Journal of Pragmatics 213 (2023) 49e66

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Journal of Pragmatics
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/pragma

Mediating through question-asking: A sociopragmatic

analysis of epistemic stance negotiation in everyday
conversation

u a, b
Esther Linares-Bernabe
a
IULMA, University of Valencia, Spain
b
Institute for Culture and Society (ICS), University of Navarra, Spain

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: This study examines the role of questions in the negotiation of epistemic stance in diffuse
Received 30 July 2022 mediation contexts. Diffuse mediation arises in various informal situations, for example,
Received in revised form 12 May 2023 between friends seeking to re-establish relationships that are at risk, or relatives trying to
Accepted 25 May 2023
resolve family conflicts. In fact, the stronger the social bonds, the greater the scope for this
Available online 11 June 2023
form of conflict resolution (Greco-Morasso, 2011; Berger, 2018). We hypothesise that third-
parties acting as mediators in informal conversations are seldom fully aware of their role,
Keywords:
and hence that they often show their point of view in attempting to resolve a conflict.
Diffuse Mediation
Questioning
Thus, we argue that a mediator's epistemic stance negotiation not only contributes to
Epistemic Stance establishing common ground, but also reflects their own subjectivity (Jacobs, 2002; Fraser,
Conversation 2007). Towards confirming this, the study presents an analysis of data from the Val.Es.Co.
Sociopragmatics corpus, which comprises 78 conversations with a total duration of approximately
1465 min. From this material, our quantitative and qualitative analysis will focus on those
conversational sequences in which a situation of informal mediation can be observed, a
total of 38 sequences amounting to 64 min of dialogue. The results confirm that pragmatic
strategies such as question-asking have a crucial role here, due to the negotiation of
meanings and the cognitive alignment that is expected to occur during the conflict. The
findings show that by asking questions, the mediator can redirect the issue to other topics,
foster the negotiation of epistemic stance, and establish common ground between par-
ticipants. Likewise, it is observed that situational and social knowledge in a specific context
become essential in the process of diffuse mediation in everyday conversation.
© 2023 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC
BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).

1. Introduction

Human relationships develop in the immediacy of interaction (Simmel, 1950). As Arundale (2021: 272) notes, “relation-
ships are born, grown, thrive, survive and die as persons engage in talk with other persons”; in such interactions, conflict
sometimes occurs, which can then be the object of mediation. In this study we examine diffuse mediation in everyday Spanish
conversations that emerge in informal social contexts and conditions. The conversations themselves involve friends seeking
to re-establish relationships that are at risk, relatives attempting to resolve family conflicts, and flatmates attempting to

E-mail address: esther.linares@uv.es.

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pragma.2023.05.019
0378-2166/© 2023 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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restore damaged relationships between other flatmates. In this cases, social bonds are a key factor, since the stronger the
bonds, the greater the availability of this form of conflict-resolution (Greco-Morasso, 2011; Berger, 2018).
Despite the dynamic environment that informal diffuse mediation1 practices constitute, it has attracted very little
scholarly attention to date, and existing studies tend to deal with formal and institutionalised mediation (see Maley, 1995;
Jacobs, 2002). The present study, by contrast, explores the linguistic resources and pragmatic strategies used to solve conflicts
in everyday conversation.
In this regard we expect to identify features different from those typically used in formal mediation. For instance, a
common characteristic of successful institutional mediators is that they are expected not to express their personal standpoint.
The present research, by contrast, aims to show that this is not the case in informal mediation contexts. Looking specifically at
the use of questions, Hale and Nix (1996) and Jacobs (2002) have noted that in formal contexts, question-asking functions as a
rhetorical-pragmatic strategy that helps to create rapport among participants in a conversation, to foster common ground,
and to situate the speaker-mediator in a partially neutral position. However, in informal mediation settings, neutrality is not
expected in question-asking. Thus, the conducive role of questions requires examination here. As Archer (2005, 2020) has
argued, understanding what questions mean entails accounting for the questioner's role and what they expect. In some cases,
the third party might use questions to elicit information, but in most cases the aim will be to facilitate self-discovery and to
exert an influence on the mediation process itself.
In addition, the epistemic status of participants and the negotiation of their epistemic stance in interaction play crucial
roles when questioning is used for the purposes of finding common ground and resolving conflicts. In this sense, Heritage
(2012: 24) claims that “interpretation of the clause cannot correctly be effectuated without a fine-grained grasp of epistemic
domains and relative epistemic status within them”. In particular, the term epistemic status refers to the relative epistemic
access which interactants have to a particular domain of information; that is, the ability to obtain or acquire knowledge or
information by having access to different sources of information, such as through direct experience, personal testimony, or
empirical research, and rights relating to a domain (or set of domains) of information. By contrast, the term epistemic stance
has been defined as the individual's position or attitude towards knowledge, information, or beliefs. It includes a range of
cognitive and affective components, such as an individual's level of confidence in their own beliefs or the beliefs of others,
their willingness to consider alternative perspectives, and their level of openness to new information or evidence (see
Heritage, 2013; Zuczkowski et al., 2014). Moreover, Padilla Cruz (2022) claims that understanding and reflecting on our own
epistemic stances can help us engage more effectively with others and make more informed decisions based on a solid
foundation of evidence and reasoning.
With these ideas in mind, the following research questions have been established.

RQ1 How do mediators show their epistemic status?

RQ2 What is the function of questioning in participants' turns?
RQ3 Do mediators negotiate their epistemic stance regardless of their epistemic status?

We will seek to show that (a) third parties who act as mediators in informal Spanish conversations are seldom fully aware
of their role and they usually reveal their point of view when trying to resolve conflicts. Indeed, we go on to argue that (b) a
mediator's epistemic stance negotiation not only contributes to the establishment of common ground, but also reflects their
own subjectivity. Finally, we will consider that (c) epistemic status can be deliberately misrepresented or manipulated by a
mediator to appear more or less knowledgeable that they really are.
The study is structured as follows. In the next section (x2) we establish the theoretical framework to be used, before
moving on (x3) to describe the methodology employed for data extraction and corpus analysis. In the main section (x4) we
present and explore the results. The paper concludes with a discussion of the findings (x5) in terms of how these shed new
light on the relation between epistemic stance, epistemic status, and diffusion mediation.

