LETTERS

Issn 0012-9976
Ever since the first issue in 1966,
EPW has been India’s premier journal for On the Dilution of Vote with limited power. Consequentially, the
comment on current affairs
and research in the social sciences.
Value in India vote value of Indian states and regions
It succeeded Economic Weekly (1949–1965), began to be diluted both qualitatively
which was launched and shepherded
by Sachin Chaudhuri,
who was also the founder-editor of EPW.
As editor for 35 years (1969–2004)
Krishna Raj
S uffrage movements of the 19th
century in Western democracies
gained momentum for their insistence
and quantitatively, while some electoral
districts represented more than five
million population and others still rep-
gave EPW the reputation it now enjoys. on “one person, one vote, one value.” Up resented less than 0.1 million population.
Editor to 1976, India was also precautious Delimitations take place in every de-
S Mahendra Dev about this democratic principle of one mocracy at regular intervals. In India,
Deputy Editor vote, one value as the Delimitation Com- the United States (US) and Canada, this
Pyaralal Raghavan
mission of India upheld this principle interval is 10 years. But India froze this
SENIOR Assistant editors in its exercises of 1952, 1963, and 1973 exercise in 1976 and further extended it
INDU K
Nachiket kulkarni by accordingly increasing the number of up to the first decennial census after 2026.
Assistant editor
parliamentary constituencies from 494 The original intention for this deep
Sahba Fatima to 543 and redrawing the boundaries of freeze was to mitigate southern states’
editorIAL Assistant constituencies after every decennial concerns over losing the number of seats it
Ankit Kawade census to make every constituency pop- already had for effectively implementing
Editorial Coordinator ulation equal as far as practicable, with the national interests of population con-
Shilpa Sawant
an accepted 10% variation in population trol and family planning, while it was an-
copy editor between two constituencies with an ticipated that the states from the Hindi
jyoti shetty
exception for small states whose popula- heartland would gain a substantial num-
production
suneethi nair tion is less than six million for the very ber of seats, even though they failed to
reason of their representation. adhere to family planning objectives.
Chief Administrative and Finance Officer
J DENNIS RAJAKUMAR As the population increased with con- Population growth in the five southern
Advertisement Manager
siderable regional imbalances in Indian states was under control by achieving a
Kamal G Fanibanda states, the Indira Gandhi government replacement-level TFR of 2.1 by 2005, but
General Manager & Publisher brought a freeze on the delimitation exer- many of the Hindi states still had a high
Gauraang Pradhan cise till the 2001 Census through the TFR rate. According to the 2011 Census,
editorial: edit@epw.in 42nd constitutional amendment. It was an average parliamentary constituency
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with a modest 2.1 total fertility rate (TFR). constituency in the Hindi belt represents
Economic & Political Weekly
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ment level. Thus, this freeze was further cratic electoral success because states
EPW Research Foundation extended till the publication of the first from the Hindi belt are severely over-
EPW Research Foundation, established in 1993, conducts
research on fi nancial and macro-economic issues in India. decennial census of 2026 by the 84th represented in the Lok Sabha due to
Director constitutional amendment in 2001, adher- their high population growth. But any type
J DENNIS RAJAKUMAR ing to the same anticipation that Indian of advantage by a fresh delimitation to
C 212, Akurli Industrial Estate
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states will achieve replacement-level TFR. the states in the Hindi belt will essentially
Phones: (022) 2887 3038/41 What does this six-decade-long deep be a disadvantage for southern states
epwrf@epwrf.in freeze mean? This means that India which abided with the nation’s interests of
Sameeksha TrusT still follows the erstwhile census data population control. As per the 2011 Census,
(Publishers of Economic & Political Weekly) of 1971 when the overall population the population percentage of the Hindi
Board of Trustees
Deepak Nayyar, Chairman was only around 547.9 million, with a belt was 47% (a 5% increase from the
Shyam Menon, Managing Trustee mere 274.2 million registered electors 1971 Census) and in the south, it was 21%
André Béteille, as the yardstick of interstate constituency (4% decrease). Thus, a fresh delimitation
Deepak Parekh, Romila Thapar,
Dipankar Gupta, N Jayaram, delimitation. Today, India has a popula- will transfer 29 over-represented seats of
SUDIPTO MUNDLE tion of 1.4 billion with 986.8 million the south and nine of the east to the Hindi
Printed and published by Gauraang Pradhan, for and registered electors. Over these years, belt only because the former implemented
on behalf of Sameeksha Trust and printed at
Modern Arts and Industries, 151, A–Z Industrial Estate, India’s population increased by 155% family planning more effectively. Tamil
Ganpatrao Kadam Marg, Lower Parel, Mumbai–400 013
and published at 320–322, A–Z Industrial Estate, and registered electors increased by Nadu and Kerala will lose 11 and seven
Ganpatrao Kadam Marg, Lower Parel, Mumbai–400 013
259%. Although the delimitation exer- seats, respectively, and Uttar Pradesh and
Editor: S Mahendra Dev (Editor responsible for
selection of news under the PRB Act) cise took place in 2002, it was endowed Bihar are likely to gain 11 more seats.
4 april 20, 2024 vol lix no 16 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

As Grant M Hayden observes, “even
with a guarantee of equally weighted
votes, meaningful minority participa-
tion may be thwarted by qualitatively
diluting minority votes.” The representa-
tion of Muslims (India’s largest minority)
and women in the Lok Sabha is signifi-
cantly low. Even though women do not
come under qualitative dilution premises,
data show that the representation status
of women remains unsatisfactory with a
recent ameliorating trend. But, despite
being the largest minority of this coun-
try with 14.20% of the overall popula-
tion, incumbent Muslim members of Par-
liament (MPs) represented only 5.16% of
members in the high-powered commit-
tees in 2019. The percentage of represen-
tation of Muslims in Parliament was al-
ways, with the exception of 1980 and
1984, as low as nearly half of their per-
centage in the total population. In 2019,
the Muslim population of India was
14.20% (204 million) while their repre-
sentation in Parliament was merely
4.97% (27 MPs).
India’s prolonged freeze has led to a
severe dilution of vote value across
states and regions, undermining the
federal structure and fair representa-
tion of minorities. Resolving this im-
passe through a judicious delimitation
or increasing parliamentary seats is cru-
cial to restoring the integrity of India’s
electoral process.
Mohammed Rashiqe K V
Mumbai
Mental Health in
Indian Prisons
I n the complex tapestry of India’s crim-
inal justice system, the intertwining
threads of mental healthcare and incar-
ceration present a particularly challeng-
ing weave. The Mental Health Act of
1987, amended by the more encompassing
Mental Health Care Act (MHCA) of 2017,
defines a “mentally ill person” as one
who requires treatment for any mental
disorder other than mental retardation.
This legislative framework lays the
groundwork for addressing mental health
within the broader spectrum of health-
care, including within the confines of
India’s correctional facilities. A critical
Economic & Political Weekly EPW june 17,
april 20,2023
2024 vol
vollViii
examination of this intersection reveals
significant gaps in care and an urgent
need for reforms.
The National Crime Records Bureau’s
(NCRB) 2021 “Prison Statistics India”
report sheds light on a stark reality—of
the 5,54,000 inmates, 1.7% suffer from
mental illnesses, affecting 9,180 indi-
viduals. This statistic, though seem-
ingly small, underscores a significant
challenge within the penal system—
a challenge amplified by the findings
from the National Institute of Mental
Health and Neurosciences (NIMHANS)
in 2013, highlighting the plight of
over 4,00,000 incarcerated individuals
across the country.
In a series of legal interventions aimed
at addressing the mental health crisis
within Indian prisons, the Supreme Court
and various high courts have taken sig-
nificant steps. In Kush Kalra v Union of
India and Ors (2022), the Supreme Court
agreed to review a petition advocating
for the education of prison staff and
law enforcement regarding the Mental
Health Act, 2017. This petition seeks
to make mental health assessments a
mandatory part of medical examina-
tion reports for prisoners at the time of
their admission to hospitals, identifying
a critical oversight in the current prison
intake process.
Following a similar concern for the
mental well-being of prisoners, the Orissa
High Court, in Krushna Prasad Sahoo v
State of Orissa and Ors (2022), addressed
the issue of inadequate mental health
resources in prisons. The court under-
scored the untenability of having just
one psychiatrist available for all inmates
with mental health issues in the state,
highlighting a severe resource gap.
According to the 2021 NCRB data, the
primary challenge is the severe short-
age of qualified mental health profes-
sionals within the prison system. There
is an alarming ratio of one psychologist
or psychiatrist for every 16,503 incar-
cerated individuals, with 21 states com-
pletely lacking prison psychiatrists or
psychologists. This scarcity is particu-
larly critical in prisons located in frag-
ile, conflict-affected, or remote areas,
which are often entirely without spe-
cialised mental health professionals.
lix no 16
24
LETTERS
Furthermore, the total sanctioned posi-
tions for medical officers across India’s
prisons are 3,497, meant to serve up to
4,25,609 prisoners.
Under the MHCA, it is required of pris-
on medical officers to quarterly notify
mental health review boards (MHRBs)
about prisoners suffering from mental
illnesses. MHRBs are empowered to in-
spect jails and authorise the transfer of
inmates to mental health establishments
for better care. However, by October
2020, only a handful of states had set up
these crucial boards. In response to this
gap, several high courts, including those
in Delhi, Karnataka, and Kerala, have
taken steps to address the issue. A sig-
nificant directive came from the Delhi
High Court’s ruling in the Sartaj @Alla-
harakha v State of NCT of Delhi (2023)
case. It called for the training of prison
staff to identify and manage mental
health challenges among inmates.
The National Human Rights Commis-
sion (NHRC) has issued a new guideline
that requires all prisoners to be checked
for mental health issues as soon as they
enter prison. However, in reality, these
checks are often done by the prison’s ad-
ministrative staff, not by medical profes-
sionals. Moreover, the NCRB believes
that installing more CCTV cameras can
help keep an eye on prisoners to prevent
suicide attempts. While this might help
protect some prisoners, there are concerns
that it could violate their privacy rights.
Essential reforms to meet these chal-
lenges include developing a compre-
hensive mental healthcare infrastruc-
ture within prisons, bolstering the
number of mental health professionals,
and ensuring nationwide access. Imple-
menting systematic screening for all
incoming inmates to identify mental
health issues at the outset, followed by
consistent support and treatment, is an-
other critical step. Furthermore, pre-
paring inmates for reintegration into
society with a focus on mental health is
vital for their rehabilitation. Underpin-
ning these efforts is the recognition of
the right to medical care, as enshrined
in international human rights stand-
ards and the Constitution.
Prashant Kumar, Rana Navneet Roy
Raipur
5
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2024 vol
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lix no 24
16 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
 APRIL 20, 2024
A Free Fall in Fertility Rates?
India needs policies to ensure that the fertility levels do not go below that of richer nations.
T
he Lancet forecasts on the expected trends in the global
fertility rates and live births over the course of the 21st
century provide very interesting insights on the demo-
graphic changes unfurling in the coming decades. The fore-
casts, which cover 204 countries and territories grouped into 21
regions and seven super regions, indicate that the economic and
social implications of the declining fertility rates would be stag-
gering at the global level. Equally, if not more importantly, the
falling fertility levels would also have a major impact on the
food, health, environment, and geopolitical security of many
nations, including India.
Let us first have a look at the historical trends in fertility rates at
the global level. According to the Lancet study, the global fertility
rate has declined substantially over the last seven decades with
numbers falling by more than half from 4.84 children per fe-
male in 1950 to 2.23 in 2021. This had not only been a great feat
that demolished the Malthusian prophecy of an impending pop-
ulation explosion but also very beneficial. This is because fall-
ing fertility levels have brought population growth closer to the
natural replacement levels of 2.1%, thus substantially reducing
potentially much larger claims on the limited natural resources.
Unfortunately, the estimates of the trends in fertility levels
over the next few decades point to very detrimental and proba-
bly even catastrophic consequences. This is because the global
fertility levels will continue to steadily fall to 1.83 in 2050 and
then further to 1.59 in 2100, which is about a quarter short of
the natural replacement fertility levels. These falling trends in
fertility rates could severely impact both the quantity and qual-
ity of the global population as the number of annual live births,
which peaked at 142 million in 2016, steadily falls to 112 million
by 2050 and further to 72 million in 2100. It is also estimated
that the number of countries with at least the natural replace-
ment-level fertility rates will also go down from 94 (46%) in
2021 to 49 (24%) in 2050 and further to six (3%) in 2100.
The consequences of this continued fall in fertility rates are
very disparate across the seven super regions. South Asia, which
is currently reaping a demographic dividend, is expected to be
the worst hit. This is because its fertility levels will decline the
most over the century from 2.07 in 2021 to 1.36 in 2050 and further
to 1.1% by 2100, the lowest fertility level across all seven super
regions at both time points. In contrast, fertility levels will be a
little higher in Southeast Asia (1.30), Latin America and the Carib-
bean (1.31), and high-income countries (1.37) by the end of the
century. The super regions with the most favourable fertility lev-
els will be Central Europe, Eastern Europe and Central Asia
Economic & Political Weekly EPW APRIL 20, 2024 vol lIX no 16
(1.57), North Africa and the Middle East (1.64), and sub-Saharan
Africa (1.82), which would partially help abate the full impact of
the imploding populations in the other regions.
These large disparities in the declining fertility levels across the
super regions also ensure that the fall in fertility rates differs widely
across the nation states. Historical trends in the top 29 nations with
the largest populations (of above 50 million each in 2021) show
that more than a dozen had registered a substantial decline in fer-
tility levels between 1950 and 2021. The countries that were most
successful in reducing the fertility rates during this period include
Kenya (by 5.8 points), Thailand (5.6), Bangladesh (5.4), South
Korea (4.9), Iran (4.7), Vietnam (4.7), the Philippines (4.4), China
(4.3), India (4.3), Türkiye, Myanmar, and Pakistan (by around 4
points each). Consequently, the fertility levels were below the
natural replacement levels in 20 of the 29 large nations by 2021.
The fertility levels are estimated to further decline in almost
all these 29 populous nations between 2021 and 2050, except
three, namely South Korea, Japan, and Kenya, where it will re-
main largely stable at varying levels below the natural replace-
ment level. The large countries with the lowest fertility levels in
2050 would include India (1.29), Japan (1.26), Bangladesh (1.2),
Italy (1.18), China 1.14), Thailand (1.13), and South Korea (0.82).
Consequently, the fertility levels in all these countries would be
much lower than that of many rich nations like the United King-
dom (UK), Germany, United States (US), and France by 2050,
that is, in just a generation.
The scenario gets more unsettling for some countries like India
where the fertility levels will steadily dip sharply from 1.91 in
2021 to 1.29 in 2050 and further to 1.04 in 2100, that is, a decline
of 0.87 in the next 79 years. The other countries with similarly
large dips in fertility levels include the Philippines, Bangladesh,
Egypt, Myanmar, Pakistan, Tanzania, Congo, Ethiopia, and
Nigeria with their fertility levels also dropping far below the
natural replacement rate.
What is disturbing is that the estimates show that the extent of
the fall in fertility rates in rich countries like the US, UK, Ger-
many, Italy, China, Japan, and South Korea in the post-2021 peri-
od is not only less than one-fourth that of India and other low-
income nations, but their fertility levels will also remain sub-
stantially higher than that of India. Such a scenario where India’s
fertility level (1.04) in 2100 is much lower than that of richer
nations like the UK (1.3), Germany (1.4), France (1.43), and the
US (1.45) will indeed have serious repercussions on the nation’s
economic welfare and also on its geopolitical security, and this
would need to be addressed.
7
COMMENT
Escalation and De-escalation in West Asia
Israel’s belligerence with impunity threatens to precipitate a regional war with global consequences.
Anuradha Chenoy writes:
W
est Asia is on the boil as Israel extended its conflict
with Gaza into Iran igniting a spiral of attacks as the
Iranians retaliated and Israel seeks to remain on top of
the escalatory ladder and strategic dominance. The background
to this escalation is clear. Israel carried out missile strikes on the
Iranian Embassy complex in Damascus, Syria on 1 April, killing
two Iranian generals and some others. A country’s embassy is con-
sidered sovereign territory and this amounts to an attack on the
country concerned (Vienna Convention), who has the right to re-
taliate under international law. Israel’s purposeful erosion of diplo-
matic immunity and norms has not been condemned by countries
who advocate a “rules-based order” to curb the anarchy in the inter-
national system. Sensibly, countries outside the collective West—
including India—regretted this attack calling for de-escalation.
Iran announced its retaliation in advance and 300 drones and
some missiles attacked an Israeli military base (14 April) but
with no casualties, as the bulk of the drones used in the attack
were effectively intercepted, though some missiles hit the target.
Iran’s retaliation appears symbolic and calibrated, as it announ-
ced the end of the operation. This can mean closure if Israel
listens to the international community—including the United
States (US), and caps its desire for further regional escalation.
Israel has long harboured a desire to hit Iran—their main ad-
versary in the region. Israel’s reasons include: Iran’s unambiguous
support to the Palestinian cause, especially to Hamas; Iran sup-
ports Hezbollah and its leader, Nasrallah, in their resistance
against Israel and reclaiming lost Lebanese territory like the
Golan Heights; Iran has supported Syria and its President,
Bashar al-Assad, against the attempted regime change by the
US; it supports the Houthis—the Ansar Allah who control much
of Yemen and have declared that any ship associated with Israel
that passes the Strait of Hormuz will be their target until Israel
declares a ceasefire in Gaza. Moreover, Iran supported the Houthis
when the Saudis attacked them in the civil war in Yemen; Iran
supports the Iraqi resistance that calls for the removal of US
bases in Iraq. Iran does not recognise Israel—calling it “that
Zionist entity.” So both Israel and the US find Iran a roadblock to
their strategy of domination in the oil-rich Persian Gulf.
But as Iran’s retaliatory measures show, it is no casual sitting
duck for an Israel shootout. Iran has suffered years of unilateral
economic measures, that is, sanctions from the US and the West,
but instead of incapacitating Iran, it has made it more self-reliant
as it has been developing indigenous defence and industrial
technologies and capacities, preparing for a long war with its
adversaries with major underground facilities. While Iran capped
its nuclear weapons and nuclear programme because of Western
pressure, it is at the threshold of making enriched uranium for
the same. Iran has silently suffered many Israeli attacks on its
military officers, scientists and facilities. With this retaliation,
Iran has shown that Israel’s weaponry and strategic defence are
8 APRIL 20, 2024
no longer a deterrence for them and that it has the capabilities
to take on Israel and its partners in a regional war.
Moreover, Iran has been mapping a strategic course of project-
ing regional power, maintaining support to Palestine, opposing
imperialism in the region, supporting regional non-state allies that
share its vision and developing international linkages. So, Iran’s
traditional relations with Russia have increased since the Russian–
Ukrainian conflict. Iran has a free trade agreement with the Rus-
sian-led Eurasian Economic Union and has signed strategic and
military agreements. There have been claims that Iran provided
Russia with drones and missiles for the Russian military opera-
tions in Ukraine and both coordinate oil-related issues in OPEC+.
Iran has strategic relations with China, including a 25-year
pact between the two, with China as Iran’s biggest trading partner.
Chinese diplomacy brought the two adversarial powers, Saudi
Arabia and Iran, together, a step welcomed in the region. Iran is
a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and the
BRICS and enjoys good relations with most of the global South.
With India, Iran has trade and connectivity, particularly the
Chabahar port projects, even as India has been cautious because
of Western sanctions. So Iran is not short of allies and support
structures, and no one would like to see a war in the region.
Despite a strong anti-Iran lobby domestically, the US is openly
cautioning Israel against escalating a regional war with Iran.
The reason is that a conflagration in the Persian Gulf will spiral
oil prices out of control, impacting the US and the world as a
whole—something the US does not want in an election year.
Moreover, US bases, military forces and installations in the entire
West Asian region are easy and accessible targets for Iran. A new
war here would distract the US from its main goals of weakening
Russia by sustaining the Ukraine war and diverting its goals of
escalating tensions against China and raising forces in the South
China Sea. Moreover, except for the British, most Europeans do
not have much of a stomach for yet another war on their periph-
ery. “The Middle East and North Africa” that falls within Iran’s
compass of strategic allies is part of the greater Eurasia region
and the US is far away. For all their bravado, the US-led 10-state
coalition (where no regional heavyweight country joined)
“Operation Prosperity Guardian” to safeguard commercial ships
from Houthi attacks has itself seen little success as Houthis go
on regardless of the missile attacks on them.
Despite such warnings, tensions re-escalated as Israel carried
out “limited strikes” on an Iranian air force facility in Isfahan,
which is close to the Natanz nuclear facility. Strikes were also re-
ported by the media in Shiraz. There were also strikes in South-
ern Syria and a province of Iraq, all as part of a retaliatory escala-
tion. Iran has downplayed these attacks and shows normality in
these regions. Clearly, Iran does not want an escalation. It has al-
ready showed what it could do, and now would go back to the
tactics of supporting the ‘‘axis of resistance’’ in hybrid ways.
vol lIX no 16 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

Israel, as a core militarist state, wants to show its domestic
and international audience that it remains the singular power
in the region, that its strategic dominance remains intact, and
that it has the capability to deter any force from the region or
beyond. Moreover, Israel would not like Iran to be a strategic
peer competitor in the region. Israel gets the West’s support and
the support of some Arab states who believe that it favours them
to keep Iran down. This, however, is a distant dream. While
Iran is looking for coexistence in the West Asian region, it has
established both its capabilities and strategic patience.
So, even if the dots seem unconnected, Israel’s attacks on
Gaza and Palestine, its attacks on Iran, US’s continued military
and missile support to Israel, the proxy war in Ukraine, and
the tension escalation in the South China Sea are all linked to
the West’s desperation to maintain dominance, primacy and
status quo of the past five centuries. However, the status quo
Economic & Political Weekly EPW APRIL 20, 2024 vol lIX no 16
COMMENT
has already changed. Bedraggled slipper-wearing forces hold
them hostage at the sea, the Iranians have for the first time re-
taliated against iron-domed and protected Israel, the Arab
street and streets across the world are calling for just peace
and ordinary people outside the domain of mainstream media
see the connections between peace, development, justice, cli-
mate, ecology and more.
The calls for de-escalation in West Asia and a ceasefire in
Israel could not be clearer or louder. Yet, Israel so far has been
immune to international reasoning. Its immunity, claim to
exceptionalism, and protection from the global great power
seem to be fraying at the edge. This time if Israel goes further
up the escalatory ladder, it does so at its own peril.
Anuradha Chenoy (chenoy@gmail.com) is an adjunct faculty at Jindal
Global University and an associate fellow, Transnational Institute.
9
 COMMENT

From 25 Years Ago
Vol XXXIV, No 16 APRIL 17, 1999
Forestry Research in India
Tapan Kumar Mishra
A major change in the policy of forestry re-
search in India has been from its quantity ori-
entation to quality orientation. Previously for-
estry research emphasised revenue but now it
advocates stress on environmental aspects.
This has been reflected in the Indian Forest
Policy, 1988. India has not been able to make
significant progress in conserving its forestry
resources and in deriving best results from the
vast natural resources it possesses. This is not
due to lack of efficiency of our scientific man-
power but is largely due to neglect of research
amenities connected to this field. A bill put be-
fore the parliament cannot do much without
the will to implement. This has been lacking.
The agenda set before our forestry research in-
stitutions has been half-hearted and aimless.
The attitudes of colonial times persist.
Organised forestry activity began in 1864,
when imperial forest department was estab-
lished in India. Brandis was brought from Ger-
many to look into the process of forest resource
management in India. He was required to help
commercial exploitation of forest resources
rather than resource management. As Gadgil
and Guha (1992) point out: “Walking a tight-
rope bet ween the imperatives of colonial ad-
ministration and the claims of social justice,
Brandis, quite remarkably for his time and mi-
lieu placed considerable trust in the ability of
village communities to manage their own af-
fairs. Displaying an early ‘ethnobotanical’ in-
terest in indigenous system of tree and plant
classification, he circulated a list of local
names, urging the younger officers, with more
leisure and more extensive opportunities, to
take up the study of the names of the trees and
shrubs used by the tribes of central India.”
In 1901 a small research laboratory was es-
tablished in Dehradun to study certain soil
properties of forests. It took no less than 37
years since the establishment of the forest de-
partment to feel that the status of forests has
to be studied scientifically along with the ex-
traction of resources. After another five years,
i e, in 1906, the Imperial Forest Research In-
stitute (IFRI) was established in Dehradun
adding some new branches to the soil labora-
tory established in 1901. The present building
of Forest Research Institute (FRI) was com-
pleted in 1929 where the then IFRI was
housed […]
It has been rightly pointed out by many
workers that an indepth study of biodiversity
of India is urgently needed. There is no func-
tional co-ordination between the national
institutes for biodiversity research. Basically
biodiversity research has not been of politi-
cal interest in India, and does not draw at-
tention of policy-makers. Up to 1985 forests
were under the jurisdiction of agriculture
ministry, government of India.

Economic & Political Weekly EPW APRIL 20, 2024 vol lIX no 16 9
 COMMENT

From 50 Years Ago
Vol IX, No 16 APRIL 20, 1974
Satellite TV Revisited
B D Dhawan
This writer has been trying, through these col-
umns specially, to argue that satellite technol-
ogy, contrary to the claims of the Indian Space
Research Organisation (ISRO), has a rather
very limited and unexciting role to play in the
establishment of a nation-wide TV system in
case we want to build one for our country.
However, a careful reading of the Draft Report
of the Fifth Five-Year Plan, released recently,
indicates that Yojana Bhavan has, subject to
some qualifications, accepted the claims of
ISRO. While ISRO’s forceful pleas for triggering
off a communications revolution via satellite
TV in the seventies have been turned down by
the planners, handsome provisions have been
made in the Draft Report for preparatory work
as a prelude to a full-fledged satellite TV net-
work, possibly in the Sixth Flan period. […].
It has been — if press and radio reports are
any indication — a rather agonising task for
the planners to determine the place of televi-
sion in the Fifth Plan. Whatever allocations
for television have finally emerged are the
outcome of a series of confabulations and con-
frontations among the Planning Commission,
the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting,
ISRO and the principal TV user ministries of
Education, Agriculture and Family Planning.
The two leading promoters of the TV idea —
ISRO and AIR — have themselves to blame for
the protracted discussions in Yojana Bhavan.
On the one hand, the two confronted each
other, each with its own blueprint for usher-
ing in a communications revolution during
the Fifth Plan period. On the other hand, they
committed the folly of not putting the princi-
pal users of educational or developmental
TV in the forefront while approaching the
Planning Commission. The TV promoters’ in-
ability to associate, the user ministries in
seeking funds for TV broadcasting intrinsical-
ly weakened their case for television.
The first hurdle to be crossed was the fa-
miliar image that TV is a luxury in a poor
country. This hurdle, it was thought by the
promoters of the TV idea, could be surmount-
ed in two ways: (1) the image of TV could be
refurbished and (2) community TV receivers
could be provided for the masses who could
not afford to buy their own TV set. Here, the
past and the present stared the planners and
the promoters of TV in the face. […]
The late Vikram Sarabhai looked upon tel-
evision — especially television via a satellite
that beams programmes directly on to TV re-
ceivers — as an instrument of development of
the country. This enlightened view of the me-
dium, however, is at variance with the past
record of television in our country. What we
have witnessed is the emergence of a degener-
ate television, a far cry from either education-
al or developmental television.

Economic & Political Weekly EPW APRIL 20, 2024 vol lIX no 16 9
LAW & SOCIETY
Party Manifestos and
Urban Governance
Alok Prasanna Kumar
India’s urban areas have grown
manifold over the years and
continue to attract migrants and
economic investments. However,
governance has not kept pace
with the changing needs. The
promises of three major national
political parties on urban
governance and cities are
examined to compare the
different promises of change
being made in this context.
Alok Prasanna Kumar (alok.prasanna@
vidhilegalpolicy.in) is senior resident fellow
at Vidhi Centre for Legal Policy, Bengaluru.
10
A
s India heads into the 18th gen-
eral elections, do the urban
voter and their concerns figure
in political party manifestos? Reading
through the recently released manifes-
tos of three major political parties (the
Indian National Congress [INC 2024],
the Communist Party of India {Marxist}
[CPI{M} 2024], and the Bharatiya Janata
Party [BJP 2024]), one finds extensive
sections devoted to pledges and prom-
ises of action in the context of urban
governance and cities. But what is
being promised and how do they relate
to the problems of urban dwellers in
India? This will be addressed in
this column.
To assess the manifesto promises, the
first part of this column deals with the
substance of the ideas and plans being
proposed to answer the question: Do
they address the deep structural prob-
lems of urban governance in India?
This is a topic that I have written about
in the past (Kumar 2019, 2023) and it
has been addressed elsewhere as well.
I examine the different solutions offered
in the three manifestos to these prob-
lems and whether they target the
deep problems.
In the second part of the column, I
attempt to gauge how serious the
promises themselves are—whether they
are mere “mothers and apple pie” type
promises or actual goals that political
parties are looking to achieve. To do
so, I take the individual promises made
in each manifesto and see if they are
specific, measurable, attainable, realistic,
and time-bound (SMART). The SMART
approach to setting goals is a useful
framework for decision-making and
has been suggested as a method to
frame promises in the election mani-
festos (Rao 2023). This approach does
not tell us anything about the content
April 20, 2024
of the promises itself, but that is some-
thing I deal with in the first half. I will
explain how I have applied the SMART
framework in the context of manifestos.
Urban Governance Promises
Each of the manifestos does make prom-
ises on the question of urban issues and
governance. Though partners in the
Indian National Developmental Inclusive
Alliance (INDIA), there is little overlap
between the INC and CPI(M) manifestos.
One key promise both parties make is
the urban employment guarantee law
that they promise to introduce to reduce
urban unemployment. Another promise,
where there is greater commonality
relates to potential amendments to the
74th amendment to give more powers to
urban local bodies. While the INC mani-
festo goes into more detail about creat-
ing a five-year term for a mayor and an
empowered council, the CPI(M) mani-
festo only talks about “strengthening”
the 74th amendment for this purpose.
The other promises made by the two
parties focus on different aspects alto-
gether. The CPI(M) manifesto focuses on
affordable housing, pollution control,
labour law protections for workers in
urban areas, and creation of public
spaces. The INC manifesto focuses more
on safe and accessible public transport,
decongesting cities, and tackling the
stray-dog problem.
Some of the concerns addressed in the
CPI(M) and INC manifesto are reflected
in the BJP manifesto as well. Like with
the CPI(M) manifesto, the BJP manifesto
also promises affordable housing and
open public spaces. Similar to the INC
manifesto, the BJP manifesto also
addresses concerns relating to transpor-
tation and decongesting cities. However,
there are some specific promises con-
cerning piped natural gas supply, remov-
ing landfills, creating convention cen-
tres, promoting water security, and cre-
ating an urban land record registry that
is unique to the BJP manifesto.
Underlying the manifesto in each case
is a slightly different vision. While the
BJP manifesto is informed by the prom-
ise to create “world-class infrastructure”
vol Lix no 16 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

and “ease of living” in Indian cities, the
INC manifesto talks about “urban devel-
opment” and the need to provide “ade-
quate infrastructure.” The CPI(M) mani-
festo does not have a specific vision for
India’s cities with specific promises.
The overlaps notwithstanding, one
sees a clear difference between the INC
and CPI(M) manifestos on the one hand
and the BJP’s on the other. Where the
former talk of decentralisation, greater
devolution of funds, and legal reforms,
the latter is almost entirely silent on
the same. The BJP manifesto focuses
more on specific outcomes such as
piped natural gas, e-buses, and open
landfi ll-free cities. While much has
been promised, it is debatable how
much of these are feasible or even
desirable for the union government to
get involved in, since a lot of these
promises will have to be implemented
at the state level, by and large.
Whatever their content, manifestos
are not just words on paper but also
plans of action. But how do we assess
whether the plans for urban governance
are serious or simply empty promises?
SMART Promises
One way to assess manifesto promises is
by using the SMART framework. Articu-
lated first by George Doran (1981), it was
proposed as a way of setting meaningful
objectives in a corporate setting. This
framework was to help managers set
objectives, which can be followed
by subordinates and evaluated over a
period of time. While this framework
has been developed in a completely dif-
ferent context, there is merit in using
this framework in a political context.
While there is no legal mandate on how
election manifestos ought to be drafted,
the Model Code of Conduct was updated
in 2015 to include a chapter on manifes-
tos, which, among other things, included
this paragraph:
In the interest of transparency, level playing
field and credibility of promises, it is
expected that manifestos also reflect the
rationale for the promises and broadly indi-
cate the ways and means to meet the finan-
cial requirements for it. Trust of voters
should be sought only on those promises
which are possible to be fulfilled. (Model
Code of Conduct)1
Economic & Political Weekly EPW April 20, 2024
While this is not a legal mandate
(and probably should not be) (Krishnan
et al 2023), if manifestos are required
to be implementable in some way, it
would be a worthwhile exercise to see
how implementable they are. In my
view, the SMART framework provides a
useful way to look at manifesto prom-
ises to carry out this exercise. This
framework helps us differentiate
between a mere slogan passing off as a
promise and one which can be actually
implemented.
To this end, I have broken down each
parameter into a yes/no type question.
For example: Is the fulfi lment of the
promise measurable in an objective
manner? If the answer is yes, 1 point is
given. Each promise related to urban
governance and urban issues is then
scored out of five, which I have called
a SMART score, and the average SMART
score for each manifesto is taken
(Table 1). While each of the parameters
(specific, measurable, actionable, real-
istic, and time-bound) are fairly self-
explanatory, I have tweaked “realistic”
and “time-bound” to suit the needs of
this exercise. “Realistic,” for the pur-
poses of this exercise, is whether the
party is promising something that is
within the legal and constitutional
competence of the union government.
“Time-bound” here relates to whether
a specific timeline has been provided
for the fulfi lment of the promise. While
it is generally assumed that the time-
line for any promise in a manifesto is
“in the next five years,” it is still worth-
while to see how parties have priori-
tised their commitments.
Table 1: Smart Scores
Party Promises Average
SMART Score
BJP 15 1.14
CPI(M) 10 1.33
INC 9 1.5
Source: Calculations by the author.
In each manifesto, only specific com-
mitments relating to cities have been
taken into account. This leaves us with
nine commitments for the INC, 15 for the
BJP, and 10 for the CPI(M). Applying the
SMART framework, one arrives at the
following score for each party.
All parties score poorly in their
SMART score with most promises failing
vol Lix no 16
LAW & SOCIETY
to fulfil even a single parameter of the
SMART framework. Only two BJP, two
INC, and one CPI(M) promises come
close to achieving a full SMART score—
most of these relate to the passing of a
specific law for a specific purpose.
Some promises are so vague and bereft
of details (“steps to curb all kinds of
pollution and environmental degrada-
tion,” “encourage the creation of new
satellite towns,’’ “transport safer for
women and children”) that it would be
trivially possible to “fulfil” them with-
out doing much by way of a concrete
law or policy action.
Almost no promise across manifes-
tos carries with it an assurance of a
time-bound action. This could be coun-
tered by pointing out that the time
frame is a default five years since that
is when the next election is scheduled
to take place. This counter misses the
fact that political parties, in their
state manifestos, have in fact provided
timelines for action. Further, the
absence of a timeline for implementa-
tion also does not tell us which of
these promises will be prioritised over
the others. It is not as if all promises in
a manifesto carry no timeline—the
INC’s manifesto promises political and
job reservations for women starting in
2025; the BJP’s manifesto promises to
declare Birsa Munda’s birth anniver-
sary as Janjatiya Gaurav Divas from
2025 onwards. These, however, are
the exceptions.
The low scores across the board may
prompt a cynical response—that politi-
cal parties are really not serious about
their promises. However, this would be
far from the truth about the actual role
Median played by manifestos in election cam-
SMART Score paigns and how they shape a parties’
0.5
1 policies in power. What is perhaps
1 missing in manifestos, and perhaps the
source of angst among voters, is the level
of detail that would tell apart a slogan
from a serious policy proposal.
Conclusions
Election manifestos are not only a col-
lection of vague ideas but also a promise
of action. They are being drafted by
those who seek political power for a par-
ticular purpose and will have to subject
11
LAW & SOCIETY

themselves to the electorate in five years
on their track record. This is perhaps
also why there is an increasing demand
to regulate or, in some way, limit the
kinds of promises political parties make
in their manifestos. Such a move intends
to take the manifesto into the realm of a
legally binding document rather than a
political plan of action—a debatable
move at best.
As the analysis of the promises on
urban governance shows, across par-
ties, there is very little by way of con-
crete action promised to improve urban
governance. Most lack specifics of any
kind, a time-bound target for comple-
tion, or even a measurable basis for a
citizen to know that a promise has been
fulfilled. In such a situation, any analy-
sis of how many promises have been
“fulfilled” would be futile as almost
anything could amount to a promise
being fulfilled if it vaguely relates to
what had been promised.
That said, there is a qualitative dif-
ference between the kinds of promises
made by the INC and CPI(M) on the one
hand and the BJP on the other. While
the INC and CPI(M) focus more on gov-
ernance reforms, the BJP focuses more
on physical infrastructure that will be
developed. Legal reform is far more
front and centre in the INC and CPI(M)
manifestos than it is in the BJP’s. While
the BJP’s manifesto addresses far more
concerns (housing, cooking gas, public
spaces, etc), the solutions offered also
tie in with the larger, centralised
approach to governance that the BJP
has adopted under Prime Minister
Narendra Modi.
While at a surface level the inclu-
sion of the concerns of urban dwellers
across party manifestos is welcome,
there is still a severe lack of imagina-
tion and detail in actually offering
comprehensive and workable solu-
tions to the deep structural problems
facing India’s urban dwellers, across
the board.
note
1 Model Code of Conduct for the Guidance of
Political Parties and Candidates, viewed on
16 April 2024, https://www.eci.gov.in/mcc/.
references
BJP (2024): “Modi ki Guarantee 2024,” Bharatiya
Janata Party, viewed on 16 April 2024, https://
www.bjp.org/files/inline-documents/Modi-
Ki-Guarantee-Sankalp-Patra-English_0.pdf.
CPI(M) (2024): “Election Manifesto: 18th Lok
Sabha Elections,” Communist Party of India
(Marxist), viewed on 16 April 2024, https://
cpim.org/sites/default/files/20240331-pdfls_
election_manifesto.final_.pdf.
Doran, George (1981): “There’s a SMART Way to
Write Management’s Goals and Objectives,”
Management Review, Vol 70, No 11, pp 35–36,
viewed on 16 April 2024, https://community.
mis.temple.edu/mis0855002fall2015/
files/2015/10/S.M.
A.R.T-Way-Management-Review.pdf.
INC (2024): “Nyay Patra,” Indian National Con-
gress, viewed on 16 April 2024, https://mani-
festo.inc.in/assets/Congress-Manifesto-Eng-
lish-2024-Dyoxp_4E.pdf.
Krishnan, Gokul, Jehosh Paul, Revati Pillai and
Saurabh Raj (2023): “Making Election Manifes-
tos Legally Binding: A Wild Goose Chase,”
Economic & Political Weekly, Vol 58, No 8,
25 February.
Kumar, Alok Prasanna (2019): “The City in the
Constitution,” Economic & Political Weekly,
Vol 54, No 3, 19 January.
— (2023): “Municipal Elections and the Constitu-
tion,” Economic & Political Weekly, Vol 58, No 7,
18 February.
Rao, Vanam Jwala Narasimha (2018): “Election
Manifesto Should be Smart,” Millennium Post,
20 September, viewed on 16 April 2024,
https://www.millenniumpost.in/opinion/
election-manifesto-should-be-smart-319614.

