The Forms of Anumana

2
In Indian logic truth has been regarded as a unit and that si why anumana has not been divided
into Formal and Material or Deductive and Inductive or Mediate and Immediate or Syllogistic and
Non-syllogistic or Pure and Mixed types. The Indian logicians wete, no doubt, aware of its
varieties and sub-varieties. But the principles upon which the varieties of anumana are based are
diffe- rent from those of Western inference. Anumana has been classified
in various ways, for example, (a) pürvavat, sesavat and samanyato- drsta, (b) vita and avita, (c)
svärtha and parartha, (d) Kevalanvayi, kevalavyatireki and anvayavyatireki and (e)
anyathanupapannaiva types. Jayanta elaborately deals with the tripartite classification of
inference as expounded by Gautama and proposes some innovations
in the interpretations of the terms purvavat, etc., over and above Vatsyâyana.3
(a) THE PURVAVAT, SESAVAT AND SAMANYATADRSTA
Gautama holds that anumana is dependent on perception and
is of three kinds, namely, paryavat, sesavat and samanyatodrsta. "These phrases", as A.B. Keith
rightly observes, "are in themselves hopelessly obscure, and Vatsyãyana gives two explanations
of fundamentally different character, a fact which
may be interpreted either as indicating that even before Gautama there were different views
prevalent ni the school or that there intervened aconsiderable interval between Gautama and his
followers during which conflict- ing interpretations of his aphorisms had come into vogue."
Parvarat. Vatsyãyana, as we have pointed out above, gives two setsof interpretation of the terms
'pürvavat', etc. According to the first, pirovat inference is that in which the effect is inferred from
the cause, e.g., when we see clouds rising we infer that there will be rain.? Uddyotakara criticizes
this view holding that no sensi- ble person could venture to cognize the effect simply on the
basis of the perception of a cause.? According to the second, reason and cflect belong to two
different places. If the effect is already known or if it does not exist there can be no scope for
inference. Jayanta discusses this problem further and endorses Vatsyãyana's line of thinking. He
is aware of the opponents' counterarguments and states that some of the logicians bold that the
term 'purva' denotes a cause, and the word 'púrvavat' denotes an effect; since it has a cause,
therefore the type of inference called pûrvavat illustrates the inference of a cause by means of
an effect. Jayanta refers to the following arguments put forth by these logicians to substantiate
their antithesis: (1) It is unreasonable to think that an effect is the subject of an inference. If the
effect is existent then what else remains to be established? If it is non-existent, it is unreal like a
sky-flower and so cannot be the subject of inference. (2) The reason and the effect are two
incoordinate objects. In order to establish the existence of na effect, if we accept the existence
of a positive condition as a reason then the reason does not belong to the subject of inference. It
is subject to the fallacies known as asiddha, viruddha and anaikantika. (3) To prove the existence
of an eflect a non-specific cause cannot serve the purpose of the reason since the relation of
universal concomitance must hold between the reason and the consequence. (4) If it is held that
the cause from which the effect follows in immediate succession constitutes the reason then the
very effect will be perceived with the remembrance of the relation of universal concomitance and
in that case the inference of an effect is simply superfluous. (5) It si wrong to contend that the
Buddhists lend support to the view that the efect is inferred om the cause. The Buddhists use
the term 'utpada' and it simply indicates the capacity by which an effect is brought into
existence Though Jayanta does not finally
accept the interpretation of pirvavat based on holding 'vat' sa the remainder of the sufix mamp,
he refutes the above arguments of the opponents of Vatsyayana on the basis of following facts:
(1) The effect, as Kumârila also holds, is not the subject of inference here; the clouds are the
subject of inference. What is to be established is that they contain rain which will drop in the
immediate future. Hence it is not the effect but the clouds containing future rain, which are
inferred. (2) The word 'purva" denotes a cause. The word 'pürvavat' denotes the property of a
cause. The cloud is the cause of rain, its property, ie., 'gathering in the sky', constitutes the
reason. There is no linguistic defect in the statement of the proposition since a non- specified
cause has not been stated as the cause of rain. (3) The fear that the effect following an
immediate antecedent is sure to be perceived is unreasonable because when we infer rain, drops
of rain do not fall on our head from the clouds.
(4) People infer an effect from competent cause and not from capacity.
Another interpretation of the term 'purvavat" as suggested by Vatsyayana is that it is a type of
inference in which out of two things one that is not perceived is inferred from the perception of
the other on the basis of a former perception of both of these things together, e.g., inference of
unperceived fire from perceived smoke on the basis of the previous perception of fire and smoke
togetber.
Jayanta interprets the tripartite division of inference in an- other way also, ie, taking 'vat' in
'pürvavat', etc., as the remainder of the suffix vati and holding that it is the universal
concomitance between the reason and the consequence which is responsible for the
establishment of one by another. The view that 'vat' in pürravat etc., is the remainder of the sufix
matup, is wrong and the division based upon it has no solid ground to stand on. Jayanta finally
maintains that 'vat' is the remainder of the sufhx vati and interprets purvavat likewise. Whenever
we discover the universal relation of concomitance holding between the reason and the
consequence on the basis of our previous perception of the same homogeneous reason with the
same homogeneous consequence, it is called púrsarat, e.g., in a kitchen we find that smoke and
fire co-exist, so when we see smoke in a hill we infer fire. As regards the question as to how the
act of inference is similar to that of perception, Jayan ta holds that the particular reason which si
perceived along withitsdetailsestablishes fire which si similar to the fire experienced before and
that is why an
act of inference is similar to that of perception, 1
Sesavat. Vatsyayana holds that in fesarat inference the cause si inferred from the effect, c.g..
when we see that the water of the river is not as usual but is swollen and swifter, we infer that
there has been rain As an alternative interpretation of the term 'Sesavat", Vatsyayana states that
it may also signify as 'remainder', There could be many possibilities with regard to the
explanation of a fact. When all the possibilities except one are rejected, the remaining one is
cognized through the means of sesavat inference, e.g., sound si distinct from the categories of
generality, individuality and inhe- rence. There are possibilities of its being a substance, a quality
or an action. When we reason by a process of elimination we find that sound cannot be a
substance because it inheres in akasa only where as other substances either inhere in more than
one (e.g., the jar) or do not inhere in any one (e.g., the atoms). Sound is not an action because an
action brings about conjunction or disjunction whereas sound is the originator of another sound.
