PARMENIDES A Text with Translation Commentary, and Critical E By Leonardo Taran PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS 1965FOREWORD >aaatextpns! doctrine repri = a turning-point in Gree philosophy, one that can truly be said to determine the course Greek thought until the time of Aristotle. Not only mpedocles, Anaxag’ nd the Atomists but alsd_Plato nd Aristotle tried to answer the dilemma put forward by Parmenides, namely, tha ny éifference from Being is absolute non-Being, and as such unthinkable, no account of ¢ world of difference and change can be valid. [But th doctrine not only invalidates any explanation of the sensible ld, it asserts that this world inso as it is different from nvexistent, Because it seems of fundamental nportance for the nding cf Greek philo: jetermine what Parmenides thought, I decided to ophy to study all available evidence about his work. My decision was mt pased on the conviction that only suck a study can be lay, for Parmenides’ philosophy is ane in which al ind any interpretation of part of it risks, hy not takin consideration other aspects of his thought, being c ults of another partial stucy T have devoted the first part of th: book to a line by line yy on the fragments, I hav: edited facilitate reference and to complete in part the eritical appa- text only 0 ratus given by Diels-Kranz, I have m the be able editions of the ancient authors who quote Parmeni des’ text. A fresh study of the manuscripts of Simplicius’ commentaries to Aristotle's Phiysies and De Caelo may still 1 to our knowledge, but I am convinced that even such a sudy would not drastically change the stat Parmenides. The variant readings ratus and sometimes in the commentary are selective and are especially meant to illustrate the p riant 1 ing may be of importance for the interpretation of the text in in the critical apFOI ORD The transla been added as a complement to the commentary, to reduce bas no pretension to literary value and has mentary, but in a few places discussion of the text is post id part of the be chap poned till the se to preserve the tnity of the first d ers. These chi fers deal with more general aspects of Parmenides’ tho ight: his notion of Bein the relation of Aletheia to Dox the content of the second part of the poem. The fc th chapter attempts to kk Parmenides’ philosophy to ve this testimony has for the historical recon- struction of Parmenides’ thos determine what the ancien be and. wha Since such a study as the present is by its very nature largely polemical, T wish to emphasize here my i to the scholars who have devoted themselv Parmenicdes id not least to those with whose interpretations I happen to disagree. In particular I would like to mention the pioneering work of H. Diels, E, Zeller, W. A. Heidel, and H, Frinkel, The book, with content, is a doctoral dis. tation submitted to the Faculty of Princeton University in September 1962, But I have taken into consideration studies on Parmenides that reached me up to December 1963, I wish to express my thanks to Professor W. J. Oates both for undertaking to direct the dissertation and for a number of given to Professor G. Viastos for discussing with me problems of interpretation of Parmenides and ancient phil general during and after my s at Princeton, to Professor cript and givin it with me, to Pro enero of his time to diseuss different B.D. Meritt for checking LG. Il 4548, and to Mr, M. C the manuscript. Iam also grateful F me the photograph of for reading part of R. Miriam Brokaw FOREWORD xd Mrs, Polly Hanford of the Princeton University Press, ind to Mrs, ita MeChang for helping 9 prepare the Wat above all I am indebted to Professors Harold I \dolfo for their teaching and their fo Me study Leowanpo Tani Januarc Classical Review eichgritber sttin des K. Deichgriiber Rechts, scines Lebrgedtichts, (I quote from ¢ Diels H. Diels. Par Deutsch. Berlin Dox. Doxographi Gr BIBLIOGRAPHICAL A ONS ankel, Wack, H. Frankel. 1 Formen fr BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ABBREVIATIONS rivehischen Denkens. Liter nd philosophic ‘The following list is selective, giving only the abbreviation Miinchen 1960 (Frinkel’s Parme 1 first pub- he works frequently quoted. Other references will be self. lished in 1930 are quoted from the new edition in the present book) ; 1A Acta Antiqua Academi Gigon ©. Gigon, Der Ursprung der griechischen Philoso- iy fiir ichte der Ph phie von Hesiod bis Parmenides. Basel 19- AP American Journal of Philolog i Albertelli P, Albertell, Gti Bleati. Test fr HSCP Harvard Studies in Classical Phitology menti. Bari 1939, : HS Journal of Hellenic Stud ASNP Annali delta Scuola Normale Superiore di Karsten, Parm. S. Karsten. Parmenidis Burnet, EGP J. Burnet, Early Greek Philos, iquiae, Avostelodami 1835. en. Parmenides, Me ee ro, Studi ion of Blea'ic Philoso erniss H. Chemiss. sristo a f {_lilosophy, Baltimore 1958. ; 3 ridolio R. Mondolfo, L'infinito ne! pensiero deltantict F.M, Coraford. Plato and Parmenides, Par o, Firenze : s. Trans. ‘phicorum Fragmenta Kern, Berolini Pasquinelli A. Pasquinell. I Presccratici, Fra Te a filosofia eleatica. In Pai n Kempfe gegen Herat “Parmenides’ Auffahrt zur Jahebiicher fitr classische Philologie nent Untersuchungen 2am Prooimion and, 1899, pp. 489-660 cpee rene Gar WPicsenseNatien watt Raven, KRG, §, Kirk and J. E tae Soe Gees Phi rs. A Critical History with a Selection of en Klasse, Sahroang 1988. Nr, U1 Texts. Cambridge 1957 ( ed with some altera- is DE tions, 1960) ss Lehrgedicht, Griechisch und Raven, P, E, J, E, Raven. Pythagoreans and Bleaties A of the ruven the Tao Opposed sit H. arly Fourth Centuries CambridgeI, et sonn 1916 "armenides, Frankfurt am Main 1934, W. D. Ross. Aristotle's Metaphysics. A Re mie der Wissenschaften (Berlin) menides.” Synibola Philologorwm Bonsinsium lerici Ritschelii Colleeta, Vol. IL P. Paris 1877 Tannery nnery, Pour Phistoire de la science 4 Transactions of Untersteiner M, Untersteiner. Pars ¢ frommnent tusione, tradusione @ co Verdenius W. Verdenius. Parmenides, Som vs Frag Vorsokvatiter. Griechisch und Deutsch von H, Diels, Achte Aullage herausgegeben von W. Kranz, 3 vols, Berlin 1956. (I have added the names of Diels ot Kranz when I refe BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ABBREVIATIONS ac it vefers only to Mondoti's notes. For Zell's R. Mandolto. Lé i Gren Lie f " ¢ I, 1-2, 7-6 Aufl. Herau: stle when T refer to names of Zeller and} Plato are quoted fron: the edition of J. Burnet the Seriptorum Clas cs of Aristotle a umn and Fine of Prussian Academy edit ts of Aristotle hy the rons ofthe edition of V. Rose, Leipeig 1880. The Avisto- and fine of the Prussian s are cited by page I have also made telian comme of the following Jem, Strom. II Cle ich I-V1, ed. ©. Stalin, Leiprig 1906. Danae,’ Damaseli Successoris, Dabitationes et Sotutiones Ruclle, Paris 1889. DI i y RD. H 1. TL London Enuseb. PLE si Lipsiae PI Phat, Pl 1925 5Proc Other ancient auth: V. Cousin, Paris Cuwratio, ed. J. Raeder _ Dipal 190. ti Gra gi Sex, ed. Portus, Hamburg ext, Adv. Math. Sexti Empirici, Opera, vol. 1 aticos Libros Quingue (cA h, PIEX finens, ed. H, Mutschmann, Lipsiae 1914 Stob. Eel. Stobaei Anthologivm, vols. I-11, ed. C tandaté