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Population Growth and

Global warming

JOHN BONGAARTS

THE AVERAGE GLOBAL TEMPERATIJRE during the 1980s exceeded that of any
other decade since reliable temperature recording began a century ago, and
1990 was the warmest year on record (Hansen. 1991). This unusual period
of global warming has sparked a vigorous debate about its causes. A number
of scientists claim that the "greenhouse effcct"-a rise in the global tem-
perature induced by the build-up of·manmade gases in the atmosphere-is
the main cause. Others point to the substantial natural variability in the past
temperature record and call for funher research before attempting to draw
firm conclusions or take drastic action. Despite these uncenainties, many
governments consider the potentially severe consequences of continued
global warming over the next century a sufliciently serious threat to warrant
immediate remedial action (Benedick et al., 1991 ). International negotiations
under the auspices of the United Nations have been conducted 10 reach an
agreement to reduce the growth of emissions of carbon dioxide and other
greenhouse gases. These effons have resulted in a convention on climate
change that was signed at the UN Conference on Environment and Devel-
opment in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992.
The ongoing policy debate about responses to the expected future global
warming is guided by extensive scientific studies. Hundreds of scientists have
taken pan in recent assessments of the potential for man made climate change
and policy options (e.g.• IPCC. 1990a,b; NAS. 1991; EPA. 1990a,b). These
repons are in agreement on the following key issues:
- Carbon dioxide (CO, ) and other greenhouse gases produced by
natural processes were present in the atmosphere long before the role of
humans became significant. By panially blocking the infrared radiation orig-
inating from the eanh. these gases have kept the globe warmer (by about
32°C) than would be the case in their absence.
- The atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gases is rising as the
result of a variety of human activities, of which the burning of fossil fuels is

PO PU LATION ANO DEVELOPMENT REVIEW IS. NO . 2 (JUNE 19921 299

300 POPULATI O N GROWTH ANO GLOBAL WARMING

the most important. Since the beginning of the industrial revolution the
concentration of CO,. the principal greenhouse gas affected by man's actions,
has risen by 2 5 percent. 1 The emission of other greenhouse gases including
methane, nitrous oxide, and chlorofluorocarbons has also increased sub•
stantially in recent decades.
- Slow but significant warming of the globe will occur in the next
century if emissions of greenhouse gases continue to grow.
A consensus has not yet been reached on other imponant issues:
- The expected rise in global temperature. There is wide variation in
the amount of future global warming estimated by different climate models.
As will be discussed funher below. the most recent assessments suggest a
temperature rise by the year 2 IOO of a little over 4°C above preindustrial
levels if economic growth continues and effective interventions are not im-
plemented. This estimate is subject to a wide margin of error and the actual
POPU L ATION AND DEVE LOPM ENT
REVIE W 111. NO .
Exit reading mode ( es

300
POPU LATIO N GR OWTH AND GLOB
AL WARM ING

the most impo nant. Since the beginning of the

industrial revolution the
conc~ntration of COz, th~ principal greenhouse gas
affected by man's actions.
has nsen by_25 perce_nt. The emission of othe r
greenhouse gases including
meth ane. nitrous oxide, and chlo rofluorocarbo
stantially in recent decades. ns has also increased sub-
- Slow but significant wan ning of the globe
cent ury if emissions of greenhouse gases cont inue will occur in the next
to grow.
A consensus has not yet been reached on
othe r impo nant issues:
- The expected rise in global temperature. Ther
e is wide variation in
the amo unt of future global warming estimated
by different climate models.
As wiU be discussed funh er below. the most recen
t assessments suggest a
temp eratu re rise by the year 2100 of a little over
4°C above preindustrial
levels if economic grow th cont inues and effective
interventions are not im-
plem ented . This estimate is subject to a wide marg
in of error and the actual
temp eratu re rise coul d be a few degrees larger
or smaller depending on the
actua l future trend in emissions and on the still
poorly understood climatic
response to elevated levels of greenhouse gases
. To put these forecasts into
perspectiv e it is of interest to note that the avera
ge global tcmperalUre has
risen less than 5°C since the peak of the last ice
age abou t 20,000 years ago.
The sea level at that time was abou t 100 mete
rs below the present level
(NAS. 1991 ).
- The degree of geographic variation in climate
chan ge. Increases in
temp eratu re are not expected to be unifo rm acros
s the globe, but the nature
and exte nt of climatic variation are uncertain.
Most climate models predict
grea ter than average warming in north ern latitu
des and on land surfaces.
- The consequences of a temp eratu re increase.
Warming will lead to
worl dwid e chan ges in weat her conditions and
to a rise in the sea level . but
the exte nt of these chan ges and the severity of their
economic and ecological
consequences remain unclear. Schelling ( 1983
) provides a thoughtful dis-
cuss ion of the implications of global warm ing in
the context of othe r economic
chan ges and risks to whic h society wlll have to
adap t in the next century.
- The urgency to respond to the threa t of globa
l warming. Environ-
mentalists generally call for drastic actio n to stabi
lize or even reduce emissions
of gree nhou se gases (e.g.. Ehrlich and Ehrlich.
1991 ). In contrast, some
economists (e.g .. Nord haus, 1991) argu e that
such actions are likely to be
very expensive and that, aside from some mino
r reductions in the growth
of emissions, adjusting to a temp eratu re rise will
not necessarily be less cost-
effective than averting it wou ld be.
Furt her research will no doub t provide important
new insights and
shar pen our unde rstan ding of the com plex proce
sses of climatic chan ge and
its cons eque nces . It should be recognized, howe
ver, that a satisfactory res-
olution of a num ber of key ques tions may take
decades.
This ankl e foc uses on two issues that have thus far
received only limited
atten tion. The first of these conc erns the role of
population growth in future

JO HN BON G AART S
301
ns consequences. ll sho uld be
recognized, ho
stions ma y ta . Ex it reading m od e
olu tio n of a number of key que
. ( es
This article focuses on tw o issu
attention. The first of these con es tha t hav ' ~ .
cerns the role of population gro
..
. .
wth in futu rc

JOH N BON GAA RT S

301
global warming. With a few not
able exceptions (e.g ., NAS. 199
available scientific assessments 1 ; Smil. 19 90 ).
com me nt on ly briefly on the
population growth. No substanti significance of
al effort has bee n dev ote d to qua
role of population or to compar ntifying the
ing its effect with the contributi
determinants of global warming ons of oth er
. A second issue is the relative
of the developed an d developin con trib uti on s
g parts of the world to climate
Most proposals for action call stabilization.
for substantial declines in the
sions from the industrialized cou growth of emis-
ntries. which un til no w have
sible for the bu lk of ma nm ade bee n respon-
gre enh ou se gases. But emiss
developing countries are expect ions from the
ed to rise more rapidly in the com
and the ir role in control strateg ing dec ades.
ies sho uld not be ignored. Be
these issues l provide a brief for e tur nin g to
review of the key factors tha
projected future temperature t det erm ine the
rise.

