The Eu Environmental Foresight System Forenv-KH0322246ENN

The EU Environmental
Foresight System (FORENV)

Final report of 2021-22 annual cycle
Emerging environmental issues due to demographic changes in the EU
February 2023
Environment
This report has been written by Owen White (Eunomia), Kenisha Garnett (Cranfield University), Tony
Zamparutti (Milieu) and Rolands Sadauskis (Eunomia) under contract number SER/ENV.A.3/2021/853059 for
the European Commission, Directorate-General Environment.
The European Environment Agency (EEA) Scientific Committee, the Scientific Committee on Health,
Environmental and Emerging Risks (SCHEER) and Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs (DG
ECFIN) contributed to this report by reviewing the emerging issue characterisations presented here.
The valuable contributions of the following EEA Scientific Committee and SCHEER members are kindly
acknowledged:
EEA Scientific Committee (review of Issues 1, 3, 5, 6 and 10): Claire Dupont, Fabio Fava, Jaroslav Mysiak,
Louis Meuleman, Susana Viegas, Theodoros Zachariadis
SCHEER (review of Issues 2, 4, 7, 8 and 9): Ana Proykova, Demosthenes Panagiotakos, Marco Vighi (Chair),
Marian Scott (Rapporteur), Peter Hoet, Raquel Duarte-Davidson, Rodica Mariana Ion, Renate Krätke, Teresa
Borges, Theodoros Samaras, Urbano Fra Paleo (external expert)
Additional review by Lucia Vergano of DG ECFIN (Issues 7 and 10) is also kindly acknowledged.
To cite this publication: The EU Environmental Foresight System (FORENV) – Final report of 2021-22 annual
cycle – Emerging environmental issues due to demographic changes in the EU, Publications Office of the
European Union, Luxembourg, 2023 ISBN 978-92-76-60198-2, doi 10.2779/495525
February 2023
EUROPEAN COMMISSION
Directorate-General for Environment
Directorate A – General Affairs, Knowledge and Resources
Unit A.3— Green Knowledge & Research Hub, LIFE
E-mail: ENV-FORENV@ec.europa.eu
European Commission
B-1049 Brussels
LEGAL NOTICE
The information and views set out in this report are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the
official opinion of the Commission. The Commission does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in
this study. Neither the Commission nor any person acting on the Commission’s behalf may be held responsible
for the use which may be made of the information contained therein.
More information on the European Union is available on the Internet (http://www.europa.eu).
Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2023
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EUROPEAN COMMISSION, DG ENVIRONMENT
FORENV 2021-22: EMERGING ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES DUE TO DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGES IN THE EU
Contents
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 5
ABSTRACT 12
1 FORENV Rationale and Method 13

1.1 Background and rationale 13
1.2 Objectives and process 13
2 Summary of the Ten Priority Emerging Issues 19
3 Clusters of Disruptive Changes from the Priority Emerging

Issues 25
3.1 Cluster 1: Lifelong learning and skills for the green transition 26
3.2 Cluster 2: Cities innovating to manage demographic change
and enable the green transition 27
3.3 Cluster 3: Can an ageing society be a green one? 28
3.4 Cluster 4: Evolving inequalities driven by demographic
change 29
3.5 Cluster 5: Will there be a convergence between green,
digital and demographic transition agendas? 30
4 Policy Questions and Concluding Reflections 31

4.1 Financing the green transition in an ageing society 31
4.2 Supporting green skills throughout society 31
4.3 Addressing environmental footprints and equity 31
4.4 Changing settlement patterns of skilled workers 32
4.5 Sustainably “downsizing” cities 32
4.6 Concluding reflections 32
Appendices
Appendix A Full Characterisation of Emerging Issues
Appendix B Validation of Issues by Scientific Committees
Appendix C Key to Icons Used in Issue Clusters
February 2023 4
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Action needed to improve the knowledge base for European Union environment policy set out in
Priority Objective 5 of the 7th Environmental Action Programme1 includes ‘that (by 2020) the
understanding of, and the ability to evaluate and manage, emerging environmental and climate
risks are greatly improved’. In response, in 2017, the Environment Knowledge Community
(EKC2), established the EU foresight system for the systematic identification of emerging
environmental issues (FORENV). FORENV is a collaborative process, implemented by members
of the EKC, with the overall aim:
To identify, characterise and assess emerging issues that may represent risks or opportunities to
Europe’s environment, and to communicate these results to policy-makers and other
stakeholders, encouraging appropriate and timely action to be taken. Ultimately the aim is to
enable policy makers and other stakeholders to prevent or effectively manage emerging risks,
and to ensure that opportunities are identified and exploited.
FORENV is based on a systematic, 5-

step approach (see image) intended to
provide regular and timely updates to
EU senior and middle management on
issues which present potential risks and
opportunities for the environment. The
system was piloted in 2017 and three
cycles were successfully completed in
2018 – 2019, 2019 – 2020 and 2020 -
2021. This report is on the fourth
annual cycle, which ran from September
2021 – December 2022, and focused on
the topic of emerging environmental
issues due to demographic changes in
the EU (see Box A).
In each annual cycle FORENV identifies 10 emerging issues which are characterised using expert
knowledge and desk-based research into existing relevant literature and evidence.
In its first two cycles the output of FORENV has been a detailed characterisation and visual 1-
page summary of each emerging environmental issue (see Box B). The characterisations include
information on: drivers of the issue’s emergence3; potential implications of the issue; associated
risks and opportunities for Europe’s environment and human health; key uncertainties and
research needs; and, relevant EU policy. In cycle 3 and cycle 4 an additional output has been
prepared: a Synthesis Report providing a cross-cutting analysis of the outcomes and presenting
1Decision No 1386/2013/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 November 2013
on a General Union Environment Action Programme to 2020 ‘Living well, within the limits of our
planet’
2 The EKC is a cross-institutional collaboration set up in 2015 between the European Commission’s
Directorates-General ENV, CLIMA, RTD, ESTAT, JRC and the European Environment Agency with
the intention to improve the generation and sharing of EU environmental knowledge.
3Emergence is expressed as Short-term: 1 - 5 years; Medium-term: 5 - 10 years; Long-term:
10+ years
February 2023 5
infographics of five key clusters of changes related to the priority emerging issues, together
with key questions for policy arising from these. In cycles 3 and 4 the five overarching
infographics have replaced the individual priority emerging issue visual 1-page summaries. A
short summary of each of these five key clusters is presented below.
Box A: Topic for FORENV 2021-22 – Emerging environmental issues due to

demographic changes in the EU
Demographic changes are driven by long-term trends in fertility and mortality, education,
economic development – or decline – and a range of other social factors. These drivers lead
to shifts in the size, age and gender profile, education and employment levels and other
characteristics of populations such as religion or ethnicity at all scales (e.g. city, region, nation,
global). These changes also relate to (are driven by and result from) movements of people
within countries and migration between countries and regions.
In Europe detailed demographic projections exist, such as those developed by EUROSTAT,
which provide a number of outlooks up to 2050 and 2100. These are in turn used in
assessments, such as recently published by JRC (JRC, 20214) exploring in detail some of the
challenges and opportunities presented by diversifying age profiles in different parts of Europe.
Global demographic outlooks also exist, for example those prepared by the United Nations
Department of Economic and Social Affairs Population Dynamics (UN DESA). Previous
assessments have focussed often on economic and social implications of demographic change
(such as ageing and implications for pensions, or health care). FORENV will seek to identify
the environmental perspective.
It will be important for FORENV to focus on one or more aspects of ‘demographic change’ that
provide opportunities to identify and explore novel aspects of demographics and/or
developments with environmental implications that are not yet well understood. It is proposed
FORENV will focus on how demographic changes may lead to changes in (selected) sectors such
as through shifts in production and consumption, such as through demand for new product
types or services, or shifts in types of consumer (e.g. older vs younger), and what implications
these changes could have for the environment. This topic can also build in two priority
emerging issues identified in the third FORENV cycle that are relevant to the topic of
demographics: urban settlement patterns and demographic changes due to the Covid-19
pandemic; and the increasing digitalisation of life and work. As overall orientations for the
elaboration of the concrete issues, the following are proposed:
What might projected European and global demographic changes, such as ageing and
population dynamics within / between territories, mean for the development of key sectors
(e.g. mobility, agriculture and food, energy) and what will the implications of these
developments be for the environment?
4Goujon A., Jacobs-Crisioni C., Natale F., Lavalle C. (Eds), The demographic landscape of EU
territories: challenges and opportunities in diversely ageing regions, EUR 30498 EN, Publications
Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 2021, ISBN 978-92-76-27239-7,
doi:10.2760/658945, JRC123046. Available at: https://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/reposi-
tory/handle/JRC123046
February 2023 6
Cluster 1: Lifelong learning and skills for the green transition
• Migration among EU countries and from outside the EU will play a role in filling the high-skill,
high-wage jobs including many with STEM skills, that are essential for achieving the green
transition. This issue could be particularly evident in Eastern and Southern Member States
and Accession countries where they will continue to experience a ‘brain drain’ as skilled
workers move to Northern and Western Europe. The lack of skilled workers in countries could
be overcome by increasing the potential pool of talent through supporting and increasing
women’s participation in STEM education and in growing sectors such as renewable energy or
construction industries.
• Some immigrants, however, will have lower or different skills. The development of rapid
qualifications systems and skill / talent partnerships with third countries could provide direct
support for mobility schemes for work or training as well as capacity building and investment
in human capital, including skills development needed for the green transition. Such initiatives
could be used to train potential migrants in their country of origin with targeted skills, prior
to migration. To be viable, these will require reciprocal arrangements to address migration
issues related to the depletion of knowledge and skills in their countries of origin and related
economic consequences.
• In addition to migration, investment in lifelong learning will be key to reducing the productive
decline in the green economy associated with Europe’s ageing population. In turn, this would
enhance the size of the green innovation pool and enable older generations to keep pace with
the sector
Cluster 2: Cities innovating to manage the

green transition and demographic change Box B: Emerging environmental
issues
• Environmentally forced internal migration FORENV presents emerging issues or
within Europe is expected to become more changes to well-known issues in
Europe’s environment. Emerging
frequent in the future. In response, European issues reflect observed changes or
cities may prioritise environmental quality in developments in the environment that
planning by using techniques such as urban occur as a result of new research or
knowledge, a shift in geographical or
greening, to minimise or reverse population
temporal scales of impact, or due to
decline and boost economic development. heightened awareness or new
Migration from more polluted cities to greener response measures to issues.
urban and rural areas could lead to a Emerging issues reflect current
evidence of possible future change to
renaissance of areas that have suffered from the environment that is either positive
de-population. In turn this could lead to or negative. These issues are assessed
environmental and social challenges, over 3 time horizons showing when an
impact (either positive or negative) is
resulting from diverging environmental values
likely to occur in Europe – short-term
and a lack of social integration in urban and (1 - 5 years), medium term (5 - 10
rural areas with rapidly expanding years) and long-term (10+ years).
populations.
• Population growth in larger cities will have uncertain impacts on the drivers of environmental
and climate pressures. Population growth is a key driver of congestion, pollution, land-use
pressures and housing costs in urban areas. However, cities that prioritise a green transition
could see more efficient use of energy, transport and land and more accessible public
infrastructure (e.g., access to public transport, internet, and social services). Where urban
February 2023 7
populations are growing, there will be an increasingly urgent need for policy interventions to
address the pressures this growth implies.
• Cities in Europe may seek to become niche places that cater for a particular demographic
group such as the elderly, young families, students or even industries as a response to
demographic trends. To accommodate such changes, city planners will have to pay attention
to the planning and design of the built and green environments, for example by considering
how their ‘green’ policies accommodate elderly citizens and ‘healthy ageing’.
Cluster 3: Can an ageing society be a green one?
• As the proportion of the population who are elderly grows so does the need to understand
age-driven patterns of consumption (e.g., energy, food, durable goods, leisure activities) and
the sustainability challenges and opportunities these pose.
• In the short term, the consumption patterns of the older generations and their impact on
environmental sustainability is ambivalent. For example, if the EU working age population
continues to decline even with migration replacing the retiring workforce it could result in a
reduction of economic activity and likewise a reduction in the associated GHG emissions.
However, older people tend to consume more resources per person than younger generations
as they are more likely to live alone in a larger house with poor energy efficiency.
• In the long-term, as the current younger generations age (e.g., millennials and Gen Z) and
retire, they are likely to have more sustainable consumption behaviours than previous older
generations, in part due to their exposure to sustainability issues and green transition
knowledge acquired in their youth.
• Changes in fiscal policies will be required to account for the fiscal consequences of an ageing
society (i.e. reduced income tax revenues). Increased environmental taxes, corporate taxes
and VAT could be seen as important mechanisms to address this issue. The potential negative
impact that higher taxes could have on older generations could be offset by lower cost of
living associated with more sustainable consumption patterns and reusing and repairing goods
instead of replacing them.
• A shift away from the traditional distinction between work and retirement due to changes in
employment policies and a healthy older population could encourage older workers and
retirees to take up some roles in the green sector (even if poorly remunerated) or to undertake
more voluntary activities, including in environmental initiatives.
Cluster 4: Demographic change, social and environmental inequalities
• Cities will continue to promote the quality of their environment as a factor in economic growth
and social wellbeing. However, some European cities with declining populations may find
themselves in a vicious circle, with reduced resources to address environmental issues. These
cities may see younger and better skilled people (segments of the population that are more
mobile) move away for economic opportunities and quality of life, including better quality
environments. Cities with declining populations may also face difficult choices about how to
adjust water, waste, public transport and other infrastructure to reduced needs.
• As cities seek to address environmental issues, they will need to consider social disparities,
which may grow when both higher and lower skilled workers and migrants move to successful
cities. As noted above, cities with declining populations may lose younger members of
February 2023 8
“middle” social groups. Cities will face the challenge / opportunity of developing green plans
that benefit all segments of the population. For example, developing plans for urban mobility
and green space that consider the needs of lower-income groups and promote options that
provide them with greater opportunities for employment and improving wellbeing.
• Digital technologies for remote working will allow skilled, service-sector workers to move to
urban and rural areas that provide a better quality of environment. This will change the
character of those areas that attract an inflow of better-paid workers, creating inequalities
with long-standing populations that may see housing and other prices increase. Attractive
rural areas may become IT suburbs of distant urban areas. Farming and other activities may
come into conflict with the preferences of the new arrivals; local knowledge of those
territories, and cultures linked to the territories, may be lost as the preferences of new arrivals
create a more digital territory and culture in rural districts.
• New technologies, and in particular smart and digital health technologies, will also provide
new tools to protect human health and to address environmental problems. However, lower-
income and older segments of the population may be less able to access these technologies,
potentially increasing health inequalities. For example, technologies to help the elderly
maintain independence may be used mainly by better-off groups (see Cluster 5). Moreover,
people on lower-incomes may be less able to adopt more energy- and resource-efficient
products and services.
• Young adults in Europe are increasingly concerned about environmental problems, and that
having children will worsen these problems. “Green parenting” could address concerns about
the environmental impacts of children – however, if government policies encourage and even
legislate for green products (such as more sustainable alternatives to disposable nappies),
lower-income families could face additional costs.
Cluster 5: Will there be a convergence between green, digital and demographic

transition agendas?
• Emerging digital technologies can help Europe’s ageing population, for example by providing
new ways of monitoring their health and providing care, in turn allowing more elderly
Europeans to maintain their independence (e.g., living in their own homes longer rather than
moving to assisted living such as care homes). Robotics can help older Europeans to perform
physical tasks and remain active at work. Healthcare costs may be reduced, and for many
elderly, life satisfaction could improve. The implications for the environment are uncertain:
more elderly Europeans living independently could lead to increased energy use. In terms of
inequality, more affluent elderly Europeans are more likely to benefit from these technologies
(see Cluster 4).
• Digital technologies will allow skilled workers to move away from urban office settings to rural
areas for a better environment and better quality of life – but this shift would create new
environmental impacts, such as from new development and roads that could lead to
ecosystem fragmentation.
• Digital technologies increasingly allow EU employers to use remote working for skilled workers
based outside the EU. Greater use of skilled workers outside the EU may reduce employment
prospects for skilled EU citizens. While this trend could reduce some migration to EU, it is not
likely to affect the migration of unskilled workers. The environmental implications are
uncertain. Greater use of remote workers outside the EU could reduce job opportunities for
skilled EU workers, particularly those in less vibrant EU urban areas, which could reduce
February 2023 9
revenues in Europe and lower green investments (see the previous cluster). On the other
hand, remote workers outside the EU often receive poorer wages and worse working
conditions, and this is likely to continue to be an issue
Key policy questions
The five clusters of disruptive development presented in Section 2 point to a range of potentially
important changes that individually and collectively suggest the emergence of new drivers. These
drivers can interact in different ways and their implications are likely to vary across the EU and
the world. Five common issues and related policy questions related to demography, the environ-
ment and the green transition are presented here.
1. Financing the green transition in an ageing society
Europe’s ageing society poses a challenge for public finance across different levels of government
(local, city / metropolitan, regional, national and EU), as needs for health and life care will increase
while the working-age population is expected to decline. Public finance also has a key role to play
in the green transition. Policy makers will need to make tough choices. One solution to this
potential dilemma is greater reliance on private finance for the green transition – however, private
finance could shift environmental priorities towards sectors and initiatives with better or more
short-term economic returns.
• What challenges and opportunities will different levels of government face in financing the
green transition in Europe’s ageing society? How could a growing role for private sources
of finance affect green priorities?
2. Supporting green skills throughout society
The transition to a greener economy will require a broad range of skills, from building renovation
and skilled manufacturing to advanced modelling, IT and programming. In particular, skills in the
areas of science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) will be needed. Migration may
continue to bring skilled workers, but the EU will face increased global competition for skilled
workers. Training and lifelong learning can create opportunities for unskilled workers, both EU
citizens and migrants. Digital technologies can allow older workers (and especially skilled workers)
to remain active and, for all workers, provide new methods for training and professional
development.
• How will the EU and Member States widen skills for and participation in the green
transition? What are the key areas for action? Which sectors and geographical areas of
the EU may face the greatest gap in worker skills for the green transition?
3. Addressing environmental footprints and equity
Both digital advances and the green transition could create new social and economic inequalities.
For example, while digital technologies can allow skilled workers to live in rural areas and work
remotely, and older people to remain active, better off segments of the population may be the
main ones to benefit. Moreover, these trends could increase environmental footprints. When it
comes to consumption and lifestyles, however, many “green” products with lower environmental
footprints are more costly, limiting the ability of lower-income groups to participate in “green
parenting” and other environmental consumption and behaviour trends.
• How can policies for the green transition address emerging changes in the
environmental footprints of different segments of the population? How can EU
February 2023 10
governments at all levels ensure that lower-income segments of the population

participate in and benefit from the green transition?
4. Changing settlement patterns of skilled workers
Digital technologies allow many skilled workers to leave traditional offices and work and live where
they choose. Europe may see new population shifts, as skilled workers move to rural areas with
a better quality of life or to more advanced cities. On the other hand, corporations may prefer to
subcontract lower-wage skilled workers outside of Europe.
• Where will skilled workers live in Europe’s digital future? How can EU policy and
legislation avoid a competition for skilled workers among Member States – and ensure
that subcontracting skilled workers in third countries does not create a ‘race to the
bottom’ in social and economic conditions for workers?
5. Sustainably “downsizing” cities
Many European cities have implemented green initiatives intended to create a better quality of
life and the environment, making urban living more attractive – and in doing so, attracting
economic development and innovation. Other European cities, however, face populations that are
ageing, younger and skilled workers who leave for more dynamic locations, and financing
difficulties for initiatives to maintain and adapt existing infrastructure to a declining population
and to create more attractive environments for their residents.
• How can the EU (and national and regional governments) help those cities with declining
populations “downsize” while improving the quality of life and quality of the environment
for their residents?
February 2023 11
ABSTRACT
Each year FORENV – the EU Foresight System for Emerging Environmental Issues – identifies and
characterises 10 priority emerging issues of potential importance to the European environment
and environmental policy. In its fourth cycle (2021-22) FORENV explored emerging issues arising
from projected European and global demographic changes that may impact the achievement of
Europe’s green transition. This focus of FORENV was to inform thinking and discussion for policies
to support the green transition and associated uncertainties. The 10 priority emerging issues
identified relate to social, economic and technological developments, including, among others,
changes in demographic makeup in urban areas and political preferences, emergence of new
technologies to assist an increasingly elderly population such as those that enable people to move
between virtual and physical realities, and enhanced urban greening to manage urban shrinking.
To enhance policy relevance, a synthesis assessment was also completed, which identified five
key clusters of change: lifelong learning and skills for the green transition; cities innovating to
manage the green transition and demographic change; can an ageing society be a green one;
demographic change, social and environmental inequalities; will there be a convergence between
green, digital and demographic transition agendas. These clusters are presented together with
associated implications for the environment and the green transition alongside uncertainties and
key questions for policy.
February 2023 12
1 FORENV RATIONALE AND METHOD
1.1 Background and rationale

Priority Objective 5 of the 7th Environmental Action Programme5 established the need to improve
the knowledge and evidence base for Union environment policy, to ensure, among other things,
‘that (by 2020) the understanding of, and the ability to evaluate and manage, emerging
environmental and climate risks are greatly improved’. Responding to this, in 2015 the
Environment Knowledge Community (EKC6), decided to jointly strengthen the Commission's
capacity to consider emerging issues, including through foresight tools as well as to monitor and
identify opportunities and complex risks and
anticipate what their impact could be on
environment and society. Policy context
The need for the systematic
identification of emerging
Capitalising and bringing together existing
environmental issues has been
knowledge, expertise and practices, in 2017 the identified in the 7th Environmental
EKC partners established FORENV, the EU foresight Action Programme (Priority Objective
system for the systematic identification of emerging 5), and also aligns with the Better
Regulation guidelines, which
environmental issues, whose overall aim is: emphasise the importance of
foresight and other forward-looking
To identify, characterise and assess emerging tools to combine quantitative
issues that may represent risks or modelling with systems thinking and
a long-term approach.
opportunities to Europe’s environment, and to
communicate these results to policy-makers
“… (by 2020) the understanding
and other stakeholders, encouraging
of, and the ability to evaluate and
appropriate and timely action to be taken. manage, emerging
Ultimately the aim is to enable policy makers environmental and climate risks
and other stakeholders to prevent or are greatly improved.”
7th EAP Priority Objective 5
effectively manage emerging risks, and to http://ec.europa.eu/environment/action-
ensure that opportunities are identified and programme
exploited.
1.2 Objectives and process
1.2.1 Objectives
FORENV is a collaborative process for the early detection, characterisation and assessment of
emerging environmental issues. The FORENV system is implemented by the members of the EKC
and has the following specific objectives:
1. Bring together in a systematic framework existing knowledge and expertise in the

European Union (EU) institutions and Member States to identify weak signals of change
relevant for Europe’s environment and environment policy.
5Decision No 1386/2013/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 November 2013
on a General Union Environment Action Programme to 2020 ‘Living well, within the limits of our
planet’
6 The EKC is a cross-institutional collaboration set up in 2015 between the European Commission’s
Directorates-General ENV, CLIMA, RTD, ESTAT, JRC and the European Environment Agency with
the intention to improve the generation and sharing of EU environmental knowledge.
February 2023 13
2. Identify 10 emerging environmental issues per year through EU internal and external
expertise, based on their potential impact and policy relevance.
3. Characterise the detected issues on the basis of sound and up-to-date scientific literature
and wider evidence, in order to highlight related risks and opportunities.
4. Communicate emerging issues to EU policy makers and stakeholders in a timely manner

so that they are able to decide what action needs to be taken.
FORENV as an approach is based on horizon scanning and the results developed and presented
in this report do not represent a comprehensive review of emerging trends. They are intended to
raise some key questions and stimulate discussion on how emerging issues could change the
societal, economic and environmental landscape over the coming decades.
Box 1: Horizon scanning as the basis of the EU Foresight System for the identification
of emerging environmental issues and related opportunities and risks (FORENV)
The methodology used for FORENV is based on horizon scanning. Horizon scanning refers to the
systematic identification and examination of potential future developments or drivers of change
at the margins of current thinking and to explore the opportunities and threats to policy or society
these may represent. As a process horizon scanning involves desk based and expert-led identi-
fication of weak signals of change that may challenge current assumptions or trends.
By making sense of such weak signals through its structured horizon scanning approach, FORENV
identifies, characterises and communicates emerging issues to policy makers and risk managers
so that they can decide what action needs to be taken. As FORENV is not embedded within a
specific policy unit it is not intended to develop or assess policy options, however the outcomes
are expected to be relevant for environmental policy.
More information on FORENV and the methodology used are available on the Commission website.
1.2.2 Process amendments in response to the COVID-19 pandemic

