For your quiz tomorrow, please read the following cases on R.A.

9262:

1. Garcia vs. Drilon (G.R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013)

2. People vs. Genosa (G.R. No. 135981, January 15, 2004)
3. XXX vs. People (G.R. No. 250219, March 1, 2023)
4. Knutson vs. Sarmiento-Flores(G.R. No. 239215, July 12, 2022)
5. XXX vs. People (G.R. No. 256611, October 12, 2022)
6. People vs. Acharon (G.R. No. 224946, G.R. No. 9, 2021)

G.R. No. 179267. June 25, 2013 (Case Brief / Digest)

Jan 20, 2024
– Case Briefs

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Title: Jesus C. Garcia vs. The Honorable Ray Alan T. Drilon, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court-Branch 41,
Bacolod City, and Rosalie Jaype-Garcia, for Herself and on Behalf of Her Minor Children

Facts:
Rosalie Jaype-Garcia (private respondent) married Jesus C. Garcia (petitioner) in 2002, a relationship that bore three
children. The couple’s marital union was marred(impair) by petitioner’s infidelity, physical, emotional, psychological,
and economic violence which prompted private respondent to file a verified petition for the issuance of a Temporary
Protection Order (TPO) on March 23, 2006 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City pursuant to
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, known as the “Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004”.

The petitioner admitted his extramarital affairs, exerted controlling behavior, and perpetrated physical and emotional
abuse against the private respondent and their children. The abuse escalated to the point that the private respondent
attempted suicide. Petitioner exercises domination over family businesses while denying adequate financial support
to his family. The trial court issued several TPOs, granting various reliefs and extending protection for the private
respondent and her children.

Following these developments, the petitioner filed a petition for prohibition with the Court of Appeals (CA), challenging
the constitutionality of R.A. 9262, alleging violation of the equal protection and due process clauses, and an undue
delegation of judicial power to barangay officials. The CA dismissed the petition, ruling that the issue of
constitutionality was not raised in the trial court and the challenge constitutes a collateral attack on the validity of the
law.

Issues:
1. Whether the petition for prohibition was the proper remedy to assail the constitutionality of R.A. 9262.
2. Whether R.A. 9262 violates the equal protection clause.
3. Whether R.A. 9262 infringes (to violate or break) upon the due process clause.
4. Whether R.A. 9262 undermines the policy of the State to protect the family as a basic social institution.
5. Whether R.A. 9262 permits an undue delegation of judicial power to barangay officials.

Court’s Decision:
1. The Court affirmed the CA’s dismissal, holding that the constitutionality of a law should be challenged at the
earliest opportunity, and that a petition for prohibition is an inappropriate vehicle for challenging an interlocutory order,
in this case, the TPO, in the RTC proceedings.
2. The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of R.A. 9262, ruling that the law’s classification was not arbitrary or
discriminatory as it was based on substantial distinctions between the experiences of men and women concerning
domestic violence.
3. The Court found that R.A. 9262 does not violate the due process clause, providing safeguards such as immediate
notice and hearing following the issuance of TPO ex parte, ensuring balance between the need for prompt action in
VAWC cases and procedural fairness to the respondents.
4. The Court held that R.A. 9262 does not undermine the family’s integrity; rather, it seeks to strengthen and protect
the family by addressing the prevalence of domestic violence, which threatens the safety and welfare of family
members.
5. In its ruling, the Court stated that the issuance of Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs) by barangay officials is an
executive function, not judicial, and within the parameters set by R.A. 9262 – thus not constituting an undue
delegation of judicial power.

Doctrine:
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of R.A. 9262, ruling that the law does not infringe upon the equal
protection and due process clauses of the Constitution and does not unduly delegate judicial power. The Court held
that immediate protection is warranted under the law to prevent further violence against victims and that the law is
substantial in differentiating the experiences of women from men in domestic violence scenarios. BPOs issued by
barangay officials are considered an extension of executive, not judicial, functions, enacting the legislative intent to
address domestic violence expeditiously.

Class Notes:
– Equal Protection Clause: A law must be based on a reasonable, substantial distinction to be constitutionally valid
and serve a legitimate government objective.
– Due Process Clause: In cases where life, liberty, or property interests are at stake, procedural fairness must be
observed, including notice and opportunity to be heard.
– Delegation of Power: Delegation is permissible if it falls within a statutory framework that provides sufficient
standards and limitations to guide the delegate.

Historical Background:
R.A. 9262 is a result of advocacy efforts to combat violence against Filipino women, reflecting international
commitments under human rights instruments such as the CEDAW. The law illustrates the evolving societal and legal
stance against domestic violence and emphasizes the State’s role in protecting vulnerable members of the family
unit.

G.R. No. 135981. January 15, 2004 (Case Brief / Digest) © 2024 - batas.org | 1

Title: People of the Philippines vs. Marivic Genosa

Facts: The case of People vs. Marivic Genosa revolves around the tragic death of Ben Genosa, Marivic’s husband,
which occurred on November 15, 1995. The couple, who had been married since November 19, 1983, had a
tumultuous relationship marked by frequent arguments and violent encounters, mainly due to Ben’s alleged
alcoholism, gambling, and abusive behavior towards Marivic. On the fateful night, Ben Genosa was reported to have
gone to a cockfight with a friend and subsequently arrived home intoxicated. Marivic, who was eight months pregnant
at the time, had gone out looking for him due to concerns over his gambling. Upon her return, an altercation ensued
between them, culminating in Marivic shooting Ben in the head, ultimately leading to his death. The procedural events
leading to the Supreme Court review began with Marivic Genosa’s indictment for parricide. She was tried and
convicted by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ormoc City (Branch 35) and was sentenced to death. The case was
automatically elevated to the Supreme Court for review, where Marivic anchored her defense on the grounds of the
“battered woman syndrome” (BWS), arguing that it constituted self-defense.

Issues: 1. Whether the “battered woman syndrome” (BWS) can be recognized as a form of selfdefense under
Philippine law. 2. Determination of the presence of unlawful aggression, reasonable necessity of the means employed
to prevent or repel it, and lack of sufficient provocation on the part of Marivic. 3. The application of mitigating
circumstances in the imposition of penalties under the Revised Penal Code.

