The German Churches and The Airlift To Biafra

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The German Churches and the Airlift to Biafra
Article · January 2011
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ABSU Journal of Arts, Management, Education, Law and Social Sciences (Jamelss) vol 1.1 (2011): 1-17

Nicholas Ibeawuchi Omenka.
Abia State University
Abstract
The word ‘Biafra’ has become synonymous with hunger. The decision of the Nigerian Military
Government to use hunger as a weapon of war precipitated the worst famine disaster of the twentieth
century in Africa. While the United Nations, the International Committee of Red Cross and the
world’s major relief agencies prevaricated, and governments expressed diplomatic indifference in a
conspiracy of silence, a group of simple and unassuming churchmen appealed to world conscience in
their call for humanitarian assistance. The massive response from Diakonisches Werk and Deutsche
Caritas Verband,1 two German relief organizations, soon led to the formation of Joint Church Aid
(JCA), a global consortium of some thirty-six Christian and Jewish charities that carried out the
greatest airlift since the Berlin episode. As the Biafran leader once said, genocide cannot be proven
until it had happened. Total blockade on land, air and sea was a strategic war plan that steered in the
course of a genocidal outcome, a catastrophe which was averted only by the humanitarian
intervention of the Christian churches. Utilizing newly available archival materials from Nigeria and
Europe, this paper tells the story of the role of the German relief agencies within JCA, the
ecumenical outfit that changed the rules of humanitarianism forever. Among other things, the paper
demonstrates that humanitarian aid can and should be given precedence over politics.
Keywords: Biafra, German Churches, Humanitarian Assistance, Blockade, Starvation.
Introduction
The Biafran War now numbers among the ‘forgotten wars’ of Africa. 1Yet this regional conflict that
ended forty-four years ago mediated the first serious global focus on the still on-going debate on how
far political considerations should be allowed to undermine the ethos of humanitarianism. The
Biafran debacle was characterized by what Maxwell Cohen has described as ‘governmental duplicity,
and the magnificent social dynamics of a youthful generation’. 2The latter was essentially a
revolutionary humanitarian intervention of the Christian nations without their governments. Biafra
united the peoples of the world in an ecumenical action on a scale hitherto unknown to mankind. For
the first time in recorded memory, confessional and national barriers were everywhere dismantled in
favour of providing relief for the starving masses in Biafra. In Europe Catholics and Protestants
worked together in Germany; the Scandinavian countries of Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden
founded a relief consortium known as Nordchurchaid, and Africa Concern emerged in Ireland. In
North America the Catholic Relief Services (CRS) teamed up with the Church World Services
(CWS) and American Jewish Committee in the US and Canairelift became active in Canada. The
remarkable thing about this global ensemble was that it was not governmental but a ‘Joint Church
Aid’.
1The name ‘Caritas’ shall be used in this essay to designate German Caritas, whereas ‘Caritas
Internationalis’ will be used for the Rome based coordinating agency for all Catholic charities around the world.
Furthermore, ‘DW’ will be used for Diakonisches Werk, the German Protestant relief agency.
1
Of all the nations of the world that were involved in that humanitarian endeavour, the
Germans were arguably the most committed. Their generous response to the Biafran cause was
informed largely by the resonance of their economic miracle and recent history. The horrific
photographs which emerged from the Biafran enclave resembled those from Buchenwald and
Theresienstadt. From their own experience, the Germans understood more than any other nation that
made up the JCA what it really meant to suffer hunger. This was a favoured reference point employed
by both politicians and the common people alike in their aid campaigns. In August 1968, for instance,
two federal ministers, Franz-Josef Strauss (Finance) and Bruno Heck (Family Affairs), added their
voices to those of the Biafran aid crusaders. Both ministers belonged to the Christian Democratic
Union and its sister party, the Christian Socialist Union, a fact that is indicative of a strong Christian
solidarity. While Heck called attention to the plight of women and children in Biafra, Strauss fell
back on recent German past. 'We Germans' he said, 'know what hunger and refugee misery mean. Let
us not delay any further in rendering assistance'. 3 A German aid group spoke more poignantly on the
same subject:
The German race has a special responsibility to raise its voice in this matter. When the
German capital Berlin was threatened with starvation and millions of Germans survived
solely on 'CARE-Packets' and school soup kitchens, we depended exclusively on external aid.
How can we now be satisfied that only ten flights a night are carried out for ten million
blockaded Biafrans whereas 900 flights daily were needed for the survival of 2 million
blockaded Berliners.4
The self-declared republic was born in a most inauspicious time for governments around the
world. In Africa, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was vehemently opposed to Biafran
secession for fear of a possible rebound effect on the territorial integrity of the artificial nation-states
that had just emerged from European imperialism. Because of its large investments in Nigeria,
especially in the oil sector, Britain fought hardest for the fall of Biafra. 5Furthermore, Britain, which
ultimately was to be blamed for the collapse of its state experiment in Nigeria, had reason to uphold
the sovereignty of Nigeria at all costs. It came as no surprise therefore that it was the architect of the
infamous theory that a ‘quick kill’ of Biafra would be the ‘most humane way’ of ending the
war’.6This stance contributed in no small measure to the outrageous famine deaths that precipitated
the humanitarian intervention of the churches. Joseph E. Thompson has endeavoured, rather
unconvincingly, to exonerate the US Government from acquiescence to the quick-kill policy by
claiming that the American ambassador in Lagos intended ‘only recognition of the concept, not
support’.7The truth was that the US, exhausted by the war in Vietnam, resolutely avoided
involvement in another regional conflict. The isolation of Biafra was compounded by Soviet
aggression in Eastern Europe and the Israeli and Arab conflict in the Middle East.
In a measure that further illuminated the dismal politics of the world’s leaders, the UN and its
humanitarian agencies turned a blind eye to the Biafran tragedy. The UN has a High Commission for
refugees and had since the Second World War catered for refugees all over the world—Algeria,
Cambodia, Tibet, Angola, Congo, Rwanda, Burundi, Cuba, the Middle East. The wave of Biafran
refugees which began in the 1966 pogrom continued unabated throughout the war. Yet, these
unfortunate victims of a bloody civil war were not considered eligible for the same humanitarian
treatment by the UN even though they fitted well into the agency’s definition of refugees as persons
living outside their original or chosen habitats as a result of justifiable fear of oppression on racial,
religious, or political grounds. In a most ironic and absurd twist, 1968 was declared the year of
human rights by the world body and yet not a finger was raised against the atrocities exposed daily in
radio and television.
2
There seemed to have been a general acceptance of the dogged view of U Thant, the UN
Secretary General at the time, that the Biafran debacle was an internal affair of the African continent
that required the exclusive attention of the OAU. This was in accordance with the General
Assembly’s unanimous Declaration on non-intervention in 1965, barely a year before the pogroms of
1966. The Canadian Prime Minister echoed the stance of the UN in an address to the House of
Commons on 26 November 1968. ‘Victims of war,’ he said, ‘are not helped by grandiose speeches in
the General Assembly; starving children are not nourished by acts which prolong hostilities’. 8 In
other words, Prime Minister Trudeau swallowed flesh and bone Nigeria’s contention that the
Christian churches were prolonging the war by providing relief to the famine victims. The case of
Biafra revealed clearly the manoeuvrability and absolute dependence of the UN on the interlocking
political interests of the Western Powers, factors which have continued to plague the world body till
this day.
The moral imperative which propelled the humanitarian intervention of the churches was
supplied by Pope Paul VI who argued that ‘the moral obligation of assisting starving people was
greater than the political obligation of maintaining good relationship with the Federal
Government’.9The Christian relief agencies for their part were free from the political obligation to a
sovereign state in a way the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) could never have
been. Traditionally, the ICRC is charged with providing relief to disaster victims, but it faced
damning criticism even from within its ranks for giving a lackadaisical response to the Biafran
famine. One such critic was Bernard Kouchner who compared the attitude of the ICRC in Biafra to
its failure to reveal the existence of the Nazi death camps. In protest he broke his contract with the
ICRC and later founded Médecins Sans Frantières.10In fairness to the ICRC, however, it must be
pointed out that the hands of the organization were tied by its unique mandate under the Geneva
Convention.11 Besides, its dilemma was exacerbated by the fact that it was sustained primarily by
governments and was at the same time expected to act independently from those governments. In
contrast, the support base of the church relief organizations was anchored in students, the middle
class and independent organizations who championed the airlift to Biafra in defiance of their
governments. The constraint which the World Council of Churches (WCC) felt during the airlift was
informed by the fact that its legal members were in Nigeria and not in Biafra. 12This precipitated an
internal quiet revolt whereby many of its member nations defied its authority and joined the Joint
Church Aid consortium that ran the airlift to Biafra. 13 As we shall see presently, that rebellion was
spearheaded by the German Protestant churches.
Famine Crimes
It is highly improbable that genocide constituted a direct action plan in Federal Military Government
(FMG) policy. However, it is indisputable that the FMG did very little in its conduct of the war to
dispel that conception from the minds of the Biafrans. Thus the assertion of Nigeria's genocidal
intentions became a bedrock of Biafra's vision of itself. 14As A. L. Hinton reminds us, ‘extreme
dehumanization, and a centralized initiative to engage in mass killing’ are some of the preconditions
under which genocide occurs.15One aspect of the Biafran war that fits into both frames is the official
use of hunger as weapon of war. The total blockade of the region and the ensuing famine had a
dehumanization effect on the populace and it is common knowledge that a greater majority of the
mass deaths in Biafra were attributed to starvation rather than to bombs and bullets. A brief exposé of
this point is paramount in order to appreciate the underlying motivation of the humanitarian
intervention of the churches.
3
Prescription for Hunger