So, by this eliminative reasoning, we come to the conclusion that sound is a quality.
As Vatsyayana did, Jayanta gives two types of interpretation of the term 'Sesavat" also He refers
to the inference of cause from its effect and quotes the same example that Vatsyayana gives to
illustrate the process. He, however, comes to the conclusion that it is not really the cause (rain),
but the up-country which has heavy shower of rain, which is inferred from the abnormal swelling
of the river; or a particular country may be the subject of inference instead of the river, holding
that this country is in contact with another country which has heavy shower because it has a
river with a swollen stream.? Jayanta refers to Kumania just to state that, according t hoim also,
the subject of inference is both the con- sequence as well as the reason, It becomes the
consequence when it is qualified by something which bas not been established. If the current of
the river is embanked somewhere then the water of the river swells somewhere else. Hence, the
swelling of the river si not always due to beavy rain only Moreover, as has been stated beforeo,
Jayanta holds that the interpretation of these terms on the basis of the suffix matup is not
sound.So as in the case of puravat he gives an alternative interpretation of sesavat also and
holds "vat' as the remainder of the suffix vati, propounding that the conclusion in this inference
si arrived at through the method of
elimination.
Jayanta gives an alternative interpretation of Sesavar' and states that there could be a number of
rival suggestions to explain a cause underlying a fact. If all the suggestions except one provided
regarding the cause of a fact are rejected the remaining one is to be known as a cause. For
example, if we infer fire from smoke and try to find out its fuel, several alternatives may arise in
our mind. We may think that it is produced by dry grass or leaves or dry wood. If we reject all of
them and also hold earthen pot or piece of stone as irrelevant, and then conclude that fire is
produced by the dried clod of cow-dung, then the inference is called sesavas, Jayanta thinks
that the instance that 'sound is a quality' also illustrates the Sesavat type of inference.
Samanyatodesta. According to Vatsyayana Samanyatodsta inference is that in which conclusions
are based upon general obser- vations, e.g. we have observed in all cases that we see a thing in
a place different from where we saw it before it has moved, and from this fact of general
observation (analogy) we infer that the sun must be moving even though we cannot perceive its
move- ment. The second explanation offered by Vatsyayana refers to samanyatodrsta as an
inference in which the relation between the antecedent and the consequent, not being a matter
of perception, is established on the ground of an abstract similarity with something else, e.g.,
inference of soul on the basis of the fact that desire, etc., are qualities and that qualities must
abide in some substance, namely, the self.?
Jayanta holds that when we infer the consequent from the antecedent which is neither a cause
nor an effect, it is sâmanya- todista, e.g., the taste of a kapittha (wood apple) is inferred from its
colour. Colour and taste inhere in kapittha and they are not causally related to each other.
Jayanta is of the view that the example given by Vatsyayana, i.e., "sun has motion', is not sound
since reaching different places due to motion actually illustrates the inference o f cause from its
effect.? It is rather an example of Sesasat. Moreover,htesunhasnocontactwiththehill,etc.,era even
if ti has contact with hte sky, it si imperceptible and het contact presupposes the perception of
the things conjoined Giving an alternative interpretation of this term, Jayanta holds that when an
imperceptible object si inferred o n the basis of concomitance between the universal of the
antecedent (reason) and the universal of the consequent ti si caled samanyatodista inference,
c.go, we infer the existence of the organ of hearing from that of auditory perception. The sense
organs are supersensuous objects, So they are never perceived. As the act of hewing depends
upon an instrument such as an axe, so the act of hearing must have some cause and that is why
we infer the organ of bearing as the instrument of the act of hearing.
Diference between Sesavat and Sámanyatodysta. Jayanta holds that the modes of operation of
sesavat and samânyatodista are different. He is, however, aware of the view of the Mimamsakas
who hold that samangatodrsta is that type of inference in which no parti- cular similar to the
consequent has been perceived even at the time of the discovery of the relation of universal
concomitance. For example, the judgment that 'Devadatta moves' refers only to Devadatta since
his action is not perceived. The judgment that 'Devadatta stands still' and that 'Devadatta
moves', refer alike to- the same person. Jayanta objects to this contention on the same grounds
on which he has refuted kriyanumanavada with reference to the definition of samanyal.
Isvarakoa mentions three types of inference but be does not name t h e m , Re, however, refers to
Samanyalodrita in a subsequent kärika. Vijnanabhiksu, Gaudapada and Mathara follow Gautama
and refer to these types of inference.' Vacaspati tries to coordi- nate the Nyya and Sämkhya
types of inference by including pürvavat and samänyatodista under vita and sesarat under avita.
Bhasarvajña distinguishes betweea drsta or visesatodisla and samanyatodrsta inferences
maintaining that in the former a perceptible object is inferred from the perception of a mark. But
in the latter an imperceptible object is inferred from the perception of a marks.