' Academy of Management Review

2001, Vol. 26, No. 4, 645-663.

TIME: A NEW RESEARCH LENS

DEBORAH G. ANCONA
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

PAUL S. GOODMAN
Carnegie Mellon University

BARBARA S. LAWRENCE
University of California Los Angeles

MICHAEL L. TUSHMAN
Harvard Business School

We tend to use different lenses—strategic de-
sign, political, and cultural—to understand how
organizations function, depending on our theo-
retical orientations (Ancona, Kochan, Scully,
Van Maanen, & Westney, 1999). Like different
schema, each of these lenses leads us to focus
on certain variables and relationships while ig-
noring others. Focusing multiple lenses on a
given phenomenon highlights different aspects
of that phenomenon—much like the story of the
blind men and the elephant. Finally, each lens
suggests a different set of practices and solu-
tions to managers. The goal of this special issue
is to sharpen the temporal lens we use in con-
ducting organizational research. In this final ar-
ticle we revisit and delineate this new lens and
then identify some new and promising areas of
temporal organizational research.
In the organizational behavior literature the
strategic design lens focuses on designing strat-
egies that "fit" the environment and the struc-
ture of the firm and on looking for further con-
gruence among organizational components.
Managers play the role of organizational archi-
tects who design an organization in a way that
improves its ability to adapt to its environment.
The political lens focuses on power, influence,
and conflict. Here, managers need to leverage
power and negotiate across multiple interest
groups. The cultural lens focuses on norms,
meaning, artifacts, and values. Managers be-
come the creators of meaning, using symbols
and stories (Ancona et al., 1999).
The papers in this issue and the work that
they represent give us a new lens—the temporal
lens. Although time plays a role in each of the
other lenses, it is usually peripheral. In contrast,
the temporal lens puts time and timing front and
center. As such, although we can see the tempo-
ral lens as an additional component of the other
three lenses—organizations are designed using
temporal parameters (Ancona, Okhuysen, & Per-
low, 2001), the power and influence styles used
to create change depend on how quickly one has
to act (Huy, 2001), and cultures differ with re-
spect to temporal norms and expectations
(Blount & Janicik, 2001)—it is also clear that the
temporal lens can stand on its own. This lens
offers its own set of variables and relationships,
its own view of specific phenomena, and its own
set of parameters to guide managerial action.
Using the temporal lens, we begin to think not
just about processes and practices but also
about how fast they are moving (cf. Eisenhardt,
1989; Huy, 2001), their trajectories over time (cf.
Albert, 1995; Lawrence, Winn, & Jennings, 2001),
the cycles they align with (cf. Ancona et al., 2001;
Gersick, 1994; McGrath & Rotchford, 1983), and
the historical positions they take on the contin-
uum of time (cf. Blount & Janicik, 2001; Clark,
1985). We think not only about the individual
personality but the individual's time urgency
and time perspective (Conte, Landy, & Mathieu,
1995; Perlow, 1999; Waller, Conte, Gibson, & Car-
penter, 2001). Is a person focused on the past, the
present, or the future (Zimbardo & Boyd, 1999)?
When these things are taken into account, work
is not only designed to fit task interdependen-
cies but also to fit group-member temporal ori-
entations and to provide "flow" (Mainemelis,
2001). We seek to understand when an activity
starts and stops and how a changing deadline

645
646 Academy of Management Review
impacts behavior (cf. Blount & Janicik, 2001; Lim
& Murningham, 1994). Finally, we begin to ex-
amine the cultures of time—how monochronic
versus polychronic temporal cultures affect the
very nature of behavior—and what happens as
we move across temporal cultures (Ancona et
al., 2001; Bluedorn & Denhardt, 1988; Zerubavel,
1979).
In other words, the variables of interest in this
new lens include timing, pace, cycles, rhythms,
flow, temporal orientation, and the cultural
meanings of time. As time can be allocated
across activities, likewise, activities can be
scheduled, fit to a deadline, accelerated, or
shifted in time. Time can be objectively por-
trayed and interpreted based on the measured,
linear, forward-moving, and exact clock time. It
also can reflect the subjective experience of
each individual.
As we sharpen the temporal lens, it permeates
our research methods. We begin to think about
when and how often to measure key variables
and how to measure the "correct" lag across
causal variables (Mitchell & James, 2001). Fur-
thermore, our data collection and analysis take
on new forms. Graphs of activities mapped to
time pinpoint the temporal location of phenom-
ena, their pace, cycles, and rhythms as they
repeat over time. We draw the interactions
across temporal maps and the shape of changes
over time (Ancona et al., 2001; Lawrence et al.,
2001). Does the change move smoothly and
monotonically over time, or is there a spiral that
shifts exponentially where small swings grow to
major gyrations? We can even draw maps that
correspond to different cultural interpretations
of time—for example, by juxtaposing a clock-
time map, an event-time map, and multiple sub-
jective-time maps.
RATIONALE
Why take on such a new lens? To make it
worthwhile, the discomfort of learning a new
way of thinking must be offset by some key
advantage. Perhaps the best way to show this is
through an example. Suppose a researcher is
interested in understanding why the introduc-
tion of a new information technology system
worked in one organization but did not work in
another. Through a strategic design lens, the
researcher comes to understand that the system
worked better in an organization that was de-
October
signed around teams than it did in an individu-
ally based organization. Through a political
lens, the researcher sees that there was consen-
sus for the change in the first company, whereas
a high-level manager in the second company
resisted the new technology. The cultural lens
shows two different cultures—one based on ex-
perimentation and risk and the other based on
rejection of new ideas and change.
In the two situations each of these lenses
missed some key temporal dimensions. In the
first organization the new system was intro-
duced just as some other organizational
changes were taking place. Organizational
members were ready for change and were ex-
pecting their work to shift. In the second organi-
zation the new system was introduced when
members were rushing to finish all of their
projects by the end of the quarter. They did not
feel as though they had the time to finish their
work and learn a new technology at the same
time.
Furthermore, members in the first organiza-
tion had heard from colleagues at competitor
firms that this new technology had already
swept through the industry and resulted in real
competitive advantage. In the second organiza-
tion the technology was new to the industry and
no fevered race to catch up to the competition
existed. Finally, the CEO of the first organiza-
tion had a very long-term planning horizon, and
she saw the move to this technology as part of a
larger trend to computerize particular processes.
The CEO of the second organization, however,
had a shorter-term perspective and was more
concerned about the temporary disruption of
work that the new technology would cause.
This example clearly shows why we should
take on a temporal lens: it provides an important
framework for explaining and understanding or-
ganizational behavior. Another advantage of
this new lens is that it focuses our attention on
new classes of independent and dependent
variables. In this example, and in articles by
Huy (2001) and Lawrence et al. (2001), the se-
quencing, pacing, and duration of change are
critical variables that provide new theoretical
insights.
Still another reason for selecting the lens is to
sharpen our methodological approaches. The
duration of X and Y and the temporal relation-
ship between X and Y are fundamental ques-
tions, yet in their review of the literature, Mitch-
2001 Ancona, Goodman, Lawrence, and Tushman
ell and James (2001) conclude that these
questions are addressed in very few empirical
studies. It seems that an explicit consideration
of these timing issues would improve the qual-
ity of empirical research in our field.
OBSTACLES TO THE TEMPORAL LENS
It may be instructive to ponder briefly why
time is not embedded in our research. If it is
such a pervasive phenomenon, why don't we see
a well-articulated temporal view throughout or-
ganizational research? Why do researchers re-
sist using a temporal lens?