FORENV is based on a systematic, 5-step approach, as detailed in the image below and in Table
1. It is intended to provide regular and timely updates to EU senior and middle management on
issues which present potential risks and benefits to the environment.
The emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic required some elements of the 5-step approach to be
modified. In cycle 3 (2020-2021) the planned physical meetings between the FORENV Secretariat
and the EKC were moved online, and the sense making workshops (Step 2) were redesigned for
virtual delivery. Due to ongoing uncertainties at the start of cycle 4 (2021-2022) the same
approach was followed as in cycle 3. The adaptation of the approach has proved successful and
both cycles 3 and 4 were able to produce anticipated outcomes.
1.2.3 Previous amendments to FORENV to enhance policy relevance (third annual

cycle)
In its third cycle (2020-2021) FORENV provided support to a specific policy process: the zero
pollution action plan. Reflecting the focus of the third cycle of FORENV on the future of a key
action plan related to implementing the European Green Deal (zero pollution action plan), the
need was recognised for synthesised, accessible and policy relevant outputs. To provide these
outputs a cross-cutting assessment of the priority emerging issues was incorporated in the
FORENV process and from this the preparation of a Synthesis Report, including key uncertainties
and questions for policy.
Given the success of this amendment, the same approach has been followed in the fourth cycle.
February 2023 14
1.2.4 Fourth annual cycle:

In the fourth annual cycle of FORENV, which ran from September 2021 – December 2022, the
focus was on emerging risks, opportunities and uncertainties for the achievement of Europe’s
green transition arising from projected European and global demographic changes (see Box A).
Box A: Emerging environmental issues due to demographic changes in the EU
Demographic changes are driven by long-term trends in fertility and mortality, education,
economic development – or decline – and a range of other social factors. These drivers lead
to shifts in the size, age and gender profile, education and employment levels and other
characteristics of populations such as religion or ethnicity at all scales (e.g. city, region, nation,
global). These changes also relate to (are driven by and result from) movements of people
within countries and migration between countries and regions.
In Europe detailed demographic projections exist, such as those developed by EUROSTAT,

which provide a number of outlooks up to 2050 and 2100. These are in turn used in
assessments, such as recently published by JRC (JRC, 2021) exploring in detail some of the
challenges and opportunities presented by diversifying age profiles in different parts of Europe.
Global demographic outlooks also exist, for example those prepared by the United Nations
Department of Economic and Social Affairs Population Dynamics (UN DESA). Previous
assessments have focussed often on economic and social implications of demographic change
(such as ageing and implications for pensions, or health care). FORENV will seek to identify
the environmental perspective.
February 2023 15
It will be important for FORENV to focus on one or more aspects of ‘demographic change’ that
provide opportunities to identify and explore novel aspects of demographics and/or
developments with environmental implications that are not yet well understood. It is proposed
FORENV will focus on how demographic changes may lead to changes in (selected) sectors such
as through shifts in production and consumption, such as through demand for new product
types or services, or shifts in types of consumer (e.g. older vs younger), and what implications
these changes could have for the environment. This topic can also build in two priority
emerging issues identified in the third FORENV cycle that are relevant to the topic of
demographics: urban settlement patterns and demographic changes due to the Covid-19
pandemic; and the increasing digitalisation of life and work. As overall orientations for the
elaboration of the concrete issues, the following are proposed:
What might projected European and global demographic changes, such as ageing and
population dynamics within / between territories, mean for the development of key sectors
(e.g. mobility, agriculture and food, energy) and what will the implications of these
developments be for the environment?
1.2.5 Summary of outputs and structure of this report
In the first two cycles of FORENV the outputs consisted of a main report (this report) containing
the 10 priority issue characterisations and a summary infographic for each. Reflecting the process
changes made in the third cycle to enhance policy relevance (see Section 1.2.3) an additional
assessment was completed to look across all 10 issues and identify key developments. A
synthesis of these key developments identified five key clusters of drivers of potentially disruptive
changes, with implications for policies to support the green transition and associated
uncertainties. Key policy questions were then defined, which are intended to inform ongoing
discussion about potential threats and opportunities to Europe’s green transition. This cross-
cutting assessment and related policy questions are also presented in a separate Synthesis
Report.
In developing the synthesis report, infographics were prepared for each cluster and these are
presented in Section 2 of this report. Section 3 then presents the key questions for policy
arising from the risks, opportunities and uncertainties associated with the clusters.
Appendix A lays out the full characterisation of each issue, on which the clustering presented in
Section 2 was based. Appendix B summarises the validation and/or review feedback from the
EEA Scientific Committee as well as the SCHEER on each of the issues.
February 2023 16
Table 1: FORENV Process 2021-22
Step 1: Information gathering
More than 100 weak signals of change were identified from existing horizon scanning activities in the Joint
Research Centre (JRC), DG Research and Innovation (RTD), European Environment Agency (EEA) and its
network of Member States, and the Science for Environment Policy News Alert managed by DG
Environment. The weak signals were reviewed and collated to select approximately 108 items that were
then discussed in Step 2.
Picture 1 presents a screenshot from Pearltrees, an online software tool used to collate items found during
Step 1, and cluster them using the STEEPL7 framework.
Picture 1: Example screenshot from items collation using Pearltrees software
Step 2: Sense-making and selection
Four online sense-making workshops were convened, bringing together in total approximately 40 experts
from the Commission and external organisations. Through these workshops, experts analysed the selected
weak signals, discussed and assessed potential emerging issues. Using online document sharing tools
participating experts were able to support virtual clustering of potential issues and vote on them to support
prioritisation. Using the workshop outcomes 10 emerging issues were prioritised by the EKC.
Picture 2 shows an example of the online workspace (Mural8) in use, illustrating the clustering and voting
of potential issues.
Picture 2: Screenshot of Mural worksheet during FORENV online workshop (5 April 2022)
7 Social, Technological, Environmental, Economic, Political, Legal

8 https://www.mural.co/
February 2023 17
Step 3: Characterisation
Preparation of characterisations of each of the 10 priority issues to highlight related risks and opportunities
for the achievement of the green transition in Europe (see Appendix A). The characterisation was based
on a desk-based review of literature (including scientific journals), discussion and feedback from external
experts and input from experts in a range of Commission DGs and the EEA.
Step 4: Validation by a scientific committee
The characterisations of the 10 issues were peer-reviewed in the fourth annual cycle by members of the
EEA Scientific Committee and the Scientific Committee on Health, Environmental and Emerging Risks
(SCHEER). The Scientific Committee review of each issue is presented in Appendix B.
Step 5: Outputs and communication
The final findings are communicated, in the form of this report, to citizens, stakeholders and EU policy-
makers for discussion and follow-up action. Reflecting the modifications to the FORENV process to enhance
policy relevance, an additional Synthesis Report has been prepared which includes some key questions for
policy (see section 1.2.3). The full and synthesis reports are accompanied by a video to communicate the
outputs and questions for policy.
February 2023 18
2 SUMMARY OF THE TEN PRIORITY EMERGING ISSUES

This section provides a short summary of the ten priority emerging issues identified and charac-
terised by FORENV in the fourth cycle. The full characterisation of each issue can be found in
Appendix A. An assessment of these priority issues, their implications for the environment and
the green transition as well as related key policy questions are presented in Sections 3 and 4.
As part of the FORENV approach (see Section 1), each issue is reviewed and validated by mem-
bers of the EEA Scientific Committee and the SCHEER (DG Santé). The Scientific Committee
reviews are presented in Annex B.
How might Europe’s ageing population influence political prefer-

ences for the green transition?
Population ageing can create change in political preference and environmental activism, chal-
lenging collective mobilisation in support of local or national movements around the green tran-
sition.
• Europe’s ageing population could influence the drive for social mobilisation (i.e. through
activism and protests) and the role that organised citizen pressure plays in lobbying
political institutions to adopt pro-environmental policies. Considering a lower cohort of
older people (compared with a younger age group) are engaged in environmental issues
such as climate change, sustainability and conservation; in an ageing society, there
could be a reduction in people joining activist groups that actively champion environ-
ment issues and campaign for policies in support of the green transition.
• The rise in the median age of voters in Europe may change attitudes and actions to-
wards the environment and, in turn, influence political choices affecting the green tran-
sition. The perception that elderly voters could benefit less from long-term public poli-
cies (e.g. protection of the environment) could mean a greater share of voters may opt
for politicians (and political parties) that prioritise policies that benefit the elderly more
directly, such as higher pensions and better health care for older populations.
• As younger activists age, they become older activists. There may also be an emergence
of alliances between older and younger activism on environmental and climate con-
cerns.
What will be the environmental impact of increased digitalisation

and automation/use of other technology in an ageing society?
A rapidly ageing populations in Europe in coming decades is highlighting the role and im-
portance of digitalisation and technology to support and respond to the needs of an ageing
society.
• Smart technologies and digital / eHealth systems (e.g. robotics, smart living applica-
tions) may increasingly emerge as cost-effective and efficient solutions for health care
and enabling independent living in later life, but could increase health and digital ine-
qualities.
• Robotics may allow the elderly to perform tasks that require physical exertion that
exceeds their capabilities, but this could create social tensions across generations if
younger people are excluded from the job market
• Immersive digital environments integrated with augmented physical reality may
emerge to allow people to move between virtual and physical realities as tasks and
situations demand (e.g. older adults seeking refuge in virtual spaces or filters to escape
the physical world, travel and engage with nature virtually). VR technology and data
February 2023 19
centres could lead to considerable energy usage and therefore emissions with signifi-
cant environmental costs.
Will changes in the organisation of work change the structure of

rural settlement, mobility and land use with an impact on envi-
ronmental quality?
Technological developments and the COVID-19 pandemic are increasing preference for agile
and remote working conditions. There is also growing evidence of a change in the choice of
work towards more socially and environmentally rewarding occupations (primarily among
young people).
• Agile and remote working is changing people’s working hours and location and could
have uncertain impacts on mobility, reducing daily commute and related transport
emissions. Conversely, a growing rural population could generate travel demand and
require new transport infrastructure and rural mobility hubs that could put pressure on
rural land use.
• Rural communities could be shaped by the emergence of new ‘ruralites’ with reconfig-
ured workspaces that better suit new ways of working. This could drive investment in
infrastructure and services that could drive up the cost of living in rural areas and
change the demographic composition of rural towns, reducing local environmental
knowledge and capacity as existing, often lower skilled and older residents (e.g. farm-
ers) are priced-out of their communities.
• There is growing evidence of a change in the choice of work as more people (particularly
younger age groups) reconsider the relative value given to the pursuit of wealth and
reflect on how they work and live, seeking more fulfilling jobs that enables a healthier,
happier way of working for a living. This could lead to change in workforce ‘distribution’
across rural and urban settings as changing lifestyles drive more people to seek out
rural locations.
What will be the environmental impact of changes in the demo-

graphic makeup of urban areas?
Changes in age dynamics, family structures, size of households, number and density of inhab-
itants, and migration flows are driving long-term change in the demographic makeup of cities,
urban areas, and individual neighbourhoods with variable environmental impacts and re-
sponses.
• Population growth in large cities may result in more efficient use of energy, transport
and land and better and more accessible public infrastructure (e.g., access to public
transport, internet, and social services), but conversely it could increase congestion,
pollution, land pressures and housing costs.
• A shrinking urban population can have both physical environmental impacts (e.g. ob-
solete infrastructure including vacant housing, industrial, shopping, education, and
other facilities) and socio-demographic impacts (e.g. departure of younger and more
qualified residents leading to proportionally older, less skilled, and less affluent popu-
lation).
• Cities in Europe may seek to become niche ‘family places’ in the future as a response
to demographic trends. For example, European cities might increasingly focus on ca-
tering for particular demographic groups such as the elderly, young families and stu-
dents or even industries. Intergenerational or micro-housing models may emerge to
accommodate people of all ages and to address spatial inadequacies.
February 2023 20
Will urban greening emerge as a key tool in thriving cities of the

future?
Demographic trends including ageing, population decline, changing family structures, smaller
households, migration flows, and people increasingly living alone are all factors linked to in-
creasing economic, environmental, health, and social challenges in urban areas.
• Increasing urban inequalities in economic, gender, skills, regional and between ethnic
groups in Europe mean that cities may increasingly need to consider issues of equality
and social justice when planning new developments including public green space.
• City planners might have to pay attention to the planning and design of neighbour-
hood’s build and green environments, for example by considering how their ‘green’
policies accommodate elderly citizens and ‘healthy ageing’ (e.g. walking-friendly infra-
structure, accessibility of destinations and services that encourage higher physical ac-
tivity and walking among older adults)
• European cities could use urban greening as a tool to adapt to, manage and mitigate
population decline and the related problem of urban shrinking (e.g. as cities ‘re-size’
greening strategies can be adopted to repurpose abandoned land).
As Europe’s population ages, will consumption patterns change

and what will this mean for the environment?
As the share of the elderly population grows so does the need to understand age-driven pat-
terns of consumption (e.g. energy, food, durable goods, leisure activities) and the sustainability
challenges these pose.
• Older people are more likely to live alone in houses which are often older, larger, and/or
have low energy efficiency, and tend to consume more energy, gas, and electricity per
person than younger cohorts and families
• Older adults have lower purchasing power for services and higher-end products com-
pared to younger adults
• A decline in the proportion of the working-age population may dampen economic ac-
tivity in a country or region thus reducing carbon emissions
• In the long-term, the ageing of younger generations (e.g. millennials, Gen Z) is likely
is likely to exhibit more sustainable consumption behaviours due to high initial exposure
to sustainability issues.
Will internal and international migration help or hinder the green

transition?
While Europe’s planned green transition is expected to lead to a net increase in jobs, Europe’s
labour force is projected to contract in coming years. The green transition will in particular need
February 2023 21
STEM (Science, technology, engineering, and mathematics) skills. Migration among EU coun-
tries and from outside the EU may play a role in filling the ‘green jobs’, and could also have
other influences on the green transition.
• EU citizens also migrate abroad, especially for high-skill, high-wage jobs, including
many with STEM skills. The global competition for highly skilled individuals is expected
to continue: this could draw talent needed for the green transition out of Europe.
• Women remain underrepresented in STEM studies and jobs in the EU. Encouraging
greater women’s participation in these areas could address job shortages for the green
transition (and for other economic sectors).
• Migration to the EU will include highly skilled individuals, and skills-oriented migration
policies can encourage this migration. Many arrivals, however, will have lower skills:
increased training initiatives can provide the skills needed for the green transition.
• Within the EU, eastern and southern Member States (plus accession and neighbourhood
countries) will continue to see a ‘brain drain’ of skilled labour to more prosperous Mem-
ber States and outside the EU, potentially affect the economies of the countries of
origin.
• Remote working may provide some counterbalance to physical migration, especially for
highly skilled jobs (and other service sector jobs) – but it could lead to exploitation of
workers in third countries and a loss of EU job opportunities. Environmental impacts
would in part shift to the countries where remote workers live.
• Migrants tend to go to prosperous EU cities, increasing urban populations and urban
environmental and social challenges. While migrants on average tend to consume less
– and have lower environmental impacts – than host populations, they tend to consume
more than in their countries of origin, leading to overall greater global environmental
impacts.
• Migration can lead to social tensions, which might reduce political attention to green
policies and actions.
• Migration from outside the EU could reduce economic prospects and skills for green
policies in their countries of origin; on the other hand, many migrants provide remit-
tances to their countries of origin, potentially enabling green action; some might share
green skills and ideas in their home countries.
Will environmental factors have a growing influence on intra-EU

migration flows within the EU?
A range of factors influence EU citizens to move across and within Member States. Environ-
mental degradation and climate change are important factors for migration at global scale.
Within the EU, environmental factors such as air, noise and water pollution as well as land
degradation have been linked to migration. Climate change is also an important driver that can
in turn exacerbate other environmental pressures, including air pollution, flooding and land
degradation.
• Migration from more polluted cities to more natural rural areas could lead to a renais-
sance of areas that are now suffering from de-population – but also to a lack of re-
sources to address environmental problems in urban areas with declining populations.
• Suburban and rural areas seeing an influx in people could face growing environmental
problems, including fragmentation of natural areas. New rural residents might, on the
other hand, support the preservation of natural habitats and the reduction in environ-
mental pressures – potentially creating conflicts with existing residents whose liveli-
hoods are tied to activities such as high-intensity agriculture.
• Successful urban areas will put a priority on environmental quality, attracting growing
populations and more economic development – thus seeing a virtuous circle. On the
February 2023 22
other hand, there could be increasing disparities between these successful urban areas
and less successful cities facing a vicious circle of declining populations and fiscal
means.
• Younger and better educated people are more likely to move, potentially increasing
social disparities with older and less educated residents who remain
How will environmental and associated lifestyle choices impact

on fertility rates and what are the environmental consequences
of this?
In Europe as well as other parts of the world, a growing number of young adults are hesitant
to have children due to environmental and climate concerns linked to the ‘great acceleration’
underway in human-induced global change. It is not yet clear to what extent this emerging
trend has yet influenced EU fertility rates, which are affected by a broad range of economic and
social factors. Nonetheless, ‘eco-anxiety’ is growing in Europe and many other parts of the
world; some young adults react by not having children or having fewer children. In addition, a
movement is promoting ‘anti-natalism’ as an action to address the world’s growing environ-
mental problems.
• If Europeans have fewer children due to environmental concerns, the resulting reduc-
tion in population is expected to reduce environmental impacts (at the same time,
smaller households typically have higher per capita environmental impacts compared
to large households).
• At the same time, reductions in the workforce that follow from lower fertility and birth
rates could hinder the green transition (not consider migration; see also issues 7 and
8) and lead to fiscal difficulties that undermine public financing for the environment
(see also issue 10).
• ‘Green parenting’ could lessen the concerns about environmental impacts held by po-
tential parents – however, there could be uncertainties and confusion if claims about
green products for parents and children are not regulated. ‘Green parenting’ may be
more expensive than current, modern approaches, leading to social inequities – if cer-
tain products are required by law – or to such environmental action seen as only a class
and lifestyle choice.
• International discussions could renew attention to population and environment links –
however, this might lead to tensions between low and high birth rate regions of the
world.
How will the fiscal and financial implications of demographic

change shape the green transition?
The long-term ageing of European societies will increase the dependency ratio between those
in and those out of the labour force. This is expected to put pressure on fiscal revenues and
government expenditure, in particular expenditure on pensions and health and social care. The
specific impacts will, of course, vary across Member States and regions.
• Declining government revenues from employment taxes could lead to a shift towards
higher environmental taxes, including on energy, transport, pollution and resource use.
A further implication could be higher VAT taxes; if these are adjusted for environmental
goals, VAT taxes could discourage consumption and encourage reuse and repair.
February 2023 23
• Increased pressure on government expenditures could lead to a greater role for private
finance, including private pension funds, in the green transition. Alongside these larger
actors, individuals may increase their support for small scale investments via crowd-
funding. Governments might encourage private finance for the green transition with
green standards and tax incentives. Greater private finance could, however, change
policy priorities by supporting projects that offer greater financial returns over those
with greater societal returns.
• The decrease in the workforce may lead to several changes. One could be greater in-
vestment in lifelong learning, which in turn could promote innovation, including green
innovation. Another could be a shift away from the traditional distinction between work
and retirement, for example as policies (and the growing population of healthy older
citizens) encourage older workers and retirees to undertake more voluntary activities,
including in environmental initiatives.
February 2023 24
3 CLUSTERS OF DISRUPTIVE CHANGES FROM THE PRIORITY

EMERGING ISSUES
As noted in Section 1, the FORENV scanning exercise identified 108 weak signals of change
relevant to the topic of demographic changes. These were collated and discussed in four
workshops bringing together Commission officials and external experts which led to the
identification of ten priority emerging issues, as summarised in Section 2. These issues were then
characterised via desk research, including defining their key drivers and expected future
development. Drivers and future changes include those that are societal (such as evolving
inequalities, green parenting etc.), economic and technological (such as digital health
technologies), and environmental. The characterisations of these ten priority issues are included
in Appendix A.
The ten priority issues were reviewed, and five clusters of potentially disruptive changes
associated with the emerging issues were developed. These clusters were then discussed by
the Secretariat and DG Environment to identify potentially important implications for policies to
support the green transition and associated uncertainties. Key policy questions were then
defined (as presented in Section 4), which are intended to stimulate discussion around how
emerging issues related to demographic changes in Europe and globally could influence the
environment and the achievement of the green transition, and what policy responses may be
required.
These results will, it is hoped, help inform reflections on future policy and action, as well as
potentially guide the direction of related research in the Commission. It is also intended that
these findings will be of value to policymakers in national or regional government. As a detailed
horizon scanning exercise, the outcomes of FORENV are well suited to inform potential wider
foresight, such as strategic foresight within the Commission or elsewhere.
The clusters presented in this Section are:

Emerging environmental issues
1. Cluster 1: Lifelong learning and skills for the This report presents emerging
green transition issues or changes to well-known
issues in Europe’s environment.
Emerging issues reflect observed
2. Cluster 2: Cities innovating to manage the
changes or developments in the
green transition and demographic change environment that occur as a result of
new research or knowledge, a shift in
3. Cluster 3: Can an ageing society be a green geographical or temporal scales of
impact, or due to heightened
one?
awareness or new response measures
to issues. Emerging issues reflect
4. Cluster 4: Demographic change, social and current evidence of possible future
environmental inequalities change to the environment that is
either positive or negative. These
issues are assessed over 3 time
5. Cluster 5: Will there be a convergence
horizons showing when an impact
between green, digital and demographic (either positive or negative) is likely
transition agendas? to occur in Europe – short-term (1 - 5
years), medium term (5 - 10 years)
Each icon used in the cluster infographics and long-term (10+ years).
corresponds to one of the ten priority emerging

issues, as presented in Section 2. A key to the
icons used is also included in Appendix C.
February 2023 25
3.1 Cluster 1: Lifelong learning and skills for the green transition
February 2023 26
3.2 Cluster 2: Cities innovating to manage demographic change and enable the green transition
February 2023 27
3.3 Cluster 3: Can an ageing society be a green one?
February 2023 28
3.4 Cluster 4: Evolving inequalities driven by demographic change
February 2023 29
3.5 Cluster 5: Will there be a convergence between green, digital and demographic transition agendas?
February 2023 30
4 POLICY QUESTIONS AND CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS

The five clusters of disruptive development presented in Section 2 point to a range of potentially
important changes that individually and collectively suggest the emergence of new drivers. These
drivers can interact in different ways and their implications are likely to vary across the EU and
the world. Five common issues and related policy questions linked to demography, the environ-
ment and the green transition are presented here:
4.1 Financing the green transition in an ageing society

Europe’s ageing society poses a challenge for public finance across different levels of govern-
ment (local, city / metropolitan, regional, national and EU), as needs for health and life care will
increase while the working-age population is expected to decline. Public finance also has a key
role to play in the green transition. Policy-makers will need to make tough choices. One solution
to this potential dilemma is greater reliance on private finance for the green transition – how-
ever, private finance could shift environmental priorities towards sectors and initiatives with
better or more short-term economic returns.
• What challenges and opportunities will different levels of government face in financing the
green transition in Europe’s ageing society? How could a growing role for private sources of
finance affect green priorities?
4.2 Supporting green skills throughout society

The transition to a greener economy will require a broad range of skills, from building renova-
tion and skilled manufacturing to advanced modelling, IT and programming. In particular, skills
in the areas of science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) will be needed. Migra-
tion may continue to bring skilled workers, but the EU will face increased global competition for
skilled workers. Training and lifelong learning can create opportunities for unskilled workers,
both EU citizens and migrants. Digital technologies can allow older workers (and especially
skilled workers) to remain active and, for all workers, provide new methods for training and pro-
fessional development.
• How will the EU and Member States widen skills for and participation in the green transition?
What are the key areas for action? Which sectors and geographical areas of the EU may face
the greatest gap in worker skills for the green transition?
4.3 Addressing environmental footprints and equity

Both digital advances and the green transition could create new social and economic inequali-
ties. For example, while digital technologies can allow skilled workers to live in rural areas and
work remotely, and older people to remain active, better off segments of the population may be
the main ones to benefit. Moreover, these trends could increase environmental footprints. When
it comes to consumption and lifestyles, however, many “green” products with lower environ-
mental footprints are more costly, limiting the ability of lower-income groups to participate in
“green parenting” and other environmental consumption and behaviour trends.
• How can policies for the green transition address emerging changes in the environmental foot-
prints of different segments of the population? How can EU governments at all levels ensure
that lower-income segments of the population participate in and benefit from the green tran-
sition?
February 2023 31
4.4 Changing settlement patterns of skilled workers

Digital technologies allow many skilled workers to leave traditional offices and work and live
where they choose. Europe may see new population shifts, as skilled workers move to rural ar-
eas with a better quality of life or to more advanced cities. On the other hand, corporations
may prefer to subcontract lower-wage skilled workers outside of Europe.
• Where will skilled workers live in Europe’s digital future? How can EU policy and legislation
avoid a competition for skilled workers among Member States – and ensure that subcontracting
skilled workers in third countries does not create a ‘race to the bottom’ in social and economic
conditions for workers?
4.5 Sustainably “downsizing” cities

Many European cities have implemented green initiatives intended to create a better quality of
life and the environment, making urban living more attractive – and in doing so, attracting eco-
nomic development and innovation. Other European cities, however, face populations that are
ageing, younger and skilled workers who leave for more dynamic locations, and financing diffi-
culties for initiatives to maintain and adapt existing infrastructure to a declining population and
to create more attractive environments for their residents.
• How can the EU (and national and regional governments) help those cities with declining pop-
ulations “downsize” while improving the quality of life and quality of the environment for
their residents?
4.6 Concluding reflections

