Nlog - Gs - Pub - Critical Well Review Uithuizermeeden-1 09-12-2001

NEDERLANDSE AARDOLIE MAATSCHAPPIJ BV WCT
UITHUIZERMEEDEN 2 - CRITICAL WELL REVIEW
ATTN.: BU Exploration
FROM: P. Church (Drilling Engineer); ITAG-23 WSDE’.
DATE: 09-12-2001
UITHUIZERMEEDEN 2 - CRITICAL WELL REVIEW 15-07-02

1. Management Summary
Well Details UHM-2

• Operations started 25/11/2001 @ 23:30hrs
• Released (abandoned) 18/06/2002 @ 20:00 hrs
Time Details Total Days

Level 3 502F 50/50 131
Planned (Original AFE) 102
Actual (normalised to 4818m) 135
Actual to 5423m 205
Cost Details (million euros) Total Expenditure

Level 3 502F 50/50 17.8
Planned (Original AFE) 16.81
Actual (normalised to 4818m) 20.4
Actual to 5423m 26.4
Execution Summary
• The well was drilled as per plan with every casing point made.
• Well TD was 450m more than the maximum planned depth.
HSE performance
• New rig start-up without a LTI.
• Crew member trapped & broke his hand when nippling down the 15K BOP. This was classified as a restricted
work case.
Highlights
+ HPHT well was planned & designed within 10 months.
+ A cold rig & new drilling contractor were started-up on a very challenging well without any major problems.
+ The well design worked, and a technically challenging well was drilled as per program.
+ The Groningen field was optimally protected & isolated.
+ Cost to 4818m was within the 15% accuarcy level of the Level 3 50/50 estimate.
+ Drilled to 5423m, approximately 450m deeper than the maximum predicted.
Lowlights
− Operations did not start at the planned date (15/11/2001).
− The performance was lower than expected, especially in the first two flat time sections.
− Language barriers hampered swift communications with drilling contractor’s staff at all levels.
− Drilling in the 8 ½” section was slower than expected.
− The evaluation of the objective section was not conclusive.
− The production casing could not withstand the necessary load cases associated with a well test. This had been
highlighted throughout the design phase as an inherit risk, and could not be designed out in time i.e. spud
would have to be delayed. This known weak point, plus the two main differences between the planned design
and the actual w.r.t. to the production casing, had the biggest impact.

2. Conclusions and Recommendations

2.1. Major Highlights and Lowlights
2.1.1. Highlights
+ HPHT well was planned & designed within 10 months.

+ A cold rig & new drilling contractor were started-up on a very challenging well without any major problems.
+ The new drilling crews executed the well as per the plan. Performance was not quite as good as expected, but it was
always highlighted that safety and quality came first.
+ The well design worked, and a technically challenging well was drilled as per program.
+ The Groningen field was optimally protected & isolated.
+ Cost to 4818m was within the 15% accuarcy level of the Level 3 50/50 estimate.
+ Drilled to 5423m, approximately 450m deeper than the maximum predicted.
2.1.2. Lowlights
− Operations did not start at the planned date (15/11/2001).

− Language barriers hampered swift communications with drilling contractor’s staff at all levels.
− Drilling in the 8 ½” section was slower drilling than expected.
− Evaluation was not conclusive.
− Wellhead parting at connection during 10K BOP test.
− The production casing could not withstand the necessary load cases associated with a well test. This had been highlighted
throughout the design phase as an inherit risk, and could not be designed out in time i.e. spud would have to be delayed.
This known weak point, plus the two main differences between the planned design and the actual w.r.t. to the production
casing, had the biggest impact.
2.2. Key Learning Points and Recommendations
• The HAZID/ risk assesment carried out at the beginning of the planning stage was essential in assessing the scope of
work, and in highlighting many of the issues and risks.
• The right experience needs to be identified inside and outside your organistion, and no hesitation should be made to hire
in the necessary technical expertise (i.e. we hired Geoff Thompson from Tech Spec consultants who also had very good
links with Shell Expro HPHT experience).
• In non-standard wells nothing can be assumed, and unfortunately most personnal do not have the necessary experience or
knowledge to give you the correct answers.
• More time and manpower should have been made available to check the drilling contractors’ SMS, procedures, HSE
documentation, etc. NAM should have assisted with manpower and expertise at an early stage; instead of allowing a
Shell-led audit team to comment on the same shortly after operations began.
• Communication between all parties is critical when a new rig contractor and a cold rig is started. To aid communication
we employed Night Drilling Supervisor throughout the well. We recommend that if a similar project is undertaken, or
cold/new rig is started, then NDSV should be used.
• The NAM drilling supervisors were fluent in the native language of the drilling contractor. This was a critical factor in
ensuring the success of the first 2 sections.
• An acceptance test plus moduspec inspection is essential before accepting a cold rig.
• The two most important factors in the success of running and cementing the liner were:
1. Getting the Baker representative onsite 3 days early to check all the equipment and to bring the rig &
office team, up to speed.

2. Two dedicated pre-job meetings were held to ensure everybody agreed upon the running procedures,
and a plan of action was developed to deal with any contingencies.
• The depleted Slochteren can be cemented successfully without using low-density cements if you are able to keep the BHP
below the 1.4sg defined in the original study (see section 4.2).
• The defined stop & go points (control gates) that were put in place to ensure that the objective was not penetrated by
mistake in the 8 ½”section worked extremely well and ensured that the Groningen field was protected at all times.
• The VSP’s were successful in reducing the depth uncertainty from +/- 250m to +/- 20m.
• The wireline logging service provide by Schlumberger was sub- optimal. In future wells this can be improved by:
- Better communication between all parties (easy said then done, especially when the geology is dictating the
logging program)
- Dedicated HPHT wireline team instead of using local operators. Apparently this is being put in place by
Schlumberger.
• High temperatures probably have a bigger impact on the well and the equipment that’s run into it, than the high pressures.
Realise early in the planning stage that the equipment that you can use is several restricted and continuously tell this to
your contractors. Sometimes it takes a while before they final realise this.
• HPHT procedures.
1. The crews successfully implemented the HPHT procedures.

2. Continuous Fingerprinting is essential in all high temperature wells.

3. Health, Safety and Environment Overview

3.1. Health
− None
3.2. Safety
− The safety awareness course was well received by the new crews and help in starting up the new rig with no LTI’s. The
response to the stop card system was positive and the crews were pro-active in their safety management.
− A crew member trapped and broken his hand between two BOP/Wellhead adaptor bolts when removing the BOP after
the wellhead failure. This was classified as a ristricted work case.
− During pressure testing of the BOP and the wellhead the connection wellhead housing – starter head parted at 630 bar.
− The swivel parted when recovering the casing (see incident report 21).
− Incident (near miss) with the top drive turning unexpectedly and the elevator hitting a crew member (see incident report
22).
− A number of contractor personnal, especially Sclumberger, did not have the required safety cousres for working on the
wellsite, or even wrt their own tools. This was disappointing, especially as the requirements were highlighted from the
very beginning.
3.3. Environment
− Though quoted (by contractual clauses) to be within requested range, the ITAG23-rig will have a maximum continuous
(average daily) noise level beyond 50 dBa @ 300 mtr. Noise protection is not present on/around the mast/substructure,
not on/around the rig pumps, not on/around hydraulic units, shale shakers,etc. Furthermore conventional (squeaking)
brake bands on the drawworks are in use. In case this rig will drill more wells for NAM at more ‘noise-sensitive’ sites,
appropriate and remedial actions need to be taken to reduce the overall noise-output.
− The rig-floor contains a number of small cracks and holes, and the drip pan does not ‘cover’ all of the drillfloor area.
As a result, mud drips down onto the ground and gets blown across the location. This complicated making accurate
mud volume balances during the HPHT phase. It was impossible to account for all mud, especially when pumping or
pulling wet OOH - which is usually done in open hole when swabbing is most likely and accurate volumetrics are most
critical. The rig-floor should be sealed, and holes plugged. A drip pan should have been fitted.

4. Business Unit Objectives & Feedback.
4.1. Ranked Objectives
WELL OBJECTIVES (in order of importance) % Achieved Comment

1 to determine the lithology / reservoir potential of the 70% Due to geological/petrophysical
objective section and evaluate the associated pore uncertainties
content (hydrocarbon) in the Groningen Deep
prospect;
2 to evaluate the economic potential of the pore content 50% Due to geological/petrophysical
(hydrocarbon); uncertainties
3 to drill the well as cheaply as possible (if dry) and 75%
minimise financial exposure.
BOUNDARY CONDITIONS: % Achieved Comment

1 to drill a safe and environmentally responsible well; 100%
2 to ensure optimal isolation of the Slochteren reservoir 100%

(Groningen field).
4.2. Quality indicators
Indicator Importance WFS % Achieved Comment
1 HSE: safe & environmentally friendly High 80% One RTW case and a near miss.
operations
2 Optimal isolation of Slochteren reservoir High 100%
(No annular pressure)
3 Achieve Total Depth (a minimum of 100m High 100%
penetration below Top Objective)
4 Ensure hole quality is suitable for High 100%
minimum petrophysical & other evaluation
data acquisition
5 Ensure hole suitability for later production High 0% This was highlighted as known
test (with rig offsite) risk with the well design.
6 Costs: target is to remain within 10% of High 0% Cost was within 15% accuracy
AFE of Level 3 50/50 estimate.
4.3. Business Unit Feedback
General
Learning Points and Follow Up

5. Planning & Design

5.1. Planning
5.1.1. General Learning Points.
− The weekly meeting between all parties was crucial in helping to make the VAR milestones and spud the well in
November. Different people attend the meetings through out the whole process, with it being heavily dominate with
asset representatives up to VAR-3, and then slowing shifting to contractor well engineering personal towards spud. The
common factor throughout was the presence of the senior & planning/operations well engineer.
− 10mths to design a HPHT well with high levels of H2S is not long enough. Several compromises had to be made, which
later affected the wells suitability for a well test.
− Define your load cases & design philosophy from the start (pre-VAR-3). A HAZID and risk assessment well help in
defining these, and get them reviewed by independent experts.
− In non-standard wells nothing can be assumed, and unfortunately most personal do not have the necessary experience or
knowledge to give you the correct answers e.g. at the start of the well we were informed that the 15K wellhead was not
an issue and anything was ready. However, it ended up requiring a number of modifications and a new 10 ¾”hanger. It
remained on the critical path for most of the planning and drilling phase.
− The right experience needs to be identified inside and outside your organisation, and no hesitation should be made to
hire in the necessary technical expertise from the start (i.e. Geoff Thompson from Tech Spec consultants).
− Have all your equipment ready before spud. Because of the time constraints some equipment (i.e. 10 ¾” wellhead
hanger) was still being manufactured after spud. Luckily we did not lose anytime waiting for equipment, but it was a
real possibility at the time.
− It is difficult to keep updated on the status of all your ordered materials & equipment. Using expediters helped us in this
process, by keeping up to date on the orders and making regular visits to the factory etc.
− Review your HPHT procedures beforehand. Modify them for your specific well and review them with your drilling
supervisors, contractor staff and outside expertise; in our case we used a retired senior HPHT well engineer (Jan
Wiggleman) and an HPHT equipment specialist who had worked on the Shearwater project (Geoff Thompson). Ensure
by the end of the meeting, in our case it took 2 days that an agreement has been reached between all parties on the
procedures that will be followed.
− Get every single bit of equipment inspected well before you require it.
5.1.2. Materials / Equipment
Production casing.
− To meet the design load case of displacement to gas at worst-case conditions i.e. 25% H2S, special non-API casing was
required. As a starting point we based the material & QA/QC requirements on the existing casings specifications that
were used in OKIOC (10 ¾”& 9 7/8” sections) and Shearwater (7” section).
− To ensure that the production casing could withstand the corrosive nature of the reservoir fluids, the casing materials
were not only tested to the NACE standard, but were also tested to well specific worst case conditions. This was carried
out on the advice of NAM material specialists & Shell Canada who stated that the NACE standard was not reliable at
these high concentrations of H2S. Two methods were used: the NACE A & NACE D methods.
− The tests should be carried out before you actual order the casing to ensure that the materials will pass. Unfortunately,
due to time constraints, the casings had to be ordered and manufactured with the tests being run concurrently. This
meant that if they failed we would have ordered the wrong casing material, and we would have to of gone back to
square one after spending a considerably amount of money. However, the tests did pass and the manufacturing process
could continue.

− All connections should be Shell qualified. If not, suitable test data should be produced by Vallourec and reviewed by the
NAM/Shells connection expert to justify the selection. In UHM-2 case, 2 connections in the 9 7/8” – 7”xo were not
Shell qualified. The test data produced by Vallourec could justify them being run for the drilling load case, but if the
well were to be tested, a full qualification would have been required.
DP & Accessories.
− Specialist non-API DP was selected (see Appendix in WTS) for its increased resistance to sulphide stress cracking. The
pipe had 95ksi tool joints instead of standard 120kis tool joints, which meant the pipe had a reduced operating envelope.
This was exacerbated by the age of the pipe, and the reduction in the tool joint diameter. Once the pipe had been
inspected the new operating window of the pipe had to be calculated and compared to the predicted operating
conditions.
− If H2S drill pipe is selected, ensure that all string accessories above the BHA have the same material properties; this
includes gray valves and kelly cocks.
− H2S rated kelly cocks: Both sizes of kelly cocks had to be ordered specially for the project because standard 15K kelly
cocks are made from 120ksi material. The 3 ½” kelly cocks could not be made to a 15K rating, because the body
diameter would not fit in the 7” casing. This was accepted because they would only be used if the well started flowing
when the 5” DP is out of the hole.
- 7 x 5”, 15K, H2S trim (80ksi material), NC50. Special ordered for the project because standard 15K kelly cocks
are made from 120ksi material.
- 2 x 3 ½”, 10K, H2S trim (80ksi material), NC38.

5.2. Well Design & Drilling Hazards Summary/Recommendations.
5.2.1. Casing design
NORTH SEA
26” hole
1000m
CHALK
KN / RN 2000m 17 1/2” hole
ZECHSTEIN
3000m 12 1/4” hole

SLOCHTEREN
8 1/2” hole
CARBONIFEROUS 4000m
TOC @ 3800m
10 3/4” / 9 7/8” / 7”
tapered casing
5000m
5 7/8” hole
RESERVOIR

The well design was a success. Every casing point was made, and the casings/liners were run and cemented successfully.
The only issue was the production casing’s (specifically the 9 7/8”-7 XO and the 7”section above the top of the 9 5/8”liner)
ability to withstand the necessary load cases associated with a well test. This had been highlighted throughout the design phase
as an inherit risk, and could not be designed out in time i.e. spud would have to be delayed. This known weak point, plus the
two main differences (listed below) between the planned design and the actual w.r.t. to the production casing, had the biggest
impact.
Main differences between planned vs. actual.
1. The planned TOC for the production casing was 4000m. However, due to gas bearing sands in the Carboniferous section,
the TOC was required to be set shallower at 3600m. Unfortunately a gauge hole and a cement channel moved this top of
cement further up the hole to 3200m.
2. The temperature of the well is hotter than in the planned design. The original well was designed with the P85 temperature
curve. However, the actual temperatures recorded show that the gradient is above even the P85 estimate at ≈
1.091degC/30m.
Eventually it was decided that if the production casing were to act as a primary barrier it would be only suitable for obtaining a
gas sample. This combined with the availability of a H2S tested completion string, and the uncertainty in the geological
setting, meant that the well was abandon.
Design Improvements.
1. Cement above the top of the crossover, or just cement around the tapered string shoe.
2. Now that the objective pressure regime is known the 10 ¾” / 9 7/8” sections of the tapered string can be replaced with a
single casing size and weight i.e. 9 7/8” 66.9#, VAM TOP, VM95 SS-1 or equivalent.
3. Redesign and space out the crossover such that only heavy wall 7 5/8” OD pipe is above the TOL, and then cross over to
7” casing inside an extended PBR of the 9 5/8” liner.
4. Run lighter weight 14”or 13 3/8” casing above the Zechstein.
5. Look into reducing the weight of the 20”casing.
5.2.2. 26” hole section & 20” casing
Depth of top-hole section.
To drill a 26” top-hole section deeper than ± 1250m with a KCl mud system, better solids control equipment is required. The
minimum specifications should be:
1. 4 x Thule VSM-300 shakers as per T-46

2. 6 x centrifuges, which throughput is at least a quarter of the maximum flowrate.
3. Functioning hopper mixing system that can provide enough shearing action to integrate polymer with the mud.
If this equipment is not available on the rig then a conservative approach should be taken to the amount of top hole that can be
drilled. This is especially true when a cold rig is started-up with specifications lower than above.

5.2.3. 17 ½” hole section & 14” casing
Formation Strength in the Chalk
Formation strength was lower than expected (1.6bar/10m), and this meant that we were operating in the stable fracture
propagation region of the pressure response curve (see below).
LOP occurred at a fairly low pressure

gradient, and the pressure was then taken
very close to the FBP (also known as UFP).
It should be noted the difference between
LOP & FBP values in the two tests.