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12 April 20, 2024 vol Lix no 16 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
COMMENTARY
Decentralised Skilling Plan
Looking beyond Numbers
Lata Gidwani, Pushpendra Chourdiya
The current ecosystem of skill
development in India is analysed
to highlight the challenges
faced. Decentralisation of skill
development is advocated
throughout the skilling chain with
a focus on inclusion. Coordination
between different ministries
and departments at the centre
and states is a precursor to the
essential synergy in the district
skill framework.
The authors thank P P Sahu, Ankur Sarin,
and Vinayak Kishore for their comments on
the article.
Lata Gidwani (gidwanilata68@gmail.com) and
Pushpendra Chourdiya (pushpendrachourdiya
@gmail.com) are former fellows under the
Mahatma Gandhi National Fellowship,
Phase II (2021–23).
20
I
n February 2023, over 12 lakh candi-
dates applied for about 6,000 patwari1
positions in Madhya Pradesh. The
applicants included 1,000 doctorates,
85,000 engineering graduates, one lakh
business administration graduates and
about 1.8 lakh candidates with post-
graduate degrees (Dwary 2023). Amid the
looming crisis of the COVID-19 pandemic
and reports of unprecedented layoffs in the
technology sector, India has witnessed
alarming levels of rising unemployment,
particularly educated unemployment,
among the youth.
While the unemployment crisis predates
the pandemic, as per the latest trends,
India’s unemployment rate rose to 8.11% in
April 2023 from 7.8% in March and 7.14%
in January of the same year (Somayya
2023). However, this may not accurately
represent the true state of unemployment
in the country. There is a high probability
that, discouraged by the lack of decent
jobs, large numbers of unemployed youth
have stopped looking for jobs reflecting
job-seeking fatigue (Shagun 2022).
As per the latest multiple indicator
survey2 report of the National Sample Sur-
vey Office (NSSO 2023), nearly one in every
three young Indians in the age group of
15–29 years is “not engaged in either edu-
cation, employment or training (NEET).”
Paradoxically, industries across sectors have
been raising heightened concerns about an
acute shortage of skilled workforce to bol-
ster the industry output and catalyse post-
pandemic recovery. To structurally miti-
gate this mismatch, it is therefore pertinent
to revisit the journey of skill development
policy in India, deliberate on the status quo
of its implementation, and recalibrate the
approach to skill development to empower
the front-line institutions to go beyond the
tunnel vision of numbers trained.
Skill Development in India
The formalisation of skill education in
India dates back to the pre-independence
april 20, 2024
era. Wood’s dispatch in 1854, for the first
time, recommended the introduction of
vocational education at the secondary
school stage. The Sapru Enquiry Com-
mittee of 1934 examined the causes of
unemployment and emphasised the
role of vocational education. The Wood–
Abbot Advisory Committee report of
1936 formed the basis for the establish-
ment of polytechnics.
Post-independence, the Second Five
Year Plan envisaged growth to be driven
primarily by rapid industrialisation and
stressed the requirement for a skilled
workforce. This paved the way for set-
ting up the first industrial training insti-
tute (ITI) in the 1950s. Several commis-
sions, namely the Radhakrishnan Com-
mission of 1948, the Mudliar Commis-
sion of 1952–53, the Kothari Commission
of 1964–66, and others gave their re-
commendations on vocational education
(Verma 2018). However, it was only
in 2009 that the first comprehensive
national policy on skill development was
notified. It set a target of skilling 500
million people by 2022.
In 2014, the Ministry of Skill Develop-
ment and Entrepreneurship (MSDE) was
established. It notified the national poli-
cy for skill development and entrepre-
neurship in 2015 and launched the
National Skill Development Mission
(NSDM). The mission envisioned a three-
tier structure consisting of a governing
council and mission directorate at the
apex level, state skill development mis-
sions (SSDM) at the state level, and dis-
trict skill committees (DSC) at the dis-
trict level. While the MSDE attempted to
bring standardisation and uniformity in
the trainings through the Pradhan Man-
tri Kaushal Vikas Yojana (PMKVY) and
Deen Dayal Upadhyay Grameen Kaushal
Yojana (DDU-GKY), the courses identified
at the centre were in stark disconnect
with the local socio-economic opportu-
nities and aspirations at the districts.
DSCs, chaired by the district collector,
were instituted nationwide to overcome
the misalignments (Figure 1, p 21). The
mandate of the committee is to forge
convergence between the stakeholders,
such as rural and urban local bodies, al-
lied departments, local youth, industries
and training partners in the district skill
vol lix no 16 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

ecosystem and undertake periodic skill
gap analysis, develop an annual district
skill development plan (DSDP), and facil-
itate implementation, monitoring and
evaluation of the plan. The committee is
supposed to comprise representatives
from the fields of industry, skill develop-
ment, education, agriculture, banking,
local industry associations, employment,
and rural development, among others.
We attempt to underscore specific
gaps and put forth recommendations
based on the experiences of the Mahat-
ma Gandhi National Fellows (MGNF)3 ap-
pointed by MSDE across several districts
in India for strengthening the district
skill and employment ecosystem.
Challenges of District Skill
Ecosystem
Funding and capacity-building: Skill
development as an agenda is seen in iso-
lation from education, entrepreneur-
ship, employment, and innovation. It
has been relegated to the periphery at
the district level in most districts across
India. Despite directions issued for set-
ting up DSC and conducting regular
meetings in 2018, the first meeting for
certain districts was not conducted until
the MGNFs joined in November 2021. The
frequency of DSC meetings is scarce, not
more than annually on average, across
the country unless the domain of skill
development and employment promo-
tion is of interest to the district collector
or warranted by specific official orders
by SSDMs or MSDE. Additionally, meet-
ings for committees such as the district
planning committee,4 district-level con-
sultative committee,5 district education
committee, and others are conducted
periodically; the DSC lies rather dor-
mant, failing to convene meetings regu-
larly to discuss matters regarding the
performance of the training program-
mes, industry engagement, and skill de-
velopment plans. Often, the concerned
officials lack the initiative or perspective
to outline the agenda for the meeting.
This could, at least partly, be attributed
to the lack of DSC’s capacity-building and
discretionary funding with the districts,
which would be a potent tool for signalling
the importance of skill development for
Economic & Political Weekly EPW april 20, 2024
Figure 1: District Skill Committee Structure
District Skill Committee - Institutional Structure
Chairperson
District officer SSDMs/
skill development
and entrepreneurship
department
District industry officer
Members
Principal of nodal
institute/ITI/PMKK
(convenor)
Members
nominated by Co-opting member 1
chairperson
SSDM – State Skill Development Mission; ITI – Industrial Training Institute; SD – Skill Development; DDU-GKY – Deen Dayal
Upadhyay Grameen Kaushal Yojana; RSETI – Rural Self-Employment Training Institute; JSS – Jan Shikshan Sansthan; DSDP –
District Skill Development Plan; PMKK – Pradhan Mantri Kaushal Kendra.
Source: Skill Book, Volume 1, SANKALP India.
employment and entrepreneurship to
the district authorities.
Moreover, there is a lack of interde-
partmental convergence for district skill
planning and implementation. For in-
stance, some courses such as beautician
and tailoring are being offered by multi-
ple departmental schemes. Operating in
silos, these departments are either una-
ware or indifferent that their chosen
courses are already being offered under
other programmes. In this tapestry of
disjointed efforts, the need for synergy
becomes all the more apparent. Coordi-
nation between the ministries at the
centre and departments at the state level
is a precondition for district-level inter-
departmental coordination. Currently,
around 16 ministries (Mehrotra 2021),
including tribal affairs, textiles, micro,
small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs),
rural development, and panchayati raj are
running skill development programmes.
Ineffective accountability: In most dis-
tricts, a regular training site inspection
by an independent authority or member
authorised by the DSC is not conducted,
especially in districts with no district
skill development office/project manage-
ment unit (PMU). This implies that there
is a lack of monitoring of the skill pro-
grammes operational in the districts to
ensure quality and authenticity. In cases
where the departmental heads of the
district skill office inspect such training,
there is a fertile ground for unholy alliances
between the district officer responsible
vol lix no 16
COMMENTARY
District Collector
District officer social District education officer
welfare/tribal welfare/
minorities department Four to five members
subcommittee
Lead district bank Representatives from SD 1. Preparation of DSDP
manager schemes in district (DDU-
GKY/RSETI/JSS) 2. Execution
Subcommittee to
One to three periodically report to DSC
District labour officer
and district statistics representatives from
industry clusters/
officer
prominent industries
Co-opting member 2 Co-opting member 3
for inspection and the training provider.
These apprehensions were confirmed by
an India Today report, which accessed
certain documents such as right to infor-
mation (RTI) replies and testimonials
(Singh 2018). They found cases of mal-
practice, including ghost beneficiaries and
alleged rent-seeking by officials from
training providers. Notably, the training
providers are obligated to offer place-
ments to approximately 70% of beneficiar-
ies. However, they forgo the final instal-
ment of their training reimbursement
cost, which is typically disbursed upon
achieving a pre-specified placement target.
In its year-end review, the report by
MSDE (2022) for its placement-oriented
flagship skilling programme of PMKVY
3.0 was centred on just the number of
candidates enrolled and trained. Further,
for rozgaar and apprenticeship melas,
only the number of candidates shortlist-
ed by industries is reported. In contrast,
the number of candidates joining the of-
fered employment opportunity is far less
and goes unreported. The numbers of
people trained and those offered work
obscure more than they reveal.
Demand and supply mismatch: It has
been noted that there exists a persistent
inconsistency between the local employ-
ment prospects and the courses offered
at the government-funded skilling schemes,
with a disproportionate number of train-
ing programmes conducted in a few
select courses such as tailoring, beauti-
cian, customer care executive, among
21
COMMENTARY
others. These have relatively limited
career progression prospects and are
near saturation. There are, however,
several factors contributing to the ob-
served trend, including the unavailabi-
lity of a qualified pool of trainers for
unconventional, yet new-age, skilling
courses in demand. The infrastructure
as per defined minimum norms is ex-
pensive, and lease market or buy-back
arrangements are not available for the
machinery required for the training.
The training partners, being an alien en-
tity to the district, lack a mediated con-
nection with the local industry players
for assured placements.
There are instances of the same indi-
vidual (who won bids for multiple de-
partments’ skilling schemes) working as
the centre manager for different train-
ing providers in a district. This individu-
al conveniently opts for the same or sim-
ilar courses across the different training
centres in the district, especially with
little involvement from the DSC, capital-
ising on existing resources and saving
the drudgery and costs of setting up in-
frastructure, finding trainers, and place-
ment avenues for different courses. Fur-
ther, demand aggregation exercises in
the districts are arbitrary and lack a sci-
entific approach. As per the industry
partners, the training course and curric-
ulum under PMKVY have not been
aligned with the actual industry require-
ments, and the practical skills imparted
under PMKVY training are not as per the
industry’s needs. Moreover, out of 37
sector skill councils,6 only 18 have con-
ducted any skill gap analysis (Parlia-
mentary Standing Committee 2022).
Mobilisation and awareness: It has
been observed that there exist dismal
awareness levels about the importance
of skilling, entrepreneurship, appren-
ticeship and placement linkage promo-
tion schemes in the districts. As per the
Young India and Work survey of 2018,
over 70% of youth aged 15–30 years are
unaware of government-run skill train-
ing programmes (Mishra et al 2018).
While extensive advertising and aware-
ness campaigns are conducted through
local newspapers, public hoardings,
mobilisation of local cadres, and social
22
Figure 2: Female Participation in Training and Placements in Short-term Skill Training (%)
95.7 97.9
85.0
98.4 71.9
96.1
71.6 56.2
86.1
27.7
6.1
26.5 57.0 14.6
11.2
10.3 7.1 11.3 5.0
7.1
Electronics and hardware
Apparel
wellness
Healthcare
Automotive
goods
jewellery
Construction
Media and entertainment
Power
Capital Goods
Construction
and Jewellery
and Wellness
Capital
Beauty and
Gems and
Beauty
Gems
% of females trained % of female placed
Source: Skill India and NSDC (2020).
media for various government schemes, and placements is significantly skewed
the efforts to raise awareness about skill towards sectors such as apparel, beauty
development schemes remain far from and wellness, healthcare, media and
adequate. Training providers find it dif- entertainment, and gems and jewellery
ficult to mobilise target group candi- (Figure 2). Sectors like electronics and
dates for training, which results in unin- hardware, construction, automotive, pow-
terested candidates being enrolled, con- er and capital goods continue to be
tributing to high dropout rates. largely male-dominated. Further, skilling
programmes emphasising the inclusion
Social inclusion: Evidence shows that, of disadvantaged communities like trans-
except in tailoring and beauty parlour genders and persons with disability are
courses, female participation in skilling rare unless under special project cases.
is low in non-traditional and science,
technology, engineering, and math Self-employment promotion: A number
(STEM)-oriented fields. This is worrisome of self-employment-oriented training pro-
given that these fields potentially offer grammes are run by government institu-
better remuneration and career pros- tions, such as the Rural Self-Employment
pects, especially in light of an already Training Institute (RSETI) and state-level
low female labour force participation centres for entrepreneurship development.
rate in India, which was pegged at 24% However, there is no provision of institu-
in 2022 (World Bank 2023). This is fur- tionalised incubation support for aspir-
ther corroborated by Skill India and the ing local entrepreneurs (be it students,
National Skill Development Corporation farmers, daily wage labourers, street
(NSDC 2020), which reveal that while vendors or women self-help groups) with
about half of the trained candidates are ideas and promising innovations. There
females, their participation in training is ample scope for post-training credit
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april 20, 2024 vol lix no 16 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

linkage with numerous self-employment
and entrepreneurship promotion schemes.
Rethinking the Skill Paradigm
In her interview with the National Skills
Network in 2020, Juthika Patankar, an
Indian administrative service office and
the former additional secretary of MSDE,
opined:
The challenge is to make sure the officials
of DSCs are adequately trained in subjects
like economic profiling, labour relations, and
a gamut of activities under skill training
management to help them come up with a
cohesive DSDP. In the absence of these capa-
cities and owing to structural issues, we
don’t have fully functional DSCs and vibrant
skill ecosystems across most of the districts.
(Karra 2020)
She emphasised that the ministry’s
primary focus is to achieve decentralisa-
tion through DSC. She added:
However, our big concern is funding for the
DSC s. If we want the District Committees to
make the skill plan and effectively implement
and monitor, these committees would them-
selves need finances. How we are going to
raise them is the real concern. (Karra 2020)
In our opinion, DSC funding and ca-
pacity building must be complemented
by sameeksha baithaks (review meet-
ings) periodically, jointly by the SSDM
and state employment department to re-
view the unemployment status and track
the performance of skill development
and employment promotion program-
mes in districts.
Building Collaborations
Additionally, the DSC can be leveraged
as a platform to forge convergences bet-
ween government schemes run by dif-
ferent ministries through the inclusion
of a consortium of district-level depart-
ments or institutions such as Krishi Vig-
yan Kendras, National Bank for Agricul-
ture and Rural Development (NABARD),
forest department, nodal government
college, and Nehru Yuva Kendra, among
others for outcome-oriented planning,
execution, and assessment of the skill-
ing programmes. The merging of all
skilling programmes under the MSDE
should be deliberated, unless the train-
ing is for a niche programme, to enhance
training quality, avoid duplication of
efforts, reduce wasteful expenditure,
Economic & Political Weekly EPW april 20, 2024
and consolidate resources for greater ef-
ficiency in outcomes. For instance, in
fisheries, the training for fish seed culti-
vation for different fish varieties, com-
mon diseases management, and entre-
preneurial skills around value-added
fish products can be conducted by MSDE,
while the fisheries department can con-
duct niche training for any new fish dis-
eases or variants as well as latest innova-
tions and best practices in the field.
The DSC can also bridge the gap be-
tween academia and the community
through collaborations for implement-
ing innovative skills-based employment
or entrepreneurship promotion initia-
tives. For instance, local tribal artisans of
geographical indication (GI)-certified
bagh prints of Dhar district in Madhya
Pradesh are struggling due to a lack
of design development and marketing
know-how. To this end, collaboration
with the Centre of Excellence for Khadi
(CoEK) at the National Institute of Fash-
ion Technology in Delhi for skilling in
designing, cost-effective production, qua-
lity control, e-commerce, and export
promotion has been negotiated by the
DSC. The budgeted funds are awaiting
approval from NABARD. The MSDE must
consider equipping district administra-
tions with the support of well-trained
full-time development professionals who
can build such proposals and connec-
tions with academia.
To avert the supply–demand mismatch,
the DSC must actively engage panchayati
raj institutes (PRIs), especially gram pan-
chayats, at every stage of skill planning
and implementation to map youth aspi-
rations, enlist local employers and op-
portunities, prepare and update the list
of youth seeking skilling and productive
work, and provide counselling and tar-
geted mobilisation. While the MSDE has
partnered with the Ministry of Panchay-
ati Raj (MoPR) to include skill compo-
nents as a focus area in its people’s plan
campaign for preparing gram panchayat
development plans (GPDP), this is yet to
translate in the field.
In addition, the MSDE, in collaboration
with the industry, needs to promote skill
entrepreneurship to expand the network
of available qualified professionals across
the sectors for diversifying the courses
vol lix no 16
COMMENTARY
run at the skill centres based on industry
demand or local opportunities. It must
ensure that being a trainer under the
government skill training programmes
is lucrative for qualified individuals.
Currently, the trainers are paid an hon-
orarium of 500 per day on average,
which leads to the problem of adverse
selection in terms of the quality of train-
ers. There must be structural incentives
designed for the industry to invest in the
formal skill landscape, say through a
corporate social responsibility (CSR) fund,
for both hard and soft infrastructure (such
as help with finding qualified trainers,
counsellors, screening for targeted mo-
bilisation, on-job training, and place-
ment tie-ups) required to conduct quali-
ty training with post-training linkages.
Policy Interventions
Policy-level interventions can incentiv-
ise industries or sellers of machinery to
enter into lease markets for their equip-
ment so that the training providers can
afford to conduct training in roles and
sectors offering decent remuneration
and career development opportunities.
Under the chairpersonship of the district
collector, the DSC must mediate such tie-
ups through a memorandum of under-
standing (MoU) between industries and
training providers. The committee must
proactively facilitate market-relevant train-
ing by encouraging interdepartmental
and industry interfaces for periodic de-
mand aggregation. Existing government
halls should be used as training loca-
tions, and untied funds available with
the district, such as the District Mineral
Foundation7 can be used as much as pos-
sible among others. The MSDE can also
consider revising the common cost norms
(CCN) in the wake of inflation to facili-
tate training and reduce the minimum
training target for training providers to
conduct training in conflict-ridden or
geographically remote areas.
Create Awareness
For awareness creation, we recommend
that quarterly or biannual rozgaar and
kaushal melas be planned across different
development blocks in rotation. The pro-
posed melas can provide a consolidated
platform for placement drives, registration
23
COMMENTARY

on the district employment exchange
and national apprenticeship promotion
scheme portal, and preliminary registra-
tion for various skill training. It can also
be leveraged as an opportunity to show-
case success stories, foster industry part-
nerships, and feature sessions on career
guidance and entrepreneurship by ac-
complished alumni and experts. As the
Parliamentary Standing Committee Re-
port (2022) recommended, the publicity
for conducting the melas needs to be
scaled up, particularly in remote and
backward areas. Local public represent-
atives need to be invited to participate
in the process to increase coverage and
trust. Moreover, the melas should be in-
tegrated with cultural and national
events as well as local festivals to in-
crease the rate of participation.
The district public relations office, lo-
cal news and radio news broadcasts can
be influential in regularly reporting on
the skill development and entrepreneur-
ship schemes, DSC meeting highlights
and event updates for greater local out-
reach. Additionally, common service
centres8 (CSCs) and Swachh Bharat vehi-
cles can be instrumental in enhancing
last-mile outreach of skill programmes.
We propose the setting up of a district-
specific dashboard, with links on the
district’s official page and social media
handles of the district to serve as a cen-
tralised, open-access platform, offering
a wide range of provisions, including a
skill calendar, registration for training
programmes, access to free online cours-
es, career counselling services, skill
training and job alerts, and a dedicated
mechanism for grievance redressal. The
dashboard can be integrated with other
job search portals for job alerts.
Strengthen Social Inclusion
To strengthen social inclusion, the DSC
should lead sustained efforts in negoti-
ating with industries to provide healthy,
fair, and cooperative working conditions
as well as quality work opportunities
for women. The DSC should engage ex-
tensively with accredited social health
activists (ASHA), anganwadi workers,
self-help groups, and community resource
person cadre of the National Rural
Livelihood Mission to create awareness
about the benefits of skilling, especially
in STEM fields, and encourage the fe-
male members who drop out owing to
pregnancy, to resume training as soon
as possible after childbirth (Parliamen-
tary Standing Committee 2022). The
provision of quality creche facilities is
essential among other measures.
Admittedly, ASHA and anganwadi work-
ers tend to live in the same communities
and face similar challenges. Therefore, it
is recommended to train some workers
as master trainers through a cluster-
based approach. This training should
focus on educating workers about the
benefits of skill development, ways to
persuade families to continue work after
childbirth, and different avenues and
schemes for skilling. The master trainers
should be compensated with an honorarium
for conducting sensitisation sessions in
their clusters.
The DSC must work with the civil soci-
ety, community-based organisations, and
field officials, if any, of the Department

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24 april 20, 2024 vol lix no 16 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

of Social Justice and Empowerment in
consultation with the transgender com-
munity and persons with disability. To-
gether, they should design and imple-
ment special projects to ensure fair ac-
cess to skilling and productive work op-
portunities. For instance, the Gajapati
district administration of Odisha in an
effort to support livelihood opportuni-
ties for transgenders has decided to offer
handicraft skill training in the state’s
renowned craft of pattachitra and ap-
plique (Times of India 2022).
To strengthen the monitoring of the
training programmes, we recommend
the constitution of a DSC subcommittee,
as also suggested by MSDE. The subcom-
mittee members should conduct surprise
visits to the training centres on a rota-
tional basis. The inspection reports should
be geotagged and submitted to the DSC.
The subcommittee’s membership for in-
spections should change periodically.
The inspection reports must provide in-
formation for data verification regarding
the candidates enrolled, trained, and
placed, compliance with tools and equip-
ment availability, and attendance of the
trainees. Post-placement tracking reports
and feedback from the industry and can-
didates should be tabled for review and
course correction by the DSC quarterly.
Incubation Support
Lastly, incubation support should be in-
stitutionalised for aspiring local entre-
preneurs with innovative ideas through
the hub and spoke model. This will help
identify indigenous or new-age techno-
logy-based innovations, especially those
geared towards rural India, and pro-
mote access to research advisory, infra-
structure, mentoring, financial and
market linkages, and technology valida-
tion support among other facilities. This
will help strengthen entrepreneurship
at the grassroots. The DSC can assist
incubators at divisional and state levels
in identifying and recommending com-
petent and passionate entrepreneurs.
District-level institutions, such as DICs,
RSETIs, district employment offices, and
ITIs may join hands to provide incuba-
tion support.
The dangers of unemployment, espe-
cially educated unemployment, are real
Economic & Political Weekly EPW april 20, 2024
and disquieting. Reports warn of the
potential social conflict emanating from
the expanding population of higher-edu-
cated youth with college degrees reeling
under unemployment or underemploy-
ment (Gupta and Pushkar 2019). In an
interview, Raghuram Rajan, former gov-
ernor of the Reserve Bank of India, em-
phasised the link between high unem-
ployment rates and increased inequality
and divisions, creating an opportunity
for entrepreneurial politicians to cater to
these divisions (Economic Times 2022).
While skill development alone is not a
panacea for the multifaceted unemploy-
ment problem, the demographic divi-
dend of the most youthful country can-
not be tapped without a robust skill de-
velopment and employment promotion
policy, with a focus on decentralisation
and convergence between several stake-
holders to account for dynamic local re-
alities of labour markets and entrepre-
neurship opportunities. To this end, the
imperative of the DSC, as a fulcrum, is
non-negotiable in reconciling youth as-
pirations, industry demand, local entre-
preneurial potential, quality assurance
and inclusion. Can it happen without the
sincere empowerment of the institution?
Notes
1 Patwari is an officer in the revenue department
who maintains the land records, collects land
revenue, and manages other such aspects re-
lated to governance at the village level.
2 A multiple indicator survey is designed to col-
lect data on a range of key indicators related to
the well-being of individuals, households, and
communities.
3 MGNF is a fellowship programme launched by
MSDE in collaboration with the Indian Insti-
tute of Management (IIM) to mentor young
professionals through classroom training at
IIM and field immersion with district adminis-
tration. Phase I of the fellowship ran from 2020
to 2022. Phase II of the fellowship commenced
in November 2021.
4 A district planning committee is established at
the district level in accordance with Article
243ZD of the Constitution of India. The com-
mittee’s role is to gather and consolidate the
plans formulated by the panchayats and mu-
nicipalities within the district and create a pre-
liminary development plan for the district.
5 A district-level consultative committee is an in-
ter-institutional forum at the district level for
coordination and joint implementation of de-
velopment programmes by banking and finan-
cial institutions and government departments.
6 Sector skill councils are industry-led bodies for
developing training content and conducting
skill gap studies.
7 The district Mineral Foundation (DMF) is a trust
set up as a non-profit body under the Mines
and Minerals (Development and Regulation)
vol lix no 16
COMMENTARY
Amendment Act of 2015 in the districts affect-
ed by mining-related activities for the benefit
of people affected by mining. The fund for the
DMF is contributed by miners.
8 Common service centres are access points
(physical facilities) to deliver government
e-services in India.
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Verma, A P (2018): “Unit-1 Emergence of Vocational
Education: A Historical Perspective,” Block-1
Vocational Education for Sustainable National
Development, IGNOU, http://egyankosh.ac.
in//handle/123456789/43674.
World Bank (2023): “Labor Force Participation
Rate, Female,” https://data.worldbank.org/in-
dicator/SL.TLF.CACT.FE.ZS?locations=IN.
25
COMMENTARY
Poverty of Thought versus
Richness of Imagination
A Flashback
P C Mohanan, Amitabh Kundu
The release of the factsheet of
the Household Consumption
Expenditure Survey for 2022–23
led government agencies and a
section of economists to claim a
massive reduction in poverty over
the past decade with alacrity.
While there is no denying that
there has been a reduction in
poverty, the reluctance of scholars
and administrators to admit and
correct the data discrepancies is
unwarranted. More disturbing
is attributing the data- and
methodology-linked queries to
poverty of thought.
P C Mohanan (pcmohanan@rediffmail.com)
is a former member of the National
Statistical Commission. Amitabh Kundu
(akundu.jnu@gmail.com) is professor emeritus
at L J University, Ahmedabad.
Economic & Political Weekly EPW april 20, 2024
T
he debate on poverty in argu-
mentative India has never been
conclusive, despite elaborate em-
pirical churning with national and inter-
national participation in the late 1990s.
Most of it, apart from the debaters’ own
convictions, had to do with the method-
ology used in data collection, determin-
ing the “right” poverty line, obtaining
appropriate prices for rural and urban
areas and in different states, and resolv-
ing the discrepancy of the consumption
estimates of the National Sample Sur-
vey (NSS) with that from the national
income accounts.
These issues, however, went into a
sort of hibernation when the National
Sample Survey Office (NSSO), the survey
agency providing the basic data, did not
come up with consumption expenditure
data for a long time and the report based
on the 2017–18 survey was junked by the
government due to unrevealed quality
issues. In the absence of the official con-
sumption surveys, experts had a field
day in exploring alternative data from
non-government sources like the Con-
sumer Pyramids Household Survey, India
Human Development Survey, etc. More
imaginative among them used growth
in rural and urban income in different
states to extrapolate consumption ex-
penditures of households and then
scaled up their total to bring it at par
with the national accounts data on
private final consumption (Bhalla et al
2022). A few among these researchers
used the Periodic Labour Force Survey
which used only just five questions to
collect household expenditure. These
exercises led to conflicting conclusions
on the poverty rates and trends in the
country. Given the sad state of national
statistics, the release of the Household
vol lix no 16
Consumption Expenditure Survey (HCES)
2022–23 factsheet, unaccompanied by
the full survey report, has been en-
thusiastically hogged by researchers,
bringing the whole debate back into
the public domain.
Background
To recapitulate, India, after making a
few significant attempts to assess the
magnitude and trend in poverty based
on some minimum expenditure, linked
roughly to the calorie requirement dur-
ing the 1960s, worked out poverty lines
for rural and urban areas using the
household per capita expenditure corre-
sponding to a predefined minimum cal-
orie consumption at 1973–74 prices. The
two lines were adjusted over time for
price changes, keeping the original rural
and urban poverty line baskets of goods
and services unchanged. Major criticisms
of these poverty lines included the use
of outdated consumption patterns, issues
in the price adjustments, not accounting
for government subsidies supplementing
household expenditures at the lower
end, and the gradual withdrawal of the
state in education and health sectors,
requiring out-of-pocket expenditure by
the households. This was the context
for setting up the Tendulkar Committee
in 2006.
Detailed studies done by B S Minhas
and others in the 1980s, comparing the
survey-based estimation of private con-
sumption and the derived estimates from
the national accounts, had shown the
robustness of the NSS data. However, it
was increasingly felt that the surveys
were underestimating the consumption
of the frequently consumed items. This
was the beginning of intense methodo-
logical research by the NSSO on improv-
ing consumption reporting. It was clearly
shown that an appropriate reference
period or recall period can improve
reporting. This led to the adoption of a
seven-day reference period for some fre-
quently consumed items, in addition to
the 30-day and 365-day recall periods
used till then. Though the data using the
last two reference periods were available
in all previous surveys, the practice was
13
COMMENTARY
to use the distribution derived from the
uniform reference period (URP) of 30
days. A comparison of the average con-
sumption expenditure using the three
approaches available in the 2011–12
survey has been provided in Table 1. The
results clearly establish that the use of
the modified mixed reference period
(MMRP, reference period of a year for
consumer durables, a week for items of
daily consumption and a month for the
rest) brings about improved consumption
reporting than the mixed reference period
(MRP, one year for consumer durables,
a month for the others) and URP due
to better recall. However, no official
poverty estimation has been done based
on MMRP in 2011–12 by the Planning
Table 1: Poverty Rates Based on the Tendulkar
Method for 1993–94, 2004–05 and 2011–12,
Estimated Using MRP to Analyse the NSS
Household Consumer Expenditure Data of the
50th, 61st, and 68th Rounds
Year Rural Urban
1993–94 50.1 31.8
2004-05 41.8 25.7
2011–12 25.7 13.7
Source: Planning Commission (2013).
Commission, possibly due to the need to
derive a new poverty line, as specified
by Suresh Tendulkar.
The Tendulkar Committee recom-
mended moving away from the anchor-
ing of the poverty line to a calorie intake
norm due to the absence of any definite
evidence of linkage between calorie in-
put and health outcomes. Instead, they
proposed the use of the urban poverty
line basket corresponding to the 27.5%
urban headcount ratio for rural areas.
This urban rate was based on the uni-
form reference period of one month,
used in the 2004–05 survey. This rural
poverty line was validated by checking
that the private expenditure near the
poverty line for “food, education and
health outcomes” ensured calorie in-
take was adequate as per the Food and
Agriculture Organization’s norms. The
committee, having used a new reference
basket and newly derived price indices
based on the same data set, clearly stated
that its headcount ratio should not be
compared with earlier estimates. The
committee also recommended that as
and when the MMRP is adopted, the
MRP equivalent per capita expenditure
should be shifted using the method
14
adopted by the committee for shifting
of URP to MRP per capita expenditure
for 2004–05.
The Planning Commission estimated
poverty rates again based on the 2011–12
NSSO, but on the basis of MRP, and using
price indices and methodology as sug-
gested by the Tendulkar Committee,
though MMRP-based expenditure data
was also available (Table 2).
The poverty estimates, thus, depend on
the per capita consumption expenditure
distribution and the poverty line, below
which the population would be counted
as poor. Getting accurate information on
the distribution of per capita consump-
tion expenditure in a temporally compa-
rable manner is, therefore, a key chal-
lenge in the estimation of poverty.
Context of the Recent Debate
In light of a shared concern that the
Total
45.3
Tendulkar Committee’s poverty line was
37.2 too low, the union government subse-
21.9 quently appointed another committee
in 2012 under C Rangarajan to examine
the poverty estimation afresh. However,
their recommendations have not yet been
officially used. After the last estimates
by the Planning Commission for 2011–12,
no further official estimate has been re-
leased and the government did not bring
the results of the consumption survey
in 2017–18 into the public domain (which,
as per a leaked news item, showed an
increase in rural poverty).
The release of the sketchy “factsheet”
came as a drizzle in the middle of a
drought, resulting in the union govern-
ment claiming massive poverty reduc-
tion with alacrity. Researchers from the
State Bank of India announced sighting
new poverty rates—7.2% in rural and
4.6% in urban areas, declining from
25.7% and 13.7% in 2011–12. This is prob-
lematic since it updated the poverty line
based on MRP and applied it to the data
Table 2: Value of Per Capita Consumption (`)
Derived Using Three Different Approaches in the
NSS 68th Round for 2011–12
Type of Recall Period Rural Urban
URP—30 days for all items 1,279 2,399
MRP—30 days and 365 days 1,287 2,477
MMRP—7 days, 30 days, 1,430 2,630
and 365 days
Source: Compiled from Appendix Tables 6A, 6B, 6C
of NSS Report No 555, Level and Pattern of Consumer
Expenditure—2011–12, National Sample Survey Office,
Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation.
april 20, 2024
based on MMRP, getting a low figure.
Agreeing with the above figures, the NITI
Aayog claimed that poverty in India
will be below 5% in 2022–23. Efforts by
statisticians to point out the problems in
comparing the new set of numbers
where a different approach was adopted
to collect the data, besides issues in up-
dating the poverty lines used by Ten-
dulkar for the current year, were dubbed
as “poverty of thought” (Bhalla 2024).
The Tendulkar Committee was clear
that a calorie norm-based poverty line is
no longer appropriate. The Rangarajan
panel, however, suggested that the pov-
erty line should be based on certain
normative levels of nourishment, cloth-
ing, house rent, conveyance, education,
and a behaviourally determined level of
other non-food expenses. Compared to
the Tendulkar poverty line, the poverty
lines estimated by the Rangarajan Com-
mittee are 19% and 41% higher in rural
and urban areas, respectively (PIB 2014).
This is partly due to the latter using
the consumption expenditure based on
the modified mixed recall period of the
NSSO as these were considered to be
more precise compared to the MRP, used
by Tendulkar and the URP, present in ear-
lier estimations. An increase of 67% in
the rural poverty line and 28% in the ur-
ban poverty line was attributed to the
shift from MRP to MMRP.
In a paper published in 2024, Rangarajan
and S Mahendra Dev have adjusted their
poverty line for 2011–12 for inflation and
showed that poverty has declined from
30.9% and 26.4% in rural and urban areas
in 2011–12 to 12.3% and 8.0%, respectively,
in 2022–23. Using the international pov-
erty line of $1.90, as proposed by the
World Bank, Bhalla and Bhasin (2024)
claimed that the percentage of the poor
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Sponsored by ICSSR, New Delhi
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vol lix no 16 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