The emerging issues and policy questions suggest the important role of demographic change in
environmental issues and the realisation of Europe’s green transition. Failure to understand and
consider such demographic drivers of change could undermine the transition, for example if there
are insufficient skilled workers to deliver it, or due to the changing preferences and consumption
patterns in an ageing and shrinking society. On the other hand, there are opportunities, such as
increasing participation in STEM education, using lifelong learning and new technologies to enable
older people (should they chose) to participate for longer in skilled work, or creating more attrac-
tive and environmentally positive green urban areas, where populations are currently declining,
as a means to encourage people to stay or move to them, or to create thriving cities even as they
age and shrink.
This study has identified a range of potential implications, uncertainties and proposed five key
discussion topics and questions for policy. These results will, it is hoped, help inform reflections
on future policy and action, as well as potentially guide the direction of related research in the
Commission. It is also intended that these findings will be of value to policy-makers in national
or regional governments. As a detailed horizon scanning exercise, the outcomes of FORENV are
well suited to inform potential wider foresight, such as strategic foresight within the Commission
or elsewhere.
February 2023 32
APPENDIX A FULL CHARACTERISATION OF EMERGING ISSUES

Issue 1: How might Europe’s ageing population influence political prefer-
ences for the green transition?
This issue explores how an ageing society could affect political processes related
to the green transition and the protection of the environment.
Increasing life expectancy, coupled with low birth rates, is leading to an ageing
population globally (EEA, 2019). This trend is particularly strong within the EU:
the share of people aged 65 years and over is expected to increase from 20.8%
in 2021 to 31.3% by 2100 (Eurostat, 2020). Moreover, the median age in the
EU is predicted to increase by 5.1. years, from 43.7 years in 2019 to 48.8 years
by 2100 (Eurostat, 2020). This might impact political engagement – for exam-
ple, the rise in the median age of voters may change political preferences related
to a green transition. Moreover, an ageing population could lead to changes in
associative activism and protests, which are often associated with younger peo-
Emerging is- ple (Mohamed 2018).
sue descrip- The policy needs and preferences of older people may differ from younger gen-
tion erations, and this issue explores the extent to which ageing in Europe may in-
fluence political processes for a green transition in the coming decades. A num-
ber of factors influence the attitudes of older population cohorts towards the
environment, and these may in turn affect political choices affecting the green
transition.
However, this issue and its emergence are affected by several uncertainties.
Evidence is available from two related strands of research: one focused on age
and political preferences and the other on age and actions in favour of the envi-
ronment. However, little research has been found on the specific issue of an
ageing society’s political support for a green transition. Moreover, other factors
affecting political preferences, such as national contexts, social and economic
trends, are likely to have a strong influence on political preferences.
Underlying demographic change: ageing
In 2021, just over 20 % of the EU population was aged 65 and older, and this
share is projected to increase to 31.3% by 2100 (Eurostat, 2020). Likewise, the
share of people aged 80 years or above in the EU is projected to have a two-
and-a-half-fold increase between 2021 and 2100, from 6.0 % to 14.6 % (Euro-
stat, 2022). The median age of the EU-27 population expected to increase by
5.1 years between 2019 and 2100 (Eurostat, 2020).
Population ageing entails changing demands for services, including public spend-
ing on pensions, health care and long-term care (ECB, 2018). The European
Commission’s 2021 Ageing Report (EC, 2021a) and the Green paper on Ageing
(EC, 2021b) show that elderly dependency ratios – the share of the population
65 (most of whom are currently retired) and over compared to the share 20-64
(working age) – will rise from 35% in 2019 to 62% in 2070. The average life
Key drivers: expectancy will be about 90 years in 2070 for women and 85 years for men. The
what is driv-
impacts will vary across Member States: if pension systems do not change in
ing the
Belgium, pension costs will rise by 3% of GDP between 2019 and 2070 (EC,
emergence
2021), while those in Luxembourg and Slovenia will increase by 6% (some Mem-
of this issue?
ber States, such as Italy, that are rapidly ageing and will see pension costs rise
rapidly in the period to 2035). Within the last 30 years, all Member States have
reformed their pension systems, and further reforms may be introduced. How-
ever, there is also a risk that the adoption of reforms too focused on ensuring
long-term financial sustainability might increase old-age poverty (Hinrichs
2021).
Rising pension and healthcare costs could create uncertainties for the implemen-
tation of green policies, which would also require new public spending (the issue
of financial and fiscal implications of ageing is explored in Issue 10). While these
tensions might be mitigated if there is strong economic growth, if current eco-
nomic uncertainties continue, there could be greater conflicts over government
choices for taxes and spending.
Changing policy preferences of an older society
February 2023 33
The policy preferences of a population with a higher median age may differ from
those with a lower median age. Countries with more older people tend to prior-
itise care, living arrangements and well-being (United Nations, 2020). The policy
preferences of younger generations often focus more on adequate and quality
education, a healthy lifestyle, including mental health, access to housing and to
the labour market (European Parliament, 2020).
The increase in the median age of voters is likely to reinforce the political weight
of older vis-à-vis younger generations (Seo, 2017). Some researchers suggest
that this so-called gerontocracy will lead politicians to be more attentive to the
requests of the elderly (Seo, 2017; Balestra et. al 2012; Asatryan, 2022) and
less attentive to the demands of younger voters (Berry, 2014). This societal
change could imply that, as elderly voters benefit less from long-term public
policies, one of them being the protection of the environment, they will vote
instead for politicians (and parties) that prioritise more policies that benefit them
more directly, such as higher pensions and better healthcare for the elderly (Asa-
tryan, 2022).
Environmental education and awareness influencing young people
Individuals with higher education levels tend to be more environmentally con-
cerned. A Eurobarometer survey indicated that respondents who continued their
education up to 20 years old or beyond are the most likely to mention climate
change (23%, compared with 11% among those who completed their education
aged 15 or earlier) as the first issue facing the world (Eurobarometer, 2021).
According to the 2021 European Parliament Youth Survey, combating climate
change and protecting the environment is mentioned by more respondents
whose parents have a university degree (European Parliament, 2021).
Moreover, young people today tend to receive more environmental education
than previous generations (Okumah, 2021) and have been more exposed to in-
formation from the media on this issue while growing up (Franzen, 2013). In
recent years there has been a growing consensus on the role of education in the
green transition (European Commission, 2022). The increasing provision of en-
vironmental education will also support environmental awareness in young peo-
ple. Environmental education can also encourage individuals to live responsibly
and change their consumption behaviours.
Higher levels of education generally and of environmental education specifically
may be reflected in young people’s views on environmental issues, which in turn
can influence voting behaviours. According to the 2021 Eurobarometer on cli-
mate change, respondents aged 15-24 years are more likely than those aged 55
and over to say climate change is the single most serious problem facing the
world as a whole (22% compared with 16%).
Younger generations’ concerns for the future
Furthermore, there may be generational differences in how people respond emo-
tionally to environmental issues. ‘Eco-anxiety’, related to the global climate cri-
sis and the fear of environmental and ecological vulnerability, seems to be a
growing phenomenon amongst younger people. A survey conducted among
10,000 young people in 10 countries – India, Brazil, Portugal, Finland, Australia,
the United States, France, the UK, the Philippines and Nigeria – published in
2020 underlined that climate change can cause distress in younger generation
(Hickman, 2021). Moreover, respondents perceived inaction on the part gov-
ernment: 65% of respondents agreed with the statement that governments are
failing young people (Hickman, 2021).
This anxiety may be linked to concerns that the exploitation of resources in the
present may deprive future generations and that current political and economic
pathways may affect the ability of younger generations to enjoy the same op-
portunities as older generations.
New forms of activism among young people
According to a Eurobarometer survey, the high turnout in the 2019 European
elections was driven by the participation of young people who consider climate
change as a key reason for voting (European Parliament, 2019). Green parties
in Europe have been consistently supported mainly by young, university-edu-
cated people (Beaudonnet and Vasilopoulos 2013; Zack P., and Tilley 2019).
February 2023 34
Nevertheless, it seems that young generations overall have lower levels of en-
gagement in traditional political processes such as voting, compared to other
generations (Kitanova, 2020). Although of course some younger people will
simply not be old enough to vote in elections, potential reasons for a wider lack
of engagement may include that young people in the EU feel that they are not
represented or perceive traditional forms of political engagement (including vot-
ing and membership in political parties) to be ineffective in making their voice
heard in important decisions (Deželan et al., 2021).
While young people might be less likely to use traditional modes of political en-
gagement, they have found alternative ways of expressing their opinion, such
as the climate protests that took place in 2018 and 2019: notably, Friday for
Future mobilised more than 1.6 million people around the globe for ‘climate
strikes’. These protests strongly mobilised the 14-19 age group, which was over-
represented among the participants (Wahlström et al. 2019). Thus, many of the
youth participating in these strikes were too young to vote.
Young people are also sharing their views via the internet and social media, as
explored in the first annual cycle of FORENV (European Commission, 2019).
However, while social media have opened up new channels for public debate,
including climate change, they also can disseminate disinformation, including on
climate change denial (Pearce et al. 2019).
A key question is whether the recent strong environmental participation will con-
tinue and grow after the COVID-19 pandemic, which confined younger genera-
tions that had already been most affected by the economic and social issues:
crises can have impact upon youth democratic participation, and they may in-
crease the political participation of young people (Sloam, et al., 2019).
Intergenerational action on climate and the environment
The distinction between younger, ‘green’ citizens and older citizens less inter-
ested in the environment may not, however, always hold true. Older climate
activism exists but is often ignored for better-known younger groups such as
Friday for Future. For example, in the US, the ‘Elders for Climate Action’, aims
to mobilise elders to address climate change. In France, there is ‘Grands-Parents
Pour le Climat’ and in the Netherlands ‘Grootouders voor het Klimaat’. The non-
violent disobedience group, Extinction Rebellion, also includes older activists;
older activists are often more experienced than younger ones, with some having
protested against nuclear weapons and other issues in the past (Haq 2021).
Moreover, a 2021 multi-country study (including several EU Member States as
well as North America, South Africa, Japan, Argentina, and others) found a pos-
itive relationship between age and pro-environmental behaviours such as re-
source conservation and sustainable consumer choices – in other words, older
people were found to be more likely to engage in these behaviours; the authors
highlight a potential “attitude-behaviour gap”, where younger people claim to be
more engaged than older members of society but face cost barriers when it
comes to actions (Wang et al., 2021).
Indeed, older people may be strongly concerned about future generations. For
parents and grandparents, for example, political preferences can be linked to
concerns for their children and grandchildren, as family dynamics likely play a
role in shaping elder’s behaviours towards a green transition.
In addition, older adults can be directly affected by environmental and climate
impacts, being more sensitive to, for example, extreme heat, cardiorespiratory
disease, toxins and infectious agents (Carnes, 2014; UNICEF, 2021). Elderly
adults are in particular more vulnerable to heat events that can increase the risk
of illness and death. Older people often have strong preferences for better air
quality as it is directly affecting their health and therefore support relevant pol-
icies (Jaehyeok, 2020). Furthermore, climate change and the degradation of the
environment can worsen air quality and have an impact on respiratory condi-
tions, which while impacting the health of all, particularly affects older (and very
young) people.
February 2023 35
In the coming years, all EU Member States will be see ageing populations and
an increase of the median age of voters that could in turn lead to greater repre-
sentation of the interests of the elderly in parliaments. This political imbalance
could further cause a decrease in the political participation of younger cohorts in
traditional political forums, including voting, if they do not see their concerns
represented (Berry, 2012; Sundström and Stockemer, 2020).
The predominance of older voters could potentially have a negative impact on
the green transition. An ageing population could make increasing political de-
mands for budget expenditures that reflect their interests, such as higher pen-
sions and better healthcare (Asatryan, 2022; Seo 2017). While better healthcare
would benefit the population as a whole, increased spending on such policies
could constrain the budgets available for green agendas.
Nonetheless, there is not a simplistic link between age and voting preferences.
The ageing of Europe’s population is an ongoing process that to date has not
prevented the EU pursuing an environmental and climate policy agenda. More-
over, current young activists are the older people of the future (someone who is
25 in 2022 will be over 50 in 2050), and the protection of the environment and
climate action might be a priority for all generations in the future. The prefer-
ences of today’s older generations may not be the same as those of current
younger age cohorts as they grow older. Moreover, it is possible that, as the
effects of climate change on the environment become more noticeable, the en-
vironmental awareness and political demands of older generations will increase.
Thus, there is not a simple trend but rather a confluence of different drivers
(which is not unusual in political developments).
Future political reforms to increase the role of younger generations could affect
support for transition policies and potentially offset warnings of a gerontocracy.
How might One proposal is to decrease the voting age, which could increase the political
the issue de- engagement and civil attitudes of younger voters (Eichhorn and Bergh, 2021).
velop in fu- This has already been implemented in several European countries (such as Aus-
ture? tria in 2007, Estonia in 2015 and Greece in 2016) and has been discussed in
others such as Germany (The Guardian, 2021) and Spain (El Mundo, 2022). The
'Votes at 16’ (British Youth Council, 2020) campaign has influenced some of
these reforms and is advocating to bring this change to other countries (Eichhorn
and Bergh, 2021). This measure might also have a positive effect on the green
transition: for instance, in Germany 16-17-year-olds have voted for the Green
Party at much higher rates than the overall population (Leininger and Faas,
2020; Zack P., and Tilley 2019). It is, however, important to bear in mind that
there are several factors at play – support of Green parties is also related to
gender, economic development and unemployment rates (Zack P., and James
Tilley, 2019; Beaudonnet and Vasilopoulos, 2014), and decreasing the voting
age might have different outcomes in different Member States and regions.
Several Arab countries, such as Tunisia and Morocco, adopted youth quotas in
parliaments to foster the election of young representatives. Such quotas could
give younger generations the opportunity to advocate for their policy prefer-
ences.
Other reforms that have been proposed (but as yet not implemented) include
‘Demeny voting’, attributing parents an extra vote -or half a vote- for each of
their children, an idea discussed in Germany, France, Austria and Hungary (Modi,
2020). Another, suggested in Japan, is voting districts by age/cohort so that
young people can select a number of representatives (Seo, 2017). At the Euro-
pean level, the European Youth Parliament promotes the active participation of
young people and encourages debate on pressing issues such as climate change.
The results of possible political reforms on environmental action may, however,
be complex, due to the many influences on political preferences.
Potential implica- Opportunities Risks

tions for the en-
vironment / hu-
man health
Growth of cross- Exchange of ideas across genera- The strength and effectiveness of
generational alli- tions could lead to new policy pro- these alliances may vary across
February 2023 36
ances for environ- posals, possibly including greater at- Member States, along with differ-
mental action. tention to the social dimension of ences in support for a green transi-
green policies. tion, leading to greater conflicts
Stronger overall political action for a across the EU.
green transition.
An increasing lack Engage young people more in deci- Increase in activism and direct ac-
of political engage- sion making, exploring new means tion that undermines current poli-
ment from younger of political representation. cies or creates division and polari-
generations. This could involve setting demo- sation.
cratic bodies to ensure the political
representation of young and future
generations and encourage political
engagement.
Economic difficul- Policy makers and activists explore Decrease in budget allocations for
ties lead to growing new avenues for the green transi- the green transition, slowing actions
conflicts over tion, for example based on taxes to tackle environmental and climate
budget choices. and incentives more than fiscal sub- challenges.
sidies.
Rise in political New avenues are explored for the Decrease in budgets available for
forces that focus on green transition, including greater the green transition compared to
other goals, such use of taxes and incentives (as other policies such as healthcare.
as pensions and above), as well as employment
healthcare. schemes and participatory methods Lack of progress on environment
for environmental action could lead to an increase in youth
activism and direct action that in-
creases division and polarisation in
society.
Youth forums and The forums could provide a source Where tried, these mechanisms
other mechanisms of new ideas for environmental ac- have little political influence and are
provide a focus for tion at local, regional and national ignored by both young people and
participation and levels. other generations.
environmental ac-
tion.
New mechanisms These mechanisms could bring to- Potential conflicts within the forums
and public forums gether different generations that could lead to deadlock on environ-
created for engage- support and find new solutions for mental action.
ment for the green environmental objectives.
transition.
This is a long-term issue (10-30 years). Most studies of the aging population
Timeframe
in Europe refer to 2030 to 2050 as the period when this demographic shift will
of emer-
have obvious impacts on society and fiscal systems, though this will be a pro-
gence
gressive evolution.
The environmental awareness and activism of an ageing population is far from
certain. Differences between countries, social groups and genders might be
more prominent than those between age groups. There is also uncertainty re-
lated to how attitudes and preferences may change as cohorts age. The oldest
millennials (people born between 1981-1996) will be reaching retirement age in
the 2040s, and it seems likely will carry environmental (and other) perspectives
and concerns with them into old age. This means the preferences of current
older people should not be seen as a blueprint for future older generations.
Uncertain- Another uncertainty refers to the fact that most projections on how an ageing
ties population could affect the green transition start from a scenario where contex-
tual conditions will remain constant in the future. In other words, they assume
that the elders of tomorrow will vote the same as the elder of today, and that
old people will tend to vote in favour of short-term policies that will have an
impact while they are alive. As noted above as cohorts age their preference may
remain the same. Likewise, the interests of older people might change in the
future years as the climate crisis and its effects become more a present issue
rather than a future risk.
Other factors such as migration may play an important role in the population
dynamics within the EU, however future migration trends (both within and to the
February 2023 37
EU) are uncertain and it is unlikely that it can reverse the trend of population
ageing (European Parliament, 2019).
Additional There is very limited research and literature into how an ageing population might
research or affect governance and the democratic process in the green transition. Most au-
evidence thors have focused on aging society and democracy as a whole; although some
that may be include references to the green transition and specifically to sustainability, more
needed research is needed to understand the implications of an ageing electorate on
support for green transition policies. Additional research might be needed on
the concrete impacts of social media on environmental awareness.
Further research could analyse how principles of intergenerational justice can
and should be translated into policy action.
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February 2023 41
Issue 2: What will be the environmental impact of increased digitalisation

and automation/use of other technology in an ageing society?
As Europe’s population continues to age, its ageing society may require or lead
to increased digitalisation, automation and other technologies both to support
an ageing demographic (e.g. technology in health care, to support active age-
ing, ageing in place9) and to replace or offset a decline in the number of working
age people proportional to the number of elderly people.
The need for and research into the use of technology in an ageing society is not
a new topic, with ‘gerontechnology’10 being an area of study since the 1990s
(Bronswijk et al., 2009) and an academic journal dedicated to the subject since
2001 (Gerontechnology Journal, no date). However, with many developed re-
Emerging gions, including Europe facing rapidly ageing populations in coming decades,
issue de- the role and importance of digitalisation and technology to support and respond
scription to the needs of an ageing society is likely to accelerate.
This will have a range of potential environmental and social implications. In-
creasing use of technology in an ageing society could lead to digital divides, for
example where some groups (less well-off / older / rural) are less able or willing
to adopt digital technologies and/or benefit from them. The proliferation of
digital technologies will also have implications for the environment. For example
related to energy required for data storage and processing, use of potentially
scarce raw materials for manufacturing of electronic goods, and the contribution
to environmental pollution through the production of electronic waste or mining
of raw materials.
Rapid advances and innovation in digital technology
Most developed economies are investing heavily in advanced technologies such
as AI and robotics (Wright, 2021) and it is a well-established trend that digital
technologies are becoming increasingly ubiquitous, affecting every part of hu-
man life (see for example Issue 10 in the 2020-21 cycle of FORENV (European
Commission, 2022c)).
In recent decades, progress in digital technologies has accelerated, with ad-
vances in processing power, more capable software and the convergence of
various other technologies (such as digitalisation of camera technology, tele-
communications and miniaturisation etc.). These technologies have a range of
Key driv- applications, including in an ageing society. For example, AI-enabled smart
ers: what is technologies are being rapidly developed to assist caregivers, facilitate access
driving the to healthcare providers, address isolation and depression among older adults,
emergence and provide mobility to and from essential services in suburbs and rural areas
of this is- (Keeler and Bernstein, 2021).
sue? A report on Japan’s society 5.011 vision and strategy identifies three key objec-
tives for creating a vibrant society in the face of rapid ageing, with technology
foreseen as playing a key role in each: maximising healthy lifespans; empow-
ering elderly people to live independently; and, increasing the working age pop-
ulation – in part through continued participation of older people (Hitachi-UTokyo
Laboratory(H-UTokyo Lab.), 2020). While there is no similar ageing focused
EU plan for transforming society, these themes are likely to emerge in Europe
and in particular in EU countries facing rapidly ageing populations. In the face
of rapidly emerging ageing populations in Europe, the European Innovation
Partnership on Active and Healthy Ageing (EIP AHA) initiative supports the idea
that the impact of digital technologies in health and long term care can be a
‘triple win’ through improved quality of life, increased efficiency of health and
9 ‘Ageing in place’ refers to technologies that enable older people to continue to live inde-
pendently at home.
10 An interdisciplinary research field combining gerontology and technology.
11 Society 5.0 refers to a society in which technology and data are integrated in all aspects of
life, enabling a systems approach to providing services, managing energy and resource use in
human environments (Deguchi et al., 2020). It is defined by the Japanese government as “A
human-centered society that balances economic advancement with the resolution of social prob-
lems by a system that highly integrates cyberspace and physical space” (Cabinet Office, Gov-
ernment of Japan, no date).
February 2023 42
long-term care, market growth and industry development (European Comis-