Court’s Decision: No. The Supreme Court, on review, recognized the battered woman syndrome as a potential
ground for establishing self-defense but found that Marivic Genosa did not meet all the requisite conditions for such a
defense in this instance. Specifically, the Court found that there was no immediate unlawful aggression from Ben
Genosa at the time Marivic shot him. Thus, Marivic’s act did not constitute self-defense. However, the Court
acknowledged the existence of mitigating circumstances, such as “psychological paralysis” and Marivic’s state of
“passion and obfuscation” due to the severe G.R. No. 135981. January 15, 2004 (Case Brief / Digest) © 2024 -
batas.org | 2 cumulative provocation and the acute battering incident preceding the killing. These circumstances led
to a diminished state of mind and a powerful impulse that clouded her reason, entitling her to mitigating
circumstances under paragraphs 9 and 10 of Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code. Doctrine: The Supreme Court in
this case recognized the battered woman syndrome as a novel theory that could potentially qualify as self-defense
under specific circumstances. It established that for BWS to be successfully used as a defense in parricide or similar
cases, it must be proven that the accused was indeed suffering from such syndrome and acted out of a justified fear
of imminent danger to their life. Class Notes: 1. Battered Woman Syndrome (BWS) – Recognized for the first time
by the Philippine Supreme Court as a possible defense in parricide cases. It requires a showing of cyclical abuse
and a justified fear of imminent danger. 2. Self-Defense – Requires unlawful aggression, reasonable necessity
of the means employed to prevent or repel it, and lack of sufficient provocation by the person defending
themselves. 3. Mitigating Circumstances (Article 13, RPC) – Conditions that do not justify or excuse an act
but reduce the degree of criminal liability or penalty. Includes “psychological paralysis” and acting upon an
“impulse so powerful” in this case. 4. Revised Penal Code, Article 13, paragraphs 9 and 10 – Defines mitigating
circumstances, including such illness or condition of the offender that would diminish the exercise of the willpower
without depriving them of consciousness of their actions. Historical Background: The case of People vs. Marivic
Genosa is pivotal in Philippine legal history for introducing the concept of the battered woman syndrome as a
potential legal defense. It demonstrates the evolving understanding and recognition of domestic abuse’s
psychological effects and its legal implications. This case reflects the legal system’s efforts to adapt and respond to
complex social issues by potentially incorporating psychological conditions such as BWS in assessing criminal liability
and personal defense.

G.R. No. 250219 - XXX,[1] PETITIONER, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

 FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 250219. March 01, 2023

XXX,1 PETITIONER, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

HERNANDO, J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari2 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the January 31, 2019
Decision3 and the October 18, 2019 Resolution4 rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 40971.
The CA affirmed with modifications the November 10, 2017 Decision5 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of x x x 6 in
Criminal Case No. 194-V-16 finding petitioner XXX guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 5(i) of
Republic Act No. (RA) 9262,7 or the "Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004."

Facts of the Case

Petitioner was charged with a violation of Sec. 5(i) of RA 9262 based on an Information8 dated January 29, 2016, to
wit:

In October 2015 up to the present, in x x x and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, being the husband of victim [AAA],9 did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously deprive his minor
child of financial support legally due to the complainant and to her minor child and abandoning them totally, causing
psychological and emotional anguish to the complainant and her minor child.

CONTRARY TO LAW.10
Petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion to Quash [the] Information and to Quash Warrant of Arrest 11 arguing violation of
the constitutional right to due process and consequently praying for a preliminary investigation.12 The motion was
granted by the trial court. Trial prosecutor Agapito F. Fajardo, Jr. was directed to conduct the proper investigation
and submit a Resolution within 30 days from receipt of the Order dated March 3, 2016, granting the motion.13

After re-investigation and careful evaluation of the evidence presented by both sides, the prosecutor found no reason
to reverse or modify the Resolution dated January 29, 2016 finding probable cause for violation of Sec. 5(i) of RA
9262 against petitioner.14

Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. 15 Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

Version of the Prosecution

Petitioner and AAA were married on December 29, 2006;16 out of their union, a daughter was born.17 After their
wedding, petitioner and AAA stayed in x x x . However, due to their difficult circumstances, AAA decided to look for a
job abroad to help sustain their family.18 AAA left for Singapore in 2108.

In May 2015, AAA learned that petitioner is in a romantic relationship with another woman, CCC. Petitioner even
messaged AAA not to communicate with him anymore.19 To make things worse, in July 2015, AAA discovered that
CCC was pregnant with petitioner's child.20

On several occasions, petitioner and CCC would send AAA text messages just to spite her, to wit:
Excerpts from CCC's exchanges with AAA:

CCC: Nabuntis ako out of love... Eh ikaw nabuntis ka out [sic] of LUST.. oh by the way do you know what lust
means?

xxxx

AAA: Ohh bakit masama bang malaman kung kelan ipanganak ang anak ng asawa ko sa ibang babae.. haha

CCC: Hahahahah asawa? Uy hindi mo daw siya asawa, eto o tumatawa sa tabi ko... Sa papel lang daw kayo nag
asawa at hindi sa puso at kaluluwa niya. Hahahaha it hurts diba?21
Excerpts from petitioner's and CCC's exchanges:

Petitioner: Sige na, ngarod ta marog kamin nakaligo na mahal ko sarap yumakap malamig ti kwarto mi hehe (sige na
matutulog na kami ng mahal ko nakaligo na siya, masarap yumakap dahil malamig ang kwarto namin) 22
Later on, AAA learned that petitioner brought CCC to their hometown,23 prompting AAA to return to the
country.24 Upon learning that petitioner and CCC started to cohabit in x x x , AAA sought the help and assistance of
the Department of Social Welfare and Development in getting her daughter, BBB, from her mother-in-law. 25

BBB, who at the time of her testimony was 9 years old, also took the stand. BBB testified that in 2015, her mother
fetched her from her father. The transcript shows that BBB had a hard time narrating her testimony as she kept on
crying when propounded with questions. Multiple times BBB would stop and cry and would require the counsels, her
mother, or the presiding judge to calm her down to allow her to compose herself to be able to give her
testimony.26 According to BBB, while she was not used to having her mother AAA around, she voluntarily went with
her mother when she was being fetched from the house she grew up in. BBB further confirmed that petitioner, her
father, had a girlfriend, CCC, whom petitioner would bring home every now and then. When asked to explain why she
was crying, BBB explained that it was because her father and CCC had an affair, and that she wanted that her father
and mother to reconcile together.27 BBB said that she no longer loved her father.

When the prosecution formally offered its evidence, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the case on Demurrer to
Evidence,28 claiming that the prosecution failed to establish the allegation in the criminal Information that petitioner
deprived AAA and BBB of financial support. The RTC denied the same in an Order dated March 21, 2017.29

Version of the Defense

Petitioner confirmed that BBB is his daughter with AAA. Prior to October 2015, BBB was living with him in x x x ; his
mother helped in rearing BBB until AAA forcibly took her away.30 Contrary to AAA's accusations, it was petitioner who
had custody and who primarily took care of their child since AAA left the country and work in Singapore.

