes aernaive, sh soo se-

examinaion oh o be esed b exposre o srin b ohers in a join
invesiaion. nd his is js ha oraes is doin in reporin his onver-
saion he had ih himse o anoher, i.e. o Hippias. I, as his sess, in
disssion onernin ehia and aeshei maers diaoe ih ohers is b
Paos ihs he ahoriaive es o ha e ake orseves o hink, and so
ahoriaive as reards se-knoede, i appears ha Pao advoaed rs-
persona plural episemi ahori in he ase o se-knoede: I arrive a he
mos ahoriaive aim o kno ha I hink abo some maer o inqir
b akin ih o and omin o an areemen ih o, in aordane ih
episemi norms, abo ha we oeher hink abo ha obje o inqir.3

50 Laches e. I am rae o Marare Hampson or his poin.

51 There are ear resonanes ih he inerpreaion o oniive se-knoede and
Paoni se-knoede proposed here, and he sesion made b Chrisopher Gi
() ha Paos onepion o diaei exhibis a phiosophia oook he desribes as
‘objeive-pariipan hroho he orps, ahoh espeia in he aer diaoes.
For, on ha ha vie, ‘knoede, i avaiabe, is objeive, as disin rom sbjeive or
inersbjeive (, ), ha is, is aimed a ‘disover o an objeive exisin rh
() abo hih i is possibe or he inqirers o be in error, and hih ria in-
voves riia diaoe (diaei) ih ohers. hoh I anno here proper expore
or disss he roe o oniive se-knoede in diaei in he diaoes aer he
ear period, and rae he ines o onneion and disonneion ih he phiosophi-
a approah idenied b Gi, i is orh noin one diverene beeen he o vies.
Whie Gi aims ha ‘objeive knoede … an on be aained b pariipaion in
diaei (, ), i is ared here ha diaoe ih ohers is episemia ahori-
aive, hoh no he soe means o episemia respeabe (and orre) aims o
se-knoede.
52 oraes remark a b ha he od be mos ashamed o speak nonsense in ron o
he son o ophroniss (i.e. in ron o himse) need no be aken o indiae ha he
reards himse as he mos ahoriaive jde o eiher he onen or episemi vae
o his on hohs. I od simp indiae ha he od be ashamed o himse i
he aied o es his on vies and beies, iven a se-onsios adopion o episemi
norms and a rasp o himse as inheren raiona, i.e. i he did no srive or oniive
and Paoni se-knoede as ndersood here. imiar, in he Gorgias, aer Caies
sks and oraes arries on he inqir o od ih himse, oraes akes himse o
be esin his vies in ron o he ohers ahered, ein hem and Caies o obje a
an poin i he disaree ih anhin oraes arees o ih himse: δίειμι μὲν οὖν τῷ
όγῳ ἐγὼ ὡς ἄν μοι δοκῇ ἔχειν· ἐὰν δέ τῳ ὑμῶν μὴ τὰ ὄντα δοκῶ ὁμοογεῖν ἐμαυτῷ, χρὴ ἀντιαμ-
βάνεσθαι καὶ ἐέγχειν (‘I o hroh he disssion, hen, and sa ho I hink i is, and i
an o o hinks ha ha I aree o ih mse isn so, o ms obje and ree me;
Grg. e-a, r. Ze; . b-).
5 The mos idea onversaion, hen, od be beeen riends, as in he Crito a d, e,
d-e.

  () -

Th�s content downloaded from

5.47.241.132 on Wed, 12 Jun 2024 04:18:59 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 g

5 Conclusion

I have ared ha Paos inerpreaion o he meanin o he Dephi Oraes
ommand o ‘kno orse—Paoni se-knoede as I have aed i—
has a is ore orre aserainin he onen and episemi sas o ones
on oniive saes—oniive se-knoede—in ine ih pariar epis-
emi sandards or norms. The se-onsios nare o he proess o aqir-
in oniive se-knoede exempied b he eenhs, moreover, invies
he aen o adop he norms as her on and, ih reerene o hem, o de-
veop a paern o se-onsios srin a a hiher-order eve o he ar-
ran or, and onneion beeen, varios aims a he rs-order eve, or
herse. The mehod hereb enoraes and is abe o aiiae he aens
apprehension o herse as an inheren raiona bein, hih, oeher ih
oniive se-knoede, onsies Paoni se-knoede. In maers o
mora and aeshei inqir, moreover, no maer ho sron jsied in his
a sh hiher-order aims are, he are aas open o revision in riia
disssion ih ohers, in ine ih hese same norms, and hereore sbje
o he ahori o ha is areed in sh a diaoe. To his exen, I have
ared, Pao endorsed rs-persona pra episemi ahori as reards
se-knoede.

References

nnas, J. (). e-Knoede in ar Pao. In: D. J. OMeara, ed., Platonic

Investigations. Washinon DC, pp. -.
Benson, H. (). The Dissoion o he Probem o he enhs. Oxford Studies in
Ancient Philosophy , pp. -.

54 I am rae o adienes ho heard varios versions o his paper: he Kinds o
Knoede in nien Phiosoph  onerene a he Universi o Oso; he
 meein o he ohern ssoiaion o nien Phiosoph a he Universi o
Cambride; he Universi o as nia Phiosoph Deparmen; irin Universi
Phiosoph Deparmen; Okahoma Universi Phiosoph Deparmen; he nd nien
Phiosoph Workshop, Texas; and he Berkee nien Phiosoph eminar. For hep
disssion and sesions I am indebed o Hh Benson, arah Broadie, Timoh Carke,
Chrisopher Gi, Veri Hare, Mark Kaderon, M. M. MCabe, L OBrien, Caherine
Roe, Chrisopher hieds, Nihoas mih, isi Wasmh and Pa Woodrf, as e
as o he ediors and an anonmos reader or he jorna. For exensive rien om-
mens and disssion, I am pariar rae o Peer damson, Joahim derheide,
ena Canoi Fieoni, Marare Hampson and Raphae Woo.