at 2011 prices in rural and urban areas
are 2.5 and 1, respectively. There is no
problem of temporal comparability here
since these have been obtained through
the application of a global poverty line
and applied to the MMRP-based expendi-
ture data for 2011–12 and 2022–23. How-
ever, getting comparable poverty esti-
mates for the years, for which MMRP-
based data are not available, would be a
problem. Also, inter-country comparisons
of poverty rates would have to be done
with a great degree of caution since their
methodology of data collection, reference
period, etc, can vary widely. This problem
exists in comparing several other macro
indicators from international sources.
One important case is the level and
growth in urbanisation since the defini-
tions of urban centres vary across coun-
tries, a few using even satellite data in
identifying urban centres.
Subjective elements are always in-
volved in choosing a poverty line. This is
reflected in the differences in the poverty
lines suggested by the two expert com-
mittees, set up by the Planning Commis-
sion with a gap of a few years. For esti-
mating poverty for 2022–23, several
economists have simply updated the
2011–12 poverty lines based on MRP with
the available consumer price index (CPI)
inflation, paying scant regard to the sug-
gestions of the Tendulkar Committee.
The plethora of poverty lines and con-
sumption data with multiple reference
periods and the use of different price
indices (Subramanian 2024) showing a
high reduction of poverty have only
helped to confuse the debate.
In Conclusion
While comparing poverty levels based
on the 2022–23 HCES factsheet and that
of the 2011–12 survey, experts have
mostly overlooked the use of multiple
visits to collect expenditure data from a
household. Rangarajan and Dev (2024)
rightly argue that this will compromise
with the robustness in comparability.
This procedural change is an admission
of the field problems in collecting the
entire spectrum of consumption data in
one sitting. Not just the recall, the quali-
ty of responses is likely to be affected if
all the schedules are canvassed in one
Economic & Political Weekly EPW april 20, 2024
COMMENTARY
sitting, due to loss of patience after a References
certain duration in the interview. In par- Bhalla, S (2024): “We Must Not Let Poverty of
Thought Stop India from Tracking Depriva-
ticular, the non-food items of consump- tion,” Mint, https://www.livemint.com/opin-
tion, usually figured in the second half ion/online-views/we-must-not-let-poverty-of-
of the questionnaire, get under-reported thought-stop-india-from-tracking-depriva-
tion-11711542595629.html.
due to this factor. In fact, social con- Bhalla, S and K Bhasin (2024): “India Eliminates
sumption surveys of the NSSO, exclusive- Extreme Poverty,” Brookings, https://www.
brookings.edu/articles/india-eliminates-ex-
ly covering health or education, report a treme-poverty/.
much larger expenditure on health and Bhalla, S, K Bhasin and A Virmani (2022): “Pan-
demic, Poverty, and Inequality: Evidence from
education, compared to what is cap- India,” IMF Working Paper, https://www.imf.
tured in the consumption survey under org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2022/04/05/
Pandemic-Poverty-and-Inequality-Evidence-
these groups, clearly establishing the from-India-516155.
need for fragmenting the schedule and PIB (2014): “Rangarajan Report on Poverty,” Press
spending more time for the interviews. Information Bureau, Government of India, htt-
ps://pib.gov.in/newsite/printrelease.
One must, therefore, laud the efforts aspx?relid=108291.
of the NSSO to bring much-needed re- Planning Commission (2009): “Report of the Ex-
pert Group to Review the Methodology for Esti-
forms in data collection in consumption mation of Poverty,” Government of India.
surveys, though it is at the cost of loss of — (2013): “Press Note on Poverty Estimates,
comparability with the earlier surveys. 2011–12,” Government of India.
Rangarajan, C and S Mahendra Dev (2024): “With
Fortunately, there is a repeat survey New Consumption Survey, the Need for New
being done for 2023–24 that could estab- Indices,” Indian Express, https://indianexpress.
com/article/opinion/columns/moving-to-a-
lish the appropriateness of the present better-count-9208676/.
methodology. Further, if economists Subramanian, S (2024): “The Household Con-
sumption Expenditure Survey 2022–23: What
agree on a fresh poverty line using the the ‘Fact Sheet’ Suggests about Welfare, Ine-
MMRP data and a method of updating quality, and Poverty in India,” India Forum,
https://www.theindiaforum.in/economy/
it over time, the poverty debate will household-consumption-expenditure-sur-
become less acrimonious. vey-2022-23.
BUDGET 2023–24
March 25, 2023
An Introduction and Overview —Pinaki Chakraborty
Independent Fiscal Councils: Lapdogs or Watchdogs? —Y V Reddy, Pinaki Chakraborty
Electoral Cycle and the Union Budget 2023–24:
Some Departures from the Past? —Ashok K Lahiri
Concerns about Balancing Growth and Stability —M Govinda Rao
Union Budget 2023–24: The Long View —Ashima Goyal
Massive Capital Expenditure, Modest Fiscal Consolidation,
and Cut in Pillars of Social Safety Net —Sudipto Mundle, Ajaya Sahu
Balancing Growth with Fiscal Consolidation —D K Srivastava
The Union Budget 2023–24 and the Financial Sector:
The Devil May Lie in the Details —Partha Ray
Agriculture and Rural Areas in Budget 2023–24:
A Need for Comprehensive Approach for Transformation —S Mahendra Dev
For copies write to:
Circulation Manager,
Economic & Political Weekly,
320–322, A to Z Industrial Estate, Ganpatrao Kadam Marg,
Lower Parel, Mumbai 400 013.
email: circulation@epw.in
vol lix no 16 15
COMMENTARY
Fitting Adjudication on the
Opaque Electoral Bond Scheme
Satya Narayan Misra, Abhipsa Ray
The electoral bond scheme in
its present form legitimises
corruption and promotes crony
capitalism, with its thrust on quid
pro quo. A constitutional bench
has unanimously adjudicated to
stop issuing electoral bonds and
submit details of the purchased
electoral bonds to the Election
Commission of India. It did
not deal with the accusation of
misusing the money bill provision
to pre-empt debate and voting in
the Rajya Sabha.
Satya Narayan Misra (misra.sn54@gmail.com)
is professor emeritus, KIIT Deemed to be
University, Bhubaneswar, Odisha. Abhipsa Ray
(ray.abhipsa1993@gmail.com) is a research
scholar, School of Management, KIIT Deemed
to be University, Bhubaneswar, Odisha.
26
T
he electoral bond scheme (EBS)
which was introduced as a money
bill in budget 2017–18 by amend-
ing several provisions in the Companies
Act, 2013, the Representation of the Peo-
ple (RoP) Act, 1951, Foreign Contribution
(Regulation) Act (FCRA), 2010 and Income
Tax (IT) Act, 1961 must rank as the most
flagrant violation in the electoral process,
as it allows the corporates to remain
anonymous while making an unlimited
donation to their preferred parties (ADR
2022). The case came up twice before the
Supreme Court when no stay was given
to the issue of electoral bonds. Given the
complexity of the issues involved, this
article attempts to discuss (i) the nuanc-
es and concerns of the scheme, (ii) the
importance of the right to information in
a liberal democracy, (iii) the role of the
Supreme Court in ensuring free and fair
election, and (iv) the historic decision of
the Supreme Court.
Nuances and Concerns of EBS
The scheme as per the government con-
tention was introduced to cleanse the
system of political funding. Non-redeem-
able debt instruments like a promissory
note, which will be interest-free and is-
sued in multiples of `10,000 to `10 mil-
lion through specified branches of the
State Bank of India (SBI).
They will have a life of 15 days and
are issued quarterly in January, April,
July, and October. Those parties who
could muster more than 1% of votes in
the last election would be eligible to draw
them. Section 29C of the ROP Act has
been amended so that the candidates do
not have to render a statement of funds
received under EBS to the Election Com-
mission of India (ECI). Section 13A of the
IT Act, 1961 was amended exempting
candidates from keeping an account of
money received through EBS (Singhal
2022). It also removes the cap of 7.5% of
the average of net profit during the last
april 20, 2024
three years (D’Costa 2020). The FCRA
(2010) has been amended allowing for-
eign companies to provide funds even if
their share in the Indian company ex-
ceeds 50% (Gupta and Naulakha 2020).
Electoral bonds are tax-exempt under
Section 80 GGC and Section 80 GGB of
the IT Act, 1961. In a nutshell, the entire
scheme was legally firewalled to be un-
limited, unaccounted, and unidentified
political funding by the corporates.
‘Right to Information’ as Part of
‘Right to Freedom’
Across all democratic countries, it has
been the experience that money plays
the most potent role in influencing pub-
lic policy and skewing the level playing
field among political parties. This has
been helped to a great degree by the fact
that the citizens are not in the know of
the source of the money and the donors.
The Supreme Court has decreed that the
right to know, particularly in the event
of elections (People’s Union of Civil Liber-
ties [PUCL] v Union of India [UOI]: 2003)
is an inalienable part of the fundamen-
tal right of speech and expression under
Article 19(1)(A).
The major trigger for this came when
the government promulgated the Right
to Information Act. It may be recalled
that the Supreme Court came out of its
cocoon of orthodoxy of examining the
procedural aspects only to recognise the
importance of an open government that
is responsible and accountable to its citi-
zens in the S P Gupta v UOI case (1981). It
served as a milestone for a spate of pub-
lic interest litigations (PIL) which were
filed by civil society watchdog organisa-
tions like the PUCL, Association for Dem-
ocratic Reforms (ADR) and Common
Cause (Yadi 2021). By keeping the infor-
mation regarding donations received by
the political parties from corporates and
the citizenry, the EBS of 2018 clearly
goes against the fundamental pillars of
democracy like the freedom of speech and
expression under Article 19(1)(a) (Bhard-
waj 2020). Chastened by the draconian
change in electoral funding and the le-
gitimised opacity that shrouded it, the
ADR, Common Cause, and CPI(M) filed
a PIL in the Supreme Court to stop the
issuance of such bonds.
vol lix no 16 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

Arguments and counterarguments:
Prashant Bhushan who spearheaded the
arguments against the scheme contend-
ed that the scheme allows the donors to
political parties to maintain their ano-
nymity, which is not healthy for free and
fair elections. Besides, the party who
will be in power is likely to get more
funds as they can indulge in quid pro
quo. He also brought to notice the seri-
ous reservations that the Reserve Bank
of India (RBI) and the ECI had about the
scheme. K K Venugopal, the then advo-
cate general, on the other hand, defend-
ed the scheme as it will curb the menace
of unaccounted money during the elec-
tion. He also mentioned that if it is known
that a corporation has given `50/`100
crore to a party, they can be targeted by
the rival parties. The Supreme Court did
not hold up the operation of the scheme
but ordered that all parties who receive
donations through electoral bonds must
submit the particulars of the donors to
the ECI in sealed covers.
Impact of EBS on donations received:
The matter again came up for hearing
after several tranches of EBS had been
issued with the Bharatiya Janata Party
(BJP) as the prime beneficiary. In the
2019 elections, the BJP received 76% of
total bonds amounting to `3,355 crore
and 9% went to Congress. Interestingly,
in 2021–22, while the BJP received `1,033
crore, Mamta Banerjee’s Trinamool Con-
gress received `528 crore as against `253
crore by Congress. As per the answer to
the RTI query, total donations as of May
2023 were of the order of `12,979 crore,
of which the overall share of the BJP was
68%. The then CJI Sharad A Bobde, Jus-
tice Bopanna and Justice Ram Subrama-
niam found no justification to stay the
scheme. They, however, conceded that
there are weighty issues that require in-
depth hearings regarding the sanctity of
the electoral process. They did note that
the ECI and RBI have made some reserva-
tions but they have not opposed the
scheme in itself.
Other concerns: There are also serious
concerns regarding the removal of the
cap on funding. Also, the amendment to
the FCRA has the potential for foreign
Economic & Political Weekly EPW april 20, 2024
companies to set up subsidiary companies
and make political funding. As per Arti-
cle 324 of the Constitution, the Election
Commission is expected to issue suitable
directions so that the purity of the elec-
tions is ensured. In fact, O P Rawat, CEC
in an interview with Economic Times
(2018) had observed: “With no limit on
party expenditure, how can you be sure
that there is no black money?”
It is interesting to note that way back
in 1957, Chief Justice M C Chagla of
Bombay High Court had warned Parlia-
ment regarding the perils of allowing
companies to freely add to the coffers of
the party (Hakim 2021). To quote: “Any
attempt on the part of anyone to finance
a political party is likely to contaminate
the very springs of democracy.” Justice
Mukherjee of the Calcutta High Court in
the same year had observed: “A man,
who pays the piper will call the tune.”
Supreme Court and Free
and Fair Elections
This raises the basic issue of whether the
right to information is a part of the free-
dom of speech and expression, more so
since it does not find specific mention in
Article 19(1)(a). The Supreme Court in
response to several PILs and appeals
filed before it has amplified the scope of
Article 19(1)(a). In the State of UP v Raj
Narain case (1975), Justice Mathew wrote:
“The people of this country have a right
to know every public Act, everything
that is done in a public way, by their pub-
lic functionaries.” In S P Gupta v UOI
(1981), Chief Justice P N Bhagawati wrote:
“Right to know is implicit in the right of
free speech.” Disclosure of information
in regard to the functioning of the gov-
ernment must be the rule and secrecy
the exception. However, the most defini-
tive ruling in the context of the election
was given in ADR v UOI (2002) where it
was made mandatory for candidates to
reveal their financial and criminal ante-
cedents. The Court also struck down
Sections 33A and 33B of the ROP Act
which tried to ban providing information.
In PUCL v UOI (2003), the Court decreed
that the state is under obligation to cre-
ate conditions so that rights under Article
19(1)(a), like the right to receive informa-
tion, can be effectively enjoyed by the
vol lix no 16
COMMENTARY
citizens. While the freedom of the press
is not explicitly provided in the freedom
of speech subclause, unlike the US consti-
tution, in the Bennet Coleman v UOI case
(1973), the court struck down government
newsprint policy limiting the number of
pages to be published by the editors.
On 15 February 2024, a five judge
bench headed by the CJI decreed that
the EBS violated the right to information
enshrined in Article 19(1)(a) of the Con-
stitution. Information about funding re-
ceived by a political party is essential for
a voter to exercise their freedom to vote
in an effective and informed manner.
The Court relied upon the proportional-
ity test laid down in Modern Dental
College v State of MP (2016) in which a
measure restricting a fundamental right
must have a legitimate ground and not
create disproportionate implications.
Democracy envisages conducting free
and fair elections and the right to infor-
mation as basic feature of democracy.
The present EBS is a retrograde measure
that legitimises crony capitalism, militates
against transparency, incentivises cor-
rupt practices, and bolsters the nexus
between politicians and big business
(Singhal 2022). Recourse to a money bill
for amending the law to relate electoral
funding to pre-empt a debate in the Rajya
Sabha has subverted the legislative
scheme. The scheme has not only emas-
culated the authority of the ECI but also
impaired its ability to conduct free and
fair elections by not providing a level
playing field to all political parties. It has
also constrained its powers to supervise
the funds of political parties (Bhat 2021).
When the government, in November
2022, decided to open a fresh window
ahead of the Gujarat and Himachal
Pradesh elections, no approval of the ECI
was taken when the Model Code of Con-
duct had kicked in.
Misuse of Money Bill Provision
Article 110 of the Constitution clearly de-
lineates the contingencies in which a bill
can be termed a money bill, namely re-
ceipt and expenditure out of the Consoli-
dated Fund of India, taxation and bor-
rowing (Khaitan 2020). The provision of
the Aadhaar bill was also included in the
Finance Bill 2016. When it was challenged,
27
COMMENTARY

Justice D Y Chandrachud called it a fraud
on the Constitution. However, the other
judges decided to put off a final decision
on this. The government again introduced
the EBS as part of the Finance Bill, 2018.
Such political subterfuges are resorted
to by the ruling party to avoid a debate
and voting in the Rajya Sabha. The Lok
Sabha speaker had agreed with the ruling
party when it was opposed as a money
bill by the opposition parties. Being a
contentious move, it will be subjected to
a judicial review by the Supreme Court.
A Historic Decision
William Dalrymple (2020) wrote in his
book, The Anarchy, that: “East India
Company was the first trading company
to effectively rule India from the board
room of London.” The EBS portents a
similar company raj, with big compa-
nies, foreign companies, and shell com-
panies funding the governing party,
with an eye on quid pro quo. The Su-
preme Court has held that the purpose
of curbing black money is not traceable
to any of the grounds in Article 19(2)
which lists the reasonable restrictions to
freedom of speech and expression. It has
directed the SBI to stop issuing electoral
bonds and it should submit details of
electoral bonds purchased from 12 April
2019 till date to ECI by 6 March 2024,
who, in turn, will publish them by 13
March 2024. When the SBI sought three
months’ time to submit the details, the
ADR filed a contempt petition. The Su-
preme Court in a firm rebuttal directed
SBI on 18 March to make complete dis-
closure of EB data in two days without
being selective. This has since been com-
plied with and several inconvenient truths
keep tumbling out. The distinguished
jurist Fali Nariman wrote in his eminent-
ly readable autobiography, Before Memo-
ry Fades: “Judiciary is like oxygen in the
air” (Nariman 2010). It is not enough
that the judges are independent of the
executive. They must have courage. M C
Setalvad, the first attorney general at
the inauguration of the Constitution, had
said: “Like all human institutions, the Su-
preme Court will earn reverence through
truth.” The EBS judgment has not only
realised that moment of truth and dem-
onstrated the courage of the judges but
also put on a firm footing the defining
elements of a free and fair election.
References
ADR (2022): “Non-transparent and Unaccountable
| Association for Democratic Reforms,” 19 Oc-
tober, https://adrindia.org/content/electoral-
bonds-non-transparent-and-unaccountable.
Bhardwaj, V (2020): “E-Bonds: Code Anonymous in
Indian Elections” (SSRN Scholarly Paper No
3959876), https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=-
3959876.
Bhat, M M A (2021): “Governing Democracy Out-
side the Law: India’s Election Commission and
the Challenge of Accountability,” Asian Journal
of Comparative Law, Vol 16, No S1, pp S85–S104,
https://doi.org/10.1017/asjcl.2021.30.
Dalrymple, W (2020): The Anarchy, Bloomsbury
Publishing.
D’Costa, O (2020): “Opacity, Democracy and Politi-
cal Funding—An Overview of the Indian Elec-
toral Bond System,” International Journal of
Law Management & Humanities, Vol 3, No 4,
pp 913–26.
Economic Times (2018): “New CEC Om Prakash
Rawat Defends Decision on 20 AAP MLAs of
Delhi,” 23 January, https://economictimes.in-
diatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/new-
cec-om-prakash-rawat-defends-decision-on-
20-aap-mlas-of-delhi/articleshow/62624480.
cms?from=mdr.
Gupta, I and T S Naulakha (2020): “Demystifying
the Electoral Bond Scheme Political Contribu-
tions and Quest for Transparency,” Internation-
al Journal of Law Management & Humanities,
Vol 3, No 4, pp 1375–1397–1414.
Hakim, S (2021): “MC Chagla Courageously Spoke
Truth to Power: Justice Riyaz Chagla Remem-
bers His Grandfather,” 28 August, https://
www.livelaw.in/news-updates/mc-chagla-
courageously-spoke-truth-to-power-was-am-
ply-displayed-by-him-justice-riyaz-chagla-re-
members-his-grandfather-180480.
Khaitan, T (2020): “Killing a Constitution with a
Thousand Cuts: Executive Aggrandizement
and Party-state Fusion in India,” Law & Ethics
of Human Rights, Vol 14, No 1, pp 49–95, https://
doi.org/10.1515/lehr-2020-2009.
Nariman, F S (2010): Before Memory Fades: An Auto-
biography, Hay House, Inc.
Singhal, D (2022): “How Electoral Bonds Open the
Door for Legalizing Corruption in India?”
Supremo Amicus, 28, pp [237]–[249].
Yadav, S (2021): “Electoral Reforms in India: An
Analysis,” International Journal of Law Manage-
ment & Humanities, Vol 4, No 4, pp 3024–33.
Yadi, M T M (2021): “SP Gupta & Ors Vs Union of
India,” Jus Corpus Law Journal, Vol 2, No 3,
pp 83–94.

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28 april 20, 2024 vol lix no 16 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
COMMENTARY
The Long and Short
of AI Regulation
Sayaji Hande, D T Shirke, O P Wali, Vineet Gupta
The exponential growth of
artificial intelligence is likely
to bring in many opportunities
and disruptions. Through
proactive policy changes by the
government, India could seize
these opportunities and avoid
large-scale disruptions.
Sayaji Hande (sayaji.hande@gmail.com)
teaches artificial intelligence and machine
learning at Shivaji University, Kolhapur, and
is an advisor to AI-based start-ups like Codvo
and I AM STILL ALIVE. D T Shirke (dtshirke@
gmail.com) is with the Shivaji University,
Kolhapur. O P Wali (opwali@iift.edu) teaches
at the Indian Institute of Foreign Trade, New
Delhi. Vineet Gupta (vineetgupta10@gmail.
com) is an artificial intelligence and machine
learning expert, currently working at Meta
(Facebook), London.
16
R
ecently, there was a hue and cry
to stop any further development
of artificial intelligence (AI) in the
West for at least a few months. Some scien-
tists and industrialists supported this
idea, while others opposed it. Prominent
industrialist and investor Elon Musk,
who partially funded the OpenAI plat-
form, ChatGPT, advocated for halting AI
research for six months. This is surpris-
ing, considering that Tesla fully utilises
AI. It was likely that some industry lobby
wanted to catch up in the AI race and not
be left behind while others may have to
upskill their processes and employees.
Arguably, while innovations can and
should be regulated via policies, they can-
not be stopped altogether. Innovations are
in general beneficial for humanity and its
advancements. As Albert Einstein suppos-
edly said:
Computers are incredibly fast, accurate and
stupid. Human Beings are incredibly slow,
inaccurate and brilliant. Together they are
powerful beyond imagination. (Sreechinth
2016; Hempell 2006; Honore 2010)
Fear of Technological
Advancements
Let us examine the scenario in India
alongside the global landscape. Recall the
time when computers first arrived; there
was significant opposition from labour
lobbies due to fears of job losses (Sætra
and Danaher 2023). Today, even a high-
school-dropout vegetable vendor uses a
smartphone more powerful than the
first computer that arrived in India. This
handheld device facilitates digital trans-
actions, record-keeping, communication,
and much more.
Jobs in areas such as accounting, dig-
ital medical records, social welfare
schemes, vaccination drives, and popula-
tion databases managed by governing
bodies have become easier and less pains-
taking. Despite the ongoing exponential
growth of technology, both then and
april 20, 2024
now, significant displacements in em-
ployment did not happen.
Then why is there so much fear now?
Technological growth and advancements
are exponential. In the past, the baseline
was lower. It took 40 years to go from
the first computer to smartphones for
the masses. Now, with a higher baseline,
the impact will be felt sooner.
Governance bodies need to ensure
policy formulations that minimise job
displacements, maximise opportunities,
and capture low-hanging fruits (Center
for AI Safety 2023). A case in point is the
aggregation model. Whether in e-com-
merce, cab companies, hotels, or online
insurance policies, to name a few, dis-
ruptions were felt. Middlepersons who
had active businesses had to shift to
different professions or become a part of
aggregation models.
Going by past experiences, the profes-
sions of individuals largely remained the
same, but the current fears are not un-
founded. In the 1970s and 1980s, the
population had time to get upskilled or
reskilled for the usage of new tools that
improved productivity drastically. But
exponential growth with a large base-
line is likely to impact faster; hence
quicker actions need to be taken, and if
all is done correctly, it will grow the pro-
ductivity and skills of individuals.
Hence, governance bodies need to form
policies that will reduce job disruptions
and enable individuals to leverage tech-
nology advancements to their advantage.
It is our argument that stopping techno-
logical development is not a solution.
Rather it will be detrimental to the pro-
gress of humanity’s past innovations.
We argue that AI has the potential to cre-
ate new jobs and improve the productiv-
ity of workers in all sectors and the over-
all living standard of the people.
It is essential for governments to for-
mulate policies that assist workers in
adapting to the evolving job market.
These policies should encompass upskill-
ing and reskilling programmes, along with
providing job placement assistance. Gov-
ernments should also allocate resources
for education and training programmes
that equip workers with the skills need-
ed to thrive in the age of AI. In addition
to government policies, businesses also
vol lix no 16 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

Table 1: Impact Areas of AI-driven Automation
Fixed Process-oriented Tasks
Real-time speech recognition, translation, and
communication in different formats
Health check-up reports and diagnoses
Financial processing and business analysis
Low-level software coding jobs
Drafting legal notices
Timetable/calendar creation for groups of people for
specific activities based on individual calendars
Manufacturing automation; farming automation
Drone delivery of medicines, groceries, etc
Source: Authors’ compilation.
have a role to play in helping workers
adapt to the changing job market. Busines-
ses should offer training programmes to
their employees and should create flexible
work arrangements that allow employees
to balance work and family responsibili-
ties, better known as work–life balance.
It is important to remember that AI is
not a threat to human workers. AI is a
tool that can be used to augment human
capabilities. When used correctly, AI can
help improve workers’ productivity and
create new values. Human talent, imagi-
nation, and intuition will not be replaced
by AI. These are the qualities that make
us unique and that will allow us to thrive
in the age of AI. By working together,
humans and AI can create a better future
for everyone.
AI-driven Job Displacement
In the context of job displacement fears
due to AI, it is crucial to identify the
categories of jobs most and least likely to
be affected.
The jobs most likely to be displaced by
AI are those characterised by repetition,
routine, and automatable processes. This
includes tasks such as answer-sheet evalu-
ation, health check-ups, and any execution
based on fixed predetermined processes.
Conversely, jobs least likely to be dis-
placed by AI are those that necessitate
creativity, problem-solving skills, and
social interaction. Occupations in the
creative arts, design, research, and devel-
opment, as well as those centred around
complex interpersonal communication,
are less susceptible to AI disruption.
Governments and businesses must coll-
aborate to assist workers who are suscep-
tible to AI-driven job displacement in their
Economic & Political Weekly EPW april 20, 2024
COMMENTARY
process-driven categories. For example,
Processes Based on Empirical Data we expect that a decade from now there
Medical treatment will be neither a doctor nor a lawyer
without an AI assistant.
Predictions of earthquakes, hurricanes, stock markets,
life-spans, etc Note that there are about 1 million
Insurance premiums based on individual as well as (or 2,800 per day) publications hap-
population data; expected monthly claims and cash- pening every day in the medical field
flow management
Fraud detection; facial recognition of terrorists
alone (Landhuis 2016). However, for an
experienced doctor, it is impossible to
handle and utilise so many new empiri-
cal discoveries.
The situation would be the same with
the huge amount of legislation as well as
similar cases that lawyers are likely to
upskilling and enable them for new op- refer to in arguments. Also, after hearing
portunities. Table 1 lists some of the are- the case, judges usually take a few days
as which are likely to be impacted by AI- to pass the verdict based on related judg-
driven automation. While some of these ments. This process could be expedited
await hardware and infrastructure deve- from three days to a few hours of itera-
lopment, given exponential growth, this tion with AI. This will be beneficial for
will happen sooner rather than later. countries like India where the pendency
of cases runs into as much as 20 years.
Implications of Government Einstein’s quote on humans and ma-
Policy Formulation chines making the world an excellent
We are of the view that most professions place needs to be our vision. And to
will see some degree of impact of AI address and execute this vision seam-
sooner than later. McKinsey & Company lessly, governments need to focus on the
(Manyika et al 2017) estimates that AI following: (i) stress on fundamental
could displace up to 30% (or one-third) education about AI and its applications;
of jobs, in all sectors where automation (ii) encourage AI experts from industries
is feasible by 2030. We concur that it will to contribute to the formulation of edu-
happen in all sectors starting with the cational content; (iii) reskill and upskill
Conference
City as the Southern Question
Application Deadline: 15 May 2024
Mahanirban Calcutta Research Group (CRG) invites applications for its Con-
ference themed “City as the Southern Question” to be held on 13-14 November
2024 in Kolkata, India, in collaboration with the Institute for Human Sciences
(IWM), Vienna.
The Conference aims to bring together contemporary scholarship on urban spac-
es and cities which are labyrinths of complex interactions of multiple interlocu-
tors. The Conference intends to look into contemporary cities through the lens of
Antonio Gramsci’s “City as the Southern Question” (1926).
For details on the Conference and the theme, please visit: http://www.mcrg.ac.in/
Apply at: https://forms.gle/MF5D5RJ2xS1oRkvi7 with an abstract (500-600
words) and a title.
Queries may be sent to forcedmigrationdesk@mcrg.ac.in with a
CC to debashree@mcrg.ac.in with the subject line ‘Annual Conference 2024.’
vol lix no 16 17
COMMENTARY
workers, where governments should sup-
port and incentivise businesses towards
reskilling and upskilling; (iv) focusing on
areas which will see an immediate im-
pact with minimal risk and tangible im-
pacts, followed by applications in more
nuanced areas; and (v) governments as
well as corporate bodies should plan to
enable their members to continue with
their lives with minimal impact in the
case of jobs reduction.
Additionally, AI also has the potential
to significantly impact global trade. Hence,
it is important to consider its policy im-
plications on trade too. Trade bodies,
platforms, and standards-making organi-
sations need to proactively factor in and
ensure that countries have consistent
regulations to facilitate cross-border
trade considering AI-driven innovative
designs, products, and services.
The context of AI presents a substantial
challenge to intellectual property (IP)
rights. Policymakers need to address IP
rights and protection concerning AI-gen-
erated content. Questions may arise re-
garding who owns the rights to content
generated by AI and how IP laws should
adapt to account for AI’s creative output.
Policymakers must determine which gen-
erative AI technologies should be regulated
and how to strike a balance between in-
novation, safeguarding IP and national
security. Some AI technologies, particu-
larly those with the potential for dual-
use applications (civilian and military),
can be subjected to export controls. For
instance, imagine a famous teacher has
uploaded thousands of their lectures on
YouTube. With this publicly available
data, multiple AI teachers can be created,
making the owner of the original con-
tent redundant.
Establishing appropriate data privacy
and protection policies is imperative in
the context of AI, as all AI models are
based on historical data. In the last few
decades, the world has seen massive
amounts of data being generated along-
side the development of innovative ap-
plications making good use of this data.
Generative AI often relies on such large
data sets to become smart. Policymakers
must consider regulations of data priva-
cy and protection and how they will im-
pact the flow of data across borders at
18
individual, company and country levels.
We have seen that countries are moving
fast to adjust policies for data-related
regulations like GDPR and CCPA, as more
data gets accumulated and processed.
Data localisation requirements could
also have trade implications.
Establishing liability rules for AI-gen-
erated products is also essential. Manu-
facturers and sellers of AI-generated
goods need to have clear responsibilities
in cases of product defects or harmful
impacts of AI. This will involve working
towards the development of internation-
al standards and certification processes
for AI systems, which can ensure inter-
operability and quality, facilitating seam-
less applications, and global trade in
AI products.
Policies need to preclude dominance
and monopoly. AI services are becoming
rapidly important in business and global
trade. Hence, policy also needs to ensure
that service providers comply with rele-
vant regulations and trade agreements
that facilitate the cross-border provisions
of AI services. The dominance of certain
AI companies in global markets may raise
concerns about competition. Strong com-
petition is a hallmark of a good market
and policymakers need to ensure that
policies are aligned to avoid dominance.
Trade policies should encourage ethical
use of AI and government policies must
ensure investments in education and
upskilling of workforce so that they are
equipped with the skills needed to work
with AI technologies.
Encouraging collaboration and infor-
mation-sharing between countries, in the
form of bilateral and multilateral agree-
ments, will also be crucial for addressing
global trade challenges related to AI.
Multilateral forums can be effective plat-
forms for discussing and harmonising AI-
based policies and governments need to
establish mechanisms for ensuring com-
pliance with AI-related trade regulations
and agreements. They should also set
norms to manage deviations.
Policymakers also need to engage
with various stakeholders, including in-
dustry experts, academia, and interna-
tional organisations, to develop a coher-
ent and effective policy framework that
promotes the responsible use of AI in
april 20, 2024
global trade while fostering innovation
and economic growth.
Recently, some companies have come
up with AI-driven “virtual girlfriend”
chatbots that talk to men, learn their likes
and dislikes, and chat with them. Soon,
they might come up with a 3D model.
This was never imagined to be a reality
and needs to be regulated since such
products could harm humanity. Com-
plexities of IP rights, liabilities, and ethical
issues will not get resolved automatical-
ly. They need to evolve proactively.
Key Opportunities
To harness the full potential of AI-based
technologies, governments should strate-
gically identify sectors plagued by signifi-
cant bottlenecks such as execution delays
and resource constraints. By doing so,
these sectors can benefit from AI imple-
mentation without adversely affecting
the existing workforce with job displace-
ments (Cave and Éigeartaigh 2019).
For instance, take the case of the Indi-
an judicial system, where there is con-
siderable scope to enhance efficiency
and expedite justice delivery. Training
an AI model on a data set of court ver-
dicts, which relies on various factors
such as presentations by opposing par-
ties, legislation, and precedents, could
significantly reduce the time taken by
the judges to draft verdicts—from three
to five days down to a fraction of that
time. This aligns with the vision ex-
pressed by the Chief Justice of India and
has the potential to boost the productiv-
ity of Indian courts by five times.
Addressing crime-related incidents is
another domain where AI can play a
pivotal role in enhancing public safety by
observing and notifying authorities of
any anomalous activities and behav-
iours. It also has the potential to address
bottlenecks of emergency phone num-
bers of public services like 100 (or 911 in
the United States [US]) for police.
In the healthcare sector, particularly
in a country like India facing a shortage
of doctors, AI can be a transformative
force. India has a shortage of doctors,
with 834 people per qualified doctor.
This is much higher than in the devel-
oped countries, such as the United King-
dom—3.2 doctors per 1,000 people and
vol lix no 16 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
 COMMENTARY

the US—2.6 doctors per 1,000 people. By
automating routine tasks such as sched-
uling, documenting, and managing pa-
tient records, AI allows doctors to focus
on more intricate responsibilities like di-
agnosis and treatment planning. AI can
also help doctors to make better deci-
sions by providing them with data-driven
insights. For example, AI can help doctors
identify patients who are at high risk of
developing certain diseases or who are
likely to respond well to certain treat-
ments. This not only increases doctor
productivity by five times but also helps
mitigate the impact of doctor migration
to developed countries, lured by higher
salaries and better working conditions.
By using AI to improve doctor produc-
tivity and decision-making, India can
improve the quality of healthcare for
all citizens.
Second, in the areas plagued by bot-
tlenecks, governments can enable AI in
areas wherein there is an opportunity
for cost reduction. For instance, there is
a significant opportunity to take advan-
tage of AI in drug discovery to substan-
tially reduce both the time and costs as-
sociated with the process. Governments
should establish policies to streamline
investments in scientific and data-driven
approaches while discouraging inefficient
and unnecessary practices.
Agriculture is another priority area
where AI can be employed to reduce risk
factors, costs and enhance productivity.
By employing AI solutions, governments
can optimise resource utilisation, improve
yield prediction, and provide farmers
with valuable insights into productivity.
These are just a few examples of how
governments can strategically employ AI
to address challenges and capitalise on
opportunities. Establishing committees
dedicated to addressing these issues and
tapping into these opportunities should
be a priority for governments looking to
harness the transformative power of AI
for societal benefits.
To conclude, the landscape of genera-
tive AI evolution presents a huge and
transformative opportunity for society
at large. Using the potential of this expo-
nentially growing field necessitates the
necessary support and facilitation, in-
cluding meticulous crafting of a compre-
hensive policy framework. By doing so,
we not only mitigate potential liabilities
but also unlock unprecedented opportu-
nities, fostering an environment of inno-
vation and progress. We need a policy
infrastructure which ensures a level
playing field, promoting fair competition
and equitable access to the benefits of
this big change. As we witness this evo-
lution and era of transformations defined
by generative technologies, the judicious
formulation of policies becomes the key
facilitator and moderator that helps us
leap into a future where the immense
possibilities of generative AI evolution
are realised responsibly and sustainably.
References
Cave, S and S S ÓhÉigeartaigh (2019): “Bridging
Near- and Long-term Concerns About AI,”
Nature Machine Intelligence, Vol 1, No 1, pp 5‒6.
Center for AI Safety (2023): “Statement on AI Risk:
AI Experts and Public Figures Express Their
Concern About AI Risk,” viewed on 30 May
2023, https://www.safe.ai/statement-on-ai-risk.
Hempell, T (2006): “Computers and Productivity:
How Firms Make a General Purpose Technology
Work,” Springer Science & Business Media, Vol 33.
Honore, C (2010): “In Praise of Slow: How a World-
wide Movement Is Challenging the Cult of
Speed,” United Kingdom, Orion.
Landhuis, Esther (2016): “How to Manage Research-
paper Deluge? Blogs, Colleagues and Social
Media Can All Help,” Nature, Vol 535.
Manyika, James et al (2017): “In an Era Marked by
Rapid Advances in Automation and Artificial
Intelligence, New Research Assesses the Jobs
Lost and Jobs Gained under Different Scenarios
through 2030,” McKinsey Global Institute Reports.
Sætra, H S and J Danaher (2023): “Resolving the
Battle of Short vs Long-term AI risks,” AI and
Ethics, pp 1‒6.
Sreechinth, C (2016): “Einstein Wisdom: Quotes
from an Extraordinary Brain,” CreateSpace
Independent Publishing Platform.