One reason may be that most field studies of
organizations are often "studies of convenience
or opportunity." It is hard enough to gain organ-
izational access. It is even harder to capture
events over time using multiple measures. This
not only takes time but additional resources and
lots of cooperation. We are accustomed to get-
ting in and out of organizations quickly. These
additional considerations preclude the use of a
temporal lens.
Similarly, much of the experimental work re-
garding organizational behavior is built around
very short-term tasks. There are a lot of reasons
for this short-term mentality: existing designs
legitimated in the literature, the focus on con-
trol, and so on. In any of these cases, the short-
term design makes it more difficult to use a
temporal lens. It is tricky to include variables of
duration, pacing, or sequencing in a fifteen-
minute task (although it has been done; cf. Ger-
sick, 1988; McGrath & Kelly, 1986; Waller, Giam-
batista, & Zellmer-Bruhn, 1999).
Overall, perhaps the biggest impediment to
using the temporal lens is that it is simply hard
to do. The difficulty stems from several sources.
First, we still have little theory about time lags,
feedback loops, and durations, making it diffi-
cult to know when, for how long, and how often
to measure key variables, even when we want to
take on a temporal perspective. Second, we do
not yet have all of the methodologies needed to
measure complex temporal phenomena. Al-
though we are skilled at detecting linear pat-
terns and even quadratic forms, we are not yet
able to readily detect spirals that increase and
decrease over time. Third, we are not experi-
enced enough to know how to choose temporal
variables. For example, in a study of entrain-
ment in software development teams, we had a
647
hard time deciding whether we needed to exam-
ine days, weeks, months, or years. In looking at
entrainment patterns, we did not know which
cycles to include (technology, customer, fiscal,
and so on). Only through some difficult trial-
and-error learning will we improve our use of
the temporal lens. Last, some features of tempo-
ral research are inherently complex. For exam-
ple, we have been trying to study teams that
respond to attacks on the internet. One obvious
problem is that we do not know when attacks
(e.g., the spreading of viruses) will occur. Also,
the definition of an attack is socially defined.
We can identify attacks after they are publicly
determined to be so, but we cannot easily deter-
mine when an incident is dismissed as not an
attack. In addition, the groups that respond to
these attacks are distributed, have a life of a few
hours or a few days, and change in their com-
position from one attack to the next. This means
we cannot study group behavior over time.
These and other factors make using the tempo-
ral lens hard to do.
There also are broader, institutional reasons
for the lack of focus on time. Doctoral disserta-
tions are planned around short rather than
longer stays. Tenure clocks focus new professors
on shorter-term products. The application of
time-based research requires new methodolog-
ical approaches that may not resonate with the
editorial boards of traditional journals. These
and other institutional factors focus our atten-
tion on the short term, detracting from temporal
issues.
The basic thesis of this issue is that the
temporal lens brings new functionality to re-
search. At the same time, understanding the
reasons why so little temporal research exists
may allow us to realistically assess our ability
to stimulate this new form of research. This
special issue will have little effect unless we
(1) rethink how we do our research (e.g., we
need to create new "contracts" with firms that
will let us explore important temporal issues,
to the benefit of both parties), (2) rethink some
of our institutional arrangements, such as en-
couraging more time-based research in theses
and our journals, and (3) experiment with
new forms of data collection and analysis. If
new members of our profession begin using
temporal lenses in their research, the body of
research will grow quickly.
648 Academy of Management Review
LOOKING TOWARD FUTURE RESEARCH
OPPORTUNITIES
In the remainder of the article, we chart some
possible paths for future research. Once we
adopt the temporal lens, what new opportunities
for research does it reveal? The three paths de-
lineated represent the views of the special issue
editors. We are writing about what we think is
important in exploring the temporal lens. There
is no attempt to integrate these perspectives;
rather, they represent important opportunities
for research. Coupling these perspectives with
the concluding sections of other papers in this
issue gives the reader a nice set of directions for
temporal organizational research.
In the first discussion Barbara S. Lawrence
explores the idea of timing norms. In all aspects
of organizational life, there are timing norms
that govern a wide range of behaviors in organ-
izations. Questions such as what timing norms
look like, where they come from, and what their
effects are form the basis of the discussion. Law-
rence also pays attention to methodological is-
sues in studying timing norms. Readers should
be stimulated to think about how timing norms
can be integrated into their own research or
explored as a research topic in their own right.
The second discussion, by Paul S. Goodman,
builds upon the Mitchell and James (2001) paper
by examining in more depth their question
about understanding lags in organizational re-
search. That is, given X, when will Y occur? The
goal is not just to help us be more explicit about
when Y will occur but to focus on developing
better theoretical tools to help us understand
lags in organizational phenomena. Goodman
draws examples from the literature on organi-
zational change and organizational errors and
pays attention to the timing between X and Y in
single and multilevel contexts. In much of our
current research, this timing question is not
carefully considered. But if we adopt the tempo-
ral lens, it forces us to think about the issue.
In the last discussion Deborah G. Ancona and
Michael L. Tushman use the lens to reframe how
we think about temporal leadership. They exam-
ine top management teams as they entrain their
organizations to technology cycles, manage
across multiple time frames, create temporal ar-
chitectures, and maintain a vision that provides
an anchor for the strategic pacing of the firm.
October
TIMING NORMS: THE RHYTHM OF
INTERACTION
Barbara S. Lawrence
Our temporal lens draws attention to timing
norms, which people experience as shared, ex-
pected patterns of paced activity. Timing norms
govern many activities in organizational life.
Schedules for project completion (Ancona &
Chong, 1996; Gersick, 1988), patterns of activity
in work processes (Pentland, 1999), and career
timetables (Lawrence, 1991) enable people to co-
ordinate their behavior with that of others and
help them create meaning out of action. Yet
much of our literature focuses on personal expe-
riences with time—for example, on an indi-
vidual's time perspective and time urgency
(Waller et al., 2001) or his or her experiences of
timelessness (Mainemelis, 2001) and flow (Csik-
szentmihalyi, 1990). Although the importance of
individuals' encounters with timing norms is ac-
knowledged in the literature (Blount & Janicik,
2001; Lawrence, 1988; Zerubavel, 1981), we know
little about how people jointly create and expe-
rience such norms. This essay examines four
important questions: What do organizational
timing norms look like? What processes produce
these norms and the meanings they acquire?
What are the individual and organizational con-
sequences of such norms? Finally, what tools
can we use to study them?
One of the classic examples of timing norms
is Roy's 1959 article, "Banana Time," which de-
scribes a small group of machine operators who
construct their day around time-based rituals.
Hourly, they take a short break named after the
activity that occurs during the break: coffee
time, peach time, banana time, window time,
lunch time, pick-up time, fish time, and Coke
time. These coordinated activities represent
daily timing norms. When events do not occur
at the appointed times, the workers experience
disruption.
Several attributes in this example are worth
noting. First, there is an event timeline. The pat-
terned events—in this case, break times—occur
daily. They do not take place on a weekly or
monthly basis; rather, they recur every day. Sec-
ond, the event timeline is paced. The events
don't just transpire every day; they occur at spe-
cific times throughout the day. Third, the event
timeline is a norm. We know from Roy's obser-
vations of the workers' coordinated behavior
2001 Ancona, Goodman, Lawrence, and Tushman
that they have a shared understandings and
expectations of these events. Work is disrupted
when the prescribed events do not occur at the
prescribed times. Finally, the meaning of the
workers' timing norms is socially constructed.
While events and pacing may be either emer-
gent or scheduled, timing norms are always
given meaning through social interaction.
