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Bioethics ISSN 0269-9702 (print); 1467-8519 (online) doi:10.1111/bioe.12044

Volume 28 Number 9 2014 pp 447–455

DEBATES IN RESEARCH ETHICS

WHEN INTUITION IS NOT ENOUGH. WHY THE PRINCIPLE OF

PROCREATIVE BENEFICENCE MUST WORK MUCH HARDER TO JUSTIFY
ITS EUGENIC VISION

REBECCA BENNETT

Keywords
Principle of Procreative ABSTRACT
Beneficence, The Principle of Procreative Beneficence (PPB) claims that we have a
non-identity problem, moral obligation, where choice is possible, to choose to create the best
eugenics, child we can. The existence of this moral obligation has been proposed by
Harris, John Harris and Julian Savulescu and has proved controversial on many
Savulescu, levels, not least that it is eugenics, asking us to produce the best children
Parfit, we can, not for the sake of that child’s welfare, but in order to make a better
intuition society. These are strong claims that require robust justification that can be
open to scrutiny and debate.
This article argues that robust justifications are currently lacking in the
work of Savulescu and Harris. The justifications provided for their conclu-
sions about this obligation to have the best child possible rely heavily on
Derek Parfit’s Non-Identity Problem and the intuitive response this provokes
in many of us. Unfortunately Harris and Savulescu do not embrace the
entirety of the Non-Identity Problem and the puzzle that it presents. The
Non-Identity Problem actually provides a refutation of PPB. In order to
establish PPB as a credible and defendable principle, Harris and Savulescu
need to find what has eluded Parfit and many others: a solution to the
Non-Identity Problem and thus an overturning of the refutation it provides for
PPB. While Harris and Savulescu do hint at possible but highly problematic
solutions to the Non-Identity Problem, these are not developed or defended.
As a result their controversial is left supported by little more than intuition.

INTRODUCTION ments or undesirable traits as possible. To choose other-

The Principle of Procreative Beneficence (PPB) claims
that we have a moral obligation, where choice is possible,
to choose to create the best child we can. On this view if
we are faced with a choice regarding, for instance, which
in vitro fertilization (IVF) embryos we should implant,
we are morally obliged, always to choose those embryos
that are likely to have the best quality of life and this
assumes choosing the embryos with the fewest impair-
wise would be morally wrong.
Parfit was one of the first to discuss such a possible
obligation as part of his analysis of what he called the
Non-Identity Problem.1 Harris brought these arguments
into the bioethical and applied ethics arena2 and in 2001
1
D. Parfit. 1987. Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Claredon Press.
2
J. Harris. 1985. The Value of Life: An Introduction to Medical Ethics.
London: Routledge & Kegan Paul: 146–149.

Address for correspondence: Dr. Rebecca Bennett, University of Manchester – Centre for Social Ethics and Policy, School of Law, Williamson
Building, Oxford Road, Manchester M13 9PL, UK. T 01612752489. Email: Rebecca.Bennett@manchester.ac.uk
Conflict of interest statement: No conflicts declared