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Monthly Accounts of the Union Government
High frequency data sets in the form of Monthly Accounts of the Union Government prepared by the Controller General
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as given below:
● Total Receipts–broadly classified under Revenue Receipts (various components of Tax Revenue and Non-tax
Revenue) and Non-debt Capital Receipts (Recoveries of Loans and Advances, Disinvestment, etc).
● Total Expenditure–comprising Revenue and Capital Expenditures, and as per the erstwhile classification of Plan
and Non-plan Expenditures.
● Deficit Indicators–Primary Deficit, Revenue Deficit and Fiscal Deficit.
● Sources of Financing Deficit–External Financing and different sources of Domestic Financing, such as Market
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Economic & Political Weekly EPW april 20, 2024 vol lix no 16 19

Some Reflections on Pakistan’s
Elections and Its Long Crisis
T C A Raghavan
Developments in Pakistan as
constituting a “poly crisis”
seemed a fair description as
catastrophic floods, a tanking
economy, and a looming national
security nightmare with terrorist
attacks growing in frequency
and intensity, all happened more
or less together in 2022 amid
political conflict and intensified
civil–military frictions. Alongside
this deep domestic crisis was a
wider geopolitical change which
also propelled Pakistan into a
more unfamiliar zone.
T C A Raghavan (tcaraghavan@gmail.com) is a
former Indian High Commissioner to Pakistan.
Economic & Political Weekly EPW april 20, 2024
A
s the political and polemical dust
settles in Pakistan after a contro-
versial general election in Febru-
ary 2024, a most unlikely change has
crystallised almost as if political positions
in Pakistan have reversed themselves.
After the 2018 general election, Imran
Khan came to power, representing the
end of a process initiated and controlled
by the Pakistani military to unseat Nawaz
Sharif from his position as Prime Minis-
ter and then delegitimising him as a po-
litical player in Pakistan. Many referred
to this process as a “creeping coup”—it
involved covert backing to street pro-
tests led by Khan and judicial activism
that in the end left no alternative to Sha-
rif but to step down as Prime Minister.
His party thereafter had to concede
power to the Khan-led Pakistan Tehreek-
e-Insaf in the 2018 general election. To
cement the entire process, a lifetime ban
on politics was also pronounced on Sharif
by Pakistan’s Supreme Court.
At that time, analysis of the new gov-
ernment led by Khan was in terms of it
being a “hybrid,” implying that what
under wrote it was the military’s support
and guidance. Hybridity did suggest to
some a way forward, given Pakistan’s
long history of civil–military friction
and conflict. A Prime Minister who had
the confidence of the military and one in
whom the military establishment was
invested did appear to offer, howsoever
superficially, the best chances of a stable
government—a first step towards lever-
aging a political and societal consensus
on the problems confronting Pakistan.
A Controversial Election and
a Surprising Result
By the time 2021 came to a close, it was
evident that the hybrid experiment had
failed. Differences between Khan and the
army were out in the open. By April
2022, Khan was no longer Prime Minister
after having lost a vote of no confidence
vol lix no 16
COMMENTARY
in the National Assembly. More impor-
tantly, he had lost the confidence of the
military and this meant that some sig-
nificant elements of his party melted
away. Somewhat to everybody’s surprise,
the formation that replaced him was a
coalition of the Pakistan Muslim League
(Nawaz) (PML[N]) and the Pakistan Peo-
ple’s Party (PPP)—a surprise, because
these parties had a long history of fric-
tion with the military. The “Imran Khan
phenomena” had been seen by many as
the outcome of the assessment that the
military felt that it needed to have a par-
ty close to it in the mainstream political
space which would provide an alterna-
tive to the PML(N) and the PPP.
Over the course of the rest of 2022 and
in 2023, what also became clear was
that there would be a reversal of all the
steps taken against Sharif earlier, in-
cluding his legal debarment from politics
and his convictions on different charges
set aside. Given Sharif’s long history of
conflict with the military, including be-
ing overthrown in a straightforward
coup in 1999, many found this to be an
astonishing reversal of past policies,
which at the time, the military had
arrived at after much deliberation.
And yet, the main story emerging
from Pakistan now is not the reversal of
past policies nor even the reversal for
the better in Sharif’s political fortunes—
amazing though both stories are, and
how much they indicated things coming
full circle. The main item was, instead,
Khan’s defiance of the military’s efforts
to end his political career and the extent
to which he took this seriously. May 2023
marked some kind of a tipping point in
this regard and the attack on the Lahore
Corps Commander’s house by his sup-
porters showcases this. According to
military spokespersons, other iconic land-
marks of Pakistan’s defence establishment
came under attack, including markers
that exemplified military heroism and
sacrifice in past wars against India. The
details are known, although all facets of
these episodes are perhaps still not out
in the public domain.
Defiance and resistance to military
encroachment into the political sphere
are not new in Pakistan and have a long
history. In the 20th century, both Benazir
29
COMMENTARY
Bhutto and Sharif exhibited these quali-
ties at different points of time. Yet it
would be true to say that the intensity of
Khan’s polemic and the extent to which
his opposition energised his supporters
against the military had an unprece-
dented flavour to it. Perhaps, this arose
in part from the amplification that social
media now enables. The severe econom-
ic downturn and high inflation also con-
solidated opinion against the PML(N)–PPP
coalition government and the military
which was seen as its sponsor and initiator.
It is also the case that Khan drew to him-
self the younger Pakistani voters, espe-
cially those voting for the first time, and
this cohort forms a significant section of
the electorate. Yet whatever the reasons
and explanations that have come up, the
fact is that it is his posture of defiance
that catapulted Khan into a narrative orbit
that left his opponents and the military
in disarray and shock. The strong show-
ing of many of his supporters in the Feb-
ruary elections in which they contested
as independents reflects that process.
From the tangled chronology of the
period from Imran Khan’s disposition as
Prime Minister in April 2022 to the Feb-
ruary 2024 elections, two general points
can be extracted. First, it is clear that
“hybridity” in Pakistan in terms of a po-
litical party underwritten by the mili-
tary forming the government is inher-
ently weak as a policy approach. In re-
cent decades, conflicts between the Prime
Minister and the chief of army staff have
regularly occurred. Khan’s trajectory as
a chosen favourite of the military turn-
ing against his former sponsors is not
therefore unusual. Sharif’s career in the
1990s had followed more or less a simi-
lar path. Khan’s case does stand out be-
cause, in 2018, it was generally felt that
this was the military’s strongest attempt
to evolve a working hybrid system and
the general expectation then was that
this arrangement would be more dura-
ble than its predecessors. That it failed
so spectacularly underlines how endem-
ic the conflicts between the civil and po-
litical authority is, on the one hand and
the military establishment on the other.
Second, events of the past two years
again clearly demonstrate how significant
a political space a narrative opposing
30
the military occupies in Pakistan. This
space was dominated for a long
period of time by the politics of Sharif
and the PML(N) on the one hand, and
Bhutto and the PPP on the other. Since
2022, Khan has moved into this space
and reaped, in February 2023, the elec-
toral benefit of doing so. A latent, but
nevertheless strong, anti-military senti-
ment in Pakistan may well appear to be
a contradiction because of the evident
dominance that institution has, but it is
nevertheless also a reality in Pakistan.
On the other hand, it is also the case that
the confident prophecies about a break-
down in the army’s command structure,
given the inroads that Khan had made
into the officer cadres, have proven ex-
aggerated. The army’s chain of com-
mand was seemingly unaffected by the
political drama that played out in the
first half of 2023, although it is also true
that the army’s reputation has taken a
beating and its image is dented from the
different developments in the run-up to
the election and from the results that
finally emerged.
A Longer Crisis
While the tactical cut and thrust of Paki-
stan’s political conflicts and the theatre
associated with its civil–military contes-
tations naturally draw a great deal of
attention, it is useful to contextualise
the 2024 election and its aftermath in a
wider framework. Pakistan’s mounting
political crisis and civil–military con-
flict—a process whose beginning was
marked by the premature end to Khan’s
tenure as Prime Minister—coincided
with the use of the term “poly crisis” to
describe the situation in the country.
Developments in Pakistan as constitut-
ing a poly crisis seemed a fair description
as catastrophic floods, a tanking economy,
and a looming national security night-
mare with terrorist attacks growing in
frequency and intensity, all happened
more or less together in 2022 alongside
political conflicts and civil–military fric-
tions. In some analyses, these were only
the conjunctural factors or symptoms—
Pakistan faced a poly crisis on account
of a combination of deeper structural
factors and deficiencies: governance,
economic, demographic, political, and
april 20, 2024
security issues which in combination be-
came more difficult to address, leave
alone resolve. However one puts it, this
sense of a deep and comprehensive crisis
impacting Pakistan seems an accurate
depiction of its current domestic reality.
And yet this was not all, because
alongside this deep domestic crisis was a
wider geopolitical change which also
propelled Pakistan into an unfamiliar
zone. In August 2021, what was general-
ly agreed to be an objective of Pakistan’s
strategic policy in Afghanistan seemed
to have been achieved as the United
States (US)-constructed architecture of
governance collapsed in chaos and the
Taliban emerged once more as the gov-
ernment of Afghanistan. This had conse-
quences, perhaps none of which had been
fully anticipated at the time by Pakistan’s
security establishment or even its strate-
gic fraternity. Most significantly, the
new Taliban regime seemed less amena-
ble to Pakistan’s point of view than ex-
pected, and quite quickly this approach
even extended to issues vital to Paki-
stan’s core interests. Terrorist attacks by
the Tehrik-i-Taliban, Pakistan (TTP) increa-
sed dramatically—by November 2022, a
ceasefire earlier declared by the TTP was
called off. To many, this marked the re-
turn of an older nightmare—an insur-
gency in the Af–Pak border zone with
Afghanistan territory providing an easy
sanctuary. The frequency and intensity
of terrorist attacks seemed to recall the
2008–14 phase when Pakistan faced an
internal security crisis of formidable di-
mensions. The irony was, of course, that
this was happening with a changed situ-
ation in Afghanistan and with a Taliban-
dominated and controlled architecture,
which Pakistan had taken great risks to
help erect.
The downward slide in Af–Pak rela-
tions became even more evident by the
last quarter of 2023 when the Govern-
ment of Pakistan—then a caretaker ad-
ministration to oversee the period up to
the elections—ordered the expulsion of
all unregistered Afghan refugees in Paki-
stan. Alongside, Pakistan–Afghanistan
frictions on their “border” also accumu-
lated with sharp rhetoric from both
sides. A peak of some kind was reached
on 18 March, shortly after Pakistan’s new
vol lix no 16 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
 COMMENTARY

government was sworn in when Paki- and political dimensions, is a relief and join the government. The government
stan resorted to air strikes inside Afghani- is in contrast to an otherwise bleak re- will have the backing of the military, no
stan in response to a terrorist attack in gional situation. doubt, but it is a military somewhat dent-
North Waziristan, in which a number of Yet the China relationship, no matter ed in the image and perhaps even afflict-
Pakistan army officers and men were its many positives for Pakistan, cannot be ed by a greater measure of self-doubt
killed. This is not the first time that air a remedy either for its domestic dysfunc- about how directly it should be involved
strikes were resorted to by Pakistan— tions or its external fragilities. Pakistan’s in managing the country’s politics.
what was new, however, was that this neighbourhood is largely defined by Both these factors amplify the al-
action was acknowledged, and, along- these three countries and its domestic ready substantial threat posed by Khan;
side, the Taliban government was blamed polity and economy have always been he and his supporters are now ener-
directly for the TTP attacks. affected most by relationships within gised and feel vindicated by the election
This steep decline in Af–Pak relations this neighbourhood. The China relation- results. The fact that he is in jail and
also took place in a changed geopolitical ship now, just as the US relationship in therefore also a political martyr, adds to
context. For the first time in almost half the past, cannot override these funda- his profile and further enhances an al-
a century, there had been a rapid and mental parameters of its geopolitics. ready larger-than-life image. The gen-
radical slackening in interest in the eral sense today in Pakistan appears to
Af–Pak region in the US following its The New Government be of an Imran Khan biding his time;
withdrawal in disarray from Kabul in The economy and Afghanistan will head there is clearly a confrontation looming,
August 2021 with very little to show for its the list of the new government’s priori- although how it will time itself is more
longest-ever overseas military engage- ties and in both, the external and the in- difficult to predict. This is with an exter-
ment. The after-effects of the COVID-19 ternal merge imperceptibly. But perhaps nal environment that is also bleak. A
pandemic and the eruption of a war in its biggest preoccupations will be political. perennially troubled suboptimal rela-
Ukraine cemented this and expanded it The situation in Pakistan for the foresee- tionship with India and dramatic spikes
from the US to cover the whole of West- able future is going to be of a somewhat in tensions with Iran and Afghanistan
ern alliance. Pakistan suddenly found tentative, even internally divided, PML(N)- together imply a regional ecosystem
that far from being a strategic ally, it was led coalition government. The support of hardly conducive to domestic stability or
being left to shoulder its mounting prob- the PPP is crucial, but this support is one that will facilitate a sharp focus on
lems on its own. In the past, when the from “outside” as it has chosen not to the economy.
International Monetary Fund (IMF) sta-
bilisation packages had to be resorted
to, the US–Pak relationship was useful in
facilitating the process. This time, the
discussions with the IMF over 2022–23
were unusually prolonged and contest-
ed. Clearly, there were many factors
behind this, but one certainly was that
Pakistan was unable to leverage geopoli-
tics to secure economic concessions in
the manner it had done in the past.
During the caretaker government pe-
riod, there was further deterioration in
its regional situation on account of Iran–
Pakistan clashes of a new and unusual
intensity—in January 2024, Iran and
Pakistan engaged in drone and missile
strikes against each other. The divide
has been papered over relatively quickly
but the mutual strategic mistrust remains
and adds to Pakistan’s problems on its
western borders. Alongside a perennially
troubled India relationship, the downtrend
in relations with Iran and Afghanistan
means Pakistan’s regional environment
remains as suboptimal and troubled as its
domestic situation. The strong relationship
with China, with its military, economic,
Economic & Political Weekly EPW april 20, 2024 vol lix no 16 31
Changing Ecology of Indian Media
Ashok Pankaj
T
his short monograph on the Hindi
language press in India raises vital
questions about the role of media
in ensuring the constitutional rights of
freedom of expression and free formation
of public opinion that is crucial to the
making of an informed and enlightened
citizenry, and above all, a free and fair
functioning of democracy. It shows that
the increasingly vicious nexus between
media, business, and politics is clouding
the free and fair functioning of Indian
democracy. It also draws attention to the
elitist and socially exclusionary charac-
ter of the Indian media. An illustration
of the elitist character of the Indian
media is the fact that the English lan-
guage press commands much greater
respect and gets an easy audience of
those in power, compared to their ver-
nacular language counterparts. Similarly,
the exclusionary character of Indian me-
dia is demonstrated by the dominance
of upper castes in the substantive posi-
tions of owners, managers, and editors.
For example, a study of 315 editors
and other media persons in Delhi, con-
ducted by Anil Chamadia, Jitendra Kumar,
and Yogendra Yadav in 2006 shows that
85% of them were upper castes, of which
around 50% were Brahmin (Drèze and
Sen 2013: 222; Media Studies Group
2019). Another survey data of press per-
sonnel in Prayagraj shows the predomi-
nance of upper castes, mainly Brahmin
and Kayastha, among the office-bearers
and members of the Allahabad Press
Club and among the press reporters
(Drèze and Sen 2013: 220). Dalits and
women are meagrely represented in these
spaces, and those who are there often
find it difficult to rise to high positions.
‘National’ and ‘Regional’ Media
An important narrative on media in
India makes a distinction between the
English language press and its vernacular
counterparts. The former is considered
32
book reviewS
The Journey of Hindi Language Journalism in
India: From Raj to Swaraj and Beyond by Mrinal
Pande, Hyderabad: Orient Blackswan, 2022; pp 176, `1,195.
“national,” “progressive,” “cosmopolitan,”
and “international in outlook,” whereas
the latter is belittled as “regional,”
“parochial,” “conservative,” and “pro-
vincial in outlook.” This book shows that
such a distinction is not only counterfac-
tual, but also derogates the massive con-
tribution of the vernacular press to the
making of modern India.
The vernacular language press played
a vital role in propagating the message
of the national movement. Amrit Bazar
Patrika in Bengali, Kesari in Marathi,
Punjab Kesari in Punjabi, Navjeevan in
Gujarati, Quami Awaaz in Urdu, Pratap
in Hindi, among other vernacular dailies
were the torchbearers of India’s freedom
struggle. Apparently perturbed by their
nationalist tone and anti-colonial stand,
the British government, with a view to
crack down on nationalist newspapers
and periodicals, enacted the Vernacular
Press Act, 1878. The English language
press, however, was not considered se-
ditious towards the British colonial gov-
ernment and, hence, was kept out of the
purview of the Vernacular Press Act. In
the post-independence period, they
played a vital role in the sociopolitical
awakening of the Dalits and backward
classes and towards the consolidation of
Indian democracy. Yet, they are dis-
missed as “regional” and derogated as
“parochial” and “provincial.”
Against the narrative of being “na-
tional,” the English language press has
never been the media of the Indian
masses. Even in the 1950s, vernacular
dailies outnumbered their English coun-
terparts, both in numbers and circula-
tion. Out of 320 dailies in the early
1950s, only 41 (12.81%) were English; the
April 20, 2024
rest 279 (87.19%) were vernacular, of
which Hindi dailies (76) were the larg-
est, followed by Urdu (70), Marathi (26),
Kannada (25), Gujarati (23), Malayalam
(21), Tamil (12), Punjabi (9), Bengali (7),
Telugu (6), Oriya (3), and Assamese (1).
They outnumbered English dailies in cir-
culation as well. Against the total circu-
lation of 6,97,000 (27%) copies of English
dailies, vernacular language dailies sold
18,13,000 (73%) copies, of which the
Hindi dailies had the highest circulation
of 3,79,000 copies, followed by Bengali
(2,40,000), Urdu (2,13,000), Malayalam
(1,96,000), Marathi (1,19,000) and so
on (p 48).
In 2009, as per Round 1 of the
Indian Readership Survey (IRS 2009),
the top 10 highest circulating dailies were
vernacular ones. Times of India, the largest
circulating English daily, was only at the
11th rank (p 69). Further, as per Round 2
of the IRS (2008), against the 55.74 mil-
lion copies sold by the top-selling Hindi
daily, Dainik Jagaran, the top-selling
English daily, Times of India, could sell
only 13.34 million copies per day, about
one-fourth of the former. The other
three top-selling Hindi dailies were also
much ahead of the Times of India. Dainik
Bhasker sold 33.83 million copies per day,
Amar Ujala 29.38 million and Hindustan
26.63 million copies. Moreover, the cir-
culation of English dailies has been
mostly limited to urban areas and pre-
dominantly to the English-educated
population who, even today, constitute
only a small fraction of the total popula-
tion of India. Yet, English dailies are con-
sidered “national” and Hindi and other
vernacular language dailies as “regional.”
The categorisation of the English lan-
guage press as “national” and vernacu-
lar language press as “regional” privileges
the former over the latter. For example,
the English media has been privileged to
access important government sources,
press briefings, press conferences, and
summit-level meets of the heads of states
and governments, often to the exclusion
of Hindi and vernacular language jour-
nalists. The author of the book under
review, an eminent Hindi journalist,
narrates an incident of an important
vol lix no 16 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

press conference in Delhi in which “a
vernacular journalist had to risk being
called a ‘trouble maker’ and shout to be
noticed” (p 5). She recalls her days as
she entered the profession:
I joined a Hindi language news agency
around 1981, when no one of any public
standing—political leaders, bureaucrats, even
most revolutionary writers of tracts against
the Emergency in English—would waste
their time or attention on journalists from
some obscure Hindi news agency they had
never heard of. Even the agency journalist, I
discovered, had low self-esteem. (p 2)
Further,
The questions and answers in any important
government media exchange following ma-
jor international meets or the annual Union
Budget were nearly always between males
and in English. (p 5)
A lso,
The VIPs in Delhi would not meet or even
answer phone calls from a mere repre-
sentative from a Hindi news agency. But
they were readily available to our English-
language counterparts. Hindi journalists, I
was advised, should forget about cultivating
sources among the ranks of important bu-
reaucrats and corporates. (p 8)
Some of the Hindi dailies accessed
these briefings through their sister Eng-
lish dailies, for example, Hindi Hindustan
through Hindustan Times and Navbharat
Times through the Times of India.
Social Exclusion and
Business Ethics
The exclusionary character of Indian
media is another painful reality. Own-
ers, editors, and journalists invariably
come from upper castes. Women, Dalits,
and Muslims holding crucial positions in
the media is so rare that it can be counted
on one’s fingers. Moreover, their rise has
not been easy. The author narrates her
own ordeals: “a rare female, who defied
odds and rose to be editor, had to face
frequent confrontations with misogyny
and insubordination by her own senior
male staff” (p 5). Though in the last couple
of decades or so, women have made an
impact as anchors on television in a big
way, which reveals another layer of
deeply entrenched gendered worldviews.
She explains: “With no data to back it up,
the male reasoning was that ‘modern’
Indian viewers preferred young and
nubile female anchors as presenters of
Economic & Political Weekly EPW April 20, 2024
news on TV, preferably in Western attire”
(p 10). No wonder, “grey hair in men lent
in certain gravitas, but greying female
anchors must hang up their gloves”
(pp 10–11).
The ethics of media business has also
changed substantially since the 1990s.
Raising revenues and hobnobbing with
power have driven the editorial and
managerial policies of most of the media
houses lately. Under such circumstances,
the moot question posed by Mrinal Pande
is: “Can editorials continue to care for
individual rights and local cultures in
view of their proximity to political and
corporate lobbyists?” Editors have not
only lost their freedom to write inde-
pendent editorials, but the “phenome-
non of paid news” has badly dented the
credibility of the Indian media. It is not
surprising that in the global index of
free press, India stands at 161 out of 180
nations. More worrying is its slipping
position. It slipped from the position of
150th rank in 2022 to 162nd rank in
2023; an 11-point decline in one year
(Times of India 2023: 10).
Another associated development is
the subordination of professional editors
to owners and managers who have sta-
tioned themselves as executive editors, or
with some other suave but camouflaging
designations, side-by-side professional edi-
tors. It is not surprising that the big dailies
or weeklies are not able to attract and
retain editors of very high calibre, who
would stand by certain principles and
for independence of the media. Smart
and technology-savvy managers, who
can raise the revenue graph every quarter,
are in greater demand than editors of
high professional credibility.
The recent change in the media out-
reach policy of the Government of India,
implemented with effect from 1 August
2020 that, of course, favours vernacular
language media, is another disturbing
trend. The government has centralised
control over the advertisement revenue
of the media; government advertisement
forms an important source. Now, all
ministries and departments will hand over
80% of the funds meant for outreach
programmes to the Bureau of Outreach
and Communication of the Ministry of
Information and Broadcasting (MIB) in
vol lix no 16
BOOK REVIEW
the very first quarter of a financial year.
It means that 80% of all government ex-
penditure on outreach programmes will
be spent by the MIB. This does not augur
well for the media, as Pande has rightly
apprehended that it “will expect media
organizations to be ‘favourably disposed’
towards any requests from governmental
quarters” (p 153).
An Overview of the Book
The first two chapters of the book deal
with the evolution of Hindi language
and subsequently explain the rise of
Hindi language press and journalism.
Chapter 2 describes the growth of the
Hindi press in the post-Emergency period
and attributes it to (i) rising sociopolitical
awakenings of the backward classes,
(ii) growth in literacy rate, and (iii) demo-
graphic growth. Chapter 3 focuses on
the changing dynamics of the business
of the media in general and Hindi press
in particular, which expanded massively
in the 1990s. It shows that the growth
story of the Indian media since the 1990s
has been led not by the big media houses
but by vernacular language dailies like
Dainik Jagran and Dainik Bhaskar in the
Hindi belt. Chapter 4 peeps into the dark
underbelly of the media and gives an in-
sider view of its fault lines. It painfully
notes the phenomenon of the use of
“stingers” instead of regular professional
news reporters and “paid news” that
raises ethical questions about the profes-
sional credibility of the Indian media.
She writes,
In a nation with a large number of unem-
ployed or under-employed finding bright
and eager young people to do risky running
around without raising ethical questions is
not too difficult. But it often results in the
local politicians and markets getting pro-
motional stories, planted as news. (p 18)
Chapter 5 explains the impact of digi-
tal and social media on print media. It
shows that they have different markets.
They are not at a cut-throat competition.
Chapter 6 describes the growth of Hindi
newspapers and Chapter 7 describes the
new media ecology. Finally, there is a
short postscript on media after the COV-
ID-19 pandemic that explains the mas-
sive expansion of digital media and its
penetration into the rural hinterland
during the COVID-19 lockdowns.
33
BOOK REVIEW
Compulsions of Survival?
While this book maps the journey of
Hindi language press and devotes a whole
chapter to its origin and evolution, its main
focus is contemporary, that is, the chang-
ing media ecology, especially the nexus
between politics, media, and business. But,
a question of vital significance remains
unanswered, that is: Why is it that most
of the media houses, especially the new-
generation owners, have become obses-
sively revenue-driven, with the added
pursuit of access to political power? Is it
a market compulsion to survive? Or, is it
an abdication of the path trodden by
their fathers and forefathers, who were
also industrialists and capitalists but ran
their media business with different ethics?
While raising this question, one is
bound to reflect on the overall decline in
public life, and the functioning of various
institutions, including the legislature,
the executive and the judiciary. Has the
fire that lit the freedom struggle and then
propelled the task of nation-building in
the early decades after independence
34
been extinguished? Why is it that we
have not been able to create another
Indian Space Research Organisation,
another Indian Institute of Science, an-
other National School of Drama (NSD),
another troika of Sahitya, Sangeet and
Natak Akademies, or another Amul? Why
is it that the second generation of Indian
Institutes of Technology and Indian
Institutes of Management have not come
even to the level of the first generation?
On the occasion of the completion of 75
years of independence, officially being
celebrated with great fanfare as “Azadi
ka Amrit Mahotsav,” this question begs
an answer.
Given the changing ecology of media,
one would expect this book to have
discussed (i) the role of the regulatory
body, that is, the Press Council of India
(PCI); (ii) the working (service) condi-
tions of journalists; and (iii) the role of
various associations of media personnel,
though the author has discussed the
Indian Women’s Press Corps. In the
changed scenario, the role of the PCI has
April 20, 2024
become more vital and significant. The
working conditions of journalists is another
important aspect of the independent
functioning of the media. They are an
organic part of the media structure. Any
story of the media in India remains in-
complete without analysing the role of
these bodies. Nonetheless, this book is
a commendable work that draws our
attention to the multifaceted challenges
facing Indian media and democracy.
Ashok Pankaj (ashokkpankaj@gmail.com) is
with the Council for Social Development,
New Delhi.
References
Drèze, Jean and Amartya Sen (2013): An Uncertain
Glory, London: Allen Lane.
Media Studies Group (2019): “Social Profile of the
Key Decision-makers in the National Media in
2006,” Forward Press, https://www.forward-
press.in/2019/09/social-profile-of-the-key-de-
cision-makers-in-the-national-media-in-2006/.
Times of India (2023): “India Slips 11 Positions in
World Press Freedom Index; Media Associa-
tions Voice Concern,” https://timesofindia.in-
diatimes.com/india/india-slips-11-positions-on-
world-press-freedom-index-media-associations-
voice-concern/articleshow/99965816.cms.
vol lix no 16 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
BOOK REVIEW
Perspectives on Conflict
from the Margins
Meenakshi Bhagat
I
n Rethinking Conflict at the Margins:
Dalits and Borderland Hindus in
Jammu and Kashmir, Mohita Bhatia
explores and analyses the perspectives
of the marginal Hindu communities, the
Dalits, and the borderland residents
in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), on the
ways in which the conflict-based politics
shapes their lives. Borderland Hindus in
the book broadly refer to the Hindus who
live along the Line of Control (LOC)—
the bordered areas between India and
Pakistan. Bhatia has focused on one
such district called Rajouri in Jammu
region. The residents include people
from different communities like Muslims,
Hindus, Sikhs, Christians, the tribal popu-
lation of Gujjars and Bakarwals and so
on. The district has a majority of Muslim
34
Rethinking Conflict at the Margins: Dalits and
Borderland Hindus in Jammu and Kashmir by
Mohita Bhatia, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2020; pp xvi + 211, `850 (hardcover).
population. The author has focused the
attention on Hindus in this border area
as a marginal community who have
suffered due to the history of shared
borders and continue to be the victim of
cross-border firing and shelling. It high-
lights their daily negotiations, everyday
realities, and the politics of conflict.
It is an important addition to previous
prominent works of P S Verma (1987),
Balraj Puri (2008), Rekha Chowdhary
(2010) Ashish and Vijay Laxmi Saxena
(2013) and others on J&K and its manifold
issues especially pertaining to religion,
April 20, 2024
caste and region. It also adds to Yoginder
Sikand’s (2004) work on Dalits in J&K
and Amarnath Saraf’s (2007) study of
narratives of partition and its conse-
quences in Rajouri.
Unravelling Regional Complexities
Bhatia uses ethnographic method to
study the two villages, Kanhal in Jammu
and Danidhar in Rajouri district. The
introductory chapter presents a summary
of the book with the two main themes
of Scheduled Caste (SC) Hindus and
borderland Hindus as marginal voices.
Chapter 2 titled “Regional Diversities
and Conflict” gives an outline of the J&K
confl ict and the various regional diver-
sities in relation to it. An outline of
the geographical, cultural and political
composition of the state and the location
of the Kashmir confl ict within it is
explained. It examines the dominant
Hindu politics of Jammu, while also
foregrounding the sociocultural diversity
of this region. The political history of
the region is discussed along with the
sociocultural heterogeneities. The chapter
vol lix no 16 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

