PRESUMPTION AS TO VALIDITY OF THE STATUTE

One of the most important presumptions in the interpretation of statutes is that the legislature intended to
enact a valid statute. Therefore, if a provision of a statute is capable of two interpretations – one making it
valid and the other invalid, the one which makes the statute valid has to be accepted as the correct
interpretation of the statute.

This means that because there is a presumption in favour of validity of the statute, burden lies on the person
contending that the statute is invalid or unconstitutional to show that it is so. In India this means that it
should be presumed that the legislature intended to enact a statute within the constitutional framework, and
Courts have to interpret a statute in such a manner that it becomes constitutional. Only where there is no
possible interpretation which brings the statute within the framework of the constitution it should be held to
be unconstitutional.

Karnataka Bank Limited vs. State of Andhra Pradesh: In this case, Supreme Court held that there is
always a presumption in favour of constitutionality of the law and a law will not be declared to be
unconstitutional unless the case is so clear as to be free from doubt. In pronouncing the constitutional
validity of a statute Courts are not concerned with wisdom or unwisdom, justice or injustice. If that which is
passed into law is within the scope of power conferred by Constitution on the legislature, and does not
violate any restriction on that power, the law must be upheld whatever the Court may think of it.

M. Rathinaswami vs. State of Tamil Nadu: In this case it was held that the Court should make every effort
to save a statute from becoming unconstitutional. A restricted or extended interpretation of the statute has to
be given to save the statute from the vice of unconstitutionality. Of the available interpretations, the Court
should prefer the one which makes the statute constitutional. In Modern Dental College & Research Centre
vs. State of M. P. it was held that if the literal interpretation of a provision makes it unconstitutional, reading
down the statute to make it constitutional is permissible.

But this does not mean that Courts should put an unnatural or forced meaning on the words used by the
legislature in search of an interpretation which would save it from the test of constitutional validity.

PRESUMPTION AS TO TERRITORIAL OPERATION

A law made by a legislature belongs to the territory over which the legislature has jurisdiction and applies to
persons, things, acts and events within that territory. It does not apply to persons, things, acts and events
elsewhere. If any legislature attempts to enacts a law in such a way that it has extra-territorial operation, the
law will be invalid to that extent.

Article 245(1) of the Constitution empowers the Parliament to enact laws for the whole or any part of the
territory of India and authorises state legislatures to make laws for the whole or any part of the state.

Art. 245(2) provides that no law made by the Parliament shall be deemed to be invalid on the ground that it
would have extra-territorial operation.

Thus, a law made by the Parliament cannot be challenged before the Courts in India on the ground that the
law has extra-territorial effect. But there is no similar provision in favour of laws made by state legislatures,
and hence, a law made by a state legislature may be challenged on the ground of extra-territorial operation.
It is presumed that a legislation is territorial in its operation. Thus the presumption is that a law made by a
legislature is operative only within the territorial limits of the legislature. Thus if the statute reads, “Any
person ...” it cannot be interpreted to mean any person in any corner of the world, but to any person who is
subject to the jurisdiction of the legislature.

TERRITORIAL NEXUS

There is an exception to the general rule that a law operates only within the territory over which the
legislature which made that law has jurisdiction. A state law having extra-territorial operation will be valid if
there is sufficient nexus between the state and the object of the law. In such a case law made by one state
may be recognised and enforced by the Courts of another state.

‘Nexus’ means connection, link or relation. The laws made by state legislatures may be given
extra-territorial effect only when the territorial nexus can be established. Such nexus must be real and the
liability sought to be imposed must be pertinent to that connection.

State of Bombay vs. R. M. D. Chamarbaugwala: A company incorporated in the state of Mysore and
conducted crosswords prize competitions through agents and depots established in the state of Bombay and
by circulating news paper in the state of Bombay. The news paper was printed and published in the state of
Mysore. The tax imposed by the Bombay legislature was held to be valid on the ground of territorial nexus.