Global wa rm ing in the ab sen

ce
of int erv en tio ns
The processes underlying the exp
ected fut ure global wa rm ing hav
subject of numerous studies. e bee n the
The mo st comprehensive of
analyze the following cha in of these exercises
causation (EPA. 1990a; IPCC.
1991a) :
Hum.an pro duc tion Em issl
on of Atm osp her ic
and con sum pt.i on -+ gre enh Global
ous e -+ con cm t.ra tlon of -+
act ivit ies gas n wa rm ing
gre enh ous e gas es

Human activities suc h as the bu

rni ng of fossil fuels. deforesta
cultivation. use of fertilizer in tion, rice
agriculture. and production of
carbons (CFCs) lead to the em chlorofluoro-
ission of a nu mb er of gre enh
rise in atmospheric concentra ou se gases. Th e
tions resulting from these em
mi ned by the complex ways in iss ions is det er-
wh ich gre enh ou se gases are abs
oceans and lan d biota or decom orbed by the
posed by chemical reactions. Ele
house gas concentrations in vated gre en-
tur
du din g a rise in temperature. n lea d to complex climatic responses. in•
A complete analysis of eac h ste
p in this global wa rm ing proces
involves highly complex com s typically
pu ter mo del s wi th scores of var
rameters. For present purposes iab les an d pa-
the details of the se models nee
us an d we will instead exa mi d no t con cer n
ne the key findings from tw
assessments. One of these wa o recent ma jor
s un der tak en by the Intergove
on Climate Change (IPCC, 199 rnmental Pa nel
l a,b) established un de r the aus
United Nations Environment Pro pices of the
gramme an d the World Meteo
gani1.ation; the oth er is con tai rol ogical Or-
ned in a Report to Congress pro
US Ernvironmental Protection du ced by the
Agency (EPA, l99 0a, b). Bo th
the impact of a variety of pau stu die s eva lua te
ern s of fut ure emissions of gre
but att ent ion will focus her e firs enh ou se gases.
t on the scenarios tha t assess
fut ure climatic
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US ~nvironmental Protection Agency (EPA. 1 Exit reading mode ( es

the impact of a variety of pauerns of future e
but auention will focus here first on the scenarios that assess future climatic

302 POP U L ATION GROWTI! AND GLOBAL WARMING

developments in the absence of interven1ions to stop or slow global warming.

The IPCC produced two such scenarios, one labeled "business as usual," the
other "reference." The EPA study also included a "no response" scenario
with results similar to those of the IPCC. Table I compares the quantitative
estimates of key variables from these studies.
The results for these scenarios difTer 10 some extent from one another
for a number of reasons, including differences in methodologies and as•
sumptions about key input variables. Whatever the differences in inputs and
assumptions, these scenarios produce quite similar results. Annual emission
rates of CO2 are expected to approximately double by the year 2025 and
then double again by the year 2100. Emissions of other greenhouse gases
are also expected to grow substantially. Temperature increases between 1985
and 2025 are projected to be about I •c. and by the end of the twenty-first
century the total temperature increase auributable to man's actions is esti·
mated to exceed 4°C above preindustrial levels.
EPA (1990a,b) and IPCC (199la,b) also examine a number of other
possible scenarios, some with and others without interventions to control
emissions. For example, EPA ( 1990a) contains two additional projections
with no new stabilizing policies. One of these produces more and the other
less future global warming than the variant presented in Table I. For reasons
given below, all of these other scenarios, even those with the most stringent
controls, arc expected to result in al least some increase in the future tern·
peraturc of the globe.
It should be emphasized that the above estimates of global warming
of over 4°C by 2100 in the absence of deliberate interventions arc su~je~ to
a wide margin of potential error. Uncertainty about future levels of~m1ss1ons
of greenhouse gases is one contributing factor. Perhaps the most 1mport~n1
source of uncertainty lies in current estimates of the extent ofglobal warrrung

TABLE I Estimates of co, emission, CO2 concentration, and temperature

increase in 1985, 2025, and 2100
C01 concn1tr•tion
Tc-mSM"UllUr~'
CO2 rmlulon rise ('C)
(Pgr of C/year)• (ppm)"
198' 202S 2100 198' 2025 1100
1,s, 202, 2100

15.2 346
IPCC "rdcrcncc" 6. 9 440 940 0.6 1.5 4.4
12.4 26.1 346 1.9 4.2
EPA " no rc~pnnsc"" 6.0 437 830 0.9
11.5 27.4 346
IPCC " bu~int•ss as usual" 6.0
_ - n,n .1vc1ll.1bh,:
~ l'):r _ .,,1 .,~ram'ii. i.e.·•• 10 'l,:ro1m>
1

,, l'.1ns rt·r mlUlno . . . I • lod Clim.tit> St'U)illvlty Is .u:~uml-d w be 2. s•c (!,,t"'l' wxo.
' lm:rcd)l' in ll'mlM.'rJlUJl' .aibOVl' pn·ind~'ilrlcl pu .
,1 EPA ') 1<a11tdly d1.ain,:lo,: wurhJ w.enJno
SOURCf.: EPA (IY90J.bl. IPCC Cl991•.bl

JO}
- - nm •vaildhll·
~ l',,:r - 1'11.'1.J),etdm,. l.l·.. IO"'i.:r•
1'•n~ Jl(.•r million m~
:. hk:r~aM· in tl"ffllk.·r.atun.· •bow.• prl'indu,1ri•I
Exit reading mode ( es
~ EPA ~. N_..t~ktly ..:h..tnt,:h11t world '<'l"OJ.rio pl·rind. Cllmalt" u.•m.lllvhy is • C()4..,,; too.
SOUl<<.F.. EPA 11990,1.l>I, IPCC (1991•.b>

JOHN BONGAART S
303

associated with a ~iven rise in greenhouse gas concentrations. Different cli-

mat~. m~dels predict temperature increases ranging from 1. 9 to 5.2°C in the
equ1h~nu_m temperature of the globe if CO2 concentrations (or an equivalent
combmauon of several greenhouse gases) are doubled from preindustrial
levels (NAS, 199 l) . This temperature rise is referred to as the "dimate sen-
sitivity" (IPCC, 199 la). As was the case in the IPCC assessment, the present
study assumes climate sensitivity to be a somewhat conservative 2. 5°C. The
implication of this assumption is that the actual warming in 2100 might not
be a little over 4°C as estimated in Table l, but could be as high as 9.0°C (if
sensitivity turns out to be 5.2°C) or as low as 3.2°C (if sensitivity is l.9°C).
The standard scenarios in Table 1 serve as benchmarks for evaluating
the effectiveness of policy interventions. The IPCC and EPA studies contain
a wide range of proposals for bringing about reductions in global warming.
Virtually all of these options aim to control the emission of greenhouse gases
(the main exception is a proposal for reforestation, which would increase
the absorption of CO2 from the atmosphere). IL is generally assumed that
the damage is done once greenhouse gases are released and that control of
emissions is the key to averting the adverse consequences of a substantial
temperature rise. The subsequent discussion ther~fore_ focuses on fact_ors
affecting the production of greenhouse gases. To s1mphfy the presentauon
further, principal attention will be given to CO2, which is expected to be
responsible for nearly two-thirds of future global warming (EPA, 1990a).