details the important aspects of subregions
in J&K.
Bhatia explains how the upper-caste
Dogra elite residing in the Hindu-domi-
nant districts of the state defined Jammu’s
political interest in antagonism to Kashmir
and its nationalist movement, and how
it is still indifferent to the political
interests of Hindus at the social, geo-
graphical, and political peripheries. He
adds that the
Dogras are only one among the various eth-
nic, linguistic and cultural groups in Jammu.
The non-Dogra communities possess their
own specific histories and culture that re-
main invisible in vocal representations of
Jammu. (p 35)
He draws from Bakhtin, Michel Fou-
cault, Judith Butler and Antonio Gramsci
to show the decoupling of agency from
the idea of absolute resistance to offer a
more complex understanding of resist-
ance that is not isolated from power
structures. Using Butler’s “no sovereign
subject,” the author argues that resist-
ance of the subordinated Hindu classes
is not an act but is rather a continuing
process that takes place in dialectic in-
teraction with the dominant discourse.
Lived Realities of Dalits in Jammu
In Chapter 3 titled “Caste, Everyday
Life and Conflict Politics,” the author
foregrounds the lived realities of the
marginalised community of the Dalits
who do not necessarily identify or
know about the word “Dalit.” They iden-
tify themselves broadly as SCs, specifi-
cally in terms of their local caste names.
The SC community is not marked by
radical forms of self-assertion but by
many ambiguous and subtle forms of re-
sistance. The chapter is divided into two
parts. The first part looks at the political
response of SCs as they closely associate
with the hegemonic conflict-oriented
discourse of Jammu. The second part,
derived from the fieldwork in two vil-
lages of Jammu—Kanhal and Danidhar—
throws light on the social response of
the SC community. This includes their
everyday forms of resistance.
The author suggests that the responses
of the SCs vary significantly in both these
realms besides both influencing and
blending with each other. For example,
Economic & Political Weekly EPW April 20, 2024
the SC population in the village supports
the mainstream politics of conflict, in-
cluding the nation and region as the
marks of strong identifications but there
are indirect and covert ways in which they
also show resistance towards the upper
castes and towards the conflict perspec-
tive. Their support to the Amarnath pil-
grimage as Hindus and as the residents
of Jammu was also an example where
they supported the agitation opposing
the Kashmir region and Kashmir Muslims
as religious others. On the other hand, the
experiences of the SC residents in Kanhal
and Danidhar, of feeling excluded in eve-
ryday religious gatherings, show their
resentment towards it. Similarly, in poli-
tics, the SC candidate supports the up-
per-caste leaders who are there to get
votes, but they also organise in small
ways at caste-level meetings or annual
gatherings where they talk about the
dominance of the upper castes.
It is a complicated and intervened
phenomenon where cooperation and
resistance go together. Regional identity
is important to the SCs and they do not
always identify with their caste identity
only. Religion usually remains in the
background and claims significance in
highly sensitive situations. Bhatia analy-
ses that dominant conflict-centric poli-
tics prevents tensions and resistances
operating at the social level from surfac-
ing at the political level. She brings out
the multiple identities and marginalities
of the SCs in Kanhal and Danidhar. These
different identities and marginalities are
context-dependent. For example, politi-
cal parties field the SC candidate as a
face in electoral politics and, in turn, a
small section of the community gets rep-
resentation. This kind of association
with politics has led them to manifest a
diversified and ambivalent response rather
than simply prioritising their caste-
based concerns.
Using Bakhtin’s concept of dialogism,
the author states that both the power-
ful and the marginalised influence each
other, and the structure sustains not
only because of the dominance of the
powerful and dominant but also due to
the one’s who are dominated. Lack of
political leadership, less active middle
class, and lesser severity of the oppression
vol lix no 16
BOOK REVIEW
have together restricted the rise of a
strong revolutionary Dalit force in
Jammu. Besides the small prosperous
class among the Dalits, having mutually
benefited from the political parties,
they still feel the ambiguity of this rela-
tionship and bias, which is practised
by the political parties towards them.
Resistance is still prevalent in such situ-
ations and is shown by the solidarity of
all the SC castes uniting on some occa-
sions and making their own groups at
the political level.
The second section deals with the
lived realities and experiences of the SC
communities in Kanhal and Danidhar.
The narratives of people in the villages
show how oppression still prevails and
how they experience discrimination
from the dominant communities in the
villages. The alternate religious space
created by various sub-castes within the
SCs serves as a form of resistance while
still retaining their Hindu identity. Despite
strongly criticising the oppressive caste
system, SC s expressed vulnerability
and also assumed partially conformist
positions in relation to the dominant
upper caste. Drawing from Butler’s views
on subjectivity, Bhatia suggests that the
condition of being subjected to certain
norms or authorities encompasses both
a sense of being a subject or participant
and being subjugated or oppressed.
This duality characterises the experi-
ence of SCs, who are influenced by the
dominant discourse of “Jammu versus
Kashmir” in their daily political interac-
tions. However, their engagement with
normative politics does not necessarily
eliminate the potential for critical ex-
amination and moments of detachment
from these norms (p 53).
Fluid Realities and Divergent
Perspectives
Chapter 4 titled “Border Realities Con-
testing Hegemonic Paradigms of Nation-
alism and Conflict” examines the conflicts
through the experiences of individuals
residing along the LOC in Rajouri dis-
trict of Jammu. The author throws light
on the historicity of partition and the
borders resulting in a huge number of
lost lives, displacements and trauma. The
chapter also questions the limitedness of
35
BOOK REVIEW
the bordered regions. It points to the
relevance of borders as interesting sites
of study where, on the one hand, cultural,
community and territorial boundaries
collapse to form broader liminal “in-be-
tween” identities and, on the other, the
intensity of the confl ict may engage
people to reproduce such boundaries.
It is in this context that the relation-
ship of Hindus is explored not only vis-à-
vis the national mainstream but also
in relation to the mainstream politics of
Jammu. Through ethnographic inter-
views, the fluidity of the perspectives of
the people living on the borders is
explained. The people in the border
area of Rajouri do not have a very strict
sense of border as they have or had
relations across the borders, which is a
very diverging view from the dominant
Kashmir conflict-based perspective.
Apart from Kashmir’s dominant conflict
discourse, the region’s politics has been
shaped by the partition, wars, multiple
displacements, divided families and
massive securitisation.
Dismantling Religious Homogeneity
In Chapter 5 titled “Contesting the
Homogenised Discourse of Religious
Identities,” the Jammu Hindu identity
as the dominant religious affiliation is
questioned. Through the analysis of
caste and border dynamics, an attempt
has been made to highlight the differ-
ences, contradictions and contestations
within the Hindu identity and problem-
atise the notion of its cohesive exist-
ence. The everyday lives of people are not
regulated by religious identity. The chap-
ter gives an account of the role of reli-
gion in the everyday lives of people and
in highly politicised situations.
In everyday life, religion gets tran-
scended beyond compartmentalisation
and is a more complex phenomenon.
Both Muslims and Hindus come together
in events such as weddings, and partici-
pate in the rituals of local shrines or
temples. The diverse and complex demo-
graphics of Jammu, including linguistic,
cultural, tribal, and caste variations plus
internal differentiation within each re-
ligious group, therefore, make it inaccu-
rate to simplify its portrayal as solely
“Hindu–Muslim.”
36
The author points out that even in
situations when religion gets compart-
mentalised into Hindu and Muslim,
there are individuals and communities
who have a different standpoint other than
the dominant discourse. The Amarnath
shrine land allocation agitation in 2008
brings out those divergent responses
among the Hindus on the issue. Some
other factors which influence everyday
lives and highly politicised situations are
caste, class, region, subregion, lan-
guage, tribal status, shared history of
partition, ghettoisation of a religious
community and so on. Many such factors
alter the idea of the “self” and the “other”
for other individuals and groups.
Political Transformations
The concluding chapter comments in
detail on recent political developments
like the rise of the BJP in the national
and assembly elections of 2014 and the
resulting impact on the J&K region.
In the case of Jammu, Bhatia notes that
the dominant discourse puts more em-
phasis on the support of the nationalist
sentiment and pro-Hindu orientation,
which was a muted component of Jam-
mu politics earlier (p 163). The book
argues that the region, not the religion,
plays a more important role for the people
in Jammu.
The SCs and borderland residents
support the conflict discourse but there
are many points of tensions and de-
tachments. The author has supported
this argument on the grounds of vari-
ous instances through narratives like
the support for Indian identity, yet
yearning for porous borders. This would
allow people to have relations across
the border with their loved ones. The
author further suggests shifting Jammu
from its position of marginality to the
centre stage and understanding the
intra-state level of political complexity
marked by political divergence, contes-
tations and assertions could help resolve
the conflict situation of the state.
An Evolving Sociopolitical
Landscape
The book draws on research conducted
before the abrogation of Article 370 from
the state. There has been a significant
April 20, 2024
change in the political demography of
the region as Ladakh has been made a
separate union territory and J&K remains
a separate territory ruled by the union
government. The political understanding
of the region might be different owing to
the loss of autonomy and statehood. But
the sociocultural aspects and perspectives
of Jammu region could have changed or
not is a question to explore.
This work is very relevant in terms of
filling the vast gap that exists in the
studies of J&K focusing mostly on the
Kashmir-based conflict discourse. The
importance of the book can also be seen
in the context of bringing a detailed and
nuanced study of caste, region and reli-
gion over a long period of time to pre-
sent an alternative position. The study is
also a useful addition to the existing
literature on the subaltern and periph-
eral communities in India.
Meenakshi Bhagat (204083014@iitb.ac.in) is
a doctoral candidate at the Humanities and
Social Sciences Department, Indian Institute of
Technology Bombay, Mumbai.
References
Chowdhary, Rekha (2010): “Identity Politics and
Regional Polarisation in J&K,” Economic &
Political Weekly, Vol 45, No 19, pp 15–20.
Puri, Balraj (2008): “Jammu and Kashmir: The
Issue of Regional Autonomy,” Economic &
Political Weekly, Vol 43, No 34, pp 8–11.
Saraf, A N (2007): “Rajouri Remembered,” trans-
lated by Babli Moitra Saraf, CC-0, Kashmir
Research Institute, digitalized by e-Gangotri,
https://archive.org/details/book-v-45-rajouri-
remembered-amar-nath-saraf/mode/2up.
Saxena, Ashish and Vijaylaxmi Saxena (2013):
“Religious Landscape, Low Caste Hindus and
the Identity Politics: Configuration of Socio-
Religious Space for Weaker Sections in Jammu
City, J&K (India),” Politics and Religion, Vol 7,
No 1, pp 93–111.
Sikand, Yoginder (2004): “Dalits in Jammu:
Demanding to Be Heard,” http://www.coun-
tercurrents.org/dalit-sikand101104.htm.
Verma, P S (1987): “Jammu and Kashmir Politics:
Religion, Region and Personality Symbiosis,”
Indian Journal of Political Science, Vol 48,
No 4, pp 561–74, http://www.jstor.org/sta-
ble/41855339.
available at
Siddhivinayak Enterprises
B-006, Antop Hill Warehousing
Wadala East
Mumbai 400 037
vol lix no 16 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
PERSPECTIVES
Demographic Dividends
and Challenges
Socio-religious Disparities in India’s
Youthful Workforce
Abusaleh Shariff, Asrar Alam
India, with its vibrant youth
population, holds the potential
for significant national and global
contribution, provided these
young individuals receive proper
education, skills, and meaningful
employment. However, there is
a concern that the country might
miss the chance to fully benefit
from its demographic transition.
This article acknowledging the
country’s diverse workforce delves
into the demographic landscape
among the socio-religious
communities. Despite being
the youngest, Muslims and
the historically marginalised
Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes face lower
workforce representation.
Abusaleh Shariff (ashariff@usindiapolicy.org)
is with the US-India Policy Institute,
Washington, DC. Asrar Alam (asraralam.eco@
gmail.com) is with the National Council of
Applied Economic Research, New Delhi.
Economic & Political Weekly EPW APRIL 20, 2024
I
ndia since its independence and
more so from the 1990s has concur-
rently with economic development
made improvements in quality-of-life
indicators such as literacy, education,
health, associated skills, employment,
and higher incomes. Thus, there has been
a significant reduction in levels of multi-
dimensional poverty (UNDP India 2018).
This article assesses differentials in the
outcome indicators of human develop-
ment according to socio-religious com-
munities across the country, especially
for Scheduled Castes (SCs), Scheduled
Tribes (STs) and the Muslims who are em-
pirically found to be deprived and margin-
alised. The recent assessment suggests that
these communities lag in several human
development indicators, yet targeted im-
provements will enhance and speed up
their social and economic development.
Historically, in India, there have been
high levels of differentials in socio-eco-
nomic outcomes due to caste, religion
and geographic factors that are deep-
rooted and complex. Such differentials
must be measured and understood
through empirical and evidence-based
policy research (Sachar Commission
Report 2006) and generate real-time
policy influence to ensure equity, sus-
tainability and peace in society.
Since 1970, India has experienced a
decline in poverty levels. However, it ac-
celerated after 1991 and also, concur-
rently, led to an increase in inequality.
From 2004–05 to 2011–12, the country
experienced a high growth in gross do-
mestic product (GDP), along with a sig-
nificant decline in estimated poverty.
The official overall poverty rate decreased
from 37.2% to 21.9% during the same
vol lix no 16
period (Planning Commission 2013).
Such a drop in the poverty rate is often
considered an achievement and cele-
brated widely. While the decline took
place at the macro level, the poverty was
concentrated among some specified
groups. Despite several targeted policy
actions against poverty reduction by the
union governments, some socio-religious
groups remain traditionally trapped un-
der the disadvantaged categories, which
deserves analytical and policy attention.
Demographic Dividend
India’s accelerated economic develop-
ment in future will largely depend upon
the value added by the youthful labour
force, and this is termed the “demo-
graphic dividend (DD).” The dividend
gets generated only if appropriate human
development investments are made to
enhance the per capita value added of
the individual labourer. Given an oppor-
tunity, a larger share of the working
population (15–64 years), as compared
to its non-working population, has the
potential for greater economic achieve-
ment. Yet having a favourable demo-
graphic age structure does not necessarily
guarantee an economic boost for a coun-
try, and historically there are possibili-
ties of missing this opportunity (UNFPA
2016). To achieve a demographic divi-
dend, strategic investment in the areas
of human development and creating
economic opportunities is necessary.
A “dividend” is lost if a country’s young
population is not educated, healthy and
properly skilled. Investing in the youth
leads to a long-term understanding of
the sustainability of the labour force and
economy. The demographic dividend
does not happen on its own (often
known as the trickle-down effect), rath-
er a well-planned investment strategy is
a precondition to tap the potential of its
youth. The Economic Survey 2016–17 had
forecasted that India was likely to ex-
perience a peak in the demographic
dividend in the early 2020s. In a scenar-
io where the world is ageing and the
young Indian population is on the rise, a
question arises whether the country is
ready to reap the benefits. Is the young
37
PERSPECTIVES
population equipped with the required
education, health, skills and employment
that are essential to generate the demo-
graphic dividends? According to the Inter-
national Monetary Fund’s senior econo-
mist, John Bluedorn, there are new re-
ports about the redundancy of the youth
labour in India (PTI 2019) and increasing
unemployment rates seem to touch lev-
els hitherto not seen post-independence.
The marginalised communities to-
gether constitute over 40% of the total
labour force. Ensuring their basic enti-
tlements and also enhancing them are
not only necessary but also essential to
boost the national GDP through demo-
graphic dividends. Further, since the
value-added gain (internal rate of return)
is relatively high at the level of mass ed-
ucation and skill formation, it will be
economic prudence for the national and
state governments to invest in educa-
tion, skill formation, and the creation of
quality social infrastructure. Such pub-
lic policies will also generate accelerat-
ing effects to ensure improvement in
economic equity and national welfare.
This article empirically reviews select
outcome indicators of human develop-
ment amongst the youth population of
India. The differentials in these indica-
tors according to socio-religious commu-
nities are also estimated and analysed.
While employment and wages are essen-
tial indicators to measure demographic
dividends, one of the objectives of this
article is to encourage debate and re-
search in a unique area of understanding
differentials according to socio-religious
communities (SRCs).
Methods and Material-data
and Analysis
Several relevant socio-economic and de-
velopmental parameters are estimated
using the PLFS 2022–23 and National
Sample Survey (NSS) 68th round (2011–12)
data on the youth and working age pop-
ulation of India. Some socio-religious
groups remain traditionally trapped un-
der low value-added sectors of the econ-
omy. They are disadvantaged essentially
due to the youth being unable to parti-
cipate in the nation’s developmental
opportunities. This article examines
the demographic parameters according
38
to socio-religious groups so that target-
ed policies can be initiated to harness
the untapped potential of the large
young population.
Socio-religious Communities
of India
Research and analysis based on caste
and religion is not very popular in India,
except the focus on the estimates for the
SCs and STs. However, the analysis in
this article is based on the SRC categori-
sation as used by the former Prime Min-
ister’s high-level committee also known
as the Sachar Committee (Sachar Com-
mission Report 2006).
The census data are essential for na-
tional- and state-level planning. In India,
they are conducted a decade apart, dur-
ing the first year of the decade. The lat-
est census was conducted during 2011
and population counts for the SCs and
STs became available quickly but usable
data according to religion became avail-
able only recently. Often bureaucratic-
level decisions appear discriminatory and
politically motivated. It would be fair to
say that it is not a technical issue that the
census has not been able to count the
population according to religion but
only that the data was withheld from
public scrutiny for long.
According to the Census of India (2011),
just about 235 million or 20% of all the
population were categorised as a reli-
gious minority. The respective shares of
population according to religion are:
Hindus 79.8%, Muslims 14.2%, Christians
2.3%, Sikhs 1.7%, Buddhists 0.7%, Jains
0.4% and other religions 0.7%. Muslims
constitute the largest socio-religious mi-
nority with a 70% share of the minorities.
The geographic spread of the Muslims is
vast across the country, while they are
numerically and proportionately small ex-
cept in Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Goa and Assam.
Although the census is a credible
source of demographic data, the unit-
level records (individual- and household-
level data) are not available for academic
purposes and are not conducive for tech-
nical analysis, especially in creating
Table 1: Distributions of Socio-religious Communities in India
States Hindu-SCs/STs Hindu-OBCs Hindu-General
All India 26.1 36.3
Source: Authors’ calculations using Periodic Labour Force Survey (PLFS) (2021–22 and 2022–23) data.
meaningful SRC categorisations. Alter-
natively, there are annual (also quin-
quennial large) surveys known as “na-
tional sample surveys” which provide
unit-level records, facilitating SRC-wise
technical analysis.
Since 2017, the Periodic Labour Force
Survey (PLFS) has taken over the role of
the National Sample Survey Office (NSSO)
employment and unemployment survey,
becoming the government’s primary
tool for monitoring employment and re-
lated statistics. Six PLFSs have been con-
ducted since 2017, with the latest being
PLFS 2022–23. These surveys are instru-
mental not only in tracking employment
trends but also in providing insights into
population distribution based on reli-
gion and SRC categories. The analysis
presented here relies heavily on the data
from PLFS, specifically from the 2022–23
round. The average SRC distribution for
all of India based on PLFS 2021–22 and
2022–23 survey rounds are presented
(Table 1).
It illustrates the distribution of SRCs in
India, across different states. The per-
centages represent the composition of
various communities in the overall pop-
ulation. As per data, Hindu SCs and STs
make up 26.1%, while Hindu Other Back-
ward Classes (OBCs) constitute 36.3%. The
general category among Hindus repre-
sents 17.7% and Muslims collectively ac-
count for 15.1%. Christians and Sikhs
make up around 2.3% and 1.5% of the
total population respectively.
Human Development Issues
The demographic distributions: The
article does a comparative evaluation of
the youth and associated human and
economic development parameters in
SRCs. India has the advantage of a rela-
tively higher young and youth population
and this “young India” is both a national
and international resource that should
be harnessed for demographic dividends.
This is possible only when youth and
young are adequately educated, skilled
and occupied in gainful employment.
(%)
Muslims-All Christians Sikhs Other Minorities Total
17.7 15.1 2.3 1.5 0.9 100.0
APRIL 20, 2024 vol lix no 16 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
 PERSPECTIVES
Table 2: Mean Age (in Years) among in the Indian labour market in coming dec- On the other hand, the proportions are
Different SRCs
ades as compared to other socio-religious lower than the national average among
Social Group Male Female Total
SCs and STs 29 29 29
groups who are turning older. Table 3(b) Muslims which reflect a higher unem-
OBCs 31 32 31 presents these data according to gender ployment rate during the recent years.
Muslims 23 26 25 and the shares are meaningful when com- These are basic proportions and are not
All others 34 36 35 pared to the respective SRC shares in the disaggregated by sex and education,
Total 30 31 30 total population (Table 1). The relative which is not the focus of this article.
Source: Authors’ calculations using Periodic Labour Force youthful advantage for Muslims is seen However, most of the lower labour par-
Survey (PLFS) 2022–23 data.
amongst both men and women. It is in- ticipation among Muslims has emerged
The mean age of the population re- structive to note that public policy focus from the abysmally lower participation
flects the possible higher value added, on the Muslim community in providing rates from the women in the community
supporting the fast pace of economic basic education and skills will boost the (Table 5). As a matter of public policy, it is
growth, through the youthfulness of acquisitions from demographic dividends essential to ensure higher school and col-
specified SRC. Sixty-six percent of India’s for decades to come. lege enrollments as well as skill develop-
population falls under the age bracket of ment, especially for women.
15 to 64 years, which is unique com- Primary workers: Primary workers
pared to the developed world. The aver- highlight the gainfully employed popula- Education profile of the youth: The im-
age mean age is 30 years, a little low for tion in the economy having a regular portance of mass education and higher
men (Table 2), who are the dominant source of income on a regular basis as levels of technical literacy cannot be
source of most of the labour force in In- salaried, or from business income or daily overemphasised, especially when India
dia. The Muslims are the youngest with wage earnings. is amid profound economic reforms
25 as the average mean age, compared The study reported the status of 53% which are redefining the way Indians
with “all others,” giving them an advan- of the youth and 62% in the age group of live, think, behave and excel within the
tage. Mostly, the high caste Hindus aver- 15–64 years as primary workers. These comity of globalising nations. Literacy,
age 35 years. The SCs and STs are the sec- numbers are on the lower side due to insig- vocational and technical training, and
ond youngest group followed by OBCs. nificant overall female work participation higher education are drivers of social and
This difference suggests that the Muslims across India. Yet one notices a relatively economic development, and they form
in India have a high proportion of the higher reporting of primary workers the very foundation of livelihood and
youth population and their future con- among the youths of SCs and STs (Table 4). lifestyle in the growing and developing
tribution to the Indian economy will not India. A large body of research establish-
Table 3(a): National Composition of Child, Youth
only be large but essential. While the all- and Total Working Group among SRCs (%) es the wide-ranging social and economic
India mean age for men is 30 years and Social Groups Child Youth All Working Ages benefits of literacy and education that
(0–14 Years) (15–29 Years) (15–64 Years)
31 years for women, for Muslims the re- accrue to individuals, households, and
SCs and STs 27.6 27.0 67.1
spective means are 23 years and 26 years. OBCs 24.7 25.9 68.4
the larger society (Caldwell 1976; Bird-
While the mean age differentials are Muslims 37.5 26.2 59.4 sall 2001; Schultz 1988). The benefits of
due to relatively higher fertility among All others 19.4 23.9 70.6 expanding literacy and educational op-
the Muslims, it is also declining faster Total 27 26 67 portunities for girls and women through
during the last several decades and the Source: Same as Table 2. an increase in the market (money in-
contraceptive practice is also increasing come) and non-market (gains in human
Table 3(b): National Gender Composition of
(Shariff 1995). The trend suggests that Youth and Total Working Group among SRCs (%) development) returns are also well-
the mean-age differentials are narrow- Social Group Youth (15–29 Years) Working Age (15–64 Years) established (Psacharopoulos 1994).
Male Female Male Female
ing and they will be much less in a cou- Social group differences in enrolment
SCs and STs 50.5 49.5 50.2 49.8
ple of decades. Further, the low mean are striking (Sachar Commission Report
OBCs 51.9 48.1 50.3 49.7
age advantage for India will diminish in Muslims 49.6 50.4 49.7 50.3
2006). The SCs, STs and Muslim children
about two to three decades. All others 53.0 47.0 50.5 49.5 are far less likely to enrol in school and
Total 51.3 48.7 50.2 49.8 are slightly more likely to drop out than
The youth in workforce: It is clearly no- Source: Same as Table 2.
ticeable that the child population among Table 5: Composition of Workers among
Table 4: Composition of Primary Workers Out of Different Age Categories by SRCs and
Muslims are considerably high compared Population (%) Not in Education among Different Gender in India (%)
with the OBCs as well as all-other catego- Age Categories by SRCs, All India Social Group Youth (15–29 Years) Working Age (15–64 Years)
Social Groups Youth (15–29) Working Age (15–64 Years) Male Female Male Female
ries. Their share among the youth is also
SCs and STs 55.8 66.6 SCs and STs 75.1 24.9 68.5 31.5
high at 26% on an average higher than OBCs 77.6 22.4 70.3 29.7
OBCs 52.6 63.7
other SRCs (Table 3a). A 37.5% share of the Muslims 48.5 53.2 Muslims 90.9 9.1 86.6 13.4
child population among Muslims points All others 52.8 59.7 All others 77.4 22.6 74.4 25.6
to the higher youth population in the Total 52.8 62.0 Total 79.3 20.7 72.8 27.2
near future, implying their importance Source: Same as Table 2. Source: Same as Table 2.

Economic & Political Weekly EPW APRIL 20, 2024 vol lix no 16 39
PERSPECTIVES
others. Muslim children are as disadvan-
taged as Dalit and Adivasi children, al-
though little attention has been paid to
religious background as a source of edu-
cational disadvantage. There is a wide
divergence in the three R’s (reading,
writing, and arithmetic) by social and
religious background with children from
marginalised communities falling behind.
Not surprisingly, this educational defi-
ciency is then reflected in the lower ac-
cess to salaried jobs among these com-
munities (Desai et al 2010).
The education profile of the youth
population shows substantial differences
among socio-religious groups (Table 6).
Notably, over 60% of the Muslim popu-
lation has education levels below sec-
ondary, emphasising a significant educa-
tional disparity. Additionally, only 6.5%
of Muslims have achieved above higher
secondary education. In contrast, the “All
Others” category exhibits a more evenly
distributed education profile, with 27.9%
having attained education above the
higher secondary level. This glaring con-
trast underscores the need for targeted
interventions to address educational gaps
and promote inclusive access to higher
education for Muslim youth.
Furthermore, educating Muslim youth
is crucial not only for the current gener-
ation but also for the future, given the
demographic significance of the Muslim
population. The repercussions extend
beyond the immediate generation, as the
high percentage of children in Muslim
families implies a possible continuation
of limited educational opportunities if
not addressed. Similarly, SCs and STs
Table 6: Educational Profile of Youth (15–29 Years) by Socio-religious Groups
Social Group Illiterate Below Secondary
SCs and STs 6.7 44.4
OBCs 3.8 31.5
Muslims 6.4 56.1
All others 1.6 21.5
Total 4.7 37.9
Source: Same as Table 2.
Table 7: Sector-wise Distribution of Youth Workers according to SRCs
Social Group Agriculture and Allied
SCs and STs 37.5
OBCs 40.2
Muslims 7.9
All others 14.3
Total 100.0
Source: Authors’ calculations using NSS 68th round (2011–12) Employment and Unemployment data.
40
grapple with comparable issues, with
over 50% having education below the
secondary level and only 10.8% attain-
ing education above the higher second-
ary level. Insufficient education poses a
barrier to upward social and economic
mobility, leading to a continuous cycle of
disadvantage. These cycles not only af-
fect the current workforce but also have
the potential to influence the opportuni-
ties accessible to future generations.
Youth and sectors of economy: The
strongest evidence of inequity and dep-
rivation emerges from the distribution
of workers according to various sectors
of the economy. For the present analysis,
the Indian economy is divided into three
standard groups: agricultural or (prima-
ry), industry and manufacturing (sec-
ondary) and services or (tertiary) sectors.
The study further subdivides the servic-
es sector into traditional (small business,
retail and so on) and modern. The latter
encompasses employment in informa-
tion technology, transport and tourism,
medical and financial services. The
modern services sector produced rela-
tively high per capita value added thus
generating better demographic dividends.
Modern services are the coveted em-
ployment sector in India. The OBC par-
ticipation in modern services is propor-
tionate to their share in the total labour
force. The SCs, STs and Muslims are highly
under-represented at only 23.7% and
8.7% respectively, while their share in
the labour force is 31.7% and 14.1% respec-
tively (Table 7). The representation of
the “high caste Hindus,” on the other
Secondary Higher Secondary Above Higher Secondary
19.4 18.7 10.8
21.4 24.4 18.9
18.1 12.8 6.5
21.2 27.8 27.9
20.2 21.3 15.9
Industry Traditional Services Modern Services
31.7 20.7 23.7
30.7 33.9 36.4
21.6 21.6 8.7
15.9 23.8 31.2
100.0 100.0 100.0
hand, in modern services is substan-
tial—31% compared with only 18% in
the youth labour force. It appears that
all the relative advantages of “all other
high-caste Hindus” have been derived
from the under-representation of the
SCs, STs, and Muslims. The relative pros-
perity or dominance of the “all other
high-caste Hindus” group is potentially
sustained by the limited presence of SCs,
STs, and Muslims in certain domains.
The case of Muslim employment and
income vulnerability in the context of
demographic dividends emerges from
the fact that their representation in tra-
ditional service and industry has been
disproportionally very high. Most of the
industrial employment that Muslims are
engaged in is unskilled manual labour
and low-paid, temporary daily wage
work. Historically, the Muslims were not
a landholding community and, therefore,
their share in agriculture is rather low
and often it will be in the form of daily
manual wage labourers.
Regardless of the sector, forward
castes and other minority religions have
higher salaries than OBCs, Dalits, Adiva-
sis, and Muslims (Desai et al 2010). It is
important to note that a relatively high-
er share of Muslims are urban dwellers.
They are less likely to be farmers and
agricultural landowners. Their low share
in modern services is the reflection of
low levels of education and limited access
(rather absence) to the quota-reserva-
tion-based policy in education and pub-
lic employment.
Determinants of Vulnerability
As stated earlier, to reap the benefits of
(%) the demographic dividend it requires
Total
that the country’s youth is equipped
100
with appropriate education, skills, and
100
100
health that are lacking amongst those
100 living below the poverty line.
100 It is not difficult to predict that if a
considerable section of people from dis-
advantaged groups (especially its youth
(%) and children) are living in poverty, then
Total
how can one expect to reap the demo-
31.7
graphic dividends (Table 8, p 41)? The
36.0
14.3
SCs and STs followed by the Muslims are
18.0 the most disadvantaged group suffering
100.0 from a high incidence of poverty. The
incidence of poverty is highest at 41.2%
APRIL 20, 2024 vol lix no 16 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
 PERSPECTIVES
Table 8: Poverty among Child, Youth population by the working population Table 11(a): Type of Job Contracts by SRCs (%)
and Working Age Groups by SRCs (%)
(Table 9). Social Group No Written Job More than More
Social Group Child (<15) Youth (15–29) 15–64 Years Written Job Contract: For 1 Year to than
SCs and STs 41.2 30.3 30.4
Both definitions show a high depend- Contract 1 Year or Less 3 Years 3 Years

OBCs 25.6 17.4 17.0 ency ratio of Muslims followed by SCs SCs and STs 85.5 3.0 1.7 9.8
Muslims 31.0 22.7 22.5 and STs. However, due to the low partici- OBCs 77.9 4.4 3.4 14.4
All others 13.1 8.4 7.9 pation of Muslims in the workforce, the Muslims 89.1 1.6 1.3 8.0
Total 28.9 19.8 19.2 strength of dependency ratios in the All others 60.8 5.6 5.9 27.7
Source: Authors’ calculations using NSS 68th round case of the second method was found to Total 79.0 3.7 3.0 14.3
(2011–12) Consumption Expenditure Survey data. Source: Same as Table 2.
be larger compared to other groups. The
and 30.3% respectively for the child and second method implies that one working Table 11(b): Type of Job Contracts of the
youth population, among the SCs and person has the burden of two non-work- Working Youth Population by SRCs (%)
Social Group No Written Job More than More
STs, and the respective incidence for the ing persons. Written Job Contract: For 1 Year to than
Muslim community is 31% and 22.7% Contract 1 Year or Less 3 Years 3 Years
while their share in the population is Work status and social groups: The SCs and STs 87.5 4.4 2.4 5.7
just over 15%. It appears, however, that a type of work has a close relationship OBCs 77.8 6.4 6.0 9.9
relatively higher proportion of child pov- with the SRCs (Table 10). Overall, 19% Muslims 95.0 1.5 1.2 2.3
erty across the SRCs is evidence of a posi- are “own account workers,” and another All others 62.2 9.5 9.0 19.4
Total 82.4 5.1 4.2 8.3
tive relationship between a higher num- 29% are “casual wage labourers.” Only
Source: Same as Table 2.
ber of children and low incomes. 29% “worked on regular salaried em-
ployment.” Once these work status distri- The “all others” which are mostly “high-
Dependency ratio and mean per capi- butions are analysed according to SRCs, caste Hindus” have the most secure jobs
ta expenditure: Low participation in one finds that Muslims, SCs and STs are since over one-third have written con-
the workforce results in a high depend- least employed in regular salaried jobs. tracts suggesting modern organised
ency ratio. A shift in the dependency ra- Muslims are most likely to work on their sector jobs (Tables 11a and 11b). The job
tio indicates the potential social support own account or self-employed vocations vulnerability of the SCs, STs and OBCs is
requirements and a burden on the work- and more so the Muslim female worker. also high, yet most of the OBCs will be
ing population. There are two types of farmers owning some amount of cultiva-
dependency ratios: one, age-based and Job contract and employment security: ble lands on which they work.
two, other work/gainfully employed In a fast-growing economy, the type of
base. The first type of dependency ratio job contracts highlights the stability of In Conclusion
reflects the share of children and senior paid employment and associated eco- India has witnessed a substantial reduc-
citizens (above 65 years of age) who are nomic benefits. These data suggest that tion in overall poverty since independ-
dependent on the age group of 15–64 Muslims work under highly vulnerable ence, yet concerns persist about its une-
years and the second type is estimated situations and around 90% undertake paid qual distribution. Traditionally, margin-
by dividing the actual non-working employment with no written contracts. alised communities, comprising Mus-
Table 9: Dependency Ratio and MPCE by SRCs lims, SCs, STs, and, to a certain extent,
Social Group Dependency Ratio 1 (Young and Old) Dependency Ratio 2 (Non-workers/Workers) MPCE* OBCs, continue to grapple with persis-
SCs and STs 49.1 1.2 2512 tent socio-economic challenges even six
OBCs 46.3 1.3 3065 decades after independence. These groups
Muslims 68.5 2.2 3102 consistently lag behind in various hu-
All others 41.6 1.4 4458 man development indicators, including
Total 49.6 1.4 3204
education and employment.
* Monthly per capita expenditure.
Dependency ratio 1 is calculated by adding together the children (aged under 15 years), and the older population (aged The demographic advantage, manifest-
65+), dividing that by the working-age population (aged 15–64 years), multiplying that by 100 so the ratio is expressed as ed in a youthful population, underscores
the number of “dependents” per 100 people aged 15–64 years.
Dependency ratio 2 is calculated by dividing total workers (both primary and secondary) by non-workers which expressed the need for strategic investments in ed-
as the number of “dependents” per working person. ucation, health, and skills. Notably, the
Source: Same as Table 2.
study reveals substantial educational gaps,
Table 10: Distribution of Work Status among Youth across SRCs (%) with the Muslim population exhibiting sig-
Social Group Own Account Employer Worked as Helper Worked as Worked as Casual Worked as Total
Worker in Household Regular Salaried/ Wage Labour: Casual Wage nificant disparities, emphasising the im-
Enterprise (Unpaid Wage Employee In Public Works Labour: In Other perative of targeted interventions. Employ-
Family Worker) Types of Work
ment patterns elucidate the stark under-
SCs and STs 15.6 0.7 23.0 23.6 0.4 36.7 100
representation of SCs, STs and Muslims
OBCs 21.4 1.0 26.1 31.7 0.2 19.6 100
Muslims 19.2 1.1 13.9 17.9 0.1 47.9 100
in secure, salaried positions, especially
All others 20.1 2.1 21.3 47.8 0.0 8.7 100 within the modern services sector. This
Total 18.9 1.1 22.0 28.9 0.2 28.8 100 echoes broader concerns about equitable
Source: Same as Table 2. access to economic opportunities.
Economic & Political Weekly EPW APRIL 20, 2024 vol lix no 16 41
PERSPECTIVES
Moreover, the prevalence of high pov-
erty rates and dependency ratios among
these groups accentuates their vulnera-
bility. The findings underline the urgen-
cy of addressing disparities not only for
the sake of societal equity but also to un-
lock the full potential of India’s demo-
graphic dividend. As India positions it-
self within a global context, nurturing
and empowering its diverse youth be-
comes paramount for a prosperous and
harmonious future.
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APRIL 20, 2024 vol lix no 16 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
SPECIAL ARTICLE
Spatial Poverty Traps and Food Security
Unpacking the Linkages
Nitya Rao, Shubhasree Shankar, Aiswarya Dutta
India’s food and nutrition insecurity is worsening despite
economic growth and a plethora of national policies.
The problem appears to be concentrated in particular
districts, creating a conflation of food insecurity with
spatial poverty traps. Using a food systems lens, the
concepts of poverty and food and nutrition security are
decoupled. Primarily qualitative methods, alongside a
food insecurity experience scale survey, and census data
are used to conduct a comparative analysis of three
selected blocks of Koraput district in Odisha. Results
showed disconnects between the levels of poverty and
food insecurity, suggesting a context-specific range of
entry points for addressing the problem of food and
nutrition security. Decentralised planning based on the
agency of local communities is needed for effective,
equitable, and sustainable solutions to food insecurity.
This paper is based on data collected by researchers at the Kalinga
Institute of Social Sciences (KISS), Bhubaneswar as a part of the
research programme, Transforming India’s Green Revolution by
Research and Empowerment for Sustainable Food Supplies (TIGR 2ESS).
The authors thank the district coordinator of KISS for connecting us
with the accredited social health activists, anganwadi workers, and
panchayat members in the selected blocks of Koraput. The support of the
KISS field staff, in particular, Aisuriya Dhir Samant and Suchi Sucharita
Mohanty, is appreciated for assisting with the fieldwork and translation
of the interviews into English. The authors thank Anuprita Shukla, Suraj
Kumar and Nizni Hans for their respective contributions. The authors
express gratitude to the communities in Koraput for participating in
the study.
Nitya Rao (N.Rao@uea.ac.uk) is with the School of International
Development, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK. Shubhasree
Shankar (shubhasree.shankar@kiss.ac.in) and Aiswarya Dutta
(aiswaryadutta96@gmail.com) are with KISS, Bhubaneswar.
Economic & Political Weekly EPW april 20, 2024 vol lix no 16
D
espite economic growth, India continues to be confront-
ed by large-scale food and nutrition insecurity. Accord-
ing to the Global Hunger Index, 2022, India ranks 107
out of 116 countries with a score of 27.5—the level of hunger is
described as “serious.” Despite the existence of various nation-
al policies aimed at strengthening the food system, food and
nutrition insecurity persist, particularly in certain regions and
social groups. One such is the subject of this paper—the Sched-
uled Tribe (ST) population in Koraput district of Odisha—a
region that was known in the 1980s for its “starvation deaths”
(New Indian Express 2009). What is specific to this group of
people that can explain the persistence of food insecurity?
Poverty and food insecurity have been historically seen as
closely intertwined, with definitions of poverty based not just
on income, but also daily calorie intake. Conceptual improve-
ments in understanding poverty since the 1990s have led to
the development of indices like the human development
index (HDI) and multidimensional poverty index (MPI), among
others, which consider health, education, and standard of living
indicators. The MPI includes multiple factors such as access to
land and credit, nutrition, health and longevity, literacy and
education, and infrastructural facilities such as electricity,
housing, water and sanitation (Mehta and Shah 2001). In Odisha,
the rural multidimensional headcount poverty is very close to
the national average of 32.75%, and the index value for
Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 2 (the zero-hunger goal)
is 34% compared to the all-India average of 35% (SDG 2019–20).
However, the tribal-dominated districts of Koraput, Malkangiri,
and Nabarangpur reveal headcount ratios exceeding 50%
(Niti Aayog 2021). When one explores the subcategories of the
index, the greatest disparities lie in education and assets,
followed by nutrition (Table 1, p 52).
This paper examines the relationship between poverty and
food and nutrition security. It investigates how far they can be
decoupled from each other. Adopting a food systems lens, it
explores a range of drivers, from biophysical to sociocultural,
across processes of production and consumption, that shape food
and nutrition security outcomes (HLPE 2020). Various factors,
including patterns of landholding and land quality (Giller et al
2021) in a context of climate variability, the social positioning
of households, especially if they belong to the Schedule Caste
(SC) or ST category (Kadiyala et al 2014; Rao and Raju 2019), the
nature of labour engagement and time constraints (Stevano et
al 2019), the legal and regulatory framework for managing
common property resources (Mitra and Rao 2021), the nature
51
SPECIAL ARTICLE