Petitioner initially denied knowing CCC, but subsequently clarified that they went to the same secondary school, but
had not seen CCC in a long time.31 When asked if he was providing support to BBB, he replied that since October
2015 when the child was taken from him, he stopped giving support because AAA does not allow BBB to be near him
nor show her to him.32

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

The RTC found petitioner guilty of inflicting psychological violence against AAA and BBB through emotional
and psychological abandonment. The RTC held that petitioner might not have physically abandoned his family, but
the emotional and psychological abandonment and all the hurts, pains, and distress brought about by his indiscretion
as a husband are far worse than physical abandonment.33

The fallo of the trial court's Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding ACCUSED [XXX] guilty of violation of
Section 5(i) of RA 9262 and is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment of two (2)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day prision
mayor as maximum. He is likewise, ORDERED TO PAY a fine of one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) and to
undergo psychological counseling in any government accredited institution and submit to this Court his proof of
compliance thereof.

SO ORDERED.34
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA imputing the following errors to the RTC: (1) in considering psychological
violence when the only accusation against him is merely economic abuse; (2) in failing to consider the fact that it was
AAA who alienated their child from petitioner; (3) in failing to consider the fact that it was petitioner who took custody
of BBB when she was still 7-months old until October 2015; (4) in failing to consider the legal implication of the act of
petitioner in filing a Petition for Custody; and (5) in failing to consider that the pieces of evidence so far adduced by
the prosecution are insufficient to support the assailed Decision. 35

Representing the People of the Philippines, the Office of the Solicitor General argued that the criminal Information
against petitioner charges not only deprivation of financial support, but likewise of abandonment, which caused
psychological and emotional anguish to both AAA and BBB.36
Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In a Decision dated January 31, 2019, the appellate court found no merit in the Petition. Sec. 5(i) of RA 9262
penalizes some forms of psychological violence inflicted on victims who are women and children. 37 Specifically, Sec.
5(i) of RA 92962 states:
Section 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and their Children. � The crime of violence against women and their
children is committed through any of the following acts:

xxxx

(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child, including, but not
limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of minor children or
access to the woman's child/children.
The criminal Information filed against petitioner stated that he "willfully, unlawfully, feloniously deprive x x x financial
support legally due to the complainant and to her minor child and abandoning them totally causing psychological and
emotional anguish to the complainant and to her minor child." 38 Clearly, contrary to petitioner's allegation, the
Information charged him not only with deprivation of financial support to BBB, but also the act of abandoning both
AAA and BBB, which may be considered as having been subsumed in the phrase "similar acts or omissions"
mentioned under Sec. 5(i) of RA 9262. While the prosecution was not able to establish that petitioner denied AAA
and BBB financial support, the prosecution was able to clearly show that petitioner abandoned them, and such
abandonment caused them mental or emotional anguish.39

The CA further emphasized that what constitutes abandonment is not only the physical act of separating and
abandoning AAA for another woman, but likewise, the emotional abandonment and alienation that petitioner did
which made AAA suffer. The fact of abandonment was supported by the text messages between petitioner and AAA.
For the CA, these exchanges do not only prove the fact of abandonment, physical and/or emotional, but likewise an
admission of marital infidelity, another specie of psychological violence by petitioner. 40

The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Appeal is hereby DENIED. Accordingly, the assailed Decision dated
10 November 2017 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to the penalty of imprisonment, in that, accused-appellant
is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day
of prision correccional as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.

The assailed Decision is AFFIRMED in all other respects.

SO ORDERED.41
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration42 imploring the CA to review its findings and carefully study his
arguments. However, in a Resolution43 dated October 18, 2019, the CA is not swayed to reconsider. Hence, this
petition.

Petitioner now comes before this Court contending that psychological violence could not be considered against him
since the same was not alleged in the Information to which he pleaded not guilty. 44 Petitioner asserts that an accused
cannot be convicted of a crime or an act which is not alleged in the Information. To rule otherwise would be a
violation of the accused's basic constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation levelled
against him or her.45

Issue

The sole issue for Our resolution is whether the CA erred in affirming the Decision of the RTC finding petitioner guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of a violation of Sec. 5(i) of RA 9262.

Our Ruling

The elements of a violation of Sec. 5(i) of RA 9262 are as follows:

1. The offended party is a woman and/or her child or children;

2. The woman is either the wife or former wife of the offender, or is a woman with whom the offender
has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or is a woman with whom such offender has a common
 child. As for the woman's child or children, they may be legitimate or illegitimate, or living within or
without the family abode;
3. The offender causes on the woman and/or child mental or emotional anguish; and
4. The anguish is caused through acts of public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal and emotional
abuse, denial of financial support or custody of minor children or access to the children or similar to
such acts or omissions.46

The Court in Reyes v. People,47 elucidated that conviction under Sec. 5(i) of RA 9262 requires proof of the
indispensable elements of (1) psychological violence as the means employed by the perpetrator consisting of any
acts enumerated in Sec. 5(i) or similar acts, and (2) the mental or emotional suffering or damage sustained by the
offended party.48 Further, it has been stressed that "the law does not require proof that the victim become
psychologically ill due to the psychological violence done by her abuser. Rather, the law only requires emotional
anguish and mental suffering to be proven. To establish emotional anguish or mental suffering, jurisprudence only
requires that [the victim testify in court and narrate such experiences]." 49

We agree with the CA and the RTC that all the elements to establish a violation of Sec. 5(i) of RA 9262 are
present.

The first and second eleme;nts are present since the offended parties are AAA and her child. The fact of petitioner's
marriage to AAA has been proven conclusively by an undisputed Certificate of Marriage dated December 29, 2006;
while the fact that BBB is AAA and petitioner's child has been proven by BBB's Certificate of Live Birth which states
petitioner and AAA as parents.

The testimonies of AAA and BBB clearly established the presence of the third and fourth elements, i.e., the offender
causing on the woman and/or child mental or emotional anguish through acts of public ridicule or humiliation,
repeated verbal and emotional abuse, denial of financial support or custody of minor children, or access to the
children, or similar to such acts or omissions.

There are several forms of abuse, the most visible form of which is physical violence. 50 RA 9262 enumerated in a
non-limiting manner the various forms of violence and abuse that may be committed against women and
children.51 Sec. 3 of RA 9262 defines violence against women and children as follows:
Sec. 3. Definition of Terms. � As used in this Act,
�
(a) "Violence against women and their children" refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any person
against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or
dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate,
within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm
or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, batter, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary
deprivation of liberty. It includes, but is not limited to, the following acts:

A. "Physical Violence" refers to acts that include bodily or physical harm;

B. "Sexual violence" refers to an act which is sexual in nature, committed against a woman or her child. It includes,
but is not limited to:

xxxx

C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions causing or likely to cause mental or emotional suffering of the
victim such as but not limited to intimidation, harassment, stalking, damage to property, public ridicule or
humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and marital infidelity. It includes causing or allowing the victim to witness the
physical, sexual or psychological abuse of a member of the family to which the victim belongs, or to witness
pornography in any form or to witness abusive injury to pets or to unlawful or unwanted deprivation of the right to
custody and/or visitation of common children.