The "determinants" of CO2 emission rates

The design of effective and comprehensive policies 10 control global warm~ng
requires an understanding of the roles played by the different factors affecun~
CO roduction. Figure l summarizes the relationships bctwe~n ih_e annu~.
!.~ n of CO and the five fact0rs that determine it: populauo~ size. _grossf
e1rnss10 2 • • .·,y of GDP carbon 1ntens1ty o
domestic product per capita, energy m1ens1_ ,
t'on and uopical deforestauon.
energy consump 1 • . . dGDPpercapitaequalstotaleconomic
The product of populau~n s1z:i::d to sustain ec~nomic production and
output. T~e a~ount of ~ner!i t~: level of energy intensity, and the ~arbon
consumpuon is a funcuon f CO emission from fosstl fuels
. determines the rate o 2 rbo .
intensity o I energy mption The total ca n em•s-
assodated with a given level of ~n~rgy cfon: the bu;ning of fossil fuels and
h sum of em1ss1ons ro , 'liar
sion rate equa1s t c . . GDP and deforestation arc ,am•
from dcforcstation.2 Populauon s1z~, t ;cquirc a brief comment. Energy
concepts, but the other two deterrn;;::~n s (expressed in standard unit~ su~h
intensity measures the amou( n~o;,:r) ~\arics widely among counmes, in
as ·oult::s) per unit of GDP a o . . f energy use in particular ~ctors
pa~t due 10 differences in _the effiC1i::~ :nd in part due to variation in the
. dus·1ry transpor1a11on, scrv
(e.g., Ill · •

GLOBAL WARMING
pOPUL,t.TION GROWTH AND

304 dic,,c lck emission

1 Ing carbon
FIGURE I Fact.Ors d~tcrm n
rates
7
9:3 3 1M1 •••

•
o-
-o jsto r.o rg/ sta ble /19 736 81- ; + ••

6 I 21
from defo resta tion. ' Population size
GDP
• din g mo de
( es
~ts, but the othe r two dctcr mi~a nts • a, Exi t rea
~ncc rcq
the amount o f energy (
m1cn• s11y meas ures ) e~presse tn s1an ar . unns sue
as JOU. lt:s) per unit of GDP (a d 0 IIar · II vane s w·d I amon g countries, in
rt d . en • c Y
pa .ue 10 d11Terence s in the efficien of ergy use in particular sectors
s . cy the
(e.g.. industry, 1rans por1a ti·on , crv1ccs) and in part d uc 10 variation in