Wachs- Part IT CONTENTS seraphical Abbreviations Parmenides' Life XX: Text, translation, and Fragments I+ Critical Essay Chapter One: Parmenides’ Concept of Being Chapter T ter Three: The World of Appearance Described in the Dora Chapter Four: Parmenides in the An Philosophical Tradition Appendix I Appendix IParmenides’ Life med about Parmenides' i: ane but poorly ini one tradition he was a pupil of Xenophanes. lato (S 22 D 4 preserved by Aristotle, Theophrastus, and late We shall see (ef. chapters I, II, and IV) that Par fat back as nides’ philosophy is not doctrinally connected with th of Xenophanes and that the ancient tradition, which ‘maintains that it is, is probably derived from a misinterpreta- 's facetious remark. According to another t with the Py ain Ameinias, son of Diochaitas (ap 35, 1900, 196 f.]). Since th inly infuenced by 1X. method of Parmenides mathematical deduction, this traditica is. pro ther on Parmenides and the Pythy 1, I, and IIT) Parmenides’ life we have two ¢ifferent and cont eports, According to D.L. IX 23 he“ flourished " in Ol. 6 nee this natice enmes from Apollodoru srs Chronik, Berlin 1902, bly genuine ‘0, correctly, Jacoby [Af p. 232 and note 3] against Tannery {p. 42]) it must be judged in the light of his arbitrary method of dating (cf. acoby, op. cit.). ‘The d lace Parmenides’ birth in 540-539 u.<, th on of Elea which is the date given for the floruit of Xeno: teristic of Ap dating by in tervals of forty years between teacher and floruit of Zeno is given as O1. 79 (464-461 n.c:). A fi.) Parmenid fe given 2y Apollodorus would phanes, This is ¢ 1 and explains According to Plato (Par and Zeno pa to Athens where they met the young s and held a conversation reported in Plato es, Plato says that at that time ParmenidesENIDE: LIFE other hand even if the book of Heraclitus written in 478 .c, we eannot assume voem could not have been composed Inter Since Socrates wa in he was put tc have taken place around 450 .¢. and this would place (cf, note to fr. Reinbardt’s contention that Heraclitus ‘a contention based mpt to solve the E must be rejected, bei sharply with that given by A preferable, for while the one arbitrary dating Plato need he v not have heen so pre that Parmenides’ pan this date; it oddess addres- g man when he icked Parmeni- wv that Heraclitus’ doctrin eatic cilemma, is purely revival of Hegel’s thesis speculative construction of the latter.’ Gigon’s, Parmenides and nkel's attempts to censider Parmenides and » refers twice to Heraclitus thinkers who did not know of Sophist 27 C) and this ach other cannot probably attacked Hera- num, to fr. VI. 4-9) at the dialogues should be Paris 1950, pp. XU London 1935, p. Parmenides is reported acceptance of T hronology does 1 does not the Parmenides actually Burnet, assert that it did, find fhat in 450 n.c ever, that the meeting described i d put to explain the fact improbability of such jon but not to the chronology, which he declares possible (cf On chronological others have denied that Parmenides could have bee aption that the expulsion ild have taken place ation of this and of could also have taken place in the tro id years between 500 ents, Cambridge 1954 For a brief ex s thesis, ef, Mondolfo (Zl 1V, pp. 3934 have been a lawgiver (D.L. IX Strabo VI. 1). This may ed light on Parmenide 117, Seutteart. 1928, pp. Hegel's method of interpre ‘ised by Stab6 Buenos A 5I oc ral pe épovow, Boor 1! ert Bris incor, depinne vie yép ne wodibpuoror dépov Erro4 ratvowras, Kotipa 8° 8861 dpua 4 8 ev xv ‘iyesvevor. ikdous dydorépafler), bre omepyotad HA els dos, Godpevar xp Bes xospat, xpodtmotirar Biyara Now sav dro xepar Kadvrarpas. kat "Mpards elie weheslon, Ea rbhau Nowrds odas 3 éxer al Mdwos ob bs Epbupo 8 aidepuan wAijvrar peydroure Bupérp 32 Aten rovmowos Eyer wdmiBas do i wahaxotee Réyourw” v ofa hav diver ra 88 Bupézpor Bi) mappapevar x: irpadées, &s oguv Bakar axaves rolnrat as & obpeybir duorfadar ddifaoar pévnuar dpmpbre: rit fa Bx até agirbv épua kai trrovs ‘aro, yeipa BE xerph v der, bbe 8 ros dibra nal we mpoomtoa i re dpoucrw ixdven *ipérepor 83, érel ob re oe poipa ax) xpotmepme véer Bae ered obre oe pig ANE Beas re Bese 7 BE oe mdvre, ruler Adnfeins ebreuwdéos drpepis HopFRAGMENT T ‘teXT, TRANSLATION, COMMENTARY to the poet. Stein (Frag. d. Porm., p. 771), however, took sides, ‘This assertion can be refuted by a simple reference to és to reler to the horses. The following considerations Fe teco eontioear: of line 4 (ef nce a foe). Verdes seem to me to make it certain that Giyds refers to the poet: (n 6 p. 11-12), however, trying to refute Witamo- (a) while it is true that the horses know the way (it. 14), coe contention goes £0 far as to assert that the horses “ per- the same applies to the poet (fr. 1.3), and this is due to the tify the poet's de and that ‘ they are the cosmic aspect fact that poct and horses have already tra (ch. fe. 13 era $3 Gero and conun. ad toc.) ; (b) the Heliades are the ones who lead the way (fr. 18), escort the poet (fr, 18-10), persuade Die (fr. 1.15-16), and guide the horses (fr. I 20-21), f des to say that the horses carry him as far as ever their desire may reach, elled on this road and comm, ad foc; ft. 14, xodgpaaro, tf his own (se. Parmeni interpretation was ven with a slight m by Sextus jh, VILLI2). ) dismiss both Sextus’ and Verdeaius’ contentions it is ficient to remark that while there is nothing in the poem to horses with the poet's de Par xgest the identification of ine 1 shows th ven above led Wilamowitz to adopt Stein's conjecture Bal that it would have been inconsistent hey are two different things. The reason ions instead of the Baipoves of the 2088 of Sextus. He wa ‘lowed by Kranz (SBBA 47, 1916, p. 1161 and VS 1, p. 228), Albertelli (pp. 119 and 122, note 6), and others \Ibertelli (p. 122, mote 6) argues that tnean, as Tl, 3.406 and Od, 13.111 f, show, ‘Ia via che la dea se. How éuroy. Through the imperfect is made actual what in kel (uP, the previous line was said in general; of Fi p. 159) , Baiporos would segue,” which meaning would be nonsense in our act that this is the meming in both Homeric ld always mean that, That it does not is provet by (Ol. 2.70 Aids 8 snd the scholia: ry [se. 68dv] olia velera in Pindari Carmina siae 1903, p. 93]). ‘There- elect the resting ofthe atss: TEthi sbby wodséquer. Diels (p. 29) followed by Kranz (VS 1, p. 228) translates as “ vielgerihmten,” but ohiqios never 2 Balnovos sh “ passages it does not follow that 6 cient Greek literature. rye) does not “ meaningful os, whether applied to a bard (Od. z28/0 185s), to a lament (Pind, sth, 858: Spivor woXSdanor), oF to an assembly (Od, 2.15 raph Kpévow ripaw eA. B, Drachman, Vol. I, Li D: dye ior; cf. Herod. V. 79 where wodi¢nuos stands for éAéy, means “uttering many things,” ie, bestowing knowledge, Cf. Frinkel (J7x.P., p. 159 and note 4) and Verdenius, (p. 12 and note 2). C. Egg 1960, pp. 379) argues that the 483s zoAigqos is the same as the true way of fr, VII; but his int ble assum w is the same as the gocdess of The Origins of Greek Phito 952, ajuoves as masculine and thinks that it In g he is misled by Sextus’ allegorical interpretation VIL.112), on whieh cf. below, comm, fr, 11 rs Lan (H ed on