D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to make a woman financially dependent which includes, but
is not limited to the following:52
It is crucial that the essential elements of psychological abuse under RA 9262 be identified to categorically determine
the jurisdiction and authority of the court over a criminal case, as well as determine whether liability for the crime can
be ascribed to the accused. In Dinamling v. People,53 this Court enumerated the elements of psychological violence
under Sec. 5(i) of RA 9262, as follows:
Section 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. � The crime of violence against women and their
children is committed through any of the following acts:

[x x x x]

(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child, including, but not
limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of minor children or
access to the woman's child/children.

From the aforequoted Section 5 (i), in relation to other sections of R[.]A[.] No. 9262, the elements of the crime are
derived as follows:

(1) The offended party is a woman and/or her child or children;

(2) The woman is either the wife or former wife of the offender, or is a woman with whom the offender has or had a
sexual or dating relationship, or is a woman with whom such offender has a common child. As for the woman's child
or children, they may be legitimate or illegitimate, or living within or without the family abode;

(3) The offender causes on the woman and/or child mental or emotional anguish; and

(4) The anguish is caused through acts of public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, denial
of financial support or custody of minor children or access to the children or similar such acts or omissions.

xxxx

It bear emphasis that Section 5(i) penalizes some forms of psychological violence that are inflicted on victims who are
women and children. Other forms of psychological violence, as well as physical, sexual and economic violence, are
addressed and penalized in other sub-parts of Section 5.

xxxx

Psychological violence is an element of violation of Section 5(i) just like the mental or emotional anguish
caused on the victim. Psychological violence is the means employed by the perpetrator, while mental or
emotional anguish is the effect caused to or the damage sustained by the offended party. To establish
psychological violence as an element of the crime, it is necessary to show proof of commission of any of the acts
enumerated in Section 5(i) or similar such acts. And to establish mental or emotional anguish, it is necessary to
present the testimony of the victim as such experiences are personal to this party. 54
Marital infidelity is one of the forms of psychological violence. The prosecution in this case was able to satisfactorily
establish petitioner's marital infidelity, his cohabitation with CCC who even bore him a child, and his abandonment of
AAA. BBB's psychological trauma was evident when she wept in open court upon being asked to narrate petitioner's
infidelity. In particular, BBB explained that she was deeply hurt because her father had another family and loved
another woman other than her mother, BBB.55

In fine, the RTC and the CA did not err in finding petitioner guilty of violating Sec. 5 (i) of RA 9262.

Penalty

Sec. 6 of RA 9262 provides the penalty of prision mayor for acts falling under Sec. 5(i) of RA 9262. In addition, a fine
of not less that PHP100,000.00 but not more than PHP 300,000.00 is imposed. Moreover, the perpetrator shall
undergo mandatory psychological counseling or psychiatric treatment and shall report compliance to the court. The
CA therefore correctly modified the penalty imposed upon petitioner to an indeterminate sentence of two (2) years,
four (4) months, and one (1) day, of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years, and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as maximum, to pay a fine in the amount of PHP 100,000.00, and to undergo psychological counseling.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The January 31, 2019 Decision and the October 18, 2019 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 40971 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
Case Digest | KNUTSON VS. FLORES
Leave a Comment / Case Digest, Jurisprudence
Randy Michael Knutson, acting on behalf of minor Rhuby Sibal Knutson vs. Hon. Elisa R. Sarmiento-Flores,
in her capacity as Acting Presiding Judge of Branch 69, Regional Trial Court, Taguig City, and Rosalina Sibal
Knutson
G.R. No. 239215 | 12 July 2022

FACTS:

Randy Michael Knutson (Randy), an American Citizen, met Rosalina Siba Knutson (Rosalina) in Singapore. They got
married and had a daughter named Rhuby. The family lived in the Philippines. Randy and Rosalina became
estranged after he discovered her extra-marital affairs, but Randy supported Rosalina and Rhuby.

Rosalina got hooked in casinos and incurred large debts from casino financiers prompting her to sell the house and
lot, condominium unit, and vehicles that Randy provided for the family. Rosalina rented an apartment and got herself
a boyfriend. Randy advised Rosalina to be discreet in her illicit affairs because it is not good for Rhuby to see her
mother with another man.

Randy discovered later that Rosalina hurt Rhuby by pulling her hair, slapping her face and knocking her head. One
time, Rosalina pointed a knife at Rhuby and threatened to kill her. Rosalina even texted Randy about her plan to kill
their daughter and commit suicide. Randy reported the matter to the police station but the authorities explained that
they cannot assist him in domestic abuse.

The neighbors of Rosalina complained about noisy parties and pot sessions in her apartment. The lessor even
terminated the lease after marijuana plants were confiscated in the premises.

On December 7, 2017, Randy, on behalf of minor Rhuby, filed against Rosalina a petition under RA No. 9262
for the issuance of Temporary and Permanent Protection Orders before the RTC. Randy averred that Rosalina
placed Rhuby in a harmful environment deleterious to her physical, emotional, moral, and psychological
development.
RTC Ruling: Dismissed the petition, explaining that protection and custody orders in RA No. 9262 cannot be
issued against a mother who allegedly abused her own child. It ratiocinated that the child’s mother cannot be
considered as an offender under the law. Moreover, the remedies are not available to the father because he is not a
“woman victim of violence”.

Randy moved for a reconsideration but it was denied.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the father can avail of the remedies under RA No. 9262 on behalf of his minor child against the mother’s
violent and abusive acts.
2. Whether RA No. 9262 covers a situation where the mother committed violent and abusive acts against her own
child.

RULING:

1. YES. RA No. 9262 allows the father of the offended party to apply for protection and custody orders.

In Garcia vs. Drilon, Section 9(b) of RA No. 9262 explicitly allows “parents or guardians of the offended party”
to file a petition for protection orders. The statute categorically used the word “parents” which pertains to the
father and the mother of the woman or child victim. Absolute Sentencia Expositore Non Indiget. The law speaks in
clear language and no explanation is required. There is no occasion for the Court to interpret but only to apply the law
when it is not ambiguous. Similarly, the statute did not qualify on who between the parents of the victim may apply for
protection orders. Ubi lex non distinguit, nee nos distinguere debemus. When the law does not distinguish, the courts
must not distinguish.