G L OBA L WARM ING

POPU LATIO N GROW TH AND
304
l« nnbs lon
~~~RE I Factors d~ter mlnln g carbon dlox

Factors
Population slu

Economic ou1pu1
(GDP)
GDP per capita

j
Energ y intens ity
~~1=••·-
Carbon emission rare
from foss il futls
Carbon inre:nsity

j
Tota I carbon
~mission rare
Oeforesrarion

t
energy intensity in the former Sovie
struc ture of econ omic s. For example, se Japa n's indus try is more
Japa n becau
Unio n is seve ral times high er than in
GDP is produced by light manufacturing
efficient and a large r prop ortio n ofils
of the fom1er USSR relics 10 a large
and services. In contrast. the econ omy
stry. Carbon intensity measures the
exten t on energ y-int ensiv e heav y indu ).
per unit of cons umed energy (a joule
amo unt of carb on (in grams) emil led prop ortio n of energy pro-
arily deter mine d by the
Carb on inten sity is prim s that make
10 be smallest in economie
duce d from fossil sources; it tends nucle ar or hydr oelectric
sources such as
significan t use of alter nativ e energy rtant facto r alTl-cting carbon
fuels is also an impo
powe r. The mixt ure of fossil n
releases nearly twice as much carbo
inten sity beca use the burn ing of coal
amo unt of energy producedn. emission rate. T. (in
as natu ral gas for a give ntwee
The relat ionsh ip be n the total annu al carbo
g factors can be expressed algebraically
gram s per year) and its five detcn ninin
as follows :
T = P X G X EXC +D

JO~

JOHN HONG A ARTS

sent. respective ly. population size. GDP per capita.
c. E. and c repre· ____ ,;,., The variable D measures the amou nt of
,.,.h,. rnle of population
9:33 &::11 •••

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7 I 21
grams per year) and its five determining factors
as follows: Exit reading mode ( es
T = PXG x E x C+D

J05
JOHN II ONGAART S

where P. G. E. and C represent, respectively, population size. GDP per capita.

and energy and carbon Intensity. The variable D measures the amount of
carbon emitted annually as the result of deforestation. (The role of population
growth in deforestation is left unspecified in this formulation.) The product
of P, G, E. and C equals the annual emission of carbon from fossil fuel
consumption.
The large future increases in the annual ratl'S of CO2 emissions expected
in the scenarios without intervention are the net result of projected trends
in the five factors identified in Figure I. Figures 2 and 3 present illustrative
projections of four of these factors from 1985 to 2 IO0 for the developed and
developing countries (for convenien ce lhe labels "developed" and "devel-
oping" will be used even though over time increasing numbers of so-called
developing countries will reach high standards of living). These results are
based on EPA's " no response" projection of global CO2 emission, which is
intermedia te between the two IPCC scenarios for 1985 to 2025 (sec Table
l ). To put these factor projections into perspective the corresponding esti-
mates for the recent past are also included in Figures 2 and 3. The kl,Y features
of these figures arc as follows:
- population size is projected to increase between 1985 and 2100
from 3.6 to 9.0 billion in the devclopil1g countries and from 1.2 to 1.5 billion

FIGURE J EstJmatn and projtttlons of population slz~ and GDP Pff capita for
Ins dewloped countries (LDCs) and mor~ ciewlol)fll countrln (MDCs): 1950-JJOO
GDP per capita
Populatlon
12 -:..__ __ sltt __ _ _ _ ___,,

10 100.000

MDCs
8 ~
~
C ~ 10.000 .,,,,
g 00

la
6
:
4
1.000

2
-----
oL-- --1-- - -.1.-- -~ 1950 2000
....L...-- :~
IOOL- -.!--- 2050 2100
1950 2000 2050 2100
Ytar
Ytar
- Projcaion --- Es1imatt
- Projt-ction - - - Estimate

SOURCES: EPA. 1990b: Z.chariah and Vu. 1988.

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Year
Exit reading mode ( esc )
- Projl-Clion --- Eslimatc
SOURCES: EPA. 1990b; Z•chariah and Vu. 1988.

306 PO PULATION GROWTH ANO G L O BAL WARMING

FIGURE 3 Estlm.iltes and projtttlons of mttgy and carbon lntrnslt~ for ~s

ckwlopN countries (LDCs) and ..-e ckwlopN countries (MDCs): 196i-2100

En<1'!1Y lntrnslly carbon Intensity

10~-----------~ 25 . - - - - - - - - - - - - - ,

2S
20 ~

ls
~ 20
0

o~--~---~---~~ 0 c__ __JIL.,__ __Jl_ _ ___,,1_,

1950 2000 20SO 2 100 19SO 2000 2050 2100
Ytar Ytdr
- Projection --- Estimate - Projection

SOURCE: Adapt,d from EPA. 1990b.

in the developed world. The future annual rate of population growth is slower
than in recent decades in both less developed countries (LDCs) and more
developed countries (MDCs). and growth rates are expected to decline
throughout the next century until stabilization is achieved at the beginning
oflhe twenty-second century. The proponion of the world's population living
in the developing world increases from 75 percent in 1985 to an estimated
86 percent in 2100.
- GDP per capita. The global average is expected to rise from $3,000
to S36,000 per capita between 1985 and 2l00. :rhe annual growth rate is
projected to average 3 percent in the developing world and 2 percent in the
developed world between 1985 and 2100. As a result, the relative disparity
between LDCs and MDCs will decline from 13:1 in 1985 to 4 : 1 in 2100 but
the absolute difference will continue to rise. Future growth rates of GDP per
capita arc assumed to decline slowly over time in the developed world.
- Energy intensity is projected to decline rapidly in the future. The
rate of cha nge is partkularly rapid in the developed world be1ween 1985
and 2025, when energy intensity is expected to be more than halved. An
even larger rcduc1ion is projected 10 occur in 1hc LDCs between 2025 and
2100. Energy intensity in LDCs exceeds 1hat of MDCs 1hro ughou1 1hc next
l·entury. A comparison with trends over 1he past two decades indica1es 1hat

JO HN BONGAARTS 307

energy intensity in MDCs is already declining. bu1 1his is 1101 the case in
LDCs where a decline is expected 10 begin before the year 2000.
- Carbon intensily remains rcla1ively invariant lhroughout the next
century. At present, average carbon intensity in LDCs is higher than in MDCs
because the lauer relv less on coal as a fossil fuel and thev use nonfossil fuels
 g I 21
rate of chang e is panir ularly rapid in t Exit rea din g mo de ( es
and 2025, when energ y intens ity is exp c ·c
even larger reduc tion is projected to occ MOC s 1hrou g~ou_1 the next
ity in LO Cs excee ds that of
21 oo. Energ y intens
past two decad es mdrcatcs that
centu ry. A comp arison with trend s over the

307
JOHN B ONGA ARTS

ing, but this is not the case in

energ y intensity in MOCs is alread y declin
befor e the year 2000.
LOCs wher e a declin e is expec ted to begin
- Carbon intensity remai ns relativ ely invar iant throu ghou t the next
in LDCs is highe r than in MOCs
centu ry. At present, avera ge carbo n intensity
less on coal as a fossil fuel and they use nonfo ssil fuels
because the latter rely
ted to be rever sed by the midd le of
to a great er exten t. This patter n is expec
the next centu ry. ced 0.7 Petag rams of carbo n
- Deforestation is estim ated 10 have produ
rate is projec ted to rise slowl y to 1. 1 Pgr in 2075 and
per year in 1985. This
in 2100. The perce ntage of total carbo n emis-
10 dedin e subse quent ly 10 0 .8
to defor estati on declin es from 12 perce nt in 1985 to 3 perce nt