© 2013 John Wiley & Sons Ltd


448 Rebecca Bennett
Savulescu suggested the label ‘the Principle of Procreative
Beneficence’3 (PPB) for this claim. Both Harris and Savu-
lescu have consistently argued strongly for such a moral
obligation.
This claim that there is a moral obligation to choose to
produce only the best children possible has been highly
controversial and attracted a great deal of debate and
criticism. On a practical level determining what we mean
by the ‘best’ child is highly problematic and highly sub-
jective.4 Further, it has been argued that PPB necessarily
puts a lower value on those with disability and encour-
ages infringing reproductive autonomy.5 This article,
however, discusses what is perhaps PPB’s and the argu-
ments by Harris and Savulescu’s most serious weakness,
their failure to provide a definite account of the theoreti-
cal foundations for their positions.
In posing the puzzle of the Non-Identity Problem,
Parfit clearly showed that while he was very drawn to a
notion of a moral obligation to produce the best lives
possible, he was unable to find a defendable argument
that enabled him to propose this obligation with any
philosophical credibility. The Non-Identity Problem
appears to show that such an obligation to produce only
the best lives cannot be justified. If we wish to reject this
conclusion we can only do so with any creditability by
finding a problem with the structure of this argument and
developing an argument, Parfit calls it ‘Theory X’,6 that
solves the Non-Identity Problem convincingly, that is,
that allows us to legitimately reject the conclusion either
by showing a problem with the existing premises or by
adding a defendable premise that has this result. Despite
his efforts Parfit was unable to identify Theory X and,
particularly in areas of population ethics, the search for
Theory X continues to be a very fertile but ultimately
inconclusive area of inquiry.7
Both Harris and Savulescu use Parfitian Non-Identity
Problem examples as their main instrument to justify
their positions, an approach only acceptable if a Theory
3
Julian Savulescu. Procreative Beneficence: Why We Should Select the
Best Children. Bioethics 2001; 15: 413–426.
4
R. Bennett & J. Harris. 2002. Are There Lives Not Worth Living?
When is it Morally Wrong to Reproduce? In Ethical Issues in Maternal-
Fetal Medicine. D. Dickenson, ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press: 321–334; R. Bennett. In press 2013. There Can Be No Moral
Obligation to Eradicate All Disability. In From Reason to Practice in
Bioethics: An Anthology Dedicated to the Works of John Harris.
J. Coggon, S. Chan, S. Holm and T. Kushner, eds. Manchester, Man-
chester University Press; P. Herissone-Kelly, Procreative Beneficence
and the Prospective Parent. J Med Ethics 2006; 32: 166–169; M. Parker.
The Best Possible Child. J Med Ethics 2007; 33: 279–283.
5
R. Bennett. The Fallacy of the Principle of Procreative Beneficence.
Bioethics 2009; 23: 265–273; Bennett & Harris. op. cit. note 4, pp.
321–334; Bennett, op. cit. note 4.
6
Parfit, op. cit. note 1, p. 366.
7
See for example M.A. Roberts & D.T. Wasserman. Harming Future
Persons: Ethics, Genetics and the Nonidentity Problem. Dordrecht:
Springer.
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X is proposed.8 This article examines their work more
closely to try to identify the possible solutions they put
forward to the Non-Identity problem, their Theory X,
that aims to refute the Non-Identity problem allowing
them to use the Non-Identity Problem in this way. I argue
that while there are hints at a number of possible solu-
tions to the problem in their work these are not developed
into a robust or defended argument that will overturn the
refutation of their views that the Non-Identity Problem
represents. Thus, I argue that neither Harris or Savulescu
have done the work needed to provide a theoretical jus-
tification for their eugenic vision. Not only does this deny
others the opportunity to engage with and scrutinize the
basis of these controversial claims, but also, without this
work, far from providing the theoretical foundations of
PPB, the Non-Identity Problem provides a clear refuta-
tion of PPB. If Harris and Savulescu wish to continue to
claim the existence of a moral obligation to produce the
best child possible then this work must be done and a
robust and defended solution to the Non-Identity
Problem must be proposed. Without this Harris and
Savulescu’s controversial eugenic views are left supported
by little more than intuition and proposing eugenics
based on intuitions alone would seem dangerous and
unjustifiable.
THE NON-IDENTITY PROBLEM
Parfit introduces the Non-Identity Problem by asking us
to consider examples like his ‘Risky Policy’ example. The
Risky Policy example asks us to suppose that we must
choose between two energy policies. Both of these poli-
cies would be safe for at least three centuries, but one
would entail a small risk of radioactive contamination in
the further future but would increase the quality of life.
We choose this Risky Policy. Centuries later an earth-
quake releases radiation. This causes thousands of people
to develop an incurable disease that will cause their death
around the age of 40.9
We instinctively feel that choosing the Risky Policy is
wrong. Parfit argues that the wrongness of choosing the
Risky Policy cannot be explained in terms of person-
affecting consequences as even small changes in a society
will affect the identities of who is born. Parfit bases this
claim on what Kavka called the ‘precariousness of my
8
See for example J. Savulescu. Procreative Beneficence: Why We
Should Select the Best Children. Bioethics 2001; 15: 413–426; J. Harris.
One Principle and Three Fallacies of Disability Studies. J Med Ethics
2001; 27: 383–387; J. Savulescu & G. Kahane. The Moral Obligation to
Create Children with the Best Chance of the Best Life. Bioethics 2009;
23: 274–290; J. Harris. Sparrows, Hedgehogs and Castrati: Reflections
on Gender and Enhancement. J Med Ethics 2011; 37: 262–266.
9
Parfit. op. cit. note 1, pp. 371–372.
© 2013 John Wiley & Sons Ltd