In any event, A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC states that the Rules of Court shall apply in a suppletory manner to
petitions for protection orders. 33 Under Section 5, Rule 3 of Rules of Court, “[a} minor or a person alleged
to be incompetent, may sue or be sued with the assistance of his father, mother, guardian, or if he has none,
a guardian ad !item.” In this case, the title of the petition for issuance of a protection order is unequivocal, to
wit: “RANDY MICHAEL KNUTSON acting on behalf of minor RHUBYSIBAL KNUTSON, Petitioner, -versus-
ROSALINA SIBAL KNUTSON, Respondent.“ There is no question that the offended party is Rhuby, a minor
child, who allegedly experienced violence and abuse. Thus, Randy may assist Rhuby in filing the petition as
the parent of the offended party.

2. YES. RA No. 9262 covers a situation where the mother committed violent and abusive acts against her own
child.

Section 3 (a) of RA 9262 defines violence against women and their children as:

“any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a
woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or
against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to
result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery,
assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty.”

The law criminalizes acts of violence against women and their children perpetrated by women’s intimate
partners, i.e., husband; former husband; or any person who has or had sexual or dating relationship with the woman,
or with whom the woman has a common child. However, the Court in Garcia emphasized that the law does not single
out the husband or father as the culprit. The statute used the gender-neutral word “person” as the offender which
embraces any person of either sex.

The offender may also include other persons who conspired to commit the violence, thus:

As defined above, VAWC may likewise be committed “against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or
dating relationship.” Clearly, the use of the gender-neutral word “person” who has or had a sexual or dating
relationship with the woman encompasses even lesbian relationships. Moreover, while the law provides that
the offender be related or connected to the victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it
does not preclude the application of the principle of conspiracy under the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Thus,
in the case of Go-Tan v. Spouses Tan [588 Phil. 532 (2008)], the parents-in-law of Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan, the
victim, were held to be proper respondents in the case filed by the latter upon the allegation that they and their son
(Go-Tan’s husband) had community of design and purpose in tormenting her by giving her insufficient financial
support; harassing and pressuring her to be ejected from the family home; and in repeatedly abusing her verbally,
emotionally, mentally and physically.

Differently stated, the fact that a social legislation affords special protection to a particular sector does not
automatically suggest that its members are excluded from violating such law.

Logically, a mother who maltreated her child resulting in physical, sexual, or psychological violence defined
and penalized under RA No. 9262 is not absolved from criminal liability notwithstanding that the measure is
intended to protect both women and their children. In this case, however, the RTC dismissed Randy’s petition for
protection orders on behalf of his minor daughter on the ground that the mother cannot be considered as an offender
under the law. To restate, the policy of RA No. 9262 is to guarantee full respect for human rights. Towards this
end, the State shall exert efforts to address violence committed against children in keeping with the fundamental
freedoms guaranteed under the Constitution, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on the
Rights of the Child, and other international human rights instruments of which the Philippines is a party.

XXX vs People

LAZARO-JAVIER, J.:

The Case

This petition seeks to reverse the Decision[1] dated June 8, 2020 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 41696,
finding petitioner XXX256611 guilty of violation of Section 5(e)(2), [2] Republic Act No. (RA) 9262 otherwise known as
the "Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004," specifically, the deprivation or denial of support
without the element of psychological violence. He was sentenced to six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to
four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum and ordered to pay a P300,000.00 fine.
XXX256611 was directed to undergo a mandatory psychological counselling or psychiatric treatment and report
compliance to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) – Branch 94, Quezon City.

Antecedents

Under Information dated October 31, 2014, XXX256611 was charged with violation of Section 5(i) [3] of RA 9262, viz.:

That on or about the year 2009 and continuously up to the present, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named
accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously cause psychological and emotional anguish upon the
person of one [AAA256611], his common law wife, with whom he has two children by then and there depriving her
and their children financial support, thereby causing complainant emotional and psychological anguish, which acts
debase, demean[,] and degrade her dignity and human right as a woman, to the damage and prejudice of the said
offended party.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]

The case was raffled to the RTC – Branch 94, Quezon City. [5] On arraignment, XXX256611 pleaded "not guilty."[6]

AAA256611[7] testified that XXX256611 was her live-in partner from 1999 to 2002. [8] They had two (2) children namely
BBB256611 and CCC256611 who were 15 and 11 years old, respectively when the case was filed. [9] She "felt
mad"[10] at XXX256611 because ever since BBB256611 and CCC256611 started going to school, i.e. years 2005 and
2009, respectively, he had failed to give them financial support. [11] On August 28, 2008, she and XXX256611 had an
agreement where the latter promised to give a monthly allowance of P1,000.00 for their two (2) children, XXX256611,
however, failed to consistently comply with his promise.[12] He only sent money intermittently, sometimes every three
(3) months.[13] In 2010, he totally stopped giving any financial support to them. [14]

Sometime in November 2013, she found out that XXX256611 optionally retired as Senior Police Officer 2 of the
Philippine National Police, Surigao, Del Sur, Mindanao. In May 2014, XXX256611 promised her, BBB256611, and
CCC256611 that he would financially support them as soon as he received his retirement benefits. In June 2014, he
received a lump-sum of P761,206.68 as retirement benefits,[15] and P953,685.99 as commutation of his leave credits.
[16]
Also, he had been receiving a monthly pension of P21,144.63.[17] But still, XXX256611 did not give them even a
single centavo.[18]

She also presented a Letter dated June 12, 2014 allegedly written by her children BBB256611 and CCC256611
addressed to their father "Pa kahit ngayon lang maging tatay ka naman sana para sa amin, kahit lang sa
natatanggap mo, as well as kasya sa aming dalawa (sic) xxx Sabi mo magbibigay ka pag nakatanggap ka, pero
wala. Sa totoo lang wala kang isang salita. xxx"[19] BBB256611 and CCC256611, however, did not testify in court.