2. Theoretical framework

2.1. Conflict resolution and diffuse mediation in everyday conversation

According to Jeffries and Webb (2008), conflict arises when one or more parties attempt to address incompatible values,
wants, needs, or desires by means such as discussing, fighting, enforcing change, seeking legal intervention, or seeking
arbitration or resolution. Likewise, the authors outline the types of conflict that can arise in interaction, namely, intrapersonal
conflict, interpersonal conflict, intragroup conflict, intergroup conflict, and conflict of values. Particularly, the present study
seeks to analyse mediation specifically in interpersonal everyday conflicts. Interpersonal disputes, friction, arguments and
disagreements are frequent in human interaction (Simmel, 1950). Indeed, conflict has sometimes been seen as an opportunity

1
In this paper, we use the term diffuse mediation to refer to mediation that occurs informally in ongoing processes of (semi)spontaneous conversation
and non-formalized interaction, in contrast to formal and institutionalized mediation practices (such as those carried out by professionals in legal contexts).

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for change and the reinforcement of social bonds (Adams and Laursen, 2007); since, as, Norrick and Spitz (2008) claim,
conflict talk is not in itself negative, given that it can help to verbalise our frustrations and negative emotions.2
A key element is the way on which conflict is managed, since the types of practices involved can also undermine re-
lationships, in that they might serve to trigger the polarisation of the positions of participants. According to Hicks (2001),
during conflict, individuals feel that their social identities are being threatened, in that a cognitive misalignment has emerged.
In these cases, the intervention of a third party may involve a mediation process, since this third participant has no emotional
attached to the issue and thus can help the disputing parties to see things in a more reasonable way (Shapira, 2016).
As illustrated in Fig. 1, below, we cannot conceive of mediation without identifying a prior conflict. Bousfield (2013) argues
that conflict is understood as a situation that arises due to a divergence of values, a conflict of interests, or disappointed
expectations, which produce a polarisation in the position of the parties in conflict; this in turn damages the relationship
between them, and results in a climate of emotional discomfort.

Fig. 1. A model for the study of mediation in interaction.

2
Sifianou (2019: 177) argues that, in order to understand the nature of conflict and disagreement, we need to look beyond utterances; these cannot be
treated as merely linguistic phenomena, since the feelings associated with them may themselves affect the development and outcomes of exchanges.

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In addition to this, Deutsch (1969) distinguishes between the underlying conflict, which can be thought of as the prevailing
incompatibility of wants, needs, and desires within individuals, groups, or nations, and the manifest conflict, which involves
the point at which one party decides to try to resolve the perceived incompatibilities, whether through aggressive or
conciliatory means. In particular, the manifestation of conflict can be seen as a response to an “antecedent event” or “trig-
gering situation,” which, according to Locher (2004) and Bousfield (2008), may in turn worsen a newly or previously existing
conflict.
Hence, the need for mediation arises on which restorative practices required as a means of reconstructing and/or re-
establishing the relationship between the parties involved. In particular, mediation can be seen as a voluntary process, one
where a third party collaborates with the parties in conflict in the negotiation of their disagreement3 in order to reach a
possible understanding. We should note here that when people disagree they are not necessarily in conflict (Sifianou, 2021:
181). Angouri (2012) observes that there is a difference between conflict and disagreement; typically, conflict is negatively
marked, whereas disagreement simply entails the existence of opposing views or deviating opinions, and these are not
inherently bonding or damaging to interlocutors. As Mey (2011) points out, speech acts have to be understood within their
specific reality, that is, in the context in which they are produced, before they can be interpreted correctly.
Taking the specific case of the mediation process, and following van Dick's (2007) proposal, the mediator has to take into
consideration both local and global contexts; that is, not only the verbal activity itself, but also the setting, features of the
participants, their relationships, as well as broader social, cultural and historical surroundings. Indeed, it is well established in
the literature on mediation (see Jacobs, 2002; Fraser, 2007; Haugh, 2013; Ran and Zhao 2018) that mediators need to
demonstrate prior knowledge about the participants, the communicative context, and the facts concerning the dispute. For
instance, they need to identify the situational and socio-cultural context in which conflict has occurred, since some contexts
and cultures are more tolerant of conflict than others. Prior knowledge of sociocultural aspects such as the age, gender,
ethnicity and social class of participants is also essential in understanding a conflict and thus being able to resolve it.
Moreover, when a mediator enters a conflict, they have to be aware of, and respectful of, the interactive group dynamics and
the power relationship that exists between the participants (Rigotti and Rocci 2006; García-Ramo
n, 2018). In this respect,
Greco-Morasso (2009) argues that third parties must also establish their power and control within the mediation and, on the
other hand, create an atmosphere of trust with the other parties, so that the latter will be disposed to listen and accept in-
formation contrary to their own position. Similarly, the third party acting as mediator must correct any asymmetry in the
balance of power, if this is detrimental to the resolution of the dispute, towards ensuring that the process always moves towards
that solution. Mediators should also show empathy during the conversation, since as Tangney et al. (2007) and Garce
s-Conejos
Blitvich (2022) suggest, empathy can have at least three positive effects (i) when individuals empathize with someone in
distress, it can elicit feelings of concern towards the suffering individual; (ii) this empathic concern frequently motivates in-
dividuals to assist the person in distress; and (iii) experiencing empathy can limit aggressive or harmful behaviours. Needless to
say, the mediator does not benefit from the outcome and must remain impartial, especially in the case of a formal mediation.
In addition, previous research has shown that in mediation, communication has a crucial role, due to the negotiation of
meanings and the cognitive alignment that is expected to occur during the discussion. Language use is vital to mediation, since a
single word or phrase is sometimes all that is needed to help resolve a conflict or, on the contrary, to feed the flames of discord. The
success of mediation, then, depends both on the willingness of the participants to create spaces of mutual understanding while
negotiating their narratives (Shapira 2016), and also on the metapragmatic competence of the mediator to use appropriate social,
cognitive and rhetorical-pragmatic strategies to achieve an understanding and rebuild bonds between the parties involved.
In particular, metapragmatic competence, i.e., knowledge about the context and the linguistic message, as well as
awareness as to which elements of language need to be chosen to adequately convey the communicative intention
(Verschueren 2019), is crucial in successfully restoring the bonds between participants. This competence must be practiced
with impartiality, establishing a shared space between the parties, and avoiding possible face-threatening acts (FTA) (Brown
and Levinson 1987). In light of the above, we understand mediation to be a communicative process in which strategies such as
mitigation or intensification d facework strategies used by the mediator to counteract FTA (paraphrasing, questioning,
summarising, reformulation, footing, and verbal humour) d will contribute to the resignification of the conflict, in which new
perspectives are sought and common ground established. In fact, Archer (2011, 2015) states that facework which is strate-
gically ambivalent in some way(s) can be an effective means of speakers manipulating others’ views without explicitly
“doing” impoliteness. For example, Maxwell and Anderson (2019) show that metaphors might be used to mitigate an opinion,
thus allowing disputants and mediator to achieve mutual understanding in a way that is perhaps not possible through direct
expression. Indeed, Bousfield (2008, 2013) suggests that face and identity are critical factors that must be considered when
researching or theorizing about aggression, conflict, and conflict resolution.4
Another strategy to resignify conflict, that Jacobs (2002) explains as to reframe the situation so as to resolve goal conflict by
dissolving it, would be reformulation. Stokoe and Sikveland (2016) show how the technique of reformulation serves to