the untena ion that ¢yjyy and aja are synonymous so that a 48d¢-woAsgyuos would be a way that contains many so »- This reading becomes dificult only if one net p. 172, note 1) does in his interpretation that Par each im arately, as for example 2-3. ined. . . Baluovos. Wilamowitz (H 34, 1899, p. 204) denied that the horses can he the subject of this clause be- cause horses that show the road themselves dd ides was a traveling philosopher, But to do so is unneces not need 10 1FRAGMENT I it will be argued below, Parmenides’ trig not be ma jentfied or interpreted allegorical the best Ms of Sextu keep it (cf. O.F, 47,3: "Hae Th faca.). ‘The most important emendations are rec % ats the reading it i mio Sor ded in the apparatus. The most ingenious is dow proposed by Meineke: ind, independently, by Jaeger, ‘This would give to the proem a religions meaning, but the emendation is unnecessary, For a full account of the different emendations cf. Untersteiner (p. LU, note 4) This is not the init maintained by s in Greob Poetry, p. $0) and others, but the man who knows the way because he has altendy traveled con it; cf. Friinkel (WauP., p. 160 with his reference there ta The relative clause (Problems in Greek P by Untersteiner (p, LXTID), thinks that it refers to the god: ay refer to A8és or to try, p. $0), followed now. Bowe ess; but, since Parmenides renches the goddess after having traveled on the way, the antecedent is mare likely to be 88d Again we find in this clause the present tense, as in line 1, which makes it general and not a specific reference to one ot, The horses are “well-discernin ay; ef. H. 19401 where Achilles 4. ods gpacr because they know the says t0 his horse sn (op.cit. pp. 377.) does, that be- Nigpaaras does not oceur in Homer it may be due phic influence. As the 1 shows, the word is a normal derivative of a Homeric expression. This alone refutes the assertion of Fran 83 ff.) th bpaore. should be tran Pindar (Ol. 6.25), where érlorarza: is said of the horses, is a atte (Phironesis, 3, 1958, pp. ied as “ disertes." 12 TEXT, TRANSLATION, COMMENTAR' vein feubvon, Ch, Od. 6.255 ad especially tition of the trip, 9, “Hrdbes x0 5. Sextus Icenly dis pretation, ed by Giord », 26, #5). Kranz (SBBA 47, 1916, pp. \ tinguishes the 160) says that the Heliades are known as nporojeral of Ielios, but this tradition is Tate Béwara Nuerds. There is nothing in the context to suggest sn influence of the Orphic conception of nigh GPh 3, 1890, p. 174) maintains (cf, against him, Diet p. 11; see also Hesiod, Theog. 744). It is 5 Kranz (SBBA 47, 1916, p. 1159) does, that the House Night is beyond Att jesiod and probably in St in Parmenides. Cf. also th fo it may be in nothing is eaid about 11, 28a... xeheifter, Kranz (SBB4 47, 1916, p. 1160) ntains that éf measts “the house of day and night,” that .¢ should understand “the door through which pass the ays of day and night,” and that the content becomes intel~ 1eog. 748A. But, identify fda (ct ble when one remembers Hesi ides the fact that there is no need eichgriiher, pp. 30-31), it cannot be the ease that the d ands between two ways (cf. Frinkd, 1.10, p. 161, note if that were so the ways would be two before the door and ¢ the case as is shown by the content of night s 9-21. Therefore the door separate 13FRAGMENT I from the way of day. Kranz's assertion that the t the way of truth and the way of doxa show be rejected since there is no need to see such a smbolism in the proem, (cf. below comm. to fr cent ith his des, Gilbert (AG Porphyry (de antro nymph, 23) had already done ; one would and one in the east and both would divide Id from the under-world, ‘The text of the ght to dismiss such an interpretation. Gilbert neglects the fact that in Porphyry the doors are no longer in the east and in the west but in the north and in the south, and that his change is due to a ch topos" the immortal soul (ef. F. Buliere, Les mythes d'Hom la pensée Grecque, Pavis 1956, pp. 447-4 that Porpti witness that Parmenides meant two doors with m it he did not the logic of 907, p. ) speaks of two gates ag ige in the doctrine of th the ida means one gate with two doors, For cf, Schwyzer-Debrunner, Grie Gramma hen 1950, p. 44. On Gilbert's conception of the trip cf, below, comm, fr. 11-32, 13, aifépi. According to Gigon (p. 246) this means that the space between heaven and earth, ie. what he tal the chaos of Hesiod (but this interpretation of « possible, cf. Viastos [Gnomon 27, 1955, p. 74, note 2] and Schwabl [Anz. f. Altertumswiss. 9, 1956, p. 139]), is de- bed by Parmenides as being full of ether. Besides being unwarranted this is inconsistent with Gigon’s own sto be struction of the phenomenal world in the Dowa and his a tion that this system had reality for Parmenides. This inter pretation is similar to that of Patin (p. 641) who identified he lintel with heaven and the threshold with earth. Against Patin, cf. Albertelli (p. 123, note 15). It is mistaken to see he locatior heaven, as Deichgraber (p. 33) does, since there is no reason 4 ATION, COMMENTARY that the trip is am actual experience (ef. comm, fr es. From the fact that this expression nt (O.F, 15 in an Orphie fra ) it must not be a Parmenides took it over from Orphic concep. 1 (Orpheus. Eine religioasgeschichfliche Unter- vvehwaig, Berlin 1920, p. 40, note 2) and Rathmann (Quaes 5 Pythagoreas, Orphicae, Empedrcleae, Halis Saxomum, 733, p. 64 and p. 80, note 14) do, earibos bp Diels (p. 51) unnecessarily follows Sex- tus (ad VIL113) in interpreting guoifots as do wc. (Against Sextus ef, comm, ;o fr. 11-32). Kranz {V's I, p. 229), followed by Albertelii (p. 119 and p. 125, }, interprets as “the keys that open and close (in ind points to duofaBév in line 19, Fran p. 168 and note 1) translates as “rewarding, re- sital” and quotes Suidas, s.v. duoy@év; and Eustathi 160 (Hesiod, Op. 334 may be added). These interpreta- wiled, for, if Dike :s the punisher of evi 8, Ad. \d the rewarder of good, it is understandable that the keys hich open and close reward and pusish, Untersteiner (p. LXXIV, note 91) interprets as “le ehvavi che si alternano in- iiferentemente"; in so doing he is misled by the plural hhich is merely poetical ef. Pindar, Pyth. 8.1-4 BaAbGpor Hoyle, Aleas & peyarérods Béyarep, Aovhay ve wa wohdjr Exon wdaibas trepriras h Farnell's note (L. R. Farnell, The Works of Pindar, IL, Critical Cows London 193 ). For Parmenides' keys in the hands of Dike, ef. O-P. 316. She is different from the Dike of line 14. Sextus i. VIL. 113-114) identified them; and so do, among 15others, Deichg 8, 196 Patin, p esp PP P. 285), FRAGMENT 1 7, esp. p a, Theog. 1 D) calls her vipa tM ae, p. 12 "armenides had pe the differenc Not because between the divine and the 37) Lines 14 that the g 24 and 748). by and this alus (4 (mage is Hemera Proclus (in ed (lines 11-13), even if Cornford] his hard ta note vod seasons to leave the g 11 ide 501, and Kranz, SBBA 47, 1916, p. 1167) ine that Parmenides ould not be decltced fc his wrote the poem when he was young p. 237) shown that m sis done by Rein (p- 1), and Raven (KR, p. that (1) this of the poem menides’ trip is given as a repeated experience (cf. nd 8), nothin Kettmann (eg. H. 6202 and 20.137; ( a way that unites two pe BD. vipat be siet 29, tuundtos arpents 1958, pp. 21 #f.) and Deichgriibe fers t and t 1 86, 1958, pp. 1 mean path Od. 9. 