Several theoretical questions about such tim-
ing norms need study. The first is What do tim-
ing norms look like? Answering this question
involves exploring whether there are different
types of timing norms, examining what "level of
analysis" means when studying these phenom-
ena, and defining what characteristics consti-
tute a norm in the first place. One way of cate-
gorizing timing norms is to distinguish between
those that emerge through social interaction
and those that result from formally scheduled
events. Although the process of creating socially
shared meaning is the same for both, they differ
in how events and pacing are established. At
one extreme, emergent timing norms such as
• those in "Banana Time" are purely emic (cf.
Headland, 1990). Both the events and their pac-
ing are socially constructed, created, and expe-
rienced solely by the workers. At the other ex-
treme, scheduled timing norms, such as those
for a routine project's PERT chart, display an etic
quality. Both the events and their pacing are
established by an external authority. Does this
difference alter the creation and experience of
meaning around timing norms? Do emergent
timing norms exert more control over people's
behavior than scheduled timing norms? Emer-
gent timing norms may be stronger because
they require a level of buy-in that is unneces-
sary for scheduled timing norms. Alternately, do
scheduled timing norms exert more control over
people's behavior than emergent timing norms?
This might occur because the visibility of sched-
uled timing norms increases people's shared
agreement about when events occur. The social
construction of emergent timing norms may de-
crease people's shared agreement. When events
are not formally scheduled, it is easy to disagree
about when they occur.
A related issue is what "level of analysis"
means in this context. Timing norms do not oc-
cur at the individual, group, and organizational
levels of analysis, although they might be expe-
rienced this way. Rather, they occur at the event
timeline level of analysis, where the unit is de-
649
termined by the duration of the expected events
(see Pentland, 1999, for a discussion of this dis-
tinction). In "Banana Time" the described activ-
ities occur within a workgroup and could be
studied as a group-level phenomenon. However,
our concern is not so much the group as it is the
expected, shared pattern of behaviors—a timing
norm for which the level of analysis is one
workday. Other examples include the pacing
of work during a project, where the unit of anal-
ysis is the project, and sequences of jobs both
within and outside organizations, where the unit
of analysis is the career (Lawrence, 1991;
Zerubavel, 1981). Similarly, organizational
change processes develop timing norms, where
the unit of analysis is the length of the change
effort (Huy, 2001) or the time elapsed for new
practices to become diffused and legitimated
within an organization (Lawrence et al., 2001).
One problem that remains is to define what it
means to observe a socially shared, expected
pattern of paced activity. In "Banana Time" the
answer is reasonably simple, since only four
workers are involved during each one-day time
period. However, in more complex examples,
where the event timeline is longer, more people
are involved, and the number of events is larger,
it becomes more difficult to define each event.
How many people must agree that a timing
event is typical before it is considered to be
socially shared?
Lawrence (1988) shows that people do not al-
ways perceive the timing of typical events in the
same way. When managers in a large organiza-
tion were asked to describe their organization's
career timetable, their answers showed strong
modal timing patterns: about two-thirds agreed
on the ages when each career level was
reached. However, this means that one-third dis-
agreed. Is two-thirds agreement "enough" to say
that the managers' perceptions are socially
shared? What criteria should we use to decide
when we reach sufficient levels of agreement?
Moreover, if more or less agreement exists at
different times within the timeline of an event,
this suggests that deviation at one point may
create more or less difficulty than deviation at
another. The correct timing of events just before
the curtain falls is more important to the success
of a show than their timing during the middle.
The second question to be answered is Where
do timing norms come from? In "Banana Time"
we can guess that the norms were motivated by
650 Academy of Management Review
workers' boredom with repetitious work and de-
sire for meaningful social connection. The
themed breaks emerged during typical eating
and snacking times, when workers had time to
interact with one another and to coordinate their
efforts. Waller et al. (2001) suggest that a team's
composition of individuals with differing time
perspectives and time urgency affects its overall
performance. It seems likely that timing
norms—the shared time-related rules for coordi-
nation—mediate this relationship. For example,
teams composed of individuals with potentially
conflicting time-related attributes, such as
crammers with their high impatience and irrita-
bility and visioners with their risk taking and
focus on future goals, may fail because they
have difficulty constructing timing norms that
coordinate their work. What are the processes
by which people negotiate timing norms in sit-
uations where individual differences in time ur-
gency and time perspective make this difficult?
Timing norms also emerge from the patterned
recurrence of events that become artifacts to
which people respond. Institutionalization,
learning, adaptive forces, and routines all influ-
ence the evolution of timing norms (Blount &
Janicik, 2001; Lawrence et al., 2001). However, the
processes by which these patterns help to create
norms require further explication. It seems
likely that there is close interaction between
workers' observations of socially significant, re-
curring events, such as promotions and project
schedules, and their establishment of timing
norms. People attempt to make sense of the
events they observe and begin to associate each
event with certain timing. Lawrence (1991), for
example, found that employees develop shared
perceptions of a career timetable, which appear
to be based on their inferences about the firm's
actual age distribution at different career levels.
While the data show that the actual and per-
ceived timetables are similar, people tend to
create larger time differences between levels
than appear justified. Thus, although these per-
ceptions are socially shared, they represent an
exaggeration of reality.
The third question is What are the effects of
timing norms, both positive and negative? There
are at least three mechanisms that predict the
outcome of timing norms. The first is fit. Are the
timing norms appropriate for the task at hand
(Ancona & Chong, 1996)? An organization's tim-
ing norms for scanning and incorporating envi-
October
ronmental cues become institutionalized over
time. If new technologies increase the speed of
change within the environment, these original
timing norms may no longer work. The organi-
zation's ability to adapt becomes impaired,
reducing its chances of survival (Tushman &
Romanelli, 1985). Ancona and Tushman discuss
this problem in more detail later in this article.
A second mechanism is change. People expe-
rience varying degrees of difficulty in respond-
ing to changes in timing norms. Blount and
Janicik (2001) explore these potential effects
through individuals' cognitive responses. They
propose that people experience unwanted
schedule changes more negatively when they
are unexpected, uncertain in length, and have
significant associated opportunity costs. In
"Banana Time" a misunderstood joke changes
the daily schedule. The banter disappears; the
workers' participation in timing norms is de-
stroyed. Roy describes the effect of this schedule
change as "a succession of dismal work-
days devoid of times and barren of themes"
(1959: 165).
A third mechanism is comparison. People use
event timelines to gauge whether they are on
schedule and compare their progress to that of
others (Abbott, 1990; Neugarten, Moore, & Lowe,
1965). Lawrence (1988), for example, found that
people who are seen by others as ahead of
schedule in their organizational careers are
viewed more positively than those who are seen
as on or behind schedule. Managers who are
seen as ahead of schedule are more likely to get
high performance ratings than would be ex-
pected by chance. Lawrence (1984a) discovered
that individual perceptions mediate these ef-
fects. Managers who perceive themselves to be
behind schedule have more negative attitudes
toward work than other managers, even when
those perceptions are inaccurate.
The final question is What tools might we use
to explore questions about timing norms? All of
the standard research restrictions apply to this
question, and the answer requires both quanti-
tative and qualitative methods. However, in ad-
dition to standard approaches, two additional
tools should be considered—one conceptual
and one empirical. The conceptual tool is histor-
ical perspective (Lawrence, 1984b). Based on an
idea from Hume (in Mannheim, 1952; 277), plac-
ing events in unlikely settings can generate un-
expected insights, and the contrasts inherent in
2001 Ancona, Goodman, Lawrence, and Tushman
historical comparison may be useful for time
research. For example, in studying the human
life span, scholars have identified consistent,
age-specific developmental stages in adult-
hood, punctuated in the middle by a midlife
crisis (e.g., Jaques, 1965; Levinson, 1978, 1996). If
we place this result in historical perspective, we
see that some of the events typically associated
with this punctuation are historically dependent
(Lawrence, 1984b). Two hundred years ago, and
without birth control, men in their middle years
still had young children running around the
house: thus, there was no empty nest. People did
not expect to change careers and did not
experience as many job opportunities as do peo-
ple today. Moreover, the human life span
has lengthened, changing the very definition
of "midlife." Considering this timing norm in a
different historical context generates ques-
tions about its theoretical boundaries and inter-
actions.