The leak-off test on UHM-2 was not carried out correctly and the pressure response was taken up to UFP (see above).
Luckily this did not have a negative impact on the well, and it did give good information on the amount of additional
pressure required to go beyond the UFP. Based on this test it be concluded that:
1. The intermediate section could be drilled safely within the stable fracture propagation zone of the chalk.
2. During the surface cement job you are exceeding the LOP in most case and small fractures are being created that
are immediately plugged by the cement.
3. Leak-off pressures in the NAM database are not always consistent, and in many cases they have been taken
beyond the LOP. Therefore, if a high formation strength of > 1.58bar/10m is required, then serious consideration
should given to setting the shoe deeper in the chalk or the Holland Marl.
VCM mud weight required to hold back the squeezing salts.
The Zechstein salts were successfully held back with a 1.5sg VCM mud, which was in line with the assumptions made in the
planning stage. This was highlighted by:
1. The 14” casing was run without encountering any resistance, even though the time taken to run the casing from
reaching section TD to being on depth, was 96 ¼” hours.
2. The only resistance observed was 20T O/P during the drilling phase. This was caused by the relaxation of the salt
and the presence of a full gauge stabiliser in the BHA.
Further Groningen wells should drill the Zechstein salt sections with mud weights of 1.5sg. There is no reason to go higher
and in actually fact it is probable that they can be drilled with even lower weights (VCM 1.45sg).
No overpressures or fractures were observed in the Zechstein.
No overpressures or fractures were observed in the Zechstein. This is in line with the initial assumption made from the offset
data. This assumption allowed the section to be drilled from the middle chalk to the Ten Boer, and should be the base case
design in any new wells in the Groningen field area. Only when overpressures have been seen in a specific area should
consideration be given to setting an additional casing string in the top Zechstein.
5.2.4. 12 ¼” hole section & 9 5/8” liner
Fracture Gradient of the Depleted Groningen Reservoir.
Successfully drilling & cementing the section without any losses suggests that the conclusions drawn from the original study
were correct (see bullet points below).
Losses will only be encountered if the formation is already fractured i.e. penetrates an injection zone, or if fractures are
induced whilst drilling
The upper limit of the operating envelope through the section is an EMW of 1.37-1.4sg. This value has been based on
empirical data from the study wells, and by calculation of the reduction in FBP caused by depletion. If the BHP goes
above this value during operations, then the risk of fracturing the formation, and thus getting losses, increases from 5% to
80%.
When losses occur, the mud weight required to balance the loss zone will equal the minimum horizontal stress and this
will be between an EMW of 0.8-1sg.

FRACTURE BREAKDOWN PREDICTION

Calculated FBP (derated with depletion factor)
1.8
EMW while cementing.
Losses
1.7
EMW while cementing. MW used to drill depleted Groningen Field
1.6 No Losses No losses encountered
1.5
1.4
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1.3
1.2
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5.2.5. 8 ½” hole section & tapered casing string.
Formation Strength Of The Upper Carboniferous.
The pressure response graph during the leak-off test showed a straight-line relationship up until the UFP.
It was concluded that the cause of the sudden breakdown was formation related and that this corresponded to a hard, brittle
rock, possibly sandstone, which was confirmed by the gamma ray log.
200
180
160
140
Pressure (bar)
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
550
600
650
700
750
800
50
0
Volume (litres)

The leak-off test pressure is similar in value to the mudweight & ECD that was inducing losses in the carboniferous section of
TJM-2. Therefore, we can assume that the weakest layers in the 8 ½” Carboniferous section are the upper sand beds, and that
these have a minimum formation strength of between 1.55-1.65 bar/10m.
Stability Of Coal & Shale Layers.
No hole stability/drilling problems were experienced in the coal layers during the drilling & casing running phases. The
reasons for this were:
• Amount & thickness of coal layers was less than expected.

• Vertical well.
• The VCM mud stabilised the shale’s, and thus no wash outs were created underneath the coal beds (opinion)
The only hole stability problem observed in the shale layers was the presence of cavings in the OH section when running back
in after the second VSP. The cavings were blocky in nature and were from the upper part of section. It was concluded that
because the hole had been open for 36 days and no problems had been observed whilst drilling and tripping through the
section, that the mechanism causing the collapse was mechanical, and was just the relaxation of the well bore combined with a
possible temperature effect of not circulating for a few days. No evidence suggests that these were pressure cavings and
that we were under or close to balance.
Picture of cavings from the 8 ½” section.
Di-electric constant measurements.
To enable comparison of the shale characteristics of UHM-2 with TJM-2, di-electric constant measurements were taken.
The results showed that the shale’s in UHM-2 had similar DCM values as TJM-2 and they followed the same trend. However,
when the impregnated bits were used, the DCM values were a lot lower. It is believed that this is caused by the different
cutting action (grinding) of an impregnated bit rather than formation related.
The conclusion that can be drawn from the analysis is that the shale’s in UHM-2 are of similar lithology and composition as
the shale’s in TJM-2, and that their LOP would be similar to the LOP of 1.82bar/10m recorded in TJM-2 at 5000m.

Figure 1 - Average Surface Area versus Depth

(core not included)
DCM Surface Area m2/g

0 25 50 75 100 125 150 175 200
3300
3400
3500
3600
3700
3800
3900
Depth (metres)
TJM-2
4000 Impregnated bit used.
UHM-2
4100
4200
4300
4400
4500
4600
4700
4800
Decision trees and stop points.
Defined stop & go points (control gates) were put in place to ensure that the objective was not penetrated by mistake in the 8-
½”section.
During the drilling phase the decision to drill ahead at these stop/go points was formal decided within a fixed team of people,
which included the Head of the Groningen Asset, the Head of Exploration, and various other drilling and exploration
personnel involved in the project. These meetings were essential in ensuring that the section was drilled in a controlled
and safe manner.
5.2.6. 5 7/8” section
Formation strength & pore pressure.
The original pore pressure prediction in the objective ranged from hydrostatic to a gradient of 1.95bar/10m (see graph below).
To constrain the pressure regime before drilling into the objective, the following measurements were carried out in the
potential sealing shale:
1. Leak-off pressure at the tapered string shoe.

2. DCM analysis (see above)
3. Pore pressure analysis.
The results obtained were
1. Leak-off pressure gradient of 1.78bar/10bar/10m, similar to the value obtained in TJM-2 of 1.82bar/10m.
2. DCM values indicated a similar shale type as observed in TJM-2.
3. Pore pressure analysis indicated a maximum pore pressure of 1.36-38 bar/10m.
All the evidence indicates that the pressure regime was similar to TJM-2’s, and that the pressure in the objective would
between hydrostatic and the P50 prediction. This of course assumed that we were in the sealing rock of the objective.
This was also constrained by Ide v/d Molen with the following note:

“As to the maximum pressure possible in the reservoir below the seal in which this LOT was done: assuming the pore
pressure to be on a 1.38 / 10m gradient (as thought to be the case from the mudweights in an earlier section) I would expect a
Smin gradient in the seal between the LOT gradient of 1.78 and halfway between the pore pressure and the LOT at 1.58/10m.
Thus for a depth of, say, 4680m the maximum possible gas pressure that can be held by the seal in which we did the leak-off
would be between 468*1.78 = 833 bar and 468*1.58= 739 bar. This is the range of maximum gradients with which the
drillers must reckon. But of course for lower pore pressures there might well be a bit less down to the minimum of 468*1.15=
538 bar, in the case that the reservoir is simply hydrostatically pressured. It seems a good idea therefore to continue drilling
with 1.5 bar/10m gradient mud.”
A pressure of 705bar at 5150m was measured in the objective. If a water gradient is assumed upto the top of the objective, the
overpressure at the top, compared to hydrostatic, is 650-537bar = 113bar. This put the overpressure at the P60 value.
15K surface equipment
ALL THE MEASUREMENTS AND ANALYSIS PERFORMED DID CONSTRAIN THE PORE PRESSURE
ENOUGH TO SELECT THE CORRECT MUDWEIGHT AND ALLOWED US TO DRILL SAFELY INTO THE
OBJECTIVE.
15K vs. 10K well control equipment.
Right at the start of the planning phase the well was to be designed as a 15K well, even though the evidence from TJM-2 and
the burial history suggested that the pressure would be lower than 10K. The “no risk” philosophy was taken to protect the
Groningen field.
In future exploration wells with similar broad pressure predictions, I strongly suggest a risked approach is taken, and if
possible the well should be drilled with 10K well control equipment. To quantify this risk, the following
challenges/assumptions need to be made:
1. Pressure prediction needs to be challenged.

- Is it based on a geological model and if so is it applicable to this area.
- Is the maximum pressure taken from the lower bound pressure and is there a good reason for doing this.
- What is the likelihood of encountering this higher pressure?
- Is it a “cover your arse" maximum pressure?

2. Challenge your drilling load case. We assumed displacement to gas at the maximum pressure because of the design
philosophy. However, if a very large influx volume is taken as the load case, the maximum surface pressure will probably
be under 10K.
3. Assume that you can see an increasing pore pressure when drilling through the seal of the objective. This was the case in
UHM-2 where we picked up a gradual increase in the pore pressure from hydrostatic to about 1.36bar/10m in the shale
above the objective.
4. Set stop-go points.
5. Full risk assessment carried out.
If the risk is considered acceptable, the cost difference between drilling a 15K and a 10k well is in the order of €2-3m.
Temperature.
The geothermal temperature was higher than the P85 estimate in the objective section. The bottom hole temperature at TD was
220degC.
The high temperatures had a major impact on the equipment that could be run in hole. Listed below is a brief summary of
some of the issues:
− VSP’s tools were rated to 150degC. During the walkway VSP the tool overheated and had to be pulled.
− The APWD used for the fingerprinting tests, was at, or was just above its maximum working temperature. To try and
protect the tool, we tried to stage in the hole i.e. run in 300m and circulate. However, the problem with these procedures
is that the tool first has to enter the hot mud and then is cooled by circulation. This resulted in the tool being cooked and
rendered the entire downhole tests void.
− Wireline Logging equipment such as the MDT & sidewall-coring tool were not rated to the downhole temperatures.
− Ensure that the components of all logging tools are made out of the same material and have the same expansion factor.
This was thought to be why the wireline magnet unscrewed downhole.
− Mud motors, MWD’s, PB subs etc are not rated to these temperatures. If a downhole drive mechanism is required than
turbines have to be used (check additional pressure requirements), and basically MWD is not possible.
Make sure all equipment that goes down hole has been checked and discussed in the planning phase and the temperature
ratings known.
Do not rely on your local wireline/drilling staff to have the necessary high temperature experience. Agree in the planning
phase that the operators have to supply personnel with high temperature experience; get the contractor to also supply their
CV’s to confirm this requirement.
5.3. Hole sections
Planned Actual hole Planned hole Actual hole Depth Comments

hole Size Size Depth (AHORT) AHORT
26" 26" 1200 - 1450 1243 Called section TD in view of mud
problems
17 ½" 17 ½" 2912 2903 Planned TD 30m TVD below top
ROCLT (Ten Boer)
12 ¼" 12 1/4" 3362 3362 Planned TD 196 m TVD into the Upper
Carboniferous
8 ½" 8½“ 4650±250 4625 Planned TD 50 m TVD above top of
main objective
5 ⅞" 5 ⅞" 4875 5423 Planned TD 100m TV into objective.

5.4. Casings/liners
Casing size, weight, grade and connection Planned Actual Planned Actual Comments
Depth Depth TOC TOC
Casing/Liner Casing/Liner (mAH) (mAH)
(mAH) (mAH)
20"-169#-L80-Big Omega IS Min: 1200 1235 14 14 Hole in
Max: 1500 gauge
14"-106#-C95-Vam Top 0 - 2150 2998 250 m 753 Hole in
-114#-ST95-Vam Top SC 2150 - 2895 inside 20" gauge
9 ⅝"-53.5#-P110-Vam Top Hanger 2800 2778 2809 2778 Hole in
9 ⅝"-53.5#-P110-Vam Top Shoe 3350 3359 gauge
10 ¾"-101#-VM95 SS-1-Vam HW ST-NB 0 – 1400 1408 3700 3950 Hole in
9 ⅞" -70.5#- VM95 SS-1-Vam Top 1400 – 2800 2765 Based on gauge
7" -35#-VM110 SS-Vam Top HT 2800 – 4645 4615 CBL
5.5. Well Profile
Hole Planned Actual Deviation Comments

Size Deviation
26" Max 2° 0.46° Attempted to nudge away from ~ 300m AH, but it was not possible
to build angle with BHA.
17 ½" 0° 2.49° Initially the angle dropped from 0.46° back to 0.24° at 1531mAH.
The rotary assembly run through the Zechstein built angle in the
basal carbonate formations.
12 ¼" 0° 2.74° @ 3198 mAH A pendulum assembly was used in this section. Initially the
1.63° @ 3355 mAH inclination stayed reasonably constant but then rose to a maximum
of 2.74° at 3198 mAH. It then dropped back to 1.63° at 3355 mAH
8 ½" 0° 0.90° @ 4600 mAH TD. The inclination stayed low during the section with a maximum
of 1.46° @ 4292 mAH.
5.6. Formation Tops
Formation Prognosed Prognosed Actual Actual Prognosed Actual Comments

Depth Depth Depth Depth Uncertainty Uncertainty
M TVNAP M AHORT M TVNAP M AHORT MTV MTV
NS 0 12 0
NL FFT 847 859 853 865 ±15 From GR
From drilling
CKGR 879 891 878 890 ±15 -1m break and
GR
CK TXM 1816 1828 1815 1827 ±15 -1m From GR
KN GLU 1864 1876 1831 1849 ±20 - 25 m From GR

KN GLM 1897 1909 1895 1907 ±20 -5m From GR
KN GLL 1901 1913 1900 1912 ±20 -1m From GR
KN NCM 1908 1920 1903 1915 ±20 -5m From GR
RB SHR 1930 1942 1928 1940 ±25 -2m From GR

From
RB SHM 1979 1991 1996 2008 ±25 + 17 m
cuttings
RB SHL 2167 2179 2173 2185 ±25 +6m From GR

From GR,
ZE Z4H 2183 2195 2183 2195 ±40 0m
cuttings
From
ZE Z4A 2235 2247 2233 2245 ±40 -2m
cuttings
From GR,
ZE Z4R 2236 2248 2234 2246 ±40 -2m
cuttings
From GR,
ZE Z3H 2239 2251 2238 2250 ±40 -1m
cuttings
From GR,
ZE Z3A 2476 2488 2468 2480 ±40 -8m
cuttings
ZE Z3C 2533 2545 2518 2530 ±40 - 15 m From GR
From GR,
ZE Z3G 2534 2546 2523 2535 ±40 - 11 m
cuttings
From GR,
ZE Z2T 2536 2548 2525 2537 ±40 - 11 m
cuttings
From GR,
ZE Z2H 2540 2552 2528 2540 ±40 - 12 m
cuttings
From
ZE Z2A 2805 2817 2786 2798 ±40 - 19 m
cuttings
From GR,
ZE Z2C 2810 2822 2812 2824 ±40 +2m
cuttings, gas
From GR,
ZE Z1W 2817 2829 2820 2832 ±40 +3m
cuttings
From GR,
ZE Z1C 2850 2862 2848 2860 ±40 -2m
cuttings, gas
From GR,
ZE Z1K 2862 2874 2860 2872 ±40 -2m
cuttings, gas
From GR,
RO CLT 2863 2875 2861 2873 ±30 -2m
cuttings, gas
From GR,
RO SLU 2933 2945 2934 2946 ±30 + 1m
cuttings, gas
From GR,
ROCLA 3028 3040 3027 3039 ±30 - 1m
cuttings, gas
From
ROSLL 3045 3057 3043 3055 ±30 - 2m
cuttings
From GR,
DCCR 3154 3166 3154 3166 ±30 0m
cuttings, gas
From
DCCB 3520 3532 3506 3518 ±100 - 14m
cuttings, gas
From
DCGE 3900 3912 4187 4195 ±150 + 283m
cuttings, gas
From
OBJECTIVE 4700 4712 4662 4674 ±250 - 38m
cuttings, gas

6. Operations Review
- Depth reference is Along Hole Original Rotary Table (AHORT), unless indicated differently.
- More detailed technical information on the well can be found in DRIRES, EZXS and in the MASTER WELL FILE.

