and met politicians, advisors, militants, experts, journalists and bloggers.

I came away with

some strong impressions. Firstly, virtually everyone told me that President Sarkozy was
hugely unpopular, and his ratings as low as it was possible to go. Yet many of the same
people told me he could still win. They know he relishes a campaign. They suspect he may
have learned from some mistakes. Incumbency is a powerful weapon. A comeback is a
powerful narrative. And they worried that with the President so unpopular, the economy
sluggish, social issues raw, and the left in power in many parts of France, the PS should
have been doing far better in the polls (to which, incidentally, French politicians and media
pay far too much attention.) Of course this was pre selection of a PS candidate. Many of the
Socialists agreed with my analysis that once they had chosen the candidate, they needed to
unite behind that candidate, resist their historic predilection for factionalism, run a campaign
that was fresh, energetic and based upon a programme totally focused on the future and
one which addressed people's concerns. They agreed too that the PS could no longer look
down its nose at communication,