The former eastern region of Nigeria was, and still is, the most densely populated part of Africa with
an estimated population density of about 1000 persons per square mile. Because of the pressure of
population, the Easterners, especially the Igbo, emigrated to the North and other parts of the country
in large numbers. Despite the best efforts of the government and the missions to make the Eastern
region self-sufficient in agricultural products, there was never a safe guarantee against malnutrition.
This situation was further exacerbated by the dietary habits of the peoples of the region where the
staple food comprised mainly of carbohydrate derived from roots and tubers such as yam, cassava
and cocoyam. With regard to protein intake, the Eastern region depended almost exclusively on
importation from other regions, except for fish which was available in some measure from the delta
and riverine areas. Large quantities of stockfish were imported from Norway. Meat, beans, fruits and
a good amount of vegetables were imported from the North. This dependence made the region
vulnerable in the event of any major catastrophe. Jacques M. May in his 1965 study, The Ecology of
Malnutrition in Middle Africa, made a telling prediction in this regard long before the civil war: ‘In
times of stress due to such causes as racial tension, intertribal warfare or external wars, all possible in
Nigeria in spite of a rather promising start, there is no doubt that the food economy of the country,
already precarious, will become serious’. 16The lack of anti-famine measures both in the colonial
period and after independence compounded the problem. 17
Although most studies by the United Nations’ Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and
other agencies reveal the nutritional volatility of the Eastern Region, famine was rare there and
Kwashiorkor was not known. When famine set in during the war and kwashiorkor became rampant,
the Igbo, Ibibio and Efik had no word for it. In fact, because of the massive importation of stockfish
into the region and the steady supply of beef from the North, it is claimed that the Igbo had more
protein in their diet than the other parts of Nigeria. 18However, although the diets of the Easterners
supplied just a little above the minimum protein requirements, they remained extremely vulnerable
without the safe practical allowance of protein intake recommended by the FAO.
The opponents of Biafra were well aware of this vulnerability and exploited it with
unyielding resolve. Accordingly, even before the shooting war actually began, the FMG resorted to
economic warfare as a means of achieving a political leverage. Among other things, all flights to the
eastern region were put on hold and a ban was placed on the transportation of food items from Lagos
and the West to the East. 19When war broke out, Chief O. Awolowo, the then Nigerian Finance
Commissioner, advocated the use of the starvation trump card in words that have now become
infamous. ‘All is fair in war’, he said, ‘and starvation is one of the weapons of war’. 20 The British
Foreign Secretary agreed and did not make any distinction between starving combatants and starving
the entire civilian population. ‘We must accept’, he said, ‘that, in the whole history of warfare, any
nation which has been in a position to starve its enemy out has done so’. 21Anthony Enahoro, the
Foreign Affairs Commissioner, who shared the views of Chief Awolowo, his mentor and close
associate, carefully outlined the procedure and objective of such a blockade: ‘If carried to its logical
conclusion, total economic blockade implies an embargo on all supplies which can assist materially
the ability of the rebel group to resist Federal Authority or prefer continual war to capitulation’. 22This
national policy on starvation, and not military strategic thinking, was the underlying factor in the
intransigence of the FMG in the long and futile haggling over land corridors for relief supplies.
4
There was an ominous consensus among policy makers and military commanders on the
starvation policy. Asked why foodstuffs and medicine were not allowed to reach ‘the starving and
dying’, Gowon, the Head of State, replied that he would ‘not allow in any relief flights because doing
so would mean allowing at the same time arms, ammunition and military hardware to be brought into
the rebel territory’.23He was not alone in this outlook: the starving and dying were denied relief when
an entire Austrian and Norwegian ICRC team was rounded up in the Asaba/Onitsha front and sent
back to Lagos from where they were deported. In the vicinity of that front were a refugee camp with
over 8000 people and a hospital that badly needed medical supplies. 24It was Benjamin Adekunle, the
maverick commander of the third marine infantry division, who gave more insight into the scheme of
the central command. In the much publicized interview with the Stern magazine, he said: ‘In this
sector of the front which I command—and that is the entire southern front from Lagos to the
Cameroon border—I will allow no Red Cross, no Caritas, no World Council of Churches, no Pope,
no missionary and no UN delegation’. 25Among those who expressed shock and apprehension over
this statement of intent was Bishop Hermann Dietzfelbinger, President of the Council of the
Protestant Church in German:
These pronouncements encompass the declared intention of genocide. I urge the government
of the Federal Republic of Germany to consider whether these findings can be overlooked
without a public protest of our people. It is precisely the German people who should
comprehend the gruesome effect of these horrible events in all their ramifications. I ask the
UN what they are doing in their declared year of human rights for the people over which the
waves of extermination are soaring. I ask the governments of the world whether the
continued shipment of arms can be justified in the light of this development.
The foodstuffs and medical supplies which the churches in Germany and other countries are
sending out for the refugees and starving people of Nigeria-Biafra are reaching their
destination in spite of diverse obstacles. I reiterate my call for a continued Christian and
humanitarian aid for Nigeria-Biafra.26
Central to the FMG’s starvation policy was the belief that the secessionists could be starved
into submission. It was put in place at a time when it was generally believed that the rebellion could
be quashed by a mere ‘Police Action.’ Nobody gave any serious thought to the unshakable resolve of
the Biafrans to fight for their survival. Of the estimated fourteen million Easterners at the outbreak of
the war, more than two million had witnessed first-hand the horrendous pogroms in Northern
Nigeria. A large number had escaped harassment and public killings in Lagos and the West. When
war broke out, all these people and the rest of the populace were in one way or another, victims of
indiscriminate bombing of schools, hospitals and market places. When these atrocities were brought
to the notice of Gowon by peace negotiators, his reaction was the chilling response that this would
serve the ‘good purpose’ of making the rebels ‘realize that rebellion doesn’t pay and so lay down
their arms’.27Writing from the advantage of hindsight, Ian Smillie, one of the avowed critics of the
airlift, describes as incorrect the general assumption that an unrestrained federal army would unleash
a genocidal bloodbath on the Igbo if Biafra were to collapse. As proof, he points out that after the
liberation of a large portion of the Igbo territory, including the Igbo-speaking areas of the Mid-West,
‘There had been no massacres in any of these areas’. 28Available evidence suggests that this position