sion, 2022).
Declining working-age population in an ageing Europe
Demographic trends are expected to lead to a declining working-age population
in the EU over the coming decades (European Commission, 2021c). Although
digitalisation and automation are already anticipated across Europe’s economy,
a falling workforce is likely to emerge as an important driver of automation in
some sectors to maintain productivity and support Europe’s economy. Europe’s
population is projected to age and fall in coming decades, with the working-age
population (20-64) decreasing significantly from 265 million in 2019 to 217 mil-
lion in 2070, reflecting fertility, life expectancy and migration flow dynamics
(European Commission, 2021c). As a result, the old-age dependency ratio will
sharply increase in the long-term, with less than two working-age persons for
every person aged 65 and more by 2070 (ibid). A shrinking and ageing work-
force presents challenges for the labour market and productivity, which drives
a need for innovation, including technical innovation, to support productivity
improvements (ILC, 2020; Kiss et al., 2021). One key area of interest is in
fulfilling the potential of an emerging silver economy12 which can help to stim-
ulate the regional economy by focusing on technological and labour markets
relevant to an ageing population (Directorate-General for Communications Net-
works et al., 2018).
Labour shortages in ageing societies such as Europe can act as an economic
incentive for labour-saving technological innovations such as robotics and arti-
ficial intelligence (AI), to replace human labour and ensure the continued func-
tioning of the economy (UN, 2020). For example, automation of agriculture,
manufacturing and services could mean that countries faced with a shrinking
workforce can still produce enough to support a larger, older population (UN,
2020).
These anticipated demographic changes are also steering technological devel-
opment and adoption with an aim to enhance physical and cognitive capacities,
allowing older people to work longer and enjoy a better quality of life (UN,
2020). The use of technology to retain older workers in active employment as
well as enabling businesses to tap into their expertise and experience is increas-
ingly recognised as a key need in ageing developed economies (Singh, 2021;
World Economic Forum, 2021). Technologies, such as virtual reality (VR) and
AI may provide such an opportunity: engaging older people in work and lever-
aging their expertise, and also enabling companies to benefit from the experi-
ence and skills mature workers can bring (World Economic Forum, 2021). Im-
proved digital connectivity and the advancement of immersive digital environ-
ments could help older people to remain engaged in work for longer. Such
changes will potentially lead to the transformation of some sectors, and poten-
tially accelerate trends towards mass-adoption of new technologies and auto-
mation, such as virtual reality (VR) and AI may provide such an opportunity:
engaging older people in work and leveraging their expertise, and also enabling
companies to benefit from the experience and skills mature workers can bring
(World Economic Forum, 2021). Improved digital connectivity and the ad-
vancement of immersive digital environments could help older people to remain
engaged in work for longer. Such changes will potentially lead to the transfor-
mation of some sectors, and potentially accelerate trends towards mass-adop-
tion of new technologies and automation.
Ageing and consumption (including related to some technologies) is explored in
Issue 6 and the fiscal and financial implications of an ageing society are ex-
plored in Issue 10.
Need for digital skills
In an era of fast-moving technological progress, an ageing population is asso-
12 The silver economy includes all those economic activities, products and services designed to
meet the needs of people over 50.
February 2023 43
ciated with a rapid depreciation of skills, which can reinforce declines in work-
force engagement and productivity (UN, 2020). The digital ability of older
adults is a lot lower the in older age groups, with only 35% of people aged 55
to 75 in the EU reported to have basic digital skills in 2021 (Eurostat, 2022).
As the twin (green and digital) transition gathers speed, Europe will need to
ensure that its skills keep pace and to support the required levels of innovation
and productivity (UN, 2020; European Commission, 2022a). This will include
the need to up-skill older workers and for improvements in life-long learning.
This is recognised in various EC initiatives and policies, including the announce-
ment of the Digital Decade in 2021 (European Commission, 2021a).
Growing demand for health and social care of older populations
As populations grow and age, so do demands on health systems and this has
been a major motivator for digital innovations in recent years (UN, 2020). The
Covid-19 pandemic has accelerated the transition towards digital e-health ser-
vices and telemedicine. At the height of the pandemic telemedicine consulta-
tions grew more in one month than they did in 10 years, and this played a key
role managing demand in hospitals and maintaining patients in good health
(European Commission, 2021a). COVID-19 has also exposed the over-reliance
on informal carers with more than 25 % of Europeans, mainly women, reported
to be informal carers for children, persons with disabilities or older family mem-
bers (Eurofound, 2022). An ageing population will also intensify demand for
long-term care, and in conjunction with lessons learnt during the COVID 19
crisis, there has been a push to develop a European care strategy (to be
adopted in September 2022) that can materialise a shift in mindsets from care
as a problem to a solution that enables people of all ages to participate, con-
tribute and remain included (Dubois and Nivakoski, 2020).
As noted, the study of gerontechnology (an interdisciplinary field exploring how
existing and emerging technologies can help meet the needs of ageing and aged
adults (Chen, 2020)) has existed for many years. Acceleration in technological
development and ageing of developed societies (such as Europe) is likely to
only increase interest in and adoption of such technologies. New innovations,
such as new smartphone apps and biosensors for remote diagnosis and moni-
toring, can improving health outcomes and long-term care services for older
people and also have the potential to raise the cost-efficiency of care service
delivery and somewhat alleviate workforce shortages (Directorate-General for
Employment, 2021).
A key area of research into the use of technologies in ageing societies is in social
care and health. Examples that have gained attention in recent years include
AI in diagnosis and care planning, wearable devices to assist in physical activi-
ties and robotics for use in care environments (Chen, 2020). Other applications
include technologies to assist older people, proving companionship or support
in everyday tasks, which support healthy ageing in place (Ollevier et al., 2020).
AI and digital monitoring can help detect many diseases much earlier than
through conventional means, which can in itself improve health outcomes and
longevity (World Economic Forum, 2021). Digital technologies also have a
range of other uses to support healthy ageing, for example digital platforms
(perhaps combined with VR or enhanced reality) could help reduce social isola-
tion in ageing, and advances in mobility (autonomous vehicles or on-demand
ride booking) could enhance older people’s ability to engage in everyday activ-
ities such as shopping or socialising (World Economic Forum, 2021). In addition,
age-friendly homes and smart, healthy age-friendly environments could greatly
contribute to better ageing in place (Dantas and van Staalduinen, 2020).
Europe’s ambition for a green and digital transition
In March 2022 the European Commission published Towards a green, digital
and resilient economy, our European Growth Model (European Commission,
2022d). This brings the ambitions set out in the European Green Deal, together
with the Digital Compass and digital targets for 2030, and places them in the
context of Europe needing to deliver a fair and inclusive transition that is resil-
ient to and prepared for shocks (such as the COVID-19 pandemic) by working
proactively with international partners. The Green Deal identified digital tech-
nology as “a critical enabler” for achieving Europe’s sustainability targets across
different sectors while calling for greater energy and material efficiency of ICT
February 2023 44
(Varlan, 2022), and the European Growth Model underlines the role of digitali-
sation in bringing Europe’s sustainability ambitions together, emphasising the
critical importance of the digital transformation in delivering them.
Europe is not alone in this ambition, the United Nations has reported that across
the UNECE region, a large majority of countries have adopted national strate-
gies for digitalisation (UNECE, 2021).
Ageing and longevity in a digital society
Increasing numbers of persons older than 80 years with care needs, particularly
those living in remote rural areas, has become a major social problem in Europe
(Valokivi et al., 2021). Many European countries have high expectations for
the increased use of eHealth, digitalisation, and welfare technology to address
this dilemma (ibid). Technologies such as robotics, smart living applications,
AI and big data may increasingly emerge as cost-effective and efficient solu-
tions for health care and enabling independent living in later life (UNECE, 2021).
Robotic care assistants are already seen in some care homes and these are
likely to develop further in coming years (Urban, 2020; Savage, 2022).
Examples of how digital technologies may develop to assist with healthy ageing
in future include:
• Assistive devices and robotics to support older people in carrying out per-
sonal and household activities, reducing dependency on others. Examples
include Toyota’s “gantry robot” that hangs from the ceiling and is able to
complete tasks like cleaning and loading the dishwasher (Urban, 2020).
• AI robots to provide care and entertainment for older people living at home
or in care facilities, for example, the University of Toronto’s robot ‘Pepper’
(Schlesinger, 2022).
• Smart implants and devices on the person and in the home that enable
health monitoring and personalised care (Keeler and Bernstein, 2021).
• VR being used within retirement communities to help reduce loneliness,
improve medical care and provide adventure and stimulation for seniors
(e.g. through VR tourism) (Fiocco et al., 2021; Navaro, 2021).
• VR could improve cognitive health through mental training exercises, pre-
How might venting premature degeneration of mental activity and improving seniors’
the issue mental and physical health and wellbeing (Navaro, 2021).
develop in • AR/VR enabled virtual check-ins with care providers to further improve well-
future? being and health spans of older adults living at home (Keeler and Bernstein,
2021).
Immersive digital environments integrated with augmented physical reality may
in time allow people to move between virtual and physical realities as tasks and
situations demand (Keeler and Bernstein, 2021). For example, the authors
suggest that faced with stressful, unsatisfying, or lonely situations, older adults
could seek refuge in virtual spaces or filters to escape the physical world (ibid).
Using avatars, people of all ages may interact in environments ranging from
highly realistic to wildly fantastical, such as are created in multi-user open plat-
forms such as Minecraft. This could also enhance opportunities for older people
to engage in work for longer (see below), which will contribute to the evolution
of a stronger silver economy which is projected to expand steadily over the next
10 years and support activity across a diverse range of sectors across the EU
(Directorate-General for Communications Networks et al., 2018).
A shift to self-monitoring for health (e.g. through smart implants and devices)
and digital ehealthcare systems (e.g. virtual check-ins with care providers) may
reduce the demand on healthcare workers and reduce state healthcare costs,
but it could also shift caring responsibilities onto the individual, or the people
they are close to. This could therefore have knock-on social impacts.
The level of technological connectivity required for much of the above is uncer-
tain and will depend on changes in social norms and policies. Societal views on
data privacy, and how future data and social policies and regulations develop,
will play an important role in whether technological innovations will pervade
society. Keele & Bernstein (2021) found that across four different future sce-
narios, the ability of governments, businesses, communities and individuals to
make meaning from all of the sensed information proved paramount to bene-
fiting from technology-enabled, personalised care regimes.
February 2023 45
Some of the technological innovations outlined above have the potential to ex-
tend healthy lifespans and reduce or delay the physiological and cognitive de-
cline associated with ageing (UN, 2020). As outlined below, longer healthy
lives, could also make it possible for people to extend their working lives, with
potentially significant implications for the availability of skills, workforce produc-
tivity, macroeconomic growth, and the reorganisation of education, work and
leisure over an individual lifespan (ILC, 2020; UN, 2020).
The nature of work in ageing and digital / automated societies
The adoption of digital automation in the labour market could lead to the dis-
placement of older people in some industries. A Mercer & Oliver Wyman report
(2018) found that across several major economies (including Germany, Italy,
Sweden and Switzerland), older workers are at mid-to-high risk of being dis-
placed by automation (Basu et al., 2018). However, an empirical study into the
effects of technological advances on the relation between population ageing and
economic growth found that automation, particularly robots in manufacturing,
can help older workers maintain their economic contributions compared to a
younger (possibly more productive) demographic (Park, Shin and Takenaka,
2020). This may require labour market reforms for efficiency and flexibility in
certain sectors, and a strengthened education system to boost the skills and
productivity of a changing demographic of workers (Park, Shin and Takenaka,
2020).
Japan, a country that has been described as ‘super-aged’, faces significant age-
ing demographic challenges, and, as noted, launched a plan for a super-smart
society (Society 5.0) in the 2020s that aims to resolve various ageing-related
social and economic challenges by incorporating the innovations of the fourth
industrial revolution (e.g. IoT, big data, artificial intelligence (AI), robot, and
the sharing economy) into every industry and social life (UNESCO, 2019; Lee,
2021; Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, no date). While such a compre-
hensive strategy for societal transformation around an ageing populace does
not exist in the EU, aspects of this approach may emerge in Europe as the social
and economic implications of ageing increase. The likelihood of this is illus-
trated by a current EU research proposal for international cooperation (including
explicitly with Japan) on smart living environments for ageing people (European
Commission, 2022b).
In the EU, the green paper on ageing (European Commission, 2021b) was
launched to initiate a broad policy discussion on preventing or limiting the neg-
ative consequences of ageing on society. These include promoting healthy and
active ageing, improving labour market performance, and an acknowledgement
that the traditional stages of education and training, work and retirement are
becoming less rigidly defined and more flexible. In most of the EU Member
States, legislated pension reforms are projected to have a significant impact on
the labour market participation of workers aged 55-64, with differences across
the EU depending on their magnitude and phasing in (European Commission,
2021c). The projections show an average increase of approximately 10% in
the participation rate for this age category, from 62.3% in 2019 to 71.9% in
2070 (ibid). Despite the increase in the participation rate, total labour supply
is still expected to decline in the long-term (European Commission, 2021c).
Coupled with adequate digital skills, using digital tools and technologies could
enable citizens to continue an active professional life as they age (European
Commission, 2021a). Ageism is unfortunately a reality in the world of work,
and technological shifts are fuelling age discrimination even further (Singh,
2021) therefore this could prove a barrier, at least in the short-term for older
people being able to enter or remain in meaningful employment. Fostering
digital skills will be important to involving older people in work for longer. As
individuals’ skills and abilities evolve with age and experience, it may become
more common to retrain throughout individuals’ lifetime to ensure continuous
employability (Keeler and Bernstein, 2021).
It is also the case that future older generations will have different skill sets and
experience with digital technologies than the current generation of older people,
and a higher education level implying higher capacity for learning new skills.
The oldest Millennials (born in early 1980s) will be reaching retirement age in
the 2040s, and have generally grown up and worked with rapid change in tech-
nology in work and life. They and later generations may well therefore be more
February 2023 46
able to maintain and develop relevant skills in later life.

Social and environmental developments
Digital technologies hold great potential for creating environmental benefits but
are also rapidly emerging as important drivers of overall energy demand and
emerging environmental pollution sources. Looking towards the next 10 years,
AI and especially deep learning neural networks are expected to be a major
driver of increased energy demand and emissions (UN, 2020). Estimates for
the global energy used by data centres’ energy in 2030 range from a fivefold
increase (from 200 to 1,000 terawatt-hours) to a 14-fold increase (to roughly
4,900 terawatt-hours). Much if not most of this increase will be due to AI ap-
plications, which require very large amounts of processing power (ibid).
As this issue develops, there is a risk of existing inequalities linked to a ‘digital
divide’ in Europe widening further. For potential social and economic opportu-
nities to be realised, digital connectivity across Europe will need to be improved.
However, a digital divide not only exists between well-connected urban areas
and rural and remote territories, but also between those who can ‘fully benefit
from an enriched, accessible and secure digital space with a full range of ser-
vices, and those who cannot’ (European Commission, 2021a). Within regions
and communities, digital literacy and skills will be vital for all citizens to be able
to leverage the benefits of a digital transformation (ibid). To be fully empow-
ered, people should have access to affordable, secure and high quality connec-
tivity, have a right to learn basic digital skills, and be equipped with other means
which together allow them to fully participate in economic and societal activities
(European Commission, 2021a).
Potential implications Opportunities Risks
for the environment / hu-
man health
Proliferation of smart eHealth systems could have Risk of exacerbated healthcare
technologies and digital / benefits for healthy ageing. inequalities. Existing barriers
eHealth systems for For example, facilitating older (e.g. cost, connectivity, societal
healthcare of older per- adults to remain in their homes norms) may prevent a unified
sons longer, to avoid unnecessary adoption of digital technologies
and prolonged hospital stays, across countries, regions and
increase safety and security, communities.
and reduce loneliness and so- Those who cannot or choose not
cial isolation (Valokivi et al., to engage with digital systems
2021). could have reduced access to
Digital technologies can em- healthcare (or reduced opportu-
power citizens to monitor their nities for meaningful employ-
health status, adapt their life- ment).
styles, support independent Increased self-monitoring of
living, prevent non-communi- health may also lead to more
cable diseases, and bring effi- people self-medicating and self-
ciency to health and care pro- diagnosing, using available inter-
viders and health systems (Eu- net tools.
ropean Commission, 2021a).
A greater reliance on digitalisa-
tion in elder-care and healthcare
may mean that accessibility and
the ability to learn basic digital
skills needs to be considered a
social right (European Commis-
sion, 2021a; Valokivi et al.,
2021).
February 2023 47
The COVID-19 pandemic has AI functionality of smart

demonstrated the value of healthcare technologies will de-
data monitoring for public pend on large volumes of digital
health (e.g. track and trace) and historical data, as well as the
and highlighted potential op- quality of such data and algo-
portunities. Digital eHealth rithm integrity (Keeler and Bern-
devices such as smart implants stein, 2021). Too much reliance
on the body or smart devices on AI technologies could pose a
in the home provide an oppor- significant risk for patient safety.
tunity to remotely monitor pa- For example, Trocin et al. (2021),
tient health and provide per- based on the framework by Mit-
sonalised healthcare (Keeler telstadt et al. (2016), identify six
and Bernstein, 2021). E.g. re- types of ethical concerns stem-
mote heart-rate or blood pres- ming from AI in healthcare: in-
sure monitoring for patients conclusive evidence, inscrutable
with heart conditions. There- evidence, misguided evidence.
fore, reducing the need for unfair outcomes, transformative
hospital visits. effects, traceability. Too much
reliance on AI technologies in
health care settings could lead to
less humane medical acts and
less acquisition of knowledge
from empirical examinations.
Risks associated with data own-
ership and privacy of medical
data, including ownership by pri-
vate companies. Today, data
produced in Europe is generally
stored and processed outside of
Europe, and its value extracted
outside Europe (European Com-
mission, 2021a). This can bring
risks in terms of cybersecurity,
supply vulnerabilities, switching
possibilities as well as unlawful
access to data by third countries.
However, the EU is acting to mit-
igate such concerns through mu-
tually beneficial international co-
operation (European Commis-
sion, 2021a). The European
Commission has also communi-
cated the European approach to
AI, to address both opportunities
and challenges, such as the opac-
ity of algorithms, as well as
safety and fundamental rights of
citizens in their interaction with
AI (EU, 2022a). The EU has pro-
posed an AI Act introducing har-
monised rules and rating risks of
use of AI (EU, 2022b).
Risks associated with freedom of
movement in unprecedented and
severe circumstances (future
pandemics etc.) where having
access to personal health data
could enable authorities to force
symptomatic people to stay at
home. In the longer term the
practice could be extended to dif-
ferent airborne diseases.
Virtual check-ins or other digi- There is also a risk that the im-
tal services could reduce the plementation of some digital
February 2023 48
demand on healthcare sys- technologies in the healthcare in-

tems by reducing the need for dustry could create an additional
physical appointments, there- burden for healthcare workers, at
fore freeing up time of least during the short-term/initial
healthcare workers, reducing implementation. For example,
costs etc. It is estimated au- the improvised implementation of
tomation could lead to benefits digital tools for social communi-
of up to € 120 billion per year cation in care homes in Norway
in Europe (European Commis- during the covid pandemic was
sion, 2021a). found to shape work routines of
care professionals, introducing
new tasks, and creating addi-
tional responsibility (Badawy et
al., 2022).
IoT technologies applied to re- Potential social impacts, e.g.
tirement homes could also pro- when great emphasis put on indi-
vide an opportunity for manag- vidual’s responsibility for their
ing heating more efficiently, own health care, can put a heav-
thus contributing to a net zero ier burden on family members
agenda. and informal carers (Raja et al.,
2021; Valokivi et al., 2021).
Longer healthy lifespans The focus of work in older age Social tensions related to em-
may mean that older could transition actively to ful- ployment opportunities across
adults work longer by filment-based mentoring or generations may become more
choice and necessity (due consulting, rather than high- common, if younger people feel
to fiscal challenges, cost income earning (Keeler and unable to access work or pro-
of living etc); job profiles Bernstein, 2021). A scenarios gress in careers due to older
across the lifespan could study has suggested that workers remaining in work for
evolve to suit this trend. multi-generational households longer. This could exacerbate in-
may increasingly emerge as an tergenerational tensions and
economic imperative as older wealth inequality.
adults earn less from transi-
tions to mentoring and fulfil-
ment (Keeler and Bernstein,
2021).
Robotics may allow the elderly
to perform tasks that require
physical exertion that exceeds
their capabilities (Pearce et al.,
2012; Kim et al., 2017), or to
facilitate social interaction
(Laitinen et al., 2016; Klein et
al., 2016) for older people liv-
ing alone or in care homes.
Technical literacy and dig- A shift to life-long learning and The use of digital technologies is
ital skills become more expectation to learn new digi- constrained by the physical and
important than ever: a tal skills at all stages of life cognitive abilities of its users
growing need for lifelong could open opportunities relat- (Badawy et al., 2022). This could
learning in local and coming to education and retraining lead to potential negative im-
munity settings and for all of green and digital skills that pacts relating to (lack of) availa-
age groups, particularly in can facilitate the European bility and usability of technology,
relation to vocational green transition. This would especially with older groups
training in digitalisation rely on policy interventions (Valokivi et al., 2021). Research
and new technologies for and investment to facilitate in Italy, Sweden and Finland
older adults (Ogg, 2021). ongoing education and promo- found that the digital competence
tion of green jobs that are ac- and economic means, as well as
cessible for older workers.
February 2023 49
Educating older adults in the mental and physical abilities, var-

skills required for environmen- ies greatly among older adults
tal digital roles could allow (Valokivi et al., 2021).
older people to remain in work Technological developments may
longer and contribute to green amplify older persons’ vulnerabil-
economic growth. Lifelong ity if they are less able to use dig-
learning in health domains ital tools or have limited access to
during retirement is also an digital technology. This may
important element in the pre- make them more prone to fraud
vention of the loss of auton- or scams (European Commission,
omy (Ogg, 2021). 2021b).
Expansion of AR and VR Proliferation of virtual and aug- AR and AV technologies may not
technologies could enable mented realities could provide be suitable to many older people
people of all ages to im- opportunities for older people if they have diminished cognitive
merse in online environ- to find social connection, capabilities or limited digital
ments (e.g. the healthcare, and employment in skills.
metaverse). ‘online worlds’. The use of digital technologies
may also diminish the opportuni-
ties for social in-person interac-
tion of older adults and lead to
cognitive deterioration (Seifert et
al., 2021; Barbosa et al., 2019;
Brooke et al., 2020).
The environmental costs for run-
ning the metaverse on a large
scale will likely be huge. The
metaverse’s reliance on VR tech-
nology and data centres will
mean considerable energy usage
and therefore emissions.
Furthermore, increased digitali-
sation is associated with con-
sumption of limited natural re-
sources and could exacerbate en-
vironmental issues already asso-
ciated with e-waste streams. The
e-waste stream contains a broad
range of hazardous ingredients,
including toxic metals, polybro-
minated diphenyl ether (PBDE)
and flame retardants, phthalates,
polychlorinated biphenyls
(PCBs), hexabromocyclodo-
decanes (HBCDs) and others. The
recycling of these materials can
result in exposure of workers in-
volved in different steps in the
chain of waste processing such as
collection, sorting, dismantling
and further processing of waste
components for instances, for the
market of recycled polymer plas-
tics and metals.
VR can be used for virtual Nature exposure in virtual re- See above – large scale use of VR
nature exposure for peo- ality (VR) can provide emo- has potential environmental and
ple who cannot otherwise tional well-being benefits for climate implications.
access nature, or for vir- people who cannot access the
tual tourism. outdoors (Browning et al.,
2020), which could include
less-mobile older people.
February 2023 50
VR may also serve as a tool to

facilitate tourism for older peo-
ple less able to travel. A pilot
study in Canada, examining
the effects of VR tourism
among older adults living in
residential care, found that
participants reported de-
creased anxiety and fatigue
immediately following expo-
sure, and increased social en-
gagement and quality of life
following six weeks of VR tour-
ism (Fiocco et al., 2021).
Increased remote / tele- Teleworking could have a pos- Increased remote teleworking
working, particularly of itive environmental impact by could exacerbate regional digital
older workers. reducing emissions from com- divides because of limiting fac-
muting. tors to extending remote tele-
Previous research has shown working to rural areas. For exam-
that flexible working is a factor ple, there is a gap between urban
in enabling older workers to and rural areas regarding inter-
remain in the labour market net accessibility and bandwidth,
for longer (Baxter et al., as well as energy security and
2021). high costs of the digital technolo-
gies involved (Esteban-Navarro
et al., 2020; Salemink et al.,
2017).
Timeframe Although some of the technologies mentioned in the above description already
of emer- exist and in some cases are already being implemented, the emergence of this
gence issue is expected to in the long-term (10+ years).
How this issue may develop in future is highly uncertain, and the potential im-
plications outlined above will be influenced by how such uncertainties unfold.
For example, a future of working for longer, facilitated by the use of digital
tools, will depend on a digitally skilled workforce (European Commission,
2021a). This will depend on the development of a high-performing digital ed-
ucation system. Basic digital skills for all citizens, including elderly populations,
and the opportunity to acquire new specialised digital skills for the workforce
will be prerequisites to active participate in a future digital society (European
Commission, 2021a). The European Commission have proposed that ‘access to
education allowing the acquisition of basic digital skills should be a right for all
EU citizens and lifelong learning should become a reality’ (European Commis-
sion, 2021a), however this will rely on overcoming existing barriers.
The capability, availability and role of technology integrated into human envi-
ronments and care settings is also uncertain. Research across three European
countries found differences in how the potential opportunities and benefits of
Uncertain- eHealth systems are perceived in policy documents (Raja et al., 2021). For
ties example, Italian policy was characterised by a techno-positive approach,
whereas Nordic policy texts had more reflections on the potential ethical issues
and risks. This suggests that there will be differences in how the use of certain
digital technologies are adopted across different European countries.
The digital transformation of health and care is eminent, in particular in an
ageing society. Data is a key enabler for digital transformation, as high-perfor-
mance computing, data analytics and artificial intelligence depends the availa-
bility of vast amounts of high quality data and appropriate regulatory frame-
works that will safeguard the rights of the individual and society. The use of
patient-centred health data is still under-developed and uptake of digital solu-
tions for health and care remains slow and varies across EU member states thus
creating uncertainties of its wide use (European Commission, 2018).
It should be considered that the experiences of upcoming generations of older
people will be unlike those of recent decades. There is a need to counter man-
ifestations of ageism and shift ageist assumptions regarding frailty and decline.
The extent to which upcoming generations of older people can benefit from
February 2023 51
‘healthy ageing’ will rely on applying an age-friendly and participatory design

approach to digital technologies (McGinley et al., 2022). It will be important to
move away from medical models that perceive ‘impairments’ or ‘differences’ as
medical issues or disabilities that need to be ‘fixed’ (ibid).
In a study looking at scenarios of what ageing in smart environments might
look like in the US in 2050, experts identified two critical uncertainties affecting
the future of ageing in smart environments between now and 2050 (Keeler and
Bernstein, 2021). These were the level of control over the technological choices
available to aging people in the future, and the level of social integration across
generations. These uncertainties were identified as being particularly impactful
on the lived experience of aging people and as playing an important role in
determining the distribution of risks and benefits of smart technologies (Keeler
and Bernstein, 2021). Uncertainties around the future development of inter-
generational relations could influence the ability of future societies to address
challenges associated with ageing societies in smart environments (Keeler and
Bernstein, 2021).
Currently, digital technologies are mostly developed outside of the EU and con-
vergence across Member States on digitalisation remains limited, hampering
economies of scale (European Commission, 2021a).
Additional • Further research and policy consideration needs to be given to the ethical
research or impacts and risks of increased digitalisation in healthcare of older adults
evidence (Valokivi et al., 2021).
that may • Further research and guidance are needed into how to adopt digital solu-
be needed tions in the delivery of health and care to the ageing population in the EU,
given a very diverse regulatory framework.
• Additional research is also needed into the potential negative impact of in-
creased digitalisation of health care on the care networks that surround
older adults. For example, informal carers, family members and friends
need to be taken into consideration.
• Future research should be conducted to demonstrate types of stimuli/situ-
ations that may potentially be harmful to VR users e.g. by eliciting emotions
such as sadness, depression, shame and anxiety (Lavoie et al., 2021).
• Further research into ways to mitigate the environmental impacts of in-
creased use of VR, AR and other energy intensive technologies. Taking into
consideration the EU new circular economy policy (EEA, 2019), there is also
a need to improve the waste management and recycling of e-waste.
• Research and policy considerations need to be given to how to prevent a
further exacerbation of a ‘digital divide’ across Europe.
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February 2023 56
Issue 3: Will changes in the organisation of work change the structure of