6.1. Rig start-up.
Started : 15/102001 @ 08:00 hrs

Finished : 25/112001 @ 23:30 hrs
Planned : x days
Actual : 40.9 days
NPT : hrs
6.1.1. Summary
Prior to UHM-2 the rig had been cold stack for nearly 3 years. The rig needed several modifications to meet the specifications
to drill the well. The major mods were: new mud tank system; 2 additional shale shakers; 1 additional 1600HP mud pump to
bring the total upto 3; separate generator and SCR system for the additional pump; additional accumulator capacity and
functionality for operating the 21 ¼” 5K & 13 3/8”15K stacks.
The contract stated that the start of mobilisation shall be not earlier than 1st October 2001 and not later than 1st November
2001. Mobilisation was to be completed not later than 15th November.
The actual mobilisation started on 05/10/2001, and the well was spudded at 00:00hrs on the 26/11/2001, 11 days after the 15th
November.
6.1.2. Rig Acceptance Criteria:
The inpsections and tests listed below were implemented to ensure that the rig was fully operational before spud.
1. Moduspec inspection.
2. Acceptance tests.
3. Electrical inspection.
Due to time constraints, several of the acceptance tests could not be performed; the most notably of which, was a full function
test on the mud pumps. This later came back to bite us, as we had numerous pump related failures during the top-hole section.
In order to spud, the moduspec action points were prioritised into those that must be completed before spud, and those that
could be completed at a later date. These latter points had agreed completion by dates, and if these were not met, then the rig
would go back onto its mobilisation rate.
The exhaust fire, whilst load testing the generators.
6.1.3. Learning Points and Recommendations from The Rig Start-up.
• Time required to start up a ‘cold stacked’ rig was not realistic.

• A standard rig acceptance test procedure (NAM requirement) should be part of the contract for all new “cold” rigs and
should be included as part of the mobilisation fee.
• The drilling contractor made a tremendous effort to fulfil the contractually agreed terms, but failed to have all systems and
procedures in place at the start of operations. Part of the problem was not having a coherent mobilisation plan and not
coordinating well enough with Moduspec.
• More time and manpower should have been made available to check the drilling contractors’ SMS, procedures, HSE
documentation, etc. NAM should have assisted with manpower and expertise at an early stage; instead of allowing a
Shell-led audit team to comment on the same shortly after operations began.
6.1.4. Equipment deficiencies.
• The combination of gaps in the rig floor and an insufficient drip pan, made the rig unsuitable for drilling operations with
VCM. Plugging the gaps had limited success, and the BOP’s and cellar were completely covered with VCM during
drilling operations. Unfortunately to install a new drip pan required a major modification to the rig, and this was only
completed at the end of the well. This meant that the mud and waste costs were significantly higher than expected, and
working conditions in the cellar/BOP area were poor.
BOP covered in VCM.

• The hopper system was inadequate and could not be used to mix chemicals into the mud system.
• The tank system was poorly designed.
6.1.5. Teething Problems.
Lised below are some of the general rig teething problems:
• Insufficient knowledge of available rig equipment.

• Several problems with the top-drive, including (un-intentionally) turning to the left.
• Inability to use rig pumps up to requirements.
• Mixing problems with hoppers, clogging suction filters and flowlines.
• Rigging-up of the 20” casing-running equipment was not carried out in the right order and thus some equipment had
to be rigged down again.
• Drawworks repairs were required during the 20”casing running.
• The upper part on the 20” casing landing string was too short to allow the La Fleur circulating head to be used to
wash the casing down to section TD. This problem had been identified 4 weeks before the job but a replacement pup
was unavailable. A significant time loss was associated with this problem (+/- 6 hours).
• Language barrier: Working with a large amount of internationally employed staff (WSDE’s, mud engineers, mud
loggers, directional drillers, directional surveyors, operation engineers, etc) it was clear from the beginning/start-up
that language barriers existed. Contrary to promises from the drilling contractor (and contractually agreed clauses) it
became clear that only 50% of the ITAG personnel from driller upwards spoke English; in the ‘lower ranks’ it was
non-existent. This did cause a number of problems initially, especially with the Geoservice personnal and the mud
engineers.
• The first pit drill was a disaster. However, after continuous practice the crews become very fast and efficient.
6.1.6. Recommendations.
• Communication between all parties is critical when a new rig contractor and a cold rig is started. It is recommended that
during the shake down section of the well a Night Drilling Supervisor should be employed because constant supervision is
required.
• The NAM drilling supervisors were fluent in the native language of the drilling contractor. This was a critical factor in
ensuring the success of the first 2 sections.
• An acceptance test plus moduspec inspection is essential before accepting a cold rig.
6.1.7. Initial Performance.
NPT Rig Start-up
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
Hidden NPT
Hours
50% NPT
Operating Hours
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
26" hole 20" csg 17 1/2" hole 14" csg
Hidden NPT 48 45.5 20.91 30.25
NPT 8.75 40.75 34.25 87.5
Operating Hours 115.25 132.75 274.84 178.25

The NPT, plus hidden NPT was recorded for the first 4 sections of the well. It can be seen that the main problem area is the
flat time. This is caused by a combination of running heavy casing strings, a safety-first philosophy, and inefficient crews.
Activity Allowance for cold rig and heavy casing strings.
Drilling Time add 15% to normal activity allowance i.e 10% + 15% = 25% new rig activity allowance.
Flat time (cold rig) add 30% to activity allowance
Flat time (heavy casings) add 10% to activity allowance
In UHM-2 case the activity allowance for the first two casing strings would be 50% and 25% for the drilling.

6.2. 26" Top hole
Started : 25/11/2001 @ 22:00 hrs

Finished : 03/12/2001 @ 02:00 hrs
Planned : 6.9 days
Actual : 7.2 days
NPT : 9 hrs
6.2.1. Planned Programme
The plan for this section was to set the 20" casing shoe between 1200-1500mTVD; deep enough into the chalk to achieve a
preferred formation strength at the 20" shoe of between 1.59bar/10m - 1.75bar/10m. The setting window was based on LOT's
from the offset wells BRW-4 (carried out on request on the UHM-2 design engineer to define the minimum section TD) and
TJM-2. Section TD would then be called before 1500mTVD, but past 1200mTVD when:
• Bit change required.

• ROP drops below an average of 8m/hr in the chalk (depends on hole condition).
• 1200mTVD is reached after more than 6 days drilling.
• Deteriorating hole conditions.
• MWD/MM failure.
In the initial design, a nudge at 400m was planned (azimuth of 90deg, inclination of 6.8deg, dogleg severity 0.33deg/10m) to
avoid a collision with UHM-1, and reduce the chance of magnetic interference. The well would then drop back to vertical.
The pressure regime in the section was expected to be hydrostatic with a planned mudweight of between 1.15-1.25sg; the
latter value to provide bore hole support for the lower NS shale’s.
The main concerns/hazards in the section were: the logistics; clay balling due to the large hole size; rig teething problems i.e.
pump failures etc; the collision risk with UHM-1; and keeping dogleg severity's < 0.33deg/10m to avoid excessive wear in the
production casing.
6.2.2. Operations Summary:
Interval : Surface - 1243 m.

Deviation : 0.46º at 1217.3 metres. Max deviation. 1.42º at 150 metres.
Mud : KPM, 1.17 - 1.30 sg.
The conductor was cleaned out and a gyro survey was run inside the DP. The survey was required to find the position of the
conductor shoe, and to confirm the conductor had not been deflected towards UHM-1 during driving (the driving report
showed indications of a possible deflection). The inclination at the shoe was found to be at 1.42°, on an azimuth of N44.3E,
therefore no additional correction to the plan was required.
The well was then drilled to section TD with a 26" GTX-C3G1 (IADC 1-1-5) bit and a steerable BHA. The planned nudge at
400m could not be performed because:
1. The wrong stabilisers were received on the rig site (23 3/4" instead of 25 3/4"). To try and compensate for this sub-
optimum BHA, the bend was increased before spud from the planned 0.78° to 1.59°. However this had little or no effect
2. The BHA was also too stiff i.e. 9 1/2" + 8 1/2" DC's were run instead of 6 5/8" HWDP. The collars were run because
there was a concern that with high (>20T) WOB the 6 5/8" HWDP might buckle. In hindsight this was not the correct
decision, as the WOB did not get above 20T.
3. Sub-optimal flow rates. Anadrill thought this was the main reason for not building. This conclusion is strongly contested
by the rig and office team. It is estimated that at least some 25% of all drilling time was done using 2 pumps only.
However, because the BHA was maintaining a vertical path, and the magnetic interference was minimal, drilling could still
continue safely. Pump problems were experienced throughout the section, which meant the actual flowrate, varied between
2800-4400l/min. It is estimated that at least some 25% of all drilling time was done using 2 pumps only. No hole cleaning
problems were experienced at the reduced flowrate when the ROP was 15m/hr or lower.

The main reason TD was called at 1243mAHRT was because the mud weight and viscosity could no longer be controlled
whilst drilling the chalk. This was caused by the build-up of LGS in the mud system which could not be removed because of
the:
1. Sub-optimum Derrick flowline shakers. The Thule VSM-300 shakers on the PT-46 seem to perform much better and if
used would have eliminated some of the problems.
2. Only a quarter of the flow could be circulated through the working centrifuges.
3. Hopper mixing system was not functioning. Polymers had to be entered directly into the pits, which did not provide
enough shearing action to integrate the polymers with the mud. (see photo's below)
The second reason was the bit had already been run for 90hrs (Hughes recommendation was a max of 80hrs), so it was
decided to stay on the safe side and not to risk a lost cone (though a lost cone is still highly unlikely with large sized bits).
No check trip was performed because the well was believed to be clean/in good condition, and only the normal tophole
overpulls (20-25T) were observed.
The bit had one plugged nozzle plugged when examined on surface, but apart from this was in good condition. The Dull
Graded assigned was: 1,1, NO, A, E, I, PN, TD.
26" bit before & after drilling. Blocking of the suction filter with polymers
6.2.3. Highlights
+ Drilled to TD without significant problems.

+ No clay balls were observed, even when drilling with 2 pumps.
+ Section TD was reached in one bit run and was called within the planned window.
+ Dogleg severities were kept < 0.33deg/10m.

+ The logistics planning and execution (removal of cuttings etc) was excellent.
6.2.4. Lowlights
− General rig teething problems.

− The solids control systems could not be used to maintain optimum mud properties during this section. Top-hole drilling
rates and the large hole size require very good performance of all this equipment.
− Less than optimum drilling BHA performance and the failure to build angle to nudge well for anti-collision purposes.
6.2.5. Learning Points and Recommendations
• A high K+ level in the mud (above 70), provides inhibition to the NS clays and shale’s, and is the main factor for stopping
clay balling.
• The hole could be drilled and cleaned with a ROP of 12m/hr and pumping with two rig pumps (2800-3000l/min). This
was thought to be a possible issue before spud, because of the low annular velocity, and the increased chance of clay
balling.
• If steering is required, do not run too many DC's in the BHA, and ensure the correct stabilisers are supplied. If necessary
drill 24" hole instead of 26" to ensure the correct equipment can be resourced. Of course appropriate stabs should be
available.

6.3. 20" Casing
Started : 03/12/2001 @ 02:00 hrs

Finished : 12/12/2001 @ 05:00 hrs
Planned : 4.4 days
Actual : 9.1 days
NPT : 40.75 hrs
Run the 20" 169lbs/ft Big Omega casing to section TD (aim 5-10m pocket) and then cement the casing to surface (stinger
method) using a POZMIX cem-oil 1.58sg lead and a 1.67sg tail (aim for minimum 150m). To reduce the BHP at the end of the
cement job (tried to stay on the conservative side with respects to the chalk formation strength) we initially planned to use a
1.55sg lead slurry. However, lab testing showed that the additional retarder required, caused large water separation during
setting, which would then have a negative impact on the cement quality. As we were being conservative with the limit on the
maximum bottom hole pressure, and knowing that cement is the best LCM material, it was decided to increase the lead slurry
weight to 1.58sg in order to reduce the amount of water separation.
After cementing the casing the wellhead housing, plus the 21 1/4" BOP’s would be installed and pressure tested as per
Cameron instructions.
Running the casing went ahead smoothly after some initial delays; the spider slips were used during the whole operation
instead of using hand slips for the first ~ 10 joints, as there was no 20” casing bowl available for the rotary table. The pup joint
required to space out the La Fleur head was also not of the correct length.
Joints were run at 5 to 8 per hour, with some washing required at 720m, when 20 tons of resistance was seen. The BOM IS
connections were planned to be torqued up to the average shouldering-out torque + 6000 ft.lbs, but in practice it was not
possible for the Weatherford hand to clearly see the shouldering point, so a fixed value of 4500 kg.m (32 500 ft.lbs) was used.
A visual check to see that the pin was made up to the base of the embossed triangle was also made.
The cementation went as planned. 187m3 of lead slurry was pumped, followed by 40m3 of tail. Returns were seen as
expected, indicating gauge hole, and there were no losses, or back-flow from the float shoes.
6.3.3. Highlights
+ The casing was successfully run to the required depth and cemented to surface without losses.
+ The 26” hole section, casing running and cementing was all completed without incidents or accidents, a good achievement
considering that this is a new contract and the high amount of truck movements

• Proper planning ensured that a logistically demanding operation was carried out successfully, i.e. in this case the
running/cementing of the 20” casing. Casing was run off the trailers (instead of pre-stocking on the piperacks), using 16
trailers. Furthermore 500 tons cement and 350m3 mixwater were called out and trucked in order to cement the casing.
• Despite some teething problems, the big top hole section was drilled and cemented successfully with a rig that had been
cold stacked for 3 years and a new crew.

6.4. 17 ½" Hole
Started : 12/12/2001 @ 05:00 hrs

Finished : 25/12/2001 @ 23:00 hrs
Planned : 11.1 days
Actual : 13.8 days
NPT : 33.75 hrs

The plan for this section was to set the 14" casing 30m into the Ten Boer to isolate the squeezing salt sections and any
potential virgin pressured sand stringers in the Upper Ten Boer. The mud weight could then be lowered to 1.16 sg to drill the
depleted Groningen field in the 12 ¼" section.
Based on offset data it was determined that the formations down to the top of the Zechstein would be mechanically stable at a
MW of 1.25 sg and that the Zechstein formation required a minimum MW of 1.5 sg to hold back the squeezing salts.
However, to be on the safe side and to minimise stuck pipe incidents, the mudweight would be increased to 1.55 sg for the
Zechstein. The maximum mudweight would be determined by the chalk leak-off test and offset data suggested that it would be
able to withstand an EMW of between 1.57-1.72 bar/10m.
The main concerns/hazards in the section were: stuck pipe in the squeezing salts, drilling too deep in the Ten Boer, high mud
temperatures while drilling the lower sections of the 17 1/2" hole, losses in the chalk section if the mudweight is raised to
combat squeezing salts, and the collision risk with UHM-1.
Interval : 1243-2903 m.
Deviation : 2,49º at 2889.4 m. Azimuth slowly turning west to 288,16° at TD.
Mud : VCM, 1.27 - 1.50 sg.
To define the upper limit of our operating window a leak-off test was required at the 20”shoe. The estimated leak-off value
was expected to be between 1.52-1.7 bar/10m. The test was performed and a deviation from a straight-line curve was seen at
1.48 bar/10m. However, the test was not halted at this point; it was continued on a curved profile until the P2min showed a
significant deviation away from Pinitial. The pressure continued to drop at 0.6 bar/min for another 5 mins without stabilising.
The pressure was then bleed-off (see leak-off graph).
Based on the low leak-off pressure and the fact that we slightly fractured the shoe, it was decided to go back to the original
planned mudweight of 1.5 sg in the Zechstein.
To ensure the PDC bit was not damaged (only one of this type was available) the shoetrack was drilled out with a rock bit and
a rotary assembly. The plan was then to drill the section in one bit run with a PDC BX536K bit (no chert expected in the
chalk), and with a steerable assembly (required for collision risk with UHM-1). The section was drilled with this configuration
until 2114 mAH (Lower Rogenstein claystone). At this point it was decided to POOH because:
1. The mud out surface temperature could not be kept below 85 °C (mud cooler unavailable at this time)
2. Large quantities of rubber from the motor were observed on surface
3. The well trajectory had passed the collision risk with UHM-1 and thus there was the option to run a rotary assembly forl
the rest of the section.
Drilling parameters up to this point showed that in the mid chalk, optimum WOB was around 3 tonnes at 4100 LPM. This
resulted in ROP’s of around 15 m/hr, dropping to around 10 m/hr, as the chalk got harder with depth. Increasing the WOB
lowered the ROP, and at 8 tonnes the motor would stall completely. In the Triassic sediments the opposite happened. WOB’s
of 5-10 tonnes produced ROP’s of 5-8 m/hr, which would increase when more weight was applied. Weight was again limited
by the motor, which would stall at 10T. At surface, several nozzles appeared to be plugged with rubber from the mud motor
but the bit was still in good condition, dull grading 0,1,NO,A,E,I,NO,BHA.
The bit was then rerun on a rotary assy for the following reasons:
1. The well trajectory had past the collision risk with UHM-1.