is untenable. The senseless large-scare massacres of defenseless civilians by the Third Marine
Infantry Division are well documented, not least by the commander himself, General Olusegun
Obasanjo.29His predecessor, Benjamin Adekunle,
5
did not mince words when he declared that if he entered Igbo territory he would ‘shoot at everything
that moves and those that did not’. 30These threats became reality at Ibagwa and Ishagu in July 1967
and at Ibusa and Asaba in October of the same year, just to mention a few instances. 31Biafra’s fear of
genocide, therefore, was rooted in its experiences and not in blind loyalty to its leader as is often
alleged. It was also at the heart of its astonishingly stiff resistance. 32Tragically, this scenario was
essentially a setting for a humanitarian disaster which everybody saw coming but were not prepared
to prevent.
Starvation and Famine Deaths
The influx of refugees from the North and other parts of Nigeria in 1966 following the pogroms of
that year created an enormous problem for the Eastern Nigerian government, but it also helped it to
put in place some long-time measures to increase food supplies. The Catholic Secretariat in Lagos
and many analysts were in fact optimistic that those measures would produce dividends in case of an
escalation of the crisis. 33The war which began on 6 July 1967 quickly dampened this optimistic
prospect. Ogoja and the food producing regions of Biafra were the first to fall into federal hands. As
a result of the blockade the region which was known for its nutritional volatility quickly experienced
a famine situation. To make matters worse, the FMG issued new banknotes in January 1968
throughout Nigeria except the Mid-West, South-East and Rivers states. Thus, the Biafrans who could
no longer produce their own food were prevented from buying them. When Port Harcourt eventually
fell in May 1968, the last link between the enclave and the outside world was cut off. It was at this
juncture that the famine catastrophe that is associated with Biafra really began.
As usual children were the greatest victims. By January and February 1968, cases of
kwashiorkor and marasmus had become evident among children in the refugee camps. Between June
and September large-scale outbreaks of kwashiorkor had engulfed the entire enclave and children as
well as adults were affected. According to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
observers inside Biafra, an estimated 3,000 famine deaths occurred in the Biafran enclave daily by
the summer of 1968.34The Washington Post even put the number of famine deaths higher at 10,000 a
day.35These are incredible figures and there is controversy over their credibility. The death rates were
computed by missionaries who ran the refugee camps and feeding centres even in remote areas, by
relief workers, doctors and Biafran officials. 36It is highly unlikely that 400 deaths a day or less as
given by casual observers and journalists who reported from far away Lagos could in any way be
taken to be more accurate than the figures supplied by experts on the ground. Whichever way one
may choose to understand the figures, the incriminating facts were undeniable that a human
catastrophe took place in the Biafran enclave in the summer months of 1968. After his visit to the
enclave, Father Ludwig Staufer, Caritas Director of the diocese of Speyer and one of the most
indefatigable crusaders for famine relief in Biafra, painted a grim picture of that catastrophe in an
address to the students of Paderborn at the request of the ‘Aktionskomitee Biafra’, one of the
numerous clandestine groupings that sprang up in Germany for relief appeals on behalf of Biafra:
The months of July, August and September [1968] were the worst hunger months….The
harvesting season began in what was left of the enclave only at the beginning of October.
Consequently, thousands of people died daily of starvation. Children under the age of four
were especially visited by death. As of today, 40 % of children under four years have died of
hunger. There was neither meat nor fish. As a result, many villages were ravaged by
kwashiorkor. The hairs of the sick children turned red as a result of protein deficiency. The
skin became discoloured in a white-
6
yellow complexion and peeled off the body in watery abscess. I saw these children reduced to
skeletons in the huts of the refugee camps and watched helplessly as they died of hunger,
even though I had a car full of relief materials with me. They simply could no longer eat.
There were five to six children in a single bed in the hospitals because there were no spaces
more left. The lady doctor complained: ‘I admitted 250 children in the children’s ward but
every night 300 children are brought to me by mothers who are as hopelessly ill as their
children. I cannot take them in; they are all condemned to death’. 37
With the military commanders enforcing the national policy on starvation at all fronts and the whole
world totally oblivious of what was going on, it was a matter of time before genocide actually
happened in Biafra. It was against this background that the church leaders in Biafra felt the moral
obligation to do something to avert the impending catastrophe. The decision they took had important
consequences for the enclave and quickly placed Biafra on the foreign scene.
Humanitarian Intervention of the Churches
In February 1968, two Catholic bishops of Biafra, James Moynagh of Calabar and Godfrey Okoye of
Port Harcourt, presented a memorandum to the Pope in which they detailed the atrocities in Biafra
since the pogroms of 1966, including what they described as ‘a conspiracy of silence by the world
press and by the Great Powers to cloak over the terrifying attack on basic human rights and
dignity.’38This memorandum was a private decision of two individuals who had no idea that their
action would precipitate a chain of events with far-reaching consequences for Biafra and the world at
large. Among other things, they suggested three ‘solutions’ as follows:
1. That the Holy See and the World Council of Churches make an urgent and united or
simultaneous appeal to both sides in the conflict for a cease-fire and the initiation of peaceful
negotiations.
2. [That] a simultaneous and united appeal [be] made to the British Government by Cardinal
Heenan and Archbishop Ramsey, and possibly by the Moderators of the Presbyterian and
Methodist Churches, asking Britain to influence Lagos to order a cease-fire and begin
peaceful negotiations for an honourable settlement.
3. That if the British Government could influence Lagos, a number of Commonwealth
countries could be found willing to mediate [a settlement] acceptable to both sides. 39
The WCC and the Vatican took up the challenge and on 20 March 1968 issued a
simultaneous appeal in Rome and Geneva in which they described war as an inhuman and futile
attempt at solving a crisis and urged the warring factions to lay down their arms and seek a peaceful
settlement. This was the first time in living memory that Catholics and Protestants came out in a
unified ecumenical front for a common objective. Among other things, they appealed to all
international relief organizations to work together in order to bring urgent aid to the suffering masses
in the theatre of war.40On 2 June 1968 the British churches did their part by conducting an
interdenominational service in the Westminster Abbey in London with Cardinal Heenan, the
Archbishop of Canterbury, and the Anglican Bishop of Birmingham among those present. Cardinal
Heenan delivered a historic sermon in the Westminster Abbey, the first Catholic to be given that
privilege since the Reformation. 41The following day, he initiated a series of correspondence with the
Prime
7