rural settlement, mobility and land use with an impact on environmental
quality?
The world of work in the EU appears to be changing. Working patterns estab-
lished in the 20th century with workers in some sectors spending long hours in
the office has diversified with the increasing popularity of flexible and home
working (Emmett et al., 2021), driven by technological developments and ac-
celerated by the COVID-19 pandemic. There is also some evidence that younger
people’s work preferences are shifting away from a culture of working long hours
to create excess capital or goods, and they may increasingly choose to seek
work that is meaningful for them and that has a social purpose and a positive
environmental impact (O’Connor, 2022).
These changes in working patterns are facilitated by a range of transformations
in the workplace. The traditional workplace hierarchy may increasingly be re-
placed with a new model that is more flexible and responsive to employee’s
needs, for example creating personalised working conditions and environments.
Although the management of workplaces and models of working have evolved
in the past, recent experiences during the COVID-19 pandemic are driving a
new period of change as some employees seek a physical and digital environ-
ment that gives them the flexibility to achieve a better work–life balance (Em-
mett et al., 2021). For many businesses this is causing dynamic reallocation of
resources, and the acceleration of digitalisation and automation (Komm et al.,
2021).
The shift towards teleworking13 and smart working14 accelerated by the COVID-
19 pandemic can reasonably be expected to continue in the long-term. This may
lead to rural towns and villages competing with larger urban areas and city
regions for productive desk-based working (Holt, 2021). This could result in a
Emerging more even workforce ‘distribution’ across rural and urban settings instead of its
issue de- concentration in big cities and help achieve the goals set out in the EU Rural
scription Action Plan (Collier, 2021; European Commission, 2021a). In the upcoming dec-
ade Gen Z and Millennial workers – also referred to as Gen Y – (who evidence
suggest place greater emphasis on work-life balance) and internal EU migrant
workers (who, depending on the nature of their employment, may increasingly
be able to work from their home country) seem most likely to take advantage
of the flexible working and a shift to more self-directed work (Sánchez-Hernán-
dez et al., 2019; Gesing, Hofmann and Mundorf, 2021).
The emergence of these new ‘ruralites’ could impact on the rural communities
they chose to settle or stay in / move back to. This could require new investment
in infrastructure and services as well as having economic impacts such as an
increase in the cost-of-living in rural areas (driven by higher spending power
and demand e.g. for housing) particularly where these are close to urban cen-
tres and tourist attractions. If these tendencies are confirmed in the near future,
changes in the demographic composition of rural communities could also reduce
local ecological and land management knowledge and capacity as existing, often
lower skilled and older residents (e.g. farmers) are increasingly priced-out of
their communities by the more skilled newcomers. For example, in the Nether-
lands several rural areas saw faster increase of housing prices, over 20%, com-
pared to Amsterdam where prices increased by 3.4% during the pandemic (Re-
mote Lab and Future Place Leadership, 2021).
The emergence of flexible and remote working will have uncertain mobility im-
plications. On the one hand it will reduce the need for daily commuting and thus
help reduce GHG emissions from the use of private transport. However, if people
live in more dispersed settlements this will generate travel demand and require
new transport infrastructure and rural mobility hubs that could put pressure on
13 Employees are working from a specific, stable location (usually at home) and they must com-
ply with a series of rules, timetables and continue to use tools established by the company
14 Smart working encourages worker compliance with objectives rather than set working hours,
location or tools that should be used - employees have absolute freedom to decide on these.
February 2023 57
rural land use. Expanding existing settlements or establishing new ones could
further add to this pressure.
Burnout and deterioration of mental health
There is evidence that an increase in feelings of burnout and a deterioration in
mental health among workers has been building up for decades across European
countries. According to a survey conducted in Europe in 2021, approximately
66% of workers have experienced unhealthy levels of stress at work whereas
59% said they were disappointed with their employer’s actions to tackle their
unhealthy levels of stress (Lepaya, 2021).
These trends have been further exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic with
more workers experiencing distress due to fear of job stability, difficulties in
finding work-life balance and disconnecting from work, and feeling of isolation
(Fondazione Cariplo, 2021). As a result, it seems plausible that over the next
decade mental health considerations could increasingly be important in business
human resource policies (e.g., mental health days off; mental health benefits
including therapy sessions or mindfulness training). The safety and wellbeing of
employees may become increasingly key to a company’s ability to retain tal-
ented staff as younger workers (Gen Z and millennials) are more prone to
changing jobs and relocating (Stahl, 2020).
Changing priorities for workers
At least in part connected to the previous driver, people and particularly younger
generations may increasingly reconsider the relative value given to the pursuit
of wealth and reflect on how they work and live, to better balance the two in
order to benefit their wellbeing (Bloomberg Bussinesweek, 2021).
The dramatic societal changes may have led to a re-evaluation of priorities to
focus more on wellbeing and fulfilment. This has changed the outlook for many
workers towards their jobs. An emerging priority following the pandemic has
been the ability for workers, where the type of work allows, to choose the loca-
tion they work from. Workers are also increasingly seeking a more fulfilling job
Key driv- that enables a healthier, happier way of working for a living (Lashbrooke, 2021;
ers: what Carbonaro, 2022). Relocating to rural areas may also become a more realistic
is driving option for those workers that seek the wellbeing and health benefits of a rural
the emer- life while also being able to keep the jobs that previously required them to work
gence of in an office in the city (due to increased focus on rural digitalisation in EU and
this issue? businesses enabling flexible working).
The Great Resignation/Reshuffle and self-organised labour
At least in part due to the drivers described above, there is some evidence that
many workers are quitting their jobs in Europe or are thinking of doing so due
to not being able to work remotely, being burned out or feeling underpaid and
undervalued a trend described by some authors as the ‘Great Resignation’ (IDC,
2022; Vigliarolo, 2022). A recent survey of employees across Europe found that
approximately one-third of European workers are actively looking for alternative
job (IDC, 2022). In comparison, a year earlier (2021) a different survey found
that 25% of employees in Europe were considering changing their employer
(Gourtsilidou, 2021), although it should be noted these figures may not be di-
rectly comparable as they are from different surveys. The outcomes of the most
recent survey also highlight that employee experience has emerged as a key
factor for businesses to attract new talent and retain existing employees (IDC,
2022). There are also multiple global employee surveys that may point to a
pattern that is likely also found in Europe. One such global survey by Microsoft
Corp. suggests that 30% of the world’s workers are likely to consider a move in
the year ahead, in particular to find a new job that lets them work remotely
(Microsoft Corp., 2022).
The COVID-19 pandemic has also resulted in an increased interest in the anti-
work movement, initiated primarily by younger sections of society, looking to
provoke changes in society. In June 2022 an r/antiwork subreddit had 2 million
subscribers globally, up from 100,000 in March 2020. The aim of this group is
to ‘start a conversation, to problematise work as we know it today’ (r/antiwork,
2022). The supporters of this movement believe people should self-organise
and work only as much as needed, rather than working longer hours to create
excess capital or goods (O’Connor, 2022).
A changing workforce
February 2023 58
The demographic makeup of the workforce could further reinforce this trend to
remote working enabled by digital technologies, as older workers (who can be
more tech-averse) are increasingly replaced by Gen Z, who are the first gener-
ation of digital natives, and subsequent generations (Qualtrics, 2021). A recent
survey of Gen Z and Millennials in the United States, the UK, Ireland, Australia
and New Zealand (carried out by a private sector software company) found that
about 4 in 10 respondents said they would leave their job if asked to come back
to the office full time (following the COVID-19 pandemic) (Qualtrics, 2021).
While these findings do not necessarily reflect the views of young people in all
EU Member States, and intentions will not always lead to action, it does suggest
a possible trend in how young people view their work and professional lives.
Considering the issue of burnout and declining mental health among workers in
Europe (Norman, 2022), it is possible that many of them would choose to work
remotely and live closer to nature (that would help to combat their stress) if
given the opportunity.
Computer-based work
There is a large potential for remote work in computer-based office work that
may be further explored by employers in the upcoming years. It is the largest
type of work in advanced economies such as Europe, accounting for approxi-
mately one-third of all employment (Lund et al., 2021). It is estimated that
among all workforce in advanced economies, approximately 20-25% of the
workers could work from home between three and five days a week without a
loss for productivity, (Lund et al., 2021). In Europe, it is estimated that 35-41%
of employees have jobs that can be caried out remotely, something which could
trigger a significant change in the geography of work (European Commission,
2020).
Digitalisation of work and life
The COVID-19 crisis appears to have accelerated the adoption of working prac-
tices previously deemed as the longer-term future of work, such as mass-use
of video / online and hybrid meetings, cloud-based working and the use of co-
working and communication software such as MS Teams and Slack. Investments
in digitalisation and automation, often considered too ambitious before the pan-
demic, has become key to survival for many businesses. By using the internet
and associated technologies, potential employees can now be attracted from
anywhere, creating a situation where employment in many sectors is much less
likely to be tied to a specific location. This also gives more opportunities for
employees to choose where they want to work from be it a city, rural area or
abroad (or indeed a mixture at different times in the year).
To overcome the potential for isolation and loneliness among an increasingly
remote workforce the adoption of virtual reality may become embedded in peo-
ple’s work life to replicate office-like group meetings (Requiroso, 2021). Other
related technologies, including augmented reality (combining real-world images
with layers of computer-generated images) and mixed reality (integrating real-
world and digital elements where users can manipulate virtual items and ob-
jects) could also become more common in business settings (Requiroso, 2021).
The rapid spread of digital technology and automation is transforming busi-
nesses. These drivers are not new, but the experiences of the pandemic and
changing priorities for workers is increasing the importance for businesses to
consider work organisation (Komm et al., 2021).
EU and national rural development policies
The European Commission has recently expressed a renewed commitment to
rural communities by presenting a new long-term vision for rural areas. The
communication published in June 2021 proposes to create a Rural Pact
(launched in December 2021), and an EU Rural Action Plan to help achieve the
goals set out in this vision (European Commission, 2021a, 2021b). The Rural
Action Plan is articulated around flagship initiatives to create new opportunities
to attract innovative businesses, provide access to quality jobs, and ensure bet-
ter infrastructure and services (European Commission, 2021a). The work on
‘smart villages’ by DG AGRI is one example of a proposed paradigm shift where
rural areas are equipped with the necessary means to become engines of change
and productive centres (Smart Rural 21, 2021). A key factor in achieving this is
the digitalisation of villages (Iberdrola, n.d.).
February 2023 59
EU countries have also been actively seeking to reverse the depopulation of

rural and remote areas through actions that could attract talent and commit-
ment to stay. An example of these efforts are rural internship programmes in
Spain supporting students to do internships in companies and institutions in
sparsely populated areas (García-Casarejos and Sáez-Pérez, 2020). In addition,
investment in the roll out of high-speed broadband, financial support for rural
authorities to refurbish vacant properties into remote working facilities and tax
incentives for individuals and companies that support homeworking in rural and
remote areas are some of the additional measures EU countries are introducing
to revitalise rural areas (Balch, 2022; Johanson, 2022). There are also cross-
country collaborations (e.g. PADIMA 15 - an INTERREG IVC Project; AAL pro-
gramme16, EIP on AHA17) that aim to exchange good practices to reverse rural
depopulation and promote active and healthy ageing (Euromontana, n.d.).
Changing working patterns revitalising rural communities
The future of working patterns is likely to continue to evolve as businesses ad-
just to workers having more leverage when agreeing where and how they work.
As a result, flexible working is likely to become increasingly normal in those jobs
where it is possible. A global survey of workers found that the majority of work-
ers in every country surveyed believe that employers should be more flexible
with regards to office working (including from Europe, 69% in Italy; 61% in
France; 53% in Germany; 57% in Spain; 56 % in Sweden had these views)
(Ipsos, 2021). This sentiment is supported by the results of the most recent
European Employer Survey which found that 52% of employees prefer flexible
(e.g. hybrid) or remote work to a greater extent than businesses currently offer
(Littler, 2021).
A move to more flexible and remote working, combined with a realisation of the
EU’s vision for sustainable and smart rural development by 2040, and achieve-
ment of age-friendly environments (Academy on Age-Friendly Environments in
Europe, n.d.) could mean it is increasingly possible to live and work in rural and
remote areas that have not historically offered enough jobs for skilled profes-
sionals. As conditions for businesses and workers in these areas change (e.g.,
high-speed internet and access to digital infrastructure) it could help to bridge
the rural-urban divide (e.g., political, cultural, economic) existing in many Eu-
How might ropean countries. The emergence of a new rural middle class consisting of skilled
the issue remote workers would inject financial resources in the budgets of rural author-
develop in ities and with it improvements in local infrastructure and housing (Johanson,
future? 2022). This may require changes in taxation policies on employee income and
businesses themselves to ensure that taxes do not remain in cities for those
now living and working in rural areas. However, the emphasis of flexible and
remote online working may also accentuate the digital divide and exacerbate
inequalities between urban and rural communities as well as well-connected and
poorly connected rural ones as high-speed broadband access is very uneven
(UN, 2020), although EU rural policy explicitly seeks to address this to compen-
sate for this. It may also generate more inequalities between rural areas as
workers will migrate to those regions with access to high-speed internet and
infrastructure (e.g., co-working spaces).
Changes in the demographic makeup of rural communities
The current demographic profiles of remote villages and communities may in-
creasingly change due to factors including the current cost-of-living crisis (Frost,
2022) and the EU’s rural Action Plan and its ambition to provide access to quality
jobs and necessary infrastructure. This change will be further driven by the in-
creasing demand for flexible and remote working, perhaps in particular among
younger workers. Skilled workers and young families may see an opportunity to
relocate to provincial towns and rural areas seeking to reduce their cost of living
(compared to cities), be able to afford more living space and live closer to nature
to take advantage of the benefits it brings (e.g., clean air, greenery, being out-
doors, improved mental health, improved sleep etc.) as already seen in some
15 https://www.euromontana.org/en/project/padima-policies-against-depopulation-in-mountain-areas/
16 http://www.aal-europe.eu/
17The European Innovation Partnership on Active and Healthy Ageing - https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/poli-
cies/eip-aha
February 2023 60
European countries (e.g. Germany) (Karsten, 2020; Dolls and Mehles, 2021).
The increase in self-determination regarding work location in turn could lead to
more social segmentation and segregation. If people no longer need to choose
where they live based on the proximity to their work they may make this deci-
sion based on similar attributes to their own, including wealth, hobbies and
quality of life factors (Anderson, Rainie and Vogels, 2021; Briod, 2021). The
influx of workers with higher purchasing power may either elevate rural com-
munities in terms of the resources spent and invested or lead to increased prices
for those whose incomes are tied to local businesses, agriculture and forestry.
If the latter occurs it could lead to distorted housing markets, price-out working-
class/low skilled residents and lead to traditionally urban problems such as gen-
trification and homelessness (Johanson, 2022).
Technologies enabling remote work could reduce employment related migration
including long-term and long-distance moves to pursue better economic oppor-
tunities (UN, 2020). However, reverse migration could also occur in Europe
where foreign-born employees decide to move back home (to other EU regions
or third countries), where their companies adopt remote working practices
(Briod, 2021). This could lead to a deceleration or even a reversal of EU rural
depopulation, ageing of rural population and “brain drain” particularly in the
most attractive / popular rural areas (e.g. those with good internet connectivity,
closest/well connected to urban centres, with good environmental amenities) as
highly skilled workers and young professionals could choose to remain in, or
move back to, their local communities as they would receive competitive sala-
ries even if living in rural and remote areas. Furthermore, people may also de-
cide to take advantage of the freedom of remote work to move frequently and
join the global digital nomad community. Some predict that there will be ap-
proximately one billion digital nomads globally by 2035 (Briod, 2021).
The expected rise of investment in automation and artificial intelligence (AI)
could further alter the composition of rural communities (Lund et al., 2021).
Low skilled workers in rural areas may be left behind due to the kind of geo-
graphic, demographic, and workforce changes that automation could lead to.
Older workers in rural areas have the most pessimistic outlook as AI deepens
the divide between areas with and without job opportunities. These people could
face the difficult decision of uprooting their lives and relocating to cities if tradi-
tional jobs in rural industries like agriculture are replaced by automation (Ouslis,
n.d.).
Mobility
It is estimated that 50% of Europe’s working age population (15-64 years) use
private vehicles daily (e.g. cars, vans), with commuting contributing signifi-
cantly to this figure (Samek Ludovici et al., 2021). Working from home or in co-
working spaces close to home will reduce the frequency, length and duration of
commuting as well as the dependency on private and public transportation
(Samek Ludovici et al., 2021). This will have a positive impact on EU’s efforts
towards decarbonisation as daily commuting generates approximately 25% of
CO2 emissions in Europe (Giménez-Nadal, Molina and Velilla, 2020). However,
the decline in daily mobility (i.e., from home to work) may lead to increase
mobility in rural areas. In general, more compact settlements (i.e., urban areas)
provide opportunities for mass-transit and more efficient transport systems as
well as making it easier to locate services close to where people live, thus re-
ducing travel demand. In rural areas remote workers will generally need to
travel further to access shops and services in villages and towns. This trend is
already observed in the US, that generally has sparsely populated rural areas
with low housing density, where residential mobility has increased by 13% since
more people started to work remotely during the pandemic (Slason, 2020; Field-
ing and Ishikawa, 2021).
The investment in co-working centres and technology in rural areas will need to
be combined with new transport infrastructure - creating rural mobility (com-
munity) hubs that bring everything together in one place (Sutcliffe, 2021; Brick
and Kakulis, n.d.). The emergence of these hubs serving a wider rural commu-
nity that is currently poorly served by public transport will help to connect the
rural hinterland to cities. This will be essential to attract skilled professionals as
employers with offices in urban centres may (in the absence of the wide-spread
use of VR) continue to demand regular face-to-face meetings with their remote
February 2023 61
employees (Balch, 2022). These hubs will also have potential to induce modal
shift away from single occupancy private cars (Sutcliffe, 2021).
Rural authorities may also need to plan for and invest in the provision of new
cycling and walking infrastructure, new transport services and modes (e.g., self-
drive, carpool, and ride share innovations; electric micro mobility; autonomous
vehicles), redistribution of road space, traffic management arrangements and
on-street parking to facilitate the integration of increasing number of young
professionals and skilled workers in their communities.
Changing land use and land management
The shift towards more remote and hybrid working may result in substantial
changes in land use in rural areas. For the hybrid workers to relocate to rural
areas and work remotely from their urban offices they will need infrastructure
(e.g. housing, co-working spaces, transport infrastructure/hubs etc.) (Johan-
son, 2022). Therefore, the overall area of agricultural land in EU could continue
to decline to support the provision of workspaces and associated infrastructure
around rural villages and towns.
An influx of remote workers would increase demand for the limited number of
homes and smallholdings in rural areas and as a result drive-up their price,
something already forecast in some European countries (SCSI, 2022). The
shortage of rural properties may cause shifts in land development from non-
residential agricultural land to smaller, lifestyle plots around rural towns as al-
ready seen for example in Ireland where more people now see running a small
farm or small-holding as a viable option (Midwest Radio, 2022). The increase in
land fragmentation could in turn alter animal habitats as well as damage water-
sheds and native ecosystems.
In most EU countries, current projections are that agricultural land area is ex-
pected to decrease. The current key driver for this trend is land abandonment,
rather than settlement in rural areas. By 2030, it is projected that 11.4% of
agricultural land in EU will be at either high or very high risk of abandonment
(Perpiña Castillo et al., 2021). This could however be further exacerbated if the
make-up of rural communities changes due to an influx of young, skilled pro-
fessionals who, as noted above, could price-out existing or new farmers and
other existing rural residents who may not be able to afford the increase in cost-
of-living caused by the new ‘ruralities’.
This could mean that fewer retiring farmers will be passing their land and
knowledge onto their kin as most remote workers are likely to be computer-
based professionals and could lack the knowledge or experience of land man-
agement and may have less affinity with and attachment to the land itself. This
could lead to a change in the way the land is managed. Instead of crops these
new owners could choose self-sufficient root and vegetable gardening or a
flower garden while abandoning other parts of their land. In contrast some of
these new more tech-savvy landowners could also be more inclined to invest in
more efficient technologies to farm land. However, this will also create an op-
portunity for rewilding these landscapes either passively (by removal of human
interference for natural vegetation and habitat quality to recover by itself) or as
a conservation approach (Quintas-Soriano, Buerkert and Plieninger, 2022).
tions
for the environment
/ human health
Increasingly well-ed- More diverse population, im- Increasing economic activities
ucated and skilled proved social capital and capacity and car traffic in rural towns and
rural demographic. to design and conduct community villages resulting in increase of
projects with environmental and air, noise, soil and water pollu-
social benefits. tion.
Promote sustainable rural devel- Increase in electronic waste as
opment and engage with and ed- businesses provide employees
ucate newcomers on local envi- with laptops, screens etc., even
ronmental issues to ensure better at the risk of duplicating devices
ecosystem management (Sopena, (Shreedhar, Laffan and Giurge,
2021). 2022).
February 2023 62
Remote workers may not take ad-

vantage of nature and the out-
door opportunities available to
them due to a range of indoor ac-
tivities enabled by modern tech-
nologies (i.e., initial inten-
tions/motivations to move to rural
areas differ from reality). This
may mean that a rural life will not
necessarily lead to closer relation-
ships with nature and the associ-
ated pro-env behaviours that it
entails (Anderson and Kret-
tenauer, 2021).
Difficulties for home Businesses could ensure that Increase in overall energy con-
working employees their work from home policies are sumption as remote workers in-
in rural areas to embedding sustainability culture, crease their energy use at home
abide with their have supportive incentives and (for heating, cooling, appliances)
company’s sustaina- consider the unique circum- while businesses also maintain
bility goals (due to stances of their employees to their office spaces and keep on
existing infrastruc- identify the most relevant sus- their heating/cooling (to previous
ture, or lack of) tainability behaviours (Shreedhar, levels) even though the number
Laffan and Giurge, 2022). of people at office is significantly
reduced.
Negative impact on energy use
for those remote workers whose
home infrastructure (e.g., build-
ing energy rating) is not sustaina-
ble. Currently only 12% of the EU
residential building stock has
been renovated to meet climate
change targets (RICS, 2020).
Investment and de- Increased population base to or- Fragmentation of land, loss of
velopment of ser- ganise services, opportunities for habitats and pollution (water,
vices and infrastruc- innovation in service delivery soil) associated with new infra-
ture in rural areas (multi-service points, combining structure developments.
due to growing de- services e.g., post, delivery of Low-density rural development is
mand by the relo- products ordered on-line, retail) significantly more energy and
cating remote work- etc. GHG intensive than high-density
ers The provision of health and care urban core development (Morris,
services (e-Health) in such a sce- 2021)
nario would depend greatly on Increasing volume of construction
the connectivity of such areas, as waste due to increasing demand
well as on sufficient digital skills, for housing and infrastructure in
both of care receivers and provid- rural towns and villages (Euro-
ers. pean Commission Scientific Com-
Governments could ensure that mittee, 2021)
rural development plans and ac-
tions contribute to the achieve-
ment of EU’s key priorities and
strategies including the European
Green Deal and EU’s long-term
vision of rural areas.
Failure of existing Local authorities (in partnership Risk of environmental pollution
infrastructure (e.g., with neighbouring cities) could from untreated discharge to wa-
wastewater treat- improve their understanding and terways or improper waste man-
ment plants) and plan for an influx of new residents agement (e.g., unsanctioned
services (e.g., waste (e.g., tax policy) and provide burning of waste) and associated
management) in ru- new/maintain existing infrastruc- soil and air pollution.
ral villages and ture.
towns due to in-
Lack of resources in Local author-
creased pressure
February 2023 63
from growing num- ities to mitigate the risk of infra-