3
Disagreement can be seen as a potential generator of conflict, especially if there is low degree of affinity between participants. However, in certain in-
group communities, disagreements are preferred over agreements in daily interactions, and their function in fact relates to sociability rather than disaf-
filiation (Schiffrin, 1984).
4
Some of the most recognised “impoliteness” or interpersonal aggression models (Bousfield 2008; Culpeper 2011) are derivations or evolutions of face-
centric politeness approaches and, as such, face has been argued and demonstrated as being central to accounting for conflictive interpersonal interaction.

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reconstruct peoples' versions of events, and mediators can make use of this, without giving direct instructions or advice,
when they attempt to encourage parties to come to an agreement about ways to move forward. Likewise, previous studies
(Brown and Levinson, 1987; Norrick and Spitz, 2008; Linares, 2022) have reported that the mediator's use of verbal humour
can foster the transformation of the individual cognitive space of the parties in an inclusive way through humorous allusions
to some aspect of real life familiar which represents shared knowledge for all participants. In the present study we look in
particular at questioning as a technique of mediation,5 since in taking steps to find common ground, questions are one of the
strategies favoured by mediators (see Jacobs, 2002; Fraser, 2008).
Fig. 1 summarises the main ideas discussed above in a sociopragmatic model of mediation.

2.1.1. Social and situational aspects of diffuse mediation

According to Briz and Albelda (2013), the context of a dispute includes expectations and conventions that themselves
justify the most appropriate type of interaction between interlocutors. In a context of communicative immediacy (Koch and
Oesterreicher, 1985), where interaction is developed in real time, attention must be paid to a variety of aspects of the
discourse: social and situational such as contextualisation cues d face gestures, body movements, physical distance d which
are typical of face-to-face communication; spontaneity in turn taking, that is, the degree of conversational dynamism, plus
feedback; the presence or absence of all parties involved in the conflict; the emotional implications of the exchange; non-
specialised issues in the conflict; the non-marked framework; and the informal tone of the interaction. These are summar-
ised in Fig. 2.

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Fig. 2. Conversational features involved in diffuse mediation.

5
Nonetheless, we acknowledge that it may also be a tactic utilized by verbal abusers who seek to exert or maintain power by asking conducive questions
(Archer 2020).

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Likewise, there is little doubt that situational and social knowledge in a specific context is essential in the process of diffuse
mediation in everyday conversation. Mediators rely on their own schemata, which, according to Culpeper (2002) and Eysenck
and Keane (2010), could be defined as cohesive and integrated bundles of information pertaining to the world, events, in-
dividuals, and actions. For instance, mediators are familiar with the interlocutors’ personalities, including how they might
respond to various face-saving or face-repairing stimuli. Consequently, they can use this knowledge to try and bring about a
reduction in strong emotions (i.e. anger, resentment, irritation, etc.) (Simmel, 1950) by using strategies most appropriate to
the personalities involved, such as telling a joke or changing the subject. More broadly, prior sociocultural knowledge, such as
the age, gender, ethnicity and class of participants, is essential in understanding the conflict and being able to resolve it.
As illustrated in Fig. 2, knowledge about the power roles and in-group relationship dynamics is essential for successful
mediation. On these lines, Teven et al. (1998) observe that the affinity between interlocutors has been seen as having great
significance in terms of whether a disagreement will develop into a destructive or constructive conflict. In the same vein,
Sifianou (2019) argues that the nature of the relationship between the interlocutors and the context has a considerable effect
on the construction and interpretation of the disagreement and whether it will escalate into conflict.