Minister, Wilson, on the issue of British arms shipments to Nigeria. Furthermore, some genuine
mediation missions were also undertaken by the British Commonwealth, thanks largely to the
personal efforts of its Secretary General, Arnold Smith. But because of the obvious identification of
the organization with Great Britain, the Biafrans never trusted the Secretary General and considered
him to be ‘little more than a stalking horse for British interests’. 42
Theoretically speaking, all three proposals by the two Biafran bishops had been addressed.
But one important detail in the memorandum still needed to be given attention, namely, ‘the
conspiracy of silence by the world press’. For the quick-kill policy of the Western Powers to work,
secrecy and total news blackout were essential. Somehow, the otherwise sensation-loving and
sensation-seeking world press managed to move in tandem with their governments. Many journalists
and news broadcasters themselves described the Nigeria-Biafra war in the early months as ‘history’s
least reported war’.43Overshadowed by the Vietnam War, the Nigeria-Biafra war received very little
media attention. The six-day Arab Israeli war of 1967 and the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia in
the spring of 1968 compounded the dearth of news from Biafra. Whenever news of the conflict found
some coverage, it was usually in small print in parts of newspapers not meant for breaking news. The
New York Times published the first front-page story on Biafra on 30 June, 1968, one whole year after
shooting war began. For the first time starvation in Biafra was mentioned in a world-class paper. The
isolation of Biafra changed dramatically following the decision of the German churches to respond to
the emerging new form of ecumenical action by convening a press conference in Frankfurt on 28
June 1968.
By all account, the Frankfurt press conference was a defining moment in the efforts of the
Christian churches around the world to bring relief to the starving people of Biafra. Two factors
accounted for its success. Firstly, it was organized not by the hierarchies of the churches in Germany,
but by their relief agencies, Caritas and the Diakonisches Werk, in response to the appeal by Vatican
and the WCC in March for all international relief organizations to work together. It was not
uncommon for members of church gatherings to do the bidding of their governments. A good
example would be the fourth general assembly of the WCC which took place in Uppsala from 3 to 19
July 1968. The Nigerian delegation got the world body to forfeit the use of the name Biafra in its
official documents and with the support of the delegates from Britain and Russia prevented the call
for arms embargo on the warring sides from being included in the communiqué. The spirited attempt
of the Lutheran bishop, Kibira from Tanzania, one of the African countries that recognized Biafra, to
prevent further concessions to the anti-Biafra faction went unheeded. 44There was a vital difference
between being pro-Biafra and being pro-Igbo. While the proponents of the former were de facto pro-
Igbo, many sympathizers with the Igbo fate were not necessarily pro-Biafra and these included
Caritas and the major relief organizations as opposed to the majority of their youthful and more
radical members. The Frankfurt conference was spared such polarization because there was a
consensus that the victims on both sides of the conflict required urgent aid. The second strength of
the Frankfurt conference was that it was the brainchild of the German TV journalist, Karl-Heinz
Froeder who had the participation of his colleagues around the world in mind. Accordingly, the
conference received ‘wide reverberations in local and foreign press, radio and television’. 45
The involvement of the press in the ecumenical relief action is noteworthy for another
important reason. According to Msgr. Georg Hüssler, the Secretary General, later President, of the
German Caritas, there was an unwritten convention in Germany whereby the readiness of the
German public to donate is strengthened when they see a disaster. 46The press was needed to provide
the disaster images later from Biafra. For the Frankfurt press conference
8
though, the organizers had to rely on the graphic accounts of two prominent eyewitnesses—Father
Tony Byrne and Pastor Lothar Kuehl. Speaking in English, Byrne was so precise in his description of
the atrocities going on in Biafra that some of the journalists openly shed tears. 47His accounts were
corroborated by Pastor Kuehl who called for an airlift to Biafra after the example of the Berlin airlift.
The appeal which Ludwig Geissel, the director of the DW, and Msgr. Georg Hüssler, President of
German Caritas, made for donations during this conference was met with an overwhelming response.
The establishment of an airlift was afterwards made possible by huge sums of money put together
through Sunday collections, individual and corporate donations and government grants.
The greatest ecumenical relief operation of the twentieth century was the combined effort of
organizations, institutions, governments and individuals around the globe. If any one individual may
be mentioned as its initiator, he would be Pastor Lothar Kuehl, the chaplain of the German Protestant
community in Lisbon. His presence in Portugal, the only country in the world that maintained direct
flight with Biafra at the time, proved very providential: it offered his humanitarian outlook a
welcome outlet. Through his indefatigable efforts, relief packets of essential drugs and foodstuffs
collected in Germany by both Catholic and Protestant churches were flown to Port Harcourt by
buying space in planes belonging to the American gunrunner, Hank Wharton. 48As an accomplished
pilot, he sometimes acted as co-pilot of the planes that flew into the enclave and thus was enabled to
provide the early photos of the horror prevalent there. His meeting with Fr. Tony Byrne, another
prominent pioneer of the airlift, in January 1968 marked a turning point in the ecumenical effort of
the churches. Byrne was the director of the Onitsha Social Service Centre which incidentally was set
up in the commercial city before the war with funds provided by Misereor, a humanitarian agency of
the German Catholic bishops. He was sent to Lisbon in January 1968 by Caritas Internationalis, the
Rome based agency that coordinated all Catholic charities around the world, to arrange for a flight to
Biafra for two papal envoys, Msgr. Dominic Conway, the Rector of the Irish College in Rome, and
Msgr. George Rochau, Director of the French Secours Catholique. The combination of Byrne and
Kuehl, the former being representative of both the Biafran bishops and Caritas Internationalis and the
latter representative of the WCC, gave the airlift a new impetus that propelled and sustained it till the
formation of the JCA.
The envoys were to travel in one of Wharton’s planes as was the practice hitherto, but on
noticing crates of ammunitions being loaded into the aircraft, the church dignitaries quickly
disembarked and wanted nothing to do with a gun-running plane.That incident necessitated the
chartering of a separate aircraft specifically for their use. The cost of the charter and money for the
procurement of relief materials were paid by Caritas Internationalis. An accusation which has
persisted till this day was that the churches mixed relief with arms in their planes but nothing could
be farther from the truth. The churches’ action was motivated solely by the humanitarian urge to save
lives and they saw the initial buying of space in a gun-running plane as a necessary evil. The
chartering and eventual purchasing of their own aircraft for the exclusive use of relief flights bore