She emphasized that she had custody of BBB256611 and CCC256611 and solely provided for their needs by also
working as a police officer.[20]

In his defense, XXX256611 claimed he was financially supporting BBB256611 and CCC256611 from the time they
were born until 2012.[21] Per his agreement with AAA256611 in 2008, he complied with his promise to give a monthly
allowance of P1,000.00 to BBB256611 and CCC256611 through remittances via Cebuana Lhuiller. He also gave
P4,000.00 every month to AAA256611's sister for serving as the nanny of his children while AAA256611 was
working.[22]

On August 3, 2012, a truck hit him while he was on his way to work. He was confined in the hospital for 40 days for
which he incurred around P1,400,000.00 for medical expenses per hospital records and receipts presented in court.
[23]
The truck company only paid him P50,000.00 as damages.[24] As a result of the accident, he lost one of his legs
and his left hand became non-functional.[25]

In order to pay his hospital bills, EEE256611, his mother, mortgaged a land for P300,000.00 with 15% interest. [26] In
2012, he also secured two (2) separate loans in the total amount of P700,000.00 payable within five (5) years.
[27]
While he received P761,206.68 as retirement benefits,[28] and P953,685.99 as commutation of his leave credits,
these amounts were used to pay off his loans and the fee of a "fixer" who settled the loans. [29] As for the monthly
pension of P21,000.00 which he started receiving since November 2016, [30] he had been using it for his maintenance,
food, and travel expenses from Mindanao to Manila during the hearings of the present case. [31] In 2017, he was
diagnosed with stage three (3) prostate cancer.[32]

EEE256611 corroborated that XXX256611 was giving financial support to BBB256611 and CCC256611. It was only
after he met an accident in 2012 where he became physically disabled, and now cancer-stricken, that he stopped
giving them money.[33]

The Ruling of the RTC

By Decision[34] dated April 20, 2018, the trial court rendered a verdict of conviction. The trial court found AAA256611's
testimony credible. On the other hand, XXX256611 merely alleged that he continuously gave money to BBB256611
and CCC256611 from the moment they were born until he figured in an accident in 2012 but failed to adduce
sufficient evidence in support thereof.[35]

XXX256611 admitted he received P761,206.68 as retirement benefits and P953,685.99 as accumulated leave credits
yet "he did not spare a single centavo" for his children. Also, he had been receiving P21,000.00 monthly pension but,
still, failed to give any financial support for them. This financial deprivation surely caused emotional anguish to
AAA256611, BBB256611, and CCC256611[36] as stated in the letter that BBB256611 and CCC256611 penned for
their father.[37]

The dispositive portion reads, viz.:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused [XXX256611] guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of [v]iolation of Section 5(i)[,] Republic Act No. 9262 otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence Against
Women and their Children Act of 2004" and is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of Two (2) years, Four
(4) months and One (1) day of prision correccional as minimum, to Six (6) years and One (1) day of prision mayor as
maximum and to pay a fine or One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) plus costs.

Accused is further ordered to undergo a mandatory psychological counseling at the SSDD, Quezon City and to
submit proof of compliance thereof to the court.

SO ORDERED.[38]

The Proceedings before the Court of Appeals

On appeal, XXX256611 faulted the trial court for rendering a verdict of conviction. He claimed that the prosecution
failed to show AAA256611, BBB256611, and CCC256611 suffered emotional and psychological anguish.[39] Also, the
letter allegedly penned by BBB256611 and CCC256611 should not be given evidentiary weight since it had not been
authenticated.[40] BBB256611 and CCC256611 were not even presented in court to confirm that they were the ones
who wrote the letter.

On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), through Assistant Solicitor General Eric Remegio
O. Panga and State Solicitor Jennifer P. Hernandez, countered that the prosecution adduced sufficient evidence
showing that XXX256611 committed economic abuse against AAA256611, BBB256611, and CCC256611. The letter
to XXX256611 revealed that despite the lapse of many years, he did not exert any effort to support his
children. He had been promising them support but repeatedly reneged on his obligation. [41]

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In its assailed Decision[42] dated June 8, 2020, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification, finding XXX256611
liable for violation of Section 5(e)(2),[43] RA 9262.

It agreed with the trial court that XXX256611 deprived BBB256611 and CCC256611 financial support which
amounted to economic abuse against women and children. But it found that the prosecution failed to show that
such deprivation caused AAA256611, BBB256611, or CCC256611 any mental or emotional anguish. What the
prosecution proved was: a) XXX256611 and AAA256611 had a romantic relationship and bore children BBB256611
and CCC256611; b) XXX256611 acknowledged he is the biological father of BBB256611 and CCC256611; and c)
XXX256611 failed to provide support for his children. Thus, XXX256611 was guilty of Section 5(e)(2) of RA 9262
or deprivation or denial of support without the element of psychological violence. Under the variance doctrine,
XXX256611 may still be liable for violation of Section 5(e)(2) of RA 9262 which allows the conviction of an accused
for a crime proved which is different from, but necessarily included, in the crime charged. [44]

The fallo reads, thus:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated April 20, 2018, issued by the Regional Trial Court Branch
94, Quezon City, in Criminal Case No. R-QZN-15-03541-CR finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violating Section 5 (i) of Republic Act No. 9262, otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence Against Women and
Their Children Act of 2004," is hereby MODIFIED in that accused-appellant is hereby found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Section 5 (e) (2), Republic Act No. 9262. Accused-appellant is hereby sentenced to: (a)
suffer the penalty of imprisonment of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional, as maximum; (b) pay a fine in the amount of P300,000.00; and (c) to undergo a
mandatory psychological counselling or psychiatric treatment and report compliance to the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 94, Quezon City.

SO ORDERED.[45]

XXX256611's motion for reconsideration was denied under Resolution [46] dated February 23, 2021.

The Present Petition

XXX256611 now prays anew for his acquittal. He asserts that he did not willfully nor deliberately deprive financial
support to AAA256611, BBB256611, or CCC256611. While he received some benefits from his retirement, he used
the proceeds to defray the medical bills he incurred following his accident in 2012, his loans, and his daily expenses.
[47]
As a result of the accident, he can no longer find another job because he lost his leg and his left hand was no
longer functioning. At present, he is suffering from stage three (3) prostate cancer.

In compliance with Resolution[48] dated December 2, 2021, the People through the OSG filed its Comment. [49] It
reiterates that XXX256611 refused to give financial support to his children despite having the means to do so.
AAA256611 has been solely responsible in providing the emotional and financial needs of BBB256611 and
CCC256611[50] which, in turn, brought pain and anxiety to the children.[51] As indicated in the letter of BBB256611 and
CCC256611 to XXX256611, he kept on promising that he would send money but failed to make good of his promise.
[52]

Issue

Did the Court of Appeals err in finding XXX256611 guilty for violation of Section 5(e)(2), RA 9262?

Ruling

We acquit.

Section 5(e)(2) of RA 9262 penalizes the acts of:

(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct which the woman or her
child has the right to desist from or to desist from conduct which the woman or her child has the right to
engage in, or attempting to restrict or restricting the woman's or her child's freedom of movement or
conduct by force or threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm, or intimidation directed
against the woman or child. This shall include, but not limited to, the following acts committed with the purpose or
effect of controlling or restricting the woman's or her child's movement or conduct:

xxxx

(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial support legally due her or her
family, or deliberately providing the woman's children insufficient financial support;

xxxx

(Emphases supplied)

In the recent case of Acharon v. People,[53] the Court En Banc decreed that mere denial of financial support is not
enough for a prosecution of violation of Section 5(e) of RA 9262. The Court, thus, abandoned the rulings in Melgar v.
People[54] and Reyes v. People[55] where these cases held that denial of financial support, by itself, was already
sufficient to make a person liable for violation of Section 5(e). Acharon emphasized that the language of Section 5(e)
is that: the denial of financial support, to be punishable, must have the "purpose or effect of controlling or
restricting the woman's... movement or conduct." The use of the word "deprive" connotes willfulness and
intention. Thus, the willful deprivation of financial support, therefore, is the actus reus of the offense, while
the mens rea is the intention to control or restrict the woman's or her children's conduct.