  () -

Th�s content downloaded from

5.47.241.132 on Wed, 12 Jun 2024 04:18:59 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
S-wg, Ecu  Autty  Ey t 

Benson, H. (). Socratic Wisdom: The Model of Knowledge in Plato’s Early Dialogues.
Oxord.
Bohossian, P. (). Conen and e-Knoede. Philosophical Topics : pp. -.
Brikhose, T. C. and mih, N. D. (). Plato’s Socrates. Oxord.
Brnshi, J. (). r qeqes empois d ὄψις. In: G. Hookeraar, ed., Zetesis: Album
amicorum. nerp, pp. -.
Brnea, M. (). Ideaism and Greek Phiosoph: Wha Desares a and Berkee
Missed. Philosophical Review , pp. -.
Cassam, Q. (). Inrodion. In: Q. Cassam, ed., Self-Knowledge. Oxord, pp. -.
Cassam, Q. (). Self-knowledge for Humans. Oxord.
Coope, U. (). Free o hink? pisemi hori and Thinkin or Onese. Journal
of the British Academy , pp. -.
Dener, N. (). Plato: Alcibiades. Cambride.
Doe, J. (). orai Mehods. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy , pp. -.
vans, G. (). The Varieties of Reference. Oxord.
Ferson, D. (). e-knoede in he e-o nao o he Alcibiades. Phronesis
, pp. -.
Fine, G. (). Inqir in he Meno. In: R. Kra, ed., The Cambridge Companion to
Plato. Cambride, pp. -.
Gerer, B. (). e-Knoede. (Revised version.) The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy (prin  diion), dard N. Zaa, ed. hps://pao.sanord.ed/
arhives/spr/enries/se-knoede/.
Giannopoo, Z. (). e-knoede in Paos Theaetetus and Alcibiades I.
Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy , pp. -.
Gi, C. (). erard: Diaei and he Diaoe Form in Lae Pao. In: C. Gi and
M. M. MCabe, eds., Form and Argument in Late Plato. Oxord, pp. -.
Gi, C. (). e-knoede in he Alcibiades. In: . ern-Gie and K. Corrian, eds.,
Reading Ancient Texts. Leiden/ Boson, pp. -.
Grisad, C. (). Self-Knowledge in Plato’s Phaedrus. Ne Haven.
Irin, T. (). Plato’s Moral Theory. Oxord.
Jirsa, J. (). henii o he Alcibiades I: ome releions. Listy lologiké ,
pp. -.
Johnson, D. (). God as he Tre e: Paos Alcibiades I. Ancient Philosophy ,
pp. -.
Kamekar, R. (). e-Knoede in Pao. In: U. Renz, ed., Self-Knowledge: A History.
Oxord, pp. -.
Leih, F. (). Kinds o e-Knoede in nien Thoh. In: F. Leih, ed.,
Self-Knowledge in Ancient Philosophy. Oxord, pp. -.
Lan, W. (). Tai Beie. In: R. J. Bodan, ed., Belief: Form, Content, and Function.
Oxord, pp. -.

  () -

Th�s content downloaded from

5.47.241.132 on Wed, 12 Jun 2024 04:18:59 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 g

MCabe, M. M. (). I Goes Deep ih Me: Charmides on Knoede, e-

Knoede, and Ineri. In: C. Cordner, ed., Philosophy, Ethics, and a Common
Humanity. London / Ne York, pp. -.
MCabe, M. M. (). From he Crade o he Cave: Wha Happened o e-knoede
in he Republic? In: M. M. MCabe, Platonic Conversations. Oxord, pp. -.
[Reprined in F. Leih, ed., Self-Knowledge in Ancient Philosophy. Oxord, pp. -.]
Moss, J. and hab, W. (). The Birh o Beie. Journal of the History of Philosophy
, pp. -.
OBrien, L. (). Self-Knowing Agents. Oxord.
Rabbås, Ø. (). Deniions and Paradims: Lahes Firs Deniion. Phronesis ,
pp. -.
Rappe,  (). e-knoede and bjeivi in he Enneads. In: L. Gerson, ed., The
Cambridge Companion to Plotinus. Cambride, pp. -.
Remes, P. (). Reason o Care: The Obje and rre o e-Knoede in
Alcibiades 1. Apeiron , pp. -.
Renz, U. (), Inrodion. In: U. Renz, ed., Self-Knowledge: A History. Oxord, pp. -.
Re, G. (). The Concept of Mind. London.
herman, N. (). Making a Necessity of Virtue. Cambride.
hoemaker, . (). e Knoede and ‘Inner ense. Philosophy and Phenom-
enological Research , pp. -.
mih, N. D. (). Did Pao rie he Alcibiades I? Apeiron , pp. -.
Tarran, H (). Where Did he Mirror Go? The Tex o Pao [?] Alcibiades I -.
Elenchos , pp. -.
Vasos, G. (). The orai enhs. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy ,
pp. -.
Vasos, G. (). The orai enhs: Mehod is . In: G. Vasos, Socratic Studies.
Cambride, pp. -.
Woo, R. (). orai hori. Archiv für Geschicte der Philosophie , pp. -.

  () -

Th�s content downloaded from

5.47.241.132 on Wed, 12 Jun 2024 04:18:59 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms