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DURATION OF HEADS OF STATE IN POWER AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN

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JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 145
Volume 48, Number 1, March 2023

DURATION OF HEADS OF STATE IN POWER AND ECONOMIC

GROWTH IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

LIMI KOUOTOU HIBRAHIM a AND BONIFACE NGAH EPO b

University of Yaoundé II, Cameroon

This paper evaluates the impact of the duration of heads of state in power on economic
growth on a panel of 41 countries in sub-Saharan Africa over the period 1990-2016. The
results find diminishing returns after the optimal threshold of twelve, eleven and fifteen
years for sub-Saharan Africa, English-speaking and French-speaking African countries
respectively. The results are robust in both static and dynamic settings as well as for fixed
effects related to the educational profile of heads of state.

Keywords: Duration in Power, Economic Growth, Sub-Saharan Africa

JEL Classification: C23, O43, O55

1. INTRODUCTION

Current literature on causes of economic growth advocates for the exploration of

other aspects in addition to traditional factors of production. Since the 19th century,
economists already underscored on the role of capital and labor (Ricardo, 1817; Smith,
1776) which were further elaborated upon in the 1950s with the inclusion of technical
progress (Solow, 1956). Contemporaneous authors have considered technical progress as
a set of endogenous factors (Romer, 1986; Lucas, 1988; Barro, 1991; Mankiw et al.,
1992), unlike their pioneering counterparts.
Several factors that improve the effectiveness of capital and labor in sustaining
long-term growth have been casted as technical progress. Towards the end of the 20th
century, this view was strengthened by several endogenous growth theories amongst
which the theory of institutions. North (1990) defines institutions as “the formal or
informal rules of the game in force in societies, linking all social actors, including the
state, which shape behavior and expectations and contribute (or not) to growth”.
146 LIMI KOUOTOU HIBRAHIM AND BONIFACE NGAH EPO

Consequently, a key input for institutions to function properly is democracy which refers
to the set of institutions that allows the population to elect their decision-makers through
free, competitive and regular elections (Karl, 1990).
There exist proponents and opponents in the literature on the effect of democracy on
economic growth. The first set of authors find a positive relationship (Rodrik and
Wacziarg, 2005; Papaioannou and Siourounis, 2008; Persson and Tabellini, 2009; Doces,
2020). The second groups of authors suggest a negative or no relationship between
economic growth and democracy (Helliwell, 1994; Borner and Weder, 1995; Barro,
1996 and 1997; Minier, 1998; Rodrik, 1999; Przeworski et al., 2000; Tavares and
Wacziarg, 2001; De Haan, 2007; Besley and Kudamatsu, 2008).
Diverse results on the effects of democracy on growth call for new investigations
such as different fundamental principles of democratic practices. In the case of African
countries, these principles were enshrined in the constitutional renewal of the 1990s
(Senou, 2016). They include multipartyism, freedom of opposition, alternation of power,
election by direct universal suffrage, the constitutionality of laws as well as limitation of
the duration and number of terms of office of Heads of State. Each of these principles
associated with democracy impacts a country's economic development (Heo and Tan,
2001; Doucouliagos and Ulubasoglu, 2008; Acemoglu et al., 2014). Nevertheless, term
limits have a significant role because it opposes the capture and personalization of power
(Loada, 2003).
Nearly thirty years after the advent of democracy in Africa, several countries are yet
to come to terms with some democratic principles. Being reticent to leave power once
the mandate is over and/or thwarting the application of laws on mandate limitation
constitute one of the undemocratic principles largely witnessed in these countries (Senou,
2016). Keneck-Massil (2019) find several abusive manipulations of constitutions that in
the recent political history of SSA. Vencovsky (2007) and the Economic Commission
for Africa (2009) report that eight African countries changed their constitutions to
extend the president's term of office between 1990 and 2008. Furthermore, three
attempts to revise the constitution were recorded after Heads of State exceeded the term
limit provided by law. The Africa Centre for Strategic Studies argues that countries with
no term limits tend to be more unstable (Centre d’Etudes Stratégiques de l’Afrique,
2018). According to this report, one-third of the eighteen countries with no term limits
they studied witnessed an armed conflict between 2015 and 2018. On the contrary, only
two out of twenty-one countries with presidential term limits reported conflicts over the
same period.
Given the essential role of democracy is stimulating Africa’s economic growth
(Papaioannou and Siourounis, 2008; Persson and Tabellini, 2009), via a transitive logic
the limitation of term of office is one of the main democratic principles that needs
strengthening within Africa's democracies. Accordingly, the main question this
manuscript attempts to answer is: what is the impact of the duration of the heads of state
in power on economic growth in SSA? Specifically: (a) what is the optimal number of
years after which we start observing a diminishing return and (b) does the relationship
DURATION OF HEADS OF STATE IN POWER AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 147

between duration of heads of state and economic growth vary with the educational
profile of heads of state.
The objective of this study is to analyze the relationship between the duration of
heads of state in power and economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa. We hypothesize
that there is diminishing return beyond an optimal threshold, and this is not contingent
on the educational profile of heads of state. To account for the heterogenous nature of
countries in SSA and robustness verification, we investigate this relationship: (a) overall
and according to three linguistic zone (English-speaking, French-speaking and
Lusophone/other linguistic-speaking African countries) and (b) along educational
profiles of heads of state.
The rest of this paper is structured into six sections. Section 2 undertakes a review of
the literature. Section 3 describes the empirical models of the study, the data and
descriptive statistics of the variables of interest. Section 4 presents the main results
obtained. Section 5 interprets and discusses the robustness and sensitivity of these results,
and section 6 concludes.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

A review of the literature on democracy and economic growth discloses two

shortcomings. Firstly, a very sparse number of studies exist that verify the duration of
heads of state in power on growth and test robustness using linguistic zones and
educational profiles of heads of state. Secondly, few studies that appraise the
relationship between democracy and economic growth have a focus Africa (Fosu, 2008;
Narayan et al., 2011; Abdoulaye, 2014).

2.1. Democracy and Economic Growth: The Absence of Studies Exploring the
Likely Role of Duration in Power

We find no studies that assess the effect of democracy on growth through the
duration of heads of state in power, whilst controlling for educational profiles of heads
of state. Nevertheless, several studies that question the impact of democracy and
economic growth can be clustered into the compatibility, conflict and skeptical
approaches (Sirowy and Inkeles, 1990).
The literature on the compatibility approach concurs that democracy positively
relates to growth. Feng (2004) contends that democratic governments accomplish higher
economic results than other forms of political arrangements. Economic freedom and the
encouragement of private initiatives (Heo and Tan, 2001) in countries having democratic
rules cause or act as inputs for growth (Przeworski and Limongi, 1993; Barro, 1999).
North (1990) emphasizes that citizen through elections correct situations where
governments inappropriately regulate their economies. Furthermore, the democratic
148 LIMI KOUOTOU HIBRAHIM AND BONIFACE NGAH EPO

mechanism tends to deter cronyism and corruption (Mesquita et al., 2001). Rodrik (1999)
as well as Baum and Lake (2003) demonstrate that democracy ensures stable and
sustainable growth because it restricts state involvement in the economy while
promoting social aspects like education, health and justice.
Findings related to the conflict approach reveal that in developing countries, the
capacity to resist populist pressures is required for growth. They indicate low-income
individuals tend to exhibit a strong demand for immediate consumption and hence use
their vote or political power to back policies that increases wages and taxes on capital
(Nelson, 1987). By voting for unsustainable income redistribution policies, this likely
undermines profit accumulation and investment (Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; Persson and
Tabellini, 1994; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006). Subsequently, democracy may slow up
investment and consequently economic growth (Wade, 1990; Asiedu and Lien, 2011).
The line of reasoning of the skeptical approach is the rejection of a regular linkage
between democracy and growth. Proponents of this approach suggest that different
political systems can implement similar economic policies and consequently argue that
these systems do not affect economic growth (Pye, 1966).
A review of the empirical literature reveals that there is not a consensus on one of
the three approaches. Reviewing thirteen empirical publications, Sirowy and Inkeles
(1990) disclose that three studies report a negative effect of democracy on growth, four a
positive consequence and six a non-significant result. Przeworski and Limongi (1993)
compare twenty-one empirical studies and highpoint that eight designate a positive
outcome, eight a negative result and five reject any association between democracy and
growth. Brunetti (1997) appraises seventeen studies and divulge that nine found a
non-significant connection between democracy and economic growth, four revealed a
positive effect and four others on a negative effect. Perusing forty-seven studies,
Kurzman et al. (2002) indicate that nineteen describe a positive connection between
democracy and growth, six designate a negative association and ten disclose an
insignificant relationship. Nonetheless, recent empirical publications cluster around two
trends. The first trend discards any direct effect of democracy on growth (Giavazzi and
Tabellini, 2005; Doucouliagos and Ulubasoglu, 2008; Sandalcilar, 2013; Freund and
Jaud, 2014) whereas the second authenticates a direct positive effect (Knutsen, 2011;
Madsen et al., 2015; Acemoglu et al., 2014).

2.2. Democracy and Economic Growth: Insufficient Studies on Africa

Table 1 below recapitulates studies undertake to question the consequence of

democracy on economic growth. In the setting of Africa, limited studies have been
effectually undertaken. We record almost no publication investigating duration of Heads
of State in power on economic growth with robustness test using educational profile of
heads of state. This is in the current context where Africa and the world face increasing
challenges on the benefits related with prolonged stay in power of leaders.
DURATION OF HEADS OF STATE IN POWER AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 149

Table 1. Empirical Studies Examining the Democracy-Economic Growth Nexus

Authors Established linkages (sample in brackets)
Rodrik and Democracy positively affects short-term growth (1950-2000, 154 countries).
Wacziarg (2005)
Fosu (2008) U-shaped association between democracy and growth (1975-2004, 30 SSA
countries).
Doucouliagos and Democracy do not have a direct effect on growth. It indirectly upsurges the rate of
Ulubasoglu growth through human capital, economic freedom and economic stability (Up to
(2008) 2005, 483 estimates from 84 studies).
Papaioannou and Democracy positively affects growth after a given timespan. During periods of
Siourounis (2008) democratic transition, the growth rate reduces and then steadies at a high level
(1960-2003, 166 countries).
Rock (2009) Democracy has a positive effect on growth and investment (1960-2003, 166
countries).
Persson and The order of reforms dictates the extent of the positive effect of democracy on
Tabellini (2009) growth and the type of the democratic regime (parliamentary or presidential)
(1960-2000, 150 countries).
Narayan et al. In the long term, democracy affects growth (1972-2001, 30 SSA countries).
(2011)
Knutsen (2011) Democracy has a positive and significant effects growth (1820-2003, over 150
countries).
Sandalcilar There is no robust relationship between democracy and economic growth
(2013) (1992-2010, 12 countries).
Abdoulaye Democracy positively affects growth and the relationship is mutual (1975-2008,
(2014) UEMOA countries).
Acemoglu et al. Democracy positively and significantly affects GDP (1960-2010, 175 countries).
(2014)
Freund and Jaud Change in political regime upsurges a 1 percentage point economic growth rate in
(2014) the long term, notwithstanding of the direction of change. The slow transition to
democracy has no significant effect on growth (1960–2011, 158 countries).
Salahodjaev The association between democracy and growth differs with the level of cognitive
(2015) capacities of a given country (1970-2013, 93 countries).
Madsen et al. Democracy is a substantial determinant of growth (1820-2000 and 1500-2000,
(2015) 141 countries).
De Kadt and For some countries, democratization negatively impacted economic output, while
Wittels (2019) for other countries it recorded a positive effect (1975–2008, SSA countries).
Luo and Converging levels of incomes and their positive relationship with democracy
Przeworski causes historical tendencies observed, without any assumptions on the effect of
(2019) regimes on growth.
Guadalupe-Lanas The evolution of growth is rather determined by the scale of a positive exogenous
et al. (2018) shock to commodity prices rather than policy regime due to higher incomes that
substantially upsurges the level of investment and productivity (Ecuador).
Anupama (2019) Democracy negatively impacts growth with an indirect positive impact on growth
through trade opening (1996-2012, 56 countries).
Zuazu (2019) The effect of democracy is contingent on the level of technology. Democracy
stimulates the growth of industries close to the global technological frontier unlike
backward industries.
Doces (2020) Democracy promotes growth by conditioning public consumption to be used for
public purposes (1990 to 2010, 72 countries).
Source: Compiled by authors from the literature
150 LIMI KOUOTOU HIBRAHIM AND BONIFACE NGAH EPO

3. METHODOLOGY

In this paper, we examine both the linear and non-linear effects of duration of heads
of state in power on economic growth by implementing both a linear and quadratic
model using both primary and secondary sources. Primary data is constructed from the
political literature to compute the number of years of duration in power for the 41
countries on the panel data. Secondary data is gotten from the World Bank Development
Indicator.
The current debate on the linearity of macroeconomic variables necessitates we
include this possibility in our empirical model. This rationalizes the usage of a quadratic
formulation of the relationship between duration of heads of state in power and
economic growth as suggested in this manuscript. Several formulations on how to model
non-linear macroeconomic relationships exist in the literature with preferences for
quadratic and regime-switching models. Regime-switching models have the benefit of
calculation both aspects of non-linearity and the type and number of regimes associated
(Hansen, 1999; Gonzales et al., 2005). However, in this paper we opt to use a quadratic
model because there are several missing data points in our sample which makes
regime-switching models inoperative, especially in carrying out the analysis by
linguistic zones and groups of educational profiles of heads of state that have smaller
country samples.

3.1. Empirical Model

The theoretical specification adopted in this manuscript is an empirical model that

contextualizes and extends the Solow’s growth model (Solow, 1956) to obtain a growth
model that is analogous to Mankiw et al. (1992) that includes the variable of
interest-duration of heads of state in power.
To empirically model our growth function, we linearize a Cobb-Douglas production
function articulated as:

𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼𝐾𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝐿𝑖,𝑡 , (1)

where 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 is the growth rates of the economy’s real output for each country at a given
period in time, 𝑉𝑖,𝑡 the technological progress recorded, 𝐾𝑖,𝑡 , the stock of physical
capital and 𝐿𝑖,𝑡 the stock of labor of country 𝑖 at date 𝑡.
We can disintegrate the vector of technological progress, into a linear combination of
numerous factors that comprise democratic principles like the duration of stay in power
to obtain:

2
𝑉𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑎𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑎1 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑎2 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + ∑𝑁
𝑗=1 𝑏𝑗 𝑍𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 , (2)
DURATION OF HEADS OF STATE IN POWER AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 151

where 𝑎𝑖,𝑡 depicts the progress of the exogenous level of technology progress; 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑖,𝑡
the duration of the head of state in power and ∑𝑁 𝑗=1 𝑏𝑗 𝑍𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 the weighted sum of 𝑁
other variables that influences the real output of the economy. The expression
2
𝑎1 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑎2 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑖,𝑡 points to the non-linear consideration included in the model; and
2
𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑖,𝑡 represents the squared value for the variable duration in power. 𝑎1 , 𝑎2 and 𝑏𝑗
are parameters to be estimated.
Combining equations (2) and (1), we can write the subsequent quadratic function:

2
𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑎𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑎1 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑎2 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + ∑𝑀
𝑚=1 𝛼𝑚 𝑋𝑚,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 , (3)

where 𝑎𝑖,𝑡 is the exogenous level of technology progress, 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑖,𝑡 is the duration of the
2
heads of state in power, 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑖,𝑡 is the square of representing the variable duration in
power, 𝑋𝑚,𝑖,𝑡 is a vector of right-hand covariates included in the model such as
investment growth, population growth, trade openness and rate of inflation. 𝑎𝑖 , 𝑎1 and
𝑎2 are parameters to be estimated with 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 designating the error term of the stochastic
model.
As earlier indicated, we test both the linear and non-linear effects of duration of
Head of State in power by estimating Equation (3) using both the ordinary least squares
(OLS) and Two stage least square (2SLS) approaches, without (linear expression) and
2
with (non-linear expression) the inclusion of the variable 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑖,𝑡 . The 2SLS approach is
to corrects for the presence of possible sources of endogeneity between economic
growth and some exogenous variables incorporated in the model. We instrument the
endogenous variables by considering its one period lagged value. We test for differences
between the OLS and the 2SLS estimator by effectuating the Hausman test. Additionally,
the stationarity test advises that the variables are stationary (Table A1 in the Appendix)
and the obtained estimates are corrected for possible heteroskedasticity through the
adoption of the White method.
The quadratic relationship theorized in Equation (3) permits us to compute the
optimal or threshold levels after which the duration of heads of state in power reports
2
diminishing returns. This is conceivable if and only if the coefficients 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑖,𝑡
are significant and post opposite signs. This value is gotten by partially differentiating
the variable indicating economic growth with respect to the variable associated with the
duration of heads of states in power, as indicated in Equation (4):

𝜕𝑌𝑖,𝑡
𝜕𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑖,𝑡
= 0. (4)

Solving this equation, we get:

−𝑎1
𝑑𝑢𝑟 ∗ = 2𝑎2
, (5)

where 𝑑𝑢𝑟 ∗ is the threshold value of the variable 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑖,𝑡 .

152 LIMI KOUOTOU HIBRAHIM AND BONIFACE NGAH EPO

Furthermore, we test the empirical strategy described above in order to judge the
stability of the results. To this end, we carry out robustness and sensitivity tests of the
main models of the study (Equations (2) and (3)).
The robustness analysis is carried out through two series of re-estimations of the
study models. The first set of re-estimates is made after switching from a static to a
dynamic panel data setting. We re-estimate our main models (which was initially
estimated using static panels), by using dynamic panels. The data used in this paper
consists of 41 countries and 27 years (from 1990 to 2006), and thus a relatively large
time period. We run regressions in dynamic panel data to check whether this would
produce similar results. For this purpose, we include the lagged term of economic
growth among the explanatory variables. The estimation technique used here is the
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) in system. We also perform post-estimation
tests (first-order and second-order autocorrelation tests of the residuals, and Hansen’s
test) to ensure the appropriateness of this method.
The second set of re-estimates is made by adding other fixed-effects explanatory
variables. To this end, we test the stability of the interactions between duration in power
and economic growth, in the presence of these additional control variables. Specifically,
we control for fixed effects related to the educational profile of heads of state, as Jones
and Olken (2005) and Besley et al. (1991) suggest, in explaining growth. The results are
as robust as the different estimates made in robustness tests tend to converge.
We also analyze for sensitivity by re-estimating the models, taking into account the
heterogeneity associated with three linguistic zones. We group, the forty-one African
countries into French-speaking, English-speaking and Lusophone/other linguistic-
speaking countries (Table A6 in the Appendix). The study's models are therefore
re-estimated on each of the sub-samples formed, to capture the specificities and changes
that implies on the interaction between duration in power and economic growth. The
results are as sensitive as the different estimates made in sensitivity test tend to diverge.

3.2. Data Definitions, Sources and Statistics

The data in the study covers a panel of 41 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa over the
period 1990 to 2016. The duration of Heads of State in power is constructed from a
literary review of the political history of African countries (Archigo’s leader’s data,
2014; Keneck-Massil, 2019; Limi Kouotou and Epo, 2019). The other variables are
obtained from the World Development Indicators database (World Bank, 2018). These
variables include the dependent variable defined as growth in GDP (Solow, 1956) and
the other covariates such as the growth rate of investment proxying physical stock of
capital (Swan, 1956); population growth rate proxying labour (Mankiw et al., 1992); the
degree of trade openness measured by the sum of imports and exports as a percentage of
GDP (Frankel and Romer, 1999) and the rate of inflation (Fischer, 1993). Table 2 gives
the definitions and sources of the different variables.
DURATION OF HEADS OF STATE IN POWER AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 153

Table 2. Definitions and Sources Data of the Variables

Variables Definitions Sources
Economic growth Economic growth is measured by the growth rate of Word Development
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) between two years. Indicators

Capital growth Capital growth is measured by the growth rate of Word Development
investment represented by Gross Fixed Capital Indicators
Formation.
Labour growth Labour growth is measured by the growth rate of the Word Development
population in logarithmic value. Indicators

Trade opening Trade openness is measured by the logarithm of the Word Development
sum of imports and exports as a percentage of GDP. Indicators

Inflation rate The inflation rate is measured by the growth rate of the Word Development
GDP deflator. Indicators

Duration in power Duration in power is measured by the number of years Authors based on
a head of state has been in power since the year of data collected from
accession. This variable gives the value zero for the the political literature
year of accessing power of a given Head of State and
subsequently 1 for the first year in office, 2 for the
second year and so on until the last year.

Source: Compiled by authors from the literature.

Table 3 post descriptive statistics. An assessment reveals that between 1990 and
2016, GDP grew on average by 4%, investment capital by 10%, population growth rate
by 2.5%, trade openness close to 4% and about 54% for inflation.

Table 3. Descriptive Statistics

Variables Average Std Min. Max. Skewness Kurtosis

GDP growth 4.195 7.745 -50.25 149.9 5.95 120.340

Investment growth rate 10.83 86.40 -294.2 2357 23.363 627.345

Population growth rate 2.507 1.045 -6.184 7.917 -1.508 13.124

Trade openness 4.205 0.461 2.979 6.276 0.506 3.926

Inflation rate 54.24 817.9 -31.57 26762 30.104 972.073

Duration in power 9.139 8.965 0 41 1.189 3.666

Source: Compiled by authors using data from the World Bank data and primary data collected from the
political literature.
154 LIMI KOUOTOU HIBRAHIM AND BONIFACE NGAH EPO

The relatively high values of the standard deviations and the large gaps between the
maximum and minimum values for some variables in Table 3 corroborates the economic
history of African countries. For example, Equatorial Guinea’s GDP expanded by 149%
in 1997 with the detection in 1996 of large oil reserves and its ensuing exploitation.
Contrarily, the 1994 Rwandan genocide unfavorably affected the country’s GDP causing
GDP to contract by approximately 50%. Regarding inflation, the record 26762%
happened in Congo (formerly Zaire) around 1994. This situation of hyperinflation was
the result of the poor choice by the authorities of Congo due to their efforts to
compensate for large budgetary deficits through a massive and systematic issuing of
money. About the extremely high variations in investment rates, this triggered by the
civil war in Sierra Leone in the 1990s that caused loss of lives and property with
investment in capital dipping by nearly 300% in 1998. The end of the war in the year
2000 marked the beginning of reconstruction based on the legal exploitation of
diamonds. This led to a rebound of capital investments to a record 2,357%.
Constructing the number of years spent in power necessitates that we gather and
code the data from Africa’s political history. This variable was given the value zero for
the year of accession to power of a given head of state and one for the first year in
office, 2 for the second year and so on until the last year. The statistics in Table 2
disclose that between 1990 and 2016, the average time span African leaders spent in
power between 1990 and 2016 was about 9 years. Nevertheless, the distribution around
the average is relatively large with a standard deviation of about 8 years. The minimum
duration was less than a year while the longest-serving leader was 41 years (Gabon).
Table A3 in the Appendix displays the number of years spent in power by the different
heads of state of the 41 countries in the sample.
Overall, our variables are asymmetric s indicated by the skewness coefficients. Most
of the variables have positive skewness coefficients; this indicates that their data have
values mostly below the mean (values to the left of the mean). Only the population
growth rate has a negative skewness coefficient, which corresponds to data that is
mostly above average (values to the right of the mean). This negative coefficient,
however, reflects only a slight imbalance in the population growth rate variable. For the
kurtosis coefficients, they are positive for all variables. This indicates that they have less
flattened data distributions than a normal density. The variable showing the rate of
inflation reported the largest data peak.
Table 4 shows the matrix of linear correlations between the different variables. The
linear correlations between GDP growth and the different variables are all significant at
the 10% level, except in the case of the duration of the heads of state in power. This
non-significance of the linear correlation between GDP growth and duration in power
suggests a potentially non-linear causal relationship between the two variables. It is
therefore appropriate to consider that this relationship could be non-linear. These
correlations are further explored through stylized facts and the causal econometric
analysis that follows.
DURATION OF HEADS OF STATE IN POWER AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 155

Table 4. Correlations between Variables

(1) (2) (3) (4) (15) (5)
(1) GDP growth 1

(2) Investment growth rate 0.113* 1

0.000
(3) Population growth rate 0.183* 0.027 1
0.000 0.423
(4) Trade openness 0.229* 0.022 -0.098* 1
0.000 0.512 0.001
(5) Inflation rate -0.050* -0.004 0.048* -0.030 1
0.082 0.890 0.096 0.308
(6) Duration in power 0.025 -0.018 0.113* 0.204* 0.087* 1
0.377 0.590 0.000 0.000 0.002
Source: Authors using data from the World Bank and primary data collected from the political literature.
Notes: * indicates significance at the 10% level

3.3. Stylized Facts of the Association between Duration in Power and Growth

The graphical analysis below divulges two stylized facts that signal the nature of the
linkage between the duration of heads of state in power and economic growth. The first
designates that a non-linear and bell-shaped association. The second displays that
Lusophone/other linguistic African countries are systematically out of line with
English-speaking and French-speaking African countries in terms of average growth and
duration in power.

3.3.1. Duration of Heads of State in Power and Average Economic Growth: A

Bell-Shaped Association

Figure 1 explicates average economic growth as a function of the time span a head of
state has been in power over the period 1990-2016. The scatter plot identifies that in the
41st we record the most negative average economic growth rate (-3.3%). On the other
hand, the 18th year in power reported highest average growth (12.3). Up till the 30th year
in power, average growth rates are all positive although diminishing from the eighteenth
year. Beyond 30 years in power, we record alternating positive or negative growth rates.
When the scatterplot is fitted around a second-order polynomial function (black
curve), we find a bell-shaped association between average economic growth and the
duration of heads of state in power. We therefore find an optimal threshold above which
we report diminishing returns.
156 LIMI KOUOTOU HIBRAHIM AND BONIFACE NGAH EPO

Source: Computed by authors using data from the World Bank data and primary data collected from the
political literature.
Notes: The trend approximated by a polynomial function of order two.

Figure 1. Evolution of Economic Growth as a Function of the Duration of Heads of

State in Power

3.3.2. Average Duration in Power and Economic Growth: Lusophone/Other

Linguistics-Speaking, English-And-French-Speaking Countries

Figure 2 post average economic growth rates and average duration in power for
English-speaking (17 countries), French-speaking (17 countries), and Lusophone/other
linguistics-speaking (7 countries) countries. Average duration in power for English-and-
French-speaking countries was eight years while Lusophone/other linguistics -speaking
countries reported eleven years in power. For average growth rates, English speaking
countries grew on average around 4%, French-speaking countries about three percentage
points and Lusophone/other linguistics-speaking countries by 7%.
DURATION OF HEADS OF STATE IN POWER AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 157

Source: Computed by authors using data from the World Bank data and primary data collected from the
political literature.

Figure 2. Average Economic Growth and Duration of Heads of State in Power in

English, French and Lusophone/Other Linguistics-Speaking Countries

4. MAIN RESULTS OF STUDY

Columns one and two in Table 5 report results for the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)
and the Two Stage Least Square (2SLS) for the lineal model while Columns three and
four displays results for the non-linear model. The Hausman test indicates we retain the
2SLS estimator because it produces unbiased estimates (Table A2 in the Appendix). We
thereupon, comment only results for the 2SLS estimator.
Results from Table 5 demonstrates a non-linear relationship between the duration of
heads of state in power and economic growth. The linear model (column 2) suggest that
this relationship is not significant whereas the quadratic model (column 4) reveals a
significant and inverted-U shaped relationship. The calculated threshold is about twelve
years and beyond this period we observe diminishing returns where each additional year
spent in power significantly reduces growth with an elasticity of about 0.02%.
Concerning the estimated coefficients associated with the other right-hand variables,
the quadratic models present results that are consistent with the literature (Columns 2
and 4). The relationship between the variable’s population growth (Mankiw et al., 1992)
and trade openness (Rodriguez and Rodrik, 1999; Frankel and Romer, 1999) were
positive and significantly with GDP.
158 LIMI KOUOTOU HIBRAHIM AND BONIFACE NGAH EPO