2. Indications in the claystones showed that more WOB/torque was required to achieve better ROP than the motor could
deliver.
3. The motor contributed to the high hole temperatures and the mud cooler was not available at this time.
The well was then drilled to section TD, reaming and washing every stand before a connection in the Zechstein and picking up
pipe at regular intervals of time to avoid stuck pipe in the squeezing salt sections (both were precautionary measures due to
lack of drilling data in the salts with VCM in this area). The BHA walked slightly to the right (the expected left hand
tendency was not seen), and maintained an almost vertical path until the basal carbonates where the angle built up to 2.49°. TD
was called at 2903 m, 30 m into the Ten Boer, as per the drilling programme. No sand lenses were encountered in the top Ten
Boer.
A wiper trip was performed across the Zechstein. Resistance on the way up was observed in the salts between 2770-2450 m;
maximum 20 T overpull. On running back to bottom the string had to be reamed past 2720-2820m (halite). On the final
POOH, only 20 T overpull was observed at 2750 m. This area was the most problematic during the check trip and surprisingly
does not correspond to a squeezing salt section. In fact it is in the base of the ZEZ2H, which is pure Halite.

The two graphs below show the mud temperature profile for the two intervals drilled with different BHA’s:
Mud Tem perature for BHA w ith Mudm otor Sudden jump probably
due to adjustment of
temperature sensor
100 4500
95
90
4000
85
80
3500
75
70
3000
65
Flowline Temperature
60
Flowrate (l/min)
55 2500
50
45 2000
40
35
1500
30
25
1000
20 Flow line Temperature
15 Temparure Limit
10 BHCT 500
BHST (P50)
5
Flow rate
0 0
1248 1348 1448 1548 1648 1748 1848 1948 2048
Depth (m)
Figure 6-1: The flowline temperature, BHCT, BHST and pump output for the interval drilled with the BHA including
mudmotor.
Mud Tem perature for Rotary BHA

Stopped drilling betw een
Mudcooler on betw een 22/12 07:00 - 23/12 0:30 Mudcooler on betw een
2461 - 2607 m because of high mudtemperature 2842 - 2903 m
110 4500
105
100
4000
95
90
85 3500
80
75
3000
70
Flowline Temperature
65
Flowrate (l/min)
60 2500
55
50 2000
45
40
1500
35
30
25 1000
20 Flow line Temperature
15 Temparure Limit
BHCT 500
10
BHST
5
Flow rate
0 0
2114 2214 2314 2414 2514 2614 2714 2814
Depth (m )
Figure 6-2: The flowline temperature, BHCT, BHST and pump output for the interval drilled with the rotary BHA.

From the graphs the following can be concluded:
1. The high flowline temperatures are caused by high flowrates (4000l/min).

2. To cool the mud, drilling should be stopped and the well circulated at a lower flowrate.
3. The mud cooler dropped the flowline temperature by 10-15degC
4. The bottom hole circulating temperature was higher than the geothermal gradient.
Bit In Out Total Hours ROP WOB RPM Press. Condition

(m) (m) (m) (m/hr) (T) (bar)
BX536K 1248 2114 866 93.50 9.26 4-10 60 88
BX536K 2114 2903 789 71.25 11.07 8-15 160 185-193 0,1,NO,A,X,I,NO,BHA
rerun
The 17 ½" bit before and after drilling
6.4.3. Highlights
+ The BX536K PDC bit was suitably aggressive, and produced good quality cuttings and relatively few fines. This in turn
improved solids removal – at ROP’s of 15 m/hr it was possible to pump at 4000 lpm + yet only run 2 shakers.
+ The VCM mud used improved the quality of the cuttings in the chalk section, so changing out from KPM higher than
planned was beneficial.
+ The section was drilled as per program with the planned mud weights.
6.4.4. Lowlights
− The mud temperature rose sharply as drilling continued, finally reaching the upper limit of 85º C at 2114mAH. Operations
had to be stopped, partly due also to mud motor deterioration. The mud coolers were not available on site early enough to
cut the temperature back.
− The rheology of the new VCM mud was very difficult to control and resulted in a much higher viscosity than planned.
6.4.5. Learning Points and recommendations
• The 17 ½" BX536K bit can easily drill all the 17 ½" formations in one bit run and at good ROP’s.
• The 11 ¼" SP is not powerful enough to performance drill the section (not enough torque and WOB for the bit; the motor
was stalling with 8-10T WOB). If future wells are drilled than a 9 5/8" GT motor is required.
Type Flow (GPM) Speed RPM Torque (ft.lbs ) Diff Pressure

9 5/8” GT 7:8 600-1200 65-130 15500 640
11 ¼” SP 3:4 1000-1500 115-170 12000 390

• A full gauge stabiliser in the string will increase the amount of overpull/resistance observed in the salts.

6.5. 14" Casing
Started : 25/12/2001 @ 23:00 hrs

Finished : 07/01/2002 @ 07:00 hrs
Planned : 6.6 days
Actual : 12.3 days
NPT : 87.5 hrs
To secure the squeezing salt sections and any virgin pressured Upper Ten Boer sand stringers, by setting the 14" casing shoe
30m into the Ten Boer. This would allow the mud weight to be lowered from 1.50sg to 1.16sg to drill the depleted Groningen
field in the 12 ¼" section. The required TOC was 250m inside the 20" casing.
The main concerns/hazards in the section were: equipment problems related to the heavy 14" casing string; casing not reaching
section TD; casing getting stuck in the salt section.
The cementation would require Pozzo lead into the previous casing, and Class G around the shoe. Good cement coverage was
important particularly over the squeezing salt sections to relieve any point loading of the casing.
6.5.2. Operations Summary
The running of the casing was delayed a couple of times due to equipment failures and severe winds. The resistance that was
seen during the check trip was not seen whilst running the 14”casing; it has been concluded that the resistance during the trips
was caused by the presence of a full gauge stab in the BHA. Casing joints were run at 7 to 8 per hour.
The cementing went as follows: 100 m3 of lead slurry and 53.7 m3 of tail were pumped followed by a total displacement
volume of 227.1 m3. No bump was observed (pumped 97% efficiency + half shoetrack) as it was decided beforehand to be
over cautious. No losses or back flow was seen during the cement job. The estimated TOC is 800 m, based on volumes
pumped and pressure differentials seen.
The changing out of the 21 1/4" BOP equipment and the 10K manifold for the 13 1/2" 15K exact wellhead housing, 13 5/8"
BOP equipment and a 15K manifold took about 2 days. During pressure testing of the BOP and the wellhead, the connection
between the wellhead housing & starter head parted at 630 bar. This resulted in the BOP’s & wellhead housing lying against
the BOP test tool. The BOP’s and wellhead were then rigged down and a thorough inspection carried out on the starter head
profile. Only minor damage was observed so the wellhead and stack were reassembled and successfully tested. On
investigation it appeared that the dogs of the speed clamp were not properly made up into the groove of the starter head (see
EAR 15) and that this was the cause of the failure.
6.5.3. Highlights
+ There were no problems running casing past the squeezing salts seen in the lower ZEZ2H. They had caused overpulls
whilst POOH, and with the operational and weather issues causing delays in getting casing to bottom, there had been
concern about tight spots – especially between 2720 and 2820 mAHRT.
+ The heavy casing string was run and cemented without any problems.
6.5.4. Lowlights
− A crew member trapped and broken his hand between two BOP/Wellhead adaptor bolts when removing the BOP
after the wellhead failure. This was classified as a ristricted work case.
− During pressure testing of the BOP and the wellhead the connection wellhead housing – starter head parted at 630
bar.
• A tripod investigation has been conducted on the wellhead failure and the recommendation and conclusions are in
the associated document.

6.6. 12 ¼" Hole
Started : 07/01/2002 @ 07:00 hrs

Finished : 12/01/2002 @ 21:30 hrs
Planned : 5.5 days
Actual : 5.6 days
NPT : 2.0 hrs
The main objective for this section was to isolate the Groningen Field by running and cementing a drilling liner to enable
deeper drilling. Other objectives were to drill the section without any losses, and to set the liner shoe 196mTVD into the
Carboniferous to ensure that the potentially depleted Upper Carboniferous sands were isolated, and the first sequence of
carboniferous coals at ± 3350m were not penetrated.
The plan was to drill the section with a 1.16sg VCM with fine LCM. The pore pressure would gradually return to a hydrostatic
1.15sg. Careful monitoring was necessary because this point was not well known. Based on an analysis of mud weights,
ECD’s and calculated fracture pressures in offset data, the minimum formation breakdown pressure for the Upper Slochteren
was set at 1.35 bar/10m. As a precaution it was intended to maintain a significant LCM content by adding fine Mikhart to the
active mud system. These additions were especially important whilst drilling into the depleted Slochteren sandstone. The
additions would be stopped when reaching the ROCLA and no losses have been observed.
The main concerns/hazards in this section were: losses in the depleted Slochteren, differential sticking, virgin pressured sand
lenses in the Ten Boer and water kicks in the ROSLL or the DC.
Interval : 2903 to 3362 m.

Deviation : 1.63º at 3354.7 metres. Azimuth was 289,5º at 3354.7 mAH.
Mud : VCM, 1.16 sg.
This section was drilled with a rotary pendulum assembly with a power pulse MWD in combination with the Genesis HC607
bit. A rotary assembly was used as no major performance improvements were to be expected because a 9 5/8" GT mudmotor
was not available. Average ROPs of 15 m/hr were observed in the Slochteren.
The mud cooler performed reasonably well, once the correct coolant flows and pressure settings were employed, and
temperatures were kept below the specified 85’C limit.
As no losses were observed, the adding of fine LCM was stopped when entering the top DC formation. The transition to the
DC formation could again easily be seen on the GR, also ROP’s dropped to an average of 3 m/hr. The drilling parameters were
regularly adjusted to maintain an optimum ROP. Section TD was called at 3362 mAH.
The blades from the upper stabiliser suffered from extensive off-centre wear with the OD decreased from 12 1/8" to about 10
1/2". The near bit stabiliser missed some 40% hard facing on the blades. The cutters of the bit were still OK but the bit was
heavily worn on nose, taper and the shoulder area, but was still in gauge.
Bit In Out Total Hours ROP (m/hr) WOB (T) RPM Press. (bar) Condition
HC607 (RO) 2903m 3166m 263m 21 12.5 7-10 120-160 135-140
HC607 (DC) 3166m 3362m 196m 84.25 2.3 10-25 120-160 135-140 0,8, LT, S, X, I, HC, TD.

Genesis PDC before & after drilling + near bit stabiliser
6.6.3. Highlights
+ Formation breakdown prediction was correct and the section was drilled without losses.
+ No differential sticking was observed.
6.6.4. Lowlights
− HC607 bit showed poor performance over the Carboniferous formations.
6.6.5. Learning Points and Recommendations.
Bit Selection.
1. The bit rotary drilled the Slochteren with good ROP’s.
2. A decline in performance was observed (wear) over the lower part of the Slochteren.
3. On entering the DC the ROP dropped immediately to 3m/hr and gradually more WOB was needed to maintain this ROP.
4. Downhole shocks were measured when the WOB was increased to 20t
Conclusion.
1. The bit is suitable for drilling the Slochteren formations.
2. Wear was already significant when entering the DC.
3. Increasing wear on the PDC cutter requires additional WOB to produce the same depth of cut and thus maintain ROP. The
amount of weight is constrained by the BHA configuration and its degree of stabilisation. Too much weight = to many
shocks (see Fig 5.4).
Increase wear cut development

= more WOB required.
PDC Bigger cutters, more wear flat
cutter development, more WOB.
4. In hindsight the bit should have been pulled at the top of the carboniferous.
Recommendations.
1. Select a heavier set PDC bit with say 13mm cutters to drill both formations, or drill the section in 2 bits runs, pulling the
first at the base of the Slochteren. Preferred option from the team would be to aim for one bit run, especially when you
consider the time taken to trip at this depth.
2. Run a 9 5/8” GT motor or equivalent. This would probably not add much to the performance in the Slochteren, but may
help in the Carboniferous. The motor would certainly help reduce the shocks if more WOB is required.

WOB and ROP in the 12 1/4 section

30 25
ROP ROS DC
WOB
25
20
20
15
ROP (m/hr)
WOB (T)
15
10
10
5
5
0 0
2900 2950 3000 3050 3100 3150 3200 3250 3300 3350
Depth (m )
Figure 6-3: Analysis of ROP and WOB in 12 1/4" section

Figure 6-4: Shocks induced by the increasing WOB are visible as the orange dots in the lower part of the graph.

6.7. 9 ⅝” Liner
Started : 12/01/2002 @ 21:30 hrs
Finished : 19/01/2002 @ 07:30 hrs
Planned : 4.4 days
Actual : 6.4 days
NPT : 8.5 hrs
The objective was to isolate the Groningen Field by running and cementing the 9 ⅝" drilling liner 196 mTVD into the
carboniferous formation. This was a boundary condition for deeper drilling and the well would not continue if this was not
met. It was confirmed by:
1. Cement jog going as per plan.

2. USIT log showing good quality cement;
3. Good LOT at the 9 ⅝" shoe.
The main concerns/hazards in the section were: a failure of the non-standard 9 ⅝" integral liner hanger system, and losses in
the depleted reservoir during the cementation.
The cementation would require Class G Gasblok slurry @ 1.94 sg lead 150 m into the 14" casing.
The liner was run without problems; no resistance or losses were seen. The Hydraulic Rotating Flexlock II hanger was set with
120 bar and the HR Setting Tool was released with 170 bar. The ball seat in the ST Landing sub was sheared out with 280 bar.
No losses were observed. The liner was cemented without problems according to the programme.
The first USIT run stood-up on the TOL. The tool was pulled and a clean out trip was made. The USIT was then rerun
successfully. The log showed excellent cement quality over the entire length of the liner, and confirmed that zonal isolation of
the Slochteren had been achieved.
6.7.3. Highlights
+ The boundary condition for the well was satisfied i.e. Zonal Isolation of the Slochteren.
6.7.4. Lowlights
− NPT due to the USIT tool standing up at liner top.
• The two most important factors in the success of running and cementing the liner were:
1. Getting the Baker representative onsite 3 days early to check all the equipment and to bring the rig &
office team, up to speed.
2. Two dedicated pre-job meetings were held to ensure everybody agreed upon the running procedures,
and a plan of action was developed to deal with any contingencies.
• The depleted Slochteren can be cemented successfully without using low-density cements if you are able to keep the BHP
below the 1.4sg defined in the original study (see section 4.2).
• Consider cleaning out the TOL before running logging tools through it.

− The pressure profile of the Carboniferous couldn't be determined with the MDT tool, as the formation appeared to be
tight.
Drilling Data Log 8 ½” Section.

Bit selection
Planning Stage.
In the planning stage, Smith and Hughes were asked to submit with a bit proposal for the 8 ½”section. The main offset well for
the section was TJM-2, which had been drilled in 1971. As bit technology had moved on since then, the actually bits that were
used were not researched in great detail. Instead, the petrophysical data i.e. sonic log, was used to analysis and select the type
of bit. Both companies concluded that the section was PDC drillable, and eventually Hughes was selected.
Two mistakes were made in the planning phase:
1. The TJM-2 bits were not researched enough.

2. Cutting and core data from TJM-2 was not made available to quality check the bit analysis logs.
Both these items could have been used to quality check the output from the rock strength/drill ability models produced by the
bit companies and would have probably changed the initial selection.
Execution.
The table shows all the different bits and some parameters that were used to drill the 8 ½" section.
Run Bit In Out Total Hours ROP WOB Press. Condition Comments
No (m) (m) (m) (m/hr) (T) (bar)
8 GTX-G3 3362 3367 5 3.75 1.3 8 160 Was not graded Used to drill out
shoetrack
9 HC607 3367 3445 78 20 3.9 6 165 1,4,WT,T,X,I,NO,PR
10 MA31BEPX 3445 3558 113 38.25 3.0 6 185 1,3,WT,T,X,I,NO,PR
11 HC607 3558 3571 13 8.50 1.5 5 149 0,1,WT,T,X,I,NO,PR
12 MX18DX 3571 3580 9 13.50 0.7 9 168 1,1,NO,A,E,I,NO,PR
13 MA31BQPX 3580 3659 79 45.75 1.7 4 155 1,4,BT,S,X,I,LT,PR
14 SE3841L 3659 3756 97 61.50 1.6 9 158 2,8,RO,S,X,I,NO,PR
15 642GFPTX 3756 3918 162 84.75 1.9 7 277 8,8,HC,A,X,¼,WT,PR
16 642GFPTX 3918 4068 150 57.75 2.6 5 296 5,6,HC,T,X,I,PN,RIG
17 645GFPTX 4068 4506 438 174.50 2.5 4 292 3,4,WT,A,X,I,NO,LOG
18 DSX94 4506 4625 119 39.75 3.0 5 210 0,1,NO,A,X,I,NO,TD
The following graphs show the WOB and ROP trends of each bit together with some information about the lithology seen by
the bit.