2.2. Epistemic status and the negotiation of epistemic stance

Knowledge is a key element in any successful mediation. In this sense, we should bear in mind that each speaker owns
their own epistemic domain or territory of information, which Kamio (1997) described as the information itself, how it comes
to be known, and the speaker's rights and responsibilities regarding it, all of which contribute to the speaker's epistemic
status. As mentioned above, Heritage (2012) defines epistemic status as the relative access to some domain knowledge of the
participants at some point in time, given that this status varies from domain to domain, as well as over time, and can be
altered from moment to moment as a result of specific contributions in an interaction. Indeed, Stivers et al. (2011: 13) argue
that “epistemic access, primacy and responsibility are governed by social norms which influence, and are influenced by, social
alignment and affiliation”. During conversation, speakers demonstrate their accountability for their knowledge, level of
certainty, authority, and adherence to their responsibilities and rights.
Consequently, epistemic access to a domain can be stratified depending on the different positions that interactants occupy
on an epistemic gradient (from more knowledgeable Kþ to less knowledgeable K). For instance, a speaker might claim
absolute epistemic advantage (Kþ) while the recipient is assumed to be entirely ignorant (K); in other cases, a speaker might
imply equality of access to the situation in question. Equality of epistemic access (and thus a flat gradient) might arise from
specifically-shared (ordinary, simultaneous) experiences of people, objects and events. However, even the simultaneous,
shared experience of something is no guarantee of epistemic equality. For example, a geography teacher and her student
might look at a map together, but mere observation will not provide the latter with the same epistemic resources to un-
derstand it as the teacher possesses. Besides, in circumstances where the object of knowledge does not itself arise exclusively
from simultaneous, shared experience, many other factors come into play, including how recent a person's information is, its
origins, and their right to know it in the first place (Stivers et al., 2011). Indeed, Heritage (2012: 6) argues that there are socially
sanctioned ways to adjudicate epistemic disputes in which, for instance, recent experience is privileged over less recent
experience. Thus, in the case of formal mediation, professional expertise and epistemic authority are typically allowed to
override non-specialist judgments and knowledge.
On the other hand, the notion of stance (Goffman 1983) allows us to see how people's displays of attitudes, feelings and
identities shift dynamically in interaction with others (Du Bois, 2007: 163). In particular, epistemic stance in conversation
involves the dynamic expression of epistemic status in each turn. Mediators, for example, can take an “unknowing” epistemic
stance as a means of inviting elaboration, with the possibility that a sequence of expansions emerges in which the parties can
express their emotions as part of their narratives; mediators might also take a more “knowing” stance as a means of inviting
confirmation of information and thus potentially opening up common ground between the parties.
In the case of diffuse mediation, the epistemic status of the mediator would include domains of knowledge about previous
experiences and conflicts, knowledge about the relationship of the parties, encyclopaedic knowledge about the object, and
sociocultural knowledge about the local context. Also, the mediator can adopt different epistemic stances during the con-
versation, in a gradient from a knowing (Kþ) stance to an unknowing (K) one, regardless of their real epistemic status. In
other words, in order to achieve a certain effect, a speaker, through their epistemic stance, can reveal either more or less than
they actually know.

2.2.1. Question-asking: types and functions

The epistemic stance and subjectivity of mediators is conditioned by the temporary phenomenological notions of retention
and protention (Husserl, 2012), since their previous knowledge influences both their subjectivity while asking the participants
questions, and also how they are able to anticipate their interlocutors' responses.6 This reflects Verschueren's (2021: 117)
work on speakers' ability to form hypothesis about the mental states and knowledge of others, and to monitor reflexively

6
Retention is the process whereby a phase of a perceptual act is retained in our consciousness. Protention is our anticipation of the following moment, the
one which has yet to be perceived. According to Husserl (2012), perception has three temporal aspects d retention, the immediate present, and protention
d and involves a sequence in which each moment of protention becomes the retention at the next point.

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(both retroactively and projectively) the effect of their words in generating meaning. As Hayano (2013) notes, “questions
neither simply nor innocently request information. They convey, and impose on recipients, questioners' beliefs”.
In a context of epistemic congruency, unknowing speakers would typically ask questions and knowing speakers would
respond with assertions. That is, the epistemic stance encoded in a turn converges with the epistemic status of the speaker
relative to the topic and the recipient (García-Ramo
n, 2018). However, this is not always the case in conversation. As Archer
(2005) observes, certain question types have the capacity to constrain an addressee's response. Indeed, in the case of diffuse
mediation, the mediator can negotiate or misrepresent their epistemic status stance to appear more or less knowledgeable
than is in fact the case. As Bousfield (2007) and Archer (2020) demonstrate, questions can be used for conducive purposes.)
Mediators take steps to secure common ground,7 and questioning is among the strategies available to them here (Jacobs,
2002; Fraser, 2008). The speech act of the question d which does not necessarily coincide with the linguistic form of the
interrogative8 d fulfils various pragmatic and interrogative functions (Schmidt, 1977). According to Heritage (2012), a
question form can be used for actions other than questioning, and in turn questioning can be achieved through linguistic
forms other than questions. And, of course, turns can simultaneously be both questions and something else that does not
involve a straightforward request for information (e.g. invitations, requests, offers.9).
In the case of mediation, questions may lead to the respondent committing to answers that serve as common premises for
arriving at conclusions (Jacobs, 2002). For example, in responses to polar questions, agreement is generally preferred, that is,
an affirmation of the proposition advanced in the question, regardless of whether that proposition is positive or negative
(Sacks, 1987). In this regard, Heritage and Raymond (2021: 55) show how polar questions are often produced within contexts
that naturally lead to the likelihood of some or other state of affairs being affirmed. Likewise, with regard to preference
organisation, Bousfield (2007) claims that adjacency pairs can constrain what is appropriate for the next speaker to do.
In addition, Bolinger (1957) argues that, in circumstances where a speaker is thought to be in a Kþ position, certain types
of negative questions actually assert information, rather than request it. Indeed, negative questions are generally seen as
conducive, since they effectively ask respondents to conform to the underlying presupposition of the question (Archer, 2005).
Clayman and Heritage (2002) identify a range of different question forms, such as “How could you X?”, which are “unan-
swerable” and thus function as challenges or accusations rather than as requests for information. On similar lines, Sadock
(1971) notes that assertions can be packaged as questions: “Did I tell you that doing a PhD sucks?”.
Declarative questions are commonly used in informal speech to express surprise or to ask for verification, in that the most
likely response is agreement or confirmation. Following, Labov and Fanshel's (1977) principle of shared knowledge, declar-
ative questions carry the assumptions that participants make about each other's knowledge and which they use when
inferring meaning. This principle differentiates between A-events (known to A, but not to B) and B-events (known to B, but
not to A), and is used in an analysis of declarative questions where B-event statements made by A (e.g. “And you felt
awkward”) would be understood as requests for information.
In sum, as Greco-Morasso (2007) has argued, a mediator can, through asking questions, redirect the issue to other topics,
foster the negotiation of epistemic stance, and establish common ground between participants.