ber of users (i.e., structure failure.
remote workers)
Reduced daily com- Improved health and wellbeing In rural areas: increased non-
muting of EU’s for workers due to stress reduc- work travel, more traffic due to
working age population and savings on commuting increase in trips by delivery ser-
tion and resulting time and travel costs. vices (from growth in online
benefits for decar- Reducing the need for daily com- shopping) and more short trips,
bonisation mutes could decrease traffic con- especially where rural services
gestion and carbon emissions are dispersed (compared to urban
from transport. areas).
Need for an excellent and efficient
digital infrastructure in order to
deliver health and care remotely.
Loss of ecological Local authorities could implement Reduced ability to manage eco-
knowledge and eco- educational programmes, harmo- systems and loss of interest and
system management nise the existing policies, norms willingness to protect them by lo-
as the demographic and regulations and ensure web- cal communities (Mikołajczak et
make-up of rural based local ecological knowledge al., 2021).
communities transmission to incentivise pro- Land abandonment as land man-
changes environmental practices (socially agement is time-intensive and re-
and economically) so that the remote workers are unlikely to en-
mote workers who have relocated sure adequate land management
to their community may feel mo- alongside their day-jobs.
tivated and capable of protecting
the local environment (Aswani, Lack of community cohesion and
Lemahieu and Sauer, 2018). a widespread ‘not-in-my-back-
yard’ attitude contributing to ten-
Potential for passive or strategic
sions between residents, and be-
(through conservation plans) re-
tween residents and policymakers
wilding.
(Bock and Krzysztofowicz, 2021)
Nature-based solutions, circular
economy and sustainability goals
have been easier to implement in
rural communities, due to their
smaller scale, access to natural
resources and lower population
density (Bock and Krzysztofowicz,
2021).
This issue is already emerging, it will further evolve in the short-term and me-
dium term.
The Covid-19 pandemic has accelerated changes in the organisation of work in
the short term (1-5 years) with people expected to continue working at home
Timeframe or choosing flexible working that is boosting rural communities as commuting
of emer- to cities is no longer a daily necessity (Collier, 2021).
gence In the medium- and long- term, the assimilation of new digital technologies
(e.g., virtual reality, augmented reality etc.) in the workplace and the ac-
ceptance and evolution (through improvements) of these emerging work pat-
terns may mean that for many workers and employers flexible and remote work
could become a norm similar to how office work was before the pandemic.
The growing demand for flexibility and the ability to work from home, and the
access to new technologies may make it easier for some rural businesses to
compete with their urban counterparts by attracting young professionals and
skilled workers (Holt, 2021). However, a recent study by Oxford Economics
(2021) questioned whether the rise in new technologies and the rise in home
Uncertain-
working will produce a major relocation of activity to rural areas. They argue
ties
that the advantages of urban economies, as well as employers’ scepticism about
remote working could mean that changes will be incremental.
It also remains to be seen which of the emergent trends (e.g. changes to the
day-to-day work through digital and automation transformations; new types of
work – ‘tele-everything’ trend) will be temporary, and which will become per-
February 2023 64
manent as businesses balance new avenues of capital generation, evolving tech-

nology, and shifting societal expectations (Mugayar-Baldocchi, Schaninger and
Sharma, 2021). Although the extent of this shift is unknown, it is likely that
home working could account for one or multiple working days per week for many
employees (Brick and Kakulis, n.d.).
The future composition of rural communities is also unclear. A further decou-
pling of location from work will mean that fewer people will need to migrate,
however more people will also be able to migrate, as keeping a job is currently
a major factor in limiting mobility (Briod, 2021). Remote work could help spread
out high-skilled workers (and well-paid jobs) more equally across urban and
rural areas. However, it is unclear whether those who cannot take advantage of
the flexible and remote work revolution (e.g., older, low-skilled workers) will
need to relocate due to the pressures (e.g., increased cost of living) brought by
the highly paid remote workers.
Additional Additional research and evidence are required on:
research or • Further monitoring of the implementation and progress of EUs Rural Ac-
evidence tion Plan, the Rural Pact and national and regional actions as the success
that may of rural development policies will largely determine the capacity for busi-
be needed nesses to enable remote working.
• Rural depopulation is still considered to be a key current trend in Europe
(European Commission, 2022), thus further research into how impactful
changing working patterns could be to decelerate or reverse this trend, in
which conditions and where (in which rural areas) would be useful.
• The changes in rural communities and environment from influx of remote
workers will not be equally distributed and could lead to rural segmenta-
tion and segregation. How to ensure that such processes are avoided be-
fore they take place.
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February 2023 70
Issue 4: What will be the environmental impact of changes in the demo-

graphic makeup of urban areas?
‘The essence of cities is that they bring people together and are stronger for
their diversity, but unfortunately no city can be all things to all people (McKinsey
and company, 2016).’
Demographic features (e.g., age, gender, employment, and ethnicity struc-
tures) of cities and other urban areas across Europe, are extremely diverse and
unique. Therefore, there is no ‘typical’ demographic makeup of urban areas in
Emerging Europe. Nevertheless, their populations are shaped by some common trends
issue de- such as increasing spatial population mobility, migration, attractiveness of large
scription metropolitan capitals, ageing and population decline, and the green and digital
transitions. Such trends are driving long-term change in the demographic
makeup of cities, urban areas, and individual neighbourhoods. Among others
this includes changes in age dynamics, family structures, size of households,
number and density of inhabitants, and migration flows.
This issue explores how the demographic makeup of urban areas in Europe may
develop in future, and what will this mean for the environment.
All cities are unique. European cities vary greatly in size and in terms of their
demographic as well as other characteristics (economic, social, health and en-
vironmental) (Easen, 2019; EEA, 2021; European Commission, 2020; Vandec-
asteele et al., 2019). Geospatial mapping of population trends by age for sev-
eral EU countries shows a large variety in spatial patterns (Jacobs-Crisioni et
al., 2020). The mapping results show that even within a single urban agglom-
eration, there may be substantial differences in, for example, the age profile
between neighbourhood (Jacobs-Crisioni et al., 2020), and national, cultural,
age and religious diversity (Expat Focus, 2016; Gislason, 2021; Martínez-Ariño,
2020). This suggests that demographic makeup of cities (as well as related
environmental and other implications) will vary greatly based on geographic
location.
Nevertheless, generally the makeup of European cities is likely to be shaped by
the following trends:
• Continued population growth in large capitals - European capital met-
ropolitan regions hosting major cities (e.g. Stockholm, Paris, Berlin) are to
2030 projected to experience population growth (Lavalle et al., 2017;
McKinsey and company, 2016), including internal and international migra-
tion, as well as movement from rural to urban areas e.g. for employment,
education (SCHEER, 2022).
Key driv- • Population decline – However, while larger cities are expected to experi-
ers: what
ence growth in the short- to medium-term, many cities across Europe (e.g.
is driving
Chemnitz, Gera, and Saarbrücken in Germany and Genoa and Venice in It-
the emer-
aly) are already experiencing population decline or low population growth
gence of (McKinsey and company, 2016; Vandecasteele I., et al., 2019). This trend
this issue? is projected to continue with half of the European cities losing population by
2050, with 12% of cities projected to lose more than a quarter of their pop-
ulation between 2015 and 2050 (Vandecasteele et al., 2019).
• Ageing including in urban areas - While ageing is a trend in many global
regions, it is projected to be of particular concern for Europe with declining
overall population and a related increase in the old-age dependency ratio
(explored in more detail in Issues 2 and 10) (Ageing Report 2018 (EC,
2018b)). In 2070 life expectancy at birth of Europeans is projected to be
over 86 years for men, and 90 for women, up from 78 and 83 respectively
in 2018 (European Commission, 2020). At the same time the age depend-
ency ratio for EU-27 was 54.9% in 2019, but is projected to accelerate to
61.8% in 2030, 76.1% in 2050, reaching more than 80% by 2080, meaning
that in 2080 there would only be around five people of working age (15-64)
for every four people older (or younger) than working age (European Par-
liament, 2021). Alongside projections that 80 % of Europeans will live in
cities by 2050, compared with 74 % today (EEA, 2020), it logically follows
that the number (and proportion) of elderly people living in cities will in-
crease (Jarzebski et al., 2021a).
• Decline in working population - The impact of ageing European society
is increasingly affecting the labour market (European Commission, 2020).
On average the EU-27’s working-age population has been shrinking for the
February 2023 71
last 10 years and is projected to fall by 18% by 2070. However, there are
significant differences between Member States and regions (European Com-
mission, 2020).
• Migration - The EU was for the last 35 years, and continues to be, a conti-
nent of net migration. In 2018, 2.4 million people immigrated into one of
the 27 EU Member States and 1.1 million people emigrated to a non-EU
country. Due to freedom of movement, many people choose to move within
the EU (1.4 million in 2018) (European Commission, 2020). However, it is
not yet clear whether and how movement patterns and preferences have or
will (long term) change by the ongoing crises, including the war in Ukraine,
COVID-19 pandemic, as well as climate change. Migration flows are ex-
plored more in Issues 7 and 8.
• Smaller households - The number of households in Europe is increasing,
which combined with a declining overall population, means they are also on
average getting smaller in size. There were 195 million households in Eu-
rope in 2019, 13 million more than in 2010 (European Commission, 2020).
These are on average slowly getting smaller, from 2.4 people in 2010 to 2.3
in 2019 (European Commission, 2020). This trend is expected to continue
and as Europe ages, more people aged 65 and above, and especially
women, will live alone (European Commission, 2020).
• Changing family structures - According to McKinsey and company (2016)
‘’fewer and fewer households these days fit the description ‘average fam-
ily’‘’. The marriage rate in the EU has declined from 8.0 per 1,000 people
in 1964 to 3.2 in 2020, while the divorce rate has at the same time doubled
(from 0.8 per 1,000 people in 1964 to 1.6 in 2020) (eurostat, 2020). Higher
number of divorces are at least in part leading to more ‘patchwork’18 families
(sometimes also referred to as blended, step, or reconstituted) (Gyuris et
al, 2020) as well as single parent families19. Cities will also have to accom-
modate the needs of other types of families including childless families 20,
grandparent families21, and rainbow families22 to name a few, as well as
different forms of cohabitation (i.e., living with other than your spouse in
the same household and having a spouse-like relationship).
• Twin green and digital transition - the demographic makeup of cities is
also likely to be affected by the twin transition. Characterised by innovation,
technological diffusion, digitalisation and a circular economy it will bring new
business models and ways of working which are likely to have (positive and
negative) socio-economic implications (European Commission, 2020), see
also the final report of FORENV 2019-20 Cycle, which explored the implica-
tions of emerging innovations in the circular economy (European Commis-
sion, 2021). In addition to these the most obvious implications of twin
transitions likely to affect the demography of cities are job and industries
creation and loss.
Big cities will become bigger
How might In 2020, around 75% of Europeans lived in cities (EEA, 2020; The World Bank,
the issue 2022), and projections show that by 2050, 80% of the EU total population will
develop in live in urban areas (EEA, 2020; Lavalle et al., 2017). However, this urbanisation
future? (mirroring wider demographic change in Europe) is likely to be extremely une-
ven. In the long term (up to 2050) large metropolitan regions including cities
18 A patchwork family can be understood as a ‘new family’ that usually follows the separation of
a former nuclear family. At least one or both partners entering into a new relationship already
have children from a previous relationship. The new family is formed from the “patches” of pre-
vious families’.
19 Now representing 31% of all households in the EU, the number of single parent families grew
from 5.2 million households in 2009 to 6 million in 2021 (eurostat, 2022)
20 In the EU the number grew from 44.1 million households in 2009 to 48.1 million households
in 2021 (eurostat, 2022)
21A family with grandchildren and no parents present in the intervening generation (“Grandpar-
ent family,” n.d.).
22Same sex couples with children (Tryfonidou, 2020). In 2016 full joint adoption by same-sex
couples was legal in 14 European countries (including the UK) (European Parliament, 2016)
February 2023 72
like Berlin, Paris, and Stockholm are likely to experience population (as well as
physical) growth, while other cities and urban areas projected to see falling
populations (Aurambout et al., 2022; Lavalle et al., 2017; McKinsey and com-
pany, 2016) (see Some cities will shrink below).
While population growth in large cities may result in more efficient use of en-
ergy, transport and land and better and more accessible public infrastructure
(e.g., access to public transport, internet, and social services) it could also lead
to increasing congestion, pollution, land pressures and housing costs (European
Commission, 2020). As a result of unaffordable housing in desirable urban cen-
tres these cities are likely to further expand at their peripheries, a trend perhaps
exacerbated by changes in working practices and preferences made possible by
digitalisation (i.e., remote working) and accelerated by the COVID-19 pandemic
(this is explored in Issue 3 and also in FORENV 2020-21 Cycle, which included
an issue related to urban settlement patterns and demographic change (Euro-
pean Commission, 2022a)).
It is likely that internal and third country migrants will continue to pursue op-
portunities in the urban economic hubs of Western and Northern EU, driven by
the greater demand for highly skilled workers as well as their personal aspira-
tions and existing networks (Lutz et al., 2019). However, these urban centres
are also likely to attract people suitable for a range of economic activities, in-
cluding by offering opportunities for life-long learning. While migration has in-
creased urban diversity, it has often also led to residential segregation in cities.
Socio-spatial segregation can occur when specific groups of immigrants are con-
centrated in deprived neighbourhoods, putting them at risk of social exclusion
(and exploitation) in cities (Vandecasteele et al., 2019). While socio-spatial
segregation is not inherently negative (it can give sense of local identity, com-
munity and provide cultural and social capital) it can have a detrimental effect
on cities’ social stability and aggravate social fragmentation (Vandecasteele et
al., 2019).
Some cities will shrink
A recent JRC report (Aurambout et al., 2022) notes that ‘while the world popu-
lation has been increasing and is continuing to concentrate in cities, the idea
that all cities are continuously growing is false’. Mainly driven by ageing popu-
lation, deindustrialisation and outmigration (from the Mediterranean and east
peripheries into the central ‘blue banana’23), an increasing number of in Europe
cities are shrinking (Aurambout et al., 2022; European Commission, 2020;
McKinsey and company, 2016; Vandecasteele et al., 2019). Already present,
this phenomenon is likely to continue in the future. Aurambout et al. (2022)
suggest that shrinking may become the new normal for many cities and their
inhabitants. However, while shrinking in population, some of these cities may
still be growing in terms of the land they occupy. This is due to people moving
out of emptying city centres to new developments in urban peripheries (Auram-
bout et al., 2022), a trend likely to be accelerated by the ongoing digitalisation
of work and life and experiences during the COVID-19 pandemic (see Issue 1 in
the 2020-21 FORENV report: (European Commission, 2022a).
Aurambout et al. (2022) argue that shrinking is a complex process that affects
multiple physical as well as socio-demographic aspects of the city. In physical
terms shrinking manifests in obsolete infrastructure including vacant housing,
industrial, shopping, education, and other facilities as well as transport and en-
ergy networks. In socio-demographic terms it manifests as the departure of
younger and more qualified residents leading to proportionally older, less
skilled, and less affluent population. In addition to becoming less vibrant, losing
people and services, shrinking cities tend to suffer from negative image and
stigmatisation at local and international scale which can have a reinforcing effect
leading to even more people and businesses leaving the city (Aurambout et al.,
2022).
The EU is making significant efforts to better understand and manage possible
implications of twin green and digital transitions (European Commission, 2022b,
2020). While cities will most likely drive the twin transition, they are also likely
to see rapid and dramatic changes because of it. If not managed carefully,
possible negative implications of twin transitions could amplify the process of
23 discontinuous corridor of urbanisation spreading over Western and Central Europe
February 2023 73
shrinking and worsen its negative physical and socio-demographic effects e.g.
job and industries loss related to new ways of working and automation; ‘green
gentrification’ leading to unintentional displacement of lower income residents
and increase inequities (Sharifi et al., 2021; Jarzebski et al., 2021; Aurambout
et al., 2022). This could be further aggravated by tourism gentrification and
tourism supported by digital platforms, leading to unaffordable prices for local
residents and increase in so called ‘ghost dwellings’ (Caramaschi and Chiodelli,
2022).
Increase in ‘niche’ cities across Europe
To retain existing or attract new residents, cities in Europe might become in-
creasingly ‘niche’, focused on catering for particular demographic groups such
as the elderly, young families and students or even industries (e.g. start-ups)
(Aurambout et al., 2022; Easen, 2019; McKinsey and company, 2016; Smit et
al., 2020).
One such type of ‘niche’ city that could become prevalent in the future as a
response to demographic trends is the ‘retirement hub’(McKinsey and company,
2016). Many cities Spain’s Mediterranean coast (e.g., Alicante, Málaga, Murcia,
Valencia), have already marketed themselves as retirement hubs popular for
expatriate retirement communities. This may leave some people more exposed
to climate risks in future, which is discussed in the risks and opportunities sec-
tion below. Despite this effect in Europe being somewhat dampened by the
2008 economic crisis, there is evidence that such ‘niche’ cities created new jobs
in the construction (e.g. building or refurbishing housing as well as infrastruc-
ture to accommodate the needs of elderly citizens), and service industries (e.g.
health, leisure, recreation) (McKinsey and company, 2016). Jobs, construction,
and service industries creation might also be the case for the retirement hubs
of the future.
Another type of niche city is an ‘education hub’. In Europe, education hubs are
mainly towns and small cities whose distinct selling point is their educational
establishments (e.g. Montpellier, France; Heidelberg, Germany; and Uppsala,
Sweden) (McKinsey and company, 2016). Driven by high demand for tertiary
education it may be that the number of cities trying to establish themselves as
educational hubs will (at least up to 2030) increase.
‘Family places’ in comparison to large cities are characterised by less dense
populations, affordable housing, and offering abundant family amenities (parks,
play grounds, schools, nurseries, libraries, sport facilities, entertainment) are
another type of niche city that might emerge in Europe (McKinsey and company,
2016). These types of cities are developing in the United States, perhaps as a
response to many large American cities (e.g. New York, San Francisco) increas-
ingly dominated by wealthy, childless residents, becoming more unfriendly to
families (Easen, 2019), a trend that might already be present and could further
evolve in Europe.
In attempts to diversify their demographic base, some cities might take
measures (e.g., affordable housing, access to jobs and services such as educa-
tion, health care, and sports and recreation facilities) to accommodate elderly,
students, families, young workers, and others. It needs to be noted that the
types of niche cities presented here are just a few examples and other kinds of
cities might emerge in the future.
Changing types of housing, space and services management and provi-
sion
Smaller households, population ageing and decline, migration, increasing di-
vorce rates, more people living alone and changing family structures (e.g.
patchwork families, single parent families, childless families, rainbow families)
combined with rising costs of living (including housing, food, energy, childcare)
could result in increase in alternative living arrangements (e.g. cohabiting,
group living) and different types of housing (e.g. ‘intergenerational’ housing,
‘micro-housing’) and (public) space, services and commodities provision, organ-
isation, management and design24 (Architizer, 2022; National Geographic,
24 The visons of ‘future cities’ presented here have been inspired by National Geographics' 'Cities
of the future' (2019) based on expertise provided by the architectural and urban planning firm
Skidmore, Owings & Merrill (SOM).
February 2023 74
2019).
‘Intergenerational’ housing could comprise of small and family-size units with
easy access to services (e.g. health, education, basic goods, telecommunica-
tions) and transit (beyond public transport also including walking, and cycling
infrastructure) to accommodate people of all ages and abilities25 in one building
(National Geographic, 2019).
‘Micro-housing’ is envisaged as tiny living spaces designed with intention to ac-
commodate increased numbers of people in cities living alone, increase housing
affordability and decrease rents. According to Architizer (2022) micro-housing
is already emerging ‘not only as a trend, but a design solution that addresses
urban spatial inadequacies’ and is driven by those in need of it as well as housing
advocates and developers.
Buildings might become increasingly more ‘adaptable’. While most buildings
change their original use during their lifecycle ‘adaptable buildings’ focus on
‘bespoke solutions which, wherever possible, are flexible to varying stakeholder
needs (Manewa et al., 2016)’. As such they are considered as more sustainable
build solutions.
In and outdoor, private and public shared spaces and amenities could become
crucial to foster human interaction (between increasingly isolated citizens), cre-
ate sense of community, belonging and social equality and allow for smaller and
micro-sized homes (National Geographic, 2019).
Inclusive, socially just, accessible, and sustainable cities?
Demographic trends, projections and policy papers reviewed indicate that on
average by being older, more alone, living in changing family arrangements,
and having to deal with increasing economic26 (e.g., rising living costs), envi-
ronmental (e.g., climate emergency, pollution, scarcity of resources), heath
(e.g., increasing diseases and mental health issues) and social (e.g. social seg-
regation, exclusion, poverty) challenges, our urban populations are becoming
more and more vulnerable. Therefore, there is an urgent need for cities (of the
future) to become more inclusive, socially just, accessible, ecologically safe and
sustainable (European Commission, 2020; Easen, 2019; European Commission,
2022b; Jarzebski et al., 2021; Lavalle et al., 2017; C40 cities, 2022).
C40cities launched the ‘Thriving Cities initiative’ arguing that for the cities of the
future to ‘thrive/become thriving’ and encourage, enable and support diverse,
active, healthy communities, they need to be ‘socially just and ecologically
safe’(C40 cities, 2022). As separately discussed in Issue 5, urban greening may
be a key tool to transition to ‘socially just and ecologically safe’ European cities.
Urban greening can include interventions such as creation of public green spaces
(e.g., parks, urban forests, urban farming), allotments, use of ‘natural’ materi-
als and plants in housing and construction (e.g., green roofs, walls, sky gar-
dens), and private green spaces (e.g., gardens, terraces, balconies). It can
(should) also include informed landscape-scale city planning and development,
considering regional ecology.
tions
for the environment /
human health
25 Almost half of older people have a disability – with this figure getting higher as people get
into the older age groups. They are more prone to face challenges of reduced mobility and their
quality of life depends on how inclusive and accessible our societies and environment are (Euro-
pean Commission, 2020).
26
For example, soaring living costs will be (in average) more difficult to bear by single parents,
‘patchwork’ families, and people who live alone. Some studies imply that these types of fami-
lies/ living arrangements may be generally less resilient to economic and consequently other
(e.g., health, social, environmental) challenges. People from broken homes have also often
gone through hard time (e.g., divorce, violence, loss, court battles, neglect etc.) and may be in
need of institutional support.
February 2023 75
Cities in which popula- Large, densely populated, cul- As centres of concentrated popu-
tion is not expected to turally, and generationally di- lation and economic activity large
decrease and age so verse cities create potential and cities create significant environ-
rapidly (i.e., larger cit- act as hubs for emergence of mental impacts. Although per-
ies and those in new knowledge, ideas, social capita land-take and environmen-
north/west Europe) and technological innovations tal impacts are generally ac-
may be more resilient that could (significantly) contrib- cepted to be lower in cities than
to climate and environ- ute to green transitions and sup- rural areas, cities none-the-less
mental challenges. port climate adaptation. will generate environmental im-
plications (e.g., waste, pollution,
GHG and other emissions, biodi-
versity loss) related to use of en-
ergy and materials, construction,
food and goods supply and con-
sumption, and transport to name
a few. These are also likely to
have negative implications on hu-
man health in particularly in rela-
tion to climate challenges such as
heath waves and related phe-
nomena of urban ‘heat islands af-
fects’.
Establishing and achieving cities’
unified environmental ambitions
might be challenged by social
segregation and different beliefs,
norms, and habits (e.g., affecting
behaviour such as food and gen-
eral consumption, ways of spend-
ing time in nature, willingness to
change, etc.) of increasingly cul-
turally diverse urban populations.
Cities with declining In efforts to cater for vulnerable Cities might not be able to reach
and ageing populations citizens and retain population, their long term environmental
may be less resilient cities could prioritise develop- and sustainability ambitions and
due to increasingly vul- ments such as accessible and targets such as SDGs and green
nerable citizens. sustainable mobility, green transitions. Cities experiencing
(public) space, health services, rapid shrinking and urban decline
energy efficiency and social in- could particularly struggle to deal
clusion. Cities could become in- with and adapt to climate and en-
creasingly socially just and eco- vironmental change due to in-
logically safe. crease in older, less skilled, and
lower income groups. This also
relates to loss of economic, finan-
cial, and human capacities to sup-
port the just sustainability transi-
tion, including provision of ser-
vices required by elderly.
Due to increasingly Empty buildings as well as infra- Urban decay characterised by
ageing and declining structure could be repurposed to abandoned buildings environ-
population in cities in- more sustainable uses (e.g., in mental risks such as disease out-
frastructure and hous- civic urban centres, housing, breaks, negative impacts on land-
ing supply may exceed theatres, cycling lanes on aban- scape character, erosion, loss of
demand, leading to an doned railway track). biodiversity and pollution (Car-
increase in vacant Retrofitting could contribute to rero et al., 2009; Faur and Maria,
properties and a de- resource efficiency through recy- 2019).
crease in property cling and reuse of construction Repurposing and retrofitting
value (Aurambout et materials. buildings imply material and en-
al., 2022) ergy use and waste generation
from demolition and construction.
Abandoned building also pose a
public danger (risk of arson or
collapse) (Faur and Maria, 2019).
February 2023 76
Retirement hubs may These cities are characterised by Due to elderly and less resilient
become an increasingly good connectivity of services, population (higher proportion of
prevalent type of ‘niche accessible public transport, people with disabilities, mobility
city’ in Europe green areas (e.g., parks, recrea- issues, cognitive challenges) re-
tional grounds, gardens, urban tirement hubs could be dispropor-
forests, walking and cycling tionally vulnerable to the adverse
routs) and apartment or small effects of climate change in com-
house living. This potentially parison to other cities. This might
makes them greener, more en- be an issue for Europe also be-
ergy efficient and sustainable. cause these cities tend to emerge
in geographical regions (e.g.,
coastal) that are expected to be
particularly affected by climate
change (e.g., by sea level rise,
high temperatures, droughts,
wildfires).
Other cities in Europe Characteristics such as less Family friendly cities may not
may seek to become dense population, green areas necessarily be sustainable, en-
niche ‘family places’ to (private and communal gardens, ergy and material efficient. Next
attract a new demo- play areas, parks, sport to schools and childcare facilities,
graphic. grounds), green streets, safe they are characterised by larger
and slow traffic make these houses, shopping, entertainment
types of cities potentially more and recreation centres, high car
sustainable. ownership and may have high rel-
Increased environmental aware- ative levels of goods and food
ness and behaviour (e.g., recy- consumption.
cling, local food consumption, To attract young buyers, ambi-
active travel) of parents traying tions to secure affordable housing
to secure sustainable future for might lead to use of cheaper and
their children (e.g., green par- less energy efficient construction
enting as discussed in Issue 9) materials.
may also contribute to lower en-
vironmental footprint of such cit-
ies.
EU, Member State, and urban
policy should seek to ensure the
creation / development of such
‘family’ cities make use of en-
ergy, water and material effi-
cient construction / buildings and
sustainable mobility.
Increase in ‘intergener- With easy access to services, Tensions created by people of dif-
ational’ housing. and transit, communal in and ferent generations living together
outdoors spaces, these types of resulting from their conflicting
houses could be more resilient to needs (e.g., elderly want quiet
future demographic changes in while young desire more vibrant
cities. They could also offer so- neighbourhood). These could po-
cial (e.g., younger in the building tentially lead to difficulties related
look after elderly while they pro- to management and use of com-
vide childcare support to young munal green and other (open)
families) and environmental space.
benefits (e.g., energy efficiency,
decreased land pressures).
Increase in ‘micro- Being affordable, space and en- Micro-housing could further in-
housing’ to accommo- ergy efficient, with shared green flate the housing prices in large
date increased num- in an outdoor spaces and amen- cities. Micro-housing could lead
bers of people in cities ities, micro-housing could sup- to very small living spaces be-
living alone. port cities’ green transitions, as coming the new normal. This
well as foster sense of commu- could result in ‘overcramming’,
nity and social equality among decreased life quality, overbur-
people living alone. dening of infrastructure (e.g., wa-
ter and wastewater systems,
February 2023 77
waste management), and in-

creased resource and energy use
per capita.
Different living ar- Cohabiting and group living may Similar to ‘intragenerational’ liv-
rangements such as give people a sense of commu- ing, tensions may emerge among
‘cohabiting’ and ‘group nity and support. It is also likely different people with different
living’ may increasingly to be cheaper, more energy and needs living together.
emerge. resource efficient.
Especially European Increased interested in improv- Feeling unaccepted can lead to
metropolitan but also ing migration integration policies being indifferent to city policies
other cities are likely to and practices. If migrants relate including their environmental ef-
continue to experience to cities and feel accepted, they forts. It can be part of the reason
and have to manage are more likely to positively con- for antisocial behaviour among
social segregation. tribute to and engage in cities’ any disenfranchised social group.
environmental and sustainability Social segregation can in extreme
efforts. This is explored in Issue circumstances lead to emergence
7 related to migration and the of ‘ghetto’ neighbourhoods which
green transition. next to social issues and safety
may also pose environmental
risks (e.g., overcrowding, pollu-
tion, disease, unsafe buildings).
This issue is already unfolding but will emerge increasingly over the medium-
to long-term.
Driven by long-term demographic trends in Europe, developments such as
Timeframe
shrinking and niche cities and changing types of housing, space and services
of emer-
management and provision could become more obvious in the long-term.
gence
The population of large European metropolis is likely to grow for the next 10
year and then start stagnating and declining at around 2050. However, this will
not happen for all the large cities at the same time.
In terms of demographic as well as other characteristics (economic, social,
health and environmental) all cities are unique (Easen, 2019; Vandecasteele et
al., 2019; European Commission, 2020). As discussed, the demographic
makeup of each city is influenced by numerous factors (e.g., ageing, migration,
fertility rates, economic factors) and it is extremely difficult to foresee how it
will develop in the future, even at a level of an individual city.
Linked to ageing and declining population, Aurambout et al. (2022) note that
the process of shrinking in cities is not well understood, and cities may not know
how to deal and plan for it. While different policy and government interventions
are being tested to counteract urban shrinking, evidence of their effectiveness
and impacts is limited and may even lead to unintended consequences such as
gentrification or increasing inequalities.
Uncertain- In terms of migration flows in and outside EU, is not yet clear whether and how
ties movement patterns and preferences have or will be influenced by the war in
Ukraine, COVID-19 pandemic, as well as climate change. For example, if the
sudden shift to remote work (roughly one-third of the global workforce began
working from home) that took place during the pandemic becomes more per-
manent, fewer people may choose to move to cities to find employment (Smit
et al., 2020) (this is explored in detail in Issue 1 on urban settlement patterns,
in the 2020-21 cycle of FORENV (European Commission, 2022a)).
The demographic structure of immigrant groups in terms of nationalities, cul-
tures, and religion at the level of cities and neighbourhoods is also poorly un-
derstood, which causes challenges for creating suitable integration policies as
well as understanding behaviour with possible environmental implications (e.g.,
consumption patterns, dietary habits, family structures, ways of living and
working) that might be related to culture and believes.
Additional To better understand the implications of demographic makeup of European cit-
research or ies and the implications this might have for the environment as well as economy,
evidence health, and society, better and geographically more specific demographic data
that may and information is needed at the scale of regions, cities and even neighbour-
be needed hoods.
For example, to better understand the integration of migrants in the receiving
February 2023 78
society it is necessary to zoom in at the level of specific neighbourhoods

(Vandecasteele et al., 2019). This notion can be generally applied as more
granular data would enable better understanding of the needs of all citizens as
well as related implications and trends.
Cities as well as national authorities need to make significant efforts to better
understand the process of urban shrinking. Apart of data collection this includes
acceptance that this process is happening or going to happen, to better plan for
the future (Aurambout et al., 2022).
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February 2023 81
Issue 5: Will urban greening emerge as a key tool in thriving cities of the
future?
This issue explores how urban greening may increasingly emerge as a tool that
cities choose (or need) to use in response to and influenced by demographic
changes in cities (the potential evolution of the demographic makeup of cities is
examined in more detail in Issue 4). Urban greening can include private, semi-
private and public green spaces including gardens, parks, playgrounds, sports
grounds, urban forests and farms as well as nature-based solutions and green
infrastructure such as green roofs and walls and the greening of walkways and
Emerging cycling lanes.
issue de- European cities will be shaped by, and have to respond to, demographic trends
scription including ageing, population decline, changing family structures, smaller house-
holds, migration flows, and people increasingly living alone. By bringing multiple
environmental, health, social, and economic benefits (e.g. climate and tempera-
ture regulation, decreased biodiversity loss, social cohesion, enabling active life-
style and ageing) urban greening could become a key tool for creating places
where people continue to want to live (and can do so comfortably), enhancing
urban resilience and achieving and maintaining ecologically stable, socially just
and inclusive thriving European cities.
The key drivers behind a potentially increasing importance of urban greening as
a key tool in enabling thriving cities of the future include:
Ageing and increasingly vulnerable urban populations
Urban populations are becoming more vulnerable as they, on average, are be-
coming older, more likely to live alone (see also Issue 4 on the demographic
makeup of urban areas), and having to deal with increasing economic, environ-
mental, health, and social challenges.
Population decline and urban shrinking
Many cities across Europe are already experiencing population decline or low pop-
ulation growth. Projections suggest that by 2050 this could be a reality for half of
European cities and 12% of these could lose more than a quarter of their popula-
tion between 2015 and 2050 (Vandecasteele et al., 2019). Urban shrinking (a
phenomenon already faced by some European cities) may in the medium to long-
term become a new normal for many cities and their inhabitants (Aurambout et
al., 2022) (see also Issue 4 on the demographic makeup of urban areas).
Key driv- Smaller households and new living arrangements
ers: what While Europe’s overall population is falling, the number of households is con-
is driving versely increasing, and as a result these are getting smaller (from 2.4 people in
the 2010 to 2.3 in 2019), a trend that is expected to continue (European Commission,
emer- 2020b). The makeup of households is also changing in terms of family structures
gence of (e.g. increase number of ‘patchwork’ and single parent families) and living ar-
this is- rangements. More (particularly elderly) people live alone, and an increase is seen
sue? in alternative living arrangements such as ‘intergenerational’ living, ‘cohabiting’
and ‘group living’. These trends are projected to accelerate in medium to long-
term (see also Issue 4 on the demographic makeup of urban areas).
The need to reduce inequality
While national and regional inequalities are important, the experience of inequal-
ity for individuals is shaped by their local environment (Glaeser et al., 2009).
COVID 19 has worsened economic, gender, skills, regional and ethnic inequalities
in Europe (European Commission, 2020a), which are likely to be further aggra-
vated by the war in Ukraine and the impact it is having on the costs of food, fuel
and energy in Europe (which were already facing inflationary pressures due to
global economic pressures post COVID-19 pandemic). Some studies show that
more ‘unequal cities’ tend to experience higher crime rates and people living in
such cities are more likely to say they are less happy (Glaeser et al., 2009). In-
come inequality across city areas seems to be linked to skill distribution (Glaeser
et al., 2009). In the context of sustainability transitions, cities may be increasingly
concerned with social and economic inequalities and trying to ensure that their
‘green’ policies do not further alienate vulnerable social groups Cities’ ambitions
February 2023 82
related to urban greening might also be driven by their efforts to tackle health
inequities by to ensuring equality of access to high quality green space and ben-
efits it delivers, something that has also been recognised by the EU (Ganzleben,
C. and Kazmierczak, A., 2020).
Cities’ increased sustainability ambitions and the importance of urban
green spaces for these
Lockdowns during the COVID-19 pandemic highlighted the value of urban green
spaces for people’s physical and mental wellbeing, especially those without private
outdoor spaces or gardens. Many European cities have made efforts to create
more or improve access to existing public green spaces and to improve facilities
for active mobility such as walking and cycling. Building on increased recognition
of ecosystem services and co-benefits provided by green space (e.g. reduction of
air pollution, climate change mitigation and adaptation, noise reduction, facilitat-
ing social interactions and promoting the sense of community among the citizens,
improved health and wellbeing including diseases prevention and mitigation) (Ali
et al., 2022; European Environment Agency, 2021), such initiatives have since
been transferred into many ‘green recovery’ agendas (European Commission,
2020b; European Environment Agency, forthcoming). These efforts are supported
by European Commission initiatives such as the Green paper on Ageing, the Green
City Accord, the Green Capital and Leaf Awards and related European Platform for
Urban Greening and incentivised by numerous EU strategies including the Circular
Economy Action Plan, the EU Bioeconomy Strategy, the EU Biodiversity Strategy,
the Farm to Fork Strategy, the revised EU Strategy for Adaptation to Climate
Change and recognition of nature-based solutions as a promising tool for climate
change adaptation and disaster risk reduction (EEA, 2021; European Commission,
2022).
Most of these City greening for a more sustainable future is also incentivised by
initiatives and projects of international city networks such as C40 (e.g. Thriving
Cities Initiative27, 1.5°C Climate Action Plan), Euro Cities (e.g. Food Trails, Mayors
Alliance for the European Green Deal, Net Zero Cities and related 100 Climate-
Neutral and Smart Cities by 2030), and Covenant of Mayors for Climate and En-
ergy to name a few.
EU’s resilience agenda
The COVID-19 pandemic highlighted the importance of strengthening the resili-
ence of European cities (European Commission, 2020a). More broadly, the need
to secure a resilient future for Europe is a declared goal of the EU policy. The
EU’s current conceptualisation is to achieve resilience along four interrelated di-
mensions – geopolitical, digital, green, social and economic (also including health
aspects) (European Commission, 2020a). The green, social and economic resili-
ence ambitions encompass public health, just and inclusive (green and digital)
transitions, supporting the most vulnerable, measuring progress and conceiving
‘wellbeing’ beyond traditional economic parameters (e.g. GDP), climate mitigation
and adaptation, pollution reduction, respecting planetary boundaries, decreased
biodiversity loss and ecosystems restoration (European Commission, 2020a).
Well planned urban greening is essential for cities to foster and make progress
towards these ambitions.
Linked to the European Green Deal, the 2021-2027 multiannual financial frame-
work and the EU’s recovery plan NextGenerationEU seeks to boost investments in
innovation and implementation of green technologies, particularly in energy, mo-
bility, and food sectors to combat climate change, biodiversity loss, resource de-
pletion and pollution in the EU (European Commission, 2021). While not specifi-
cally targeted at cities, it is likely that many of these investments might be fo-
cussed in urban areas and in particular in relation to tackling biodiversity loss
encourage urban greening.
On a quest for resilient and liveable future cities
How
might the In order for cities to remain places where people want to live and to support
issue de- thriving urban communities and populations (e.g. attracting working age popula-
velop in tions required for a functioning local economy, health and wellbeing of citizens)
future? they may have to make substantial progress towards climate mitigation and ad-
aptation, sustainable food supply, pollution reduction, ecosystems restoration and
27 https://www.c40.org/what-we-do/raising-climate-ambition/inclusive-thriving-cities/thriving-cities/
February 2023 83
consideration of planetary boundaries. The implications of environmental and cli-

mate change are expected to worsen significantly in coming decades, and many
of these pressures will be felt most acutely in cities and urban areas (European
Environment Agency, 2021).
Cities may find that their preferred option is to implement a green approach to
urban planning that considers current and future climate change and environmen-
tal pressures (Deloitte, 2021) as well as city’s mitigation and adaptation policies
and measures to address them. A recent study analysing European cities’ actions
in relation to sustainability- accomplished, ongoing, or forthcoming from 2014 to
the present (2020) and coming years- concluded that ‘one of the most promoted
themes is related to the environment, highlighting nature and biodiversity in cities
to improve environmental quality and achieve the decarbonization necessary to
fight climate change’ (Arias et al., 2022).
Greening for healthy ageing
An ageing population in Europe is increasing interest in and support for measures
to enhance ‘healthy ageing’ - ways to keep older people healthy longer and pre-
vent or reduce disease and disability in old age, and this includes in cities. Due
to, for example, retirement or increasingly limited mobility, elderly people often
spend more time at home than younger people. Therefore, their wellbeing is
strongly linked to their residential environment (De Keijzer, 2019).
To accommodate elderly citizens and ‘healthy ageing’, cities might have to in-
creasingly pay attention to the planning and design of neighbourhood’s build and
green environments. This can either hinder or support people’s access to services,
healthy and nutritional food, wellbeing, healthy lifestyles and even community
participation and engagement (Ali et al., 2022). For example, walking-friendly
infrastructure and accessibility of destinations and services encourages higher
physical activity and walking among older adults (De Keijzer, 2019).
Recent studies (some focused particularly on older populations) reported benefits
of living in areas with more green space. These include improved mental and
physical health, reduced obesity, reduced risk of disease, better life satisfaction,
decreased stress levels, slower cognitive decline, slower decline in walking speed,
encouragement of social cohesion and reduced feelings of loneliness (De Keijzer,
2019; Barcelona Institute for Global Health, 2018; Ali et al., 2022). As such, well-
planned, designed and maintained neighbourhood greening may be a needed and
promising intervention to improve health and wellbeing of ageing urban popula-
tions.
With the COVID-19 pandemic and sudden shifts to working from home, which
could become more permeant, greening of residential environments is likely to
become increasingly important for the wellbeing of urban populations.
Greening to retain population and adapt to shrinking
In the medium to long-term future, cities across Europe might use urban greening
as a key tool to adapt to, manage and mitigate population decline and the related
phenomenon of urban shrinking. As described in Issue 4 shrinking often manifests
as obsolete and vacant housing and infrastructure, and progressively older, less
skilled, and less affluent urban populations. As such demographic changes are an
important aspect of and driver of urban shrinking.
In the future, cities may increasingly adopt ‘targeted urban strategies’ to manage
and plan for urban shrinkage, demographic change, and population decline.
Around 13% (of about 1,000) integrated territorial strategies supported by the
EU’s Cohesion Policy focus on European territories within continuously shrinking
Functional Urban Areas (FUAs) (Aurambout et al., 2022). These strategies are
mainly supported by the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and their
most frequently addressed thematic objectives are social inclusion, environmental
protection, resource efficiency and shift toward a low carbon economy (Auram-
bout et al., 2022).
All of these challenges can be successfully addressed and supported by urban
greening. It is likely that as urban shrinking becomes more prevalent across Eu-
rope, increased attention in terms of policy interventions, actions and funding in
cities may be targeted to these issues, with urban greening becoming a key tool
to achieve progress in these areas. For example, when cities ‘resize’ they can use
greening to repurpose abandoned land (Aurambout et al., 2022), demolished
buildings and infrastructure for example by creating green areas such as public
February 2023 84
open spaces (e.g. parks, urban forests and farms, playgrounds, sports grounds),
industrial and adventure parks, open space galleries, walking and cycling routes.
These can make cities more attractive for tourists as well as for people to move
to or stay in the city.
Emergence of semi-public communal green space
New types of housing such as micro-housing (including tiny houses and micro-
apartments) are foreseen as affordable urban living solutions for small families
and people living alone (see also Issue 4 on the demographic makeup of urban
areas). As house prices are rising in many European countries, new types of hous-
ing are already emerging in cities in China (e.g. Hong Kong), United States (New
York, San Francisco) and Europe (e.g. Rome) (Day, 2012; Les, 2013; Mueller,
2020) and seem likely to become more common in medium to long-term future.
Due to the emergence of new types of housing, ‘semi- private’ shared green out-
door spaces and amenities could increasingly become a feature of future cities. In
micro-housing the purpose of shared in and outdoor space is primarily to enable
and ensure quality living by compensating for the small scale of the indoor living
space. Therefore, it is envisaged that these communal spaces will be ‘shared’
between residents, but not necessarily public to enable the privacy and safety
people would expect to be able to enjoy when spending time at home. This is
particularly likely be the case when the aim of micro-housing development is to
accommodate the needs of more vulnerable occupants such as children, elderly
and less able people (e.g. suffering from dementia or visually or mobility im-
paired) or to support ‘intergenerational’ living.
To avoid tensions that could arise from residents’ conflicting interests, and to de-
liver desired benefits of green communal space (e.g. sense of safety and security,
stress release, encouragement, social cohesion and reduced feelings of loneliness)
these need to be carefully planned, designed and managed, considering the needs
of all potential users. The trade-off between an increasingly green city but in which
access to green space is restricted (i.e. not public) and the needs of the wider
population, especially those living in older housing without new shared green-
spaces, may also emerge as an increasing concern in urban areas.
Promote equal, fair and integrated urban planning
In the light of increasing urban inequalities in economic, gender, skills, regional
and between ethnic groups in Europe, cities may increasingly need to put greater
consideration on issues of equality and justice when planning new developments
including public green space.
To ensure equal and socially just but also greener cities, a key challenge for urban
development may be how to create new green corridors and spaces without in-
flating property prices and rents. Particularly in larger cities across Europe neigh-
bourhood greening is often associated with a rise in house prices. However, the
causality between green spaces and property values might not be as a straight-
forward as it seems, as greening often accompanies other changes in an area
(e.g. schools, nurseries, residential and business developments, sport facilities
etc.) which can also contribute to increases in property prices. In addition to this,
leisure (e.g. restaurants, cafes, sport) but also other services (e.g. education,
child care and care for elderly) can become more expensive as areas become
greener and more sought-after as places to live. This can lead to gentrification
and the risk of displacement of low-income residents from an area (Deloitte,
2021). Additionally, younger populations (e.g. first-time buyers, and people who
started families and need to upsize) might also move out to other (smaller) cities,
suburbia, or to the countryside with more affordable housing prices.
To avoid reinforcing health inequalities in urban areas, cities will have to ensure
preservation and fair distribution and access to public green space and the ser-
vices it offers (e.g. climate regulation, improved air quality, urban cooling and
flood mitigation) (Lin et al., 2015; Deloitte, 2022; De Keijzer, 2019) for all citi-
zens, regardless of their age, ethnicity, gender, or income.
Public green space in cities should be situated where people live (Li et al., 2021).
However, to make sure public green space is truly inclusive, proximity may not
be enough. To ensure equality of access and all the benefits of green space for
people of all age groups and physical abilities, so called ‘universal’ or inclusive
design (including dropped curbs and ramps, and providing sufficient public seating
and sanitary facilities) could become prevalent in future cities including public
February 2023 85
green spaces (Vandecasteele et al., 2019).

To encourage and support social connections and create a sense of community
between increasingly vulnerable but also culturally diverse urban populations,
public green spaces will also have to be ethnically inclusive. The Nørrebro neigh-
bourhood of Copenhagen, Denmark is an example of green public space created
with the intention to encourage a sense of community in a highly culturally diverse
residential area. To foster a sense of familiarity and comfort through design for
immigrants who moved to Copenhagen, the developers create a public park
(Superkilen) which acts as a canvas for creating social connections, by asking
people of various cultures that live in the neighbourhood what they would like to
see in their shared space. The place includes installations from over 60 countries,
such as chess boards from Bulgaria, a Japanese octopus slide for children, and a
two-sided swing from Iran (reSITE, 2022).
To improve resilience of communities, support social cohesion and inclusion and
encourage connectedness between urban dwellers and nature cities may encour-
age urban farming. All types of urban agriculture (e.g. private gardens, urban
farms, allotments, community farms and gardens) bring wellbeing, food, health
and economic benefits (Kirby et al., 2021). However, in companion to other forms
of urban agriculture community gardening and farming seems most promising to
promote and foster social cohesion, sense of community, engagement and be-
longing (Kirby et al., 2021). As such community urban farming and gardening
could become a key tool to support social justice and cohesion between increas-
ingly culturally and economically diverse urban population and an important part
of future cities’ migration integration strategies. They can, where managed to
achieve this objective, also represent a source of fresh food for vulnerable and
marginalised groups of the population (e.g. informal workers, the elderly). During
the COVID 19 emergency some community garden spaces played a contingency
role in mitigating increasing costs of and limited access to food due to lockdowns
and other restrictive measures.
Potential Opportunities Risks
implications
for the envi-
ronment /
human health
Increase in More green spaces providing various Investments an increase in ecosystems
investments types of ecosystem service functions services can only benefit urban dwellers
and provision including carbon-sinking, biodiver- if these are equally distributed, well
of ecosystem sity preservation, recreational func- planned, designed and maintained.
services in tions that are of value to urban
cities. dwellers.
Green resi- Healthier and more active elderly cit- Greening of neighbourhoods can only
dential areas izens are more resilient to economic, benefit elderly if these are well planned,
support health, social, climate, and environ- designed, maintained, and tailored to
healthy age- mental challenges. As such they can their needs (e.g. foster accessibility of
ing be more involved and better contrib- destinations and services, are not close
ute to city’s environmental and sus- to noisy activities, are wheel chair ap-
tainability transitions. proachable).
Improved healthy years due to more
active lifestyles will also have bene-
fits for health and social care (re-
duced demand and costs for health
authorities)
Green resi- Better ability and capacity of urban Greening of neighbourhoods needs to
dential envi- dwellers to successfully engage in be well planned to avoid unintended
ronment fa- mitigation and adaptation to future consequences such as increased costs
cilitates more climate and environmental but also of living in greener neighbourhoods
resilient social and economic challenges. leading to gentrification, increased so-
(healthier, cial segregation and divided cities.
happier, less
stressed, ac-
tive, engag-
ing) urban
February 2023 86
populations.
Green spaces Cities supporting and contributing to Green spaces such as parks could prove
(e.g. urban intranational, European, national costly and challenging to maintain.
forests) in cit- and their own carbon targets. Poorly maintained green spaces can
ies helping Improved climate mitigation and ad- have environmental, health and social
cities move to aptation and increased climate and risks (e.g. anti-social behaviour).
carbon neu- environmental resilience of cities. Proximity of ‘wilder’ and biodiverse
trality / net green areas in densely populated cities
zero (i.e. ab- could lead to increased health hazards
sorbing more such as allergies (e.g. related to stings
carbon than from bees, wasps, hornets or plants),
they pro- poisoning (from e.g. fruits, berries), in-
duce). fections (e.g. from animal bites, fae-
Green spaces Decreased health risks related to ur- ces).
in cities miti- ban heath waves during summer pe- The creation of new green spaces while
gating or riods (e.g. dehydration, cardiac ar- bringing a range of benefits may also
avoiding ur- rest) and more liveable cities all year limit future options to increase urban
ban ‘heat is- around. density and/or to build other forms of
land’ effects. infrastructure.
Green spaces They significantly reduce the speed
in cities con- as well as amount of urban water
tribute to bet- roundoff, thus contributing to better
ter water flood management in urban areas.
quality and
management
Green spaces Decreased biodiversity loss and con-
in cities lead tribution to international, European
to increased and national biodiversity targets.
biodiversity
and better
ecological
stability of ur-
ban areas.
Active mobil- Health benefits for urban dwellers
ity options (e.g. decrease in cardiovascular dis-
such as cy- eases and stroke reduction, less
cling and obesity and respiratory symptoms
walking be- incidence). Other benefits of active
come more mobility many include stress release,
attractive and anxiety and depression manage-
safer in ment, improved cognitive develop-
greener cit- ment in children, etc.
ies. Contribution to city’s environmental
and climate adaptation and mitiga-
tion objectives (e.g. through im-
proved air quality, decreased fossil
fuels use and emissions, lower car
dependency).
Creating Next to delivering climate and envi- Repurposing of abandoned land needs
green areas ronmental benefits, green areas to be done with care to for example
such as public make cities more attractive for tour- avoid contamination with pollutants
open spaces, ists as well as for people to work, that might be present in predominantly
industrial and move to or stay in the city. This also water and soil as a result of previous
adventure creates economic benefits for the industrial or agricultural activities in the
parks, open city. area.
space galler- Increased tourism can lead to environ-
ies, walking mental and social pressures, for exam-
and cycling ple through upward pressure on rental
routes is used prices (due to holiday lets) and environ-
to repurpose mental pollution (water, waste etc.).
abandoned
land in cities
February 2023 87
and as such
becomes the
main tool to
adapt to and
manage ur-
ban shrink-
ing.
Increased Enabling and ensuring private and Semi-private spaces become prevalent
emergence of safe quality living by compensating feature in housing and other develop-
semi-public for the small internal living space to ments, hindering equality of access to
communal bring health and wellbeing benefits green spaces and benefits it delivers,
green space of green space to people who cannot resulting in urban health, wellbeing,
to accommo- afford private gardens. economic and social inequalities.
date new Tensions could also arise form resi-
types of dents’ conflicting interests potentially
housing (in- resulting in poor care and management
cluding tiny of green shared space.
houses and
micro-apart-
ments).
Inflating Higher property values, residential Attracting wealthy population and dis-
property and and commercial rents may increase placement of low-income residents
associated urban / city authority tax revenues, from an area leading to aggravated so-
rent prices in which could be used to invest in fur- cial inequalities.
green neigh- ther greening or other environmen- Green cities may become less accessi-
bourhoods tal measures. ble to young people (e.g. first-time
and cities. Wealthier citizens may generally buyers, and people who started families
have higher levels of education and need to upsize) as housing for them
(Glaeser et al., 2009) and therefore is no longer affordable.
have higher environmental aware- With young and other people with lower
ness, and be more knowledgeable incomes moving out to more affordable
and resourceful in adopting more suburbia or rural hinterlands, this could
sustainable consumption practices. lead to urban sprawl and increased car
dependency (e.g. teleworking is often
not an option for people on lower in-
comes).
City centres populated by mostly
wealthy but also elderly citizens, may
be disproportionally vulnerable to cli-
mate, environmental and other chal-
lenges.
Wealthy citizens are also likely to have
larger carbon and environmental foot-
prints due to their consumption habits /
lifestyles.
Public green Health and welling benefits and en-
spaces in cit- couragement and support of social
ies are fairly connections and creating a sense of
distributed community between increasingly
and inclu- vulnerable and culturally diverse ur-
sively de- ban population.
signed
Increase in all Improved health and wellbeing, in- If not adequately planned and managed
types of ur- creased sense of connectedness with urban farming can increase risks of in-
ban agricul- nature, economic opportunities, so- vasive species spread, water contami-
ture including cial cohesion and equality (particu- nation and pesticides pollution, odour
private gar- larly in relation to community farm- and noise pollution potentially causing
dens, urban / ing and gardening), food provision, environmental and economic harm as
city farms, al- and education and therefore in- well as risks to human health.
lotments, and creased resilience of urban commu- Engagement of low-income citizens in
community nities and dwellers (Kirby et al., community farming can be challenging
farms and 2021). (e.g. people do not have time to engage
February 2023 88
gardens. as they work long hours, are less moti-