Table 5. Effects of the Duration of Heads of State in Power on GDP Growth in SSA
Dependent variable: GDP growth
Linear model Quadratic model
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Variables
Col. 1 Col. 2 Col. 3 Col. 4
Investment growth 0.008 -0.006 0.008 0.003
(0.007) (0.118) (0.007) (0.106)
Population growth 1.649*** 1.574*** 1.649*** 1.567***
(0.317) (0.364) (0.324) (0.350)
Trade openness 5.707 7.168* 5.482* 7.154**
(3.617) (3.821) (3.300) (3.505)
Inflation rate -0.0002*** -0.003 -0.0002* 0.003
(8.45*10-05) (0.005) (0.0001) (0.007)
Duration in power -0.069 -0.074 0.335** 0.348*
(0.053) (0.069) (0.167) (0.200)
Duration in power (squared) -0.014** -0.014*
(0.007) (0.008)
Constant term -23.27 -28.98* -23.80* -30.64**
(15.04) (15.23) (14.39) (14.93)
Optimal time threshold to power (dur*) - - 12.4 12.4
R-squared 0.091 0.071 0.115 0.115
Comments 855 835 855 835
Number of countries 41 41 41 41
Source: Authors using data from the World Bank and primary data collected from the political literature.
Notes: Significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*). Standard deviations corrected for heteroskedasticity and
adjusted are reported in brackets.

5. INTERPRETATION AND DISCUSSION OF THE STUDY RESULTS

5.1. Interpretation of the Study’s Main Result

In Sub-Saharan Africa, we find an inverted U-shaped relationship with an optimal

threshold of 12 years between the duration of heads of state in power and growth. The
function of head of State necessitates significant resource mobilization and the
associated effort to consolidate and manage power diminishes over time; probably due
to rent-seeking networks put in place. This sub optimal situation is strengthened by the
actions of the ruler's collaborators who generate counterproductive pouches of rent to
DURATION OF HEADS OF STATE IN POWER AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 159

indefinitely maintain the system in power. The limitation of durations of heads of state
in office is thus perceived as a democratic principle that, if respected will likely
guarantee that leadership changes. This result is consistent with the findings by Rodrik
(1998) and Acemoglu et al. (2014).

5.2. Robustness of Results to Changing from Static to Dynamic Panel

We test the robustness of the results of study by first re-estimating our main models
using a dynamic rather than a static panel in Table 6. We include the lagged term of
economic growth among the explanatory variables. The estimation technique used is the
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) in system. Appropriate post-estimation tests
for this method are then performed (first-order and second-order autocorrelation tests of
the residuals, and Hansen’s test).
The results obtained with a dynamic panel (columns 2 and 4) confirm those found
with a static panel (columns 1 and 3). All the coefficients maintain their signs and are
significant. The lagged economic growth of one period has a positive effect on the
growth of the following year. The post-estimation tests satisfy the validation conditions
for the use of the GMM estimator in system. The p-value of the first-order residual
autocorrelation test is less than 5%, the second-order autocorrelation test is greater than
10%, and the Hansen test is greater than 10%. The number of instruments used is much
lower than the number of countries (17 instruments for the linear model and 20 for the
quadratic model). Our model is quite robust to the change from a static to dynamic panel
setting.

5.3. Robustness of Results After Controlling for Fixed Effects Related to the
Educational Profile of Heads of State

Though conclusive, our baseline result is based on a sample of countries where the
characteristics of heads of state are not homogeneous. Indeed, African heads of state
have heterogeneous individual profiles which, as Jones and Olken (2005) suggest, affect
economic growth. Potential sources of unobservable heterogeneity are therefore related
to the profile of heads of state, notably their education as demonstrated by Besley et al
(1991). It is likely that the results of the study are more or less robust to the introduction
of fixed effects related to the individual profiles of the heads of state to explain growth.
We re-estimate our main models with fixed effects related to the level and field of study
of the head of state, to assess the robustness of the results to their inclusion. The level of
education takes the value one for heads of state with higher education and zero
otherwise (Table A4 in the Appendix). The field of study covers twelve fields: Law (1),
Chemistry (2), Communication (3), Diplomacy (4), Economics (5), Geology (6), History
(7), Engineering (8), Medicine (9), Military (10), Political Science (11) and Sociology
(12) (Table A5 in the Appendix).
Table 7 presents, in columns 1 and 2, the estimate of the growth model explained by
160 LIMI KOUOTOU HIBRAHIM AND BONIFACE NGAH EPO

duration in power without taking into account fixed effects. Columns 2, 3, 5 and 6
present the estimates of the model when we introducing successively the fixed effects
related to profiles of heads of state.
This robustness test points out that in situation where heads of state have higher
education, we find a positive effect on growth. The education of heads of state in the
social sciences have a positive and significant effect on growth, unlike exact sciences.
These results are similar to the findings of Jones and Olken (2005) and Besley et al.
(1991) on the economic effects of leaders' profiles.
The main results of the study are robust to the introduction of fixed effects among
the explanatory variables. The signs and significances of the coefficients associated with
the duration in power variables remain the same, whatever the fixed effect introduced.
Thus, in columns 5 and 6, the duration in power has a positive and significant effect at
10% confidence level for the estimates. The effect of the square of duration in power is
negative on the other hand. This confirms that the relationship between the duration of
heads of state in power and economic growth is non-linear in nature and reveals a
significant and inverted-U shaped relation between these variables. The computed
optimal threshold years is still around twelve years.