When Intuition Is Not Enough
origin’10 and what he calls the Time-Dependence Claim,11
which is the notion that the chances of any particular
individual being born is spectacularly unlikely, given the
infinite number of variables that had to be in place for
this to happen. In order for any particular individual to
exist, that individual’s parents have to have been created
in the first place, they have to meet at the right time and
conceive us at a particular time to enable that particular
sperm to fuse with that particular egg. Thus, it is clear
that all sorts of things, any change in society, will effect
who is born. As Parfit points out, a woman who wonders
who she would have been if her ‘parents married other
people’ ignores the answer which is ‘no one’.12
If Parfit is convincing, then those who suffer the results
of the Risky Policy (premature death caused by radia-
tion) have not been harmed by this policy as it was this
policy that provided the conditions (a change in the
quality of life enjoyed) that allowed for their existence.
These affected people were born in the only state they
could have been born in, with worthwhile if foreshort-
ened lives. Thus, if morality is restricted to what is
person-affecting, this leads to the conclusion that,
morally, it does not matter which of these energy policies
we choose as no-one is harmed as a result.
Parfit provides further examples to illustrate this puzzle
where he considers individual decisions around reproduc-
tion rather than policy decisions. Here he asks us to
consider the actions of a woman who chooses to conceive
a child at a particular time knowing that this will result in
that child having an impairment that could have been
avoided if conception had been deferred to another time.
The impairment is not such that it is likely to render the
life unworthwhile (dominated by suffering) but will cause
this life to go worse than another alternative life could
go.13 In such cases no child’s welfare is damaged – the
impaired individual would be born in the only state he
could be born in and with what is as likely as anyone
else’s to be a worthwhile life. But while this act is not ‘bad
for’ the child created there may be a strong feeling that a
woman making this decision to choose to have a impaired
child has behaved immorally even though no individual
child is made worse off by her decision.
This is the Non-Identity Problem. We appear to have
shown that no-one is harmed by the Risky Policy or by
choosing to conceive an impaired but worthwhile life. As
such it appears that as these acts are not bad for any
individual, these are not bad acts. This is seems to be a
valid argument. But what makes this the Non-Identity
Problem and not the Non-Identity Argument is the
general feeling of unease, shared by Parfit, that examples
10
G.S. Kavka. The Paradox of Future Individuals. Philos Public Aff
1981; 11: 93–112: 93.
11
Parfit. op. cit. note 1, p. 351.
12
Ibid.
13
Ibid: 358–361.
© 2013 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
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449
like the Risky Policy and choices to conceive impaired
rather than unimpaired lives produce in us. For many
these examples show the conclusion to this seemingly
valid argument as hugely counter intuitive. Parfit intro-
duced the puzzle of the Non-Identity Problem to attempt
identify a reason, Theory X, to explain our intuitions
about allowing impaired rather than unimpaired lives to
be created and try and find a reason to reject the conclu-
sion to the Problem a task at which he was not successful.
So, faced with this puzzle, we have two philosophically
credible choices: We can ‘bite the bullet’ and accept the
conclusion and thus the Non-Identity Problem becomes
the Non-Identity Argument. If we do this we have to
accept these are not bad acts even if this doesn’t feel right
and we have no moral reasons to suggest these acts
should be avoided. If however we wish to reject this con-
clusion we can only do so by finding what eluded Parfit,
a problem with the structure of this argument and devel-
oping a Theory X that solves the Non-Identity Problem
convincingly, that is, that allows us to legitimately reject
the conclusion.
Interestingly what Harris and Savulescu do is neither
of these two credible options. We will consider their
approach now.
THE NON-IDENTITY PROBLEM AND
THE PRINCIPLE OF PROCREATIVE
BENEFICENCE
What Savulescu and Harris do is use a version of the
Problem where the conclusion is replaced with a com-
pletely contradictory one, which does not follow from the
premises. They do this without giving an explicit or
defended argument to establish a Theory X which would
find fault with the structure of the Non-Identity Problem
and allow them legitimately to make this bold move.
As I will show, both Savulescu14 and Harris15 rely
heavily on the Parfitian Non-Identity Problem examples
to justify their views about this moral obligation to
produce the best children possible. They consider exam-
ples like the Risky Policy example or examples of delay-
ing pregnancy to avoid producing an impaired child and
conclude that these examples and the intuitive responses
we have to them alone convince us that decisions to create
impaired lives rather than unimpaired ones are wrong. As
we have seen Parfit shared these intuitions but resisted
bowing to intuition in the absence of defendable reasons
to justify this position. Unable to find a convincing
account of the badness of acts such as the Risky Policy,
14
See for example Savulescu, op. cit. note 8, pp. 413–426; Savulescu &
Kahane, op. cit. note 8, pp. 274–290.
15
See for example Harris 2001, op. cit. note 8, pp. 383–387; Harris 2011,
op. cit. note 8, pp. 262–266.

450 Rebecca Bennett
aside from our intuitive feelings, Parfit reluctantly accepts
that he cannot convincingly show that such acts are in
fact bad. However, this does not seem to trouble Savu-
lescu and Harris. They reject the seemingly valid but
counter intuitive conclusion, that although these acts feel
bad they are not bad without justifying this rejection of
logic.
APPEAL TO INTUITION
What Harris and Savulescu do offer to support their
arguments is an appeal to what we already are very aware
of with the Non-Identity Problem, what makes the Non-
Identity Problem such an interesting and baffling conun-
drum: that the conclusion of the Non-Identity Problem is
very counter-intuitive. Harris and Savulescu follow Par-
fit’s lead and use examples where a choice can be made
between bringing to birth impaired or compromised
human lives and lives that we assume do not have these
foreseeable compromises. Unlike Parfit, Harris and Savu-
lescu’s examples are used to show that because we feel
that a choice is wrong it therefore must be actually wrong
to make these choices.
For instance, in his influential 2001 article, Savulescu
uses what he calls the ‘Parfitian defence of voluntary
procreative beneficence’.16 He introduces a Parfit-inspired
example of the woman deciding to delay conception until
after her rubella infection in order to attempt to avoid
having a child affected adversely by this infection and
concludes simply ‘She should choose to wait until her
rubella is passed17’. He then presents a version of Parfit’s
Risky Policy example which he calls the Nuclear Accident
and concludes:
If we object to the Nuclear Accident (which most
of us would), then we must appeal to some form of
harmless wrong-doing. That is, we must claim that a
wrong was done, but no-one was harmed. We must
appeal to something like the Principle of Procreative
Beneficence.18
Here Savuescu is articulating exactly what Parfit did
about these kind of examples. He is recognizing, as Parfit
did, the strong intuitive response many of us have that
allowing the choice of the Risky Policy or choosing to
conceive an impaired child is wrong. He is also recogniz-
ing, like Parfit, that if these choices are wrong it cannot be
to do with person-affecting harm as no individual’s
welfare is damaged by these choices as these individuals
have the only life they could have had (as Parfit said
‘Theory X will not take a person-affecting form’19). But as
16
Savulescu, op. cit. note 8, pp. 413–426: 417.
17
Ibid.
18
Ibid: 418.
19
Parfit. op. cit. note 1, p. 378.
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we have seen, this is only part of the story here. It is a
massive and completely unsupported jump from recog-
nizing these elements of the Non-Identity Puzzle to reject-
ing its conclusion on the basis of intuition rather than
reason. Here Savulescu appears to unaware of the puzzle
the Non-Identity Problem poses and the well established
need for a Theory X, using Parfit’s work simply to show
that we intuitively need to accept PPB.
In a similar vein both Savulescu and Harris use exam-
ples asking us to consider choices between IVF embryos.
In Savulescu’s example one embryo has no abnormalities
but the other shows a predisposition to asthma.20 In Har-
ris’s example we have a choice of six IVF embryos three
of which are shown to have ‘various genetic disorders and
three seem healthy’.21 The question posed is, which
should be implanted?
Harris and Savulesu attempt to claim that choosing the
unimpaired embryo is the rational choice and thus the
right choice. Harris argues that we have a ‘rational pref-
erence’22 to choose to bring to birth the best child possible
and Savulescu argues that the unimpaired embryo
‘should (on pain of irrationality) be implanted’.23 This is
the main argument used in favour of their position, that
when we are faced with examples we feel that we have
good reasons to make this choice and favour the unim-
paired. As Harris says a prospective mother ‘has reason
to do what she can to ensure that the individual she
chooses is as good an individual as she can make it [. . .]
and that will have the best possible chance of a long and
healthy life and the best possible chance of contributing
positively to the world it will inhabit.’24 But without an
explanation of why it is important to choose the best child
amongst lives of positive value, rather than simply to do
the best for the children we have, it is not clear why this is
the rational choice. On one side we have what appears to
be a valid argument, the Non-Identity Problem, that
shows that choosing worthwhile but impaired lives harms
no-one and is thus not less preferable. Against this it
seems we only have our feelings of unease. While intui-
tions and uneasy feelings might be useful in indicating
areas that need further ethical investigation it is not
enough to rely on such feelings to supply our conclusions
here, particularly where there is a strong argument that
has not been refuted and indicates the opposite conclu-
sion. This is not to say that reasons could not be provided
for the conclusion reached by Savulescu and Harris
but that these reasons are not provided. But without a
refutation of the Non-Identity Problem, the examples
put forward by Savulescu and Harris do not show that
20
Ibid: 416.
21
Harris, 2001 op. cit. note 8, pp. 383–387: 385.
22
Ibid: 383–387: 386 citing J. Harris. 1992 Wonderwoman and Super-
man. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 72–73.
23
Savulescu, op. cit. note 8, p. 416.
24
Harris, op.cit. note 8, p. 385.
© 2013 John Wiley & Sons Ltd