An additional empirical tool with which we
might explore timing norms is sequence analy-
sis (Abbott, 1990). This analysis is particularly
suited for timing norms, because it allows us to
use event timelines as the unit of analysis. By
using optimal matching, we can test hypotheses
about the similarity of events and pacing during
a specified duration. For example, Abbott (1990)
studied the careers of 595 German musicians in
the eighteenth century. In this study the events
are the different positions a musician holds, the
pacing is the time between positions, and the
unit of analysis is the career. Abbott found dis-
tinctive job sequences for organist, church, and
court careers but not for town or opera careers.
In the organizational literature Pentland (1999)
discusses event sequences as stories, where the
unit of analysis is the story and where the event
timeline and the narrative it acquires provide
the basis for much organizational reality. This
methodology allows us to focus more broadly on
timing norms and to study not only whether peo-
ple perceive each event or the pacing between
events but whether they see the entire event
timeline (the "story") and understand its mean-
ing to organizational life.
In summary, timing norms provide a temporal
lens that requires us to think of all behavior,
interaction, activity, and events as embedded
within a paced, temporal context. For example,
if we just compare the experiences of minority
and white executives after they have been pro-
651
moted, we may miss the fact that the former get
to the top by pathways that are paced quite
differently than those of their white counterparts
(Bailyn, 1980; Thomas & Gabarro, 1999). Individ-
uals are not just promoted or socialized to new
jobs; they are promoted or socialized within a
timetable spanning their careers (or even their
lives). If we examine only the success of venture
capital funding, we may miss the fact that fund-
ing decisions depend on timing norms. In Sili-
con Valley, venture capitalists expect an entre-
preneur's timetable to be fast, furious, and
young, whereas in Great Britain, investors ex-
pect a more moderate timetable (Cowe, 1998;
Moody, 1998).
To use this temporal lens, we must first under-
stand timing norms as a significant phenome-
non in their own right. Consistently paced pro-
cesses, whether they involve work or social
activity, pervade organizational life. From the
short event timeline of a single customer service
call to the long event timeline of an industry's
value chain (Slywotzky, 1996), timing norms de-
scribe the rhythm of interaction. They require us
to view individual, group, and organizational
interaction as paced and meaningful sequences
of events, rather than single, isolated occur-
rences.
UNDERSTANDING TIME LAGS
Paul S. Goodman
An important contribution of the temporal lens
and, more specifically, the Mitchell and James
article (2001) is to refocus our attention on criti-
cal timing issues in organizational research.
That is, if we are interested in the relationship
between X and Y, we need to determine when Y
will occur, given X. If a supervisor changes a
reward system, when will an individual perfor-
mance change follow? If a group has more au-
thority and responsibility for decision making,
when will its performance change? If a large
organizational change is instituted, when will
organizational benefits, such as increased pro-
ductivity and customer satisfaction, be realized?
In this section this question of when is ex-
plored. Although Mitchell and James (2001) iden-
tify this key question, they are more interested
in a host of methodological time issues, such as
the duration of X and Y. They also provide the
reader with a set of X and Y configurations.
652 Academy of Management Review
including reciprocal causation between X and Y
or changes in X and Y over time, and so on. They
do not go into depth about when Y might occur
and why it might occur. These are two funda-
mental questions at any level of organization
research and are important issues for people
who are interested in multilevel phenomena.
In this discussion some conceptual tools for
understanding the lag between X and Y are ex-
amined, beginning in a single-level setting and
then moving to a multilevel context. The latter
case is interesting because the question of when
changes in a group's performance will affect
organizational-level performance, if at all, is ex-
amined. It has been relatively clear over the
past decade that we need to look at organiza-
tional issues in a multilevel context (Chan,
1998). Time lags in a single or multilevel context
have not been explored in any of the articles in
this issue.
I begin this exploration by focusing on
planned organizational change. When an organ-
izational intervention is introduced, one ques-
tion concerns when we might expect changes in
outcomes such as productivity, quality satisfac-
tion, and so on. Following is an example of this
interesting theoretical and practical problem. I
had the opportunity to conduct a large-scale
multidisciplinary assessment of an organization-
al change over multiple years (Goodman, 1979).
A very simple question was when to do the as-
sessment. Looking at the organization over a
three-year period, I saw no initial improve-
ments, but noticeable improvements were visi-
ble fourteen months into the change. These pos-
itive outcomes were directly tied to the change
effort. Between years two and three, however,
there was a gradual decline of the improve-
ments to the original baseline. The problem is
that the time periods you select to measure Y
will determine what you will learn. In the exam-
ple above, if I had done solely annual measure-
ments in this study, I would have observed no
change.
The basic question, ex ante, is can we better
understand when Y might occur? Our assump-
tions are
• we can develop theories about time lags;
• we cannot do point estimates—that is, pre-
dict exactly when changes in outcomes will
occur (e.g., in four days or four months); and
October
• we can develop tools that will permit some
dynamic forecasting and understanding of
the lags.
Organizational Change—Single Level
Let's assume a multiple-system intervention
is introduced at the departmental level of an
organization. The intervention includes changes
in rewards, such as pay for knowledge and
profit sharing, recognition, communication, and
decision-making systems. The intent is to in-
crease productivity, quality, and employee sat-
isfaction. How can we begin to understand the
when question?
First, the nature of existing work characteris-
tics can be an important tool in predicting the
results of an intervention. A number of studies
(e.g., Sitkin, Sutcliffe, & Schroeder, 1994; Ster-
man, 1994) have shown that the impact of
changes will be seen more slowly in certain
work settings. For example, Sterman, Repen-
ning, and Kofman (1997) indicate that change
was much slower in a product development
group than in a manufacturing group. In the
latter unit tasks were more concrete and less
abstract, the problems to be solved were often
more visible, and outcomes such as increased
productivity were easier to measure as com-
pared to the product development group.
While the nature of work does not predict ex-
actly when the outcomes are likely to appear, it
does indicate that there will be differences
across workgroups and gives us some idea of
why these differences may occur. The idea is to
think about the features of work in various set-
tings and the interaction with specific organiza-
tional change interventions. In the above exam-
ple the intervention was designed to improve
team problem-solving skills, ultimately lower-
ing costs and improving quality. In the manu-
facturing setting the visibility of problems, ease
of measuring outcomes, and fast feedback cy-
cles complemented the intervention. In a prod-
uct design group or, similarly, in a research lab,
this form of intervention will not be as good a fit.
As work becomes more abstract, outcomes
harder to measure, and the feedback cycles
longer, the lag between changes and results is
likely to be both longer and more difficult to
predict. I introduce other work features in sub-
sequent analyses to sharpen the role of such
features in predicting when Y will occur.
2001 Ancona, Goodman, Lawrence, and Tushman
A second tool that might help in our analysis
of when is positive feedback cycles. In these
cycles, changes in one variable lead to changes
in a second variable, which lead to changes in
the first variable. These cycles tend to acceler-
ate in one direction, rather than to seek equilib-
rium. An important issue is the rate and direc-
tion of acceleration. Positive feedback cycles are
going to help us predict lags and understand
them in the following way: when the feedback
cycle starts, the acceleration rates are slow;
however, if we can track the cycle as it begins to
accelerate faster, we will be in a better position
to predict when Y will occur.
