Safety of chemical processes

3. Safety aspects during Project Engineering & Execution (Part 1)

Geert Vercruysse
Contents

Introduction

8 Safety functions

Layers of protection - Prevention

Atmospheric storage tank

Distillation column

SIL (Safety Integrity Level) &

LOPA (Layers of Protection Analysis)
Plant life cycle
• Different phases of project
 Study of project
 Basic engineering
 Detailed engineering
 Construction
 Commissioning and start up
 Closing of project
• Plant in operation
 Revision of safety study
 Renewal/revision permit – operating license
Introduction to example
Example: Large scale production of coating product
• Successful trial in R&D lab
• Copolymer of styrene and acrylic acid
• Reaction in presence of a solvent
• Final product in IBC’s* or drums
Raw materials:
• Acrylic acid & styrene as main raw materials
• Solvent storage (very small consumption)
• « Peroxide » as initiator
* IBC = International bulk container (1m3)
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Start of plant set up

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8 Safety functions for a chemical plant
1. Prevention of loss of containment due to process upsets
2. Prevention of loss of containment due to degradation
3. Limitation of the size of an accidental release
4. Control of spreading of substance accidentally released
5. Prevention of ignition of explosive atmospheres
6. Mitigation of damage due to fire
7. Mitigation of damage due to explosion
8. Mitigation of damage due to toxic release

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Layers of protection
M
I
T
I
G
A
T
I
O
N

P
R
E
V
E
N
T
I
O
N

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Safety critical items - Prevention
● Intrinsic safe design

● Mechanical protections:
 Safety valves

 Rupture discs

● Instrumentational protections:
 Interlocks and safeguarding systems

 Distinction between hard-wired and soft-wired interlocks (SIL classification)

● Organizational protections:
 Key interlocks

 Key arrangements

 Start up and shutdown procedures (spool pieces, spectacle blinds, etc.)

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Process safety study
• Process units to be further discussed:
 Atmospheric storage tank
 Destillation column
 Batch reactor

• Critical process parameters:

 Level
 Pressure
 Temperature
 Flow
 Composition

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Atmospheric storage tanks
• Hazards associated with atmospheric (ambient pressure to 2.5
psig) storage tanks:
 Overfilling

 Overpressure and vacuum

 Spills – tank rupture

 Fire

• To be investigated:
 Health hazards (toxicity)
 Flammability properties

 Conductivity (static electricity)

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Atmospheric storage tanks
• Which type of qualitative method to be used?
Safety review / checklist is sufficient.

 In case of raw materials as described in the example, safety

aspects of acrylic acid and styrene are well known.

 General standards and design guidelines exist and can be

applied as “start” for design review.

• Safety concept for import via truck/train is different from

concept for import via pipeline.

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Atmospheric storage tanks

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Atmospheric storage tanks
How to assess level / prevent overflowing
• Logistic departement:
 Manufacturing Resource Planning (MRP) for truck deliveries.

 Once truck has arrived - control of Certificate of Analysis (CoA).

 Procedure to guarantee that the right tank will be connected

with the truck.

• “What if” normal level measurement is failing

 Foresee level high interlock.

 Independent level high interlock which stops unloading pump and

closes automatic valve.

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Atmospheric storage tanks

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Atmospheric storage tanks
Pressure / prevent overpressure and vacuum
• Overpressure:
 Unloading in tank and pressure controller is not functioning

 Excessive vapor generation (deviation of temperature)

• Vacuum:
 Pumping out of tank and pressure controller is not functioning

 Sudden temperature drop (weather conditions)

• Prevention:
 Pressure control + breather valve

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Atmospheric storage tanks
Composition / prevent internal deflagration
• Causes:
 Presence of a flammable / air mixture in the presence of an iginition
source.

• Prevention:
 Collect information: conductivity of fluid & flash point.

 Pay attention to type of filling (prevent splashing) e.g. foresee dip

pipe.

 Inerting of gas volume by nitrogen; in case of acrylic acid with lean

air (in order to keep polymerization inhibitor active).

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Atmospheric storage tanks

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Distillation column

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Distillation column
• As the technology is energy intensive there is a strong
focus on the overpressure protection.

• This means that when a failure occurs the design

conditions (pressure/temperature) should not be exceeded.

• Which type of qualitative method to be used?

Cause / consequence analysis.

• In the next slide some generic failures are presented which

should be included in the hazard evaluation technique of
each distillation column or similar unit.

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Process safety – Generic scenarios

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Distillation column - Overpressure protection
Intrinsic safe Mechanical Safety Concept Instrumental Safety Concept

Flare Flare Flare Atmosphere

PSH

PSH

“NA” “OPEN” “CLOSE” “CLOSE”

Design Design Design Design

Intrinsic Safe Relief valve SIL-interlock SIL-interlock

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Mechanical safety concept
• Relief devices are usually designed to protect the
equipment and auxiliaries from overpressure due to any
single cause.