Further, Acharon ordained that while Sections 5(e) and 5(i) deal with denial or deprivation of financial support,
these separate provisions punish different things. Hence, the variance doctrine is inapplicable. The Court clarified,
thus:

Section 5(e) punishes the deprivation of financial support for the purpose of controlling the woman or to make
her lose her agency. Section 5(i), on the other hand, punishes the willful infliction of mental or emotional
anguish, or public ridicule or humiliation upon the woman by denying her financial support that is legally due her.
Thus, while the portions of Sections 5(e) and 5(i) that deal with denial or deprivation of financial support may seem
similar at first glance, they, in reality, deal with different matters and penalize distinct acts. As the Court comes to
the realization that the said sections punish different things, the Court, therefore, abandons Melgar and Reyes to
the extent that they hold that the variance doctrine may be applied for Sections 5(e) and 5(i) of R.A. 9262.
Finally, the Court clarifies that in either case, whether the accused is prosecuted under Section 5(e) or Section
5(i), the mere failure to provide financial support is not enough. In other words, neither Section 5(e) nor 5(i) can
be construed to mean that mere failure or inability to provide support is sufficient for a conviction. (Emphases
supplied; citations omitted)Acharon then laid down the elements for violation of Section 5(e) of RA 9262, viz.:[56]

(1) The offended party is a woman and/or her child or children;

The woman is either the wife or former wife of the offender, or is a woman with whom the offender has or had a
(2) sexual or dating relationship, or is a woman with whom such offender has a common child. As for the woman's
child or children, they may be legitimate or illegitimate, or living within or without the family abode;

The offender either (a) deprived or (b) threatened to deprive the woman or her children of financial
(3)
support legally due her or her financial support;

The offender committed any or all of the acts under the 3rd element for the purpose of controlling or
(4)
restricting the woman's or her child's movement or conduct. (Emphases supplied)
Here, there is no dispute as to the first and second elements of Section 5(e) of RA 9262. XXX256611 had a romantic
relationship with AAA256611, and together, they bore children BBB256611 and CCC256611. XXX256611
acknowledged he is the biological father of these children.[57] We, thus, focus on the third and fourth elements of the
crime.

As to the third element, although XXX256611 eventually failed to provide financial support and admitted that "he can
barely support himself, let alone, BBB256611 and CCC256611," [58] mere failure to provide financial support will not
rise to the level of criminal liability under Section 5(e).[59]

On this score, XXX256611 testified that on August 3, 2012, he got hit by a truck while he was on his way to work. He
got confined in the hospital for 40 days for which he incurred around P1,400,000.00 for medical expenses as
evidenced by medical records and receipts.[60] As a result of the accident, he lost one of his legs and his left hand
became non-functional.[61]

To pay for his hospital bills, EEE256611, his mother, mortgaged a land for P300,000.00 with 15% interest. [62] In 2012,
he also secured two (2) separate loans in the total amount of P700,000.00 payable within five (5) years. [63] While he
received P761,206.68 as retirement benefits,[64] and P953,685.99 as commutation of his leave credits, these amounts
were used to pay off his loans.[65] As for the monthly pension of P21,000.00, he has been using it for his maintenance
for his stage three (3) prostate cancer, for his food, and for his travel expenses from Mindanao to Manila to attend the
hearings of the present case.[66] He could no longer work to earn a living due to his physical disability and cancer.

The prosecution did not refute the foregoing testimony nor did the trial court or the Court of Appeals make any
contrary factual findings. Hence, we accord weight and credence to petitioner's testimony on his accident, the
consequent amputation of his leg and hospital expenses he incurred, the mortgage of his mother's properties just to
help pay off his hospital expenses, and the meager amount he received as monthly pension, a big portion of which
goes to his own subsistence and expenses he had to incur to attend the hearings of this criminal case in Manila.

In other words, he did not deliberately choose not to give support to his children; it was rather the serious accident he
figured in that has totally hindered his capacity to do so.[67] Notably, neither the courts below nor the People refuted
this. In fine, XXX256611 is cleared of any malicious intent when he failed to give financial support to his children
BBB256611 and CCC256611.

Next, under the fourth element, the prosecution must establish that the willful denial or refusal of financial support
is for the purpose of controlling or restricting the woman's and/or her children's actions or decisions.

Here, records are devoid of any factual allegation that XXX256611 denied financial support for the purpose of
controlling the actions or movements of AAA256611, BBB256611, or CCC256611 to make them lose their agency.
The prosecution, thus, failed to prove the requisite actus reus and mens rea under Section 5(e)(2) of RA 9262.

In Acharon, the Court ruled that Christian Acharon cannot be held liable for violation of Section 5(e) in the absence
of the third and fourth elements. There is no proof that he deliberately refused to give support in order to control
his wife's behavior or actions. The evidence presented by the prosecution only established that he failed or
was unable to provide financial support which is not enough to convict under the law, as in this case.

Meanwhile, Section 5(i) of RA 9262 penalizes a form of psychological violence inflicted on victims who are women
and children through the following acts:

xxxx

(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child, including, but not
limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of minor children or
access to the woman's child/children..

Similar to Section 5(e), mere denial of financial support is not enough to support a conviction for violation of Section
5(i) of RA 9262. Evidence should show that the accused willfully or consciously withheld financial support due to
the offended party, i.e. the woman and/or her child or children, for the purpose of inflicting mental or emotional
anguish.[68] Thus, the elements of violation of Section 5(i) are:

(1) The offended party is a woman and/or her child or children;

The woman is either the wife or former wife of the offended, or is a woman with whom the offended has or had
(2) a sexual or elating relationship, or is a woman with whom such offender has a common child. As for the
woman's child or children, they may be legitimate or illegitimate, or living within or without the family abode:

The offender willfully refuses to give or consciously denies the woman financial support that is legally
(3)
clue her; and

The offender denied the woman the financial support for the purpose of causing the woman and/or her
(4)
child mental or emotional anguish.[69] (Emphases supplied)
Still in Acharon, the Court acquitted the accused of violation of Section 5(i) for failure of the prosecution to prove that
a) he willfully refused to provide financial support to his wife; and b) such denial to provide financial support was
intended to cause his wife mental or emotional anguish. The Court elucidated, thus:

In order for criminal liability to arise under Section 5(i) of R.A. 9262, insofar as it deals with "denial of financial
support," there must, therefore, be evidence on record that the accused willfully or consciously withheld financial
support legally due the woman for the purpose of inflicting mental or emotional anguish upon her. In other words,
the actus reus of the offense under Section 5(i) is the willful denial of financial support, while the mens rea is
the intention to inflict mental or emotional anguish upon the woman. Both must thus exist and be proven in
court before a person may be convicted of violating Section 5(i) of R.A. 9262.

xxxx

Applying the foregoing discussion to the facts of the present case, the Court finds that Acharon is not guilty of
violating Section 5(i) of R.A. 9262 for the failure of the prosecution to establish the third and fourth elements of the
crime. The Court finds him innocent, for there is undenied evidence that Acharon tried, as he successfully did for a
time, to provide financial support. He testified under oath that he failed to continue providing support only when his
apartment in Brunei was razed by fire, and when he met a vehicular accident there. There is also no dispute that he
had already paid Php71,000.00 out of the Php85,000.000 of the debt that the spouses — not the husband alone —
were obligated to pay from their community property.

While Acharon eventually failed to continue providing financial support, this, however, is not enough to support a
conviction under Section 5(i) of R.A. 9262. Again, to be convicted under Section 5(i), the evidence must
establish beyond reasonable doubt that the accused intended to cause the victim mental or emotional
anguish, or public ridicule or humiliation through the denial of – not the mere failure or inability to provide –
financial support, which thereby resulted into psychological violence. As the prosecution failed to establish that
fact, i.e. willful refusal to provide financial support, then Acharon cannot be held guilty of violating Section 5(i) of R.A.
9262. (Emphases supplied)

Here, no evidence was adduced showing such deprivation was aimed to caused AAA256611, BBB256611, or
CCC256611 any mental or emotional anguish. More the prosecution failed to show that XXX256611 specifically
chose such act of depriving financial support as a means to inflict mental or emotional suffering on AAA256611,
BBB256611, or CCC256611. AAA256611 also failed to present details of her personal experiences which supposedly
caused her mental or emotional anguish as a result of XXX256611's inability to financially support their children. Her
allegation that she "felt mad" when XXX256611 failed to financially support BBB256611 and CCC256611 when they
started going to school did not equate to such mental or emotional anguish within the contemplation of the law.

As for the purported letter dated July 12, 2014 allegedly penned by BBB256611 and CCC256611, being
unauthenticated, the same cannot be given evidentiary weight to establish the supposed mental and emotional
suffering of these children. As it was, both BBB256611 and CCC256611 did not testify to confirm the authenticity of
the said letter. Nor did AAA256611 testify that she actually saw her children write it or that her children, at the very
least, confided to her that they wrote the said letter and the same were intended for their father. [70]

All told, XXX256611's conviction for violation of Section 5(e)(2) of RA 9262 should be reversed and set aside.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated June 8, 2020 and Resolution dated February 23,
2021 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 41696 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner XXX256611
is ACQUITTED in Criminal Case No. R-QZN-15-03541-CR. Let an entry of final judgment be issued immediately.

SO ORDERED.

People vs Acharon

G.R. No. 224946 – Criminal Law – Book II – Special Penal Laws – Anti-Violence Against Women and their
Children Act – Section 5(i) – Economic Abuse must be Deliberate

Christian Acharon was an Overseas Filipino Worker. His wife sued her for economic abuse (violation of Section 5(i)
of R.A. 9262) as Acharon, while being gainfully employed abroad, failed to provide financial support to his wife. Due
to this, his wife was not able to pay off their debt – that debt was actually used by Acharon in going abroad. Acharon
also maintained a paramour abroad and even told his wife to look for another man. The trial court convicted Acharon
as it was proved that his failure to provide financial support to his wife caused her psychological stress. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the conviction.

ISSUE: Whether or not Acharon is guilty of economic abuse.

HELD: No. Firstly, it was improper for the trial court to receive evidence regarding Acharon’s infidelity. The
Information against him only charged psychological abuse as a result of his failure to provide financial support.

The elements of Section 5(i) insofar as it deals with denial of financial support are as follows:

(1) The offended party is a woman and/or her child or children;

(2)The woman is either the wife or former wife of the offender, or is a woman with whom the offender has or had a
sexual or dating relationship, or is a woman with whom such offender has a common child. As for the woman’s child
or children, they may be legitimate or illegitimate, or living within or without the family abode;

(3) The offender willfully refuses to give or consciously denies the woman and/or her child or children financial
support that is legally due her and/or her child or children; and

(4)The offender denied the woman and/or her child or children the financial support for the purpose of causing the
woman and/or her child or children mental or emotional anguish.

Section 5(i), although a special penal law, is a mala in se. Thus, criminal intent must be established before a
conviction may be had. In other words, to be punishable by Section 5(i) of R.A. 9262, it must ultimately be proven that
the accused had the intent of inflicting mental or emotional anguish upon the woman, thereby inflicting psychological
violence upon her, with the willful denial of financial support being the means selected by the accused to accomplish
said purpose. Mere failure to provide financial support is not punishable by R.A. 9262. To be convicted under Section
5(i), the evidence must establish beyond reasonable doubt that the accused intended to cause the victim mental or
emotional anguish, or public ridicule or humiliation through the denial of – not the mere failure or inability to provide –
financial support, which thereby resulted into psychological violence. In this case, the private complainant failed to
adduce evidence that Acharon deliberately withheld financial support in order to cause her emotional anguish.

SIDE ISSUE: In the previous cases of Melgar vs. People (G.R. No. 223477, 14 February 2018, 826 Phil. 177)
and Reyes vs. People (G.R. No. 232678, 3 July 3 2019, 907 SCRA 479), it was held that: (a) a charge for Section 5(i)
necessarily includes a charge for Section 5(e) and (b) denial of financial support BY ITSELF is sufficient to support a
conviction for violation of Section 5(e), is Acharon liable for violation of Section 5(e)?

NO. Melgar and Reyes are abandoned. It was wrong to interpret Section 5(e) to mean that denial of financial support
PER SE or BY ITSELF is already a criminal violation. The language of Section 5( e) is clear: the denial of financial
support, to be punishable, must have the “purpose or effect of controlling or restricting the woman’s movement or
conduct.” To be sure, Section 5(e) uses the word “deprive” which, like the use of the word “denial” in Section 5(i),
connotes willfulness and intention. The denial or deprivation of financial support under Section 5( e) is, therefore, an
intentional act that has, for its purpose, to control or restrict the woman’s movement or conduct. The willful deprivation
of financial support, therefore, is the actus reus of the offense, while the mens rea is the intention to control or restrict
the woman’s conduct.