sion attrib utable
in 2100.
ent factors is the produ ct of
This set of future trajectories for the differ
and comp uter mode ling exercise under -
a complex and detail ed assessment
the EPA. Furth er details abou t
taken by group s of scientists assem bled by
l assum ption s arc prese nted in EPA
this project and the under lying mode
ess to say, the scena rio prese nted here is o nly one amon g
( I 990a, b). Needl
many possible alternatives.
mina nts of CO2 emission
The above summ ary of trend s in the deter
plaus ibility of the emiss ion levels proje cted
rates gives some insight into the
Table I. A comp arison of past
in the no respo nse scena rio summ arized in
the proje ctions are not impla usible. at least
and future trend s suggests that
discontinu ities with past trend s
in the near future, becau se no impo rtant
per capita in both LOCs and MOCs (with
occur . The conti nued rise in GDP
simila r to those in the past two decad es) is perha ps the most
grow th rates
st could well turn out to be too optim istic,
crucial assum ption. This foreca
it appro priate for a " busin ess
but the EPA analy sts never theless consi dered
to be seen whet her the past upwa rd trend
as usual" projec tion. It remai ns
ity in the devel oping world can be rever sed. At the very least
in energ y intens
tment s in conse rvatio n and in new techn ologi es.
this will requi re majo r inves
nue its declin e, but an accel -
Energy intens ity in MOCs will no doub t conti
cted in Figur e 2 will not be easy to achie ve.
eratio n of this declin e as proje
4°C is expec ted by 2100, despi te
The fact that globa l warm ing of more than
lation grow th and with rapid decre ases in
future reduc tions in rates of popu
a tas.k the mitig ation of global
energ y intens ity, make s dear how formi dable
warm ing will be.

Population grow th and futur e carb on dioxide

emission rates
er popu lation grow th and eco-
The preceding discussion revealed that furth
princ ipal factors puttin g upwa rd
nomi c devel opme nt arc expec ted to be the
ion rates. This trend is partia lly offset by re-
pressu re on annu al CO2 emiss

AL WARM ING
308 ,o,uLA TION GROW TH ANO GLOB

qualit ative concl usion s can be

du':'io ns in energ y in~cnsity. While these
Figur es 2 and 3, they only give broad indic ation s
dcnvc d fro_m an rnspe ctron of
nts; a more accur ate quant itativ e
of the relau~e roles of the different deter mina
assessment rs theref ore desira ble.
deter mina nts is bevo nd the
A comnlete analvsis of the effects of all
 •
~o js to r.org/ st able/1 9736
81 -; + ••

10 / 21

future ca rbo n
, Exit reading m od e ( es
Population gro wt h an d
em iss ion rares
1ion grow1h and eco-
cus sio n rev ealed 1ha1 fur the r popula
Th e pre ced ing dis pal faa ors pu1ting upw ard
cxp cae d 10 be the princi
nomic dcv elo pm cm arc on ra1es. This 1rcnd is pan
ially 01Tse1 by re-
on ann ual C0 em issi
pressu re 1

WAJIMIHG
WT H AHO GLO IAL
POP ULA TIO N GRO
308
live conclusions can be
ime nsi ty. While these qualita s
o nly give broad indication
ductio ns in ene rgy
n ofFigurrs 2 and 3, they
derived from an inspectio mo re acc ura te qua ntit ativ e
different dc1crminan1s; a
of 1he relative roles of the
des irab le.
assessment is therefore ina nts is beyond the
the effects of all det erm
A com ple te analys is of n gro wth will be examined
and on ly the role of pop ulatio
scope of this arti cle pro jed ions for 202 5 and
est imates for 1985 and
briefly. Table 2 presen ts CO2 emission rates
n size, CO emission per capita. and
ula tio tha n fourfold rise in global
pop 2
210 0 of
g and dev elo ped wo rld. The mo re du e
in the dev elo pin
26. 1 Pgr per year) bet
ween 198 5 and 2 IO0 is
CO , emission (fro m 6 to J 5) and the MD Cs (fro m 3.8 5
to gro wth in bot h the
LOCs (fro m 2. I 5 10 14. m
ginating in LDCs rises fro
pro por tio n of global emissions ori 198 5
to 11 . 95 ). Th e 54 per cen t in 210 0. In
55 percent in 202 5 and n live times
36 percen t in 198 5 to dev elo ped world wa s mo re tha
iss ion fro m the eae d to
per capita CO2 em par ity is not exp
tha n in the dev elo pin g wo rld ; this large dis
hig her
the next century.
cha nge drastically over is calculate d her e as the
com rib uti on of pop ula tio n gro wth
The spe cifi c
CO em ission gro wth rate tha t
the average ann ual 2
proportional reduction in r 198 5 and if the projected
n size is kept constant afte
would occ ur if pop ula tio ain s unaffecte d., II sho uld
per capita em ission rate rem n
futu re tre nd in the
contribution of populatio
resulting estimates of the
be emphasized tha1 the n bec aus e the ass um pti on
uld be used with cautio
arc rat her cru de and sho

tttnds throug h 210 0 In

for 198 S and ass um fll tot al co , em issi on for
TA BLE 2 Esl lma tn ~ r cap ita, and
pop ulatJon slze , co , emelo pfl l wo rld
ission
the dffelo pln g and dev )NIDtt elol
Wor ld
Dtt eloplns touJ
w orld wor ld

4.8 7
Population size (billions) 3.6 4 1.23
1985 1.43 8. 19
6.7 6 10.4 2
202 5 1.4 7
8.9 5
210 0
1.23
CO , emission per capita 0.5 9 3.13
3.8 8 1.51
198 5 1.01
8 .13 2.5 0
202 5 1. 58
2 100
ssio n'
Total car bon dioxide emi 6.0
/Ps:r of Cly ta rJ 2. 15 3.8 5
12.4
198 5 5. 55
6.8 5 26. 1
202 5 14.15 11. 95
210 0
'f1 produc.1ion.
ddorC'Sl,rion •nd ttnK
• Jncl ud;n J mw~siom lrom (RCWI K"<nario.
EPA ( 199111>1. no response
SOURCE: Adap1nl (rum
9:33 fi:::O •••

0 ~o jstor.org/stable/1973681-; + •••

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2100 14. 15 Exit reading mode ( esc )

• 111dudi1~ cffll"kH'li from dri01nc.t1k,n .tnd «nk'nt produi.lkN1.
SOURC E: A~ptt'\I from EPA I l'IYOb), oo rnpomt' (RCWI K't'rwrio.

J O HN BONGAARTS )09

of independence bc1ween popula1ion growlh and per capita CO, produc-

lion is al best a rough approximalion of reality. (A variation in the population
grow1h trajectory can be expected to result in some changes in future trends
for the four other determinants of CO, emission. For example, a reduction
in future population growth will presumably lead to an increase in lhe growth
rate of GDP per capita. The net effect on CO 2 emission per capita is difficult
to estimate because the factor changes arc likely to be at least panially
offsetting.)
This decomposition exercise yields lhe results presented in Table 3. The
role of population growlh as a determinant of lhe projected rise in CO,
emissions appears 10 be substantial. It accounts for 35 percent of lhe global
increase and for 48 percent of 1he growth in LDCs between 1985 and 2100.
As populalion growth slows during the next century, its contribution declines
from 50 percent of the global total between 1985 and 2025 to 22 percent
between 2025 and 2100. These findings suggest that furthereffons to reduce
population growth could result in significant savings in the emission of
greenhouse gases. Such effons are both desirable and feasible, but the cost-
effectiveness of this policy option is partly limited by the so-called population
momentum. which makes some further increase in global population size
inevitable over the next few decades.
The significance of population as a policy variable depends not only
on its contribution to the projCTted rise in emission but also, and more
importantly, on the degree to which the future population trajectory can