3. Methodology

In the current exploration of diffuse mediation in informal interaction, we have been guided by the following works:
Ethnography of Communication (Gumperz and Hymes, 1996) and Interactional Sociolinguistics (Goffman, 1981), as well as the
principles of conversation analysis (CA).
This study, then, has an exploratory, interpretative, and qualitative nature. In particular, it draws on a corpus of audio
recordings, the Val.Es.Co. 3.0. corpus, which comprises 78 everyday conversations in Spanish. From these, we have selected
those excerpts in which conflict and subsequent informal mediation occur, specifically in seven conversations, amounting to
9% of the corpus. Such a small dataset can be explained in terms of their spontaneous nature10, since as Leech points out,
“conflictive illocutions tend, thankfully, to be rather marginal to human linguistic behaviour in normal circumstances” (Leech,
1983: 105). As such, these data are rather exceptional, offering insight into an aspect of interaction seldom captured in
conversational corpora.
In order to make our qualitative analysis homogeneous and to avoid misleading results, we have focused on sequences
from two conversations that share the same situational and social features. Both of these involve conflicts that arise during
family conversations at mealtimes, and are the result of the absence of an expected type of behaviour in that context.
Likewise, both conversations show triadic dialogues in which there is a third party that plays a key role for the termination of
the conflictive episode.

7
Raymond (2014)speaks of epistemic brokering as the interactional steps taken by mediators to ensure that there is common ground and that par-
ticipants are able to socially align.
8
In Schegloff's words: “whatever defines the class “question” as a linguistic form will not do for questions as conversational objects, or interactional
objects, or social actions” (Schegloff, 1984: 49).
9
This is what Searle (1975) understands as “indirect speech acts”.
10
Conflict sequences tend to be more frequent in, for example, courtroom discourse (Archer, 2011), family discourse (Laforest, 2002) and therapeutic
discourse (Albelda, 2022).

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Following Luzon (2013: 113), we consider a conflict act to be “any discourse act where disagreement, criticism or
dissension is explicitly marked by different discursive or lexical devices”. We also take a dialogue to be a mediation sequence
when participants contradict each other in three consecutive turns (Norrick and Spitz, 2008) and where this conflict act is
interrupted due to the use of rhetorical-pragmatic strategies by a third, mediating party.
The conversational fragments selected were segmented into sequences following the Val.Es.Co. model, in which a
sequence is understood as a conversational structure composed of several turn-taking interchanges on the same topic (Ruiz
Gurillo, 2019; Pons and Fischer, 2021). This segmentation yielded a total of 38 sequences11 that contained turns in which the
mediator or other parties assert and request information depending on their epistemic status and epistemic stance. In our
analysis we focused specifically on those sequences in which the speaker negotiates their epistemic stance and uses questions
to mediate and find common ground. In the following section, examples will be provided to illustrate patterns of convergence
and divergence in the relation between the epistemic status and the epistemic stance, as used to achieve successful
mediation.

4. Results and discussion

The analysis has followed Wall, Stark and Standifer's (2001) mediation framework, in which the authors argue that it is
important to identify the situation preceding mediation, the mediation practice itself, and the outcomes. This broadly reflects
Heritage (1984), who claims that whatever is uttered in a conversation is said in a sequential context, and its illocutionary
force will be determined by reference to what it accomplishes in relation to some sequentially prior utterance or set of ut-
terances. So, in our two conversations, mediation is conditioned by the situation that caused the conflict, which speakers
retain in their cognitive space, as well as by the speakers' predisposition to cooperate and re-construct their bonds. As we will
see, diffuse mediation tends to rely on empathetic strategies (e.g. reinforcement of ‘us’, preferred answers, cooperative turns)
to re-conduct potential conflicts between participants.
The first conversation takes place over breakfast. There are three participants: B and C are a young couple, and A is the
mother of B. In particular, we observe oppositional talk, or conflict talk, between B and C, with these interlocutors expressing
opposing views through disagreement, challenges, denials, accusations, threats and insults).
The first example begins with an attack on B by C, and continues with an attempt at mediation by A, who tries to calm
things down first by scolding C and then by placing herself in an unknowing epistemic stance so that B can express his point of
view and calm his emotions.

Example 1

11
The transcription conventions used are outlined in Briz and Grupo Val.Es.Co. (2002), available at https://www.uv.es/valesco/sistema.pdf.