Run 9: HC607
Run No Bit In Out Total Hours ROP WOB Press. (bar) Condition Comments
(m) (m) (m) (m/hr) (T)
9 HC607 3367 3445 78 20 3.9 6 165 1,4,WT,T,X,I,NO,PR
Conclusions
• Bit performed quite OK and drilled with the

highest average ROP of all the bits in this section.
• Bit could have drilled significantly more and was
pulled to early because expectations were too
high. This was a result of the ROP in the 12 ¼”
(same bit type) and the initial ROP estimate of
4m/hr.
• If the bit had been pushed through the sand it is
highly likely the ROP would have picked up in
the next shale section.
• Same as in the 12 ¼” section, once a wear flat has
developed on the bit, more WOB is required to
get the same depth of cut. However, the WOB is
limited by the BHA, motor, shocks etc.

Run 10: MA31BEPX
To try and improve performance, drilling continued with the proposed Smith bit (MA31BEPX).
(m) (m) (m) (m/hr) (T)
10 MA31BEPX 3445 3558 113 38.25 3.0 6 185 1,3,WT,T,X,I,NO,PR
Conclusions
• Variable ROP dependent on the formation being drilled.

Slower ROP in the sandstone sections.
• The bit was pulled too early as it was maintaining a ROP
of 1.5-2m/hr.
• Sandstones at this point were still PDC drillable. Cutting
and core analysis from TJM-2 indicate that the sands at
this point contained up to 40% quartz

Run 11: HC607
Running out of options so we decided to go in with the HC607.
(m) (m) (m) (m/hr) (T)
11 HC607 3558 3571 13 8.50 1.5 5 149 0,1,WT,T,X,I,NO,PR
Conclusions
• The interval drilled 100% sandstone, which didn’t drill any
faster when WOB was increased to 10 tonnes for the last
couple of metres.
• As confidence was lost in the first HC607 due to
'disappointing' performance, this bit was pulled to early.
The bit only drilled sandstone and wasn't pushed through
to the next given claystone layer.

Run 12: MX-18 DX
An MX-18 DX insert bit was run to try and improve performance in the upcoming sand layers.
(m) (m) (m) (m/hr) (T)
12 MX18DX 3571 3580 9 13.50 0.7 9 168 1,1,NO,A,E,I,NO,PR
Conclusions
• Only a maximum 10T WOB could be applied to the bit. The
resistivity tool in the BHA limited this. This was one of the main
factors why the bit did not drill faster, because 20T WOB was
probably required to crush the rock.
• It was later discovered that the WOB limit on the resistivity tool
was incorrect and actually 20T could be applied. However, this
information came to light after we had POOH.

Run 13: Smith MA31BQPX
(m) (m) (m) (m/hr) (T)
13 MA31BQPX 3580 3659 79 45.75 1.7 4 155 1,4,BT,S,X,I,LT,PR
Conclusion.
• Shocks (25G +) were reported by the MWD, which

correspond to the first sequence of interbedded
sands. These shocks probably caused the damage to
the cutters.
• Quartz content of sand layers increasing (becoming
harder & more abrasive) upto 70%.
• Bit performance steadily decreasing as sand/shale
ratio increases.
Lost teeth probably

caused by the initial
shocks.

Bit run 14: SE3841L.

This bit was a PDC bit with diamond impregnated discs behind the cutters, which we thought would help drill the abrasive
sands.
(m) (m) (m) (m/hr) (T)
14 SE3841L 3659 3756 97 61.50 1.6 9 158 2,8,RO,S,X,I,NO,PR
Conclusions:
BEFORE
• The interval drilled was made up of thin alternating sandstone
and silty claystone sections.
• Sand layers became increasingly quartz rich (upto 70%), and
thus not PDC drillable.
• Impregnated discs seemed to have little effect in this type of
formations. They also probably need to be rotated at a higher
RPM.
• Bit performance was poor due to the hard/abrasive ssts.
• Impregnated bits with turbines needed to drill these
sections.
Impregnated
discs
AFTER

Run 15: 642GFPTX

A Hycalog 642GFPTX impregnated diamond bit with additional TSP cutters was run in combination with a Neyrfor-Weir 6
⅝" Bent Housing Turbodrill.
(m) (m) (m) (m/hr) (T)
15 642GFPTX 3756 3918 162 84.75 1.9 7 277 8,8,HC,A,X,¼,WT,PR
Conclusions:
• The ROP's were constant regardless of lithology and
WOB, as can be seen in the graph.
• The bit and the lower part of the btm stabiliser were
¼” under gauge. Once the stabiliser started to
“drill” the formation erratic torques and a drop in
ROP were observed (see BIS graph).
• Sandstones v.hard, abrasive and cemented with
silica (70% quartz).
• The turbine required 120bar additional pressure.
• Correct bit selection and drive mechanism i.e.
grinding at high rotational speeds.
TSP cutters mounted on the

impregnated blade to make
the bit more aggressive and
improve performance in the
shale sections.

Drop in ROP Erratic torques
BIS drilling parameters graph showing erratic torques caused by the bit and stabiliser becoming under gauge.

Run 16: 642GFPTX
(m) (m) (m) (m/hr) (T)
16 642GFPTX 3918 4068 150 57.75 2.6 5 296 5,6,HC,T,X,I,PN,RIG
Conclusion.
• Similar performance as the first impregnated run.

• Bit could have drilled further but was pulled for a
BOP test.
• Sand/shale ratio gradually decreasing.
Impregnated Diamond
cutting structure still
visible.

Run 17: 642GFPTX
(m) (m) (m) (m/hr) (T)
17 645GFPTX 4068 4506 438 174.50 2.5 4 292 3,4,WT,A,X,I,NO,LOG
Conclusions.
• The bit drilled the longest interval (438 m) and was on bottom for 174.5 hrs.
Finally it was pulled because of an upcoming logging job.
• The formations drilled were predominately shale’s with some thin sandstone
beds. It appears that the sandstones were also getting softer and less abrasive.
• In hindsight it is possible a PDC bit could have drilled this section
Part of the TSP cutting structure

remaining.
This indicates that the formations
drilled were considerably less
abrasive than in run 15 & 16

Run 18: DSX94
The decision was made to run a Hycalog PDC bit with M/M because it was believed that the remaining formations were PDC
drillable and the Geologist wanted to improve cuttings quality.
(m) (m) (m) (m/hr) (T)
18 DSX94 4506 4625 119 39.75 3.0 5 210 0,1,NO,A,X,I,NO,TD
Conclusions
• ROP affected by formation changes.

• Formation PDC drillable.
• Stop/start drilling reduced the performance of the bit.

6.8. 8 ½" Hole
Started : 19/01/2002 @ 07:30 hrs

Finished : 09/03/2002 @ 07:00 hrs
Planned : 28.9 days
Actual : 51.5 days
NPT : 44.5 hrs
6.8.1. Planned Programme:
The plan for the section was to set the tapered string shoe 50 mTVD above the top of the objective to ensure that the objective
was not penetrated by mistake. This would be achieved by running 2 x VSP’s to reduce the depth uncertainty error from +/-
250m to +/-20m and having defined stop/control points throughout the section.
The operating envelope lower limit was governed by the 1.15-1.25 sg hydrostatic pressure prediction in the section, and the
mud weight required to maintain a stable well bore. To be on the safe side this limit has been set at 1.35 sg. The upper mud
weight limit has been set to 1.5 sg and was determined by the weakest formation in this section. This value has been
determined by analysing the losses that occurred in the TJM-2 Carboniferous formations.
The main risks and hazards in this section were the reservoir depth uncertainty and thus drilling accidentally into the main
objective, unstable coal measures, unstable shale’s, hard and abrasive layers and increasing hole temperatures.
Interval : 3362 - 4625 m.

Deviation : 0.90º at 4600.3 metres. Max deviation. 1.46º at 4292.4 metres.
Mud : VCM, 1.35 - 1.43 sg.
The LOT at the 9 5/8”shoe was carried out using a DLT packer to safeguard the cement around the liner. Unfortunately the
formation was fractured during the test (see section 4.2) and the resulting stable closure pressure was 1.54 bar/ 10m (EMW of
1.57sg).
When drilling started, the mud was changed out to 'Enhanced Standard HTHP VCM' (1.35 sg). Drilling performance was not
as expected and it took a number of different bits and BHA’s to come up with the optimum selection i.e. a turbine with
impregnated bit. A full description and an analysis of the bits chosen can be found in the learning and recommendations
section below.
The two VSP's were carried out at 3918m & 4506m respectively and reduced the uncertainty error to an acceptable margin of
+/-20m. After the second VSP the bit was changed back to a PDC bit and the real time pore pressure analysis, plus the HPHT
procedures began. At 4523 mAH, with a mudweight of 1.35 sg, the well was closed in after a positive drilling break and both
drillpipe and annular (trapped) pressures were seen. The well was circulated over the choke with the driller’s method and then
circulated to a mudweight of 1.41sg (see recommendations and learning’s below). Drilling continued until the pore pressure
prediction suggested we were getting close to balance, and the decision was taken (at night) to increase the mudweight to
1.45sg. However, upon reflection in the morning, it was considered that the weight had been raised unnecessarily and the
weight was reduced back to 1.41sg. Section TD was finally called 4625mAHRT.
Logging was then carried out but unfortunately no pressure points could be obtained due to tight formations.
6.8.3. Highlights
+ The stop points, tollgate meetings and the VSP’s all helped to ensure that the objective was not penetrated by
mistake.
+ The depth uncertainty error of the objective was reduced from ±250m to +…, -….
+ The mud was extremely stable under the high temperatures.
6.8.4. Lowlights
− Poor drilling performance that cost an additional 3 weeks of drilling time.

Main Learning Points (Operations).
1. Bits were initially pulled too early because expectations were too high.
2. 25-30% more sandstone was drilled compared to TJM-2.
3. The optimum PDC bit for durability and performance is something in between the HC607 & MA31BQPX, possibly
similar to the DSX94. High strength PDC cutters is preferred, and good stabilisation is required
4. If rock bits are run, ensure enough WOB is available to achieve optimum drilling parameters.
5. The sandstones become increasingly quartz rich, and are not PDC drillable between 3650m & 4100m.
6. The sandstone packages could be correlated to TJM-2, and helped in developing the bit strategy.
Future Bit Recommendations For The Section.
Aggressive Approach
Runs Type Description Drive From To (m) ROP Comments

(m) Avg.
1 run PDC Heavy set 13mm GT mud motor 3350 3600 - 4m/hr Accept that the sands will drill slower
cutters. Similar to or equivalent. 3700 and push the bit past these into the
DSX94 design. next shale sequence. Bit will quit
when the sands get more abrasive at
around 3600-3700m.
≈ 2 runs IP 645GFPTX or similar Turbine or 3600 - 4100 – 2.5m/hr 2 runs are estimated to get through
high-speed 3700 4300 the abrasive sands. With the first bit
mudmotor (i.e. quitting around 3900m (run 15).
600rpm).
1 to 2 PDC Heavy set 13mm GT mud motor 4100 – 4615 3.5m/hr Formations predominately shale with
runs cutters. Similar to or equivalent. 4300 some thin sand layers. Sands appear
DSX94 design. to be less abrasive.
Conservative Approach
Runs Type Description Drive From To (m) ROP Comments

(m) Avg.
≈ 3-4 IP 645GFPTX or similar Turbine or 3350 4500 2.5m/hr Run impregnated bits from the start.
runs high-speed
mudmotor (i.e.
600rpm).
1 run PDC Heavy set 13mm GT mud motor 4100 – 4615 3.5m/hr Changed over to PDC for the last run
cutters. Similar to or equivalent. 4300 of the section.
DSX94 design
The economics would have to be run on both proposals before a decision could be made, but both approaches will definitely
drill the section much quicker.
Running the impregnated bits on a high speed motor might be preferably to running the turbine w.r.t to cost &
pressure drop.
Well Control Incident.
The well was closed in on a positive drilling break at 4523 mAH and the well killed. The mudweight was then raised to
1.41sg. Post analysis concludes that no influx entered the wellbore and the well was not under balanced or close to balance.
This conclusion is based on the following evidence:
1. Bit had just been changed from an impregnated bit to a PDC bit. The PDC bits ROP is much more sensitivity to
formation changes and pronounces drilling breaks.
2. Close in pressures were caused by temperature affects. No fingerprints had been carried out yet so it was difficult to
determine between the two. Later fingerprinting showed similar build-ups.
3. No pit gain was seen in the active system.
4. The flow rate out did not increase through the EKD (early kick detection) system.
5. No evidence of gas on surface after drillers first circulation

6. Pit volume during kill didn’t follow standard well kill response. Leaking valves were the cause of the observed drops
in active pit volume, not gas being separated in the pore boy degasser.
Recommendations
• Fingerprint the well at an early stage e.g. when the downhole temperature is > 140degC. Then repeat the fingerprints
after every 300-400m.
• Do not raise the mudweight on assumptions, which are not correct.
Gas Trend
Learnings
• Drilling with the impregnated bit increased the gas readings by an order of magnitude (1000ppm to 10000ppm).
• After a round trip, and during the initial circulation, high gas readings were observed from the whole open hole section.
This peak value was always an order of magnitude more than the drilled gas readings.
This increase is difficult to explain, but it is unlikely that gas was seeping into the wellbore because the well was
overbalanced. The more likely explanation is that more gas comes out of the oil phase when the mud is cold, and thus
higher gas readings on surface are observed.
Recommendations
• Careful monitoring and recording of gas trends is required throughout the section, so that when problems occur, people
can quickly distinguish between the wells normal & abnormal behaviour. Doing this saves time and reassures people that
the well is in a stable condition.
Pore Pressure Analysis.
Real-time pore pressure analysis was started at the 2nd VSP point. The main parameters used to predict the pore pressures
were: resisitvity, dx exponent, gas trend, gas composition, evidence of cavings and the cuttings. Overall the pore pressure
service was of value, and did indicate an increase in pore pressure towards the top of the objective.
The main problem with the service is that all the models are based on a setting like the Gulf of Mexico (young, rapidly buried
basin), which is not the case in UHM-2, and thus all predictions must be treated with certain caution. Highlighted below is a
list of points and recommendations if this service is used again:
1. The pore pressures should be given as a range i.e. 1.25-1.35bar/10m and not as a single figure.
2. The fitting of trends to the resistivity data and the dx exponents needs to be QC. The trends were fitted based on
experience from the Gulf of Mexico and sometimes didn’t fit the data (see below). This had the affect of exaggerating
the deviation from the trend line, and thus an overestimation of the pore pressure value occurred. This had a direct
affect towards the end of the section when the mudweight was raised from 1.41sg to 1.45sg unnecessarily.

The dx exponent trend (in

black) was fitted as a deviated
line (in line with what is seen in
the Gulf of Mexico). However,
the best fit is actually a straight
line (red). Similar trend lines
were also fitted to the resistivity
data.
The dx exponent trend was

continued after the bit was
changed from a impreg to PDC.
This line should have been
discontinued and restarted for
the new bit type. Because this
was not done, the deviation
away from the trend was
exaggerated, and the pore
pressure increase over
estimated.

6.9. 10 ¾" / 9 ⅞" / 7" Casing
Started : 09/03/2002 @ 07:00 hrs

Finished : 21/03/2002 @ 09:00 hrs
Planned : 8.2 days
Actual : 12.1 days
NPT : 18.75 hrs
The objective for this section was to achieve zonal isolation between the potential reservoir below, and the carboniferous
formations and the Groningen field above. This was a prerequisite before drilling ahead. Other objectives were to ensure that
we had a “pressure vessel” for drilling into the objective. The required TOC was at 3700mAHRT.
The main hazards and risks in this section were: The heavy casing string, poor cement bond around the shoe & not getting the
casing to TD.
To maximum the chance of success, the following measures were taken:

1. Check trip made across the open hole section
2. Actual volume of the casing was determined by measuring 25% of the actual ID’s (more accurate displacement
volume).
3. Because of the tapered string configuration, a standard shoetrack volume of 3-4jnts, was equivalent to < 0.5% of the
pump efficiency. So to ensure that the shoetrack wasn’t over displaced (volumetric mistakes/mud compressibility
factor) a 9jnt shoe was run.
4. Philosophy was not to pump to bump. Maximum displacement volume was the theoretical volume calculated from
the pipe ID’s, with a pump efficiency of 97% and then half the shoetrack volume. Once this had been reached
displacement would be stopped.
5. Ran 3 high temperature float valves.
HPHT measures:
1. Thickest 10 ¾” pipes were placed in the top section of the string
2. All connections were jammed.
3. Vallourec field engineer was on site to assist W’ford and ensure proper make-up
The casing was run and hung-off successfully. During the cement job much high circulation pressures were observed (see
overleaf). It is difficult to explain these additional pressures, but after some anxious moments the casing was cemented
successfully.
The CBL confirmed zonal isolation had been achieved around the shoe. However, a cement channel had placed TOC at 3150m
instead of the planned 3600m. This would later have a major affect on the operating envelope for a potential well test.
Tapered String Cement plugs
70cm

Graph showing the CEMCADE estimated circulating pressures vs. the actual
6.9.3. Highlights
+ The tapered casing was run and cemented as planned, and zonal isolation was achieved.
6.9.4. Lowlights
- TOC was planeed at 3700m but a in guage hole plus cement channel put the TOC inside the 9 5/8”liner at 3150m. This
had an impact on the ability to perform a well test.
• Better centralisation might have prevented the cement channel forming.