plausibly be expected to deviate from the projection presented in Figure 2.
An assessment of lhe feasibility and potential impact of population policies

TABLE J Esllm,oted c:onulbullon of popul,ollon growth to tM

lncr~ase In CO, emission Mtwttn 198' and 2100 und~r th~
assumpllons sllpulated In Tabl~ 1
One-loping Dndopcd World
world world tot.Al

Increase in CO 2 emission
(Pgr of C/ycar)
1985-2025 4.7 1.7 6.4
2025-2100 7.3 6.4 13.7
1985-2100 12.0 8.1 20.1
Contribution o f population
growth to tmission increase
(percent)
1985-2025 53 42 50
2025-2100 39 3 22
1985-2100 48 16 35
SOURCE: T.lbk l ; 'itt o1ho nott> ).

JIO POPULATION GROWTH ANO G LOBAL WARMING

will no1 be anempted here. Instead, the set oflong-range projections prepared
recently by the United Nations will be accepted for selling plausible upper
and lower limits on global population growth (Uniled Na1ions. 1992). Ac-
cording to the UN's " high" projec1ion, world population could reach a 1otal
of as much as 19.1 billion in 2100 if fenili1y declines slowly over lhe next
several decades. The low projection, in contras1, assumes rapid declines to
 <>-
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- -
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scenari<>S- s s ae>1ns a.e>Lal s L<> a l < e m a t i v e d e m o g r a p h i c

ECCec:l:i'-"er■ess ~ . - a.l1:er1r1ative e m i s s i < > i n cc:>.-.1:r<>l

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implemen■.
r.a.-.ge <>f" c:>pti<>r■s
ra<>W ,e;K.iSt_S I.<> c::<>T'ICr<>l m e a s u r e - s (.Bcraecliclc eL al.. I 9 9 1 ) . A. w i d e
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I 9 9 0 a ; IPC:C:. J 9 9 I a ; NA.S. J 9 9 1 ) - Bef<>CC:
i,n rn<>re dee.ail_ I discuss i n genoecal
c e r ~ It.he- c l i m a t i c r e s p < > n s e Ce> c h a n g e s i n Lhe f"u1.ure pr<>duca.i<>n of"greenh o u se
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9:33 fi:::O •••

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13 / 21

SOURCE: Sec IUI and Appendix.

Exit reading mode ( esc )

JO H N BONGAA RTS JII

control scenarios on future greenhouse gas concentrations and on global

temperature.• The first of these control scenarios (A) assumes a stabilization
of emissions after the year 2000. Since emissions are lower than in the no
response scenario discussed earlier (dashed line ), future CO2 concentrations
and temperatures are reduced somewhat. However, a stable level of emission
still leads 10 continued growth in CO2 concentration as well as in temperature.
This is a crucial and sometimes misunderstood feature of the greenhouse
warming process. The reason for 1he continued rise in CO2 concentration is
that the emission rate is at present far above preindustrial levels. and, whether
stable or not, this excess emission continues adding 10 the atmospheric res-
ervoir of CO2 al a faster rate than it is absorbed or destroyed (EPA, 1990a;
IPCC, 1991a). In theory, it is possible 10 stabilize the CO, level in the at-
mosphere, but this requires a drastic and rapid reduction 10 a small fraction
of 1he current emission rate, as sketched in scenario B. II is highly unlikely
that such a change will in fact be implemented, but even if it were 1he global
temperature would continue to rise for decades. The principal cause of this
phenomenon, called unrealized warming, is the large thermal capacity of
1he oceans. Only after decades of slow warming do the atmosphere and
oceans reach 1he equilibrium temperature associated with a given constant
bul elevated CO2 concentration. The scenarios sketched in Figure 4 make
clear that future temperature trends are not very responsive 10 large changes
in emission rates. As a consequence. some global warming is almost ccnain
10 occur.
No agreement exists on what cons1i1u1es an optimum strategy for re-
sponding to the threat of global warming. Environmentalists have proposed
the most radical interventions, calling for reductions in the emissions of CO2
and other greenhouse gases. The Montreal Protocol for the reduction of CFCs,
signed by most countries in the late 1980s. sets an encouraging precedent
(Benedick ct al., 199 1). But the imponance of fossil fuels to the economies
of both the developed and developing countries makes the reduction of
emissions of CO2 a much more difficult and controversial proposition. In
practice, the best 1ha1 can probably be achieved is an agreement 10 stabilize
CO, emissions in the near future. The elTecliveness of any such policy would
of course depend on the level and timing of stabilization and on the degree
of panicipation of dilTerent countries. I now examine 1he impact of variation
in these factors on global warming with a set of simulations.
It is clear that the sooner a s1abiliza1ion policy is adopted, the more
effective it will be in curbing warming. To assess the impact of variation in
the liming of a stabilization policy, I made a set of model estimates of future
CO, concentratio n and associated 1cmpcra1ure changes for five scenarios
with stabilization dates of 1990, 2000, 2025, 2050, and 2075. In each case
101al emission rates were assumed 10 follow the no intervention scenario
until the date of s1abiliza1ion, after which emissions were held constant. Table
4 presents the results of this exercise.

Jl2 POPUL ATI O N GROW TH ANO G LOBAL WARMIN G

TABLE 4 Er£ttt of changn In timing of emission stablllutlon on

atmospheric concentration of CO, and temperatu~ rise In 2100
Estlmatn for l 100
COJ:ftftission
Ye-uo( ~te-ahtt CO;a conttr1lr.tk>n TNn~rillture
stabllwitlon s tabUlutlon (Pgr/yur) (ppm) rise ( C)
0

1990 6.7 522 2.5

2000 8. 1 567 2.8
2025 12.4 686 3.5
un ti lcs
4 pr th e<s
d at
- -~
cn e••or•c
1.h s tle
ta bi
111td"IF
s H
w er e
e re su lts z",'~':
. as su m

w1•-
• ed
-~ vu. .Z 02 5
.7·s af
ex le
ercrw ~'.:c hfoelio
1·se m.;,
0 issi o n s w er e he ld
co n sta nt
- • • •
. Ta ble - -

3I 2
TA BL E. ..
a~ m os ph erCiE
coffnc
~ en
o<tr no < co
co
chata
W ::e s In timPO PU
in g oLf
" an d te•n o• e_ .._ ,0GR OW T H AN O GL OB A
sn - • • • nusta L WA RM >H G
- rlbl ll-d on
• e -. .••o on
Esl.l■n.-t.eS ,: -• n ••oo
ra t.e aaf
Ve ar of '
_, ,b m'-C
-d
T n
on (P g.r/ yea r) Temr-- raa ure
s~ bl l_i zia t.. lon 6 .7 co ~ or 2'0
G _ (.~
C)
CP P"con
"l
c-e -n
-•"-
rl
1990 S . l 2 .5
20 00 1 2. 4 S2 2 2 .8
20 25 687
S6 6 3 .5
20 50 16. 9 78 6 3 .9
22 .0 86 2 4 .2
20 75
so uR C: E: s~ Ap
ptn dlx .
9:33 fi:::O •••

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of its large and growing population. Current) Exit reading mode ( esc )
of the globe lives in the developed countries; b1 ~

JOHN BONGA ARTS JI}

FIGURE S Effttts of allttlutlw, emission stabilization scenarios on global

warming In 2100
Ttm~ratur< ds< In llOO (abov< pr<lndusutal l<v<I)
5~------------------------------,
No response

4
v~ars of
dclay in UX: 75
stabilization
50
" " Simuhanrous stabilization
25 in MOCs and LOCs

•c
0

0.__ _ _ _ _ _ _
19.._7_5_ _ _
2000....__ _ _20~2-5_ _ _2~05-0----,2~07c,5---,2,,-l.,_OO,,...-

Year of stabilization in MOCs

SOURCE: See 101 and Appendix.

is expected to decline to less than one in seven. As a result. control measures

aimed solely at the developed world will become less effective over time.

Achieving stabilization of CO2 emission

from fossil fuels