Consider the following examples. A multiple
intervention is introduced in a department. Ini-
tially, there are only a few participants who
work on high-yield and immediate-results
projects. Their initial success is broadcast to
others, which motivates other employees to both
participate in the change and produce results.
The positive feedback cycle is underway. As the
percentage of participants in the change in-
creases from 0 to 10 percent to 30 to 40 percent,
the force attracting more people to become in-
volved in the change accelerates. Also, the ac-
tual impact on the outcomes will be greater.
Change effects are not linear. The effects of
moving from 30 to 40 percent participation are
different, and possibly much larger, than the
move from 0 to 10 percent. There is an acceler-
ating feedback among participation, motivation,
and results. Better results lead to greater partic-
ipation and motivation, which, in turn, lead to
even greater results. As these relationships,
which are all measurable, begin to accelerate,
the probability of a noticeable change in out-
comes at the department level will be greater.
A second example of using positive feedback
cycles to understand temporal lags concerns
planned change involving problem-solving and
continuous improvement teams. The role of
problem-solving teams is to react quickly and
effectively in solving problems. Continuous im-
provement teams focus on improving the sys-
tem. Initial improvements by the continuous im-
provement teams should reduce the number of
problems facing the problem-solving teams,
which should permit faster response time and
better-quality solutions to the problems these
teams do observe. That is, the success of the
continuous improvement teams improves both
cost effectiveness and quality and, at the same
653
time, changes the ability of the problem-solving
teams to improve cost effectiveness and quality.
This is the beginning of a positive feedback
cycle. Eventually, as the frequency of problems
decreases, members of the reactive problem-
solving teams can switch to performing contin-
uous improvements, which, in turn, should fur-
ther improve the organization's performance
indicators. This is another example of a positive
feedback cycle. The positive level of interaction
between these two problem-solving processes
should improve organizational outcomes, such
as costs, quality, capacity, and utilization,
which, in turn, should motivate the teams to
operate at higher levels, which, in turn, should
lead to organizational improvements.
In the above examples we cannot give point
estimates about when the changes will occur,
and we cannot make strong predictions before
the changes actually begin. But understanding
when a positive feedback cycle starts or fails to
start, and the rate at which it accelerates, pro-
vides important information about when depart-
ment-level outcomes will change. Another inter-
esting research challenge is understanding
when these cycles begin to decelerate.
By continuing the discussion of the nature of
work variables and the positive feedback cycle,
we can make the following observations:
• Positive feedback cycles will start earlier
and accelerate faster in manufacturing
units versus product development units.
Features of the work (e.g., degree of struc-
ture, abstract versus concrete tasks, visibil-
ity of problems, and visibility of results) af-
fect this timing.
• Delays in achieving significant benefits or
results in product development units (com-
pared to manufacturing units) may discour-
age these workers from actively participat-
ing in the change.
• "Quicker" results in a manufacturing unit
may lead the organization to move more
resources for change into that unit, which
may further accelerate the change and pull
resources away from product development
units, which may need these resources
more. This, in turn, will increase the lag in
the product development unit (Sterman et
al., 1997).
What has been accomplished with this anal-
ysis? First, we can now say more than just
"make time lags explicit." Second, two concepts
were introduced that will help us think about
lags in a change context. These tools do not tell
654 Academy of Management Review
US exactly when Y will change, but they provide
some guidance on determining when a change
in outcomes is likely to occur across different
contexts.
Organizational Change—Multilevel
A different question is, given change out-
comes at one level (e.g., group or department),
when will change occur at the organizational
level? This is an important theoretical and prac-
tical problem. In the literature on organizational
change, there is some evidence that positive
changes at one level do not necessarily have
positive benefits at other levels (Goodman,
2000). Other studies (MacDuffie, 1995) have
shown positive organizational benefits from
change but give little, if any, documentation of
how individual- and group-level performance
contributed to these changes.
Let's go back to one of the earlier examples
and assert that through technological and or-
ganizational interventions, there were produc-
tivity improvements in the firm's product devel-
opment group. Today, the group can design
more products in the same time. The question is
when will the positive changes in this unit im-
pact organizational-level outcomes, such as
sales and profitability?
As with the single-level analysis, the nature of
work is a good place to begin. First, fhe presence
of constraints elsewhere in the value chain (e.g.,
in production or sales) will help us to under-
stand whether changes in the number of new
products a team can design will lead to changes
in overall organizational sales levels. If there
are constraints in manufacturing or sales capac-
ity to absorb the new products, there will be no
change in organizational-level indicators. How-
ever, if there are no constraints, then the inher-
ent fime embedded in the manufacturing or
sales cycles will identify at least the minimum
time frame for organizational-level outcomes to
occur. For example, if fhe manufacturing/sales
cycle were three to four weeks, we would have fo
wait at least that long fo see whether changes in
product development led fo changes in organi-
zational-level outcomes.
Another nature-of-work variable takes the
form of interdependence. In this example the
workflow is sequential (Thompson, 1967), and
intermediary activities fake place befween
changes in product development and changes
October
in organizational effectiveness indicators. Any
increases in the number of constraints or inter-
mediary activities suggest that no effects or very
delayed effects will occur. Compare this picture
fo one in which the form of organizing is addi-
tive (e.g., units in a department store), where
typically there are no constraints or intermedi-
ary activities between the unit and the larger
organizational entity. Here, the time between
changes in one unit's outcomes and the organi-
zation's outcomes may be limited only by the
accounting confroi system (see Goodman, 2000:
Chapters 4-6, for more detail).
Although fhe nature of work should provide
some insights regarding fhe when question,
some other concepts discussed earlier may also
be helpful. For example, in the scenario of prod-
uct development improvements in the presence
of constraints and a long manufacturing/sales
cycle time, it was indicated that changes in Y
might not occur at the organizational level. How-
ever, there are some possible compensatory pro-
cesses. Perhaps this firm has strong reactive
problem-solving and continuous improvement
teams. If a positive feedback exists between
fhese two fypes of teams, the aforementioned
constraints might be removed, or both teams
could focus on reducing cycle times. If con-
straints are removed and problems with cycle
time are reduced, we may be better able to link
fhe changes in fhe product development unit
wifh the fiming of organizational changes in
sales and profitabilify. That is, although certain
work features lead to long delays in Y, compen-
satory processes may speed up changes in fhe
organizational outcome variables.
Some Observations
In this section only one content area—that of
organizational change—has been explored.
How generalizable is this approach to other ar-
eas? In a very different kind of literature—that
of organizational errors—we could use a similar
approach (Goodman, 2000). "Organizational er-
rors" refers to deviations from standard prac-
tices fhaf result in negative organizational con-
sequences, such as the Three Mile Island crisis,
the Barings Bank scandal, and so forth.
If we briefly look at some snapshots of the
bankruptcy of Barings Bank, we see a trader
operating well outside the explicit trading limi-
tations—a clear deviation from standard prac-
2001 Ancona, Groodman, Lawrence, and Tushman
tices. In addition, we see a bank providing funds
to cover the positions of its trader, motivating
the trader to further exceed the limits, that at the
end amounted to more than 28,000 contracts
worth $29 billion. In this case the positive
feedback cycle discussed earlier accelerated
the potential vulnerability of fhe bank by
encouraging the trader to deviate further from
accepted practice.
No one could have predicted the earthquake
in Japan that led to a major decline of the Nikkei
Index and the subsequent demise of Barings.