119) it does not designa but a step” or the ecently 16 f, Nestle that this is the first ti Jamesor 2N ess (ct p. 728) “ornford Beside: the revelation nd not t (2) while ines 1 Par. (Phronesis. 3 (p. 22) have argued against eimwdéos and in favor of ebruléos. ‘The sami Friinkel (Di id Philosophie des jrithen G Miinchen 1962, p, 402, note 11), who al instead of drpepés. But hoth etaGéos and drpents a facitiores (ef. Verdenius, Mnemosyne 4th ser Iso because he is done. by 15, 1962, s out best TEXT, TRANSLATION, COMMENTARY thority for Parmenides’ text, T prefer Simplicius’ readings, Proclus’ eipery%os is derived from the Neoplatonic conception a ible light, as Proclus' comments on the passage how (ia Tim For this Neoplatonic notion, ef. ef, note to fr, VITL28. the interpretation of these lines ef. chapter II 1-32, The proem as a whole. The proem is mainly (i [.1-30) preserved by Sext VIL.I11), Simplicius hing the only one who quotes lines 31-32, Sextus quoted 10 and fr.VIL2-fr. VIIL2 to show that Parmenides established reason as the cr of truth and rejected tt a saraphrase of the proem 1 which preted Parmenides' journey ‘call testimony of the senses, He add His actual word: Sext, edv, math, VII112-114) : robrass yp rrovs nev gym arly dpe rhs adédyo0s ty sal Splbes, ward. 82 rhe Baiporos mopeseaGas iv xart tte 8 ipdocte Hhuibor napan Nueris dzolurotous, "ds dias (82> Soapdvas darrbe yhvendan sir aprjow aby. a BB chy woh cedyibes dyoiBocs,” ry Buivonay rib aed my dnayyedderae Bio 1 ips ebreios is rope” Smep ered od nie drurrjuys dqerantryror Bina, v 8, “ Bpordy Bd te tx mizrs Bdybijs,” rovréare Sextus the horses are the irrational impulses and des is the of investigation according to reason the maidens are the the wi Ber are sight; Dike are the ¢FRAGM TI Jon, and it is this reason that teaches Parmenides the: truth and the opinions of mortals Tn order to develop his allegorical interpretation Sextus arbitrary distinctions into the prom. He dig: ir instance, between the koipat of line $ and the ingish xuee of line 9, which are, as may be seen from the text \ self, the same; the horses he interprets as the irrational part cf the soul, while in the proem they are characterized ag oh (ef, note ad loc.) Such incongruities would be gh to condemn the whole allegory even without the fact nat nothing in Parmenides suggests the comparison with the soul. ‘T in leads us to inquire about Sextus! nurce which seents to be an interpretation of Plato's figure of he chariot and charioteer in the Phaedrus (246A ff.). That at some time it became a fashion to read Parmenides’ proem with the myth of the Phaedrus in mind is shown also by Hermi dr, p. 122, 19ff. [Couvreur] : of ros 8 5 Hddruv jployor net frou rapthaBer, @AR mpd bros sav mooyrin "Opgpos, “Ops, Hapueridns). Tt has been ally dependent on Parm (eg: ite Ausgabe, Leipzig 1921, p. 74, and Frutiger, Les myth: Paris 1930, p. 264), but this is prubably nul te case because the differs ences between Plato and Parmenides exclude any such relae tionship (cf. Robin, Phddro, quatriéme édition, Paris 1954, X, note 2, and Hackforth, Plato's Phaedrus, Came 77). While in Parmenides nothing suge n of the chariot with the soul, in the of Bes asserted th: mpi haedrus (246 A 4-7) it is expressly stated that the myth is (Se. Bea rip yois), dong pect AAS rhocws, § 8 fouer, drdperins stich a comparison: elay ple dere dvras Oelas evan kal poxapis Bo ‘ros’ rainy oly Adyopey’ tous 8) ounginy Burdpat lifferences fmronzépav fetyovs renal tdyou. Moreover, there a of detail, too, between Parmenides’ proem and the images used in the Phacdrus, Phaedrus 246 A 7 says that both horses and charioteer are winged (ef. Hackiorth, Plato's Phaedrus, 18 ‘EXT, TRANSLATION, COMMENTARY 246 B 2 fl.) betwe The detail last mentioned has a precedent in Achilles’ horses N, 16.148-154 and 23.276-278) 1d the fact that ‘mortal and immortal horses. (at (ce Tr dons of he gol also have peti in Homer (ct the cpavjots of Zeus and of Poseidon, Tl 84150, 438-440; 53) is ficient to suggest Homer as Plato's source tut this assertion should be taken in the sense of a poetical precedent (the chariot of a god was a poetical convention, Ef, Sappho fr. 1.9 [Lobel and Page] ; the Homerie Hymn to Intemis TX.4; Bacch, 13,194 [Snell], ete.) ; as to the myth itself there is no reason to deny that lato was the author of nothing in Greek literature before him suggests the jot with the soul (Ps. Isocrates, nparison of the wonicon 32, is later) aphiase of the proem goes far beyond the Phaedvus and it has been argued by Reinhardt It is obvious that Sextus’ pa », 33) that Sextus took the allegory from Posidenius, for pavapliase would be due to a middle Sto sition to the orthodox Stoie doctrine wanted to demonstr ple source of knowledge in man, Heinemann (Pose taphysische Schriften, T, Breslau 1921, p. 208) and ichgraber (pp. 20-21), among others, have followed Rein fat Sextus? source might well have been either a pupil of Posid platonizing Stoie (Heinemann). This th who in oppo rdt althongh they maintain (Deichgraber) or a of Reinhardt, however i, at best unwarranted and may be rejected." To be that Posidonius made use of the an a ‘BO St eee 19FRAGMENT 1 cp Sbot povar Sibirds de vofjaar) and therefore must have 4 almost immediately after fr. I, while fr. VILS-6 (epiva wodiBypir Edeyxor || 2 ydber jnBérra) shows that there: ition, for these words refer to fan 2eyxos already given by the goddess (cf. Verdenins, p. 64 and the comm, to fr, VITS-6) and consequently ‘ome immediately after fr T While rejecting Sextus’ allegorical interpretation, modern ccholarship has tried to supply the proem with an explana. tion of its own, thought that Parmenides! poetical vision is tives. Since the deseription of all its antecedents would sur= pass his powers and the limits of his hook he decided to point uit the immediate predecessors of Parmenides. These he found in Homer and in Hesiod, in Orphism and Pytha; ism; but especially in lost models of Orphie apocalyptic litera- ture ae of Epimenides would be an example, This led Diels to postulate that the heavenly: p of Parmenides was a. sh: although not due to the spirit of his ancestors. Hermotimus, the oracle of Trophonius, and Phormion of Croton were adduced as anter cedents. The very fact that it seems to be necessary to cite ne to wonder what the character= hese different “antecedents " explain. But to conjecture what it is would be fruitless, for eady been an expo which that related to the na nanistic rapture so many antecedents caus istic of the proem is that all to explain the known by the unknown is certainly a method: by which not much can be gained ; and in a case we should ave to interpret the proem and then decide whether it ting as its supposed antecedents (for the shamanistic interpretation ef, below). To trace the influences under which Parmenides' proem was written was apparently not enough, and scholars tried: which Parmenides made his trip, Some maintain that Parmenides’ journey. to identify the material places thror passes through the towns of men (ef, H. Mutschmann, Zeitsch. f. d. Gymnosiateiss, 