• The additional measures and time taken, all helped to increase the chance of a successful job.

6.10. 5 ⅞" Hole
Started : 21/03/2002 @ 09:00 hrs

Finished : 31/05/2002 @ 16:30 hrs
Planned : 16.7 days
Actual : 71.3 days
NPT : 478.75 hrs
The main objectives were to determine the lithology / reservoir potential of the objective section and evaluate the associated
pore content (hydrocarbon) by penetrating 100 m into the top of the objective and carrying out a full petro-logical evaluation
of the formation.
The section is vertical with an initial section TD of 100 mTVD into the top of the objective. The top objective has been
defined as the seismic reflector seen at ≈4700m, and final TD will be 300 mTVD into the objective. Depending on hole
conditions an 18 m core will be cut after the first logging point at 100 mTVD. The mud weight will be based on the results of
the LOT plus any indications of overpressure seen in the 8 ½" or 5 ⅞" section. The UHM-2 HPHT drilling guidelines will be
used in this hole section.
The main hazards and risks in this section were: A gas kick, increasing pressure, corrosive gases (CO2, H2S), losses, poor
cuttings quality and an unknown evaluation.
Operating Window
Operating window objective
Pressure (bars)
600 625 650 675 700 725 750 775 800 825 850
4500
4600
SEAL
4700
Formation strength at the shoe
Seal Strength
4800
Estimated Pore Pressure In 8 1/2" section
Mudweight 8 1/2"
4900 Mudweight 5 7/8"
TVD (metres)
MW + ECD
Losses (MW + estimated ECD)
5000
Formation Pressure (RFT point)
Water Gradient
5100 Top of Objective
tapered string shoe
Max gas column based on RFT point
5200
5300
5400
5500
The LOT was carried out at the 5 7/8” shoe with a downhole pressure gauge. After some debate and a retest, the leak-off value
was confirmed at 1.78 bar/10 m. Based on the leak-off data the initial mudweight to drill into the objective was set at 1.5sg.

A series of HPHT fingerprint tests were carried out to establish the operating limits and the wellbore characteristics.
Unfortunately the APWD (memory only) failed (cooked due to high temps), rendering most of the tests worthless.
The section was then drilled as per UHM-2 HPHT procedures to 4751m, where two attempts were made to take an 18m core.
The first attempt yielded 7m of core before jamming, and the second yielded 0m. The core and the cuttings confirmed we were
drilling a carbonate rock.
Drilling then continued with various trips made for logging runs. A good pressure point was taken at 5150m and it confirmed
the pressure to be 705bar (1.35bar/10m). Losses were encountered at 4751m, 5123 – 5170m, and 5238m respectively. The
latter depth being the severest, with an initially rate of 10m3/hr. Each time the losses were cured, and drilling continued until a
drop in performance was observed at 5324m. On surface it was found that a nozzle had been left downhole.
The last section was logged and then an attempt was made to fish the lost nozzle with a wireline magnet. Unfortunately, half
of the magnet was left downhole. Two attempts were made to fish the magnet. The first attempt with a die collar was
unsuccessfully, and the second with an overshot recovered the magnet without the lost nozzle. A junk mill was then run to mill
away the nozzle.
Drilling continued with a new MGR16PX bit and the same BHA configuration. Performance was a lot lower than expected
with average ROP’s between 0.5-1m/hr. This seemed to coincide with a formation change back to more clastic sediments.
The bit was pulled for performance and a logging run was performed. A new bit was then run, but this did not improve
performance, and the bit had to be pushed very slowly to well TD at 5423m.
Bit In (m) Out (m) Total (m) Hours ROP (m/hr) WOB (T) RPM Press. (bar) Condition
MGR16PX (1) 4630 5333 693 226.5 3.1 5-7 120 100-140 1,3,LN,N,X,I,CT,PR
FC264LI Core 4751 4758 7 4 1.75 2-4 100 135 1,1,NO,A,X,I,NO
MGR16PX (2) 5333 5350 17 56.75 0.3 5-10 100 150 1,3,BT,C,X,I,JD,PR
M18PX 5351 5423 72 141.25 0.51 5-8 120 150 6,2,RO,C,X,I,CT,LOG
MGR16PX (2)

M18PX

Drilling Data Log 5 7/8” section.

6.10.3. HPHT Equipment/Set-up

Pumping System
EQUIPMENT
¾ 15K, H2S trim, side entry sub with 3" 2202 WECOconnection &
NC50 DP connections.
Kick single Standpipe ¾ 5 x 15K, H2S trim, lo-torq valves.
¾ 1 x 10K, lo-torq valve.
Manifold ¾ 2 x 4 1/6" flange - 3" 2202 WECOconn xo's.
¾ 2 x 2 9/16" flange - 3" 2202 WECOconn xo's.
¾ 1 x 15Kkill pump
¾ 1 x 10Kcmt unit with 3 x 10m3 or 7 m3 mix tanks.
¾ 3" 2202 WECOchicksan lines H2S trim(yellow) with safety line &
clamps on each side (chicksans (seals) should also be VCM
resistance)
¾ 3" 1502 WECOchicksan lines (green) with safety line &clamps on
each side (chicksans (seals) should also be VCMresistance).
¾ 1 x Cement bulker (cement needs to be airated)
¾ Cement additives.
Low-torque valves ¾ 2 x centrifugal pumps with flowbypass.
¾ Pressure gauges required at the choke manifold, for the annulus and
kick single (DP) lines.
¾ 2 x X/O3" fig 2202 x fig 1502, just on the 10Kside of the 15Klo-
Side-entry sub torq valve (from10Klines to 15Klines)
¾ 2 x 3" - 15Kfig 2202 Tpieces to connect the 15Kand the 10K
lines.
¾ H2S trimmaterials: in accordance with NACEMR0175 Sections
3-8.
15KKILL
ANNULUS connections: PUMP
- Upper kill line
- Wellhead side outlet
10KCEMENT
UNIT
Personnel &Timing
¾ Cement unit with one centrifugal pump to be rigged up to the standpipe manifold
fromthe 2nd VSP point at ≈ 4300m(≈ 40 days).
¾ 15Kkill pump and the rest of the equipment to be rigged up and fully functional
before drilling out the tapered string shoe (≈ 25 days).
¾ 1 cement &kill pump operator to be on 24hr standby (within 15 minutes of the
location) fromthe 2nd VSP point until the end of the well (≈ 40 days). The Cent. Cent.
operator is required to come to the location at least once a day to report in and pump pump
check/turnover the equipment.
¾ During the drilling of the seal/objective boundary 24hrs coverage on site (2 days)
is required.
¾ Opeartors must be able to work with breathing apparatus; must be H2S trained;
and reliable/experienced pump/cement operators. HPHT expereince would be
prefered.
MUDTANKS

HP separator set-up.
Rig flare from

poor boy degasser
3
T
AF
DR

BOP’s & Accumulators
2 accumulators were required to provide for the additional

functionality of a 15K system
i.e 5 x hydraulic valves on the choke manifold
3 x pipe rams
2 x choke lines (HCR’s)
10K annular
Double pipe rams

TOP 5”-3 ½ variable”
BTM Shear
3 ½” fixed
5” fixed
Early Kick Detection
Line back to shaker header box
Test graph of the rigs EKD system,

showing the sensitivity of the system.
UHM-2 EKD Flow Test - 6 Feb 2002
2500.00
Rig Pump Flowrate
Connection from the flow line.
EKD Total Flowrate
2250.00
Ideal set-up is to have it coming out of
the bell nipple, but there was no space
because of the 15K BOP.
Flowrate (LPM)
2000.00
This had an impact on the amount of

1750.00
106 L Influx Pumped
into EKD
50 L Influx Pumped
into EKD
13 L Influx Pumped
into EKD flow the sensor could accommodate due
to trapped air.
1500.00
16:55:00 16:55:48 16:56:33 16:57:18 16:58:03 16:58:48 16:59:33 17:00:18 17:01:03 17:01:48 17:02:33 17:03:18 17:04:03 17:04:44 17:05:29 17:06:14 17:06:59
Drillers screen. Parallel coriolis sensors.

100% of flow.
Maximum flow 2100l/min
Drillers traffic light.

Glycol Injection
Manual choke
Glycol injection pumps
Inlet upstream from the choke

Inlets

6.10.4. Fingerprinting
Test 1: Instrumentation Calibration & Synchronisation
Test 2: Static mud weight on btm.

- No data due to APWD failure.
Test 3: Slow circulation rates
Test 4: Open choke circulation

Test 5: Dummy flow check
DUMMY FLOWCHECK - 21 MARCH 16:15 - 16:45 hrs
0.700 70.0
60.0
0.600
50.0
0.500
40.0
Triptank level (m3)
Flowrate (L/min)
0.400
30.0
0.300
20.0
0.200
Triptank level 10.0
Flowrate
0.100
0.0
0.000 -10.0
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
Time (min)
Test 6: Trapped pressure when closing-in:

Trapped pressure vs time
5
Pressure (bar)
1
Surface pressure
0
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
Time (min)
Test 7: Flowrates/ECD’s
Test 8: Swab/Surge
For the failed tests it was decided not to re-run the APWD and rely on the MI virtual hydraulic data instead. The dummy
flowchecks were continued throughout the section.
Gas trends (background, btms-up etc) were continuously monitored and recorded. These provide a valuable reference point
throughout the section.
6.10.5. ECD's and Virtual Hydraulics
MI modelled ECD values at different circulating rates using a virtual hydraulics package. This gave the following figures:
Circulation Rate 0 LPM 600 LPM 800 LPM 1000 LPM

Annular Pressure Loss 0 SG EMW 0.03 SG EMW 0.04 SG EMW 0.045 SG EMW
EMW at 4650 mAH 1.49 SG 1.56 SG 1.57 SG 1.595 SG
Extra BHP Over Static 0 + ~ 30 bar + ~ 40 bar + ~ 48 bar
- Pipe rotation was modelled to have no significant effect on the BHP
MI also modelled Swab and Surge effects:
RIH 30 seconds / stand 60 seconds / stand

BH MW Increase + 0.15 SG + 0.09 SG
BHP Increase + 75 bar + 45 bar
POOH 30 seconds / stand 60 seconds / stand 120 seconds / stand

BH MW Increase + 0.13 SG + 0.08 SG + 0.06SG
BHP Increase + 65 bar + 40 bar + 30 bar

However the failure of the APWD tool meant that the model could not be checked against field data. The figures were used
therefore to estimate the effect of changes in drilling parameter values, rather than to choose the values themselves.
ECD's were rechecked after the losses seen from 5224m onwards, as flowrates were lowered to try to prevent losses restarting.
MI supplied the following figures.
Circulation Rate 0 LPM 400 LPM 500 LPM 600 LPM 700 LPM 800 LPM
SPP 0bar 88bar 119bar 142bar 167bar 196bar
ECD at Shoe - 1.505 SG 1.509 SG 1.513 SG 1.517 SG 1.521 SG
ECD at 5400mAH 1.464 SG 1.508 SG 1.514 SG 1.517 SG 1.522 SG 1.528 SG
Extra BHP Over Static 0 + ~ 23 bar + ~ 26 bar + ~ 28 bar + ~ 31 bar + ~ 34 bar
6.10.6. Highlights
+ The Versa-clean HT mud remained in excellent condition despite the high temperatures.
+ Excellent rig crew performance especially w.r.t to the HPHT procedures.
+ Drilled an additional 400m in the objective.
+ Excellent bit performance between 4625-5300m.
+ Pore pressure measurement at 5154.5m obtained by MDT tool.
+ A formation fluid sample was retrieved at 5154.5 m in temperatures higher than the temperature rating of the used MDT
tool.
6.10.7. Lowlights
− Not being able to conclusively confirm the presence of mobile gas.

− APWD failing due to the high temperatures.
− Lost a bit nozzle downhole while drilling, presumably due to high temperatures. (see learning points). This caused bit
damage and low ROPs.
− Fishing magnet swivel unscrewed, again presumably due to high temperatures, leaving the magnet fishing tool downhole.
− High BH temperatures caused several logging tool failures.
Leak-off Test.
To eliminate the temperature affects on the mud, the leak-off test was performed with a real-time downhole pressure gauge.
However, due to a communication breakdown, only the surface pressure (cement unit) was plotted and use as the primary
reading. This later caused confusion when the downhole pressure deviated before the surface pressure, and no downhole
pressure plot was available for analysis.
Therefore, if a downhole pressure gauge is run the following procedures should be used:
1. The downhole pressure readings should be recorded and plotted, and these should be used as the primary pressures.
2. If the downhole pressure gauge cannot be read from the cement unit (i.e. its in the wireline unit) use radio’s to
communicate between the two.
3. When the downhole pressure response is longer, record Pinitial after 1min and P2min after three.
Lost Nozzles.
A nozzle was lost downhole at 5333m. To prevent this happening again either lock the nozzles in place with something like
bakerloc (check temperature rating) or do not run nozzles at all.
Because we had already been using the largest nozzle size on the bit (for LCM pumpablility), and the small increase in flow
area would not affect the hydraulics, it was decided to opt for the no nozzle option on the remaining bit runs.
Fishing.
Two options were available to fish the nozzle:

1. Run a milling assembly and mill the nozzle away (safe, “guaranteed” option).
2. Attempt to fish with a wireline magnet.
It was decided to try first with the wireline magnet because potentially it could save a round trip. However, during the run the
wireline magnet unscrewed and was left downhole.
Two important points can be learnt from this incident:
1. Do not run unknown, unplanned equipment into a high temperature well (especially wireline).
2. In this type of well (deep and high temperature) always go for the safe, “guaranteed” option first, even though
it may take a bit longer.
Cavings
Blocky shale cavings were observed when the mudweight was reduced from 1.5sg to 1.47sg. The cavings then continued
throughout the drilling phase and the calliper log showed a large 14”-16” washout in the rat hole below the shoe. The
consensus is that a high pore pressure in the seal did not cause these cavings, but instead, they were caused by a combination
of lowering the mudweight, temperature cycling, and an existing washout.
To combat this problem in the future, the following principles should be followed:
1. Rat hole below the production casing should be < 5m.

2. Do not lower the mudweight.
3. Set the casing deeper i.e. closer to the top of the objective.
Unfortunately, the uncertainty in the well didn’t allow us to follow these principles.
HPHT procedures.
1. The crews successfully implemented the HPHT procedures.

2. Continuous Fingerprinting is essential in all high temperature wells.
3. Closing in on a drilling break was probably a little bit over the top, especially when you have the EKD system that can
detect a differential flow of 20l.
4. Simulating connections before an actual connection is not necessary and is double dipping.
The HPHT procedures were conservative, but because of the uncertainty in the well they were fully justified. Even now that
the pressure is known, and is < 10K, I would still recommend using a modified, less conservative version of these procedures.
The main areas I would relax on are:
1. Use 10K well control equipment.
2. Do not use a drilling stand.
3. Do not simulate connections.
4. Do not close in on a drilling break.

The remainder of the drilling procedures and equipment (i.e. cement truck, kick single) I would keep in place.
Fingerprinting tests.
The downhole fingerprinting tests were unsuccessful because the APWD sub failed due to high temperatures. If these tests are
carried out in the future it is important to:
1. Get a higher rated APWD sub,

2. Run it in real time and not memory mode, so you can see if it has failed or not,
3. Do not attempt to run a lower temp tool and stage it into the well. The problem here is that you always have to run the
tool into hot mud before you can circulate and cool the mud down.
Cameron ‘D’ Rubber Element.
The Cameron ‘D’ rubber element leaked during a BOP test and had to be replaced. A visual inspection of the element showed
that it had been in poor condition for sometime, and we were lucky that the leak was not discovered during a well control
incident. It is not clear whether the damage occurred during the drilling phase of the well, or it was in a bad condition from the
start, and this was missed or not checked when the 15K BOP had been inspected in the Cameron yard.
Used New
In future HPHT wells, or where new/different BOP’s are rigged-up, it is important that all sealing elements are checked
properly and the history is known. This information should then be recorded and be part of the inspection report. It may also
be necessary to physically check the element after so many hours have been drilled through it; however, this is a lot of hassle.
Wireline Logging
In wildcat exploration wells such as UHM-2, the geology is driving the logging depth and program. This means that
everything has to be done on the fly, and of course this is a recipe for lots of NPT. In situations like this it is impossible not
tohave some mishaps, but communications can be improved by all the involved parties (Schlumberger field and office rep,
petrophysicist, ops engineer, snr well engineer, DSV) by sitting round the same table and discussing the proposed program.
Unfortunately this was not carried out, and maybe if we had, we would have reduced the amount of NPT.
Hanging Off The Drill String on a DLT packer.
The wearbushing could not be pulled to perform a BOP test because the lockdown pin was bent. To remove the wearbushing
the BOP’s need to be removed while still in OH. In order to have a barrier in the well, whilst the BOP’s were off, it was
decided at the weekend to hang-off the drill string on a DLT packer.
The problem setting a DLT packer is that the dies dig into the soft carbon steel and can produce localised notches, which will
reduce its burst rating, and will provide ready made points for stress corrosion cracking. This issue had been highlighted but
was missed when the decision was made.