testimony to their attempt to counter the false charge of their critics, a fact which even unrepentant
faultfinders have acknowledged.49
The flight put in place in Lisbon for the papal envoys by Caritas Internationalis successfully
conveyed the first planeload of relief materials to Port Harcourt on 8 February 1968. This opened the
way for the airlift mission of the Christian Churches, Catholic and Protestant. The World Council of
Churches based in Geneva followed the Catholic example
9
and on 28 February it chartered a plane and sent relief materials to Port Harcourt through Lisbon.
This was followed in April by a flight chartered by the German Protestant Churches. It consisted of a
ten-ton medical supplies and foodstuffs and was organized as part of the efforts by the WCC to send
relief materials to both sides of the conflict. Earlier in the month, a consignment of foodstuffs and
drugs, as well as a substantial sum of money were successfully delivered to the Nigerian side through
the Christian Council of Nigeria. But because of the blockade of the break-away region, which
included all flights from Nigeria, the WCC relief aid could not reach the former Eastern region.
The direct involvement at this stage of the WCC central administration in the German project
is noteworthy. In the first place, it was recommended by the executive committee of the world body.
Secondly, the Director of the WCC secretariat, Pastor B. T. Molander and a staff of the humanitarian
wing of the organization, Geoffrey Murray, accompanied the relief flight to Port Harcourt. 50 When
this airport, the last remaining inlet to the enclave, was sealed off a month later, the WCC stopped its
direct involvement in the Airlift to Biafra out of pressing legalistic impulses. Some of its member
nations, notably Germany and the Scandinavian countries went ahead with the project undeterred.
To cut the high cost of flying planes from Lisbon to Port Harcourt, Caritas Lisbon and the
German Protestant churches negotiated with the Governor of the Portuguese island of Sao Tomé off
the coast of Nigeria for the airlift to originate from there. To strengthen this arrangement, George
Hüssler visited the Governor of the island in person because as he said, ‘The Governor is here...all
and all; he knows everything and nothing takes place without his knowledge....As long as Sao Tomé
remains the only practicable base near Biafra, a positive outlook of the Governor is decisive’. 51Goods
from all over Europe and North America were transported by ship to Sao Tomé and from there flown
into Biafra by night.
Talks on buying church relief planes began in Rome in May 1968 and one of the participants,
Fr. Dermot Doran, remarked rather facetiously that ‘only the Germans would accept this kind of idea
because the Church has never before bought a plane’. 52As it turned out, German Caritas and the DW
did buy planes for the airlift, not one but five of them. Initially, the search was for Super constellation
aircraft, the type used by Wharton, but eventually the churches settled for DC-7 propeller planes to
further emphasize their uniqueness. 53Caritas and DW each paid for two planes and a fifth was jointly
purchased for use as spare part. An interesting contract was sealed which reflected the
unconventional nature of the Biafran airlift. While the ownership of the planes was ceded to
Wharton, the gun-runner, the churches retained the right of exclusive use. This was a convenient
arrangement which saved the churches, and later the Joint Church Aid, a lot of problems. In the first
place, it helped to circumvent the thorny political imbroglio, solved insurance problems and helped
in the procurement of pilots and crew members.
The first of the four church planes landed at Uli on 25 July 1968. The second took off from
Frankfurt on 24 July 1968 but during a stop-over in Lisbon, the news was received that the German
government had called for a parliamentary hearing on the airlift and wanted a representative of either
of the churches to be present. While Hüssler (Caritas) flew on to Uli, Geissel (DW) had to return to
Germany. In his memoirs, the latter expressed his anger and frustration over this development thus:
10
It was not only the UNO General Secretary, U-Thant, for whom the war between Biafra and
Nigeria was still an ‘internal affair’ and who had remained silent and inactive. Also the
governments of Europe and North America passively watched the mass deaths of innocent
people in the most terrible war of the African continent. Meanwhile, the Soviet MIGs and
Ilushin bombers with Egyptian pilots bombed Biafran positions and England supplied arms
to the central government and allowed British majors to command Nigerian units. All these
did not appear to have bothered our politicians. It was precisely when, unlike the
governments, independent organizations wanted to provide un-bureaucratic and effective
relief that Bonn decided to make a move.54
As a Protestant, Ludwig Geissel had good relations with high-ranking SPD politicians such
as Erhard Eppler and Helmut Schmit. The decision to have him represent the two German churches
was a wise one. Not only did the German government pledge five million DM towards the church
humanitarian project, it also chose him as one of the advisory members of the parliamentary sub-
committee on Nigeria-Biafra. Furthermore, it placed the churches on top of its list of the beneficiaries
of its humanitarian grants. In its 1969 budget, for instance, fifty million DM was set aside for
Nigeria-Biafra humanitarian projects to be shared as follows: thirty-two Million for the feeding
centres of the churches, fourteen million for the German Red Cross, two million for the children’s
village in Gabon (run by the two German churches), two million for personnel operations of
Misereor.55
Arrangements for the formation of JCA were formalized in Rome in November 1968. Within
that consortium, German Caritas and DW were responsible for the packaging and shipment of all
relief materials to Sao Tomé. The Scandinavian Nordchurchaid and Canairelift got the task of
handling the flight operational and technical matters. Caritas Internationalis was put in charge of
personnel travels in and out of Biafra while Catholic Relief Services USA took charge of public
relations from Geneva. Caritas Switzerland got the task of establishing a radio link between Biafra
and Europe. Furthermore, an executive committee was established which met regularly in various
cities of Europe and America whenever a need arose.
Caritas and DW went about their task with German precision. Coordinating the huge supply
of relief materials that emanated from different parts of the globe by air, land and sea was a daunting
task. A special loading jetty was set up in Bremen harbour and various pharmaceutical and packaging
companies were engaged to ready the goods for shipment to Sao Tomé. The greatest headache of the
two church agencies came however from the independent groupings in Europe. In 1968 there were in
Germany alone a total of ninety-four groups, institutions, individuals, media houses and diverse press
services making appeals for Biafra. Their often radical views steered in a collision course with the
more conservative leadership of Caritas and the DW. Since only the latter had direct access to the
Biafran enclave, all the other groupings often tried to 'impose' themselves on them. More often than
not any relief appeal that did not get the blessing of Caritas and the DW, and those whose action
could not be controlled, were discouraged, and sometimes discredited. This generated a lot of bad
blood between the two blocs. However, the German churches executed their assignment with
remarkable efficiency till the end of the war and beyond.
11
Libreville and Spadeville