66, 1912, p. 800). Burnet TEXT, TRANSLATION, COMMENTARY 1) says as much and adds that as an itinerant philosopher like the S lescribed in Plat and 172, not BGP, pp. 16 mendes Parme , and that the visit to Athen ie tetually took place. Diels (opi) and. others vt eelential journey. Giber: (AGP 20, 1907, pp thonght of tip t0 the under world, the details of Sr decribes as follows. ‘The door in the vest i for the druBos. The Heliades the adBoBos; the one in the east i vcing the stn to go around take both the sum and the poet wre Parmenides remains, The identifi- 11 of two doors (in itself a mistake, ef, comm, to fr, 1.10) not sufficient to establish a journey to the underworld, for E, Pfeiffer (Studien swn antiten Sternglauben, Leipzig Berlin 1916, p. 123), while acceptirg the former interpre ‘ion, rejected the later hypothesis and proposed a heavenly le (ZN, p. 727) was prompted to deny that > the underworld ¥ ocalization of the trip because of the re can determine the uncertainty of our text in line 3; while Ganschinietz (RE X. 2409) thought it possible to reconcile both interpretations and joth to heaven and to the underworld thinks that the way menides is the path of Helios, as does Cornford (Pr Sapientiae, p, 118) without being mere specific. This thesis was maintained much earlier with an abundance of details by Kranz (SBBA 47, 1916, pp. 11594). He asserts that the way goes through all towns and yet is not on earth, for it is far away from the path of men, Neither :s it a celestial trip, like 7 1 all towns, Two ‘llowed by Pat in the Phaedrus, for it passes throu, houses are the points of departure and of arrival, the house of hight (in the west) and the house of the goddess, the Ia being im the light, for the Heliades have it as their end: the journey is «is ddes, He asserts, because of a comparison of sed in the procm and a mistaken assumption hat fa in line 11 refers to the house of night, that the ourney is fo east on the path of the sun, ic i umptions led ‘éthon’s trip in the reverse sense, These as 23GMENT him to maintain that the trip began in Hines 11-21 and that Tines 1-10 are the description of the journey, while lines 22-32, describe the reception by the Kranz did not cone sider this complex trip to have been a real experience but a construction designed to point out that the journey is to the with truth, The whole of Kranz’g oundation, for there is nothing in la designates the realm of night and ter is in the west (cf, also comm, to fr. L11), ode sun, to Hight, synony the text 1 st that & Moreover, the argument derived £ m the comparison of the tenses used in the proem is refuted by the imperfect of line 21 cf, also Havelock, HSCP 63, 1958, p. 141, note 16). This did not deter Albertelli (p. 121) and Havelock (op.cit.) from. epting the division of the trip (the latter only as far as ne opening Hines are concerned) ; but there is no justification for doin his, since this notion of Kranz’s was based on the assumption that the trip began in line 11, which is not the for &#a cannot be located. ‘The common notion of these interpretations lies in st Parmenidles’ journey is one that can be localized. Nothing in the proem) points to this; the very fact that so many conficting inte: pretations have been proposed is enough proof that Par- menidee did not intend hi ‘trip to be taken as a reality ta special reference with Pindar, 7. 6, uurney is ag meta ). ms do not explicate the + 10 place strongly suggests that Parmenides’ as Pindar's way of song (cf. belo Thinking that material interpretat nore profound meaning of the proem, other scholars were led Jently at the proem is a symbolic or allegorie description GPh 3, 1890, or to time, The paral phori 0 assert, in addition to such interpretations o indepe f them, Spiritual experience pp. 173{f.), R. Eisler (Welter Himmelsselt, Vol. I, Miinchen 1910, p. 617, note 5, and p. 6894), Darfler (Die Eleaten und die Orphiker, Freistadt 1911), and others, saw direct mention of Orphic concepts. Burnet (EGP, the 04 ff.) as, Nestle TRANSLATION, MENTARY nding his assertion that Parmenides was a her, asserts that the proem is an allegorical yrmenides’ conversion from some form of held to be the truth and that the form in sed is that of an Orphic apocalypse. Zafiro aims that the proem symbolizes the initi nong. the ans and other mystery XVIII, 1554) tried to RAE we to each pretation its due and asserted that the proem is influenced which were read in Pythagorean circl 1. Schuh sur de la pensée grecque ed, Paris 1949, p. 285) fo (ZM I, p. 82) 1 that the proem describes an Orphic-Pythagorean oto. the last-mentioned hypothesis, even if we grant the smenidles? It is said to r what light can it n Parmenides’ proem ould be Tine 27; but what the goddess that the wandering of men is far away from ds to her, and this has nothing to do with (ef, also Nestle, Zi, p. 728, note 4). ‘The ould be the goddess’ differentiation between and the opinions of mortals, But did Ps is differentiation berntse he was influenced thagorean idea of bifurcation or hecause it answered to the exigencies of his thought? I think that to uit the question ig to answer it, Moreover, it is interesting ‘our evidence for the idea of exiow and its nce by Parmenides. Our earliest evidence nis is Plato ® (Gorgias 524 A, Phaedo 108 A, 1s (ch, VS1 BAT (8) sxe later. Plato's dependence Osphie-Pythagorcan ideas has been infereed from the fact that in i of Er and in some of the Orphic tablets the souls of the Ugo 10 the right and that the Pythagcreans calle ood istotle, fr. 200 [Rose]), That the evidence is ot £0 readily reted, is shown by a more recently discovered golden plate in nl goes to the left; ef, the text of the tablet published by ‘Eé., 1950-51, p. 99), In aay ease 1 do not seeFRAGMENT I It is necessary to point out that in Plato it sto the destiny of the soul after death* Thig difficulty was undoubtedly felt by Albertelli (p. 123) and (The ogy of the Early Greck Philosophers, Ox ford 1947, p. 99) who claim that the idea of oxi must also sd to the life in this world, Evidence for such an lacking, however, for Hesiod’s statement Ww i Days, 286 f,) about the narrow path of virtue and the broad way of misery has nothing to do with the idea of b death that we find in Plato and later in Orphie or Pythagorean documents, ‘To obliterate the differ- * ences hetween the two is simply to go beyond any legitimate inference. If Parmenides was influenced by such a choice we have in Hesiod and in the myth of Prodicus (ap. Xeno phon, Memorabitia 1I.1.21 f., which most probably is de- pendent on Hesiod, the idea was commonplace enough and docs not allow us to assume the influence of an O: Pythagorean idea of bifurcation, which ig only attested later. Parmenides’ poem cannot, however, be compared with the statement in Hesiod about the two ways, for Parmenides does not have a choice at all to do with good and evil or with happiness hice has nothin Other scholars think that what Parmenides deseribes ie an actual experience, that his truth was given to him througl wine religious revelation” The proem has been inter any reason to assume that Plato is dependent here on an Ors! That there is no suppose that Plato is