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Human interaction is strongly loaded with d and influenced by d emotion (Alba-Juez, 2021), and, as Leech (2014) states,
human emotions can be conceptualised and expressed by means of speech acts. In this sequence, C uses a directive order
“warm it up” which is then mitigated by a negative question, and an insult “twat” to express her frustration and weariness
with B's behaviour. However, this first intervention is seen as an FTA by B, since, as Sifianou and Tzanne (2021; 253) have
argued, directive speech acts such as commands, orders or requests are prime examples of acts that threaten the addressee's
negative face, in that they are an imposition on the interlocutor.
Consequently, A intervenes and uses the discourse marker “chica”,12 often employed in Spanish to mitigate disfavoured
responses, to mark her disapproval of such behaviour (see Briz, 2012; Albelda, 2022). After this, she attempts to mediate by
asking B a solution-focused question, thus affording him an opportunity to express his point of view. With the question “look/
do you like it cold or warm?”, A explicitly concedes B primary rights to the information, so that he is the one who decides;
simultaneously, C's direct act is discarded. However, B's response reflects a case of epistemic incongruence and misalignment,
since instead of cooperating and responding to A, he decides to express his own dissatisfaction.
In response to this, A tries to deescalate the conflict by minimising A's position with a hyperbolic generalisation: “they
don
t tell you off? ↑//well→ anyone might think people spend their whole lives telling you off/right?” Indeed, the use of
the tag question here is a way of requesting confirmation in a context where the speaker is looking for support for a point of
view and seeks to downgrade her epistemic stance. Thus, in this turn taking we can see that the ongoing negotiation of the
participants, in terms of who has the primary right to know what, involves an indexing of epistemic authority (B) and
subordination (A). Finally, the argument ends when C shows her withdrawal from the verbal conflict and downplays the
importance of what has been said.
And although it might seem that the conflict ends with the withdrawal of C, in fact B now retaliates and threatens C's face,
as we can see in the following sequence.

Example 2

12
We have translated this marker as “girl” following Alba-Juez (2009), who argues that despite the marker “man” being more widely used in generic
addresses, the word “girl” can be considered to be the feminine counterpart.

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Here, B performs a directive act with which he threatens C's face, in that he implies that she is dirty. Previous studies
(Laforest, 2002) have shown that for people in close relationships, norms are shared to the extent that the mere mention of an
act/behaviour can immediately be categorised as a complaint and a threat.
The two speakers then engage in an exchange of attacks and insults to manifest their emotional stances. Speaker A now
finds it very difficult to mediate in this situation due to the heightened emotions displayed by the other two participants.
Indeed, she only intervenes by expressing her discomfort and showing her inferior epistemic stance d since B and C have a
closer relationship d in order to understand the reason for such comments.
According to Sifianou and Tzanne (2021), once participants enter in a conflict sequence, it becomes extremely difficult for
the mediator to know what they bring with them in terms of experience and knowledge (socio-cultural and encyclopaedic),
which is all relevant information in relation to their personal traits, emotional states and relational histories. For instance, in
the next sequence (example 3), A knows the relationship13 between C and B well, and hence she downplays the importance of
the conflict by changing the topic with a question that concerns her own epistemic domain (Kþ), a question from which she
expects only confirmation from her two interlocutors.

Example 3

As we noted above, although a straightforward interrogative syntax may seem to be used to index K- positions, and hence
consistently aligned with a speaker's K- epistemic status, this is in fact not always the case. Rather, we need contextual in-
formation to determine whether a turn involving a question is genuinely seeking information. For example, questions
involving domains in which the questioner has or should have primary epistemic status are not ordinarily understood as to be
information-seeking. In this example, A invites a response relating to a domain of which she herself has privileged access:
“[well↓]///[ now CAN I→?/] Can I put the washing machine on now?” So, whatever the action that arises from this utterance
d challenge, complaint, protest, rebuttal d it is not the product of a request for information. Also, with this question, A breaks
the argument frame and changes the topic. So, this first conversation has illustrated how epistemic status varies from domain
to domain, as well as over time, in that it can be altered from moment to moment as a result of specific contributions.
In the second conversation, below, three speakers are having lunch: a mother (B), the daughter (C) and a third, male
participant (A), who could be B's husband. During the meal B and C tell A about a conflict that happened a few hours pre-
viously, when C had a driving lesson with her mother (B). C did not follow her mother's instructions and they almost had an
accident.
In this sequence (example 4), B seeks affiliation with A while telling him what happened, and A, who tries to act as a
mediator, intervenes by asking a series of questions so that B can expand on her version of events.

13
s-Conejos Blitvich (2009: 282) notes the importance of knowing the interlocutor's identity in the interpretation of what is said and thus in
Garce
understanding whether the issue of conflict is actually significant or controversial.

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Example 4

In B's first intervention, A is identified as having Kþ epistemic status, this through framing the information conveyed in a
rhetorical question as something that the co-participants ought to know, thus presupposing shared knowledge and seeking
solidarity. A's response to this is affiliative, recognising as it does an inferior epistemic status than that which B has
presupposed.
Here, it is again evident that epistemic status is not unchallengeable, since first A acknowledges that he does not know
what B is talking about (K), then uses his encyclopaedic knowledge to formulate a question that aims at achieving agree-
ment and confirmation (Kþ) through conceding the epistemic high ground to B, and finally returning to a K position so that
B can expand on her version of events.
In particular, through the polar question “Have you gone that way by the↑ MT?”, A negotiates rights and access to
knowledge as a basis for a common frame of understanding, this with the aim of seeking agreement. As Heritage and
Raymond (2005) have argued, questions relating to epistemic stance are inherently associated with questions of affilia-
tion. In this case, A acts as a mediator by creating common ground and rapport between the B and C.
Consequently, the operational preference for agreement is seen in the behaviour of the mediator, who adjusts the design of
the question according to the prevailing state of affairs (Heritage and Raymond, 2021). In this case, the mediator uses a polar
question in search for agreement and confirmation, given his lower epistemic status, and uses his background knowledge
about the roads in Valencia in formulating the question. An expected answer may well depend upon conduciveness, or the
controlling nature of the question itself. As Pomerantz (1984) notes, agreement between parties is comfortable, supportive,
reinforcing and perhaps also sociable, in that it demonstrates that interlocutors are like-minded. This is also why A continues
and finishes B's utterance. So, this sequence involves diffuse mediation, since, as seen in Kotthoff (1993), if it were a conflict
interaction, disagreement would arise as the preferred acts therein.
Finding common ground is probably the strongest tool a mediator possesses in guiding people towards a successful
resolution of their dispute. In the next sequence (example 5), we will see how the mediator repeats questions and para-
phrases to make what is said by B more acceptable for C, and thus to contribute to the progression of the discussion.