The two most successful ventures undertaken by the German churches outside the mission of JCA
were their action to save Biafran children and large-scale agricultural schemes to boost food
production within the enclave. Wittingly or otherwise, these projects, by intent and execution,
bordered on the survival of the Biafran race. The idea was by no means a guarantee for the survival
of a separate nation but rather ensuring that the people that desired to be known as Biafrans did not
go into extinction.
The Saving of Biafran Children
The alarming death rate among the Biafran children shocked the world and it was Terre des Hommes
and the French Red Cross which took the first steps to evacuate some mortally sick children to Ivory
Coast, Tanzania, Zambia and Gabon, the friendly countries that accorded diplomatic recognition to
Biafra. When Caritas and the DW purchased their own aircraft, they too began to fly out very sick
children in the emptied relief planes. By October 1968 there were a total of 1150 children in
Libreville, the Gabonese capital. About 390 of them were housed in the parish halls of two Catholic
parishes, St. Marie and St. André. Another group of 114 children was given refuge in a Protestant
female hostel. These children in church quarters were cared for by Catholic nuns, willing
parishioners, and German and Irish Caritas nurses. The rest of the children were housed in two state
buildings in Libreville and looked after by the Gabonese and French Red Cross, volunteers of the
Order of Malta and Terre des Hommes. Caritas Internationalis was responsible for the coordination
of the rescue programme in Gabon and its representative there, Father Pinus, C.S.Sp., requested
German Caritas to take over the financial responsibility of the children already under Catholic care.
This was how the two German churches came to the decision to found a Kinderdorf (children’s
village) in Libreville to accommodate a projected 1500 Biafran children with the cooperation of the
Gabonese government and with massive financial support from the German Government.
By all account, the Kinderdorf project was the most effective ecumenical venture undertaken
by the German churches on behalf of Biafra and the first such project in their history. When it was
fully operational, the village was home to 2260 children. In it were living quarters and schools
equipped with playgrounds. But the heart of the village complex was a children’s clinic which was
described at the time as ‘the best equipped in the central African region’. 56
Not all children who were mortally ill were able to be flown out and for them a special pediatric
hospital was established by German Caritas at Okporo in Orlu. Of all the projects mounted by the
German relief organizations the Okporo and Libreville ventures were the ones that received the
greatest support from the German public. In these projects they saw concretely the result of their
generous donations.
Agricultural Schemes
The name Spadeville which was given to the Caritas agricultural project mirrors the success of the
Kinderdorf and was indicative of the versatility of its coordinator, Fr. Ruhlmann, who was also the
director of the Kinderdorf in Libreville.57 The agricultural scheme was a pet project of German
Caritas with the assistance of Misereor. According to Fr. Ruhlmann, the basic idea was to set up
enough demonstration centres by means of which Biafra would eventually become self-sufficient in
food production.58The introduction of this new project
12
was announced to the Biafran bishops in December 1968 by Ludwig Staufer on behalf of German
caritas.
All the seedlings and farming equipment, including motorized tractors, were flown in by Africa
Concern on behalf of German Caritas. Concern, an Irish relief agency, chose to remain outside the
JCA and operated from Libreville. Later this route became an invaluable port of departure for Caritas
flights for the airlift of its farm projects, the pediatric hospital in Okporo and special deliveries for
Nigerian prisoners of war.
Practical agricultural courses began in September 1969 for men and women in each of the provinces
where farms had been established. Plans were underway to start formal agricultural colleges in 1970
when the war suddenly ended. Thankfully, because the pilot project was for five years, the Caritas
venture became the backbone of the rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts of the post-war years.
Rehabilitation and Reconstruction
The FMG committed two humanitarian blunders following the sudden collapse of Biafra in January
1970, namely, the expulsion of the mainly Irish missionaries and the refusal of aid from Caritas and
the JCA. A British aristocrat aptly described these actions as ‘narrow-minded’. 59That is because the
missionaries inside Biafra were the ones who had expert knowledge and practical experience in relief
work and this expertise was greatly needed in the ravaged region. Eventually, the Catholic Secretariat
of Nigeria emerged from the initial setback caused by government’s short-sightedness to become the
most important organ of national integration after the war. Led by a vibrant native clergy, it
undertook the task of coordinating the massive rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts throughout
the country thanks largely to the vision and support of two German agencies Caritas and Misereor.
Whereas the former took care of emergency aid, the latter looked after developmental programmes.
Undaunted by the hostilities against it, Caritas continued to provide massive relief assistance after the
war by changing its name to ‘Dr.Specht’s Organization’ after the name of its Secretary General. For
record purposes, the Catholic Secretariat had to insert ‘German Caritas’ by hand on all mails from the
organization. In accordance with its philosophy on sustainable long-time projects, Misereor laid great
emphasis on helping the local Church to generate a national orientation on development work. As
early as 1968,while the war was still raging, the agency had worked out a plan of development,
rehabilitation and relief for a post-war Nigeria. The plan was denounced at the time as ‘lacking in
reality and a sense of priority’. 60Misereor proved the critics wrong. After the war, it recommended
that each diocese in Nigeria should establish its own Social Welfare Department. Accordingly, relief,
medical, educational and agricultural projects, which were funded by Caritas and Misereor, were
executed in all the dioceses. Loans were granted to cooperatives and individuals for small-scale
businesses. With the assistance of the two agencies, a National Welfare Department emerged from a
moribund Social Welfare Department that was reactivated by the Catholic Secretariat of Nigeria in
1968.It undertook, in collaboration with the diocesan Welfare Departments, development
programmes not only in the war affected areas, but also throughout the country.
13
Conclusion
The Biafran aid mission of the churches was unconventional and highly controversial. On the one
hand, it was accused of ‘technical incompetence and political amateurism’. 61On the other it has been
recognized as ‘a formative experience in contemporary humanitarianism’. 62This ambivalence has
arisen because the churches decided to defy all political and diplomatic niceties in order to bring aid
to millions of starving victims. They were convinced that for such a work to be possible, it needed to
be ‘un-bureaucratic and unconventional’. 63Frustrated by the lethargy of the world’s agencies and
motivated by the positive cooperation between Vatican and the WCC in their search for peace for
Nigerian and Biafra, church leaders in Germany toyed with the idea of forming a global church
commission comparable to the UN or the OAU. 64Although such a commission never materialized in
theory, it did function in practice in the form of the executive committee of the JCA. Dubbed
‘Managers of Humanity’ by a German newspaper, 65this ad hoc committee was responsible for the
global co-ordination of the greatest ecumenical humanitarian venture of the world. They were not
politicians or diplomats, but rather simple clergy men and heads of church humanitarian agencies.
Prominent among them were three Germans: Msgr. Carlo Bayer, Secretary General of Caritas
Internationalis, Msgr. Georg Hüssler, President of German Caritas and Pastor Ludwig Geissel,
Director of the DW. Their un-bureaucratic and unconventional method led to a ‘modern humanitarian
law’ in 1977 when the Geneva Conventions were amended for the first time since 1949 to include,
among other things, the prohibition of the use of starvation as a means of warfare. 66
Rwanda, Bosnia and Dafur have clearly demonstrated that ethnic hatred can lead even the most
civilized societies to unimaginable atrocities. Speaking about the holocaust, Pope Benedict XVI has
emphasized that the memory of that terrible calamity must ‘induce humankind to reflect upon the
unpredictable power of evil when it conquers the heart of man’. 67At the outbreak of the Bosnian War,
some opinion makers reasoned that a quick victory for the Serbs would mean less suffering for the
Bosnian Muslims.68 Today, while millions have been driven from their homes in the Dafur Region of
Sudan and tens of thousands killed solely on the basis of their ethnicity, the rest of the world is busy
arguing whether these atrocities amount to genocide. Biafra foreshadowed these events apparently to
no avail.
In the end, the outcome of the churches’ action in Biafra proved superior to the political
arguments of their critics who, in a most ironic twist, have provided the best accolades for the
humanitarian intervention. The evacuation of Biafran children was dismissed at the time as ‘a cheap
propaganda ploy’.69 Yet, in a message to President Bongo, Gowon, Nigeria’s Head of State,
expressed his gratitude ‘to all the organizations and all those who performed a noble deed in Gabon
by taking in the children and by so doing contributed immensely to their rescue’. 70Under pressure
from the Nigerian government and peoples, the Catholic secretariat in Lagos denounced Caritas and
the foreign missionaries as victims of Biafran propaganda. 71 Yet in the end it was able to say: ‘But for
Caritas, the magnitude of the suffering would have been staggering….The ordinary people, no less
the elite, cannot forget, and shall not forget, the prodigious efforts of Caritas to alleviate pain and
hunger during those dark and grim days’. 72Biafra was a wakeup call for the world and the lesson it
provided was loud and clear: politics should be put at the service of humanity and not the other way
round.
14
Endnotes
1See Rolf Hofmeier and Volker Matthies, eds. Vergessene Kriege in Africa (Goettingen: Lamuv Verlag, 1992).
2Speech on the occasion of the first international conference on Biafra, in New York, 7 December, 1968, available
at: http://www.biafraland.com/genocide_in_biafra_speech.htm. Visited on 21/05/07.
32000: Magazin fuer Mensch und Zukunft, No. 2 Aug. 1968.
4Internationale Zentrale der Biafra und Sued-Sudankomitees, 'Appell an die deutsche Oeffentlichkeit', Hamburg, 15
Dez. 1968; the translation is mine.
5See Chibuike Uche, ‘Oil, British interests and the Nigerian Civil War', Journal of African history, Vol. 49, No. 1
(2008).
6Donald E. Lukens, Interview in International Herald Tribune, 1 January 1969.
7American policy and African famine: The Nigeria-Biafra War, 1966-1970 (New York: Greenwood Press, 1990), p.
108.
8Archives of German Caritas in Freiburg in Breslau (hereafter AGC): 187.1 biaf-6/1.
9AGC: 187.1 biaf -11/2, ‘History of the relief programme to Biafra’.
10See Alex de Waal, Famine Crimes: Politics and the Disaster Relief industry in Africa (Bloomington: Indiana UP,
1997), p.76.
11See August R. Lindt, Generale hunger nie: Geschichte einer Hilfsaktion in Afrika (Bern: Zyflogge Verlag, 1983).
As High Commissioner of the ICRC, August was declared persona non grata by the Nigerian authorities.
12See Nicholas Ibeawuchi Omenka, ‘Blaming the gods: Christian Religious Propaganda in the Nigeria-Biafra War’,
Journal of African History, Vol. 51, No. 3 (2010), p. 383.
13Ntieyong U. Akpan, The Struggle for Secession, 1966-1970: A personal Account of the Nigerian Civil War,
2ndedn. (London: Frank Cass, 1976), p. 159.