The principal goal of the climate treaty signed al the Eanh Summit in Rio
de Janeiro in June I 992 is to stabilize CO2 emissions in the developed
countries. The cost of implementing this objective will no doubt be substantial
since it entails a large reduction from the rapidly growing rates of CO2
emissions projected in the no response scenario presented in Tables I and
2. Nevertheless. many European governments have already indicated their
willingness to accept this approach (Benedick et al., 1991). Measures to
reduce the growth of emissions from developing countries are also being
considered.
Once a decision has been reached to halt the growth of CO 2 emissions.
the question becomes how to achieve this objective. The focus here is the

314 PO PULATION GROWTH ANO GLOBAL WARMING

stabilization of CO2 released through the burning of fossil fuels (EPA. 1990a
expects lhe emission of carbon from deforestation to grow only slowly). The
earlier analysis identified four determinants of the rate of CO 2 emission from
this source: population, GDP per capita, energy intensity, and carbon inten-
sity. In discussing !he potential roles lhese factors can play in bringing about
stabilization, it is useful to refer to the following equation:

J=p+g+e+ c
 • •• .... e;• uwm of emi · . \-'-II
consi dered. ssions from developin
the ·
On~e a decision has been reach ed to hah th Exi t rea ding mode ( es
ques uon becom es how to a h' h' . g Wth of CO2 em1ss1ons
c teve t is ObJeetive. The focus here is th;

314
POPUL ATION GROW TH AND GLOB AL
WARM ING
stabilii.ation of CO2
released thro h .
expec ts the emiss ion of carbo n fr~! the burru_ng of fossil
fuels (EPA, 1990a
earlie r analy sis identified four determ~eforesta;'~n to grow
this sourc e: popu lation , GDP only slowly). The
_mam s o t _e rate _of CO2 emission from
sity. In discussing the otent ' rr capita, energy lntensuy.
and carbon intcn-
stabil izatio n, it is usef~I to r~~e ;~::~ e;:i,~ :~~ :::.~
~~:n bringing about

f = p+g +e+ c
h"ch
I · I
w sii:np Y states that_the average annu al grow th rate of CO
~om fossil fuel c_onsumpt1o n (/) equa~s the sum of the avera 2 emission
ge annua l growth
. tes ~f popu lation (p). GDP per capita (g) . energy intens
ity (e), and carbon
mten~tly ~c) . The obje ~ve ~f reduc ing/t o O can be attain
ed by achieving a
comb mano n of r~uc nons mp. 9, e. and c that is equiv
alent to f Since few
~ove mme nts ar~ likely to adop t policies that deliberately
reduce the growth
m G~P per capu~ , any reduction in/ must preferably
be brought about by
redu ong popu lauon grow th or energy and carbo n intens
ities. Ln other words,
the sum of reduc tions in p. e, and c must equa l/ if CO
emissions are to be
stabilized witho ut affecting the desirable growth of per2
capita income.
Projected levels of p. 9. e. and c for LDCs and MDCs
for the period
2000 -202 5 are prese nted in Figure 6. The annu al grow
th rate ofCO2emission
is expec ted to be much highe r in the developing than in
the developed world
(3 .6 perce nt vs. 0.6 percent). thus maki ng it correspond
ingly more difficult
lo achie ve stabilization in the former. Given the projec
ted rapid increase in
popu lation and GDP per capit a in the LDCs, the task
of reducing the CO2
grow th rate to O in the next few decades appears daunt ing.
Even if population
grow th could be elimi nated (a rathe r implausible assum
ption ).fwo uld only
be reduc ed by l.3 perce ntage points, i.e.. from 3.6 to
2.3 percent. Funh er
reduc tions in energ y inten sity provi de anoth er policy
option that could be
pursu ed in a numb er of ways . includ ing a more rapid transf
er of technologies
from MDCs (OTA. 1991). It must be noted, however.
that the LDCs are at
a stage of econo mic devel opme nt at which energy intens
ity has historically
risen . thus maki ng it difficult to achieve any decline. let
alone a large one.
Some funh er decli ne in carbo n intensity may be possib
le by emphasizing
the devel opme nt of nonfossil energ y resources, such as
solar, nuclear. and
hydro electric powe r. An optim um strategy for reducing
the growth of carbon
emiss ion clearly calls for effons to chang e all the determ
inants, including
popu lation grow th. . .
Bringing abou t stabilization of CO2em1ss1on from the devel
oped world
in the first quart er of the next centu ry woul d seem to be
relatively less difficult
l>ccause the annu al grow th rate of CO2 emission is _expec
ted to ~e only 0.6
perce nt for the no interv entio n scenario. Popu lauon
growth 1s o~y 0:3
perce nt and the most ol>vious sources for savings are
further reductions m
 17 / 21
.. -~r lin~ rno de ( es
wou se
. arter o t e next centu1ol ernissi
in l 1e rst qu I growth rate of . Po
lli lll li
eductions JO
:
t.,ccause the a;n~ao intervention scena;~~-savings
are furth er r
percent for t : most obvious sources
percent and th

JOHN soNGA ARTS

ioXJck emission f,olll
rowth In carbon d
f 1GUR E6 D eterm inant s or I

rosslll.l)Cs:r,ud;s~~~~----------- -- -- -- -7
1000-1 015

~
;,- 2
K
i:
..
u
l:!
u

EnCf8Y
inu,nsitY
- 1

MI>Cs: 100o- 202s

GDP/c ap.

.....
~

;,-
2

R
i:
...
..t 0 Carbon
intens ity
-I

-2
Energ y
-1 L- --- -- -- -- -- -- -- --- --- -'
SOURCE: Adapt« ! from EPA. 1990b.
Intens ity

energy iniensity and carbon intensity. As noted

earlier. the reduc tion of
energy intensity al a rate of 2.2 percent, as
projected in the no respo nse
scenario, is rapid by historical stand ards and achie
ving addit ional reduc tions
may be expensive. Future gains in carbo n inten
sity from great er relian ce on

) 16
POPUL AT ION GROW T H AND GLOB
A L WARM ING

nonfossil energy _will be partly offset by a rise

in the carbon inten sity of fossil
fu~ls as_cconom~es arc expected 10 rely incre
auvely mexpens1ve coal (EPA, 1990a). asingly on abun dant and rel-

Conc lusio ns
9:33 ~ ... •1 II I •el II Vo ~ (I D •
WiFi -:On

~o js to r.o rg /s ta bl e/ 19 73 681':
. + ••
•

18 / 21
, .,....,..,,1_,,.~n-=J,:
. .
scenario,
may be expis rapi"dbY h"s
1 torical s;a nda rds and a ,
. in car bon int c Ex it re ad in g m od e ( es
ensive. Future gam s

}16
POP ULA TIO N GR
OW TH AND GLO
BAL WA RM ING
I
I
non
fuelsfosassileco
enenom _wil. arc
rgy ies l be pan ly odffset b~ a Iriserea
in the car bon int ens ity of I
expcct singly on abu nd ant an dfossil
atively inexpensive coal (EP e 10 re Y nc rel - I
A. l 9 9 0a) . I
I
Co ncl usi on s I

Despite the many uncena

int ies abo ut the cau ses ,
economic and ecological pot ent ial ~a gn itu de._ an
con seq uen ces of global d
that significant remedial act wa rm ing, ll seems_ h~ ely
ion will be tak en in the nea
pol icy measure being r fut ure . Th e pnn c1~ al
climate change is the reductsidered in res pon se to ~~ th~eat of subst~n!1
con
ion of gro wth o r the sta b,h al
of various greenhouse gas zau on of the em1ss1on
es, pan icu lar ly in the dev
ceding analysis leads to two elo ped wo rld . Th e pre -
con clu sio ns abo ut thi s app
mentatio n of control me asu roa ch. First, im ple -
res in MDCs Is an im po
step toward limiting global nan t and ess ent ial first
wa rm ing . bu t suc h me asu
the expected temperature res alo ne will red uce
rise of ove r 4°C at the end
a relatively small am ou nt- of the nex t cen tur y by
les s tha n 1°C. Th e ind ust