here dependent on an Orphic saréSeae ade dau has been shown, it seems to me, con ‘Yincingly by H.W. Thomas (RIIEKEINA. Uniersvchungen fiber das aut in den Jensctomythen Platons, Diss. Wrzburg rod Test th ders tele im that he will (ff 128), Her guments for the sole existence of Being he is to juige by Logos (Ge, VITS) and the idea of judgment is repeated in fe. VILL * Mondolfo (231 TI p. 648) and Jaeger (Theafogy, p98) think that for Parmenides Inowleige is necessary for salration, but nothing in the poem suggests that sara ‘all thin TEXT, TRANSLATION, COMMENTARY in this sense by Jaeger (Theology, pp. 95 ff.), Bowra, ar ey op. LIGHE.) and others, Ve-denius has indeed gone jarther, for in Neoplatonic fashion be claims that Parmeni- jas a mystic luninated by a supernatural ight. This iehe of the proem, however, le asserts, should not be int tee! ight posited, undoubtedly under the ce, 28 one of the components 1c universe (cf. in the same sense Vlastos, Gnomon 31, 1959, p. 194). This mystical expercence, Verdenius thinks, s not exchide the possibility that Parmenides reached the rath by his own reason and that the two can be reconciled iy the idea of cooperation between man and god so typical for Greck world, Untersteiner (pp. LI ff.) adopts this idea { cooperation between the divinity and man but nevertheless crprets the proem in a purely rationalistic way. ‘The common notion underlying the various religious interpreta: the assumption that attention has to be paid to the fact that Parmenides describes his trip to the house of an snnamed goddess from whom he receives a revelation ; and cli is, to a certain extent, to repeat the mistake of ie material interpretations of the trip. ‘There is nothing ‘oem than there is in Hesiad’s proem to the Theogony to justify a genuine religious revelation; on the contrary there is mitch less, for we have the faet that the revelation is repeated indefinitely (cf. comm. fr. I i 3% by the ment for a god's unchan 1¢ other hand, what is there in the proem to justify a double meaning such as Jaeger, Bowra, and others suggest? Surely not line 3, for Jaeger’s emendation is not 8 onepyolaro) and with the same wo: goddess (probably a good a bility). On. id is. pro ly derived from the assumption that the prom depicts a religious revelstion. The e8ss is has also exercised the imagination of these interpreters, but this belongs to the poetical medium (ef, comm, adJoc. and 2FRAGMENT 1 error that he was criticizing, ie, of giving to the proem a meaning not directly expressed by the words themselves. An examination of fr. XVI convinced Frankel that Parmenides in the proem describes himself as reaching the Light which is the equisite for the knowledge of true Being. (For the latter part of Frdnkel’s theory, ef, chapter III.) What is then the significance of the proem, and is it a proem at all? To begin with the latter question, it seems from the evidence at our disposal that it must be answered in the affirmative. ‘The purpose of Parmenides’ proem is to relate how he reached the goddess. The goddess herself, after ac counting for Parmenides’ journey to her (an account amounting to a justification of her whole discourse), gives a résumé of the entire poem (fr. I.28-32). Such characteristies fit well with the purpose of pro Greek literature before Parmenides, from the short ones of the Hic Hesiod’s Theogor ms as we know them in and Odyssey to the complex one As for the meaning of the proem, the wording of its text is ficient to prove that Parmenides did not intend his journey to be taken as a reality in any sense. We have seen that Parmenides spealss of his journey as a repeated experience (cf. comm. fr. T.1 inivor; 3,» @ara; 8 orepyoiare) jit is necessary to give their full value to these expressions and infer that the procm is not a reference to a specific occasion. This revelation” is an actual olism in the proem, since excludes the possibility that the Neither is there syn expounds her doctrine without symbols and her listener is biden to judge her arguments by Logos, ‘That it the godde Ch B.A. van Gron Greeque. Procédés Parmenides el p nd Guome, Phi "The attemp n (La composition litéraire archaique ms, Amsterdam 1958, pp. 62. on )} ei, also K. Bielohlawele” (ifypatheke agus Suppl, XXX, 3, Leipsig 1940, pp. 212). Schwabl ("Hesiod tnd Parmenides,’ Zor Formmang 1 Prooimions," Pek. Mus. 106, 1963, pp. 134-142) © show the pentadie structure of Parmenides’ proem stems to me to bbe meonvincing and so is also his analysis of Hesiod's procm to the Theogony (el Schwabl, H1 91, 1963, yp. 385-415). 30 TEXT, TRAN ATION, COMMENTARY rary to talle of the way of song and of the chariot ynorieal sense is proved by the parallel in Pindar in a merce Pindar, OL 622, D1. 981 fF 33, Tah, 862, Sitonides fr. 793-4 [Diehl], Bacey {et %i76-178 [Snel], Eropedoces B 3.5 and B 38:1). The i religious figure at all and only stands as a ng that the “ sevelation ” is the truth ald not ary device imp wvered by Parmenides himself, Parmenides uitributed any reality to the goddess because for him exists only one thing, the unique and homogeneous Being (cf. comm. fr. I1.3-8; fr. VIL, and chapters I and II) js delinitely settles the question that the proem is only a iterary device. Consequently, the various words and expres sions that scholars have understood in the light of similar arrences in Homer, Hesiod, and others, should be inter ig to the poe ess is only part of the literary device, cal medium. The journey to nouse of the god antecedent of which we find in Hesiod’s meeting with he Muses (ef. Hesiod, Theog. 22 ff) The reason behind Parmenides’ decision to put his doctrine 1 coming from a nameless goddess was his desire (ef. Chermiss, Tour. loreover, this is ‘emphasize the objectivity of hi ist, of Tdeas 12, 1951, pp. 337 device to expound a theory that not only reduces all conceptions to empty names, but also tries to show the world in which we live is deceptive appearance. Scholars have tried to determine why Parmenides put his loctrine into verse. Burnet (EGP, p. 171) thinks that this Cornford (From Religion to 225.) and others assert that s? students who had to iemorize it. Both contentions, however, go far beyond our 1s due to Orphic influence don 1912, pp. it was done as a help fo idence. But once Parmenides had decided to express his uth as a divine revelation, the natural thing to do was to © the language and meter of didactic epic 310 dy) yb bode, ndpuras 88 09 pi nodvas Bibjouds eee vofjrar Teods éorenéhevdos ("AXnOeins yap dmb), ode Zorw 7e Kai ds xpedv dors wip evar, dpdtio mavareviea Euper ofre yap dv yookns 76 pi) dv (08 yp dawordy) 18 Procl, in Tim, 134518 6 Procl. i» Parm, 1078.45 8 Simpl, Phys, 116284174 Simpl.: om. Proel re Simpl: ye Prod, rb Simpl: ducrbs 1 ay dydy Karsten: dye 4 argued Bywater: AM Pro. Simpl, Prod. ferebéa Prod m Come ther T shall tell you, and do you pay attention to the sn you have heard it, which are the only ways of and tis the way of persuasion n truth); the other [says] ot” and “not to exist is necessary,” this I point 1 is a path wholly unk you could not know that which ¢ inquiry that can be concelved; the one [says] : “ext (for perstiasion follows you expre L. ed... deotoas. The speaker is the goddess and of refers Parmenides. U ersteiner (p. LXXX) says that it cannot Parmenides himself; but this ech is from the point of to fr. 11-32) as some tac, fr. VIA, be excluded th hy the speaker thesis is unnece for the r jons of the poem show: fr. 1.30, Bpora expres TENT, TRANSLATION, COMMENTARY VIIL39, port xaréBerro, fr. VITILSI, of lines 3 g. It is necessary to begin with an analy 15 contain the startin it of Parmenides’ and §, for they © farting 7 il ind itis due to the misunderstanding of them tha see nisinterpretations of Parmenides’ ht have arisen. 