Comparing Evidentialist and Fideist Views on Religious Belief

This essay examines two prominent views on the nature and meaning of religious belief - the
evidentialist or empiricist view represented by Kai Nielsen, and the Wittgensteinian fideist view
represented by D.Z. Phillips.

The evidentialist view, held by Nielsen, argues that religious beliefs are only meaningful if they are
empirically verifiable or falsifiable. The authors contend that this view fails to capture what religious
believers are actually doing when expressing their beliefs, which often involves an element of trust
and commitment that goes beyond just reporting empirical facts.

The fideist view, held by Phillips, sees religious beliefs as expressions of commitment to a "form of
life" rather than empirical claims. The authors argue this view loses sight of the extent to which
believers intend their beliefs to be about the world and real persons/events.

The authors propose an alternative "third way" that preserves insights from both perspectives. They
suggest religious beliefs have two dimensions of meaning:

1) A descriptive dimension that makes empirical claims, in principle falsifiable.

2) An "expressive" dimension involving trust/commitment that conditions how the descriptive

meaning is understood by believers.

This allows religious beliefs to maintain some connection to the empirical world and public criteria,
while also capturing the element of faith and personal commitment involved for believers. The
authors argue this two-dimensional account better reflects the complexity of religious practice and
belief.

In summary, the authors critique the reductionism of purely evidentialist and fideist accounts, and
propose a more nuanced view where religious beliefs involve both descriptive empirical claims and
an expressive commitment that gives those claims deeper significance for believers.