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3. Ancient Buddhism

LIKE Jainism, but even more clearly, Buddhism presents itself as a product of the time of urban
development, of urban king- ship and the city nobles. The founder of Buddhism was Sid- dharta, the
Sakya Simha or Sakya Muni, called Gautama,46 the Buddha, who was born in Lumbini in the present-day
Nepal territory at the foot of the Himalayas.

His flight from the house of his parents into solitude, "the great renunciation" (of the world) is
considered by Buddhists as the time of the founding of Buddhism. He belonged to the noble (Kshatriya)
sib, the Sakya of Kapilavastu.

In the ancient literary documents of the Buddhists, just as with the Jains, and still more in the
inscriptural names of donors to Buddhistic cloisters, guild leaders play an outstanding role. Oldenberg
drew attention to the fact that rural surroundings, cattle and pasture, were characteristic of the ancient
Brah- Imanical teachers and schools, at least in the early times of the

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Upanishads, whereas the city and the urban palace with its elephant-riding kings were characteristic of
Buddha's time. Moreover, the dialogue form reflects the advent of city culture. Even in the later
Upanishads all this is underway. Obviously a difference in age cannot be readily deduced from literary
chap acter. It would be easier to do so by comparing the sequence and development of ideas here and
there. Early Buddhism, like Samkhya teaching and the Jain sect know nothing of Brahman. In opposition
to both, however, it also denies the atman and, in general, the problems of "individuality" which had
been the pre- occupation of philosophical school soteriology.

The opposition to atman doctrines occurs, partially, in so pointed a form against the whole complex of
problems that it must have been thoroughly worked over before it could be dis- missed as vain and
without substance. The character of Budd- hism as a quite specific soteriology of cultivated intellectuals
appears on the face of it, not to mention the fact that all Buddhist documents place it there.

Tradition has it that the founder was a generation younger than Mahavira, the founder of the Jain order.
This is probable because not a few Buddhistic traditions presuppose the com- petition of the new order
against the old and the latter's hatred of the Buddhists. Occasionally Jain traditions, too, mirror this
hate. Feelings of competitiveness were combined with feelings that arose from the inner opposition of
Buddhistic holy striving not only against the classical Brahmanical path, but, also and especially, against
the Jainistic.

The Jain order represents essentially an ascetic community in the specific sense we attribute here to
"active asceticism." As with all soteriologies of Indian intellectuals, tranquility is the holy goal. The way,
however, is through detachment from the world, and self-denial through mortification. Mortification,
however, is not only bound up with extreme exertion of will power, but easily entails emotional, and
under certain circumstances, quite hysterical consequences.

In any case active asceticism does not readily lead to that feel- ing of security and tranquility which must
have had for the holy, seeking after detachment from the toil and trouble of world, decisive emotional
value. This certitudo salutis, however -the present enjoyment of the tranquility of the saved-is in- deed,
psychologically, the psychic state sought, in the last

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ethical compensation, which replaces the theodicy, and which Buddhism does not doubt, man's ultimate
fate depends entirely on one's own free behavior. And karma doctrine does not take the "personality"
for its point of departure, but the meaning and value of the single act. No single world-bound act can get
lost in the course of the ethically meaningful but completely cosmic causality.

One might think that an ethic based on these premises must be one of active conduct, be it within the
world (like those, each in its particular way, of Confucianism and Islam), or in the form of ascetic
exercises, e.g., Jainism, its main competitor in India. Early Buddhism, however, rejected both alike
because its salva- tion "from what?" and "for what?" precluded both alternatives. Out of the general
premises and viewpoint of the soteriologi- cally-minded Indian intelligentsia, Buddha's doctrine as
expressed even in the first address after the "illumination," and pene- tratingly interpreted by Rhys
David, drew the ultimate conclu- sion that the basic cause of all illusions inimical to salvation is belief in
a "soul" as a lasting unit. From this the doctrine con- cludes that it is senseless to be attached to all or
any inclinations, hopes, and wishes connected with belief in this-worldly, and above all, other-worldly
life. All this means attachment to im- perfect nothing. To Buddhistic thought an "eternal life" would be a
contradictio in adjecto. "Life" consists precisely of the fusion of the individual constitutive elements
(khandas) in the form of the self-conscious, willful individuality which by its very nature is completely
transitory.