However, the accelerating feedback cycle that
put Barings at high risk was observable and
avoidable. It was possible to predict that Bar-
ings was at risk of experiencing a financial di-
saster. That is, although we could not have pre-
dicted exactly when Barings would announce
bankruptcy, and we could not have predicted
anything when the trader began working for the
bank, when the trader began to exceed the lim-
its and the bank reinforced that behavior by
providing funds to cover his positions, the like-
lihood of bankruptcy increased. As the positive
feedback cycle accelerated, so did the probabil-
ity of Barings' demise.
Another potential limitation of this analysis is
its focus on only a few concepts—the nature of
work and positive feedback cycles. While there
are, of course, other relevant concepts, the goal
of this discussion is to make you think about
how to apply this lag question in your own work.
I do not believe there is a generic theory of time
lags; each research problem and each context
will evoke a different cluster of factors to help
understand when Y will occur. However, the na-
ture of the work and the positive feedback cycle
can help us to understand time lag issues across
research areas.
Conclusion
The purpose of this discussion has been to
stimulate the reader to think more explicitly
about the time lags between X and Y. "When
will Y occur?" is a fundamental question at any
level of organizational analysis. It also is a fun-
damental question across different levels of
analysis. As we conduct more research in a mul-
tilevel context, the mapping of changes in Y at
one level to changes in Y at a different level
presents an exciting area, and the temporal lens
becomes an even more important tool.
655
To advance our understanding of when, we
must face at least two important challenges.
First, we need to build "minitheories" about lags
in our specific research. In this discussion I pre-
sented the nature-of-work variables (e.g., visibil-
ity of results, constraints, form of interdepen-
dence) and positive feedback cycles as
examples of tools that can help explain lags in
the organizational change literature and organ-
izational errors literature. While we need to cre-
ate new theory, rich bodies of conceptual tools
already exist in this literature for us to draw
upon.
The second challenge is to design our re-
search in a way that permits an examination of
the when question. If we do quick, cross-
sectional studies or ten-minute experiments, it
is unlikely we can address the question. How-
ever, this is not simply a call to do only longitu-
dinal studies, although many others have made
that request. Rather, this is an assertion that
when Y will occur is a theoretical, interesting
question, and whether we prefer to do field stud-
ies, experiments, or observational work in a
quantitative or qualitative mode, we should
build theories and design research to address
that question.
TIME, TECHNOLOGY, AND DYNAMIC
CAPABILITIES: TOWARD TEMPORAL
LEADERSHIP
Deborah G. Ancona a n d Michael L. Tushman
We now focus the temporal lens on leadership
and the temporal tasks of the senior team. The
temporal lens centers our attention on cycles,
time perspectives, temporal structures, and
timeless visions. This view complements that of
the three lenses mentioned at the start of this
article and the top management team literature
by bringing time into the foreground.
The three lenses suggest the role of architect
for the firm (strategic design lens), power broker
and coalition builder (political lens), and mean-
ing creator (cultural lens) for the senior team
(Ancona et al., 1999). The top management team
literature focuses us on top team demography
(cf. Bantel & Jackson, 1989; Williams & O'Reilly,
1998), team affect (cf. Staw & Barsade, 1993),
team cognition (cf. Isenberg, 1988), team pro-
cesses (cf. Eisenhardt & Zabaracki, 1992; Peter-
son, Owens, Tetlock, Fan, & Martorana, 1998),
656 Academy of Management Review
and strategy-making capabilities (cf. Burgelman
& Doz, 2001; Hambrick, 1997). Yet, in these per-
spectives time has been relegated to the back-
ground (see Eisenhardt, 1989, for an exception).
Here we bring time into the foreground by
examining the temporal leadership challenges
senior teams face as they help their organiza-
tions adapt to changing environments. Teams
enact temporal leadership as they entrain their
organizations to technology and competitive cy-
cles, manage across multiple time frames, and
create temporal architectures for their organiza-
tions. In the context of these multiple and con-
trasting time frames, the senior team must
maintain a timeless organizational vision that
provides an anchor for the strategic pacing of
the organization.
To anchor our discussion of time, cycles, dy-
namic capabilities, and temporal leadership,
consider three brief examples. The senior team
at Firestone Tire and Rubber Company had sub-
stantial knowledge of and capabilities in radial
technology and tires in the early 1970s. These
competencies were rooted in their considerable
experience with the European tire business. Fur-
ther, this senior team had considerable knowl-
edge of the changing demands of the American
auto producers (Sull, 1999). Although radial tech-
nology was fundamentally different from the
then-standard bias-ply technology, and radial
tires had a significantly longer life span than
bias-ply tires, the business and organizational
models Firestone's senior team employed were
the same as those employed in their bias-ply
tire business. As a result, Firestone missed the
radial tire revolution, underperformed the rest of
the tire industry throughout the 1970s, and fi-
nally was forced to undergo radical change ini-
tiated by an external CEO in 1980.
While Firestone used its bias-ply organization
to get into the radial business, Polaroid sepa-
rated its digital camera business from its histor-
ically dominant film business; staffed this dis-
tinct unit with a new, digitally competent senior
team; and had its senior leader report directly to
the CEO (Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000). Yet, Polaroid's
senior team, when given the opportunity and
competencies to operate simultaneously in mul-
tiple time frames, retreated to its historically
anchored film-based business model. Through
2001, Polaroid's digital business has floundered,
even as the technology it pioneered has pros-
pered in other firms.
October
Finally, USA Today built its newspaper fran-
chise over a twenty-year period, based on re-
porting, producing, and delivering a daily na-
tional paper. By 2000, USA Today was the most
widely circulated newspaper in the United
States. It was, however, challenged by news de-
livered instantaneously by its major competi-
tors' internet-based organizations. Tom Curley,
USA Today's CEO and the architect of its news-
paper business, had to grapple with the ques-
tion of "when is news news": is it once a day or
is it second by second? Where other competitors
floundered, Curley drove streams of innovation
inside his organization and built capabilities
such that both his paper and its dot.com busi-
nesses flourished. By 2001, Curley and his senior
team simultaneously managed both a mature
20-year-old newspaper organization and a
young, entrepreneurial web-based news deliv-
ery organization. In executing this proactive rev-
olution, Curley changed five of the seven mem-
bers of his senior team.
These examples illustrate the role of senior
teams in building multiple time frames into
their organizations and in shaping the rate of
both technology cycles and organizational
change. These examples also illustrate the con-
sequences for organizations that do not build
the capacity to operate simultaneously in mul-
tiple time frames. In this essay we further dis-
cuss these challenges and indicate the possibil-
ities for future research.
Technology, Competitive Cycles,
and Entrainment
Top management teams face temporal lead-
ership decisions, including how fast to act and
with which external cycles to coordinate. These
decisions are linked to the concept of entrain-
ment (McGrath & Rotchford, 1983). Entrainment
entails adjusting the pace or cycle of one activ-
ity to synchronize with that of another (Ancona &
Chong, 1996). In the case of top teams, the lead-
ership challenge is to match the pace and cycle
of organizational change to the competitive and
technological cycles that are of strategic impor-
tance to the unit. For example, USA Today's
Curley was able to build a senior team and
organizational architecture that helped them
entrain to multiple technology cycles, whereas
the teams at Firestone and Polaroid remained
2001 Ancona, Goodman. Law/rence. and Tushman
entrained to their historically dominant bias-ply
and film-based cycles.
The literature on technology cycles is an-
chored in unfolding processes of variation, se-
lection, and retention (McGrath, 2001; Tushman
& Murmann, 1998). A technology cycle begins
with a technological discontinuity (e.g., bias-ply
tires, analog camera technology) that triggers
periods of technological ferment. These fermen-
tation periods are, in turn, closed by the emer-
gence of new dominant designs or industry
standards. Thus begins a period of incremental
change that is ultimately destabilized by a sub-
sequent technological discontinuity (e.g., radial
fires and digital cameras).