• The probability of two unrelated failures occurring

simultaneously is considered remote and is not normally
designed for.

• API RP 521 defines causes to be unrelated if no process,

mechanical or electrical linkages exist among them.

API RP = American Petroleum Institute Recommended Practice

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Mechanical safety concept

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Mechanical safety concept
Size of relief device must be carefully examined:
• Consequences of undersizing are obvious.
• However, grossly oversizing is no guarantee for proper protection:
 Excessive discharges, with a potential to lower discharge rates:
Excessive vapor flows may cause flooding and gas lifting of the liquid
resulting in a liquid discharge into the relief header and possible
damage to column internals.

 This can be calculated within a design program: gas velocity for

flooding, arising pressure drop capable of lifting internals.

 Expensive.

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Instrumentational safety concept
• Safety instrumented functions are usually designed to protect the
equipment and auxillaries from overpressure due to different
type of causes.

• IEC 61511* is the guideline used in EMEA.

• Specific engineering concepts:

 Functional safety – the complete set up from sensor till actor is
described.

 “Voting systems” 1oo1, 1oo2, 2oo3, …

 Complexity requires on line testing – calibration.

*Standard IEC 61511 « Functional safety – Safety instrumented systems for the process industry sector »
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Instrumentational safety concept
Some definitions
Abbreviation Full expression

BPCS Basic process control system

SIF Safety instrumented function

SIL Safety integrity level

SIS Safety instrumented system

SRS Safety requirement specification

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 Instrumentational safety concept
SIL
Safety Demand mode Continuous mode Consequence of a
integrity « Low demand mode » « High demand mode » failure
level
Level Availability Probability of a Probability of a dangerous
failure on demand. failure per hour.

Potential for fatalities

SIL 4 >99,99% ≥10-5 to < 10-4 ≥10-9 to < 10-8
in the community.
Potential for multiple
SIL 3 99,9% ≥10-4 to < 10-3 ≥10-8 to < 10-7
fatalities.
Potential for major
SIL 2 99%-99,9% ≥10-3 to < 10-2 ≥10-7 to < 10-6
injuries or one fatality.
Potential for minor
SIL 1 90%-90% ≥10-2 to < 10-1 ≥10-6 to < 10-5
injuries.

SIL 0 No requirement N/A

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Instrumentational safety concept
SIL

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LOPA - Overview
COMMUNITY EMERGENCY RESPONSE

PLANT EMERGENCY RESPONSE

PHYSICAL PROTECTION (DIKES)

PHYSICAL PROTECTION (RELIEF DEVICES)

AUTOMATIC ACTION Safety Instrumented System

OR Electronic Shutdown system

CRITICAL ALARMS, OPERATOR SUPERVISION,

AND MANUAL INTERVENTION

BASIC CONTROLS, PROCESS ALARMS,

AND OPERATOR SUPERVISION
PROCESS
DESIGN
I

LAH
1

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LOPA - Introduction
Layer of protection analysis (LOPA) is a semiquantitative
tool for analyzing and assessing risk.

KEY QUESTIONS FOR PROTECTION LAYERS

• How safe is safe enough?

• How many protection layers are needed?

• How much risk reduction should each layer provide?

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LOPA - Definition

LOPA has its origins in the desire to answer these key

questions using a rational, objective, risk-based approach.

In LOPA, the independent protection layers (IPL) proposed or

provided are analyzed for their effectiveness. The combined
effects of the protection layers are then compared against
risk tolerance criteria.

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Distillation column – P&ID

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 Distillation column - PHA
Project name: Date: Page of
Process : Steamcracker
Section: C3/C4 Splitter K5001 Reference drawing: P&ID xx1 till P&ID xx4

Study Process Deviations Possible

Item Possible consequences Safeguards Type IPL
node parameters (guide words) causes

Overpressurizing of K5001
Pdesign is 9.5 bar Design Y5001/02/30 is based on
Loss of
Column worst case scenario, i.e. closed
Pressure High cooling Y 10-2
K5001 Risk matrix resulting in a outlet or loss of condenser.
water
target factor of 10-3

Minimum selector on reboiler

controller will limit hot water flow to BPCS_1 10-1
reboiler W5001.

As column pressure further

increases, PVP5004 (SPHH
BPCS_2 10-1
controller) will take over. Part of top
product will be directed to flare.

Total 10-3

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Distillation column – Layers of protection

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 Distillation column - PHA
Project name: Date: Page of
Process : Steamcracker
Section: C3/C4 Splitter K5001 Reference drawing: P&ID xx1 till P&ID xx4

Study Process Deviations Possible

Item Possible consequences Safeguards Type IPL
node parameters (guide words) causes

Overpressurizing of K5001
Gas
Pdesign is 9.5 bar Design Y5001/02/30 is based on
breakthrough
Column worst case scenario, i.e. closed
Pressure High from previous Y 10-2
K5001 Risk matrix resulting in a outlet or loss of condenser.
column
target factor of 10-3
C2/C3 splitter

Minimum selector on reboiler

controller will limit hot water flow to BPCS_1 10-1
reboiler W5001.