To attribute "timeless validity" to individuality in Buddhistic, as in all Indian thought, is as an absurd and
ridiculous pre- sumption, the very peak of creature worship. What is sought is not salvation to an eternal
life, but to the everlasting tranquility of death. The basis of this salvation-striving for Buddhism, as for
the Indians in general, was not any sort of "satiety" with the "meanness of life" but "satiety" with
"death." This is indicated. most clearly in the legend of the experiences preceding Buddha's flight from
the parental home, from the side of the young wife and the child into the solitude of the woods.

Of what use was the splendor of the world and of life when it was incessantly beset by the three evils-
sickness, age, and death; when all surrender to earthly beauty only enhances pain and, above all, the
senselessness of the departure ever and again analysis, by the religions of India.

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As ficanmukti, the Indian holy seeker, as noted, will enjoy the bliss of the world-detached life even here
and now.
It is important for the assessment of early Buddhism to keep in mind the fact that its specific
accomplishment consisted in having pursued this and only this goal, abolishing without con- sideration
all holy means which had nothing to do with it. Buddhism has expurgated all the ascetic features
peculiar to Jainism, all speculation about such problemi-be they worldly or ofher-worldly, social or
magical-so long as they are unrelated and of no value to the achievement of this particular goal. The
true holy seeker is not attached even to the desire for knowledge. The peculiarities of "primitive"
Buddhism-whether this term is understood to mean the teaching of the master or the practice of the
oldest community makes no difference to us-are an object of study in the most recent literature
containing a whole series of distinguished works of Indologists. Unanimity has not been reached in
everything. For our purposes it is advisable first to present early Buddhism according to the oldest
sources, sys- tematically, with regard to points important to us, stating the ideas in as close connection
as possible, and disregarding whether in its original phases it contained this rational closure actually and
fully-a question which only the expert can decide."

Ancient Buddhism represents in almost all, practically deci sive points the characteristic polar opposite
of Confucianism as well as of Islam. It is a specifically unpolitical and anti-political status religion, more
precisely, a religious "technology" of wan- dering and of intellectually-schooled mendicant monks. Like
all Indian philosophy and theology it is a "salvation religion," if one is to use the name "religion" for an
ethical movement with- i out a deity and without a cult/More correctly, it is an ethic with absolute
indifference to the question of whether there are "gods" and how they exist. Indeed, in terms of the
"how," "from what," "to what end" of salvation, Buddhism represents the most radical form of
salvation-striving conocivable. Its salvation is a solely personal act of the single individual. There is no
recourse to a deity or savior Prom Buddha himself we know no prayer. There is no religious grace. There
is, moreover, no predestina- tion either According to the karma doctrine of the universal causality of

THE RELIGION OF INDIA

» 208 « in an infinity of new lives? The absolute senselessness of epheme- ral beauty, happiness, and joy
in an everlasting world is precisely that which in the end devalues the goods of the world. For him who is
strong and wise and only for him, Buddha repeatedly explains, is his teaching.

Buddhism negates the ordinary conceptions of salvation. A concept of sin based on an ethic of
intentions is as little con- genial for Buddhism as it was for Hinduism in general. Cer- tainly there were
sins for Buddhistic monks, even deadly sins which excluded the offender forever from the fellowship.
And there were sins which only required penance. However, every- thing that hinders salvation is by no
means a "sin." In fact, sin is not the final power inimical to salvation. Not "evil" but ephemeral life is the
obstacle to salvation; salvation is sought from the simply senseless unrest of all structures of existence in
general.

All "morality" could only be a means, hence, could have mean- ing only insofar as it is a means to
salvation. In the last analysis, however, this is not the case. Passion per se, passion for God, even in the
form of the loftiest enthusiasm is absolutely inimical to salvation because all desire means attachment
to life. Basically, hatred is no more inimical to salvation than all forms of passion. It is on the same
footing as the passionately active devotion to ideals. The concept of neighborly love, at least in the
sense of the great Christian virtuosi of brotherliness, is unknown. "Like a mighty wind the blessed one
blows over the world with the wind of his love, so cool and sweet, quiet and delicate." Only this cool
temperance guarantees the internal detachment from all "thirst" for the world and men. The mystic,
acosmic love of Buddhism (maitri, meta) is psychologically conditioned through the euphoria of
apathetic ecstasy. This love and "unbounded feeling" for men and animals like that of a mother for her
child gives the holy man a magical, soul-compelling power over his enemies as well.58 His temper,
however, remains cool and aloof in this.64 For in the end the individual, as a famous poem of the master
states,55 must "wander lonely as the rhinoceros"; that means, as well, that he must be tough-skinned
against feeling. The "love of enemies" is necessarily quite foreign to Buddhism. Its quietism could not
stand such virtuoso powers of self-domina- tion, but only the equanimity of not hating one's enemies
and the "tranquil feeling of friendly concord" (Oldenberg) with

