Kelsen saw better than anyone that law is not directed to citizens and the

guidance of everyday, but instead to officials, and their imposition of sanctions.’

The question requires examination of the first half of Kelsen's theory, which posits that
laws are norms that compel officials to sanction transgressions. Kelsen's theory
presents a unique perspective on the legal hierarchy of norms, institutions, and positive
law, grounded in knowledge theory and human cognition. Unlike Austin's command
theory of law, Hart's sociological framework, and Raz's practice-based approach,
Kelsen's theory remains compelling. Though Kelsen's theory cannot defend coups and
military dictatorships, it is valuable to legal scholars, judges, and attorneys. However,
Stanley Paulson notes that Kelsen's Pure Theory of Law has some ambiguity
surrounding the term "normative" and lacks a coherent conception of law's validity.

Laws regulate behaviour, but Kelsen focuses on authorities' responsibility for enforcing
them, believing in being governed "not under man, but under law." However, separating
law from politics, morality, and religion can be challenging, especially when legal
systems may still be corrupted. Without a clear value system underlying our
assumptions, we may encounter the same problems that Kelsen attempted to address.
Kelsen aimed to prevent the law from becoming a tool for ideology, particularly during
the 1920-1930s with the emergence of Nazism and communism. However, adopting a
neutral view risks reintroducing politics into the legal system, as seen in Southern
Rhodesia in 1965 which undermines Kelsen's efforts.

Kelsen's emphasis on officials in the legal system may overlook the public's crucial role,
whereas Hart emphasises that people, not officials, are the true participants in a legal
system. Hart used a cricket match analogy to illustrate that players, not umpires, are
essential to the game, suggesting the public's actions determine the legal system's
success or failure.

Kelsen, like Austin, believed in the importance of sanctions in enforcing the law,
however, Hart disagreed saying not all laws have consequences. For instance, a null
contract, which is rendered void due to non-compliance with contractual obligations, has
no positive or negative consequences. Nevertheless, Roger Cottrell supported Austin's
view that even the nullity of a contract could be considered a sanction, as the individual
would be denied money. Hart criticized Austin's approach, suggesting that it relied too
heavily on instilling fear in individuals to ensure obedience to the law. On the other
hand, Cottrell argued that Austin's punishments were analytical, rather than social, and
that law sanctions served to distinguish law from simple requests. However, the notion
of the "negation of society," which refers to the idea of a world without penalties, is
flawed since it assumes that individuals are inherently good. As a result, every breach
of a legal standard must have a corresponding penalty. Nonetheless, this perspective
overlooks non-sanctioned laws such as constitutional, equity, moral, and human rights
aspects of the content of many laws.
Kelsen's belief that punishment should be imposed immediately upon the commission of
a delict is flawed as it overlooks the procedural steps needed to prosecute an offender.
Harris criticized this by referring to standard practice of lawyers not including a penalty
clause in contracts but instead reading and interpreting acceptance and conditions. This
approach is common in developed countries like US and UK, but not feasible to impose
sanctions for every crime in developing countries where many crimes go unnoticed by
officials, particularly in cases of domestic abuse in countries like Pakistan, India, and
Bangladesh.

After examining the coercive nature of his theory, how does Kelsen's legal system
validate itself? Kelsen distinguishes between primary norms (laws) and secondary
norms (social and moral rules), arguing that adding secondary criteria would trap the
legal system into natural law. Kelsen evaluates legal norms against preceding
benchmarks until the highest norm, the grundnorm, is reached, which validates the
entire legal system by sanctioning the first norm. However, Marxist philosophy claims
legal normativity is linked to history and economic interactions, and that legislation is a
weapon for those who control the economic means of production. Kelsen, a legal
scientist who specializes in computational and causal logic, counters this view, believing
that law is generated when all requirements are met.In its grammatical form, imputation
states that "Under certain conditions, a given consequence should occur."

Kelsen's legal theory states that the validity of a legal norm is derived from a higher
standard until we arrive at a Grundnorm, which legitimizes the entire legal system.
However, if we cannot establish the validity of the Grundnorm, how can we be sure it is
valid? Kelsen describes the Grundnorm as a transcendent epistemic foundation that
stands beyond the law, a "theory of knowing." He says that the Grundnorm may be
presumed to be the first constitution in history or derived from custom in the absence of
a written constitution, such as in the United Kingdom and New Zealand. Kelsen argues
for the objectivity of law at the definitional level by linking each regulation to a higher
norm. This overcomes Austin's gunman dilemma and distinguishes law from non-law.
Kelsen's concept of higher order criteria has been applied to lower order norms in cases
such as R v Miller 2019 by the Supreme Court.

Kelsen's view on the concept of revolution is important to consider. He believed a legal

system's effectiveness determines its validity and judicial efficiency is a prerequisite for
principle of legitimacy. During a revolution, laws of the former regime lose their legality
since the underlying norm justifying them is no longer valid. Kelsen argued that when
the old order disintegrates, a new one arises and later legislation is presumed valid
while preceding legislation is deemed illegal. This raises the question of how many of
the old laws remain valid in the new system. Kelsen introduced the concept of the new
basic norm or Grundnorm, which represents the tacit vesting of validity of previous
legislation. For instance, during Musharraf's presidency in Pakistan in 1999, 99.5% of
the country's laws remained intact, indicating their tacit acceptance.

In the case of State vs. Dosso, Justice Muhammad Muneer used Kelsen's theory to
determine the success of a revolution by examining whether the citizens of the country
have accepted the new administration (Effectiveness). The idea that "an unlawful
government is better than no government at all" was also used in other cases such as
Uganda v Exparte Matovu and Madzimbamuto v Lardner-Burk. However, in Asma
Gilani vs. the Government of Punjab, the Supreme Court overturned this decision and
argued that Kelsen's theory of revolution was only an intellectual concept and did not
establish legal norms. The court held that a new legislative institution could only be
deemed competent if it embodied the people's will, which required judicial recognition.
This idea was also applied in Lakanmi v A.G.

In conclusion, while Kelsen's rejection of natural law limits the real-world explanatory
power of his theory, it still has considerable utility in understanding the legal system as a
descriptive theory. However, the ethical integrity of the system, as well as
considerations of legitimacy and efficacy, must also be taken into account, which is
where natural law philosophers like Fuller and Finnis come in. Ultimately, while Kelsen's
theory cannot solve all the challenges faced by inhabitants and government officials in
each legal system, it provides an important framework for understanding and analyzing
the law.