Table 1: Indicator-wise Contribution to Multidimensional Poverty Index of India, Odisha, and Koraput District production and availability
MPI MPI Health (%) Education in the 1960s and 1970s to a
Standard of Living
(Overall) (Rural) Nutrition Child and Maternal Years School Cooking Santiation Drinking Electricity Housing Assets Bank
problem of distribution
Adolescent Health of Attendance Fuel Water Account
Mortality School (access) and entitlements in
Koraput 0.265 0.296 47.60 2.56 24.91 38.82 15.58 81.10 82.22 20.06 22.62 59.13 39.72 16.35 the 1980s (Sen 1981). More
Odisha 0.136 0.152 37.26 2.23 19.50 16.66 4.95 80.94 70.43 20.97 13.37 55.81 19.22 10.94 recently, the definition of
India 0.118 0.155 28.1 13 10.4 15.1 7.4 9.3 8.6 2.2 3.3 8.3 3.6 2.2
Source: NITI Aayog (2021).
food security has been ex-
panded to include ideas of
of markets, all play a crucial role in households’ ability to agency and sustainability in addition to dimensions of availa-
command food. We also draw on the concept of spatial or geo- bility, access, utilisation, and stability (Clapp et al 2021; HLPE
graphic poverty traps (Bird 2019; Jalan and Ravaillon 2002) to 2020). While sustainability emphasises the need for long-term
better understand the sets of conditions that have led to the thinking, and regeneration of natural, social and economic
persistence of poverty among certain groups and localities systems to ensure future food needs, especially in the context
even within a single district. of climate change, agency takes account of people’s choices and
Drawing mainly on qualitative methods, a food insecurity preferences, giving weight to cultures of food production, pro-
experience scale (FIES) survey, and census data, we examine cessing and distribution (Clapp et al 2021; HLPE 2020; Hanke et
the impact of differences in agroecology, social organisation, al 2017; Gassner et al 2019). Yet, top-down policies often over-
employment and infrastructure, on food security strategies look the diverse realities on the ground, including spatial, eco-
and outcomes. Through exploring the nuances behind spatially logical, social and cultural factors (Barrett et al 2008).
differentiated experiences in three blocks—Kotpad, Boipariguda, In the context of spatial poverty traps and food security,
and Koraput—of a single district in southern Odisha, namely decentralised analysis becomes crucial for ensuring effective
Koraput, we seek to unpack the relationship between spatial policy formulation and targeting (Cobbinah et al 2013).
poverty traps and food insecurity, identifying potential areas Mohapatra (2020) found education and caste to be the two
needing urgent policy attention. most significant factors determining poverty and food security
status at the household level in four villages of two districts in
Conceptual Starting Points Odisha. The two remote villages had worse outcomes emphasis-
Spatial inequality contributes significantly to chronic poverty ing the importance of rural connectivity (de Haan and Dubey
in India, especially among certain occupational and historically 2005), investments in agricultural development and innovation,
disadvantaged groups such as the STs and SCs (Shah 2007) including credit, storage, climate-resilient technologies, mar-
who transmit this poverty intergenerationally to their children ket information, and mechanisms for collective bargaining.
(Mehta et al 2011). This phenomenon is not exclusive to India. While concerned with spatial poverty traps within districts,
In China, Jalan and Ravaillon (2002) found that living in a this paper did not consider the role of the environment and
poor area lowered the productivity of a household’s own biodiversity as contributors to poverty and food insecurity.
investments and made escape from poverty difficult. Similar To address this problem, Amarasinghe et al (2005) in the
observations were made on the clustering of the “food poor” in case of Sri Lanka and Mathenge et al (2022) in the case of
the central Andean region of Ecuador (Farrow et al 2005) or western Kenya used subdistrict-level poverty maps and the
western Kenya (Mathenge et al 2022). In all these cases, the small area estimation technique to identify significant clusters
authors emphasise the need to address productivity con- of poverty and food insecurity. Factors like water access, land-
straints such as land tenure, the use of farm equipment, tech- holding size, connectivity, and alternate employment opportu-
nology and skills, the distance to markets and services, recog- nities emerged as key explanatory variables shaping food
nising women’s roles and lack of asset ownership, alongside security outcomes in Sri Lanka. In western Kenya, low levels of
investing in the provisioning of supportive infrastructure and farming skills, inputs, technology, information, and land
services such as healthcare, education, drinking water and tenure security affected availability; access to savings, assets,
sanitation to create an enabling environment for food and inputs and markets shaped food access; climate variability,
nutrition security. pests, and diseases influenced stability; and low levels of women’s
However, targeting poor areas may not always align with landownership and asset endowment, alongside water and
targeting poor individuals as poverty densities can vary across sanitation, exerted influence on utilisation. Mathenge et al (2022)
different geographies (Minot and Baluch 2005). Furthermore, raise the issue of women’s asset ownership as a key variable
low population densities in remote rural locations can pose affecting food security. Given the different roles and responsi-
challenges in providing adequate services and infrastructure, bilities of men and women across cultures and the specific
exacerbating social exclusion and prolonged poverty (Bird 2019; social norms shaping their access to resources, taking a gender
Deshingkar 2010). This reflects the breakdown of the “social lens becomes critical to identifying the differential pathways
contract” between the state and citizens and highlights the leading to the occurrence of poverty and the experience of
nature of investment choices made by political institutions. food insecurity (Agarwal 2018; Pradhan and Rao 2018).
Alongside shifts in thinking around poverty clusters, the Such analyses have highlighted the importance of a systems
idea of food security too has evolved from an emphasis on food approach to understanding variations within spatial poverty
52 april 20, 2024 vol lix no 16 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
 SPECIAL ARTICLE

traps influenced by local ecologies, market access, and cul- comprising 10%–20% of households in the selected villages.
tures. Case studies by Giller et al (2021) in sub-Saharan Africa This survey consisted of eight questions related to household
demonstrate that even regions with favourable conditions for food consumption in the previous 12 months. The responses
agriculture can experience food insecurity due to high popula- were coded as “0” for “No” and “1” for “Yes.” An average raw
tion densities and small farm sizes. Gassner et al (2019) fur- score derived from the “Yes” responses to the FIES questions
ther highlight the heterogeneity within the agricultural sector indicates the severity of food insecurity, with a value between
among both farmers and farms, necessitating a differentiated zero and eight. The lower numbers in the scale indicate mild
approach involving a combination of farm, off-farm and non- food insecurity, including uncertainty regarding the ability to
farm activities (Hanke et al 2017) or midstream food system obtain food (a score from zero to three). Moderate food inse-
activities providing the only possibility of stability for the curity is denoted by compromising the quality and variety of
poorest (Woodhill et al 2022). A fine-grained multisectoral food intake, reducing quantities and skipping meals. Eight
analysis is therefore needed to inform decentralised planning, represents the extreme severity of food insecurity, with
enabling context-sensitive pathways to food security while higher values denoting an experience of hunger (from a score
addressing persistent poverty. of about 5.5 to 8). Given the intervening COVID-19 pandemic,
we repeated this survey in all the villages with 194 partici-
Methodology pants in September 2021.
The data for this paper was collected in six villages across
three blocks of Koraput district, Kotpad, Boipariguda, and The Study Context
Koraput. The survey was conducted as a part of the research Koraput district in Odisha was constituted as a separate
programme, TIGR 2ESS (Transforming India’s Green Revolution district in 1936 and was characterised by its isolated geogra-
by Research and Empowerment for Sustainable Food Sup- phy, lack of road connectivity, dense forests, steep hills, and
plies). Ethical approval was obtained from the University of malaria concerns (Bell 1945; Shah et al 2008). The colonial
East Anglia’s Development Ethics Committee. While district government and its forest department exploited the district’s
and block names have been retained, the names of the select- abundant forest resources through reservations implement-
ed villages and individuals we spoke to have been changed for ed in 1900, purportedly to curb deforestation caused by
purposes of confidentiality. podu (shifting) cultivation (Mitra and Rao 2021), in the
Data was collected between July 2019 and March 2020 us- process denying the local inhabitants of a rich source of
ing individual and group interviews alongside participatory dietary diversity.
mapping methods. Twelve group interviews were conducted Over 50% of the district’s population comprises STs and
in six villages (two in each block) mapping economic and SCs constitute around 15%. The literacy rate is low for both
social resources separately with women and men (Table 2). men and women, though there is considerable variation
Additionally, 24 focus group discussions (FGDs) captured within the district, with women in Koraput block, closest to
gender and generational differences in four FGDs per village the district headquarters, and with good connectivity, doing
aimed at deriving community food maps and understanding better than women in the other blocks (Table 3). Conversely,
the seasonality of food systems. The community food maps when considering work participation rates the situation is
were useful tools to explore people’s perspectives on local different, perhaps due to a shift away from agriculture,
food production systems, enablers and barriers to accessing Table 2: FGD and Group Interviews’ Profile in the Selected Blocks
food from markets, the public distribution system (PDS), or Block Village FGDs Age Group Age
Range Interviews Range
any other community-based nutrition programme. The sea-
Male Female Total Male Female
sonal calendars and maps sought to capture the year-round Kotpad A 20 15 20–60 13 7 6 19–65
patterns of food cultivation and consumption. Further, 12 B 12 14 18–62 19 11 8 18–60
key informant interviews were conducted with the accredit- Boipariguda C 12 12 24–59 13 7 6 24–60
ed social health activist (ASHA) and childcare (anganwadi) D 13 12 22–65 15 8 7 20–61
workers to understand the gaps in knowledge on nutrition Koraput E 16 13 19–61 12 6 6 21–63
F 13 12 18–63 16 9 7 20–65
and health.
Total 86 78 88 48 40
The data was collected by six local field researchers Source: Authors’ compilation based on data collection.
conducting interviews in the Odiya and Desia languag- Table 3: Population Demographics in Selected Blocks
es. Audio recordings were translated into English. An Kotpad Block Boipariguda Block Koraput Block
Excel spreadsheet was used to organise the data vil- Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female
lage-wise, with prompt questions used to assign codes Population 94,994 46,889 48,105 1,10,746 54,133 56,613 74,867 36,917 37,950
(100) (49.3) (50.6) (100) (48.8) (51.1) (100) (49.3) (50.6)
and categorise the data by the thematic dimensions of
Literates 35,347 21,790 13,557 32,608 20,341 12,267 35,853 21,791 14,062
food security. Based on this framework, detailed (37.2) (46.4) (28.1) (29.4) (37.5) (21.6) (47.8) (59.0) (37.0)
village profiles were developed for all six villages, Workers 51,610 28,047 23,563 58,380 30,367 28,013 32,774 19,699 13,075
which we draw on for our comparative analysis. (54.3) (59.8) (48.9) (52.7) (56.0) (49.4) (43.7) (53.3) (34.4)
An FIES survey was also conducted in late 2019 with 130 Sex ratio 1,026
Percentages in parentheses.
1,047 1,074

households across the six villages (Ballard et al 2013), Source: Census (2011).
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SPECIAL ARTICLE

where women are central to production processes. Despite need to therefore decouple their analysis, exploring drivers
being disadvantaged in terms of their access to land, and and strategies that may overlap, but equally be distinct.
education, the positive sex ratios across the blocks reveal the
existence of a degree of mutuality among men and women, Dimensions of Food and Nutrition Security
visible also in the relatively high work participation rates We use a range of variables to explore the six dimensions of
of women. food security. Food availability is explored through the availa-
In terms of poverty, as per the Comprehensive District bility of land and water, crop diversity, access to commodity
Plan, 2017–18 (DPMU 2018) over 90% of households in the markets, employment, and social relations. Food stability and
district have a monthly income of less than `5,000 per utilisation include daily and seasonal food intake, the role of
household (the official rural poverty line for a household of community nutrition programmes, civil society and non-gov-
five members). Interestingly, there is a variation in the num- ernmental organisation (NGO) interventions, and various food
ber of households classified as below the poverty line (BPL) taboos commonly prevalent among women across the blocks.
(Table 4). While Koraput district has 83.81% BPL households, The role of women’s agency and facets of sustainability are ex-
Kotpad block has a high of 95.2% despite its year-round avail- plored across all other dimensions.
ability of water for irrigation, and water-scarce Boipariguda
has 84.9% of households classified as BPL. These figures Ensuring the Availability of Adequate Food
are higher than the MPI for the district, which stands at The three blocks of Koraput district display varied agroeco-
51.14% (Table 1). logical characteristics. Kotpad block is near river Indravati,
The FIES data reveal that the perceptions of food insecurity assuring it year-round availability of water for irrigation. Boi-
worsened during and after the lockdowns (Table 4). Neverthe- pariguda is close to the forests, and Koraput is a peri-urban
less, the scores across blocks reveal mild food insecurity. area with better connectivity. Boipariguda and Koraput blocks
Koraput block saw the maximum decline in score due to the suffer from water scarcity, except during the monsoon months
closure of labour markets with the announcement of a nation- and, even then, are prone to sudden flooding or droughts. The
al lockdown in March 2020. Migrant workers returned home, land use categories in the three blocks and the access to water
and wage labour was no longer available. In Kotpad, produc- for irrigation are presented in Tables 5 and 6.
tion was affected by the inability to procure seeds and other In Kotpad block, the villages are predominantly inhabited
production inputs resulting from market closures. Despite by the Bhottada and Omanatya tribes, respectively. Both the
these challenges, the PDS and the availability of cultivated (in tribes are primarily agriculturists. The proximity to the Indra-
Kotpad) and collected (in Boipariguda) foods contributed to vati river ensures year-round water availability and the clayey
mitigating food insecurity. nature of the soil is suitable for cultivating rice and vegetables.
Clearly, there is a mismatch between the understanding Sugar cane (which can withstand flooding), maize, tubers
and measurement of poverty and food security, pointing to the (simlikanda), bamboo, and fruit trees like mango are grown
Table 4: Pre- and Post-COVID-19 FIES Scores across Blocks and Number
on the sandy soil. After the harvest of paddy in the winter,
of BPL Families fields are prepared for the cultivation of seasonal vegetables
Block Name Average Score Average Score (COVID-19 Period: March BPL Families like brinjal and radish, which are processed and stored for use
(Pre-COVID-19) 2020 to August 2021)
Number % during the summers. Sugar cane is sown around January–Feb-
Kotpad 0.87 1.70 18,323 95.2 ruary and harvested a year later. Most households have small
Boipariguda 1.24 1.68 19,396 84.9 kitchen gardens for growing vegetables for consumption.
Koraput 1.0 2.60 11,578 77.3 Boipariguda block faces water scarcity. Home to several
District 1.06 1.97 2,21,846 83.81
Sources: FIES Survey (2019 and 2021) and Government of Odisha (2014).
tribes such as the Parojas, Bhumias, Kandhas, and Gadabas,
farming is mostly rain-fed, with finger millets, which need less
Table 5: Land Use Patterns across Blocks (%) water, cultivated in the hilly terrain.
Blocks/ Total Area Forest Land put Barren and Permanent Land under Cultivable Old Current Net Rice and finger millet are the two
District (Ha) to Non- Non- and Other Miscella- Waste Fallow Fallow Sown
agricultural cultivable Grazing neous Tress Area
main crops, though those with some
use Land Land resources and access to wells or
Kotpad block 42,213 10.16 10.04 1.14 5.7 3.9 1.75 2.9 7.1 52.3 ponds for irrigation, do grow vegeta-
Boipariguda block 76,484 34.2 6.8 4.3 6.1 9.9 4.8 2.9 4.9 26.8
bles and pulses. The selected villages
Koraput block 43,173 8.4 5.2 19.7 1.8 10.4 1.08 3.9 5.9 21
Koraput district 6,07,553 15.1 8.6 17.0 3.7 9.0 2.5 3.7 9.8 30.1
are located close to the forest, hence
Source: Census (2011). after the harvest of the rainfed crop,
Table 6: Total Irrigated Area across Blocks a majority of the people are unable
District/Blocks Total Cropped Area Total Irrigated Area to cultivate further and instead collect different varieties of
(Ha) (Ha) % yams (pit kanda, sarandakanda, mainsarikanda, nangalakan-
Koraput district 3,90,476 1,53,170 39.2 da), bamboo shoots, mahuli flower, and other edible plants
Kotpad block 38,914 30,148 77.47
from the forest. These serve as an important source of income.
Boipariguda block 36,640 4,621 12.6
Koraput block 21,366 5,503 25.7 Aquatic foods like small fish, bitter fish (pita machha), prawn,
Source: DLIC (2016). and crab are collected from the village waterbodies. During
54 april 20, 2024 vol lix no 16 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
 SPECIAL ARTICLE

the dry summer months, several men migrate to nearby states
for wage work.
Koraput block, a peri-urban area with better connectivity,
comprises both hills and plains. The villages studied had a
considerable population of Other Backward Classes (OBCs)
too. As water scarcity is an issue, crops like paddy, finger mil-
lets, vegetables, and pulses are cultivated during the monsoon.
Kitchen gardens are rare, and people rely on markets for food,
hence, they focus on earning cash incomes rather than cultiva-
tion. Migration and off-farm activities are common due to bet-
ter connectivity. The SCs here, situated at the bottom of the
social hierarchy, engage largely in wage labour, scavenging,
pottery, and other caste-based activities.
In terms of the biophysical drivers shaping food availability,
the villages of Kotpad, seen as the poorest block in the district
and the most remote, nevertheless, have the greatest potential for
food security. The constraints lie in the maintenance of the irriga-
tion infrastructure, and development of local, territorial markets.
Access to Food and Women’s Agency
The ability to ensure food security depends on the physical,
social, and economic access to resources, technology, and mar-
kets for both commodities and labour. Access mechanisms are
deeply embedded in power relations (Ribot and Peluso 2003),
with outcomes shaped by social identities and relationships
based on caste, ethnicity, gender, and location.
Labour, employment and sources of income: Agriculture is
the primary occupation, yet it is unable to ensure food security
due to various risks, as evident also from a range of studies in
South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa (Giller et al 2021; Amaras-
inghe et al 2005; Mohapatra 2020; Hanke et al 2017). Kotpad
block regularly faces flooding while Boipariguda and Koraput
blocks face water scarcity.
In Kotpad block, apart from their own cultivation, both men
and women engage in agricultural wage work in their own or
nearby villages, as per demand, an observation confirmed by the
census (2011) which classifies more than 90% of main workers
in the selected villages of this block as cultivators or agricul-
tural labourers. This is despite the fact that non-agricultural
wage rates at `300–`500 per day are almost double current agri-
cultural wages at `150– `200 per day for weeding and harvest-
ing paddy. The category of “other workers” is highest in the
Koraput block, given its water scarcity and need for diversification
beyond agriculture, alongside better connectivity and proxim-
ity to the district headquarters. Following the rainy season, both
men and women work as wage labourers, mainly in Koraput
town, with men earning more than women. A large number of
women engage in paid domestic work. Given the wage differ-
entials, however, many women prefer to engage in cattle-rear-
ing or post-harvest processing at home, rather than undertak-
ing low-paid work outside. Boipariguda block faces water scar-
city limiting agriculture to the monsoon months. Men from
here migrate to other parts of the country in search of work in
brick-making, construction, textile and hosiery industry, and
agriculture. Women engage in activities such as the collection
and sale of firewood, mahula flowers (in March), kendu leaves
(in April), and handia or rice/millet liquor in the winter.
Women are primarily engaged in agriculture as unpaid family
workers or agricultural labour across the block (Table 7).
Jamuna of Boipariguda noted, “it is only during the monsoons
that we cultivate. For the rest of the year, we either take up
wage work or run small businesses.” Several studies highlight
the importance of women’s asset control for food and nutrition
security (Farrow et al 2005; Mohapatra 2020; Mathenge et al
2022). In a time-use study conducted in villages of Boiparigu-
da block, Rao and Raju (2019) found that during the planting
season, women spent close to nine hours a day on agricultural
work, alongside four hours on domestic work. This, however,
reflected a decline of almost 30% in the time required for care-
work, a major factor contributing to child undernutrition and
household food insecurity.
Commodity markets and social relations: Apart from
labour markets, commodity markets too play a vital role in the
lives of the villages. Reliable markets ensure their ability to sell
surpluses of cultivated crops and collected forest produce and
also purchase food, when they confront shortfalls (Nandi et al
2021). Local markets are critical for food security. In Kotpad
block, women rely on the weekly (Tuesday) market in Kotpad
to sell their products or buy vegetables. Boipariguda has both a
daily and a weekly market, but it is the men who usually trans-
port the forest produce to the market. Karna Majhi indicated
that one reason for this was the lack of transportation, “men
who have two-wheelers are at an advantage as they don’t have
to wait for the buses, usually overcrowded on market days, to
come.” Koraput too has both a daily and weekly market with
the latter attracting both buyers and sellers from further
afield. Additionally, small shops within the villages sell essen-
tial food items and vegetables.
From the perspective of reliability, the villages of Koraput
block have the most secure access to markets for both the pur-
chase and sale of commodities. Market access is precarious in
the other two blocks, especially during the rainy season when
food insecurity is highest. Market access is also gendered, with
women in Kotpad having greater access to local markets and
control over the incomes they earn than in Boipariguda, where
men mediate the sale of products, including those collected by
women. According to Kadiyala et al (2014), women’s control
over their incomes can positively impact food and nutrition se-
curity, as women are likely to engage in more pro-nutrition
consumption choices than men. This highlights how social norms
and gendered access can play a critical role in ensuring food
Table 7: Gendered Work Participation Rates across Blocks
Blocks/District Total Workers Main Marginal
Workers (%) Workers (%)
Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female
Kotpad 51,610 28,047 23,563 43.3 64.3 18.4 56.6 35.6 81.5
Boipariguda 58,380 30,367 28,013 45.6 64.6 25.0 54.3 35.3 74.9
Koraput 32,774 19,699 13,075 59.5 74.6 36.8 40.4 25.3 63.1
Koraput 6,93,406 3,84,053 3,09,353 57.1 74.4 35.7 42.8 25.5 64.2
district
Source: Census (2011).

Economic & Political Weekly EPW april 20, 2024 vol lix no 16 55
SPECIAL ARTICLE
security. Apart from constraints to market access, women face
taboos such as being debarred from consuming certain fruits
and vegetables during pregnancy and post-birth, leading to
micronutrient deficiencies and contributing to the intergener-
ational transmission of poor nutrition outcomes.
Ensuring the right to food: The National Food Security Act,
2013 provides legal entitlements to food security for all citi-
zens through programmes such as the PDS, the Integrated
Child Development Services (ICDS) and the mid-day meal
(MDM) scheme. These programmes were functioning well in
the studied blocks, though social access issues, including
caste-based and religious discrimination, as well as gendered
taboos on food consumption practices, affected the food and
nutrition security of particular groups and individuals.
In the Kotpad block, anganwadi workers organised monthly
awareness programmes on food and health every month, in
association with the ASHA or local health workers. These pro-
grammes were crucial due to the limited accessibility to
healthcare facilities. Traditional practitioners—the sirsa or
dishari—are relied upon and the district hospital is the last
resort. In Boipariguda, challenges like inadequate sanitation
facilities, limited ambulance services, and increased domestic
violence resulting from alcohol consumption, were also
mentioned. Caste-based differences persist with SCs and STs
experiencing higher levels of anaemia (Table 8).
In terms of the enabling environment for food and nutrition
security, apart from the dismal healthcare facilities, educa-
tional provisioning is also poor as visible in the low literacy
rates in all three blocks. While primary schools exist in the
villages, students who wish to pursue higher education need
to go to the block headquarters several kilometres away. Not
all can commute every day, especially girls, which explains the
gender gaps in literacy rates.
Policy Implications
What then are the implications of the above findings for policy?
From the perspective of food systems, we are confronted with
a complex picture of differentiation among both the barriers
and enablers of food and nutrition security even within a single
district. As far as food availability is concerned, the natural
resource base greatly influences the choice of economic activity,
and in turn, the purchasing power of households and individuals.
The natural resource base of Kotpad block, for instance, bene-
fits from year-round cultivation and food availability, unlike
the other two blocks, where water scarcity limits the potential
of agricultural production. Men here adopt migration as a
strategy for earning incomes, which while making them less
Table 8: Health Status of Odisha
Overweight/Obese Anaemia
Women Men Women Men
Odisha SC 12.4 13.1 SC 55.0 30.4
ST 5.5 9.9 ST 63.3 40.1
OBC 18.9 19.3 OBC 46.7 24.8
Other 28.8 27.0 Other 40.4 18.0
Koraput 10.2 18.3 63.3 40.0
Source: NFHS-4 (2015–16).
56
poor in income terms, nevertheless increases the perceptions
and experience of food insecurity. With women simultane-
ously disadvantaged in terms of job opportunities and dis-
criminatory wages, there is evidence of increased violence
and declining gender equality. This points to the importance
of addressing gender and other social inequalities while
promoting income diversification.
Access to commodity markets across the blocks is often dis-
rupted by heavy rains and flooding, compounded by the absence
of facilities for transportation and storage, especially for per-
ishables, and lack of timely credit. This has gendered implica-
tions. While in Kotpad, women take their produce to the weekly
market when they need cash, in Boipariguda the task of selling
forest produce is taken over by the men, thus denying women
direct control over cash incomes and household purchases.
Sensitising men to the food and nutritional needs of women
and children then becomes important, so that the right com-
modities are purchased and consumed, along with developing
support services that can strengthen women’s agency.
When it comes to food stability, the PDS has become the life-
line for all the villages, especially in times of crisis, such as the
COVID-19-induced lockdowns, providing rice and oil, but also
millets, pulses, and vegetables. The enabling environment in
terms of access to water, sanitation, education, and healthcare,
however, remain inadequate. People depend on local medicine
men in the first instance, going to distant hospitals only when
their health conditions worsen. Given heterogeneous popula-
tions in the villages of Koraput and Boipariguda, solidarity at
the local level is also lacking, with caste- and religion-based
discrimination visible in health statuses. Improving access to
quality education and healthcare facilities is critical for
strengthening the agency of local women and men to make
choices about their lives and livelihoods.
This analysis reveals that despite income poverty, food secu-
rity perceptions are generally positive in Kotpad block due to
year-round cultivation, access to the PDS, and supplementary
food through the ICDS. They lack access to jobs and markets,
and this affects poverty in its multiple dimensions, however, the
same relationships do not necessarily apply to food security.
Conflating them can lead to policies that fail to address the
specific constraints in particular locations and communities,
even within a single district.
We therefore point to the usefulness of decoupling the anal-
ysis of poverty reduction and food security strategies to allow
for different entry points to address specific constraints. In
Kotpad, focusing on strengthening agricultural production
systems, irrigation infrastructure, and post-harvest process-
ing, storage, transportation and value addition, can improve
(%)
household livelihoods, and nutrition. Climate-proofing and in-
vestments in improved agricultural skills and technology are
crucial for increasing agricultural wage rates, important par-
ticularly for women and small landholders. In Boipariguda
and Koraput blocks, irrigation development, infrastructure for
strengthening territorial commodity markets, employment-
oriented education and skills, ensuring minimum wages for
farm and non-farm work, social security for and organisation
april 20, 2024 vol lix no 16 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
 SPECIAL ARTICLE

of migrant workers, are key. Social relations and structures
that discriminate against particular castes or genders need to
be considered, as they can deepen the experience of poverty
and constrain the access to food. Policies must consider the
closure of forests, contract farming (Mitra and Rao 2021), and
transportation issues in Boipariguda which impact gender
equality and household nutrition.
There are rays of hope. The Odisha Millet Mission, initiated
in 2017 by the Government of Odisha, in partnership with civil
society organisations has shown positive outcomes. Millets,
being both climate-smart and highly nutritious crops, have
contributed to significant increases in yields and production
value. In Boipariguda, yields increased from 6.53 to 8.65 quin-
tal/ha and the value of produce rose from `9,646 to `12,570 in
2017–18 over the previous year (Mishra 2020). This is, however,
not the case in other blocks without the intervention. Instead
of labelling blocks or districts as food secure or insecure,
policies should consider contextual variations in line with the
six dimensions of food and nutrition security outlined in this
paper (HLPE 2020).
Restoring the agency of local communities through decen-
tralised planning and community control is the way ahead for
addressing persistent poverty and food insecurity among
India’s tribes, residing in geographically remote, yet often bio-
diverse regions. Strengthening their control over natural
resources, and climate-proofing, can empower communities,
foster local entrepreneurship for value addition and process-
ing of primary products using modern technologies, create
gainful employment and incomes within local contexts, and
reverse the process of “spatial poverty traps.”