When Intuition Is Not Enough
choosing the non-impaired life is rational and thus pref-
erable, these examples merely show that we have a gut
feeling, an intuition, an emotional response to these
examples that may indicate a problem with the Non-
Identity Problem or may simply be a ‘yuk’ reaction that
when examined does not indicate something morally
problematic.
POSSIBLE PROBLEMS WITH THE
NON-IDENTITY PROBLEM
So simply saying that such choices are rational because
they fit with our intuitions and ignoring the problems
with this so eloquently set out by Parfit doesn’t provide a
credible foundation for an obligation to choose the best
child possible. So what could Harris and Savulescu do in
order to provide a theoretical foundation to their views?
Many people have tried to solve the puzzle of the Non-
Identity Problem and come up with the Theory X that
shows it not to be a valid argument and that would allow
us to reject its conclusion in a credible way. Numerous
solutions have been proposed but all have their short-
comings. The question that has to be asked here in order
to try and find this Theory X is ‘what could be wrong with
this argument that would allow us to reject the conclu-
sion?’. There are a number of options open to us that
have been explored with this aim:
1) We can reject the notion that only it is only person-
affecting concerns that are morally important.25
2) We can reject the claim that bringing to birth
someone can only be considered to be bad for that
person if he or she has what might be termed an
‘unworthwhile’ life (a life dominated by suffering).
Either because
a) all human life is a harm and reproduction is
wrong26
b) impaired individuals are harmed27
c) impaired individuals are wronged.28
25
See for example Parfit. op. cit. note 1; A. Buchanan, N. Daniels & D.
Wikler. 2000. From Chance to Choice: Genetics and Justice. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press; D. DeGrazia. 2005. Human identity and
Bioethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; J. McMahan. 2009.
Asymmetries in the Morality of Causing People to Exist. In Harming
Future Persons: Ethics, Genetics and the Nonidentity Problem.
M.A. Roberts & D.T. Wasserman, eds. Dordrecht: Springer. 49–68.
26
D. Benatar. 2006. Better Never to Have Been: The Harm of Coming
into Existence. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
27
See for example C. Wolf. 2009. Do Future Persons Presently Have
Alternative Possible Identities? In Harming Future Persons: Ethics,
Genetics and the Nonidentity Problem. M.A. Roberts & D.T. Wasser-
man, eds. Dordrecht: Springer: 93–114; B. Steinbock. 2009. Wrongful
Life and Procreative Decisions. In Harming Future Persons: Ethics,
Genetics and the Nonidentity Problem. M.A. Roberts & D.T. Wasser-
man. Dordrecht: Springer: 155–178.
28
See for example Steinbock, op. cit. note 27, pp. 155–178; J. Wood-
ward. 1986. The Non-Identity Problem. Ethics 96: 804–831.
© 2013 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
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451
3) We can claim that the motivation of the agent makes
these acts wrong.29
4) We can accept that the child is not harmed but claim
that others are harmed by bringing this child to birth
– the parents, other siblings, society.
WHAT WOULD HARRIS/
SAVULESCU DO?
As we saw earlier the main way that Harris and Savulescu
defend their view is using examples that appeal to the
intuitive response we often have to such cases. They do,
however, hint at least two of the approaches listed above
but, even with very sympathetic reading of these hints a
lot more work needs to be done.
Impersonal Harm as a solution to the
Non-Identity Problem
While Parfit has been unable to identify his Theory X that
accounts for the badness of acts such as the Risky Policy
he does argue that ‘We can predict that Theory X will not
take a person-affecting form’.30 For Parfit, at least, it
seems clear that no individual’s welfare is damaged by the
choice to bring to birth impaired but worthwhile lives and
thus that Theory X will not be a theory that involves
badness that affects persons or individuals. Harris and
Savulescu also offer a few hints that the wrongness of or
badness of the Risky Policy and similar examples might
be explained by some kind of non-person affecting or
impersonal harm.
As such they are rejecting the notion that it is only
person-affecting concerns that are morally important.
Parfit, Harris, Savulescu and many of us share the intui-
tion that those choosing the Risky Policy or to implant
impaired embryos over non-impaired embryos do some-
thing wrong. In the absence of any identifiable harm to
the welfare of the person created, Parfit has tried to
explain the wrongness of such acts using a notion of
impersonal harm and benefit. He suggested the ‘Imper-
sonal Total Principle’31 to try and explain what is wrong
with these acts that don’t seem to be bad for any
individual.
The Impersonal Total Principle says that ‘If other
things are equal, the best outcome is the one in which
there would be the greatest quantity of whatever makes
life worth living.’32 This principle attempts to rationalize
the intuition we have about these seemingly bad acts by
29
B. Steinbock & R. McClamrock. When Is Birth Unfair to the Child?
Hastings Cent Rep 1994; 24: 15–21.
30
Parfit. op. cit. note 1, p. 378.
31
Ibid.
32
Ibid.

