(AISPORNA V.

CA, 113 SCRA 459)

DOCTRINE: Doctrine of Associated Words (Noscitur a Sociis)
Where a particular word or phrase in a statement is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings, its true meaning may be
made clear and specific by considering the company in which it is found or with which it is associated.

SYNOPSIS:

FACTS:
Petitioner’s husband, Rodolfo S. Aisporna (Rodolfo) was duly licensed by the Insurance Commission as agent to Perla Compania de Seguros. Thru
Rodolfo, a 12- month Personal Accident Policy was issued by Perla with beneficiary to Ana M. Isidro for P50,000. The insured died by violence
during lifetime of policy.

Subsequently, petitioner was charged because the aforementioned policy was issued with her active participation, which is not allowed because she
did not possess a certificate of authority to act as agent from the office of the Insurance Commission.

Petitioner contended that being the wife of Rodolfo, she naturally helped him in his work, and that the policy was merely a renewal and was issued
because her husband was not around when Isidro called by telephone. Instead, appellant left a note on top of her husband’s desk

RTC: Found petitioner guilty of a violation of the first paragraph of Sec 189 of the insurance act.

CA: Affirmed decision.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a person can be convicted of having violated the first paragraph of Section 189 of the Insurance Act without reference to the second
paragraph of the same section.

RULING:
NO. Accused should be acquitted of the crime charged.

Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole. The particular words, clauses and phrases should not be
studied as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part of the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its
parts and in order to produce harmonious whole. A statute must be so construed as to harmonize and give effect to all its provisions whenever
possible. More importantly the doctrine of associated words (Noscitur a Sociis) provides that where a particular word or phrase in a
statement is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings, its true meaning may be made clear and specific by considering
the company in which it is found or with which it is associated.

A perusal of the provision in question shows that the first paragraph thereof prohibits a person from acting as agent, sub-agent or broker in the
solicitation or procurement of applications for insurance without first procuring a certificate of authority so to act from the Insurance
Commissioner, while its second paragraph defines who an insurance agent is within the intent of this section and, finally, the third paragraph
thereof prescribes the penalty to be imposed for its violation.

The definition of an insurance agent as found in the second paragraph of Section 189 is intended to define the word “agent” mentioned in the first
and second paragraphs of the aforesaid section. More significantly, in its second paragraph, it is explicitly provided that the definition of an
insurance agent is within the intent of Section 189.

Applying the definition of an insurance agent in the second paragraph to the agent mentioned in the first and second paragraphs would give
harmony to the aforesaid three paragraphs of Section 189

Considering that the definition of an insurance agent as found in the second paragraph is also applicable to the agent mentioned in the first
paragraph, to receive a compensation by the agent is an essential element for a violation of the first paragraph of the aforesaid section .
Petitioner-accused did not receive any compensation for the issuance of the insurance policy of Eugenio Isidro. Hence, accused did not
violate Section 189 of the Insurance Act.