5.4. Sensitivity of the Results Taking into Account the Heterogeneity of

English-Speaking, French-Speaking and Lusophone/Other Linguistic-Speaking
Countries

We also perform a sensitivity test of our results in terms of language. We group the
countries into three linguistic groups and re-estimate equations (3) and (4). Table 8
(Columns 4, 5 and 6) display that estimates for English-and-French-speaking countries
significantly mimic the overall results. Lusophone/other linguistics -speaking countries
show an inverted U-shaped relation which is not significant.
In the quadratic model (Columns 4 and 5) the coefficients of the duration and
duration squared variables are all significant and validates the presence of a non-linear
inverted U-shaped effect. The optimal number of years of duration in power was eleven
years for English-speaking countries and fifteen years for French-speaking countries.
These findings refine our interpretations. Our study models are estimated over the
period 1990 to 2016 and may not capture the effects of virtually unchanging
developments. The peculiarity of the Lusophone/other linguistic countries is due to the
observation that in several of these countries (Eritrea, and Somalia, for example), their
national constitutions did not provide for any limit on the duration of terms of office
(Centre d’Etudes Stratégiques de l’Afrique, 2018). As a result, some heads of state have
stayed in office for long periods without ever having to worry (Eritrea, for example, has
had only one head of state since 1993). Even where constitutional term limits are in
force, there has been nothing to prevent leaders from remaining in power for just as long.
Equatorial Guinea, for example, has had only one leader since 1990, while Guinea
Bissau has had only two (Table A3 in the Appendix).
DURATION OF HEADS OF STATE IN POWER AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 161

Table 6. Results After Changing from Static to Dynamic Panel

Dependent variable: GDP growth
Linear model Quadratic model

2SLS GMM 2SLS GMM

Variables
(Col. 1) (Col. 2) (Col. 3) (Col. 4)

GDP growth (lagged (-1)) 0.239*** 0.225***

(0.027) (0.0246)
Investment growth -0.006 0.007*** 0.003 0.006***
(0.118) (0.001) (0.106) (0.001)
Population growth 1.574*** 1.370*** 1.567*** 1.616***
(0.364) (0.147) (0.350) (0.145)
Trade openness 7.168* 4.565*** 7.154** 5.221***
(3.821) (0.710) (3.505) (0.831)
Inflation rate -0.003 -0.003*** 0.003 -0.002***
(0.005) (0.0003) (0.007) (0.0003)
Duration in power -0.074 -0.086*** 0.348* 0.191***
(0.069) (0.011) (0.200) (0.050)
Duration in power (squared) -0.014* -0.008***
(0.008) (0.001)
Constant term -28.98* -18.86*** -30.64** -22.84***
(15.23) (3.047) (14.93) (3.593)
Optimal threshold (dur*) 12.4 11.94
R-squared 0.071 0.115
Observations 835 833 835 833
Number of countries 41 41 41 41
Number of instruments 17 20
AR (1) 0.008 0.008
AR (2) 0.654 0.543
Hansen 0.164 0.199
Source: Authors using data from the World Bank and primary data collected from the political literature.
Notes: Significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*). Standard deviations corrected for heteroskedasticity and
adjusted are reported in brackets.
162 LIMI KOUOTOU HIBRAHIM AND BONIFACE NGAH EPO

Table 7. Results after Controlling for Fixed Effects Related to Heads of State Education
Dependent variable: GDP growth
Linear model Quadratic model
No FE With FE No FE With FE
Level Field Level Field
Variables
(Col. 1) (Col. 2) (Col. 3) (Col. 4) (Col. 5) (Col. 6)
Investment growth -0.006 -0.003 0.002 0.003 0.005 0.010
(0.118) (0.114) (0.092) (0.106) (0.103) (0.084)
Population growth 1.574*** 1.628*** 1.473*** 1.567*** 1.635*** 1.454***
(0.364) (0.360) (0.359) (0.350) (0.349) (0.328)
Trade openness 7.168* 7.612* 9.134* 7.154** 7.617** 8.925**
(3.821) (3.899) (4.669) (3.505) (3.560) (4.128)
Inflation rate -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
Duration in power -0.074 -0.075 -0.086 0.348* 0.361* 0.362**
(0.069) (0.070) (0.100) (0.200) (0.201) (0.157)
Duration in power (sqr) -0.014* -0.014* -0.014*
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007)
No higher education -1.902* -0.333
(1.055) (0.580)
Higher education 2.233** 2.469**
(1.060) (1.084)
Law 4.273 4.951*
(2.710) (2.947)
Chemistry 4.577* 6.381**
(2.400) (3.159)
Communication 1.552 2.891
(1.835) (2.468)
Diplomacy 6.394* 6.824*
(3.551) (3.568)
Economics 5.465* 6.065**
(2.789) (2.939)
Geology 3.720* 5.554*
(2.033) (2.844)
History 4.432 5.785
(3.420) (3.849)
Engineering -1.884 1.080
(3.000) (1.976)
Medicine 3.879 5.225*
(2.515) (3.016)
Military 5.677 6.174
(4.271) (4.179)
Political Science 5.866* 6.255*
(3.433) (3.268)
Sociology 1.708 4.009**
(1.453) (1.881)
Constant term -28.98* -33.01** -41.62* -30.64** -35.05** -43.05**
(15.23) (16.45) (21.37) (14.93) (16.10) (20.18)
Optim. threshold (dur*) 12.4 12.8 12.9
R-squared 0.071 0.176 0.142 0.115 0.149 0.134
Observations 835 833 835 835 833 835
Number of countries 41 41 41 41 41 41
Source: Authors using data from the World Bank and primary data collected from the political literature.
Notes: Significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*). Standard deviations corrected for heteroskedasticity and
adjusted are reported in brackets.
DURATION OF HEADS OF STATE IN POWER AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 163

Table 8. Results by Linguistic Zones

Dependent variable: GDP growth
Linear model Quadratic model
English French Lusophone English French Lusophone
and other and other
Variables Col. 1 Col. 2 Col. 3 Col. 4 Col. 5 Col. 6
Investment 0.003 0.091** 0.126*** 0.003 0.089** 0.115***
Growth (0.003) (0.0414) (0.026) (0.003) (0.042) (0.021)

Population 1.402* 1.707*** -0.251 1.326* 1.730*** -0.323

Growth (0.722) (0.339) (0.257) (0.688) (0.317) (0.295)

Trade 0.923 -0.523 10.12** 0.807 -0.348 10.14***

Openness (1.310) (1.033) (4.852) (1.183) (0.993) (3.495)

Inflation -0.049** -0.0003*** -0.013 -0.049** -0.0003*** -0.029

Rate (0.022) (3.02*10-05) (0.066) (0.022) (1.63*10-05) (0.086)