1 it has been asserted ar assumed that Zora in Tn get tine 3 and of Zovw in line $ must have a subject. Diels (p. 33 hued in the 4th ed. of S) takes the subject to be a non- Jas Seiende.” This interpretation, maintained nd Zs by a majority of scholars among whom we Jnhardt (pp. 354f.), Albertelli (p, 131 Deichgriber (p. 44), and Pas- wed (op. 30-31; ef, especially yy Karsten (Parmen., p. 71) (ZN ),note 2) went further and emended the text jv dos niond himself recognizes that in fr. VIIL2, Zor does not \d fr, VITI.16, forw or those who understand a non-expressed Being it may we a subject, and we ould biect, At such an early stage of the argument ‘that Parmenides assumes his reader te subject (ef. below be in a position to supply a the geneval criticism of the theories which maintain that d to be a subject). Some seholers, like Burnet (E nd then try to determine oneeptions p. 173), translate Zorw by “it is” hat the “it” stands fc Parmenidean Being which they ca generally from thei terpretation of fr, VII, Such an terpretation, therefore ‘open to the me obj bove, Raven (KR and tthe fusion of the existential fficulty consists in Parmenide shall see (ef below and chapter I)RAGMENT 1 Verdenius (p. viewing Par- asa whole we m snd note 3) asserts that ist conelude that the subject menides’ poem ality " and that this means all that exists,” “ the total of things. st this view it may be objected, as Verdeniug himself did (pp. 31-32) against those who assert that the ubject is Being, that at this stage of the argument there ig ne gests to the reader such a subject as “ reality.” Besides, this would introduce the difficulty of distinguishing ing; and finally, it supplies a subject that not only is not present in this fragment but in no other of the whole poem and which depends on an interpretation of hy which, it seems to me, is incorrect ss ef. Frankel, CPh 41, 1946, p. 169). More recently Verdenius (Mnemosyne 4th ser., 15, 1962, p. 237) maintains that the subject is Truth, Verdenius argues that if Truth is the subject of the goddess’ discourse (Ch. fr, VILLSL: dys ad Parmenides’ philos (against this thesis of Verd: eine) it is by implication the subject wr; with the same kind of argument one could deduce that the subject is Being. Moreover, Verdenius thinks that Truth here is to stood as the true ma sand, consequently, what er thesis applies also to the new one, Loenen (pp. 12 ff.) says that the subject of Zan we haye to emend the text or to supply it. Mi w. This seem: 10 bea nom sequi is vx whether reaver he hat two manuscripts of Sextus (L and E) have such bject in fr. VIILLL: 8¢ re instead of 8! én, but the latte the reading of the best manuscript of Sextus (N) (cf. comm, fr. VIIL1-2). ‘The emendatiom in fr. IL. is impossible (cf. chapter I, note 44) ; Loenen’s su argu raises the same difficulties as does the suggestion of Verdenius, ention that in Melissus we have expressly stated that the subject of dere is nis not supported by the text of Melissus (cf, Melissus B 1: da jy 3 vey mai det Zora). Clearly (or, always shal This he subject of Zor is an the subject is J + and the meaning is “ whatever w: that whiel does not mi ndefinite ve but TEXT, TRANSLATION, eat dn don, of, chapter T, note 44) Untersteiner (pp. LXXXYV fl.) asserts that the subject is heaay ieell. T8 order to do so he argues h ft depend on a negative of a verb ww thinkir Js eames that bros, as in Hlomer, as to be und ative. It is, Untersteiner asserts, the ease see ie followed by three de; and this sense of éros is duc to This hypothesis, however, is unmecestary, Gros to be declara- ving or thinking. as Herod. 37:3 (4d de ob # pide tru pat § pr dros Eo in Hine 3 is 1 line § and the lover, Saws re kal sin line 3, wher the fact that Owen (CO [N'S. nent IT it can be ‘hat can be talked n maintains, is later o x thered that thi d the same follows is no indirect question im othing in the text of fr, IT to sty hat can be talked or not be inferred, as Owen thinks. from the w is due mis (fe. 117-8 aying and thinking 35 ing or thinking n ight about ), fer thes not Owen’s TARY what in other words Parmenides expresses, a vs in Hine 3 0 be that it oves, in spite of Untersteiner’s attempt to nullify this example (p. LXXXYV, note 140) parallel to 9 8° dp of Parmenidles' text shows red. ner himself recognizes that in Tine 5 6s is to be interpreted is must hay mnction, is parallel to dy re wat ds in line § and = de (of also chapter T, VILA with the ist place ther subject of pobre yp by yoolge 7 thinks that assert the and the ¢ 1 Parmenides would be theAGMEN1 0 Marburger-Winekelmann_ Programm, pp. 13 89) maint certing that Parmenides in line § attacks Anaxis Ted which he identifies with non-Being. Previe rea gal something exists (cf Cherniss, Jour. of the Hist, of Ideas 12, 1951, 1p, 338) and tried to explain the diversity of the phenomenal) World as due to the transformation (e.g. by condensation and rarefaction, as Anaximenes thought) of one substance. The great merit of Parmenides is that he bate back to.a previous stage and shows that whatever exists (whatever js is) can have only the characteristic of existence plus c tions established by reasoning. In the course tf this reasoning he applies the law of the excluded middle and shows that to accept the character world would imply the assertion of the existence of nome Being, which he had already declared to be impossible because it is inconceivable and unutterable (fr. I1L7-8). That this is so is shown by fr, VIIL15-18, tarted from the assumption tha 1e phenomenal BR plone wepl rotray by rad! dwperas 8° oly rep dvd, || ie y itis), which ted, however, that Par pis kis Uvtjran dsconjes (ab yas ada || 2 refers to fr, IL7-8. Te has been a trate what he states in fr, 11.3 and 5; but this is derived from the notion that there ia a subject in lines 3 and 5. If this had heen the ease, the subject would: have to be the same and then a demo ld indeed, be needed ; for if one states (1) “A” exists and (2) “A” does not exist, a demonstration is required before one ean adopt one of these statements as the basis for a philosophical ie, But, since there is no subject, there is no need of int of departure of Parmenides dot any demonstration, The p is that there is existence, whatever the exi nt may be, and je is clearly stated. point of departure more openly. this nobody was going to deny. The principl by Melissus, too, with th ed ob » & unbess). This is sufficient to show that the cs proof. Verdenius ¢p Locnen (pp. 7), Owen (CQ [N.S 1960, pp jotld be a demon ation of the premiss of line Sf, ie. of the premiss that it But th chievement possible to conceive or to express