THE CULTURED PROFESSIONAL MONKS

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community members. This sentiment is not born purely out of mystical experience, but feeds also on the
egocentric realization that the expurgation of all aggressive tendencies benefits one's personal salvation.
Buddhistic caritas is characterized by the same impersonality and matter-of-factness as Jainism, and, in
another manner, also that of Puritanism. The personal certitudo salutis, not the welfare of the neighbor,
is at issue.

In Buddhism, too, salvation is achieved through "knowledge." Naturally this is not in the sense of broad
knowledge of earthly or heavenly things. On the contrary, early Buddhism demanded an extreme
restriction of the quest for knowledge, namely, the conscious renunciation of the search for what will
occur after the death of the saved. A concern for knowledge is also a "de- sire," a "thirst," and does not
benefit the holiness of the soul. The monk Malukya, who wished to know whether the world was eternal
and infinite, and if Buddha would live on after death, was mocked by the master. Such questions from
one who was unredeemed were compared to those of someone lying deathly sick from a wound who
demanded to know from the doctor, before allowing him to treat the wound, his name, whether or not
he was of noble birth, and who had inflicted the wound upon him. Inquiry into the nature of nirvana
was, indeed, held by correct Buddhists to be heresy.

In Confucianism speculation was rejected because it was of no use to the present perfection of the
gentleman and was, viewed in utilitarian terms, sterile. In Buddhism it was rejected because it bespeaks
of an attachment to mundane intellectual knowledge and this is of no use for future perfection. But salu-
tary "knowledge" is exclusively the practical illumination by the four great truths of the nature, origin,
conditions, and means of destroying suffering.

While the early Christian sought passion as an ascetic means or perhaps as martyrdom, the Buddhist
flees passion by all means. "Passion," however, is equated to the transitoriness of all forms of existence.
What is the nature of passion? It is the fight without prospects of success against the transitoriness of all
forms of existence resulting from the nature of life, the "struggle for existence" in the sense of striving
to maintain one's own existence which yet is consecrated to death from the outset.

Still later Sutras of the "world-friendly" Mahayana school operated with the proof of the complete
senselessness of life

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THE RELIGION OF INDIA

that it was unavoidably to end in old age and death. The illu- mination definitively liberating one from
passion is solely secured through meditation, through the contemplative absorption in the simple
practical truths of life. "Knowledge," which is denied to active men and available only to the aspirant of
enlightenment, hence is also practical in nature. However, it is not "conscience" -which Goethe, too,
denies active man, conceding it only to "contemplative" man. Buddhism knows of no consistent concept
of "conscience" and cannot know it because of the karma doc- trine substructuring the Buddhistic denial
of the idea of per- sonality.

Buddhism elaborates this with special consistency, somewhat in the manner of the Machian soul-
metaphysics. What is the "ego" that salvation teachings hitherto took no trouble to de- stroy? The
various orthodox and heterodox soteriologies had given different answers to this question, from the
primitive, more materialistic, or spiritualistic linkage to the ancient, magical soul power of the atman (in
the Buddhistic Pali: attan), to the con- struction of an immutable constant, but merely receptive mind of
the Samkhya doctrine, which referred all that happens to mat- ter, that is to say, to transitory events.

Buddha turned back from these intellectualistic constructions, which did not satisfy him soteriologically
and psychologically, to what in effect amounts to a voluntaristic construction, with however, a new
twist. In addition to all sorts of residues of more primitive views is to be found the nuclear sense of the
new teaching, particularly rich in spiritual implications in "The Questions of King Milinda."56
Introspective experience shows us no "ego" at all and no "world" but only a stream of all sorts of
sensations, strivings, and representations which together con- stitute "reality." The single elements as
experienced are bound together into wholes (by meanings). If one has "swallowed" something with a
"taste," for example, the substance is afterward still there-but no more as "taste." And "salt," that is to
say, salty quality of taste is not discernible (III, 3.6). A bundle of all sorts of heterogeneous single
qualities are perceived as true external "things," and, especially by way of self-consciousness, also as
that which appears to us as an "individuality." This is the sense of the discussion.57

What is it that establishes the unit? Again, external things are taken as a point of departure. What is a
"chariot"? Clearly, it is