452 Rebecca Bennett
claiming that it is not only person-affecting concerns that
are morally important. Thus while no-one’s welfare is
changed or improved by a choice to bring to birth an
impaired but worthwhile life, the Impersonal Total of
‘whatever makes life worth living’ is diminished by this
choice. No individual is made worse off or indeed given
anything to complain about in that they will have a
worthwhile life but the world is a slightly worse place
than it could have been in terms of cumulative totals of
happiness or flourishing or whatever we think produces a
good quality of life. If happier, more successful people
with higher qualities of life were born (and this argument
assumes that impairments will diminish the quality of a
life) then the cumulative impersonal total of ‘whatever
makes life worth living’ will be higher in this society than
one that allows those with impairments and/or those with
lower quality of life to be born.
Thus Parfit begins to argue that this notion of imper-
sonal harm and benefit might be the solution to the Non-
Identity Problem, that is, that these acts are bad because
although they are not bad for any individuals they are
bad for total cumulative sums of life quality.
Both Harris and Savulescu allude to this notion of
impersonal harm in their work albeit in a superficial and
fleeting way. Harris talks about ‘the wrong of bringing
avoidable suffering into the world’33 and that by bringing
to birth impaired or disabled individuals rather than
unaffected individuals we are choosing to make the world
a worse place than it could have been even though that
individual has not been wronged.34 Similarly Savulescu
has said that ‘we must appeal to some form of harmless
wrong-doing’35 and in a much more recent article Savu-
lescu and Kahane say that PPB is:
compatible with different accounts of reasons to select
future children. It can take either a wide-person affect-
ing form or an impersonal form. According to the wide
person-affecting version, our reason to select the child
with better prospects is that that child will benefit more
than the other would by being caused to exist. Accord-
ing to the impersonal view, our reason is that selecting
the most advantaged child would make the outcome
better, even if it is not better for the child created. It is
possible to support PB on either view.36
At first glance Savulescu and Kahane seem to have two
different theoretical grounds as a foundation for PPB:
impersonal considerations and wide-person affecting
consideration. However, it is difficult to see wide-person
affecting considerations as any more than another way of
referring to impersonal considerations. Here Savulesu
33
J. Harris. 1998. Clones, Genes and Immortality: Ethics and the Genetic
Revolution. Oxford. Oxford University Press: 111.
34
Bennett & Harris, op. cit. note 4, p. 324.
35
Savulescu, op. cit. note 8, p. 418.
36
Savulescu & Kahane, op. cit. note 8, p. 277.
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and Kahane say that ‘the child will benefit more than the
other would by being caused to exist’.37 But this is not a
person-affecting claim. No person is better off or benefit-
ted by this choice between these two individuals. So if
there is any benefit here it must be in the sense that Parfit
and Harris talk about of free-floating benefit in the
‘making the world a better place’ impersonal sense. So it
seems that the grounds offered by Savulescu and Kahane
are essentially impersonal.
We can’t do more than assume this as Savulescu and
Kahane refuse to be tempted into providing any further
explanation of a theoretical foundation to PPB. They say:
We do not take a stand on this difficult philosophical
issue [of what theoretical foundation or argument
might support PPB]. As we have tried to show, our
moral intuitions about timing of conception recognize
reasons to select future children. PB is an account of
the content of these reasons, not an explanation of
what might ground them.38
So whilst they suggest that it could be supported by
impersonal consideration and wide-person affecting con-
sideration (which ultimately reduce to impersonal consid-
erations), this need for a sound theoretical basis for the
Principle is seen as secondary to the strong intuitive
response examples such as the Risky Policy invoke. Thus,
the appeal to our ‘moral intuitions’ or the fact that PPB is
‘implicit in commonsense morality’39 is used here rather
than any exploration of the notion of impersonal harm.
THE PROBLEMS WITH APPEALS TO
IMPERSONAL HARM
It is understandable why Savulescu does not wish to ‘take
a stand on this difficult philosophical issue’40 and explore
impersonal harm any further than he does. This notion of
‘free-floating’ impersonal harm is a very difficult concept
to take seriously for many reasons.
Firstly, the very intuitions that attract us to this possi-
ble explanation also repel us from this explanation. Intui-
tively we find it difficult to understand how something
can be wrong when it doesn’t affect the welfare of indi-
viduals. Do we really care about benefit or harm that
doesn’t benefit or harm anyone?
On a more theoretical level the notion of impersonal
harm is complex and fraught with many difficulties.
While Parfit begins to argue that impersonal harm may
be the solution to the Non-Identity Problem and is
consistent in maintaining that Theory X will not be
37
Ibid.
38
Ibid.
39
Ibid.
40
Ibid.
© 2013 John Wiley & Sons Ltd

When Intuition Is Not Enough
person-affecting, he quickly shows that the concept of
impersonal harm is impossible to sustain convincingly.
Whilst he is hopeful that others will have the success that
has eluded him there has not, as yet, been a convincing
solution to the fatal problem with impersonal harm Parfit
calls the ‘Repugnant Conclusion’.
THE REPUGNANT CONCLUSION
If what matters is to increase the cumulative totals of
happiness or whatever makes life good in any given
society, this leads to some rather unpalatable conclu-
sions. Firstly, it creates a moral obligation to create as
many worthwhile lives as possible as doing so will
increase these totals very effectively. But the notion of
having a moral obligation to reproduce is hugely counter
intuitive. Do we really do good by being obliged to bring
as many worthwhile lives into the world as possible? Isn’t
it likely that bringing these large numbers of lives into
being will eventually decrease the average quality of life
dramatically due to overcrowding and scarcity of
resources? As Parfit puts it ‘For any possible population
of at least ten billion people, all with a very high quality
of life, there must be some much larger imaginable popu-
lation whose existence, if other things are equal, would be
better, even though its members have lives that are barely
worth living’.41 Can a huge population of people with a
low but worthwhile quality of life really be morally pref-
erable to a world with a smaller population where people
will have a substantially higher quality of life? Cumula-
tive totals in the huge population will be higher but does
this make this world morally preferable?
This is what Parfit calls the Repugnant Conclusion and
what makes this conclusion repugnant is that it cares little
about what we normally regard as morally important: the
welfare of individual people. The consequence of holding
onto the notion of impersonal harm (and benefit) is that
in doing so you are then committed to the view that any
decrease in the quality of lives in a population can be
compensated for by an increase in the number of lives
brought to birth in this population.
Faced with the difficult and highly counter-intuitive
conclusions to which notions of impersonal harm lead,
Parfit is unable to give reasons why we should reject the
conclusion to the Non-Identity Problem and risks taking
a stance similar to that of Harris and Savulescu. Parfit
argues that ‘It may then be better that we conceal the
Non-Identity Problem from those who will decide
whether we increase our use of nuclear energy. It may be
better if these people believe falsely that such a policy
may, by causing a catastrophe, be greatly against the
interests of some of those who will live in the distant
41
Parfit. op. cit. note 1, p. 388.
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453
future.’42 Parfit feels strongly that the conclusion to the
Non-Identity Problem is wrong but is unable to produce
a convincing account of why this is so and thus is tempted
to throw reason aside to allow others to reach what he
feels are ‘the right conclusions’.43 This is exactly what
Harris and Savulescu do. They work to conceal the Non-
Identity Problem by creating a ‘Principle’ that plays to
our strong intuitions but has not been defended by
reason.
But Harris and Savulescu have to accept, as Parfit
ultimately does, that if they wish to maintain their con-
clusions here convincingly they cannot do so by con-
cealing the problems with their position. If they wish to
appeal to impersonal harm to solve these problems then
they must do more than simply hint at this solution.
They must provide a convincing account of impersonal
harm that avoids the unpalatable conclusions identified
by Parfit. There have, of course, been attempts to accept
the notion of impersonal harm without incurring the
Repugnant conclusion.44 But these attempts are highly
problematic often raising more problems than they
solve. Space does not allow me to go into these here,
but if Harris and Savulescu wish to use the notion of
impersonal harm as their justification for their argu-
ments in this area, this cannot be done by fleeting and
superficial hints at this problematic solution. If Harris
and Savulescu mean to justify their eugenic vision on
the existence of impersonal harm, then this approach
and the way that their approach deals with the problems
faced by impersonal harm, including the Repugn-
ant Conclusion, must be made explicit, opening it
up to scrutiny and debate. Something they do not
currently do.
We can reject the claim that bringing someone
to birth can only be considered to be bad for
that person if he or she has what might be
termed an ‘unworthwhile’ life
As well as arguing for impersonal harm, Harris argues
that bringing to birth an impaired or disabled child is
wrongful as it ‘causes a child to be born in a ‘harmed’
condition’.45 Harris accepts that the impaired child has
‘no complaint because for them the alternative was non-
42
Ibid: 373.
43
Ibid: 373.
44
See for example T. Hurka. Value and Population Size. Ethics 1983;
93: 496–507; G.S. Kavka. The Paradox of Future Individuals. Philos
Public Aff 1982; 11: 93–112; F. Feldman. 1997. Utilitarianism, Hedon-
ism, and Desert: Essays in Moral Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press; L.S. Temkin. Intransitivity and the Mere Addition
Paradox. Philos Public Aff 1987; 16: 138–187.
45
Bennett & Harris, op. cit. note 4, p. 325.

