"Challenging Mearsheimer’s Conclusion: Economic Interdependence and the Liberal Order as

Foundations for China's Peaceful Rise”

Maj. Belghiti Mohamed Anouar

Theories of Great Powers in International Relations

Spring Elective AY24

April 17, 2024

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Debates about the future behavior of rising powers, particularly China, continue to

generate significant scholarly interest among international relations practitioners. In that regard,

John Mearsheimer's thesis postulates that China's rise will inevitably be unpeaceful and that

intense security competition with the United States is more likely to lead to war. 1 This

perspective challenges the foundational beliefs of those advocating for a globally integrated

order, who are proponents for peaceful engagement and cooperation among international actors.

This essay contests Mearsheimer's conclusions by presenting two robust arguments: the

dampening effect of complex economic interdependence in mitigating conflict and the unique

capacity of the American-led liberal order to foster China's peaceful ascent within the global

system.

The paper will begin by exploring the pivotal role of complex economic interdependence,

illustrating how the intertwined economies of China and the United States create mutual

vulnerabilities that challenge Mearsheimer’s realist paradigm, which foregrounds military power

and security competition. Then, it will explore how the American-led liberal order incentivizes

peaceful engagement and economic growth for rising powers like China before presenting

Robert Axelrod’s theory of iterated prisoner's dilemma as a pathway from competition to

cooperation within the liberal order.

The pivotal role of complex interdependence and the diminishing significance of military

power in shaping contemporary international relations contrast the perspective of Mearsheimer’s

realism on the potential for conflict between China and the United States. In its economic piece,

complex interdependence disincentives this pessimistic prediction of the offensive realist view of

the inevitability of conflict between two major economic partners, notably China and the United

States. Realists argue that states' behavior toward others results from traditional power politics.
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Conversely, ‘Complex Interdependence’ combines the latter with economic liberalism, offering a

broader picture that does not omit the possibility of military conflicts among great powers. 2 One

significant aspect of this interdependence is the economic ties between states. In that regard,

globalization of trade and investment has intertwined China's economy with that of the Western

world, especially the United States. In the last decade, China has consistently ranked among the

top 3 trade partners of the United States. In addition, the United States and China share around

25% and 18% of the world GDP, respectively.3 Accordingly, war between those two major

powers would lead to mutual economic setbacks as much as it would damage the world

economy. This interdependence and mutual vulnerability present a significant deterrent against

military conflicts. The Sino-American scenario differs markedly from the Cold War era, where

the U.S. and the USSR had minimal economic ties. The cost of a conflict today extends far

beyond the battlefield, creating a strong incentive for peace and cooperation. Suppose this cost-

benefit analysis has always governed states' behavior. In that case, economic interdependence

presents a more comprehensive approach that amplifies it on a scale far beyond Gilpin's

framework, which positions it as a mechanism for explaining states' expansion to drive

international political change.4

Moreover, Mearsheimer’s idea of China's unpeaceful rise is grounded in the realist

premise of relative gain, which drives security competition to be more acute.5 Neorealism also

subscribes to this idea and contends that international politics is naturally conflictual. It states

that positional competition is a zero-sum game in which a gain for China or The United States

ultimately results in a corresponding loss for the other and vice versa.6 However, unlike

traditional power politics, in ‘Complex Interdependence, ’ this may not be a zero-sum game.

Although competition will always occur, as we are witnessing today between China and the
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United States, the politics of economic and ecological interdependence involving competition is

more prone to extensive net benefits expected from cooperation due to an absolute gain for all. 7

In addition, the global supply chain and technological interdependencies complicate the notion of

a zero-sum game in great power politics. The global economy's interconnectedness means

conflicts can have widespread, detrimental impacts, encouraging states to seek stable relations to

safeguard their economic interests even if no tangible benefits are at stake.

On top of that, Mearsheimer emphasizes military power as the ultimate currency of

international relations, which underpins the continuous security competition among states, thus

increasing the odds of war.8 Therefore, he considers China's economic rise a means to an end:

increasing military might and dominating its neighbors.9 The liberal concept of complex

interdependence disagrees with that stance and argues that in today's globalized world, economic

ties and environmental concerns significantly eliminate hierarchy among issues and, more

importantly, attribute a minor role to military force.10 Reflection on the 1970s oil crisis or the end

of the gold standard consolidates the shift from military to economic power.11 These events

reshaped global power structures, suggesting that economic capabilities can rival, if not surpass,

military strength. Building on these observations, the neoliberal perspective advocates that

international cooperation and economic interdependence can significantly influence global

politics without even resorting to military power or escalating to an armed conflict. Along the

same line of thought, Ikenberry's analysis complements this view by highlighting how the liberal

international order incentivizes economic cooperation and provides extensive forms of

multilateral security arrangement, further mitigating the likelihood of great power conflicts. 12