14Douglas Anthony, ‘Resourceful and progressive blackmen: modernity and race in Biafra, 1967-70’, Journal of
African History, Vol. 51, No. 1, 2010, p. 44.
15Quoted in Douglas Anthony, ‘Resourceful and progressive blackmen’, p. 44.
16Quoted in John A. Daly and Anthony G. Saville, ‘The history of Joint Church Aid’ (unpublished ‘White Paper’),
p. 25.
17Alex de Waal, Famine crimes: politics and the disaster relief industry in Africa (African Rights, 1997), p. 26.
18Michael Samuels, quoted in Sydney Emezue, ‘Survival methods’, in Axel Harneit-Sievers, Jones O. Ahazuem
and Sydney Emezue, A social history of the Nigerian Civil War: perspectives from below (Hamburg: Lit Verlag,
1997), p.112.
19West Africa, 5 November, 1966.
20Quoted in Ntieyong U. Akpan, The Struggle for Secession, p. 159.
21Quoted in Charles A. Allen, ‘Civilian starvation and relief during armed conflict: the modern humanitarian law’,
Georgia journal of international and comparative law, Vol. 19 (1989), p. 31.
22AGC: 187.1 biaf -07, ‘An address to a gathering of representatives of the relief organizations in Lagos on 30
June, 1969’.
23Der Spiegel, No. 34, 1968, p.73.
24Sueddeutsche Zeitung, No. 312, 28/29 December, 1968.
25Der Stern, No. 33, 18 August, 1968.
26Evangelischer Pressedienst, Zentralausgabe (ZA), No. 187, Munich, 16 Aug, 1968); the translation from the
German original is mine.
27Quoted in Cynthia Sampson, ‘To make real the bond between us all’: Quaker conciliation during the Nigerian
Civil War,’ in Douglas Johnston and Cynthia Sampson (eds.) Religion, the missing dimension of statecraft
15
(Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 96; this answer does not portray him as the kind-hearted and humane
Christian Commander-in-chief which history endeavours to make of him.
28Ian Smillie, The alms bazaar: altruism under fire—non-profit organizations and international development
(London: IT Publications, 1995), p. 104.
29My command: an account of the Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970 (Ibadan: Heinemann, 1980), p. 23. The General’s
account is a falsified version of the massacre designed mainly to exonerate the high command from the crime.
30Der Stern, No. 33, 18 August, 1968.
31 See New York Times, 21 July, 1967; John A. Daly and Anthony G. Saville, 'The history of Jointchurchaid, vol. 1
(unpublished 'White Paper'), p. 50.
32See John de St. Jorre, ‘Genocide cannot be proved until it has been committed’, in The Observer, 11 August,
1968. The title is taken from a speech by Ojukwu.
33Catholic News and Photo Service, 22 June, 1967.
34Joseph E. Thompson, American Policy and African Famine: The Nigeria-Biafra War, 1966-1970 (New York,
1990), p. 59; see also L’Osservatore Romano, 29 June 1968.
35Washington Post, 18 Nov. 1968.
36Maxwell Cohen, Speech on the occasion of the first international conference on Biafra, in New York, 7
December, 1968, available at: http://www.biafraland.com/genocide_in_biafra_speech.htm. Visited on 21/05/07.
37AGC: 187.1 biaf-04/1, ‘An Address by Ludwig Staufer Speyer’, December 1968; the translation is mine.
38Catholic Diocesan Archives, Enugu (hereafter CDAE), ‘Memorandum submitted to the Holy Father on behalf of
the Archbishop and Hierarchy of Onitsha ecclesiastical province by bishop James Moynagh of Calabar and Bishop
Godfrey Okoye of Port Harcourt on the present tragic war in their country’.
39CDAE, ‘Memorandum’.
40See Paul Gerhard Eberlein and Rainer Kruse (eds.) Nigeria-Biafra: Tatsachen, Berichte, Dokumente zur
kirchlichen Hilfsaktion, Vol. 1, (Stuttgart: Quell Verlag, 1968), p. 34.
41See Frankfurter Algemeine Zeitung, 4 June 1968.
42John J. Stremlau, The international politics of the Nigerian Civil War 1967-1970 (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1977), p. 146.
43West Africa, 17 February 1968.
44See Schweiz.evang.Pressediest, No. 32, Zuerich, 23 July, 1968.
45Paul Gerhard Eberlein and Rainer Kruse, p. 25.
46Personal interview, Freiburg, 14 August 1997; in both Caritas and the DW, the department of ‘Overseas Aid’ is
called ‘Disaster Relief’.
47Hüssler, personal interview, Freiburg, 14 August, 1997.
48See AGC: 187.1 biaf-02, Kasper, P. “Aktennotiz,” Freiburg, 27 June 1968.