Effective temporal leadership involves the en-
trainment of internal organizational change to
exfernai technology cycles. Major organization-
al changes must be entrained with technologi-
cal discontinuities (Miller, 1994; Rosenbloom,
2000; Sastry, 1997; Tushman & Romanelli, 1985).
For example, USA Today's move into web-based
news on demand was coupled wifh sweeping
shifts in the firm's structure, controls, systems,
and culture. As previously mentioned, Curley
replaced nearly all of his senior team during
this time. In contrast, at Polaroid and Firestone,
a stagnant senior team and organizational iner-
tia stunted fhe companies' ability to mesh with
the changing technology cycles (Tripsas &
Gavetti, 2000).
The frame-breaking organizational changes
required to entrain to shifting markets and/or
technologies are often initiated by transformed
senior teams (Ancona, 1990; Meyer, Brooks, &
Goes, 1990; Romanelli & Tushman, 1994). While
reorientations are risky, and often done incom-
petently (e.g., Carroll & Teo, 1998; Henderson,
1993), persistence in the face of a changing in-
novation stream is even riskier. Further, if stra-
tegic reorientations are not done proactively,
they are done reacfively—as with Polaroid in
digital cameras and Firestone in radial tires.
Reactive reorientations (turnarounds) are more
risky than proactive reorientafions, because
they must be implemented under crisis condi-
tions and under considerable fime pressure
(Hambrick, Nadler, & Tushman, 1998; Rosen-
bloom, 2000).
The most effective discontinuous changes are
initiated rapidly and are directed by a senior
team with an integrated change agenda (Nadler
& Tushman, 1998). Proactive moves across inno-
657
vation streams, as at USA Today, are also asso-
ciated wifh shifts within middle management
(Kanter, Stein, & Jick, 1992; Pettigrew, 1985, 1987).
If implemented incrementally, reorientations
run the risk of being sabotaged by the politics,
structures, and competencies of the status quo
(Kearns & Nadler, 1992; Sabherwal, Hirschheim,
& Goles, 2001; Virany, Tushman, & Romanelli,
1992).
Top management teams exhibiting temporal
leadership do not simply entrain organizational
change to key technology changes—they act to
directly shape the timing and nature of those
external cycles. Managerial actions shape and
direct both technological discontinuities (e.g.,
Michelin's action with radials), as well as
the closure on dominant designs (Cusumano,
Mylonadis, & Rosenbloom, 1992). Equally impor-
tant, eras of incremental change typically are
punctuated by managerial actions to initiate
product, process, or service discontinuities. For
example, the initiation of radial tires, digital
cameras, or instantaneous news was less a
function of technological possibilities than it
was a choice that senior teams made regarding
when to act on technological discontinuities
and/or when to act on creating a dominant de-
sign (Van de Ven & Garud, 1994). While there are
different rates of technological change for high-
versus low-technology industries, managerial
and community action shape the timing, pacing,
and nature of technology cycles (Chesbrough,
1999; Rosenkopf & Tushman, 1998; West, 2000).
Managing in Multiple Time Frames
Senior teams must build organizational capa-
bilities that allow them fo function in multiple
temporal environments, each paced by funda-
mentally different technological and market
time frames. These dynamic capabilities mean
that incumbents must exploit their current prod-
uct/market position even as they explore new
product/market positions (Foster & Kaplan, 2001;
Tushman & O'Reilly, 1997). These streams of
innovation, each with their own technology/
market fime frames, must be executed not
sequentially or in rhythmic shifts, but simulta-
neously. For example, Tom Curley was able fo
incrementally innovate his traditional newspa-
per business even as he experimented with on-
line and dot.com innovations. Similarly, fo be
successful over time, Polaroid had fo become
658 Academy of Management Review
ever more efficient in its analog business, even
as it experimented with digital technology and
business models (Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000).
Dynamic capabilities require that an organi-
zation have two temporal orientations: the
present and the future (Brown & Eisenhardt,
1998). In the present, exploitation dominates
through sustained incremental innovation and
short-term learning that is entrained to the dom-
inant industry design and its associated era of
incremental technological change. In contrast,
preparing for the future involves learning-by-
doing, creating new product designs, and luck
that allow the organization to drive possible
new designs, architectural innovations, and/or
product substitutes. Whether done internally or
externally, through alliances or acquisitions, se-
nior teams learn about alternative futures from
entrepreneurial activity that allows entrainment
to technological discontinuities and evolving
technology cycles (McGrath, 2001). Thus, tempo-
ral leadership is rooted in the senior team's abil-
ity to operate simultaneously in the present and
the future.
Organizational Architectures and Time(s)
Dynamic capabilities are rooted in streams of
innovation—in simultaneously exploiting and
exploring. These contrasting strategic, task, and
temporal requirements must be reflected in dif-
ferentiated organizational forms (Nadler &
Tushman, 1998; Tushman & O'Reilly, 1997). Se-
nior teams that exhibit temporal leadership de-
sign organizational architectures in a way that
allows them to operate in multiple time frames.
Exploitation requires more highly structured
processes, roles, and systems; more tightly con-
trolled cultures; and a greater emphasis on
hierarchy than exploration (Bradach, 1998;
Levinthal, 1997). The time frames for exploitation
activities are shorter than those for exploratory
activities (Jaques, 1956). Further, for incumbent
organizations, exploratory activities take place
in the context of larger, older exploitation units,
which have their own sense of both time and
history (Milliken & Lant, 1991). Because organi-
zational inertia is so strong, exploratory units
must be physically and culturally distinct from
the exploitative units and must have incentive
structures rooted in different time horizons
(Burgelman, 1991).
October
Ambidextrous organizational designs are
composed of radically differentiated subunits
with weak tactical integration but with strong
integration within the senior team (Tushman &
O'Reilly, 1997). These subunits represent differ-
ent "time zones," each with its own culture of
time, mapping of activities to time, and experi-
ence of time (Ancona et al., 2001). As such, the
cultures, goals, and processes of these highly
differentiated zones are inconsistent with each
other. For example, the dot.com unit at USA To-
day had a completely different set of structures,
norms, and values. The unit's job was to report
the news instantaneously, whereas the newspa-
per reported the news once a day. Curley and
his new senior team separated the dot.com unit
from the newspaper; helped it develop its own
competencies, structures, and processes; and
managed the integration across these units. In
contrast, Firestone's radial unit was embedded
in its bias-ply unit. The history, inertia, and time
frames rooted in the incumbent technology pre-
vented the company from successfully imple-
menting the new radial technology.
By building ambidextrous organizational ca-
pabilities, the senior management team can
maximize the probability that it will have both
the expertise and the luck from which to make
proactive, industry-shaping decisions, rather
than react to others' activities. Ambidextrous or-
ganizations create options that allow the senior
team to make informed bets on the future
(Burgelman & Grove, 1996; McGrath, 1999). While
correct strategic bets can be identified only in
retrospect, managerial action within the firm—
and with collaborators, alliance partners, and
governmental agencies—can affect the ultimate
selection of a new industry standard or the
success of a product substitute (Cusumano 8f
Yoffee, 1998; Rosenkopf & Tushman, 1998).