non-Beit " unnecessary. Farmenicles in showing that cosmological explanations amount to Being, and here his atta n-Being exists, ‘The atomist nd in any case their void is not the absolute non-Being Plato, in the Sophist, asserted the exi st as the contrary of Being. nenides reduces all oppositions to the one of Bei Being, for to put the choice is to make the c fr. VITLIS- # of Zor ve pair dor job cit what his predecessors implicitly admitted in » explain the phenomenal wor'd; if this world is real, ‘ould follow that non-Being exists (cf. Melissus B 8: doa dy, a 8) zara dort, wat Sets 68s Spayer wad dliae yp) Ueerror roxofron, oliv rep 70 mpdror Eboker Spi, (3) Bonet 8 spy 15 re Bepudy yrypdv yreaBas rm, Sree Spliis Eopipey of82 decve. rohAR b yin dv wertmonrey, ol dy Hr GAA’ Gp olbv wep (6) fv 8 perextor, 23 pr dy ek). ‘That absolute n Plat Fyroeroy; ixanizara. (See also Theactetus 189 A; Ew 39FRAGMENT IL that thydemus 283 E ff.) The whole argument in the Sop mn the favor of dr as * Othernes absolute non-Being is inconcei to's conchision ig (Soph E-259 A; ch. also 238 B-239 C, especially 38 C) that absolute non-Being cannot even he named for jn doing so we attribute some reality to it; demonstration of this there is none. This is so because m a pseudo-idea, What has been said is sufficient proof that Parmenides! Being did not originate in a confusion between re and the existential use of the verb “to be.” exist, Parmenides could not have Should such a confusi asserted that a negative statement is true, but, to give but one example, fr, VITI22 shows that he did: 882 Bayperdy v xrA. Or, conversely, he should have asserted that all statements of the form ‘“ X is are true, which is not the case either. Although Parmenides maintains that non-Being can= ize that one can utter words 38-41) and these not be expressed, he loes recc which do not express Being (e.g. fr. VII he consider: as empty names, The impossibility of thinking non-Being and af uttering it has its complement in the asser~ tion that to think is to think Being (ef. fr. IT and fr. VIII, 44). Th spite of the characterization of the second way ag s that it is unknowable,” Loenen 94, ani a real way of inquiry. This shows absolute disregard for 1 most (On ind Parmenides’ statements and opens the way f controversial interpretations of Parmenides the ways of inquiry cf. comm, to fr. V chapter IL) ety. Cf. comm. to fe. VILL, 6. wand the reading of Simplicius which is to be preferred to Proclus’ resuxaféa; ef. fr, VIIL2L repos This fsagment preserved by Plotiny 1m ys HAMOAZ; Plot B nV 18 ul or the same thing can be thought and can exist 1d Clement is con ‘ed by many scholars to contain the essence of Parmeni- tion of the fon: “For to philosoply. ‘The most natural interpret it is the one based on its literal trans! amd to be is one and the same thing.” This interpre. on is maintained by many, incl Heidelberg 1910, p. 44) 1983, p. 168 and notes 1 and 2). This literal pretation of the fragment is pressed by those who main- t Parmenides identified Being and thought; although lentificat rent meanings. (For the ‘dtp, 77), Viastos 1 may have did cf. chapter I teral interpretation should not be pressed and is by insufficient is shown by the fact that different meanings 25, 1953, p. 168) extracted from it, Vlastos (Gnomon that it means that for Parmenides Being is mind. fiir den Begriff des Berlin 1924, p. an the identity of subject and object of th fonischen PI akes it to aght based on his type of inter inciple yubais r06 Spotou 7 m, however, has been correctly reject 1946, pp. 67-68 [cf. alse chapt » mean that thinking presupposes Being, i.e, some that exists as its object, as Sorey (AJP 21, 1900, alAGMENT 111 This is possibly what Diels (p. 33 and nslation “ Denn p. 211) interpr VS, 4th ed.) wanted to imply with his tr (das Seiende) denken und Sein ist dasselbe,” but as it stands, ced the Greek. The re it is dificult to gather how he interpr makes some difficulty for Frankel (D p. 408, note 18) while Friedlinder (Plato J. An Introdues tion, New York 1958, p. 376, n¢ sition’ tated by the meter, He takes the fragment to thought exists and both are one und P mean that Being exists and the same er such a method of literal interpretation is correct in the absence of the context. Diels, followed by a majority of critics, thinks that the fragment ame immedin but this is uncertain, More- over, this hyp fon the assumption that the inconceivability of non-Be Js a demonstration; ry (ch comm. to fr. 113-8). ‘That the context might change come pletely the meaning of the clause is shown by Calogero's interpretation, Following Diels, Cal that fr. TIT has to be joined the words Zaza vosis It is doubtful, however, wh but this assumption, as we have seen, is unnece gero (p. 19) maintains IL8 and completed with ofa: so that the meaning of the frag. ment world be: “For to think ie the same at to say that that which you think accepted, because it goes beyond the textual evidence. But ich an interpretation, which shows how ineonclusive the fragment is, should by itself constitute a serious warning to those who base their reconstruction of Parmenides’ philoso- cover, the interpretation that identifies thought and Being br ve evidence that this was first done by Plato, while it is inconsistent with Parmenides’ reasoning in fr. VITL ists.” ‘This is ingenious but cannot be phy on this fragment thought to the level of (for both questions ef. chapter 1), Verdenius (pp. 35 ff.) adopted the transtation “Knowing is the same as Being,” interpreting the fragment not in ideal- istic fashion but as implying that thought is something that 2 TEXT, the ine con. to ft unqualified Being and denies the reality of dif nceivability 1138). TRANS! Tt monstration of fr. TT of non-Being w rture and d thought and hough he d interpretation 0 however, derives her with fr, VI1 and fr, VIIL34-38 is untenable because Parmenides rece DN, COMMENTAL But this is not so, of Parmenides’ ot need a demonstration (cf Against Verdenius’ reconstruction of ngism of Parmenides ef. Frinkel (CPh 41, 1946, p. Untersteiner (pp. CVI.) also Being meaus that thought is an not connect this with Verdenius’ at the ident certs t Parmenides. Such an interpre- rent er T and comm, to fr. VIIL349). More. hether 13 airé can imply here that thought is an existent, for the sentence must assert, if con- plain ident For it ig one an ie meaning being the same es in fr, VIIL34. This ed in this Ibertelli (p. 132, note 1) interprets 13 ad ht and Being are the same. not as meaning but as suggesting that to think implies the f what is thought, but this it to go b menides rmenides’ philos of Arts and Si eras fr e of brachylogy and that we mu he same thi fond the though the meaning is not in Heidel (Proc. of 1913, p. 720) 503 mm the preceding voc and translate (think and to think that is possible and makes good sense but it is A different interpretation of the fragment was proposed by Zeller (ZN, p. 687, not ny and take the s in fr. 112 infinitives with their value of dativ ‘Therefore asselbe kann gedacht werden und sein” its meaning b nly that which can exist, can be thought.” This 1). He asserts that we should ie transl pre (EGP, p. 173), Comford (p. 34,