49See Pat Williams and Toyin Falola, Religious impact on the nation state, (Aldershot: Avebury, 1995), pp. 285-
288.
50Evangelischer Pressedienst, ZA, No. 85, Geneva, 9 April 1968.
51AGC: 187. 1 biaf-11/2, Georg Hüssler, ‘ReisenachLissabon – Sao Tome – Biafra’, July 1968.
52H. D. Quigg, ‘Dispatch for United Press International’. 2 June 1969 (AGC: 187.1 biaf-11/3).
53Die Welt, No. 276, 26 November, 1968, p.7.
54Ludwig Geißel, Unterhaendler der Menschlichkeit: Erinnerungen (Quell Verlag, 1991), p. 218; the translation is
mine.
16
55See AGC: 187.1 biaf-02, ‘Meeting of the parliamentary sub-committee for humanitarian aid in Africa on 16
January, 1969 in the German Parliament Bonn’.
56AGC:187.1 nige-17/1, Hilfsaktion in Libreville für Kinder aus Ost-Nigeria.
57A rehabilitation centre for amputees at Uturu which was run by Caritas Switzerland was called Hopeville.
58CDAE, ‘Minutes of Bishops’ meeting held at the mission house Ugiri, Umuahia, 17 September, 1969’.
59AGC: 187.1 biaf - 06/1: ‘Lord Brockway to Jean J. Chenard’, 24 January 1970.
60Franz-Josef Stummann, 'Einsichtige Weitsicht', Afrika Presse Dienst, No. 1, 1968.
61Klaus Stephan, Publik, No. 5 (1968), p. 17.
62Alex de Waal, Famine crimes, p.72.
63Nikolaus Frank, the former Director of the Information Department of Caritas Internationalis, quoted in Christian
Heidrich, Carlo Bayer: Ein Roemer aus Schlesien und Pionier der Caritas Internationalis (Sigmaringen : Jan
Thornbecke Verlag, 1992), p. 364.
64See AGC: biaf -2, A-F, ' Dietzfelbinger to Blake', 10 August 1968; AGC: biaf -2, A-F, 'Bishop Tenhumberg to the
Nuncio, KonradBafile', Bonn, 22 August 1968.
65Geissel, Unterhaendler, p.222.
66Charles A. Allen, ‘Civilian starvation and relief during armed conflict: the modern humanitarian law’, Georgia
journal of international and comparative law, Vol. 19, No. 1, 1989, pp. 1-85.
67Vatican Information Service, 5 February, 2009.
68Jonathan Benthall, Disasters, relief and the media (London: I.B. Tauris, 1993), p. 94.
69Nigerian Observer, 18 January 1971.
70AGC: 1 nige-17/1, Hilfsaktion in Libreville fuer Kinder aus Ost-Nigerien.
71National Archives Ibadan (NAI), RCM BD1/168. See also AGC:187.1 nige-02/1, ‘Statement of Father John
McCarthy to the National Advisory Committee of Voluntary Agencies’, 29 January, 1970.
72AGC:187.1 nige-02/2, ‘Statement by Rev. Father A. Makozi: Secretary-General of the National Catholic
Secretariat of Nigeria’, 16 October, 1970.
17
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Keywords: Biafra, German Churches, Humanitarian Assistance, Blockade, Starvation.

Prescription for Hunger

Libreville and Spadeville

9AGC: 187.1 biaf -11/2, ‘History of the relief programme to Biafra’.

2ndedn. (London: Frank Cass, 1976), p. 159.

20Quoted in Ntieyong U. Akpan, The Struggle for Secession, p. 159.

24Sueddeutsche Zeitung, No. 312, 28/29 December, 1968.

25Der Stern, No. 33, 18 August, 1968.

44See Schweiz.evang.Pressediest, No. 32, Zuerich, 23 July, 1968.

45Paul Gerhard Eberlein and Rainer Kruse, p. 25.

48See AGC: 187.1 biaf-02, Kasper, P. “Aktennotiz,” Freiburg, 27 June 1968.

53Die Welt, No. 276, 26 November, 1968, p.7.

60Franz-Josef Stummann, 'Einsichtige Weitsicht', Afrika Presse Dienst, No. 1, 1968.

61Klaus Stephan, Publik, No. 5 (1968), p. 17.

62Alex de Waal, Famine crimes, p.72.

69Nigerian Observer, 18 January 1971.

70AGC: 1 nige-17/1, Hilfsaktion in Libreville fuer Kinder aus Ost-Nigerien.

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