454
existence’46 but argues that whilst this child has not been
wronged he has been harmed unnecessarily. For Harris to
be born with any impairment that one could have a
rational preference to be born without is to be born in a
harmed state and parents who choose to bring to birth a
disabled child are responsible for harming that child and
causing that child to suffer from this harm.
Harris’s stance on harming challenges the notion of
harming as something comparative – that you don’t have
to be ‘worse off’ to be harmed (or better off to be ben-
efitted). He argues that bringing to birth an impaired
child or a child with a foreseeably compromised life
harms the child in a non-comparative way.
We are left in no doubt that Harris feels that those who
are born with an impairment have been harmed and
suffer from this harm. For instance Harris says ‘I do not
believe there is a difference between choosing a preim-
plantation deaf embryo and refusing a cure to a newborn.
Nor do I see an important difference between refusing a
cure and deliberately deafening a child’.47
There are, of course, those that argue impairments
such as deafness do not cause suffering in themselves but
that any suffering that arises from an impairment such as
deafness, only does so as a result of the attitudes of others
in society and the lack of provision made for those with
these conditions.48 Harris shows this stance to be implau-
sible when it is applied to person-affecting harm. He
argues that the deaf child is harmed by a decision to
withhold a cure and to deafen a child is to cause harm to
that child. It would be morally wrong to harm a child by
deafening that child or denying a deaf child a cure, as to
do so would be to harm that particular child by denying
them options they are likely to have valued. To deafen a
child or deny him an effective cure would be to harm that
individual, to make him ‘worse off ’, not because of soci-
ety’s imperfections but because this child had lost some-
thing of value he otherwise could have had.
However, problems occur when he takes his analogy
further and argues that not only do we harm an indi-
vidual by making that individual ‘worse off ’ than it could
have been (by deafening that individual or denying him
an available cure for deafness), but that we also harm
individuals by bringing them to birth in an impaired
state.
Harris argues that we have ‘a strong moral obligation
to prevent preventable harm and suffering and that this
obligation applies equally to curing disease and injury
and to preventing the avoidable creation of people who
46
J. Harris. Is There a Coherent Social Conception of Disability? J Med
Ethics 2000; 26: 95–100: 97.
47
Ibid.
48
S.M. Reindal. Disability, Gene Therapy and Eugenics – a Challenge
to John Harris. J Med Ethics 2000; 26: 89–94.
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Rebecca Bennett
will have disease or injury’.49 Now, it is clear that we have
a strong moral obligation to prevent preventable harm
and suffering to individuals, but what is not clear is that
bringing to birth an impaired life is to harm that indi-
vidual. We need to consider what is person-affecting
harm and what is impersonal harm here. Of course we
have an obligation to avoid harming individuals who will
exist. Thus any parent who deafens their child would be
doing a grave moral wrong as they are directly responsi-
ble for causing harm to this individual child. However, it
is not clear how a woman who brings to birth a deaf child
causes that particular child harm. If any harm is caused
by this choice then it is not harm to this individual child
as he is not deafened by his mothers’ actions but born in
the only state he can be born in.
Harris talks of ‘depriving it [the deaf child] of one of its
senses’.50 For the analogy to be sound, the ‘deaf’ embryo
would have to have the option or hearing or being deaf.
However the ‘deaf’ embryo does not have these options –
it can either exist deaf or not exist at all. This child is not
denied anything he could have had, in this case the ability
to hear, his interests and rights have not been frustrated
as they have when an individual child is deliberately deaf-
ened. It makes perfect sense to compare the life of an
individual child before and after he was deliberately deaf-
ened and say that he is now in a worse condition and has
been harmed. However, attempting to compare a child’s
life with or without an impairment, when to be without
an impairment is not an option, does not make any sense.
Thus, while it would be wrong to deny a deaf child the
possibility of hearing by denying him an effective cure, we
do not harm a child by bringing her to birth with an
impaired but worthwhile life, as that child has not been
denied anything by this action.
Isn’t this just impersonal harm expressed in another
way? We agree that the individual is not wronged by
being born with a worthwhile life. He is born impaired
but with a life he is likely to value and the only life it is
possible for him to have. If suffering is increased by his
birth but he is not wronged and his actual suffering is not
increased then it seems that this increased suffering must
be impersonal and thus prone to all the problems with
impersonal harm.
Even if we were to be generous and suppose that we are
wrong about this and that Harris could somehow con-
vince us of the idea that individuals are harmed by being
born with an impairment, this simply creates new prob-
lems for Harris. Harris assertion that we have ‘a strong
moral obligation to prevent preventable harm and suffer-
49
J. Harris. 1998. Rights and Reproductive Choice. In The Future of
Human Reproduction. J. Harris & S. Holm, eds. Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press: 31.
50
Harris, op. cit. note 46, p. 99.
© 2013 John Wiley & Sons Ltd