Duration in -0.029 0.001 -0.071 0.152* 0.266*** 0.589

Power (0.030) (0.031) (0.168) (0.078) (0.097) (0.414)

Duration in -0.007** -0.009*** -0.020

power (squared) (0.003) (0.003) (0.015)

Constant term -2.323 0.313 -35.99* -2.249 -1.401 -38.20**

(6.719) (4.822) (18.48) (6.038) (4.732) (14.83)
Optimal threshold (dur*) 10,85 15,64
R-squared 0.076 0.197 0.209 0.085 0.214 0.234
Comments 358 396 122 358 396 122
Number of coun. 17 17 7 17 17 7
Source: Authors using data from the World Bank and primary data collected from the political literature.
Notes: Significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*). Standard deviations corrected for heteroskedasticity and
adjusted are reported in brackets.

6. CONCLUSION

The aim of this manuscript was to analyze how the duration of heads of state in
power relates to economic growth in Sub-Saharan African and test for robustness and
sensitivity. We implement both linear and non-linear (quadratic) models to authenticate
this assertion on a panel of forty-one countries in SSA over the period 1990-2016.
The results show that the relationship between the duration of heads of state in
power and economic growth post diminishing returns after the twelve-year threshold.
Before this time frame, each year spent in power suggest a positive elasticity of about
0.3%. Beyond this point, the effect is negative with an elasticity of -0.02%.
English-and-French-speaking countries reveal optimal years of eleven and fifteen years,
respectively. The results are robust when we use both a static and dynamic setting as
164 LIMI KOUOTOU HIBRAHIM AND BONIFACE NGAH EPO

well as fixed effects related to the educational profile of heads of states.

APPENDIX

Table A1. Stationarity Tests On Variables

Tests Statistics P-value
GDP growth Inverse chi-squared(92) 789.0 0.000
Inverse normal -21.61 0.000
Inverse logit t(179) -32.29 0.000
Modified inv. chi-squared 52.11 0.000
Investment growth Inverse chi-squared(92) 785.5 0.000
Inverse normal -22.14 0.000
Inverse logit t(179) -33.69 0.000
Modified inv. chi-squared 54.94 0.000
Population growth Inverse chi-squared(92) 362.7 0.000
Inverse normal -4.729 0.000
Inverse logit t(179) -10.42 0.000
Modified inv. chi-squared 19.95 0.000
Trade openness Inverse chi-squared(92) 115.3 0.037
Inverse normal -1.749 0.040
Inverse logit t(179) -1.993 0.023
Modified inv. chi-squared 1.887 0.029
Inflation rate Inverse chi-squared(92) 754.4 0.000
Inverse normal -21.80 0.000
Inverse logit t(179) -30.93 0.000
Modified inv. chi-squared 49.52 0.000
Duration in power Inverse chi-squared(92) 179.9 0.000
Inverse normal -5.639 0.000
Inverse logit t(179) -6.167 0.000
Modified inv. chi-squared 6.477 0.000
Source: Computed by authors using data from the World Bank

Table A2. Hausman Test of Convergence between the OLS Estimator and
the 2SLS Estimator
Linear model Quadratic model
Difference Difference
Variables S.E. S.E.
(2SLS - OLS) (2SLS - OLS)
Investment growth -0.0149 0.0725 -0.0053 0.0684
Population growth -0.0742 0.2127 -0.0823 0.2066
Trade openness 1.4602 0.7898 1.6720 0.7925
Inflation rate -0.0032 0.0215 0.0027 0.0215
Duration in power -0.0049 0.0142 0.0137 0.0540
Duration in power (squared) - - -0.0005 0.0021
χ2 12.72 16.08
Prob > χ2 0.0261 0.0133
Source: Computed by authors using data from the World Bank data. Null hypothesis-Ho: difference in
coefficients not systematic)
DURATION OF HEADS OF STATE IN POWER AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 165

Table A3. Data on the Duration of Heads of State in Power in Sub-Saharan Africa

Source: Computed by authors using primary data collected from the literature.
166 LIMI KOUOTOU HIBRAHIM AND BONIFACE NGAH EPO

Table A4. Data on the Levels of Study of Heads of State in Power in SSA

Source: Computed by authors using primary data collected from the literature
Notes: Higher education (1), No Higher education (0)
DURATION OF HEADS OF STATE IN POWER AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 167

Table A5. Data on the Fields of Study of Heads of State in Power in SSA

Source: Computed by authors using primary data collected from the literature.
Notes: Law (1), Chemistry (2), Communication (3), Diplomacy (4), Economics (5), Geology (6), History (7),
Engineering (8), Medicine (9), Military (10), Political Science (11) and Sociology (12).
168 LIMI KOUOTOU HIBRAHIM AND BONIFACE NGAH EPO

Table A6. Sub-Saharan African Countries by Language Area in the Study

Anglophone Francophone Lusophone/others
(17) (17) (7)
South Africa Benin Angola
Botswana Burkina Faso Cabo Verde
The Gambia Burundi Eritrea
Ghana Comoros Ethiopia
Kenya Congo, Democratic Republic of Equatorial Guinea
Lesotho the Guinea-Bissau
Malawi Congo, Republic of the Mozambique
Mauritius Ivory Coast
Namibia Djibouti
Nigeria Gabon
Uganda Madagascar
Seychelles Mali
Sierra Leone Niger
Swaziland Central African Republic
Tanzania Rwanda
Zambia Senegal
Zimbabwe Chad
Togo
Source: Compiled by authors.

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Mailing Address: Limi Kouotou Hibrahim, University of Yaounde II, Department of Public
Economics, P.O. Box 1365 Yaounde, Cameroon, E-mail: hibrahimlimi@yahoo.fr

Received December 12, 2021, Revised June 22, 2022, Accepted March 05, 2023

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