and have bee n the princi ria lize d cou ntr ies are
pal sou rce of gre enh ou se
population and economic gases. bu t rap id rates of
gro wth In the dev elo pin
raise its emissions above g wo rld are exp ect ed to
those of the dev elo ped wo
century. Efforts to cur b em rld for mo st of the nex t
issions from dev elo pin g
also be necessary to cur b cou ntr ies wil l the ref ore
global wa rm ing. Th is wil
with~_ut interfering With l be difficult to acc om pli
desirable eco nom ic gro wth sh
specific measures for cur . Sec ond , in dis cus sin g
bing CO 2 emissions , mo
focuse~ on reducing the st att ent ion has thu s far
energy int ens ity of eco nom
sumption and on increa ic pro duc tio n an d con -
sing the role of alte rna
sou rces of ene rgy. Althou tiv e, pri ma rily non fos sil.
gh future pop ula tio n gro
po~ a~t cause of global wa wth is no t the mo st im
rm -
cm1ss1o~s. and effons 10 slo ing, it is a key det erm ina nt of gre enh ou se gas
w pop ula tio n gro wth in
dev elouce
to red pingglo
wo rldwa bo th the dev elo ped an d
bal sho
rmuld
ingbe
. an essential ele me nt of a com pre hen
siv e pol icy
~voidance of the advers
the primary motivation for e con seq uen ces of glo
;~~~~~~;~~~ns. tak ing effective and pot bal wa rm in
Th e re are , how eve r. oth
"d
ent ial ly cos tl g pr~v1 es

consum pti on of foss com ro1 me asu res Per hap er sub sta nti al be Je~ ~1~; ::
il fuels and the · s mo st im
in their costs. The no res pon . P0 rta nt 1.s t h e red uce d
se sce n:~ :s; qu e~t slow1
a fourfold increase in CO ~g ~f the pro jec ted ris e
• . . esc nbe d ear her inv olv es
?•I. emissions fro m
natural gas. and especi2 ally fossil r el Al h mo re tha n
increase in their con sum pti coal a . u . s. t o~ gh res erv es
,..,. on th ppefar of
k," rve s have lo be exploi . e cost o prosuf duc
ficient to per mi t an eno
tio n rm ou s
ted w·n .
sig
P •nifican t fossil fuel reserv-' hMost . I n se as ess acc ess
ibl e
. dle velop1 ng 1
nee rises of the l 970 s.· Th ~., ave a rea dy hadcou ntr ies tha t do no t hav e
d'll •
e 'di . ' lcu1ty adj ust ing to the
rap , y exp and ing glo bal
ene rgy con sum pti on
 19 / 21
Exit reading mode ( es
price rises of the 1970s. The rapidly expandi

317

JOHN BONGAAR TS

s in the prices
foreseen in the no response scenario will cause future increase
fossil fuels. This will make efforts to improve standard s of
of oil and other
are. By
Jiving in many p00r countrie s even more difficult t_han they ~lre~dy
reducing the growth of global consump tion of fossil fuels, pnce r'.ses can be
ve energy
moderat ed and more time will be availabl e to develop ahernau

sources.

Append ix: Estima ting global temper ature rise in 2100

from assume d trends in CO2 emissio ns
scenarios
The estimates or global temperature rise by 2100 for different CO, emission
in Table 4 and Figures 4 and 5 are derived with the rollowing four-step
presented
procedure.
Aimospheric concentrations or CO2 (C) in 2100 are estimated from:
(II
C - 346 + CC A/2. 12
ve carbon
where 346 is the CO2 concentra1ion (in ppm) in 1985, CC is the cumulati
(Pgr) between 1985 and 2100, A is the proportio n of emitted carbon that is
emission
required to
re1aincd In the atmosphere, and 2.12 is the amount of carbon (in Pgr)
average grow1h
raise atmospheric concentrations by I ppm. A is made a function of the
rate (R) (percent per year) or CO2 emission between 1985 and 2100:
(2)
A= 0 .48 + 0. 125R
rep-
The coefficients 0.48 and 0.125 were selected so that equation (I) exactly
as usual" and
licates the estimated CO, concen1rations in 2100 for IPCC's "business
..low emission" scenarios. ric
- The increase in the radia1ive forcing (F) resulting from a rise in atmosphe
used by IPCC
concentra1ion of CO2 (C) is estimated with the same equation as is
(1991a):
F = 6.3 In (C/346)
gases (F'I
The change in the total radiative forcing auributablc to all greenhou se
65 percent of
ls set equal 10 F' = FI0.65 on the assumption that CO2 acc-ounts for
the total increase as projected by EPA ( 1990a) .
_ - !~ change in the equilibrium temperature 1n
associated with an increase
in the rad1a11ve force (F') is calculated as:

T = 2.5 F'/4.37 (3)

as IPCC) and
whe~ 2.5 is the "climate sensitivity" chosen for this exercise (same
_equal to the change in radiative forcing associate d with a doubling
4.37 1s a constant
of CO2 concentration.

G
318 POPULAT ION GROWTH ANO G L OBAL WARMIN

- The actual ~pcratu re rise (r) bet d with a

given rise in the equilibrium temperature Tis: : : i : t : ;r~~•oo associate

r = O.Ol68 + 0.903T - 0 .0365T' (4)

.
The coefficients in this equation are obtained f rom a regressio
0.999) ofsetsofe stimatesf or Tand r bl' h d n analysis (R' =
b:r~: ~=:5( 19~b) dilferent
ror_ scenarios.
Ad~ing o.55, the estimated tempera tu::°ri;
. • to. obtained from equation
4 gives the total temperature increase above 1he premdus
4
tnal level presented in Tobie
 ,,,,.,,,,,,:1·t, ■ii

318
POPULATION GROWTH ANO GLOBAL WARMING

. - The actual temperature rise (r) between 1985 and 2100 associated with a
g1~n rise in the equilibrium temperature Tis calculated from:

r = 0 .0268 + 0.903T - 0.0365Tl

(4)

The coctlkicnts in this equation are obtained from a reiiression analysis (Rz -
O.9~9) of sets of estimates for T and r published In EPA ( 1990b) for ditlerem scenarios.
Ad~1ng 0.55. the estimated temperature rise before 1985. tor obtained from equation
4 gives the total temperature increase above the preindustrial level presented in Table
4.
. Applying the ab~ simple procedure to EPA's no response scenario gi~s an
esumated temperature rise of 4.32°C in 2100, compared 10 4.4° as estimated with a
much more complex EPA methodology.

Notes
t Waler vapor is 1he most importanl
gn•t·nhousc gas, but ils armospheric concen•
tratio n has thus far not been si1tnifican1ly al-
tered by human ac1ivity.
2 Other minor sources or COJ emission
(e.11., cement produaion) arc 001 explicitly
identified in the present analytical framework.
) This procedure is the same as tht• one
proposed by Holdren ( 199 l ). except that the
global decomposition results arc derived from
rhc regional ones. For example, rhe average
annual itrowth rates in population and emis•
slon of CO, arc. respectively. 1.55 percent and
2.90 percent between 1985 and 2025 in the
LDCs. The proportion or 1his emission growrh
attributable to population is 1hereforc csti•
mated as 53 percent (i.e. 1.5512.9). For the
world total the proponion contributed by pop-
ula1ion growth between 1985 and 2025 is cal•
cularcd as (0.53 x 4.7 + 0.42 x l.7)/6.4 •
0. 50. Nore that 1his estim,ne Is lower than
would be obtained by applying the decom-
po)ition procedure d ircaly 10 global t')limatt'S
o r i:ro wth in population and carbon emission.
The advantage of this approach is that there
are no irneraaion terms, and biases from het•
eroi:cncity in population growth ratt-s and lev•
els of per capita co, consumption arc largely
avoided.
4 The projet1io11) pr~nteJ in Figure 4
are calculated wilh a set of C(jUations described
in the Appendix. Using different methodolo-
gies. EPA (1990a) and IPCC ( l99la) examine
SC<.'lltlrios in which emissions ~re s1abilized af•
ter 1990. with results broadly comparable to
those obtained here.

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