The general rule is that a Legislature is presumed not to have exceeded its constitutional powers and a
construction consistent with those powers is to be put upon the laws enacted by the Legislature. The
corollary of this principle is that if on one construction the statute offends the rule forbidding extra-territorial
legislation, and if, by another construction, which may be open, such a result is avoided, the latter
construction will be preferred.

It is now well settled that the laws enacted by the Legislature having no extra- territorial powers of
legislation like those of colonies, Canadian Provinces, Australian States and States in the Indian Republic
must for their validity, satisfy the test of real territorial nexus.

Presumption against what is inconvenient or absurd

If words are ambiguous and one leads to enormous inconvenience and another construction does not, the one
which leads to the least inconvenience is to be preferred.

Thus, if it is apparent that, by a particular construction of a statute in a doubtful case, great public interests
would be endangered or scarified, it ought not to be presumed that such construction was intended by the
legislature.

But if there is no doubt, obscurity or ambiguity on the face of the statute, but its meaning is plain and
explicit, the argument from inconvenience has no place. In other word, the inconvenience created by the
statute where its provisions are clear and is capable of only one interpretation, such inconvenience can be
avoided by a change in law itself i.e., by the legislature and not by judicial action.

Example: where a statute gives to a husband the power, by his last will, to extinguish the common law rights
of his widow and where the language of the Act is clear and not ambiguous and is sufficiently include every
widow, whether sane or insane and the Act makes no exception in favour of latter, the Courts cannot make
any such exception, from consideration of the hardship and inconvenience which may result.
Presumption Against Absurdity

It is presumed that the legislature does not intend an absurdity, or that absurd consequences shall flow from
its enactments. Such a result will therefore be avoided, if the terms of the Act admit it, by reasonable
construction of the statute.

By an “absurdity” as the term is here used, is meant anything which is irrational, unnatural or inconvenient
that it cannot be supposed to have been within the intention of men of ordinary intelligence and discretion.

The presumption against absurd consequences of legislation is therefore no more than the presumption that
legislators are gifted with ordinary good sense.

It is applicable, like all other presumptions thus, if by applying the literal rule of interpretation, the
construction is being absurd then it should be avoided.

But it must be observed that if the legislature will enact an absurdity in clear and specific terms, the Courts
are not at liberty to divert the statute from its intended object by process of construction.

If absurdity is an impossibility, the Act will be inoperative.

Thus, when the language is explicit, its consequences are irrelevant and if the language is plain and
unambiguous, the Courts have to give effect to it regardless of consequences thereof.

Any plea of injustice, hardship, inconvenience or anomaly shall not be admissible. The Court cannot
legislate under grab of interpretation.

In Om Prakash v. Radhacharan, It was held that the sentiment or sympathy alone would not be a guiding
factor in determining the rights of the parties which are otherwise clear and unambiguous.

Presumption against intending justice

When laws are made by elected representative of the people, it is proper to assume that they enact laws
which the society considers as honest, fair and reasonable. As a result, justice and reason constitute the great
general legislative intent in every piece of legislation.

If this is not there and harsh and ridiculous effect was actually intended by the legislature, it could easily
accept that it represents the legislative intent.

Presumption against exclusion or ousting the established jurisdiction

A statutory enactment is not competent to take away the jurisdiction conferred by the Constitution; this
jurisdiction can be taken away only by means of amending the Constitution.

In Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu (1993) it was observed that even a provision in the Constitution conferring
final ity to the decision of an authority is not construed as completely excluding judicial review under
Articles 136, 226 and 227 of the Constitution, bur it limits it to jurisdictional errors, for example mala fides,
non compliance with rules of natural justice, infirmities based on violation of constitutional mandates and
perversity. If the legislature states that the decision or order of a tribunal, or a court shall be final and
conclusive, the remedies available under the Constitution remain unrestrained or uninhabited."

PRESUMPTION AGAINST RETROSPECTIVITY OR PROSPECTIVE OPERATION IS MENTIONED

IN UNIT I