When Intuition Is Not Enough
ing’51 including the creation of new lives surely commits
Harris to the view that reproduction is always immoral,
for we are all subject to suffering through disease, injury,
limited opportunity and loss.
Harris’s notion of harmed but worthwhile lives seems
riddled with problems. It appears to reduce to impersonal
harm with all the problems that concept has or leads us to
considering the immorality of reproduction per se. What
Harris doesn’t do, even on the most sympathetic reading
of his work, is provide a strong argument that enables us
to legitimately reject the conclusion of the Non-Identity
Problem and thus provide convincing reasons to accept
PPB and similar arguments.
CONCLUSION
Harris and Savulescu’s argument that proposes a moral
obligation to produce the best children possible is a
strong and controversial claim. It is a claim that we have
an obligation to change the sort of people that will be
born, not because it will be better for any particular
person that these changes are made but that this will
create somehow superior society. The unsolved Non-
Identity Problem provides a seemingly valid argument
against this claim. As such we have strong reasons, pro-
vided by the Non-Identity Problem to reject PPB and
similar arguments. If Harris and Savulescu wish to hold
onto their arguments in this area with any philosophical
credibility, they must do a great deal more than tell us
what we already know, that many of us feel intuitively
that the conclusion to the Non-Identity Problem is
wrong. They must give reasons for this wrongness rather
than simply replace the conclusion of the Non-Identity
Problem simply because it just feels wrong. To justify a
strong eugenic vision on the basis of intuition alone is not
an acceptable stance. Harris himself explains this issue
well when talking about Kass’s attempts to use feelings
rather than moral philosophy to solve bioethical issues,
saying:
51
Ibid: 31.
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455
The problem that confronts Kass – and anyone who
wishes to cut to the chase of morality so to speak by
finding ways to decide or to act “immediately and
without argument” – is to have a way of knowing when
one’s sense of outrage, or ones “feelings” or whatever,
are evidence of something morally disturbing and
when they are simply an expression of bare prejudice or
simply an induced emotional response.52
Further Harris points out that morality and moral
principles must be backed up by reason
And this means they must always be prepared to offer
a reasoned defence and justification of their morality or
elements of it. It would never be enough or indeed even
respectable for the reply to be “I just felt like it”.53
If we are going to accept their claim about a moral
obligation to produce the best child possible then Harris
and Savulescu must provide a reasoned defence of this
claim in order to attempt to provide it with credible jus-
tification and to expose this justification so that it can be
open to scrutiny. What is not acceptable is that this
strong vision of future generations is left justified by little
more than an appeal to intuition and gut feeling. Harris
and Savulescu must take a clear and logically robust
stance on this difficult philosophical problem if they wish
to present their arguments with credibility. They must
work harder to reveal the flaw in the Non-Identity
Problem if they wish to substitute their own conclusion.
Eugenics based on intuition is indefensible.
Rebecca Bennett is Senior Lecturer in Bioethics at the Centre for Social
Ethics and Policy, in the School of Law, University of Manchester.
Rebecca has taught bioethics for twenty years and has published widely
on diverse issues in bioethics including antenatal HIV testing, assisted
reproductive technologies, genetic testing in pregnancy, arguments sur-
rounding attempts to eradicate disability, responsibility in pregnancy,
HIV/AIDS, cloning, stem cell research, ecotognesis, and brain dead
pregnancy.
52
J. Harris. What It Is to Be Good. Camb Q Healthc Ethics 2012; 21:
294.
53
Ibid: 296.