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Example 5

In the first and second turns, B uses a negatively polarised question, which is formulated towards a preference for
agreement, and she uses her epistemic status to display her knowledge of driving while criticising her daughter's actions.
Heritage and Raymond (2021) argue that those who use polar questions cannot avoid taking a stance regarding the likelihood
of the state of affairs in their questions being true, so here B expects an aligned response from A, one that is in agreement with
her and is affiliative in nature.
Accordingly, A shows his alignment and emotional agreement with B when repeating the syntactic structure “when you
can”, doing this so that B can infer that he is providing support for her (Brown and Levinson, 1987). In this regard, Giles et al.
(1991) argue that alignment is influenced by strategic communication processes that are related to the ongoing discourse.
During a conversation, individuals tend to adjust to each other across a wide range of behaviours.
Finally, A seeks to facilitate and regulate the discussion and asks a final question in which he displays a Kþ epistemic stance
as a means of showing solidarity with B. Indeed, the question is phrased in such a way that it implies the preference for an
answer that reflects B's ideas: “and if someone comes from the left/what do you do?/they can come from the left on that
alley”. It is also evident that in diffuse mediation the third party, acting as mediator, is not neutral; neither should this be
expected, since the knowledge shared between the speakers is greater than is typically the case in institutional, formal
mediation.
In the following sequence (example 6), B explains to A why C has ignored B's instruction, while A asks questions in search
of information about what happened, and C tries to justify herself.

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Example 6

B and C show a Kþ epistemic stance, in that both have experienced the event at first hand and thus have primary rights to
the knowledge. In this regard, B uses questions to challenge or confront C's position, showing a strong epistemic stance.14
Then, echoing Goffman's (1979) concept of ‘footing’, C uses reported speech to act as an ‘animator’; that is, producing an
utterance in which she reflects her mother's position but without aligning her own position to it (since in the episode in
question C clearly did not follow her mother's instructions). From a Kþ stance, then, C uses reported speech, reproducing the
exact words that her mother has previously used in the argument to build common ground with A, so that he can better
understand the conflict.
From this Kþ position, the mediator A now contributes the turn, “why didn
t you turn↓ by the street- [on the road?]”.
Here, he is not requesting information but asserting an opinion. Indeed, in circumstances where a speaker is thought to be in a
Kþ position, negative interrogatives will typically be interpreted as assertive rather than questioning. However, as Heritage
(2012) claims, the interpretation of negative questions as either requesting or conveying information depends on the
epistemic status of the speaker with respect to the addressee. In this case, A has more knowledge than C about driving, and
has already heard how the events referred to occurred.

14
According to Koshik (2003) and Tanangkingsing (2022), in English, wh-rhetorical questions can also be used to form negative assertions with a strong
epistemic stance.

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A tries to de-escalate the conflict and to reduce the hostility following a FTA by uttering a humorous comment about the
‘examiner’. Of course, A uses humour because the degree of seriousness of the threat is not high, given the low social distance
and high degree of familiarity between the interlocutors. Thus, as the third party here, A exhibits rapport and solidarity, while
alleviating the tension of such an emotionally loaded encounter with a jocular remark.15 However, as Attardo (2019) has
pointed out, in some cases a negative criticism levelled at a person by means of a sarcastic comment may provoke negative
feelings in the person criticised yet positive feelings of camaraderie in a third person who aligns with the person using the
sarcasm.
On the other hand, the relationship between knowing something and having experienced it is deeply entrenched in
interactional practices associated with assessment and evaluation. When people report first-hand experiences of any great
intensity (involving, for example, pleasure, pain, joy or sorrow) they oblige others to join with them in their evaluation. This is
not only to affirm the nature of the experience and its meaning, but also to encourage (in others) a sense of affiliation with the
stance of the experiencer. Moments of empathic communication ate therefore created, as in example 7.

Example 7

When the parties are close friends or relatives with intimate knowledge of each another's lives and activities, and when
the matter to be addressed is emotionally loaded, the management of empathetic communication is very demanding, in that
the mediator seeks not to appear disengaged or over-involved (Heritages, 2011: 182). In the above sequence, we observe how
A uses a declarative question “and it startled you→” to request confirmation about B emotions, as she has primary epistemic
access here. In this respect, Bolden (2010) argues that assertions about the addressee's domain of knowledge articulate a
missing element in the interlocutor's preceding turn, so what A formulates can be inferred from B's prior turn.
Finally, in example 8, below, we can observe how the disputants often initiate de-escalation themselves, which is a
practice often found in diffuse mediation in everyday conversation as well as in institutionalised mediation. Here, C tries to
create common ground with B so that they can both agree on something.

15
It has been shown that speakers can resort to teasing and playful comments as a vehicle for mitigation (Drew, 2003; Norrick and Spitz, 2008; Linares,
2018).