This was not such a major issue in UHM-2 as the reservoir was a lot more benign than the design case.
6.11. Abandonment
Started : 31/05/2002 @ 16:30 hrs

Finished : 18/06/2002 @ 20:00 hrs
Planned : 9.4 days
Actual : 18.1 days
NPT : 37.45 hrs
The well was abandon as per the well sketch below.

6.11.2. Highlights
+ Cutting and recovering the casing strings went quickly.

+ Permeable zones were isolated.
6.11.3. Lowlights
− Cement plug 4 was contaminated with VCM and failed to set. The plug had to be repeated.
− The swivel parted when recovering the casing (see incident report 21)
− Incident (near miss) with the top drive turning unexpectedly and the elevator hitting a crew member (see incident report
22)
None.
7. Time and Cost Review
7.1. Time and Cost Overview
* Preliminary Rig-site figures
Time & Cost Review UHM-2 (Rev 1) Planned Actual Difference Planned Cost Actual Cost Cost Variance
Time Time (prelim rigsite/SAP) (prelim rig site)
Operation (days) (days) (days) (mln Euro) (mln Euro) (mln Euro)
1: Rigmove to UHM 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.2 1.1 -0.2
2: Drill 26" 6.9 7.2 0.2 1.6 1.3 -0.2
3: Casing 20" 4.4 9.1 4.7 0.8 1.5 0.7
4: Drill 17 1/2" 11.1 13.8 2.7 1.9 2.1 0.2
5: Casing 14" 6.6 12.3 5.7 0.8 1.4 0.6
6: Drill 12 1/4" 5.5 5.6 0.1 0.7 0.9 0.2
7: Liner 9 5/8" 4.4 3.9 -0.6 0.7 0.7 -0.1
8: Drill 8 1/2" 28.9 51.5 22.7 4.0 5.6 1.6
9: Casing tapered 8.2 12.1 3.9 1.7 2.8 1.1
10: Drill 5 7/8" 16.7 71.3 54.7 2.3 7.3 5.0
11: Abandonmt 6.4 18.1 11.8 0.9 1.7 0.8
Planned time Actual time Difference Planned Cost Actual Cost Cost Variance
(days) (days) (days) (mln Euro) (mln Euro) (mln Euro)
Total 99.0 204.9 105.9 16.6 26.4 9.8
7.2. Event Assessment Reports
EAR # DATE NPT (HOURS) DESCRIPTION

001 29-11-2001 0.0 Wrong size motorsleeve delivered by Anadrill
002 29-11-2001 1.25 Unable to operate 3rd mudpump properly because off tripping SCR
003 29-11-2001 0.5 Leaking 3" gatevalves on pumpmanifolds rigpumps #1 and #3
004 28-11-2001 2.0 Malfunctioning TDS, Unintentionally rotating LH
005 01-12-2001 0.5 Screens from suction lines clogged due to inabaility to use hoppers properly
006 03-12-2001 1.0 X/O between Topdrive and La Fleur too long
007 06-12-2001 6.0 Difficulties to disconnect Drillquip connector. Probably due to debris
008 09-12-2001 2.5 Installed flow nipple
009 10-12-2001 17.5 Leaking seal on annular preventer
010 12-12-2001 10.0 Wet electrical connection causing unexpected starting of mud pumps
011 13-12-2001 0.5 Box on drill collar found to be too short to run. Had to be laid back down
012 17-12-2001 0.5 Mud motor started chunking and losing rubber
013 18-12-2001 0.0 Sleeve breaker broke while attempting to breake a 17 ¼" sleeve
014 22-12-2001 18.0 Cooling elements of mudcooler not correctly made up and leaking seal of the
centrifugal pump
015 01-01-2002 50 Wellhead housing parted from starter head while pressure test wellhead and
BOP
016 04-01-2002 7 Pumps iced up / Lo torques leaking / Chart recorder not operational/Pressure
relief valve leaking
017 04-01-2002 1.0 Leaking seal PTT during P-testing
018 04-01-2002 3.25 Leaking seal hand choke / not functioning auto choke / broken spindle
connection
019 09-12-2001 0.0 Miscellaneous problems with mudcooler
020 23-12-2001 0.0 Cables from the mudlogging unit to the rigfloor and flowline where damaged
by a forklift while unloading casing
021 12-01-2002 2.0 Dirty sensor on Pick-up-lay-down machine caused downtime

022 15-01-2002 2.0 Malfunctioning air hammer and hydraulic spanner while tightening bonnet
bolts
023 15-01-2002 2.0 Leaks found in various parts of the BOP / manifold / standpipe during BOP-
testing
024 17-01-2002 4.0 No communication between USIT / CBL logging tool and surface
025 30-01-2002 1.0 During P-testing a leak in the wash pipe in the TDS was found
026 06-02-2002 0.0 Mud cooler performance lower than expected due to unknown reasons
027 07-02-2002 0.0 No failure but an assement of the flowtest done to check sensitivity of EKD
028 08-02-2002 3.5 Ignition box could not detonate dynamic seismic charges
029 09-02-2002 2.0 When runnig VSP survey some dynamite charges could not be detonated
030 09-02-2002 6.5 VSI transmission cartridge thermally cut out at 161 C
031 15-02-2002 0.5 Lever for crown protection was bend when block cable touched it
032 15-02-2002 4.75 Wheel off depth encoder fell off; Retaing plate fell off when repairing wheel
033 17-02-2002 1.0 Miscommunication between generator and SCR because off ground problem
034 24-02-20023 1.5 Pump and suctionline for triptank were plugged
035 26-02-2002 2.5 Unable to apply hydraulic force to piston for rotary tong
036 28-02-2002 0.0 Stop collar of spir-o-liser parted when tightening set screws
037 05-03-2002 2.5 Signal problems between sonic and caliper cartridges
038 06-03-2002 1.0 MSCT tool stopped working during coring operation
039 06-03-2002 3.0 MSCT backup tool would not work at all
040 10-03-2002 4.75 Misalignment between RT and BOP caused standing up of casing collar
041 18-03-2002 0.75 Leaking hydraulic hose coupling from iron roughneck had to be changed out
042 18-03-2002 2.25 Sensor from PU/LD machine failed
043 19-03-2002 1.5 Several problems with iron roughneck
044 21-03-2002 0.5 Needle from from wireline lubricator leaked
045 23-03-2002 0.0 Wireline battery failure du to high downhole temperatures
046 30-03-2002 1.5 Worn out eye for height adjustment on topdrive system
047 31-03-2002 0.75 Leaking hose connection from mudbox to the flowline
048 31-03-2002 1.25 Leaking topdrive hydraulic connection
049 03-04-2002 0.0 Washed out pre-drilled hole in core barrel
050 04-04-2002 1.0 Small leak in hydraulic system topdrive torque wrench
051 08-04-2002 3.75 Logging tool failure because flooded with mud due to failing o-ring seal
052 17-04-2002 0.0 Weco end connection was a threaded line pipe connection - banned for use in
Shell/Nam operations
053 18-04-2002 1.75 Sampling module not delivered in time to rig
054 19-04-2002 6.25 Sampling line blocked while attempting downhole fluid sample
055 24-04-2002 0.0 Standoffs damaged while pulling out of hole
056 24-04-2002 147 Bit nozzle unscrewed while drilling
057 25-04-2002 180 Swivel unscrewed/detached from logging assembly.
058 05-05-2002 1.5 Air in compressor unit arppeared to be too moisterous.
059 05-05-2002 2.0 Remove idle wiring on Trafo's of generators.
060 10-05-2002 49.3 Unable to back out tie-down bolt to recover the wearbushing for BOP test.
061 10-05-2002 0.75 Changed out the electric socket on the hydraulic unit.
062 14-05-2002 74.0 Packer element on the annular BOP failed during 10K testing
063 16-05-2002 4.5 Valves would not pressure test.
064 26-05-2002 10.25 Pitgain - circulated well clean twice (EAR was never written)
065 31-05-2002 2.75 Repaired SCR unit.
066 07-06-2002 3.5 3 ½" DP does not roll off PU/LD machine - kickers are worn.
067 10-06-2002 1.5 Change out Weatherford tong for Franks high torque power tong.
068 12-06-2002 0.5 Block which controls ascent/decent of pipe on ramp stuck in position.
069 15-06-2002 1.0 Unable to circulate through plug setting tool (after set plug).
Total NPT (hours): 665.8

7.3. Benchmark with HPHT wells in the North Sea.
HPHT wells in the North Sea & Other Areas
Total Days
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700

14000
Other HPHT North Sea
Shearwater
15000 F18 Lima
F18 Lima
Average
16000
Kashagan
Best in class
17000 L02-Bravo
Level 3 Estimate Project 2001
(vertical)
UHM-2 actual
UHM-2 actual
18000 Tjuchem 2
L02-Bravo
19000 Kashagan
Depth (AHBDF)
Best Shearwater
Tjuchem-2 Burlington deep wells (USA)
20000
21000
22000
23000
Burlington exploration well

24000
25000 Lastest Burlington Well
26000

7.4. Non Productive Time (NPT)
UHM-2 (Rev 1) NPT - % of total Time

Total operating hours:
85.1%
Surface equipm ent

1.3%
Total operating hours:

Sub-Surface equipm ent
Surface equipment 6.7%
Sub-Surface equipment
Other Top Drive System
Top Drive System
0.5% 0.6%
Hoisting equipment
Logging
Circulating system 0.6% Hoisting equipm ent
BOP + Wellhead 0.1%
Instrumentation Well flow / control Circulating system

0.3% 0.3%
Seismic instruments
Well flow / control BOP + Wellhead
Seism ic instrum ents
Logging 0.1% 4.3%
Instrum entation
Other 0.1%
UHM-2 (Rev 1) NPT - % of total NPT Time
Hoisting equipm ent Circulating system

0.8% 2.2%
Top Drive System BOP + Wellhead

3.8% 29.0%
Sub-Surface equipm ent Instrum entation

44.7% 0.6%
Surface equipment
Sub-Surface equipment Seism ic instrum ents
Top Drive System 0.7%
Hoisting equipment
Circulating system
Well flow / control
BOP + Wellhead 1.8%
Instrumentation
Seismic instruments
Logging
Well flow / control Surface equipm ent 4.2%
9.0% Other
Logging
3.2%
Other

UHM-2 (Rev 1) NPT Per Section
1800.00
1600.00
1400.00
1200.00
Operating / 1000.00
NPT hrs 800.00
600.00
400.00
200.00
0.00
Rigmo ve to Casing
Drill 26" Casing 20" Drill 17 1/2" Casing 14" Drill 12 1/4" Liner 9 5/8" Drill 8 1/2" Drill 5 7/8" A bando nmt
UHM tapered
NP T (hrs) 0.00 8.75 40.75 34.25 87.50 2.00 3.00 32.25 9.50 478.75 37.45
A ctual Operating ho urs 0.00 163.25 178.25 295.75 208.50 132.50 90.00 1204.25 280.50 1232.75 398.05
Activity
UHM-2 (Rev 1) - NPT per activity (in % of operating time)
100.00
90.00
80.00
Rigmove to UHM
NPT (% of operating time)
70.00 Drill 26"

Casing 20"
60.00
Drill 17 1/2"
50.00 Casing 14"
Drill 12 1/4"
40.00
Liner 9 5/8"
30.00 Drill 8 1/2"
Casing tapered
20.00
Drill 5 7/8"
10.00 Abandonmt
Overall
0.00
Rigmo ve Casing Drill 17 Casing Drill 12 Liner 9 Casing A bando n
Drill 26" Drill 8 1/2" Drill 5 7/8" Overall
to UHM 20" 1/2" 14" 1/4" 5/8" tapered mt
NP T (% o f o p time) 0.00 5.09 18.61 10.38 29.56 1.49 3.23 2.61 3.28 27.97 8.60 14.93
Activity

7.5. Time Break Down
Start Date: 25-11-2001 Days com pleted: 204.9

End Date: 18-6-2002 UHM-2 Time-Depth Graph Days behind: 105.9
Days to com plete: -
Print date: 9-7-2002
Days on AFE: 99.0
Well Status: Com pleted
0
Planned AFE
1000
Actual/comple ted
Look ahe ad
TLD line
2000
MD Metres
3000
4000
5000
6000
0 50 100 150 200 250
Total Days excluding rig mobilisation
UHM-2 (Rev 1) Time Per Section
80.0
70.0
60.0
Duration (days)
50.0
40.0
30.0
20.0
10.0
0.0
Rigmove to Casing
Drill 26" Casing 20" Drill 17 1/2" Casing 14" Drill 12 1/4" Liner 9 5/8" Drill 8 1/2" Drill 5 7/8" Abandonmt
UHM tapered
Planned Time 0.0 6.9 4.4 11.1 6.6 5.5 4.4 28.9 8.2 16.7 6.4
Actual Time 0.0 7.2 9.1 13.8 12.3 5.6 3.9 51.5 12.1 71.3 18.1

7.6. Cost Break Down
Start Date: 25-11-2001 Days com pleted: 204.9

End Date: 18-6-2002 UHM-2 Cost-Depth Graph Days behind: 105.9
Print date: 9-7-2002 Days to com plete: -
Well Status: Com pleted Days on AFE: 99.0
0
Planned (AFE)
Actual/completed
1000
2000
Depth (m)
3000
4000
5000
6000
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Total Cost (Million HFl)
UHM-2 (Rev 1) Cost Per Section
8.000.000
7.000.000
6.000.000
5.000.000
Cost (DFl.)
4.000.000
3.000.000
2.000.000
1.000.000
0
Rigmove to Casing
Drill 26" Casing 20" Drill 17 1/2" Casing 14" Drill 12 1/4" Liner 9 5/8" Drill 8 1/2" Drill 5 7/8" Abandonmt
UHM tapered
Planned Cost/section 1.247.656 1.579.251 788.379 1.877.758 826.043 686.986 744.731 3.950.761 1.657.705 2.315.767 929.094
Actual Cost/section 1.054.113 1.343.730 1.518.984 2.074.694 1.431.700 906.066 675.371 5.584.305 2.791.038 7.349.051 1.703.605

Final Final AFE Level 3 Level 2

normalised (mNLG) (mNLG)
to 4818m
Rig: Itag-23
Final well depth: 5423m 4818m 4818m 4818 m 5500 m
A Technical Success Cost: 33.7 33.5

B Activity Allowance Cost (15% of base estimate): 3.3 3.1
C Total Requested funds for AFE (A + B) euro: 16.80 16.60 13.95

D Well duration (AFE) days: 102 115 150
E Contingency Costs (see Risk Exp Standard sheet): 1.09 1.14 3.09
F Contingency Time (see Risk Exp Standard sheet): 15 16 30
50/50 Cost Estimate (AFE+ Contingency) (C + E) Euro 26.4 20.4 17.90 17.80 17.05
50/50 Time Estimate (AFE+ Contingency) (D + F) days 205 135 117 131 180
Large consequence contingency costs: 5.10

Large consequence contingency time 22.30
All the costs estimates were based on drilling a dry well to 4818m and then abandoning.
In the actual well we drilled a lot further into the objective section and performed more logging runs than planned. Thus to
compare the actual costs with the Level 3 & AFE estimates they have to be normalised to 4818m. The costs after this depth
should be considered a scope change and will be out of the discussion.
The cost difference between the Level 3 50/50 estimate and the actual (normalised) is 2.6 million euro (14.5% higher). This
falls inside the 15% accuracy range of the Level 3 estimate. The additional costs came from under estimating the affect on
performance when starting up a new rig and slower than expected drilling in the 8 ½” section.
An additional point is that the costs increased with each new estimate and the actual cost was higher still. The reason for this is
when drilling complex non-standard exploration wells it is much harder to estimate costs because they are no good
benchmarks to use.