In essence, the current liberal international order not only facilitates peaceful engagement

and economic growth for rising states but also acts as a deterrent for China to oppose it and
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offers pathways for possible cooperation with the United States. In contrast to the inevitability of

conflict with China, the current liberal international order is structured upon regulations, norms,

and open markets, thus providing opportunities for any rising state to peacefully engage and

pursue its economic and political objectives within this framework.13 The United States

succeeded in building an order around liberal values and international institutions that

demonstrated an unparalleled capacity to assimilate former adversaries into a cooperative

international system. The reintegration of Germany and Japan into the system is itself

remarkable. Two former enemies to the end flipped almost in a few years to partners in this

larger project to the point of becoming respectively the third and fourth largest economies in the

world.14 Also, it is worth mentioning how Germany and France found a way to stabilize their

relationship without going to war every 30 years and became the top two E.U. leaders within the

international liberal order. Consequently, China's integration into this system is more likely to

occur seamlessly. What predisposes China to this strategic engagement is its prior experience of

reaping the benefits of operating within that system, which fosters openness and creates

conditions that allow it to amass substantial economic dividends.15

Furthermore, in the realm of competition, China does not just face the United States, but

it faces a more profound and broader order rooted in capitalism. The current liberal order is not

an American-only order but a more extensive aggregation of democratic states.16 The dominance

of liberal democracies further strengthens the continuity of the system. This aggregation is more

incentivizing China to cooperate rather than try to go against the well-established liberal order. 17

Mearsheimer overlooks the role that liberal order plays in moderating state behavior. It strongly

mitigates the state of anarchy and provides some hierarchy with features that favor cooperation

through exchange and investment of multiple forms. This hierarchy manifests through
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institutions, international firms, and other stakeholders who aim to maintain openness and

stability.18 Simply put, it is an order “easy to join and hard to overturn,” as described by J.

Ikenberry,19 which implies that China would need to exert considerable effort and commitment to

challenge it, which the Chinese themselves consider might be in vain.

Unlike the idealism that Waltz critiques in his book, ‘The Twenty Year's Crisis,’20

international liberalism does not assume that rules-based order can erase the competitive nature

of international politics; instead, it seeks to manage it to reduce the likelihood of conflict and

enhance the potential for cooperation. Robert Axelrod’s work on prisoner’s dilemma iterations

provides a compelling foundation for understanding how cooperation can emerge even among

self-interested actors.21 According to Axelrod's findings, the anticipation of continued interaction

can lead actors to favor cooperation over defection.22 This model can be paralleled with US-

China relations, where multiple interactions over time will create opportunities for building trust

and cooperation despite the underlying competitive relationship between the two states. One can

argue that China has exploited the system's openness while continuing its unethical market and

monetary manipulation. Axelrod's framework helps identify those actions as a Tit-For-Tat

response that matches the US presence in China's backyard but also recognizes that in the long

run, the liberal order, emphasizing rules and norms, will eventually facilitate a robust path to

cooperation as a result of the multiple iterations that could occur between the two great powers.

In conclusion, Through the lens of complex economic interdependence and the adaptive

nature of the American-led liberal international order, we have presented a nuanced argument

that challenges John Mearsheimer’s thesis, which forecasts an inevitable conflict between China

and the United States. Economic interdependence creates a mutual vulnerability between China

and the United States, making the costs of conflict far too great compared to the benefits of peace
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and cooperation. It also marginalizes the role of military power in resolving issues among

modern states. Furthermore, the American-led liberal order, with its openness and set of rules

and norms, provides a conducive framework for China's integration into the global system, as

seen in the historical reintegration of powers like Germany and Japan. It also materializes as a

self-sustained order that China cannot overturn. Instead, it provides the ground to shift the US-

China dynamic from competition to cooperation in analogy to Robert Axelrod’s seminal work on

prisoner's dilemma iterations.

NOTES
1
John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. WW Norton & Company, (2001), 326.
2
Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence, 4. ed, Longman Classics in
Political Science (Glenview, IL: Pearson, 2012). 9
3
Accessed on https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/rankings/gdp_share/ and
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=US-CN
4
Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge University and Press, 1991), 9-10.
5
John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 35.
6
Schweller, Randall L., and William C. Wohlforth. "Power test: Evaluating realism in response to the
end of the Cold War." Security Studies 9, no. 3 (2000, 71.
7
Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence. 9
8
John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 42–45.
9
John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 361.
10
Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence, 21-22.
11
Ibid, 23.

G. John Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American
12

World Order, Princeton Studies in International History and Politics (Princeton (N.J.): Princeton
University Press, 2011).316-320.
13
Ibid, 344.
14
Accessed on https://www.worlddata.info/largest-economies.php
15
Ibid.
16
Ibid, 345.
17
Ibid, 339,347.
18
Ibid, 340.
19
Ibid, 322.
20
Carr, Edward Hallett. The Twenty Year's Crisis: 1919-1939, an Introduction to the Study of
International Relations, by Edward Hallett Carr. Macmillan, 1946, 11–21.
21
Robert M. Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation, Rev. ed (New York: Basic Books, 2006).
22
Ibid, 174.