As column pressure further

increases, PVP5004 (SPHH
BPCS_2 10-1
controller) will take over. Part of top
product will be directed to flare.

Total 10-3

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 Distillation column - PHA
Project name: Date: Page of
Process : Steamcracker
Section: C3/C4 Splitter K5001 Reference drawing: P&ID xx1 till P&ID xx4

Study Process Deviations Possible

Item Possible consequences Safeguards Type IPL
node parameters (guide words) causes

Overpressurizing of K5001
Pdesign is 9.5 bar Design Y5001/02/30 is based on worst
Column Maximum case scenario, i.e. closed outlet or loss
Pressure High Y 10-2
K5001 heat input Risk matrix resulting in a of condenser.
target factor of 10-3

As column pressure further increases,

PVP5004 (SPHH controller) will take
BPCS 10-1
over. Part of top product will be directed
to flare.

Total 10-3

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 Distillation column - PHA
Project name: Date: Page of
Process : Steamcracker
Section: C3/C4 Splitter K5001 Reference drawing: P&ID xx1 till P&ID xx4

Study Process Deviations (guide Possible

Item Possible consequences Safeguards Type IPL
node parameters words) causes

Overpressurizing of K5001
Pdesign is 9.5 bar Design Y5001/02/30 is based on worst
Column case scenario, i.e. closed outlet or loss
Pressure High Fire Y 10-2
K5001 Risk matrix resulting in a of condensor.
target factor of 10-2

Total 10-2

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Distillation column – « Other » safety concept

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Distillation column – Other scenarios
Other scenarios to be discussed in a similar way:

• Deviation composition feed due to disturbance in previous column

and/or reactor conditions upset.

• Too much flow (feed)or reflux will lead to an hydraulic overload in the
column = flooding regime. If not properly handled this will lead to
damage of the internals and in the worst case to a possible liquid relief
via safety valve.

• Temperature deviations will mostly be handled by pressure protection

as distillation is a typical boiling process.

• API guidelines how to deal with internal leakage in heat exchangers.

• Reflux pump - general pump protection concept is applicable.

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Pump protection – Blocked pump
M

blocked suction side

(early cavitation)

blocked
discharge side
M

• Usually, an intolerable pressure increase will not apply.

• The liquid temperature in the pump can climb to the boiling point. This might
lead to comparably slight damage.
• A higher hazard has to be considered with regard to substances that can
decompose. As for the case of a completely blocked-in pump, the increasing
temperature could lead to an explosive energy release at the Onset
Temperature Point.
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Pump protection - Countermeasures

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Pump protection - Countermeasures

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 Back up

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Inherent Safer Design (ISD)
• An inherently safer design avoids hazards instead of
controlling them
• Strategy:
 Minimize

 Substitute

 Moderate

 Simplify (KISS “keep it safe and simple”)

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Inherent Safer Design
• Minimize: Reduce the inventory of hazardous materials.
• Methods:
 Storing smaller amounts of material
 Reducing the size of equipment
 Intensify the processes
• Examples (non-exhaustive list):
 Replace batch process by continuous one
 Replace stirred tank reactors by tubular ones
 Add reactants continuously to a batch reactor
 Intensify reactions (use catalysts, ultrasound, lasers)
 Intensify mass transfer (spinning disk reactor, jet reactor and other
strong mixing devices).
 …
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Inherent Safer Design
• Minimize

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Inherent Safer Design
• Substitute:
Substitute hazardous materials by less hazardous materials.

• Examples (non-exhaustive list):

 Physical agents in reactors, separation processes, utilities and
other applications: refrigerants, thermal fluids, degreasing agents,
solvents, foaming agents…

 Chemical reactions: different reaction routes to have less

hazardous reagents or intermediates.

 Change the physical process (e.g. separation method) to use less

hazardous materials

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Inherent Safer Design
Substitute

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Inherent Safer Design
• Moderate:
Reduce risks by moderating conditions (attenuation)
• Methods:
Less extreme conditions; less hazardous form of the material;
facilities that attenuate/minimize consequences of process
deviations
• Examples (non-exhaustive list):
 Reduce high pressure, high vacuum, high temperature, high
concentration.
 For particle processing: use larger particles or replace by slurry
processing.
 Work in gas phase rather than in the liquid one.
 Moderate potential damage by proper plant location and layout.
 To liquify gases: use cooling rather than compression.
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Inherent Safer Design
• Simplify:
Reduce complexities that increase probability of failure/leakage and
opportunities for errors/mistakes.

• Methods:
 Dedicated rather than multipurpose plants or items.

 Single stream rather than multiple streams.

 Simple and clear procedures.

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