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Economic & Political Weekly EPW april 20, 2024 vol lix no 16 57
SPECIAL ARTICLE
Status of Women’s Landownership in India
A Comparison of Estimates from NFHS and AIDIS
Rakesh Kumar Mahato, Sai Chandan Kotu, Kulvinder Singh, Arindam Das, Bheemeshwar Reddy A
Women’s access to land is limited in India and there
persists considerable gender gaps in landownership.
This paper compares the extent of women’s ownership
of land using the National Family Health Survey and the
All-India Debt and Investment Survey. AIDIS 2019 has for
the first time collected gender-disaggregated data on
landownership. We examine, with the help of descriptive
evidence, logistic regressions and matching analysis, the
comparable indicators of women’s ownership using the
two data sets. There are considerable differences between
the two in terms of the proportion of women owning
any land. At the national level, the share of females
(15–49 years) owning land as per the NFHS is almost
six times higher than the AIDIS estimate. Contrarily, the
discrepancy is not high in terms of the proportion of
households which have female agricultural landowning
members. From the binomial logistic regression, we find
that the same set of individual and household
characteristics explain the outcome of whether the
woman owns land differently in the two data sets. NFHS
estimates are contrary to the existing evidence on the
regional patterns in ownership by women. Issues in data
collection methodology, such as the options provided
for recording ownership status, could be at the root of
the inconsistencies in the NFHS data, necessitating a
thorough re-examination by the survey organisation.
The authors thank Madhura Swaminathan, Yoshifumi Usami and Srinivas
Goli for their useful comments and critical feedback which helped improve
the draft paper. They also thank Sethu C A for helping them shape their
arguments and S Gayathri for helping them in copy-editing the draft.
Rakesh Kumar Mahato (rkm.dnb@gmail.com) is a research scholar
at BITS Pilani, Hyderabad and works with the Foundation for Agrarian
Studies, Bengaluru. Sai Chandan Kotu (saichandan26@gmail.com) is
with the Foundation for Agrarian Studies, Bengaluru. Kulvinder Singh
(kullugulia@gmail.com) is with CEDA, Ashoka University. Arindam Das
(arindam@fas.org.in) is with the Foundation for Agrarian Studies and
a research scholar at BITS Pilani, Hyderabad. Bheemeshwar Reddy A
(bheem@hyderabad.bits-pilani.ac.in) teaches economics at BITS Pilani,
Hyderabad.
58
L
andownership among women in India is extremely low.
Studies have highlighted that there exists a continued
prevalence of discrimination against women in terms
of ownership of land (Agarwal et al 2021; Landesa 2013).
Additionally, researchers and policymakers were thus far chal-
lenged by the lack of reliable gender-disaggregated data on land-
ownership. The official secondary statistics have been inadequate
in capturing gender-disaggregated information, particularly on
asset ownership (Kurian 2015). Even the limited available data
sources are marred by concerns which require further investiga-
tion. Agarwal and Guilmoto (2023) show that the National Family
Health Survey (NFHS) data on women’s landownership in India is
inconsistent with other available evidence. Such difficulties have
led to a gap in the knowledge about the current status of women’s
landownership in India and the differences across regions and
social groups. Nevertheless, the All-India Debt and Investment
Survey (AIDIS 2019), conducted as part of the 77th round of the
National Sample Survey, has, for the first time, collected land-
ownership status for all household members—this data set has
the most detailed and comprehensive gender-disaggregated
information (NSO 2021).
Our objective in this paper is to compare the NFHS data on
women’s landownership with that of the AIDIS, and identify
probable factors which can explain the differences in estima-
tion from the two data sources. We add to the discussion in
Agarwal and Guilmoto (2023) by comparing the estimates from
the two data sources and attempting to explain proximate causes
for the inconsistencies in NFHS; this warrants a re-examination of
the data collection methodology employed. Furthermore, our
findings will inform other studies, which might be relying on
the NFHS data, of the possible inconsistencies (and their sources)
warranting some caution while using this data source.
Features of NFHS and AIDIS Data
The NFHS-5 of 2019–21, conducted by the Ministry of Health and
Family Welfare (MoHFW) (IIPS and ICF 2021), is widely used for
studying health outcomes particularly for women and children
(Bhalotra et al 2019; Roy 2015; Biswas et al 2023). The survey
is conducted using both individual (men’s and women’s) and
household questionnaires. The individual questionnaire is
canvassed for women aged 15–49 years and men aged 15–54
years from a sub-sample of 15% of the households from every al-
ternate household in 30% of the total households. At the indi-
vidual level, data is collected on whether the woman (or man)
owns any land. At the household level, data is collected on the
april 20, 2024 vol lIX no 16 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
 SPECIAL ARTICLE

extent of agricultural land owned by the household, and Figure 1: Statewise Share of Women (15–49 Years) Owning Any Land (%)
whether men/women/both own the land. India 5.5 (0.1) 31.7 (0.4)
As pointed out earlier, studies have argued that the
Uttarakhand 5.1 (1.2) 17.5 (1.5)

Central
discrepancies in NFHS estimations lie primarily in the Uttar Pradesh 4.7 (0.3) 42.7 (1.1)
women’s questionnaire and not so much with the Madhya Pradesh 3.7 (0.6) 32.3 (1.2)
Chhattisgarh 4.5 (0.7) 38.8 (1.9)
household questionnaire (Agarwal et al 2021; Agarwal
and Guilmoto 2023). Contrary to the existing evidence, West Bengal 4.6 (0.4) 16.8 (1.3)
Odisha 3 (0.4) 36.6 (1.6)

East
which shows that southern states have higher land- Jharkhand 2.8 (0.6) 54.6 (1.7)
ownership of women than other regions, Agarwal and Bihar 2.9 (0.4) 43.8 (1.3)

Guilmoto (2023) find that eastern Indian states have Rajasthan 4 (0.4) 20.7 (1.2)
Punjab 4.6 (0.7) 27.1 (1.5)
higher women’s ownership as per the NFHS women’s

North
Jammu and Kashmir 5.3 (1.5) 51.3 (2.2)
questionnaire. It is argued that a substantial increase Himachal Pradesh 5.1 (1.2) 20.3 (2.1)
Haryana 4.5 (0.7) 30.7 (1.8)
in the sample size of NFHS and recruitment of a large
number of relatively inexperienced investigators would Tripura 3.6 (0.6) 10.7 (1.4)
Sikkim 3.2 (1.3) 39.8 (4)
have led to non-sampling errors. Nagaland 1.9 (0.8) 15.9 (1.5)

North East
Even the other existing literature (Swaminathan et al Mizoram 4.7 (0.8) 14 (1.8)
Meghalaya 32.8 (2.9) 45 (2.5)
2012; Lahoti et al 2016; Agarwal et al 2021) on female Manipur 2.8 (0.8) 24.9 (2.7)
landownership in India either rely on data sets which are Assam 4.4 (0.8) 34.9 (1.5)
Arunachal Pradesh 9.7 (2.2) 63.1 (2.1)
not nationally representative or collect limited informa-
Telangana 10.3 (1.2) 42.6 (1.5)
tion on ownership.1 Given this background of limitations Tamil Nadu 5.2 (0.5) 21.9 (1.4)
in the available data sets, we proceed to analyse the AID-
South

Kerala 11.5 (1.3) 19.4 (1)

Karnataka 5.1 (0.5) 53.8 (1.8)
IS of 2018–19 conducted by the National Statistical Office Andhra Pradesh 11.8 (0.8) 24.5 (1.6)
(NSO). This is also the first time that AIDIS has collected
Maharashtra 6.7 (0.5) 14.7 (0.9)
data on ownership status of any land and agricultural
West

Gujarat 3.2 (0.6) 34.9 (1.6)

land for each household member. It collected data on Goa 4.6 (2.4) 9.2 (2.2)

“whether any member of the household owns any land” 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70

and if the response is yes, it collected information on % of women landowners

“whether that member owns any agricultural land.” Sub- NFHS AIDIS
sequently, the plot-level ownership details of different Standard errors in parentheses.
types of land owned by the household and whether a Source: Authors’ calculations from unit-level data of NFHS-5 and AIDIS 2019.
female household member owns any share are collected. to the total female population owning any land (aged 15–49); and
Despite its gender-disaggregated information, ownership (ii) using household questionnaire—the proportion of house-
details in AIDIS were not canvassed separately for women, holds with at least one female agricultural landowner. We com-
unlike NFHS’ women’s questionnaire. As will be discussed later, pare the differences across states, individual, and household-
this lack of self-reporting in AIDIS could be leading to some level characteristics. Individual-level characteristics include
incorrect reporting of ownership. Nevertheless, AIDIS (2019) is age and education. Household-level characteristics include
the most comprehensive and up-to-date data set that can be used caste, religion, gender of head of the household, and sector or
for quantifying the extent of gender inequality in landownership. location of household.
It is also reliable as its primary objective was to collect information Figure 1 presents the statewise estimates of the share of
on asset ownership at the household level, unlike NFHS. There- women owning any land in the age group of 15–49. The estimates
fore, we contribute to the discussion raised by Agarwal and between the two data sets diverged considerably. At the all-India
Guilmoto (2023) by using a more recent, nationally represent- level, 31.7% women in the age group of 15–49 owned land as per
ative, and reliable data set (that is, AIDIS) for comparing the NFHS, while it is almost six times lower at 5.5% as per AIDIS. The
NFHS estimates on women’s landownership. AIDIS is also more NFHS data shows a higher proportion of women owning land
meaningful for our purpose here than the village data of the than the AIDIS data in almost all states with the exception of
International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics Kerala. For instance, estimates of women landowners in
(ICRISAT) or the Indian Human Development Survey (IHDS) Jharkhand from NFHS are almost 20 times higher than the es-
data as used in Agarwal and Guilmoto (2023), because NFHS-5 timates of AIDIS. Similarly, Bihar, Odisha, Uttar Pradesh (UP),
and AIDIS 2019 were conducted at around the same time. Gujarat, and Karnataka are among the other states that have
high divergence between the two data sets. Another important
Statewise Comparison of Women Landownership Using finding is the states that show a high proportion of female land-
NFHS and AIDIS owners from AIDIS have either almost the same estimate from
We analyse the differences between NFHS and AIDIS with respect NFHS or even lower. For instance, the NFHS estimate of women’s
to the estimation of women’s landownership using the two landownership for Meghalaya, which is also the highest based on
indicators, as used in Agarwal and Guilmoto (2023): (i) using AIDIS data, is only 1.4 times higher than that of AIDIS. Similarly,
women’s questionnaire—the proportion of female landowners Kerala, which has the second highest women’s landownership
Economic & Political Weekly EPW april 20, 2024 vol lIX no 16 59
SPECIAL ARTICLE
Figure 2: Correlation between Estimates of AIDIS and NFHS for Major States Figure 3: Statewise Share of Men (15–54 Years) Owning Any Land (%)

PG
'FNBMFT
8IP
BSF
-BOEPXOFST India 36 (0.3) 43.9 (0.6)

Uttarakhand 27.5 (2.6) 42.1 (2.8)

," "3

Central
Uttar Pradesh 35.2 (0.7) 57.9 (1.1)
+) Madhya Pradesh 39.4 (1.2) 47.7 (1.5)
+, Chhattisgarh 41.6 (2.3) 68.1 (1.8)
#) 61 .-
NFHS

4, 54
$) West Bengal 35.7 (2.4) 39.8 (1)
0% "4
(+ */

East
Odisha 35.8 (1.5) 59.7 (1.5)
)3 1+ 5/ Jharkhand 42.5 (2.1) 74.8 (1.9)
.1 )1 "1
3+ Bihar 42.5 (1.1) 54.6 (1.8)
8# 6, .) ,-
Rajasthan 37.6 (1.1) 45.8 (1.4)
(0 Punjab 32 (1.6) 32.7 (2)

North
Jammu and Kashmir 40.9 (2.8) 70.7 (2.2)
        Himachal Pradesh 37.4 (2.1) 51.1 (2)
"*%*4 Haryana 30.5 (2.5) 38.4 (1.8)


PG
)PVTFIPMET
XJUI
BU
-FBTU
0OF
'FNBMF
-BOEPXOFS Tripura 36.2 (3.4) 43.6 (1.5)

Sikkim 31.1 (2.9) 71.4 (6.9)
Nagaland 43.4 (4.5) 44 (2.4)

NorthଫEast
.- Mizoram 36 (2.1) 42.6 (4.8)
,- Meghalaya 12 (2) 38.9 (3.4)
Manipur 38.1 (1.8) 45.9 (3.9)
"3 (" 54 Assam 41 (1.9) 64.8 (1.8)
.1 "1
Arunachal Pradesh 51.8 (3) 73.3 (1.9)
$( 5/ )1 ,"
6,
NFHS

Telangana 38.8 (2.1) 51.6 (2.6)

+) 4, )3 */ .) Tamil Nadu 27.7 (1.5) 33.9 (1.2)
61
South
1# Kerala 27.3 (2.2) 32.8 (1.2)
#3 +, Karnataka 30.6 (1.2) 52.1 (2.4)
(+
"4 03 3+ 8# Andhra Pradesh 35.7 (1.3) 36.1 (2.2)

       Maharashtra 28.8 (1.3) 33.2 (0.9)

"*%*4
Source: Authors’ calculations from unit-level data of NFHS-5 and AIDIS 2019.
based on AIDIS, has the second lowest ownership in NFHS.
Even the IHDS data of 2011–12 shows that Kerala is among the
states that have the highest incidence of female agricultural
landownership among all adult females in rural areas (Lahoti
et al 2016). Also, it has the highest female ownership at 16.5%
among landowning rural households, signifying that IHDS find-
ings are vastly different from NFHS. As Agarwal et al (2021) and
Agarwal and Guilmoto (2023) point out, this reversal of trend
among the states in NFHS data raises several questions re-
garding the accuracy of the landownership data. It runs con-
trary to the available evidence on regional differences in fe-
male landownership due to state interventions, cultural prac-
tices, norms, etc (Agarwal 1994; Lahoti et al 2016; Agarwal et
al 2021; Jain et al 2022; Agarwal and Guilmoto 2023).
Contrastingly, the share of households with at least one
female member owning agricultural land is lower for NFHS for
most states, when compared to AIDIS (Appendix Figure A1, p 67).
At the all-India level, this share is 11.6% of the households in
NFHS and 17.3% in AIDIS (Appendix Figure A1). Nevertheless,
the share and the gap between the two data sets varies across
states. In Maharashtra, the share of households with at least one
female agricultural landowner is 14% in NFHS and 23.8% in
AIDIS. It is similar for states like Jammu and Kashmir, Kerala, West
Bengal, etc. Meghalaya has the highest share in both data sets,
but the NFHS estimate is 1.2 times higher than AIDIS. Whereas,
for Kerala, the state with the second highest share, the NFHS esti-
mate is lower than AIDIS by 0.6 times. The states with lower
estimates in AIDIS are mainly the north-eastern states and Chhat-
tisgarh, Jharkhand, and Tamil Nadu. Therefore, the divergence
between NFHS and AIDIS for the household-level indicator is
much lower compared to the one at the individual level.
60
Gujarat 34.9 (1.2) 43.8 (1.8)
Goa 7.1 (2.2) 25.8 (6.3)
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
% of men landowners
NFHS AIDIS
Standard errors in parentheses.
Source: Authors’ calculations from unit-level data of NFHS-5 and AIDIS 2019.
We find a positive correlation between the estimates of the
two data sets on the percentage of households with at least one
female landowning member: the states which report higher
ownership in one data set are also the ones that have higher
ownership in the other data set (Figure 2). However, no such
correlation exists in the case of the indicator which captures
the percentage of female landowners.
Furthermore, we have also estimated the ownership of land
from the men’s questionnaire of NFHS and compared the same
with AIDIS. We do not find such large discrepancies for men’s
ownership, unlike women’s ownership. At the national level,
43.9% of the men aged between 15 and 54 years owned land as
per NFHS (Figure 3). As per AIDIS, this is 36.1%. However, even
for this indicator, some states in the northern, central, and
eastern regions have a higher difference as reflected by the
ratio between NFHS and AIDIS. These states have higher differ-
ences between the two surveys for women’s ownership as well,
albeit at a much larger scale (Figure 1). Therefore, issues in the
individual questionnaire of NFHS pertain more to the women’s
data, and not so much to the men’s data.
Using the detailed gender-disaggregated ownership details
in AIDIS, Mahato et al (2023) calculated the extent of gender
inequality in landownership based on indicators capturing
different dimensions of ownership. All the indicators reported
by them show that women’s landownership in India is
extremely low. The regional variations show that women
from southern Indian states perform better with respect to
landownership compared to other states (Mahato et al 2023).
april 20, 2024 vol lIX no 16 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
 SPECIAL ARTICLE
Figure 4: Percentage of Women’s Landownership across Age from NFHS-5 to understand the effects of these characteristics on women’s
and AIDIS 2019
50
landownership, and how these differ across the two data sets.
NFHS
P (yi = 1)
log ൬ ൰ = Ⱦ0 + Ⱦ1 X1i + Ⱦ2 X2i + Ⱦ3 X3i + ɂi
40 1 െ P (yi = 1)
Percentage of landowners

In the above equation, Yi is our binary outcome variable

30
which takes the value of 1 if the woman owns a land, and 0
20 otherwise. The left-hand side of the equation is the log-odds
AIDS
ratio of the woman owning any land. X1 includes the individu-
10
al-characteristics of age, age squared, education level, and
0
whether the respondent is head of the household. X2 includes
15 20 25 30 35 40 45 the household-characteristics of size, caste, religion, gender of
AgeAge
(in(in
years)
years) head of the household. X3 includes rural–urban dummy, and
Source: Authors’ calculations from unit-level data of NFHS-5 and AIDIS 2019. state fixed effects.
Figure 5: Share of Women Owning Any Land across Individual and Household Characteristics Similar to the distribution of female landowner-
45o49 16.6 (0.6) 38.3 (0.6) ship across states, female landownership across
40o44 11.5 (0.5) 35.9 (0.7) different groups shows that the NFHS estimates are
35o39 8.1 (0.4) 34.4 (0.6) many times higher than AIDIS estimates (Figure 5).
Age

30o34 4.5 (0.3) 32.9 (0.6)

The estimates of logistic regression show that
25o29 2.1 (0.2) 31.4 (0.5)
20o24 0.9 (0.1) 29.2 (0.6) age is a significant factor that explains the owner-
15o19 0.2 (0) 24.1 (0.5) ship of land by women for both NFHS and AIDIS
(Table 1, p 62). We find that in both data sets, the
Others 5.9 (0.2) 26.9 (0.6) percentage of female landowners increases with
OBC 5.4 (0.2) 33.8 (0.5)
an increase in age (Figures 4 and 5). However,
Caste

ST 5 (0.4) 39 (1)
SC 5.2 (0.3) 30.2 (0.7) with an increase in age, the difference between
the two estimates declines, as reflected in the lower
Higher 4.3 (0.2) 28 (0.6) values of the ratio. That older women are more
Education

Secondary 4.2 (0.2) 29.6 (0.4)

likely to own land has been established (Agarwal
Primary 6.1 (0.3) 32 (0.6)
Illiterate 8 (0.3) 39 (0.6)
et al 2021). However, in NFHS, landownership for
those in the group of 15−49 years is as high as
of head
Gender

Female 23.1 (0.7) 34.4 (0.7) 31.7% (Figure 1). This is higher than even the AIDIS
Male 3 (0.1) 31.2 (0.4) estimate for those above 50 years which is 26%
42.1 (0.9) 55 (1.5)
(Appendix Table A1, p 68). So, it can be expected
Yes
Is head?

No 2.9 (0.1) 30.9 (0.4) that age is associated with a considerable discrep-
ancy between the two data sets.
Others 10.9 (0.8) 27.1 (1) Across education levels, we find that there is a
Religion

Muslim 5.7 (0.3) 28.7 (0.9) decline in women’s landownership with an in-
Hindu 5.2 (0.1) 32.6 (0.4)
crease in educational attainment (Figure 5). NFHS
estimates show that 39% of the women who were
Sector

Urban 6.1 (0.2) 23.5 (0.6)

Rural 5.1 (0.2) 35.7 (0.4) illiterate owned land, while it is only 28% for
women who pursued higher education. In AIDIS,
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
% of women landowners only 8% of illiterate women own land; it further
NFHS AIDIS
decreases to 4% for women with higher education.
Standard errors in parentheses. This negative relationship between education and
Source: Authors’ calculations from unit-level data of NFHS-5 and AIDIS 2019. a woman’s landownership status is also evident
Meghalaya and Kerala report the highest landownership by from the regression; however, it is only significant at the sec-
women, while Arunachal Pradesh, Bihar and Jharkhand are ondary or higher education level and not at the primary level
among the lowest female landowning states. This pattern is for NFHS (Table 1).
consistent with the findings reported for the household indi- With respect to the sector of residence, there is a difference
cator for both NFHS and AIDIS (Appendix Figure A1), and the between the two data sets. As per NFHS estimates, rural wom-
individual indicator of AIDIS (Figure 1). en were more likely to own land than urban women. However,
it is the opposite in the case of AIDIS, although the difference is
Landownership across Groups of Individual and marginal. Based on IHDS data from 2011–12, Lahoti et al (2016)
Household Characteristics find that only around 4% of adult women in rural India owned
We analyse the discrepancies between the two data sets across land. This is closer to the AIDIS figure of 5.1%, but vastly differ-
different groups based on individual and household character- ent from the NFHS estimate of 35.7%. However, the IHDS esti-
istics. We estimate a logistic regression model for each data set mate pertains only to agricultural land, and it could also be an
Economic & Political Weekly EPW april 20, 2024 vol lIX no 16 61
SPECIAL ARTICLE

underestimate because it only recorded the names of a maxi- it was the lowest in AIDIS. Regression estimates using AIDIS
mum of three landowners from the household. data show that being SC or OBC, relative to being ST, was not
The regression estimates on NFHS data show that women in significant in explaining ownership for women in AIDIS data
rural areas are 64 percentage points more likely to own land (Table 1). However, other caste women were almost 31%
compared to urban areas (Table 1). On the other hand, the more likely to own land than ST women in AIDIS. On the
AIDIS estimates show that there is no statistically significant other hand, women belonging to SC, OBC or other castes
difference in ownership in rural and urban areas. Considering were almost 32%, 26% and 28% less likely to own land than
the religion of the household, in NFHS, Hindu women have ST women in NFHS.
higher landownership (33%) than Muslims and others. Con- The striking difference between the two data sets is evident
trarily, in AIDIS, Hindu women have the lowest landownership in the case of the relationship between the gender of the head
(5%) (Figure 5). However, this difference in ownership rates of the household and whether the woman is the head of the
across Hindu and Muslim women compared to those from other household, and the woman’s ownership status. The gender of
religions is not significant for both AIDIS and NFHS at least the the head of the household does not matter for women’s land-
5% level (Table 1). ownership status in NFHS, with only a 3 percentage point dif-
ference (Figure 5). However, the difference is striking, at al-
Table 1: Results of Logistic Regression with Dummy Dependent Variable of
Whether the Woman (15–49 Years) Owns Any Land most 20 percentage points, in the case of AIDIS. Furthermore,
Variables NFHS AIDIS there is no statistically significant difference in the likelihood
Age of women 0.079*** 0.415*** of owning land by a woman, if a female is the head of the
(0.01) (0.03) household, than when a male is the head in NFHS (Table 1).
Square of age -0.001*** -0.004***
However, in AIDIS, it is significant but the relationship is nega-
(0.00) (0.00)
Household size -0.005 -0.072***
tive, that is, if a female member of the household is the head,
(0.00) (0.02) then the ownership of land by any other woman in the house-
Sector (urban =0, rural =1) 0.496*** 0.081 hold is likely to be lower than men by around 30%. So, when
(0.02) (0.07) controlled for other factors, particularly whether the woman is
Education level (illiterate = 0) the head of the household, the gender of the head of the house-
Primary -0.021 -0.028
hold is not a significant factor for women’s likelihood of own-
(0.03) (0.09)
Secondary 0.104*** 0.087
ing land in NFHS. However, in the case of AIDIS, it has a signifi-
(0.03) (0.08) cant and negative effect, that is, women are less likely to own
Higher 0.147*** 0.248** land. Swaminathan (2017), based on village data, finds that a
(0.03) (0.11)
Gender of head of the household -0.045
(0.03)
-0.313**
(0.15)
EPWRF India Time Series
(male = 0, female = 1)
Religion (others = 0) (www.epwrfits.in)
Hindu 0.079* -0.088
(0.05) (0.15) Agriculture Census Statistics
Muslim 0.004 -0.08
(0.06) (0.17) Data sets from Agriculture Census have been added to the
Caste (ST=0) Agricultural Statistics module of the EPWRF India Time Series
SC -0.390*** 0.13 (ITS) online database. This sub-module contains state-wise data on:
(0.03) (0.12) ● Number, Area and Average Size of Operational Holdings
OBC -0.295*** 0.159 by Gender, by Social Groups and by Size Groups; and
(0.03) (0.11)
● Characteristics of Operational Holdings by Tenancy
Others -0.326*** 0.268**
(0.04) (0.11)
Status, Terms of Leasing, Land Use, Irrigation Status,
Sources of Irrigation and Cropping Pattern.
Respondent is head of household 0.279*** 3.747***
(0=no, 1 = yes) (0.05) (0.17) These characteristics are also provided in a two-way
Constant -1.641*** -12.181*** classification of Social Groups by Size Groups.
(0.13) (0.81)  Social Groups include Scheduled Castes, Scheduled
State-fixed effects Yes Yes Tribes, Others and Institutional Holders
Observations 1,08,696 1,35,318  Size Groups are: Marginal (Below 1.00 hectare),
Pseudo-R squared 0.084 0.373 Small (1.00 < 2.00 hectares), Semi-medium (2.00 <
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 4.00 hectares), Medium (4.00 < 10.00 hectares) and
Source: Authors’ calculations from unit-level data of NFHS-5 and AIDIS 2019.
Large (10.00 hectares and above)
The other castes (those who were neither Scheduled Caste These data are available quinquennially from 1970–71.
[SC]/Scheduled Tribe [ST]/Other Backward Class [OBC]) re-
Agricultural Statistics module constitutes one out of 37 modules
ported the lowest ownership among women in NFHS (~27%), of EPWRF ITS covering a range of macro-economic, financial
but reported highest ownership in AIDIS (~6%); however, in sector and social sector indicators for India.
the latter, the difference is only marginal (Figure 5). While, For more details, visit www.epwrfits.in or e-mail to: its@epwrf.in
in NFHS, ST women had the highest incidence of landownership,
62 april 20, 2024 vol lIX no 16 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
 SPECIAL ARTICLE

large majority of women who owned agricultural land did not from each other. In our case, the outcome variable would be
belong to female-headed households. whether the female owns any land (at the individual level)
On the other hand, 42% of the women who were heads of and whether the household has any female member owning
the household owned land, while 31% of those who were not agricultural land (at the household level). We use logistic
heads owned land, in NFHS. In AIDIS, the difference is more regression to calculate the predicted probability associated
pronounced, at 55% and 3%, respectively. Women who were with each outcome, since our outcome is binary. If the pre-
heads were more likely to own land in both the data sets. So, dicted probability of owning land (or having a female mem-
controlling for whether the woman is a head or not, the relation ber as the owner of agricultural land) is greater than 0.5, we
between the gender of the head of the household and the own- assign the predicted outcome as owning the land (=1). We
ership status reverses in AIDIS. Therefore, it only matters if the then compare the predicted outcome with the actual out-
particular woman is the head, and not whether a female is the come presented in the data set—this gives us three catego-
head of the household. ries, that is, (i) when outcome is matched, (ii) outcome is
The number of female-headed households is very low in over-predicted (model predicted that the individual is own-
India, and it is argued that it just signifies the absence of an ing while they are actually not owning), and (iii) outcome is
adult male in the household due to death, migration or other- under-predicted (model predicted that the individual is not
wise (Madhura Swaminathan cited in Kurian 2015). It could be owning while they are actually owning).
through widowhood that women become the head of their Table 2 shows the matching status distribution across differ-
households. Agarwal et al (2021) find that widowhood is the ent models for the dependent variable of female landowner-
most significant factor which explains women’s ownership of ship (aged 15–49). The first two rows depict matching distribu-
land. This could explain why the relationship between the var- tion using NFHS coefficients for predictions in NFHS and AIDIS
iables “whether the woman is head of the household or not”
and “whether she owns land” is significant and positive. Table 3: Distribution of Matching Status within Each State (%)—AIDIS
Coefficients on NFHS Data
Matched Ownership Ownership
Matching Analysis Over-predicted Under-predicted
The pseudo-R squared from the logit model for female Central
ownership of any land shows a substantial difference be- Uttarakhand 81.3 4.1 14.6
Uttar Pradesh 58.1 2.1 39.8
tween the NFHS and AIDIS models with the same set of inde-
Chhattisgarh 62.0 1.9 36.1
pendent variables. While the former has an explanatory Madhya Pradesh 67.8 1.5 30.8
power of 8.4%, AIDIS has 37.3%, suggesting the presence of East
some systematic differences between the two data sets in Bihar 57.7 2.6 39.7
capturing women’s landownership status. We examine this West Bengal 81.8 3.1 15.2
further using a matching technique to identify if the two data Jharkhand 47.1 1.2 51.6
Odisha 63.1 2.3 34.6
Table 2: Distribution of Matching Status for Women’s Ownership of Land (%) North
Dependent Variable Share of Women (15–49 Years) Share of Households with at Least Jammu and Kashmir 49.3 0.3 50.4
Owning Land One Female Agricultural Landowner
Himachal Pradesh 78.5 3.8 17.8
Model Matched Ownership Ownership Matched Ownership Ownership Punjab 71.7 2.1 26.1
Over- Under- Over- Under- Haryana 68.8 1.9 29.3
predicted predicted predicted predicted
Rajasthan 78.5 2.3 19.3
NFHS coefficient – North East
NFHS data 70 6 24 89 1 10 Sikkim 60.2 1.8 38.0
NFHS coefficient – Arunachal Pradesh 40.2 2.5 57.3
AIDIS data 91 4 5 87 0 13 Nagaland 82.5 2.6 14.9
AIDIS coefficient – Manipur 73.1 3.3 23.6
AIDIS data 96 1 3 91 1 8 Mizoram 83.8 3.9 12.3
AIDIS coefficient – Tripura 87.3 2.6 10.1
NFHS data 67 3 29 86 9 5 Meghalaya 57.7 20.7 21.6
Source: Authors’ calculations from unit-level data of NFHS-5 and AIDIS 2019. Assam 65.4 2.2 32.3
South
sets are systematically under-reporting or over-reporting any Andhra Pradesh 71.1 6.8 22.1
specific groups of women. We used the technique employed Karnataka 46.8 2.8 50.4
Kerala 82.1 7.6 10.3
by Abraham and Shrivastava (2022) to compare NFHS and
Tamil Nadu 73.3 6.5 20.2
AIDIS data sets. In their work, Abraham and Shrivastava Telangana 56.0 5.0 39.0
compare two labour force surveys by using the estimates of a West
multinomial logistic regression from one data set to predict Gujarat 64.5 1.7 33.8
the outcomes of another data set or its own data. We proceed Maharashtra 83.2 3.1 13.6
to do the same to identify the accuracy with which the esti- Goa 86.3 4.9 8.8
India 67.5 3.1 29.5
mated coefficients are able to predict the outcomes, and to Row sum is 100.
what extent the predicted and observed outcomes differ Source: Authors’ calculations from unit-level data of NFHS-5 and AIDIS 2019.

Economic & Political Weekly EPW april 20, 2024 vol lIX no 16 63
SPECIAL ARTICLE

data. The subsequent two rows illustrate distribution using from similar levels of mismatches. We find that the divergence
AIDIS coefficients on AIDIS and NFHS data, respectively. in the extent of matching is considerably lower at the house-
The proportion of matched observations is the highest when hold level where the dependent variable is whether the house-
the AIDIS coefficients are run on AIDIS data at around 96%. hold has any female member as an owner of agricultural land.
Contrarily, it is only 70% when NFHS coefficients are used to The difference between the extent of mismatch at the individ-
predict NFHS outcomes. Similarly, when the AIDIS model is ual and household levels is stark. The latter models are able to
used to explain NFHS outcomes, only 67% of the observations match at least 86% of the observations (Table 2).
were matched. The NFHS model, however, is still able to match Since our objective is to compare the estimates from NFHS
around 91% of the outcomes in AIDIS. The extent of matched and AIDIS data sets, we proceed to investigate where the mis-
observations is low even when we use NFHS coefficients on matches are concentrated, allowing us to understand if par-
NFHS data due to the low explanatory power of the logistic re- ticular regions or social groups are systematically mis-
gression using NFHS data in Table 1. matched. For the subsequent analysis, we will be relying on
There is a clear divergence between the recorded and pre- the model which uses the coefficients obtained from AIDIS’
dicted outcomes in NFHS when we use household and individ- logistic regression, to predict outcomes on NFHS data. As dis-
ual characteristics to explain the outcome. Furthermore, we cussed previously, the difference in landownership between
find that a significant portion of mismatch arises (24% and the two data sets is significant across the states. This is re-
29%) due to an under-prediction of ownership by the model flected even in the distribution of matching statuses (Table 3,
where the actual outcome recorded in the survey was that the p 63). States reporting high ownership as per NFHS also had a
individual owned land. We proceed to investigate if the house- higher share of mismatched observations, particularly that of
hold-level ownership indicator, using NFHS and AIDIS, suffers under-prediction.
Table 4: Distribution of Matching Status across States (%)—AIDIS Furthermore, we compare the share of each state in the
Coefficients on NFHS Data weighted sample of the survey and its corresponding share in
Matched Ownership Ownership Share in the total number of matched and mismatched weighted obser-
Over- Under- Weighted-
predicted predicted sample vations (Table 4). For instance, UP’s share in the weighted sam-
Central ple of female population aged between 15 and 49 was 16.4%—
Uttarakhand 0.9 1.0 0.4 0.8 it contributes to 22.1% of the under-predicted weighted obser-
Uttar Pradesh 14.1 11.1 22.1 16.4 vations. If the under-prediction is indeed randomly distributed,
Chhattisgarh 2.2 1.5 3.0 2.4
then each state’s share of matching status should approxi-
Madhya Pradesh 5.5 2.6 5.7 5.5
East mately be equal to its share in the weighted sample. However,
Bihar 7.4 7.4 11.6 8.6 states such as UP, Chhattisgarh, Bihar, Jharkhand, Odisha,
West Bengal 10.2 8.5 4.4 8.4 Jammu and Kashmir, Karnataka, Telangana and Gujarat are
Jharkhand 1.8 1.1 4.6 2.6 over-represented in the mismatched observations (that is, own-
Odisha 3.3 2.6 4.1 3.5
ership under-predicted) and under-represented in the matched
North
Jammu and Kashmir 0.7 0.1 1.6 0.9 observations vis-à-vis their share in the weighted sample.
Himachal Pradesh 0.7 0.7 0.3 0.6 Contrarily, states such as West Bengal, Kerala, Maharashtra,
Punjab 2.5 1.6 2.1 2.3 Andhra Pradesh, and Tamil Nadu are over-represented in the
Haryana 2.0 1.2 1.9 1.9 matched sample and under-represented in the under-predicted
Rajasthan 7.2 4.6 4.1 6.2 sample vis-à-vis their share in the weighted sample. They also
North East
have a higher share of matched observations within each of
Sikkim 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1
Arunachal Pradesh 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 them, suggesting that errors in the data pertain to some states,
Nagaland 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 prominent of them being UP, Bihar, Jharkhand, Karnataka,
Manipur 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 and Telangana.
Mizoram 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 The distribution of the matching status based on the individual
Tripura 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.3
and household characteristics shows that most of the mismatched
Meghalaya 0.2 1.7 0.2 0.3
Assam 2.6 1.9 2.9 2.6
observations are concentrated among women who are in rural
South areas, who are either ST, OBC or Hindu, and who are the head of
Andhra Pradesh 4.3 9.0 3.0 4.0 their households (Appendix Figure A2, p 67). These groups also
Karnataka 3.6 4.7 8.8 5.1 have a lower share of matched observations compared to the
Kerala 3.1 6.4 0.9 2.6 mismatched ones. For instance, 64.2% of rural observations
Tamil Nadu 6.4 12.6 4.1 5.9
were matched, while it is 74.4% of urban observations. Similarly,
Telangana 2.2 4.3 3.5 2.6
West only 46.7% of the women who were heads of the household were
Gujarat 4.5 2.6 5.3 4.7 matched, while 69% of those who were not, were matched.
Maharashtra 11.3 9.4 4.3 9.2 However, the extent of mismatch is not significantly different from
Goa 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.1 their share in the weighted sample (Appendix Table A2, p 68).
India 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Column sum is 100.
Matching status is almost similarly distributed both across
Source: Authors’ calculations from unit-level data of NFHS-5 and AIDIS 2019. categories, and within each subcategory, unlike the distribution
64 april 20, 2024 vol lIX no 16 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
 SPECIAL ARTICLE