Integration Through a Time-Free Vision
Operating in multiple time frames to develop
streams of innovation that entrain to different
technology cycles requires organizational archi-
tectures composed of subunits that are them-
selves inconsistent with one another. Beyond
the actions of the senior team, what prevents
these internally incongruent organizational
units from destroying each other? The answer is
a clear, emotionally engaging vision that pro-
vides a strategic anchor from which the senior
2001 Ancona, Goodman, Lawrence, and Tushman
leadership balances the contrasting require-
ments of different innovation streams (Hamel &
Prahalad, 1994; Rotemberg & Saloner, 2000). Sim-
ple, direct organizational aspirations allow the
members of an organization to simultaneously
host incremental and discontinuous innovations
(Hurst, 1995; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1998). Strategic
integration is further reinforced by senior man-
agement's consistent behaviors in support of the
vision through a small set of overarching core
values and the use of common-fate reward sys-
tems for the senior team (Pfeffer & Sutton, 2000).
With a clear, consistent vision the senior team
can support the internally contradictory organi-
zational architectures associated with ambidex-
trous organizations and still be seen as consis-
tent and credible. In the context of multiple
inconsistent time frames, a clear vision and a
few core values provide timeless anchors. For
example, at USA Today the dot.com and news-
paper units were united by Tom Curley's overall
network vision and by shared values of fairness,
accuracy, and trust. It is the senior team's role as
a temporal leader to link these paradoxical re-
quirements—to exploit and explore, to act both
in the present and the future—together through
its substantive and symbolic actions. Indeed, a
key integrating device may be the coupling of
multiple time frames associated with ambidex-
trous organizations with a vision and a set of
core values that are time free.
Conclusion
Choosing a few temporal parameters and
then applying them to the role that senior teams
play in organizational leadership and the devel-
opment of dynamic capabilities provide a fresh
point of view to guide inquiry and practice. Tem-
poral leadership on the part of the senior team
involves the entrainment of organization
change to key technology and competitive cy-
cles. It involves managing across multiple tem-
poral orientations, creating appropriate organi-
zational architectures, and providing a timeless
vision that both integrates and focuses temporal
decisions. Temporal leadership is about map-
ping and shaping technology cycles and inte-
grating across disparate units.
Entraining to key technology cycles, moving
in multiple time frames, and creating temporal
structures are, we believe, the keys to an organ-
ization's dynamic capabilities. Time has been in
659
the background of our field's theory and re-
search, but it clearly needs to be brought to the
foreground. By applying a temporal lens, we
may discover a fundamentally new view of
leadership, organizations, and dynamic capa-
bilities.
Future researchers can clearly build on this
work by further exploring the temporal vari-
ables described here or by examining others. In
the area of entrainment, we have focused on
technology cycles. Clearly, there are additional
cycles that are of importance, including cus-
tomer cycles, supplier cycles, and economic cy-
cles. We still need to understand which cycles
are most important. Furthermore, we need to
understand how to entrain to multiple cycles
with conflicting demands. Finally, we need to
explore how many cycles can act as external
pacers before the internal cycles of the firm
overwhelm us with their speed and complexity.
Or, put another way, what kinds of internal pac-
ing and cycles allow for maximum entrainment
to external ones?
In the area of dynamic capabilities and ambi-
dextrous organizations, we have argued that
strategic linkages must be present within the
senior team to ensure strategic control and co-
ordination of innovation streams. However, sub-
stantial theoretical and empirical differences
exist regarding how to effectively design and
implement structures that enhance dynamic ca-
pabilities (e.g.. Brown & Eisenhardt, 1998;
Siggelkow, in press). Other models suggest that
the entrepreneurial units must be completely
separated or spun out from the business unit
(Christensen & Overdorf, 2000; Klepper &
Sleeper, 2000). Still other work suggests lower-
level integration mechanisms, such as temporal
crossing periods and temporal boundary objects
(Ancona et al., 2001). Research is required to
further understand when and under what condi-
tions highly differentiated units should be inte-
grated versus split out from the incumbent unit.
Furthermore, what range of mechanisms can co-
ordinate across these differentiated units?
In the area of vision, we have argued that a
clear and consistent vision, reinforced by con-
sistent managerial action, is needed. Future re-
searchers need to focus on other properties of
such a vision and the mechanisms that help
organizational members internalize key values
and behaviors. Future researchers also can ad-
dress the difficulties of changing certain tempo-
660 Academy of Management
ral elements of a cuifure while maintaining core
values; how can we continue fo offer high levels
of service but do it faster and more efficiently?
While we have addressed enfrainmenf, multi-
ple fime frames, ambidextrous organizations,
and vision, fufure researchers could examine
the interplay befween fhe temporal issues we
raise and other strategic, interpersonal, cultural,
and design issues. In addition, by examining
other temporal parameters (such as speed,
rhythm, and scheduling), we can identify addi-
tional aspects of temporal leadership. Through
such inquiry the concept of temporal leadership
can take hold.
CONCLUSION
The goal of this article—and the issue as a
whole—is to advance our understanding of time
in organizational research. Adopting a temporal
lens provides a new and powerful way to view
organizational phenomena. It makes us speak in
a different language (cf. Ancona et al., 2001), ask
differenf questions, and use a different frame-
work in the methodological aspects of our re-
search (cf. Mitchell & lames, 2001).
The use of the temporal lens can play out in
two different ways. First, it provides a new
way to understand phenomena where the pri-
mary focus is on nontemporal issues. Your re-
search may be about individual decision mak-
ing, group performance, or organizational
transformation. In any of fhese cases, using
the language of time in addition to other ana-
lytical methods will sharpen our contextual
understanding of fhis research. While tempo-
ral norms may not be central to your research,
they might provide new insights as powerful
moderators or mediators. If you think carefully
about the duration of X and Y and when Y
might occur, the theorefical formulation and
methodological approaches of your work will
be different. Using the temporal lens in this
way, it seems to us, is a minimum condition for
advancing organizational work. The re-
searcher will have a richer understanding of
the "context of time," which should provide
new opportunities for explanation and predic-
tion.
Af a second level, temporal lenses focus our
attention on specific fiming research. Through-
out fhis issue, you have seen models of temporal
research at the individual, group, and organiza-
Review October
tional levels of analysis. Here, the language of
time is translated info specific temporal con-
cepts, such as pacing, timing, and sequencing,
which are fhe direct objects of research. In this
article the discussion of timing norms and the
discussion of temporal leadership are exem-
plars of time-focused research. Taken as a
group, the articles in this issue chart a broad
range of research challenges surrounding tem-
poral issues.
We must acknowledge that working at fhis
level is much harder. There is not yet a rich set
of theoretical and methodological tools regard-
ing time. We argue, in this article, that there are
many obstacles to temporal research. There are
inherent difficulties in doing this research, as
well as strong institutional forces that work
against the development of this form of re-
search. However, there are also tremendous op-
portunities for examining issues of time in cur-
rent and future research.
While we do not expect this issue to spark a
sudden proliferation of time-based research, we
believe the temporal lens can be an important
intellectual tool for both refocusing our work
and creating new intellectual opportunities.
This issue presents valuable ideas, perspec-
tives, and models for doing research on tempo-
ral issues.
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Deborah G. Ancona is the Seley Distinguished Professor of Management and a

professor of organization studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Her
research centers on team process and performance, time, and entrainment.
Paul S. Goodman holds the Richard M. Cyert Professorship and is a professor of
organizational psychology at Carnegie Mellon University. His research centers on
groups, organizational errors, and tools for multilevel research.
Barbara S. Lawrence is an associate professor of management at The Anderson School
at UCLA. Her research focuses on organizational reference groups, norms, organiza-
tional demography, and social comparison processes.
Michael L. Tushman is the Paul R. Lawrence, MBA Class of 1942 Professor of Business
Administration at the Graduate School of Business, Harvard University. His research
focuses on the relations between technological change, executive leadership, and
organization adaptation, and on managing R&D laboratories.