8. Data Acquisition
8.1. Mud Logging.
Planned
Hole Type of Mud Logging. Depth Logged Logging Comments
Size From – To (AH) Company
26” By WSDE 0 – 1350 m
17 ½” By WSDE 1350 – 2195 m
Geoservices 2195 – 2900 m Geoservices
12 ¼” Geoservices 2900 – 3350 m Geoservices
8 ½” Geoservices 3350 – 4650 m Geoservices
5 ⅞” Geoservices 4650 – 5423 m Geoservices
Actual
Hole Type of Mud Logging. Depth Logged Logging Comments
Size From – To (AH) Company
26” By WSDE 0 – 1243 m
17 ½” By WSDE 1243 – 2000 m Geoservices ready to start earlier than
Geoservices 2000 – 2903 m Geoservices planned.
12 ¼” Geoservices 2903 – 3362 m Geoservices
8 ½” Geoservices 3362 – 4625 m Geoservices
5 ⅞” Geoservices 4625 – m Geoservices Assisted by Wellsite Geologist
8.2. Wireline Logging.
Planned
Run Hole/Casing/ Logging Tools Run Depth Logged Logging Comments
No Liner Size From – To Company
1 8 ½" GR-LDL-APS-AS 2nd VSP - 50 mAH insde 9 ⅝" casing Schlumberger
2 8 ½" GR-AS-AIT 8 ½" TD - 50 mAH insde 9 ⅝" casing Schlumberger
3 8 ½" IPLT (HNGS, APS, 8 ½" TD - 100 mAH above deepest Schlumberger
LDL) fully logged depth of wireline run 1
4 8 ½" GR-MDT 8 ½" TD - 50 mAH insde 9 ⅝" casing Schlumberger
5 8 ½" GR-MSCT 8 ½" TD - 50 mAH insde 9 ⅝" casing Schlumberger Optional run
6 8 ½" GR-CBT-CCL Over 7" casing Schlumberger
7 5 ⅞" HTGC-XSLT-XAIT- 5 ⅞" TD - 50 mAH inside 7" casing Schlumberger
CNTH
8 5 ⅞" HNGS-HLDS-XAPS 5 ⅞" TD - 50 mAH inside 7" casing Schlumberger
9 5 ⅞" GR-MDT 5 ⅞" TD - 50 mAH inside 7" casing Schlumberger Optional run
10 5 ⅞" GR-HOBDT 5 ⅞" TD - 50 mAH inside 7" casing Schlumberger
11 5 ⅞" GR-SRFT 5 ⅞" TD - 50 mAH inside 7" casing Schlumberger
Actual
Run Hole/Casing/ Logging Tools Run Depth Logged Logging Comments
No Liner Size From – To (AH) Company
1 8 ½" GR-LDL-APS-DSI 4502 - 3310 Schlumberger
2 8 ½" GR-AIT-AS 4625 - 2800 Schlumberger
3 8 ½" GR-APS-Neutron- 4620 - 4400 Schlumberger
Density
4 8 ½" GR-MDT 8 ½" TD - 50 mAH insde 9 ⅝" casing Schlumberger

5 8 ½" GR-MSCT 8 ½" TD - 50 mAH insde 9 ⅝" casing Schlumberger

6 8 ½" GR-CBL-CCL 4620 - 2850 Schlumberger
7 5 ⅞" HTGC-DSI-XAIT-Cl 4850-4465 Schlumberger
8 5 ⅞" HNGS-HLDS- 4850-4500 Schlumberger
XAPS-CNTH
9 5 ⅞" GR-RFT 4700-4830 ( 6 Press. Points) Schlumberger
10 5 ⅞" HTGC- XSLT- 5225 - 4615 Schlumberger
HOBDT
11 5 ⅞" HNGS-HLDS- 5225 - 4855 Schlumberger
XAPS-CNTH-CAL
12 5 ⅞" HTGC-XAIT 5225 - 4615 Schlumberger
13 5 ⅞" GR-MDT 5154.5 ( retrieved only Po - no sample) Schlumberger 10/5/2002
14 5 ⅞" HTGC-XSLT-XAIT 5330 - 4810 Schlumberger
15 5 ⅞" HNGS-HLDS- 5330 - 4850 Schlumberger
XAPS-CNTH-CAL
16 5 ⅞" HOBDT - GR Schlumberger 18/5/2002
17 5 ⅞" MDT - GR Schlumberger
18 5 ⅞" HSLT - HTGC Schlumberger 28/5/2002
19 5 ⅞" HIT - HTGC Schlumberger
20 5 ⅞" DTC - HNGS - Schlumberger
HLDS
21 5 ⅞" CNL - APS - HTGC Schlumberger
22 5 ⅞" VSP Schlumberger
23 5 ⅞" GR - CST Schlumberger CST: 8 of 9
successful
recoveries
24 5 ⅞" GR - CST Schlumberger CST: 20 of
24 successful
recoveries
8.3. Wireline Summary

8.3.1. Acquired Data
LWD
In the 8½” hole section LWD GR and Resistivity were acquired. The ARC6 tool was used down to the 2nd VSP point
(4515mAHRT). Beyond that depth the CDR tool was used. For both sections NAM was provided with the 28” attenuation and
phase resistivity curves. No LWD data was acquired while drilling the 5⅞ “ section because of temperature restrictions and the
requirement to have full pumping capabilities for LCM.
A full mud logging data set was acquired while drilling over both hole sections. The cuttings were described by mudlogging
contractor Geoservices and SIEP geologists .
Full Core
Having drilled some seventy metres into the structure the available data suggested that a cyclicity on a ten metre scale was
present. An 18m core was planned to capture at least one full cycle. Unfortunately the core barrel jammed after having cut
only 7.8 metres of core. A second core was attempted to capture the full cycle. This time the barrel jammed after only three
metres. At surface no core was found in the barrel at all. The cored section is 4751.0 – 4757.8mAHRT (driller’s depth).
Sidewall Samples
Before abandoning the well an extended effort was made to obtain properly depth constrained rock samples for further
analysis. The primary goal was to enable dating of the underlying clastic sequence. Three run were made with three different
CST tools. Each of the tools contained 24 bullets. The bullets were hard rock type bullets and were fired with 8.0g of AHT
high temperature powder charge.
Recovery was good, in particular in the final two CST runs. The sample quality ranged from a couple of broken fragments up
to 1.5 cm long cylindrical cores.

Wireline Logs
All wireline logs were acquired by Schlumberger. Excluding the three VSP logs a total of 28 wireline runs were executed in
the well. Runs 1 to 8 were logged in the 8½” hole, whereas runs 9 to 28 were carried out in the 5⅞ “ hole.
Run Log Description Date Interval (mAHRT)

1 GR – LDS – APS – DSI 18-02-2002 3299.0 – 4504.5
2 GR – AS – AIT 25-02-2002 2746.5 – 4632.4
3 IPLT (HNGS – LDS – APS) 26-02-2002 4536.4 – 4632.4
4 GR – MDT 27-02-2002 3449.0 – 4527.5
5 GR – MSCT 27-02-2002 3847.5 – 3965.0
6 GR – MSCT 27-02-2002 –
7 GR – MSCT 28-02-2002 3814.5 – 4620
8 GR – CCL - CBL–VDL 23-03-2002 2835 – 4621.5
9 GR – AIT – DSI – CAL 08-04-2002 4577 – 4850
10 HNGS – LDS – APS – CNL 08-04-2002 4623 – 4858
11 GR – SRFT 09-04-2002 4699.0 – 4826.9
12 GR – XSLT – HOBDT 17-04-2002 4622.5 – 5225
13 HNGS – HLDS – XAPS – CNL 18-04-2002 4622.5 – 5227
14 GR – HIT 18-04-2002 4622.5 – 5226
15 GR – MDT 19-04-2002 5154.5
16 GR – XSLT – HIT 24-04-2002 4803.2 – 5340.7
17 HNGS – HLDS - XAPS – CNL 24-04-2002 5034.8 – 5338.7
18 GR – MDT 10-05-2002 5154.5
19 GR – HOBDT 18-05-2002 5126 – 5268
20 GR – MDT 19-05-2002 4705.0 – 4835.0
21 GR – MDT 19-05-2002 4760.0
22 GR – XSLT 28-05-2002 5191.3 – 5434.5
23 GR – HIT 29-05-2002 5169.4 – 5434.5
24 HNGS – LDS 29-05-2002 5157.5 – 5434.5
25 HNGS (GR only) – CNTH – XAPS 29-05-2002 5182.7 – 5434.5
26 GR – CST 30-05-2002 5318.8 – 5416.3
27 GR – CST 30-05-2002 5070.0 – 5386.0
28 GR – CST 31-05-2002 4660.0 – 5364.6
Table 1: Logging Runs
8.3.2. Operating Environment

The mud weight varied from 1.35 g/cc in run 1 via 1.41 g/cc in run 2 to 7 to approximately 1.47 g/cc in runs 9 to 28. The
maximum bottom hole temperatures that have been reported by Schlumberger for the logging jobs are:
4504mAH: 163oC
4622mAH: 173oC
4850mAH: 196oC
5225mAH: 206oC
5340mAH: 210oC
5435mAH: 208oC
As a consequence of the rising bottom hole temperatures, special high temperature tools were used from run 12 onwards. The
standard high temperatures tools function up to a maximum temperature of 260oC (500oF). Some of the tools have operating
limits that were much lower: the MDT, HOBDT and CST had to operate at or above their designed maximum operating
temperature. On logging runs 15 and 18 the MDT failed after a short time because of temperature. The situation was
complicated further because of the losses that had occurred. In order not to disturb the LCM material the maximum speed at
which the tools could be run in was limited considerably. This contributed to the heating effect and increased the likelihood of
tool failure.
As a consequence, it was not attempted to use the MDT below 5154.5mAH because the chance of success would be even
smaller. Surprisingly the HOBDT functioned well. The CST functioned fine as well because, since it is a relatively small tool,

the constraint on the maximum allowed speed running in hole was relaxed. The effect that this had is most evident when run
26 (constrained RIH) is compared with runs 27 and 28 (unconstrained): 9 bullets fired before failure on run 26 versus all
bullets successfully fired on both run 27 and 28.
8.3.3. Logging Issues

Problems
During the logging operations in Uithuizermeeden problems with Schlumberger occurred on a number of occasions. These
problems were related to mainly to logistics and communication issues.
22-02-2002:
Having discussed the logging programme at length with Schlumberger in the months before, Schlumberger only spotted a day
before logging that the specified tool string contained incompatible elements: APS neutron & array sonic.
07-04-2002
Although being specified separately in the logging programme, the SRFT tool was not supplied with a back-up tool. After it
became apparent that the MDT would not enter the hole without running a severe risk of getting stuck, this implied that we
were dependent on only one tool for acquisition of pressures. Under the extremely high temperature this presented a risk of not
being able to acquire the necessary data.
16-04-2002
Although it had been made sufficiently clear that the decision to POOH and commence logging could be taken at any moment,
Schlumberger only flew in the XAIT (hostile environment induction tool) from the USA after POOH had started on April 15.
Upon arrival the tool proved to be damaged. The tool was not fixed in time for the agreed logging programme, which had to
be adjusted to accommodate for this. In addition it became apparent that no back-up tool had been made available. The
evaluation programme was thus severely jeopardised.
18-04-2002
Schlumberger had decided, without consultation, to change the configuration of the MDT tool from that specified by NAM.
This was only discovered a few hours before logging. Two hours down time were suffered, while waiting on the remaining
equipment. After problems in the first MDT run it became apparent that no back-up gauge was available. The used gauge was
inserted into the back-up tool, RIH, and failed immediately after the pressure test, thus preventing a successful sample. The
cause of failure is most probably the prolonged exposure to high temperatures.
19-04-2002
After failure of the primary tool the back-up tool could not be run immediately. It had not been prepared for high temperatures
and as such was not a proper back-up. Several hours down time while making necessary modifications to back-up tool.
Positive Issues
It must be said that Schlumberger did overall manage to execute good quality logging runs under very difficult circumstances.
They managed to push their tools to the edge of the operating envelope and sometimes even beyond.
Mobilisations of the tools were done at sometimes very short notice. As a specific example the CST runs deserve mention as
an example of a case where Schlumberger managed to bring logging forward by several hours and still deliver good results.
8.4. Coring
Planned
Hole Type of Coring Depth Core % Recovered Coring Company Comments
Size From - To
5 ⅞" 4751 – 4758m Security- DBS 18 m core was planned but
core jammed after 7 m

8.5. Gyro Surveys
Hole Size Type of Survey Survey Depth Survey Comments

From - To Company
26” Finder 0 – 150m SDC Run to check direction of conductor.
8.6. MWD
Hole Type MWD Depth Used Logging Company Comments

Size From – To (AH)
26” PowerPulse 150 – 1217 Anadrill
17 ½” PowerPulse 1248 – 2889 Anadrill
12 ¼” PowerPulse 2913 – 3355 m Anadrill
8 ½” PowerPulse w/IWOB 3375– 4600 m Anadrill
8.7. Gas Detection
Hole Type of Gas Detection. Depth Used Logging Company Comments

Size From – To
26” Hydrocarbon gas + H2S 0 – 1243m BIS BIS detector not satisfactorily immersed in
mud, and had insufficient air supply
pressure for agitator to work effectively.
Readings unreliable.
17 ½” Hydrocarbon gas + H2S 2000 – 2903m GeoServices
1243 – 2903m BIS
12 ¼” Hydrocarbon gas + H2S 2903 – 3362 m Geoservices / BIS
8 ½” Hydrocarbon gas + H2S 3362 – 4625 m Geoservices / BIS
5 ⅞” Hydrocarbon gas + H2S 4625 – 5423 m Geoservices / BIS The BIS system gave much higher
readings than the system from GeoService,
e.g. 20th April BIS read a peak of 300,000
ppm while the GeoService system only
read 20,000 ppm.

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NEDERLANDSE AARDOLIE MAATSCHAPPIJ BV WCT

UITHUIZERMEEDEN 2 - CRITICAL WELL REVIEW

UITHUIZERMEEDEN 2 - CRITICAL WELL REVIEW 15-07-02

Well Details UHM-2

Time Details Total Days

Cost Details (million euros) Total Expenditure

UITHUIZERMEEDEN 2 - CRITICAL WELL REVIEW 15-07-02

2. Conclusions and Recommendations

+ HPHT well was planned & designed within 10 months.

− Operations did not start at the planned date (15/11/2001).

2.2. Key Learning Points and Recommendations

UITHUIZERMEEDEN 2 - CRITICAL WELL REVIEW 15-07-02

1. The crews successfully implemented the HPHT procedures.

UITHUIZERMEEDEN 2 - CRITICAL WELL REVIEW 15-07-02

3. Health, Safety and Environment Overview

UITHUIZERMEEDEN 2 - CRITICAL WELL REVIEW 15-07-02

4. Business Unit Objectives & Feedback.

4.1. Ranked Objectives

WELL OBJECTIVES (in order of importance) % Achieved Comment

BOUNDARY CONDITIONS: % Achieved Comment

2 to ensure optimal isolation of the Slochteren reservoir 100%

4.2. Quality indicators

Indicator Importance WFS % Achieved Comment

Learning Points and Follow Up

UITHUIZERMEEDEN 2 - CRITICAL WELL REVIEW 15-07-02

5. Planning & Design

5.1.2. Materials / Equipment

UITHUIZERMEEDEN 2 - CRITICAL WELL REVIEW 15-07-02

UITHUIZERMEEDEN 2 - CRITICAL WELL REVIEW 15-07-02

5.2. Well Design & Drilling Hazards Summary/Recommendations.

5.2.1. Casing design

KN / RN 2000m 17 1/2” hole

3000m 12 1/4” hole

UITHUIZERMEEDEN 2 - CRITICAL WELL REVIEW 15-07-02

Main differences between planned vs. actual.

5.2.2. 26” hole section & 20” casing

Depth of top-hole section.

1. 4 x Thule VSM-300 shakers as per T-46

UITHUIZERMEEDEN 2 - CRITICAL WELL REVIEW 15-07-02

5.2.3. 17 ½” hole section & 14” casing

Formation Strength in the Chalk

LOP occurred at a fairly low pressure

UITHUIZERMEEDEN 2 - CRITICAL WELL REVIEW 15-07-02

VCM mud weight required to hold back the squeezing salts.

No overpressures or fractures were observed in the Zechstein.

5.2.4. 12 ¼” hole section & 9 5/8” liner

Fracture Gradient of the Depleted Groningen Reservoir.

UITHUIZERMEEDEN 2 - CRITICAL WELL REVIEW 15-07-02

FRACTURE BREAKDOWN PREDICTION

5.2.5. 8 ½” hole section & tapered casing string.

Formation Strength Of The Upper Carboniferous.

UITHUIZERMEEDEN 2 - CRITICAL WELL REVIEW 15-07-02

Stability Of Coal & Shale Layers.

• Amount & thickness of coal layers was less than expected.

Picture of cavings from the 8 ½” section.

Di-electric constant measurements.

UITHUIZERMEEDEN 2 - CRITICAL WELL REVIEW 15-07-02

Figure 1 - Average Surface Area versus Depth

DCM Surface Area m2/g

Decision trees and stop points.

5.2.6. 5 7/8” section

Formation strength & pore pressure.

1. Leak-off pressure at the tapered string shoe.