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Example 8

In this sequence, C and B share the same epistemic status, in that they have both experienced the situation in question and
thus have primary access. However, C downgrades her epistemic stance and makes a concession by admitting that she has
driven badly, which B tries to mitigate with the quantifying adverb “tan” (that). Consequently, the turn “mom but I haven't
driven that bad→” can only be understood as a request for confirmation. Seeking agreement, from a K- epistemic stance,
could be considered a strategy of positive politeness, and here we can see how A seeks to build common ground with her
interlocutor.
However, B responds with an ironic comment, which shows a misalignment but also mitigates such a dispreferred
response, since verbal irony is a powerful rhetorical-pragmatic strategy to express a dissociative attitude and to imply a
certain degree of criticism without actually asserting it.16 C recognises and understands B's ironic comment, and then repeats
her idea in an effort to reach agreement and bring the conflict to an end.
Speaker A makes a parallel assessment here by focusing on a focal element of the discussion (that C does not have a driving
licence) and shows his opinions on this issue. According to Heritage (2013: 168), assessments of this kind support “a first
speaker's description but without attempting to enter directly into the experience that is reported”. So, we again see an
evident absence of neutrality of the third party in the diffuse mediation that takes place in this everyday conversation. A's
assessment here allows B to agree that it was not in fact a good idea to practice driving with her daughter in the city.
All in all, in the sequences from this second conversation we have seen how two participants in the conflict d mother and
daughter d conduct the argument with a considerable degree of reason, and the questions asked by the mediator (A)
contribute to the resolution. Our analysis has thus corroborated previous studies (Archer, 2005; Bousfield, 2007) in illus-
trating the multifunctionality of questioning, with some questions used to seek factual information from participants, and
others conveying information from the questioner to the other participants. In the analysis of this second conversation we
have seen how speaker A acts as facilitator of the communicative interaction of the parties in conflict, moving the conver-
sation forward towards its resolution. According to Van Eemeren et al. (1993:1), the change in the positions and attitudes of
parties can occur due to a mediator's interventions, which aim to establish common ground, as indeed we have been able to
see in these examples from Spanish conversations.

5. Conclusions

The conclusions to be drawn from the present analysis have potentially significant implications for mediation and conflict
resolution studies. We have seen how epistemic stance is a dynamic phenomenon, one which is constructed and which can be
negotiated in everyday human social practices; as such, it is observable in interaction. Both the mediator and the other parties
shift their displays of attitudes and knowledge dynamically during conversation. In terms of our specific hypotheses, first, we
have argued that epistemic status can be negotiated or deliberate misrepresented by the mediator, who deploys epistemic
stance to appear more or less knowledgeable that they really are. In short, our analysis has corroborated the initial
hypotheses.
The findings of this study highlight the decisive role of the epistemic status of participants in determining whether an
utterance is intended to convey information or to request it. So, depending on the epistemic stance (Kþ/K) involved,
questions can invite elaboration and expansion on an issue, or can ask for confirmation and, hence, lead to the closure of a

16
Bousfield (2007) shows that individuals can use preference organisation and conductivity pragmatically for impolite purposes.

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sequence. We have also observed that polar questions unavoidably assume either a positive or a negative stance toward the
likelihood of the state of affairs depicted in the question's main proposition being true. Finally, it has also been found that,
while conflict polarises the positions of parties and creates a situation of precarious rapport, mediation fosters constructive
initiatives to re-establish relationships between parties. However, participants that act as mediators in informal conversations
are hardly ever fully aware of their role, and this explains why a third party acting as a mediator in diffuse mediation is not
neutral; neither should this be expected, since the knowledge shared between the speakers is greater than is typically the
case in institutional mediation.
In sum, for mediation to be successful, each party needs to know what information the other parties have about the object
of the conflict, and indeed there needs to be mutual awareness of the extent of shared knowledge here. In addition to
knowledge about the context and about participants and the bonds between them, language use is crucial in mediation.
Whereas our findings are limited to the conversational culture of peninsular Spanish, future research might usefully consider
diffuse mediation in other languages and cultures.

Declaration of competing interest

The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have
appeared to influence the work reported in this paper.

Data availability

Data will be made available on request.

Acknowledgments

I need to acknowledge that this paper has been funded by the research projects InMedio (ICS2020/09) “Towards an
Interdisciplinary Theory of Mediation. New Scenarios and Tools for Studying Discourse Construction of Social Bonds” and
CoCoMInt (RED2022-134123-T) "Conflictive Communication and Mediation: Interaction, Relational Links, and Social
Cohesion".

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Esther Linares Bernabe
u is a full-time assistant professor at the Department of English and German Philology of the University of Valencia. Her main research
interests are in the field of pragmatics, sociolinguistics, and gender studies. In particular, she focuses on verbal humour, the discursive construction of
identity, mediation and dispute resolution in digital and everyday contexts.
Currently, she is a member of the GENDIGIT research group at the University of Valencia. Likewise, she is part of the GRIALE research group of the
Department of Spanish, General Linguistics and Theory of Literature of the University of Alicante. In fact, apart from being part of the project ICS2020/09,
InMedio:“Towards an interdisciplinary theory in mediation: new scenarios and tools for the study of the discursive construction of social ties" funded by the
ICS- UNAV, she is also researcher in the project PID2021-124673NA-I00, ESTANDAREV: "La Estandarizacio
n Lingüística Revisitada; Mediatizacio

n, Vernac-

n e Ideologías Lingüísticas en la Espan
ularizacio ~ a Contempor
anea", and collaborates in the research project: PID2019-104980GB-I00, HUMORACTION: “El
humor inter- accional en espan ~ ol. Ge

neros orales, escritos y tecnolo

gicos” [Interactional humour in Spanish.Oral, written and technological genres] (MICINN,
AEI) (2020e24). Previously, during the year 2020e2021, she was a research fellow at the University of Navarra. Likewise, during the years 2017 and 2019, she
was a pre-doctoral researcher for the research project PROMETEO 2016/052” Gender humor: observatory of the identity of women and men through humor”
at the University of Alicante.

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E. Linares-Bernab
eu Journal of Pragmatics 213 (2023) 49e66

With regard to research, she has published more than thirty papers and, among the most relevant works, it is worth highlighting the articles published in
high-impact journals, such as Signos, Humor, Sociocultural Pragmatics, Pragmalingüística, Verba or ELUA, as well as the three books published in prestigious
publishers: John Benjamins, Peter Lang & Iberoamericana Vervuert. Likewise, she has disseminated her research findings in more than 35 international
conferences in different venues like the Queens College of the City University of New York, Molloy College, University of Panam
a, Universit
a degli Studi di
Palermo, University of La Habana, University of Wolverhampton, University Ricardo Palma in Perú or the University of Tallin, among others. Finally, she had
undertaken several research visits to the Open University and to the Universita di Bologna.

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