Questions:

1. Why do we need to find the true and correct meaning in the interpretation of the law? Are the
existing frameworks meeting this objective?
2. What are the principles Dworkin lays down to address complexities that arise in the
interpretation of the text of the statute and lawmakers’ intention?

Questions:
1. How do theories of statutory interpretation restrict judicial and administrative discretion?
2. Which one of these theories provides the most satisfactory account of discretion?

Aharon Barak, what is Interpretation About?” & “Purpose in Law” in Purposive

Interpretation in Law
· Barak (the author) defines interpretation as a rational activity that gives meaning to a
legal text. According to this definition, interpretation shapes the content of the norm
“trapped” inside the text. Here, the text is the object of interpretation whereas the legal
norm derived from it is the product of interpretation. Furthermore, Barak states that ‘text’ is
not limited to written text. For purposes of interpretation, any behavior that creates a legal
norm is a ‘text’.
o Alternate definitions of interpretation exist that the author differs from. The narrow
definition states that there is room for interpretation only when the text is unclear.
Constrictive definition states that interpretation should be restricted to finding the
intent of the author. Barak states that every legal text requires interpretation and it
need not be limited to realising the intent of the author (subjective interpretation)
but can also be to materialise the objective standards (objective interpretation).
o Dworkin asserts that law in itself is the practice of interpretation. It is not limited to
judges interpreting the law, or lawyers decoding statutes and documents but the
very proposition of law is an interpretation of legal history. Barak says that his
definition is narrower in scope than Dworkin’s.
· Assume the existence of a valid legal text. Questions regarding what the text is, and whether
it is valid are questions related to interpretation. Questions of validity of the norms that
have been derived from interpretation is not interpretative activity (even though it may be
posed as one under some legal systems), according to Barack.
· According to the author, the following constitutes interpretative activity:
o Resolving contradictions within a text – yes, interpretative activity
o Resolving contradictions in different texts (both on the same normative and
different normative plane) - yes, interpretative activity
 Same normative plane – Eg, two statutes, two contracts, two wills
 Different normative plane – Eg, constitution and statute, statute and
contract, contract and will
o Resolving contradictions based on the meaning given – Not an interpretative activity.
 Resolving contradictions between norms would be a broad activity, aligning
with Dworkin’s definition of law as opposed to Barack’s narrow idea of
interpretation.
 Resolving contradictions or asserting relationship between a superior norm
(constitution) with a inferior norm (statute) is not an interpretative activity.
o Filling gaps in a legal text – Yes, interpretative activity depends on the legal tradition.
However, Barak flags this as a broad/wide interpretative activity.
· Linguistic rules are used for interpretation. The interpretation must be accommodated
within the language of the text. [Since Barack acknowledges that filling gaps often by giving
meaning that is not present in the language of the text is an interpretative activity, he also
states that his definition of interpretation is narrow one limited by structure and language
of the text].
·