across and within states. Hence, much of the mismatch is asso- twice—household member-wise and plotwise. Therefore, there
ciated with the state of residence of the respondent. is greater accuracy in capturing the true status of ownership, as
it allows for checking the consistency between the two. On the
Reasons for Discrepancies in NFHS other hand, the NFHS questionnaire for women in the age group
As Agarwal and Guilmoto (2023) posit, the NFHS women’s ques- of 15–49 only asks whether the woman owns any land or not. A
tionnaire suffers from inconsistencies which give biased esti- separate questionnaire is canvassed to the household, which
mates of female ownership. They argue that non-sampling errors pertains to only agricultural land, and there is no age restriction
due to the hiring of a large number of inexperienced investigators as well unlike the individual questionnaire, which precludes any
to handle the increase in the sample size could be a factor. consistency checks.
Differences in estimates of landownership between AIDIS and Furthermore, a closer look at the ownership status in NFHS
NFHS may result from variations in data collection methods and reveals some surprising results (Table 5). While 31.7% of the
investigator instructions. NFHS outsources data collection to pri- women in the age group of 15–49 reported to have owned land,
vate agencies, unlike AIDIS. This increased participation of pri- 40% of them have reported that they own land “both alone and
vate agencies in data collection was already highlighted as a jointly,” which implies that 12.7% of the women in this age
potential cause for inconsistencies and the low quality of data group have reported to have ownership rights over at least two
collected (Srinivasan and Mishra 2020). On the other hand, the plots of land. The most reported category at the all-India level
NSO conducts AIDIS; data collection is done for a state sample is that of “both alone and jointly.” The states (such as Bihar, UP,
(which is canvassed by state statistical departments) and a cen- Jharkhand, etc) which have reported higher ownership have
tral sample (canvassed by NSO itself). Another major difference also had a higher share of those owning land “both alone and
between the two surveys pertains to the manner in which the jointly” compared to other ownership statuses. These states are
details on landownership by women are collected. As men- also the ones that have greater discrepancies between AIDIS
tioned earlier, AIDIS collects women’s landownership details and NFHS. It is possible that there was some confusion in un-
Table 5: Distribution of Women’s (15–49) Landownership Status, in NFHS (%) derstanding this category either on the part of the interviewer
States Does Not Own Owns Alone Owns Jointly Owns Both Alone or the respondent. This could be true for the other similar ques-
Only Only and Jointly
tion on house ownership as well, which immediately precedes
Central
Uttarakhand 82.5 4.6 6.4 6.5
the question on landownership. As per the NFHS interviewer’s
Uttar Pradesh 57.3 6.6 13 23.1 manual, the instructions are similar for these two questions,
Chhattisgarh 61.2 5.5 13 20.4 and the options were also the same, that is, “do not own,”
Madhya Pradesh 67.7 5.6 11.7 15 “alone only,” “jointly only” and “both alone and jointly.”
East As expected, we find that the discrepancies that exist for
Bihar 56.2 9.6 15.6 18.6
landownership are also present for the house ownership indi-
West Bengal 83.2 3.4 5.7 7.7
Jharkhand 45.4 7.1 20.6 26.8 cator. This could be because the instructions given for both
Odisha 63.4 16.3 11.8 8.5 questions were the same. Around 42% of the females in the age
North group of 15–49 own at least one house (Appendix Figure A3, p 68).
Jammu and Kashmir 48.7 10.9 20.4 20 Even for this indicator, the category of “both alone and jointly”
Himachal Pradesh 79.7 2.3 14.3 3.7
is the most reported at the all-India level. It implies that
Punjab 72.9 8 12.2 6.9
Haryana 69.3 5.6 10.5 14.7
around 16% of the females within the above age group have
Rajasthan 79.3 3.6 6.1 11 ownership stakes in at least two houses. It is not surprising
North East that there is a high correlation between female landownership
Sikkim 60.2 15 11.3 13.4 and house ownership at least at the state level. But such high
Arunachal Pradesh 36.9 12 26.6 24.5 levels of reported ownership (of both land and house) cast doubt
Nagaland 84.1 3.1 7.3 5.5
on the instructions and options provided for capturing land
Manipur 75.1 5.5 7.3 12.1
Mizoram 86 3 4.7 6.2 and house ownership by NFHS. Since the landownership data
Tripura 89.3 2.5 3.4 4.8 is not collected plotwise in NFHS, unlike in AIDIS, it is not pos-
Meghalaya 55 9.7 15.9 19.4 sible to capture whether a woman owns land alone, jointly, or
Assam 65.1 6.8 15 13 both alone and jointly, without using the above categorisation.
South But relying on this categorisation probably created confusion
Andhra Pradesh 75.5 12.5 8.4 3.5
Karnataka 46.2 23.5 17.3 13
during data collection. The lack of substantial difference between
Kerala 88.5 6 3 2.6 the estimates of NFHS and AIDIS for Kerala, however, could be
Tamil Nadu 78.1 12.3 6.3 3.2 because of a relatively greater awareness of landownership
Telangana 57.4 24 12.3 6.3 status by women for several reasons, already discussed in the
West existing studies (Lahoti et al 2016; Roy 2015). Therefore, the
Gujarat 65.1 5.9 15.3 13.7
error arising out of this categorisation could be lower in Kerala.
Maharashtra 85.3 4.6 4.4 5.7
It is also not clear, from the NFHS’ interviewer instructions,
Goa 90.8 2.8 0.9 5.5
India 68.3 8.3 10.8 12.7 how the survey has differentiated between ownership of home-
Source: Authors’ calculations from unit-level data of NFHS-5. stead land and ownership of house. Using the IHDS data for
Economic & Political Weekly EPW april 20, 2024 vol lIX no 16 65
SPECIAL ARTICLE
2011–12, Lahoti et al (2016) find that only around 16% of the
households who owned their residence had women respondents
(ever married women aged 15–49) as owners at the national
level. On the other hand, NFHS data shows that 42% of the
women owned a house (Appendix Figure A3). These two are
not directly comparable because of the difference in the year of
survey and the indicator used. Nevertheless, the vast gap is not
likely to be accounted for by these two differences alone.
The discussion highlights that NFHS data overestimates female
landowners in certain states and across various demographic
groups, contrary to the existing literature. However, there is a
difference between the nature of reporting landownership sta-
tus between the two surveys. Ownership status in the individ-
ual questionnaires in NFHS is self-reported for both men and
women, while in AIDIS, it is not; either the head of the house-
hold (in a majority of the households) or other household
members could be the respondent. There were some households
in AIDIS, for which, a non-household member was the respondent.
Proxy reporting of women’s ownership by men could lead to
under-reporting. A recent work by Abraham et al (2023) shows
that there are significant differences in the work participation
rates for women between the self-reported and proxy-reported
observations based on a survey conducted in Rajasthan and
Karnataka. This difference is almost negligible for men. The
importance of the respondent’s gender for collecting asset
ownership details, particularly that of agricultural land, was
also highlighted by Kilic et al (2021) using two sample surveys
from Malawi. While the two surveys were broadly similar in
their questions, they differed in terms of respondent selection.
One survey canvassed the ownership details of all members
from “the most knowledgeable member of the household,”
while the other conducted private interviews. The authors find
that the former survey over-reports ownership for men while
under-reporting women’s claims over land.
Even for men’s ownership of land, NFHS estimates when
compared to AIDIS are slightly higher at the national level and
for most states (Figure 3), suggesting that proxy-reporting, as
is the case with AIDIS could be a factor leading to its lower
reporting. However, this discrepancy is significantly higher for
females. As suggested by Abraham et al (2023) and Ambler
et al (2021), this could be because of information asymmetry
among the household members and existing discriminatory
social norms. In our case, information asymmetry may not be
a major contributing factor because ownership of land cannot
easily be concealed, unlike work activity status or ownership
of small-scale assets. However, since AIDIS seeks responses
from only one member of the household, it could be possible in
large households that ownership of female members is under-
reported due to a lack of information. Social norms, in much of
India, discriminate against asset ownership by women. In such
a context, if the ownership details are proxy-reported, which
in most cases is by a male member of the household, they could
under-report or wrongly assign the ownership to the husband/
father of the female member. Therefore, while AIDIS estimates
are much closer to the reality of male and female landowner-
ship based on the available evidence and the sociocultural
66
norms and government interventions in different states, we
cannot completely rule out the possibility of some under-esti-
mation for the variables which capture the landownership status
of the women in a household. Due to this, the share of female
landowners in reality could be higher than the AIDIS estimate
of 5.5%, but far below the NFHS estimate of 31.7%.
Conclusions
Nationally representative data on women’s landownership
in India has been limited. The NFHS has collected limited
information on female landownership for the last two rounds.
However, questions have been raised on the accuracy of its
estimates which capture whether the woman owns a land or
not. We used the latest round of AIDIS, which for the first time
collected detailed gender-disaggregated data on landowner-
ship, to compare and check the accuracy of NFHS estimates.
We find that in terms of the proportion of females owning
any land, the two data sets differed substantially both at the
national and regional levels. The ownership among different
groups based on individual and household characteristics
shows that NFHS estimates are many times higher than AIDIS.
The category of owning land “both alone and jointly” seems
to be over-reported in states (such as Bihar, UP, Jharkhand,
etc), which are reporting relatively higher discrepancies with
AIDIS data. Contrarily, the discrepancies between NFHS and
AIDIS are much lower when we use the indicator which cap-
tures the share of households that have reported whether at
least one female member owned agricultural land.
While acknowledging the potential underestimation of wom-
en’s ownership in AIDIS due to proxy reporting, AIDIS estimates
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april 20, 2024 vol lIX no 16 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
 SPECIAL ARTICLE

align well with existing evidence on Appendix

women’s landownership. The data collec- Figure A1: Percentage of Households with at Least One Female Owning an Agricultural Land
tion methodology of AIDIS is also more India 11.6 ( 0.1) 17.3 ( 0.4)
reliable, as it collects ownership infor-
mation both individually and plotwise. Uttarakhand 15.5 (0.6) 22.5 (3)

Central
Uttar Pradesh 10.1 (0.2) 19.3 (1)
Even though NFHS remains an impor- Madhya Pradesh 10.7 (0.2) 13.8 (1.5)
tant source of information on a range Chhattisgarh 11.2 (1.8) 12.6 (0.4)
of indicators pertaining to women’s and
West Bengal 8.3 (0.5) 13.8 (1.3)
children’s health, the ever-increasing
Odisha 7.7 (0.3) 11.9 (1.5)

East
number of variables being captured by Jharkhand 8.7 (1.7) 9.2 (0.4)
the survey has cast doubts on data qual- Bihar 7.7 (0.3) 8.6 (1)
ity (Srinivasan and Mishra 2020). The
Rajasthan 8.1 (0.3) 13.5 (1.2)
high women’s landownership reported Punjab 8.7 (0.5) 14.7 (2.8)
in NFHS necessitates a thorough re-ex- North Jammu and Kashmir 6.1 (0.4) 17.7 (3.4)
amination by the survey organisation. Himachal Pradesh 16.9 (0.6) 18.5 (3.2)
Haryana 9.7 (0.5) 14.1 (2.8)
The identified inconsistencies underscore
the importance of researchers exercising Tripura 11 (2) 13.8 (1.2)
caution when using the data set. Given Sikkim 11 (2) 11.8 (1.7)
the comprehensive nature of NFHS data, Nagaland 5.5 (2.6) 13.4 (0.7)
NorthԟEast

Mizoram 14.7 (1.1) 15.8 (2.9)

a critical analysis of estimations for other 71.5 (5.4)
Meghalaya


85.5 (1.1)
variables would contribute to enhancing Manipur 11.6 (2.8) 13.7 (1)
the overall data collection methodology. Assam 7.5 (0.3) 12 (1.9)
Arunachal Pradesh 16.4 (4.2) 18.6 (0.7)
Note
1 The only nationally representative data set Telangana 22 (0.5) 22.5 (2.5)
that these existing studies have used (in addi- Tamil Nadu 13.2 (1.5) 13.7 (0.6)
South

tion to NFHS) is the Indian Human Develop- Kerala 28.8 (1.2) 48.2 (2.2)
ment Survey (IHDS) 2011–12 (for example, Karnataka 15.9 (0.4) 19.5 (1.6)
Lahoti et al 2016). Even IHDS, as discussed by Andhra Pradesh 20.9 (0.8) 26.6 (2.1)
Agarwal et al (2021), is limited because it did
not collect information on the extent of land
owned by women; collected data only for the Maharashtra 14 (0.5) 23.8 (1.4)
West

“top three owners”; did not collect details of Gujarat 9.9 (0.4) 11.5 (1.5)
joint/individual ownership. Agarwal et al (2021) Goa 15.9 (3.1) 19.1 (9.1)
use sample longitudinal data of 30 villages
across nine states between 2010 and 2014 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
collected by ICRISAT. While this data allows
for calculations of multiple indicators of female % of households with at least one female agricultural landowner
landownership, it is limited by its lack of repre- NFHS AIDIS
sentativeness. Swaminathan et al (2012) use
only a state-level sample survey, called the Source: Authors’ calculations from unit-level data of NFHS-5 and AIDIS 2019.
Karnataka Household Asset Survey (KHAS)
conducted in 2010–11 to find the distribution of Figure A2: Distribution of Matching Status within Each Individual and Household Characteristic
ownership across genders. (%)—AIDIS Coefficients on NFHS Data

References ST 61.5 2.6 35.9

SC 68.8 3.3 28
Caste

Abraham, Rosa, Nisha Anjum, Rahul Lahoti and

Hema Swaminathan (2023): “What Did They Others 72 2.9 25.1
Say? Respondent Identity, Question Framing
and the Measurement of Employment,” Centre OBC 65.4 3.1 31.4
for Sustainable Employment Working Paper
#55, Azim Premji University, Bengaluru.
Other religions 70.8 4.9 24.3
Abraham, Rosa and Anand Shrivastava (2022):
Religion

“How Comparable Are India’s Labour Market Muslim 70.2 2.9 26.9
Surveys?” Indian Journal of Labour Economics,
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Hindu 66.8 3 30.3

Vol 65, No 2, pp 321–46.
Agarwal, Bina (1994): A Field of One’s Own: Gender
Respondent Head?

and Land Rights in South Asia: Cambridge: Yes 46.7 42.4 10.9
Cambridge University Press.
Agarwal, Bina, Pervesh Anthwal and Malvika No 69 0.1 30.9
Mahesh (2021): “How Many and Which Women
Own Land in India? Inter-gender and Intra-
gender Gaps,” Journal of Development Studies,
Urban 74.4 3.7 22
Sector

Vol 57, No 11, pp 1807–29. Rural 64.2 2.7 33.1

Agarwal, Bina and Christophe Z Guilmoto (2023):
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
“The NFHS Data on Women’s Land Ownership: (%)
Pitfalls and Prospects,” Economic and Political
Weekly, Vol 58, No 33, pp 13–17. Matched Ownership over-predicted Ownership under-predicted
Ambler, Kate, Cherly Doss, Caitlin Kieran and Row sum is 100 for each subcategory.
Simone Passarelli (2021): “He Says, She Says: Source: Authors’ calculations from unit-level data of NFHS-5 and AIDIS 2019.

Economic & Political Weekly EPW april 20, 2024 vol lIX no 16 67
SPECIAL ARTICLE
Spousal Disagreement in Survey Measures of
Bargaining Power,” Economic Development and
Cultural Change, Vol 69, No 2, pp 765–88.
Bhalotra, Sonia, Abhishek Chakravarty, Dilip
Mookherjee and Francisco J Pino (2019):
“Property Rights and Gender Bias: Evidence
from Land Reform in West Bengal,” American
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No 2, pp 205–37.
Biswas, Shreya, Upasak Das and Prasenjit Sarkhel
(2023): “Duration of Exposure to Inheritance
Law in India: Examining the Heterogeneous
Effects on Empowerment,” Review of Development
Economics, Vol 28, No 2, pp 777–99.
IIPS and ICF (2021): “National Family Health Survey
(NFHS-5), India, 2019–20: Karnataka,” Inter-
national Institute for Population Sciences,
Mumbai.
Jain, Charu, Disha Saxena, Chandni Mishra, Rupal
Landesa (2013): Report on the Formal and Informal
Barriers in the Implementation of the Hindu
Succession (Amendment) Act 2005, in the con-
text of Women Agricultural Producers of
Andhra Pradesh, Bihar and Madhya Pradesh,
Landesa Rural Development Institute.
Lahoti, Rahul, Suchitra J Y and Hema Swaminathan
(2016): “Not in Her Name: Women’s Property
Ownership in India,” Economic & Political
Weekly, Vol 51, No 5, pp 17–19.
Mahato, Rakesh Kumar, Arindam Das and
Bheemeshwar Reddy A (2023): “Gender Ine-
quality in Land Ownership in India: Evidence
from National Sample Survey,” Social Science
Research Network (SSRN).
Figure A3: Distribution of Women’s (15–49 Years) House Ownership Status in NFHS (%), for Major States
India 57.7
All
NSO (2021): “All India Debt and Investment Survey—
January to December, 2019,” National Statistics
Office, Ministry of Statistics and Programme
Implementation, Government of India.
Roy, Sanchari (2015): “Empowering Women?
Inheritance Rights, Female Education and
Dowry Payments in India,” Journal of Develop-
ment Economics, Vol 114, pp 233–51.
Srinivasan, K and Rakesh Mishra (2020): “Quality
of Data in NFHS-4 Compared to Earlier
Rounds: An Assessment,” Economic & Political
Weekly, Vol 55, No 6, pp 40–45.
Swaminathan, Hema, Rahul Lahoti and Suchitra J Y
(2012): “Gender Asset and Wealth Gaps: Evidence
from Karnataka,” Economic & Political Weekly,
Vol 47, No 35, pp 59–67.
13 13.7 15.5

Taneja, Deepak Sanan and Somnath Sen

(2022): “Empirical Evidence of Gender Bias in
Land Ownership in India,” NCAER Working Uttarakhand 76.2 6.8 7.4 9.7
Paper: WP 132, National Council of Applied
Central

Economic Research. Uttar Pradesh 48.8 9.2 15.5 26.6

Kilic, Talip, Heather Moylan and Gayatri Koolwal Madhya Pradesh 61.1 6.9 13.9 18.1
(2021): “Getting the (Gender-Disaggregated)
Lay of the Land: Impact of Survey Respondent Chhattisgarh 54.9 7.2 14.8 23.1
Selection on Measuring Land Ownership and
Rights,” World Development, Vol 146, 105545.
Kurian, Oommen C (2015): “Data and Discrimina- West Bengal 77.9 4.9 7.8 9.4
tion: Women’s Ownership of Assets in India,” Odisha 57.5 20.4 12.1 10
East

Oxfam India.
Jharkhand 36.4 9.2 23.9 30.4
Table A1: Age Category-wise Percentage of
Female Landowners in Total Female Population Bihar 45.6 12.7 19.4 22.3
in India, Using AIDIS
% of Female
Landowners
Rajasthan 74 4.7 8.6 12.7
Between 15 and 49 years 5.5 Punjab 36.8 21 26.9 15.3
North

50 years and above 26.1 Jammu and Kashmir 43.1 12.4 22.2 22.3
15 years and above 10.9
Himachal Pradesh 77.5 2.7 15.6 4.2
Source: Authors’ calculations from unit-level data of
AIDIS 2019. Haryana 61.4 7.6 13.2 17.8

Table A2: Distribution of Matching Status

across Different Individual and Household
Tripura 84.2 3.9 4.7 7.2
Characteristics (%)—AIDIS Coefficients on Sikkim 47.4 21 16.6 15
NFHS Data
Nagaland 74.5 5.7 9.9 9.9
North East

Matched Ownership Ownership Share in

Over- Under- Weighted- Mizoram 80.6 5.2 6.5 7.7
predicted predicted sample
Meghalaya 35.3 20 23.1 21.7
Sector
Manipur 42.5 12.1 21.4 24
Urban 35.5 39.1 24.0 32.2
Assam 57.8 8.3 17.8 16.1
Rural 64.5 60.9 76.0 67.8
Caste
Arunachal Pradesh 30.9 15.9 28 25.1
SC 22.1 23.4 20.6 21.7
ST 8.4 7.9 11.2 9.2 Telangana 36.4 38.5 15.1 10
OBC 42.4 45.0 46.6 43.8 Tamil Nadu 52.9 29.5 11.8 5.7
South

Others 27.1 23.7 21.6 25.4 Kerala 75.4 13.1 6.5 5

Religion Karnataka 33.7 31.7 19.3 15.3
Hindu 79.9 78.1 82.9 80.7 Andhra Pradesh 54.4 27.4 12.5 5.8
Muslim 14.6 13.5 12.8 14.0
Other
religions 5.5 8.5 4.3 5.3 Maharashtra 78.5 7.4 6.1 8
West

Respondent head? Gujarat 57.8 8.5 18.1 15.6

No 95.1 1.9 97.4 92.9 Goa 77.2 8 4 10.9
Yes 4.9 98.2 2.6 7.1 0 20 40 60 80 100
(%)
Column sum is 100 for each category.
Source: Authors’ calculations from unit-level data of Does not own Alone only Jointly Both alone and jointly
NFHS-5 and AIDIS 2019. Source: Authors’ calculations from unit-level data of NFHS-5.

68 april 20, 2024 vol lIX no 16 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
 POSTSCRIPT
IDENTITY

From Namaskara to Annyeong

Questioning Where I Belong
A young Mizo woman’s short holiday in South Korea brings up questions of identity and belonging.

Embassy Lawbei

I
n October 2023, I travelled to Seoul and Busan with two
of my best friends. A first visit for all of us, it was exciting
and nerve-wracking at the same time. Our limited knowl-
edge of the culture is from watching Korean dramas and
K-pop culture. We are familiar with certain phrases like
Annyeonghaseyo, Khamsamida, Saranghaeyo and hoped that
they might help in our interactions with the locals. So we
expected a culture shock, but it came in the most unexpected
way—an existential crisis that made me question who I am
and where I belong.
I observed that, in general, Koreans do not bother you
whether you are a local or a foreigner. They keep to them-
selves, eyes glued to their phones. So, it was a pleasant sur-
prise to see an Ajusshi (a term used to describe an older man)
approach us curiously on the subway one day. He My identity was
asked in limited English where we were from. questioned—am I
When we said it was India, he exclaimed “ah more Mizo or Mara? Mara, but once I moved outside of my hometown
Indo!” He looked at me and said, “you Korean,”
and I said, “I am Indian.” Pausing for a moment and pointing
at my friend, he said, “She is Indian, you no Indian.” I tried
explaining for some time that I was indeed Indian but gave
up because he remained unconvinced. I thought to myself,
“Here I am in Seoul, wearing a kurta and bindi to assert my
Indian identity, yet my Mongoloid features say otherwise. In
India, my home country, I am called Chinese, Nepali, etc.” I
joked to my friend that I belong nowhere. And even though we
laughed about it, it does make me question: Where do I fit in?
Yes, I was born and brought up in India, but I do not speak Hindi
(which is increasingly being equated with Indianness) nor do I
look like a typical Indian. But in Ajusshi’s defence, I do look
more Korean than Indian. This kind of encounter is a common
occurrence. Over the years, I have grown to learn and accept
these differences and shatter the boundary of “us” versus “them.”
But what an odd feeling to have that in a foreign country!
As someone who grew up in a close-knit Mizo society, I had
limited exposure and interaction outside of my community.
My knowledge of the world comes from textbooks and the
media—mainly Hollywood films and Western music. Grow-
ing up, my bedroom walls had pictures of Western celebrities
and my notebook had lyrics of either Mizo or English pop
songs. It was much later that I realised that I had very little
exposure to my Indian culture. The only vais (a term used to
refer to outsiders or non-Mizos) I had interacted with were a
few schoolteachers or migrants. To this date, I do not speak
any other language except English and Mizo. Our names are
Economic & Political Weekly EPW april 20, 2024 vol lix no 16
either in Mizo or English or a combination of the two. Find-
ing a “typical Indian name” with a Mizo surname would
not be easy. For instance, names like Aaryan Sailo, Kavitha
Ralte, etc, are unheard of but Kim Ralte or Kim Sailo are
common, borrowing from Korean names, quick as we are to
adopt Korean trends.
This feeling of being different is instilled in us at a very
young age in our family, our society, and our school. The “us
versus them” rhetoric is very common at home, and I have
felt this on multiple levels. Mizoram has five major tribes—
Lushai, Hmar, Ralte, Lai, and Mara, all grouped under
“Mizo.” I belong to the Mara tribe, and we reside in the
southern part of the state, bordering Myanmar. Since the
Maras have a language and culture that is different from the
majority Lushais, I grew up with a conflicting
identity. Within my community, I was a proud
and lived with the Lushais, the identity confusion
intensified. My identity was questioned—am I more Mizo or
Mara? When I speak my mother tongue, I am either made
fun of or my being different is emphasised by Mizos. Interest-
ingly, when I moved out of Mizoram for higher studies, I in-
troduced myself as a Mizo because what is the point of ex-
plaining the nuances to those who see all of us as “north-
eastern only”? In any case, there is a common thread—the
Mizoness—that binds all the tribes together. Just like all
North East Indians are put into one box by others, we too
group all the mainland Indians into the monolithic “vais.”
The “us versus them” is now between the Mizo and the vais.
The sense of alienation we feel stems not just from the pre-
sent but is a cumulative product of the past as well. Insurgen-
cies, hostility, and conflict have put us in direct battle against
the vais for many decades; the resentment from past experi-
ences is perhaps deeply entrenched. Apart from this, there
are many identifiable differences in food preferences, cul-
ture, and religious beliefs. Most importantly, the main differ-
ence is visible in the physical features of the people from the
North East. When South Korea’s Arirang TV reached our
households, the actors seemed like a reflection of us. Their
food is similar to our cuisine. Their communication pat-
terns—body language, gestures, voice modulation, etc—are
relatable to us and we feel that we can see a little bit of our-
selves in them. Perhaps that is why our local cable channels
have more Korean films dubbed into the Mizo language than
Bollywood films.
71
 POSTSCRIPT
IDENTITY | CULTURE, CITY

A fleeting interaction with a Korean man brought on a

reflection about my own identity. Identity is not constant;
we change and adapt based on our situation. I am a Mara in
Mizoram, a Mizo outside the state, and an Indian in South
Korea; I am constantly navigating my multi-hyphenated
identity. I also understand that my interpersonal experience
is part of a larger shared experience of the north-eastern
people in India. It also forces us to look at our own responsi-
bility towards “them” and our role in creating that divide.
The negotiation continues. This uncomfortable position that I
find myself in forces me to renegotiate and reconfigure my
identity constantly. That said, it affords me a rare opportu-
nity to navigate multiple identities and gain perspectives
which another Mara, Mizo, or even an Indian would, per-
haps, not be able to. Even though Ajusshi could not believe
that I was Indian and had called me a “non-original Indi-
an,” I embrace my hyphenated, sometimes confl icting,
identities. It felt great to come back to my second home,
Bengaluru, and say Namaskara instead of Annyeong.
Embassy Lawbei (emmylawbei@gmail.com) teaches at the Department of Media
Studies, CHRIST (Deemed to be University), Bengaluru. She is engaged in teaching and
research on media, conflict, and human rights.

72 april 20, 2024 vol lix no 16 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

Economic & Political Weekly
POSTSCRIPT
CULTURE, CITY | CINEMA, MEMORY, PAIN, DEMENTIA
Three of Us
A Tender Saga of Pain,
Mourning, and Care
This meditative film slows down time, allowing for
an unobtrusive entry in the register of pain.
Jyoti Dalal
Who is the third who walks always beside you?
When I count, there are only you and I together.
—T S Eliot, The Waste Land (1982)
A
person in pain not only experiences difficulty in ex-
pressing its magnitude, but also struggles to enter
into an intersubjective realm with the other person.
American academic Elaine Scarry writes about this inex-
pressibility and unshareability of pain to the point of de-
stroying the capacity for language, something that becomes
visible in cries and shrieks. But the other dimension of pain
comes forth in Veena Das’s Wittgensteinian enquiry in Life
and Words (2006), which explores a way of its inhabitation
that provides anchoring in the symbolic realm. Avinash
Arun’s film, Three of Us (2023), subtly responds to this phe-
nomenological experience through Shailaja’s (Shefali Shah)
journey back into her past to inhabit the pain that awaits her
in the face of dementia. This nuanced piece resonates with
Das’s anthropological quest: What does it mean to know the
pain of the other? How does one move from the inexpressi-
bility and unshareability that is experienced while being in
pain to the point of opening up a realm where sharing and
healing become possible? Approaching the world with a ges-
ture of mourning allows Shailaja an unobtrusive entry into
the registers of pain, which, instead of closing down, opens
the index of cohabitation and relationality.
Three of Us is woven around Shailaja’s search for her ori-
gin, as her worsening condition puts her on a threshold from
where she looks into an abyss whose emptiness threatens to
engulf her, erasing her existence. Quitting her clerical job
and navigating noisy, chaotic Mumbai through lists and re-
minders, she shares with her husband, Dipankar (Swanand
Kirkire), the desire to visit Vengurla, a sleepy town in Kon-
kan where she spent a few years in early adolescence. This
might be her last attempt to salvage her core in the face of
the impending devastation. It echoes Theodor Adorno’s re-
mark on the genius piece of Fantasie in C that the great pia-
nist, Robert Schumann, composed just before his mental
collapse, as was recounted in the movie, The Piano Teacher
(2001): “He knows he’s losing his mind. It torments him but
he clings on one last time. It’s being aware of what it means
to lose oneself before being completely abandoned.” It is this
EPW april 20, 2024 vol lix no 16 73
 POSTSCRIPT
CINEMA, MEMORY, PAIN, DEMENTIA

knowledge of the impending collapse that draws Shailaja to the symbolic location, as alluded to by Jacques Lacan. This
her past with the hope of finding a safe harbour for the oce- story of love and loss traverses deceit and hurt with such
anic turbulence that awaits her. grace that the usual neat boundaries made between them
Decades ago, Shailaja’s family had left Vengurla suddenly are softened, tenderly fusing into each other, giving an
after she lost her elder sister, in front of her eyes, leaving experience of boundarylessness to the viewers. And so,
her childhood sweetheart Pradeep Kamat (Jaydeep Ahlawat) Dipankar oiling Shailaja’s hair or Pradeep embroidering
behind. Neither her place of birth nor of work or marriage, a saree for Sarika fit in the layered relationality of love
this becomes the in-between space marked by Avinash Arun does and care that encompasses what is conveniently
love and loss. Revisiting that unprocessed pain is not allow the usual understood to be against it.
required to reconcile with the past before it cacophony of trust, “Who is the third in Three of Us?” is an interest-
stands erased for her. In this exploration of her treachery, and ing aporia faced by the viewers. A convenient
origin, Shailaja might have come in contact with deceit to consume reading would put their partners by marriage as
its timelessness, where the origin is not only in the narrative that the third in the equation that unfolds between
the past, but also inhabits a space that is near, jettisons the third Shailaja and Pradeep. An important position in-
existing in the present—as was grasped by out of the frame deed, though external and outside, providing a
Pradeep’s brilliant poem, Udgam (Origin). This strong backdrop for the love to be rescripted
journey back into her past has an ineffable effect on Shailaja. between them. However, the possibility of Pradeep being the
How she mattered to this place and to the few people here, third also lies open, not only for disrupting the banality of
like her friends, her teachers, the old woman at the beach, marriage but for bringing up fresh contours in Shailaja’s mar-
and most importantly, Pradeep, becomes important knowl- riage. The shifting nature of the third is such in this musical
edge for her. The capacity of humans to heal each other piece that Shailaja herself could be the third, not only for giv-
in strange, known and unknown ways, giving them faith ing new dimensions to Pradeep but also for the alliance that
in their existence is brilliantly touched upon by Olga emerges between two men—Pradeep and Dipankar. The
Tokarczuk in Tender Narrator, her acceptance speech for register laid out by pain provides such an expanse of con-
the 2019 Nobel Prize in Literature. She narrates how her nectedness and relationality that at what point viewers also
first experience of the world came from her mother who participate and cohabit this space of devastation becomes
missed her even before she was born; approaching the difficult to locate. It dissolves their hardened projections,
world with this knowledge scripted a beginning for Olga to striking a chord with their vulnerable insides that stand
which she often returned. healed and cared for. The movie stands as a reminder to so-
Like Olga’s tender narrator, the movie is scripted on the cial scientists to not bypass the realm of pain in their enquir-
mutual nature of healing. Meeting Shailaja after all these ies and to stand humbly while being marked by the pain of
decades softly touches Pradeep, allowing him to walk the other so that the language of pain can emerge without
down memory lane with the woman whom he always objectifying the other.
wanted by his side. After all, despite being married to Sarika,
Jyoti Dalal (jyoti.dalal@ihe.du.ac.in) teaches at the Institute of Home Economics,
his beginning could also be traced back to this centre in University of Delhi.
which Shailaja dwells. Without any declarations of love
and longing, the long gazes and silences in the movie pro-
vide enough space for the viewers to feel the tenderness
that exists in their transitional space. The nature of this
space is such that instead of narrowing their worlds, it
becomes expanding and encompassing, providing a canvas
not only to Shailaja and Pradeep, but also to their partners,
Dipankar and Sarika, who witness the unfathomable bond
between their partners with a hint of jealousy and under-
standable disturbance. If the strange contentedness and
confidence in Shailaja is unknown to her husband, Sarika
too had not been able to inspire the poet in Pradeep all
those years, in the way Shailaja managed in just a few
days. However, Arun does not allow the usual cacophony
of trust, treachery, and deceit to consume the narrative
that jettisons the third out of the frame, be it Dipankar or
Sarika. Instead of being external interruptions as is stereo-
typically understood, they anchor them to the outside,
hooking them to the realm of language that comes with
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IDENTITY | CULTURE, CITY

tinctures and potions which are remnants from the period of

Bengal’s industrial nationalism, the headiness and frenzy of
Durga Pujo are also experienced with adequate preparation
to negate its associated enervation.
Bishwakarma Pujo flags off the festivities for most resi-
dents of the city. Chondi kaku, who would take us to school
on his rickety rickshaw, told us that Bishwakarma was the
architect of the universe, the creator of the shell that Brahma
breathed life into. Given the background, it did not make sense
that the worship of the cosmic framework’s creator was con-
fined to factories, industrial areas, shops, and small-scale pro-
duction units, like my uncle’s printing press in the central
business district of the city. In the satellite town where I grew
up, in what used to be the periphery of the city, it was primarily
celebrated by mechanics, welders, rickshaw pullers, and bus
drivers living and working there. Pandals were erected near
bus and rickshaw stands, in shops, and community market cen-
tres. On that day, vehicles and machines would be festooned
with garlands, rejuvenated with fresh coats of paint; shops
would be shut, and workers, busy tending to their visiting
god. Feasts would be organised, and on some occasions,
weekend trips to the nearest coastal town, all funded by
chaanda (donations) raised in the community of workers. For
others, Bishwakarma Pujo was associated with a day of kite-
An Elephant and a Kite flying and looped loudspeaker playthroughs of Kumar Sanu’s
discography.
Walk into a City… As Bishwakarma and his elephant vahana (mount) make
their way towards local ponds to be immersed, the city
gears up for the “big one.” The transition catches one off-
Relative to the scale of celebrations during Durga guard, with the overnight profusion of a cornucopia of cele-
Pujo, festivities like Bishwakarma Pujo are bratory billboards, coupled with the spontaneous advent of
gradually diminishing. commercials for everything from clothing brands to coconut
oil, all of which tug at the heart and purse strings of the
city’s residents, through a cautious blend of nostalgia and
Surya Sankar Sen presentism. This, for most, marks the true beginning of pujo.

S
eptember in Kolkata signals the beginning of the The word pujo is synonymous with Durga Pujo, an attenua-
annual period of festivities for which the city momen- tion of the subconscious accept-
tarily wakes up before retreating into its ascriptive The gradual ance of its prevalence over other
somnolence. During the week of Durga Pujo, the city is out on disappearance of festivities in the city. Durga Pujo
its streets, navigating the narrow, meandering alleys of the paper kites and has emerged as a significant source
north and the south’s Shibuya-like crossings. The typical de- Bishwakarma’s of revenue through tourism, com-
marcations of a day in the life of most residents, earmarked elephant is mercialisation, and a general aban-
by the first cup of tea and the morning newspaper, the after- indicative of larger donment of frugality.
noon siesta, and evening adda, are fused into an interminable transformations in The popularisation of theme-
experience of wandering the length and breadth of the city Kolkata’s urban pujos which pay homage to popu-
till one’s footwear comes undone. biome lar culture, and pandals which are
Growing up, one of the first things my brother and I did on interactive art installations—replete with complex structural
receiving the new year’s calendar was to check the exact date contrivances, auditory and visual stimuli leading to the final
that the festivities would commence. Like many, we were revelation of the idol ensconced within its decorative pali-
singularly fixated on the biggest and most grand festival of sades—have contributed towards the burgeoning scale of
this period, Durga Pujo. It falls at the centre, preceded and festivity. Organisational configurations have also witnessed
succeeded by festivities that are lesser in scale and spectacle. a concurrent transformation, as traditional barowari and
Like the insatiable Bengali appetite, which is sustained through sarbojonin arrangements, which entail some variation of
pre-empted cycles of ascetic abstinence and a dependence on cooperative, community-level organisation, are replaced by
72 april 20, 2024 vol lix no 16 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
 POSTSCRIPT
CULTURE, CITY | CINEMA, MEMORY, PAIN, DEMENTIA

sponsorships from big corporations and patronage from the

city’s notable political figureheads. Previously confined to
more affluent localities, patronage used to be concealed with-
in the chaanda that all community members contributed to,
but more recently have attained visibility as party flags and
banners of gratitude have become obligatory and consistent
components of the decorative motif.
Relative to the scale of celebrations during Durga Pujo,
festivities like Bishwakarma Pujo are gradually diminishing.
From a critical perspective, this marginalisation indicates
the muting of specific, sectional desires which emerge in the
context of a variegated urban sociality. The eclipsing of less-
er festivities will eventually denude a diverse festive calen-
dar. The consequent singularity of festive abandonment will
diminish the already-limited opportunities for respite avail-
able to the urban working classes. The expression of differ-
entiated desires in the city necessitates gaps in the routine
and rhythm of everyday life, afforded through festivals like
Bishwakarma Pujo.
Pujo has come to represent an undisputed singularity in
the conceptualisation and experience of respite from the de-
mands of urban life, but only for a select few. Romanticised
representations of this time are selective splices of a mottled
urban bricolage, which shroud variable experiences and ex-
pressions of mirthful abandonment that once pervaded a di-
verse urban sociality.
For the urban working class, Durga Pujo stretches work-
ing hours beyond conceived durations of normality. As peo-
ple’s purse strings come to be loosened, the festive economy
resembles a participative market on overdrive, unre-
strained by conventional diurnal work cycles or condition-
alities of expectable recompense in lieu of services ren-
dered, pushing the urban working classes to work as much
as they want to earn. During this week, the limits of their
bodily capabilities are pushed to the brink to capitalise on
this transient boom. The inability to access respite means
that they must keep pushing, pedalling, and driving to keep
the city’s framework functional. Like all animals which ex-
hibit sensitivities to changes in their environment, the
gradual disappearance of paper kites and Bishwakarma’s
elephant is indicative of larger transformations in Kolkata’s
urban biome.
With the disappearance of a habitat that was once condu-
cive to their flourishing, this current endangerment indicates
the unsustainability of diverse festive traditions in a chang-
ing city. Their eventual disappearance will signify a transi-
tion in the recognition of what may be viewed to necessitate
the suspension of the everyday normal. Like the proverbial
coal mine canaries, paper kites and clay elephants are indica-
tors of a city’s shifting contours, which invisibilises those
who engineer its inhabitable framework, just like their over-
looked god.
Surya Sankar Sen (surya.sen@sju.edu.in) teaches at the Department of Political Science,
School of Humanities and Social Sciences, St Joseph’s University, Bengaluru.

Economic & Political Weekly EPW april 20, 2024 vol lix no 16 73