vated, lack resource including money,
tools and knowledge, land). Therefore,
particularly in deprived areas these ini-
tiatives need to be supported and
guided by city councils, to create bene-
fits and avoid unintended negative im-
plications of farming and gardening ac-
tivities. Cities however often lack re-
source themselves to initiate and lead
community (farming) initiatives.
While greening has been a key element of European urban fabric for a long time,
Timefram its importance is increasing due to the urgency of achieving urban environmental
e of sustainability transitions.
emer- As such, this issue is already seen and considered short-term. However, achieving
gence changes in urban areas, particularly the creation of green spaces and changes to
the urban fabric will require medium- to long-term action.
There is recognition about the numerous social, economic, health and environ-
mental benefits of green spaces in cities beyond the academic community. Urban
greening initiatives have been a part of EU’s and international political discourse
and environmental sustainability ambitions for decades (e.g. Agenda 21, UN Sus-
tainable Development Objectives, Urban Agenda) and they continue to grow
stronger.
However, although European cities are making efforts towards environmental sus-
tainability transitions, putting ambitions into practice remains a challenge (Euro-
pean Environment Agency, 2021; European Environment Agency, forthcoming).
Uncer- Preoccupied with other pressing issues (e.g. housing, transport, energy, poverty)
tainties cities often lack resources and capacity (e.g. finance, knowledge, data and infor-
mation) to instigate and support (including adequately design, build, and main-
tain) development of public green spaces and green community initiatives (e.g.
community gardening and farming) (European Environment Agency, 2021).
Therefore, while clear drivers for increased urban greening exist it is uncertain
whether European cities will be able to respond to these drivers and create
greener urban areas that can enable thriving socially-just communities in cities.
Furthermore, all cities are unique and while greening is generally considered as a
welcome intervention to address urban environmental and social challenges, it
might not be a suitable approach for all.
Addi- There is a need for a better understanding of the connections between demogra-
tional re- phy and urban greening. For example, while there is an increasing body of litera-
search or ture on environmental, social and health benefits of green infrastructure, research
evidence focused on specific age groups (e.g. children, teenagers, young adults, elderly),
that may gender, income levels or ethnicity is sparse.
be As discussed in Issue 4, the demographic makeup of each city is influenced by
needed numerous factors (e.g. ageing, migration, fertility rates, economy) and it is diffi-
cult to foresee clearly how it may develop in the future. In terms of spatial distri-
bution urban demography (e.g. structure of neighbourhoods in terms of religion,
age structures, ethnicity) seems to be fairly poorly explored and understood, with
cities often lacking adequate data. Such information is crucial to understand peo-
ple’s behaviour and plan and design inclusive green cities, which will meet citizens’
needs.
There is a need for knowledge sharing between cities and national / regional gov-
ernments on good urban greening practices. However, there are no ‘one size fits
all’ solutions. Cities are unique in terms of their demographic, social, economic,
environmental and geographic features, therefore, these need to be considered
in urban planning and design.
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February 2023 89
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February 2023 90
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February 2023 91
Issue 6: As Europe’s population ages, will consumption patterns change

and what will this mean for the environment?
Decreasing fertility rates and increasing life expectancy means, while the
overall population in Europe is expected to fall, the number of older people
(65+ years) will increase over next three decades (Eurostat, 2020). Such
projections are leading to a growing awareness of and need to understand
the sustainability challenge posed by the ageing population, and it is ex-
pected that this demographic change will have an ongoing impact on con-
sumption patterns, carbon emissions, and sustainable development paths
(Jarzebski et al., 2021). While the relationship between changes in overall
population size and the environment has been explored in detail (Götmark
et al., 2018; Weber and Sciubba, 2018), the association between specific
demographic changes such as ageing and the environment is less well stud-
ied.
Consumption is defined as the use of goods and services by an individual or
household. Ageing at individual and societal levels may influence consump-
tion in a variety of ways. For example, general deterioration in health and
reduction in mobility in older people will have implications for healthcare de-
mand and travel preferences (Eurostat, 2020; European Commission, 2021).
Retirement from work can also influence domestic energy consumption as
people spend a higher proportion of their day at home, although this could
be offset by the economic and energy consumption effects of an overall re-
duction in the number of working age people (Zheng et al., 2022). The em-
ployment sector has also seen a shift towards more flexible, home-based
working, and smart working patterns, accelerated by the emergence of
Emerging is- COVID-19 and associated lockdowns, which may make it easier for people
sue descrip- work for longer and retire at a later age or retire in stages (Smit et al., 2020).
tion Older people may also exhibit different consumption preferences and behav-
iours than younger cohorts. For example, in the purchase of durable goods
such as clothing and electronics, where older people currently consume less
than younger cohorts (Vogels, 2019) as they currently require easy access
to retail (Proietti, et al., 2022) and do not engage as readily in certain con-
sumer behaviours such as online shopping (Eurostat, 2022), although this
may change over time as more computer-literate generations age and reach
retirement. Age driven patterns are also observed within the consumption of
leisure activities. Declines in both physical and social leisure activities have
been recorded with ageing, while participation in less physically demanding
activities (e.g., walking, reading books, and watching TV) often continues
(Finkel, Andel and Pedersen, 2018). The evolving consumption patterns and
behaviours due to population ageing across Europe will therefore have impli-
cations for the environment in the terms of, for example, energy demand,
carbon emissions, water usage, resource use and associated demand for raw
materials (Yang et al., 2021).
While a wide range of activities can be classified under consumption, this
issue considers in particular the influence of ageing on consumption in rela-
tion to four main categories (heating and energy, healthcare, food,
transport), these being aspects where ageing appears to have a clear influ-
ence on consumption. The issue explores historic and current trends in age-
ing and consumption and the traditional drivers of these patterns. It then
reflects on potential future consumption patterns in an ageing society con-
sidering drivers of consumption change such as the use of technology, evolv-
ing attitudes, and support for active and healthy ageing.
Consumption characteristics of an ageing population
As populations age, a higher proportion of people are expected to be retired
Key drivers: from work (i.e., above working age). There is evidence that household con-
what is driv- sumption generally falls with retirement (i.e. in retired households), with a
ing the emer- recent study in Italy analysing data from the survey on national Household
gence of this Income and Wealth finding that total consumption (food consumption, ex-
issue? penses for housing, health, insurance, and spending on durable goods)
showed a clear drop at the point of retirement, and that this was accompa-
nied by beliefs that the amount of money needed ‘to live comfortably but not
in luxury’ also decreased at retirement (Celidoni and Weber, 2020). Several
February 2023 92
studies have found that consumption across many sectors (e.g., leisure,
transport, and food) is inversely associated with retirement status, i.e., re-
tired people consume less in these sectors. The reasons for these changes
are often not explored in depth, however with one reason provided is that
many people possess inadequate savings at the point of retirement and the
economic shock of retirement drives this general consumption decline at the
point of retirement (Beblo and Schreiber, 2022; Morato et al., 2021). This
reduction in consumption is reflected across EU Member States, where
households in which reference person was retired usually had a lower level
of consumption expenditure than the average for all households (Eurostat,
2020). Key factors explaining changing consumption patterns at retirement
include people having lower purchasing power compared to younger adults,
with wealth found to be the primary driver of household consumption over
the course of retirement (Chen and Munnell, 2021). Adverse health (see be-
low) can also lead people to reduce their consumption.
However, it appears there is ambivalence in the effects of ageing on con-
sumption as other studies have found that the opposite may hold true: an
ageing society, in which wealth is concentrated and individuals have more
free time, may be associated with greater levels of consumption and a higher
per capita greenhouse gas (GHG) footprint. In a study examining household
expenditure by age group for OECD countries from 2005 to 2015, the eldest
age group (60+) had higher spending than younger groups in almost all cat-
egories, with differences particularly notable for carbon-intensive products
such as household energy (Zheng et al., 2022). Such increases in household
energy consumption is likely due to older people’s need or requirement for
comfort (e.g., higher indoor temperature during wintertime and more air-
conditioning during summertime) combined with the fact that older people
may typically spend a larger proportion of the day at home (Pais-Magalhães
et al., 2022).
Reduced mobility and other health concerns linked to ageing can impact
travel preferences. Across Europe, older people are less likely to take long
distance holidays, often citing health concerns as a reason (Eurostat, 2021).
There is also evidence to suggest that seniors are more likely to travel using
public transport over private vehicles (Fatima et al., 2021), however this
preference is not universal and use of public transport by older people may
in fact lag behind younger cohorts due to technology adoption. For example,
they are less likely to use computers or smart phones to facilitate more fre-
quent and easier use of public transport, for example by checking travel in-
formation or buying tickets online (Lin and Cui, 2021). The potential for gen-
erational change in this aspect (as current generations used to using smart
devices ages) is discussed in the next section on future developments.
When it comes to food consumption, the changes in physiological conditions
caused by ageing means that, in general, older age leads to lower food con-
sumption (Spence and Youssef, 2021). There is nevertheless competing ev-
idence regarding diet preferences in older age. Research across several Eu-
ropean countries has shown there may be a correlation between older age
and an unhealthier diet, including consumption of more meat and dairy prod-
ucts (Celidoni et al., 2020; Patriota and Marques-Vidal, 2021; Zheng et al.,
2022). However, a European wide study into ageing also indicated that older
people on average have a higher tendency to eat fresh fruit and vegetables
(Eurostat, 2020).
Structure of older societies
The structure of older societies is also a driver of consumption patterns
across several goods and service areas. Older people are more likely to live
alone in houses which are often older, larger, and/or have low energy effi-
ciency, thus some research has found that seniors consume more energy,
gas, and electricity per person than younger cohorts and families (Estiri and
Zagheni, 2019; Zheng et al., 2022). Additionally, Europeans approaching the
age of retirement have demonstrated a higher propensity to move from ur-
ban to rural areas (Goujon et al., 2021). Moving out of urban areas can in-
crease consumption of energy and water, plus have impacts on waste and
recycling practices (Pauleit et al,. 2021). More elderly people living in rural
February 2023 93
areas will also impact upon travel consumption and transport patterns; cur-
rent deficiencies in public transport systems in certain areas of Europe mean
that car dependence among seniors is very high (Camporeale et al., 2019).
Health and healthcare for the elderly
As a person ages, their general health deteriorates and they are more likely
to suffer from physical and sensory functional limitations (e.g., in terms of
vision, hearing, mobility, communication, and memory). This is likely to im-
pact consumption at both individual and population levels. While adverse
health in older age can impact upon consumption patterns regarding house-
hold energy, travel, and food (see above), it will primarily affect the need for
healthcare and non-medical care as older people need support for activities
in their daily lives. The relationship between the ageing for an individual and
their use of healthcare within Europe is well documented by age-related ex-
penditure profiles (European Commission, 2021). Poor health, and with it
demand for healthcare, may not just be limited to the ageing process itself,
but can be linked to some of the consumption patterns displayed by older
people. For example, concerning food consumption and promotion of un-
healthy diets which can increase likelihood of obesity, in particular for older
men (Celidoni et al., 2020).
Environmental attitudes/engagement across generations
The potential implications of ageing for policy and governance of the green
transition are explored in Issue 1. There is some evidence of generational
differences in attitudes towards sustainability and environmental steward-
ship, with generation Z found to adopt more sustainable behaviours than
other groups (Deloitte, 2021; Hassim, 2021), while issues such as climate
change are thought to be less of a priority for elderly people (Geys et al.,
2021). This could be because environmental attitudes are also thought to be
heavily influenced by an individual’s political affinity, with older people who
are more likely to hold conservative ideologies being less supportive of pro-
environmental initiatives (Currie and Choma, 2018). Other research has sug-
gested that as elderly voters benefit less from long-term public policies, one
of them being the protection of the environment, they are more inclined to
support more short-term policies (Asatryan, 2022). These attitudes may
drive changes in consumption patterns as Europeans' sustainable consump-
tion behaviour has been shown to be associated with levels environmental
concern (Saari et al., 2021).
Conversely, ageing may involve a re-examination of life roles, with a shift
towards focussing more on others, and this can facilitate an increase in el-
derly participation in pro-environmental behaviours (Wang et al., 2021).
There is also evidence that older generations across Europe may have some
consumption behaviours that are more circular than younger people: a re-
view of the Eurobarometer 91.3 survey identified that people from older age
groups were more likely to separate waste and reduce consumption of dis-
posable items (Jakučionytė-Skodienė and Liobikienė, 2021). Data from mu-
nicipalities in Portugal has also demonstrated that the elderly recycle more
than younger cohorts (Cerqueira and Soukiazis, 2022), although it is not
clear from the source if this is a reflection of greater access to facilities and
time rather than attitudes. However, the existing literature is not unanimous
on the relationship between a person’s age and their disposition to recycle
with other studies revealing that there is some resistance by older people in
adopting new practices beneficial for a circular economy (Neves and
Marques, 2022).
Utilisation of sustainable technologies
The relationship between accelerating technological change and an ageing
population is likely to become an increasingly important factor (and is ex-
plored in Issue 2 on the environmental impact of digitalisation and automa-
tion in an ageing economy). Although data from the Survey of Health, Ageing
and Retirement (SHARE) in Europe indicates that retirement is associated
with a reduction in computer literacy and the frequency of internet utilisation
(Cavapozzi and Dal Bianco, 2022), other research suggests that the COVID-
19 pandemic and associated lockdowns have facilitated the adoption of digi-
tal technologies by older people (Tabassum, 2020). The utilisation of new
technology is increasingly important for older people to enhance their quality
February 2023 94
of life (e.g., to support healthy ageing) which will have knock-on effects on
their consumption of different goods and services and impact on the envi-
ronment (See Issue 2). However, for this to happen it is important to ensure
the elderly have access to high-speed, low-cost internet in order to promote
digital inclusion for older adults (Akinola, 2021).
Older people tend to live in older houses with older, less energy efficient
household equipment (washing machines, fridges etc). Therefore, smart en-
ergy monitors and home automation technologies will become important in
enabling elderly people, who spend long periods of time at home, to reduce
their energy consumption. However, those researching these technologies
believe that they currently possess several usability issues which act as a
barrier to their use by older people (Walker et al., 2017; Brown and Markus-
son, 2019). Another key sector where technology may enhance livelihoods
of older people is that of transport and mobility. Current evidence suggests
that older adults are willing to adopt self-driving vehicles as a mode of trans-
portation (Rahman et al., 2020). Whilst these technologies may have poten-
tial transformative impacts on mobility of older people, there is limited cur-
rent research into the extent to which new technology as a whole has been
utilised by older age groups (e.g., the number of people using products) and
scalability to benefit a larger proportion of an ageing population (Morato et
al., 2021).
Europe’s population is ageing right now, and the number of people 65+ in
the EU is projected to rise steadily, peaking at 129.8 million in 2050; an
estimated 29.4% of the total population (Eurostat, 2020). As explored in the
drivers’ section above, older people have different consumption patterns, in
part inherent (due to the realities of older age) but also driven by values and
behaviours which differ between young and old. This means in future as pop-
ulations age, consumption of different goods and services will change, and
this will impact upon the health of both people and the environment.
Population health and healthcare consumption
One area that is likely to see a significant change in consumption is that of
healthcare. A higher proportion of older people in society is expected to in-
crease demand for both short and long-term healthcare services. A recent
study into ageing in Europe included a ‘demographic scenario’ which mod-
elled the pure effect of an ageing population on health care spending assum-
ing that the morbidity rates remain constant. This scenario projects that
healthcare expenditures will grow annually by 1.2 percentage points of GDP
(European Commission, 2021). The demand for health care may increase
further if past rates of increase in life expectancy are realised over the com-
ing decades but where this is not complemented with ‘healthy ageing’ (see
How might below) i.e., increased longevity, without an improvement in health status,
the issue de- leads to increased demand for healthcare services over a longer period.
velop in fu- Healthcare consumption would also expand if population ageing were accom-
ture? panied by population growth, either through migration or a rise in fertility
rates as healthcare consumption is also high at very young ages and during
maternity years for women. However current demographic projections for
the EU are that both overall population and fertility rates will fall in coming
decades (European Commission, 2020).
An increase in healthcare consumption as a result of an ageing population is
anticipated to lead to new long-term environmental challenges (Yang et al.,
2022). Currently, it is estimated that the health sector is responsible for 5%
of European greenhouse gas emissions (EASCAC, 2021), but this seems
likely to increase due to an increased demand for healthcare services. There
are several other environmental impacts associated with healthcare that
could manifest as demand increases across Europe. The construction of med-
ical facilities, requiring energy and resource / materials and potentially re-
ducing green space in urban areas population (MacNeill et al., 2021). Con-
taminants such as pharmaceutically active compounds, personal care prod-
ucts, and endocrine-disrupting substances can be discharged into aquatic
systems through hospital wastewater, impacting environmental health (Khan
et al., 2021). Additionally, a large proportion of medical products (e.g.,
dressings, needles, and pharmaceuticals) are not safe for regular waste man-
agement (re-use, recycling), so there is a lack of opportunity for circular
February 2023 95
waste disposal or re-use of material resources.

However, changing attitudes towards healthy ageing28 has the potential to
alleviate some of the increase in demand for healthcare services. This decade
marks the United Nations (UN) Decade of Healthy Ageing 2021−2030, which
brings together governments, civil society, international agencies, profes-
sionals, academia, the media, and the private sector to collaborate in im-
proving the lives of older people and their communities. The European Inno-
vation Partnership on Active and Healthy Ageing (EIP-AHA) was launched in
2011 by European Commission to promote innovation in ageing research that
addresses the current and future needs of older people, increasing recogni-
tion of how a range of factors (e.g., physical activity, diet, self-awareness,
outlook/attitude, life-long learning, faith, social support, financial security,
community engagement) can contribute to healthy ageing (Abud et al.,
2022). Evidence suggests there are currently few coordinated preventive
health and social health initiatives in European countries (Rudnicka et al.,
2020), however if healthy ageing is realised across Europe then this has the
potential to slow down the increase in demand for healthcare services. In EU
projections, healthcare expenditure under a ‘healthy ageing scenario’ was
significantly lower than under the ‘demographic scenario’ mentioned previ-
ously (European Commission, 2021).
Long-term care need and expenditure is also bound to increase through pop-
ulation ageing. This service may increase the need for transport (for carers)
and additional lodging.
Overall consumption and changing attitudes
Despite projected consumption increases in certain areas (e.g., healthcare
demand and potentially domestic energy consumption) the general consen-
sus is that relationship between consumption levels and age across nearly all
national contexts is an inverted U-shape, with population cohorts at middle
age having the highest consumption rates (EEA, 2020). Therefore, assuming
this pattern holds, population ageing could be considered to lead to an overall
reduction in environmental footprints through reductions in resource con-
sumption, pollution, and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (Pruim, 2021;
Yang et al., 2021). There are two key reasons for this. Firstly, in terms of
consumption, older adults have lower purchasing power for services and
higher-end products compared to younger adults. Additionally, a decline in
the proportion of the working-age population may dampen economic activity
in a country or region thus reducing carbon emissions. It is predicted that in
Europe, these assumptions will hold true. One study investigating the effect
of population ageing on the GHG footprint of EU countries in 2050 under
various demographic scenarios estimated that population ageing by itself
could lead to a net positive contribution of about 4 % reduction in greenhouse
gas emissions levels in all scenarios (EEA, 2020).
It is likely that evolving attitudes towards sustainable consumption and en-
vironmental stewardship will carry through cohorts into older age, meaning
current characteristics of older generations and the environment may not
hold as younger generations age. The current generational difference in at-
titudes towards sustainable consumption is unclear, with older people seem-
ingly less concerned with issues such as climate change but more likely to
engage with circular behaviours such as recycling that are crucial to reduce
pressure on the environment and to improve the security of supply of primary
raw materials.
Attitudes towards sustainability are thought to be related to lower knowledge
levels (or lower initial belief levels on topics such as climate change) rather
than an unwillingness to change attitudes (Milfont et al., 2021), in the longer
term, the ageing of younger generations (e.g., Millennials29, Gen Z30) will
likely be accompanied by more sustainable consumption behaviours due to
high initial exposure to sustainability issues (it is worth noting that the oldest
28 The World Health Organisation defines healthy ageing as the process of developing and main-
taining the functional ability that enables wellbeing in older age.
29 Generally referring to people born 1981 - 1996
30 Generally referring to people born 1997 - 2012
February 2023 96
Millennials – born in the early 1980s – will reach retirement age in the
2040s). Recent research has also suggested that at the national level, living
in a country with a greater share of older persons encourages individuals to
behave sustainably (Wang et al., 2021). These are positive indicators which
suggest that negative environmental impacts associated with consumption
and ageing may not hold true in the future, particularly if accompanied by a
growth in the uptake of new technology and lifestyle options by older people
(e.g., moving to or investing in more energy efficient houses or switching to
alternative, especially active, modes of transport).
In response to concerns over ageing populations, policy makers in many Eu-
ropean countries have implemented reforms aimed at delaying retirement
and extending working lives, with analysis of SHARE data in Europe indicating
that planned retirement ages are due to increase in the future (Hess et al.,
2021). Retirement is strongly linked to consumption, so future shifts to later
retirement will balance out some of the inherent consumption patterns ex-
hibited by an ageing population due to people having more disposable in-
come, plus the reduced likelihood of economic stagnation.
Potential Opportunities Risks
implica-
tions
for the envi-
ronment /
human
health
Ageing and Increased use of renewable energy Poor health can lead to increased do-
poor health for heating and cooling homes of the mestic energy use as people spend
leading to in- elderly in Europe. more time at home. If residential en-
creased do- This transition could be achieved for ergy use continues to remain a crucial
mestic en- example by supporting local / re- driver of CO2 emissions, then the trend
ergy use gional energy cooperatives while ac- may become self-reinforcing: warmer
counting for the needs of an ageing temperatures increasing energy de-
population (Pais-Magalhães et al., mand at older ages to cool household
2022). environments (especially in southern
Europe).
Changing Lower food consumption per person Some studies have found older people
patterns of with age may impact the amount of may consume more meat and dairy.
food con- land needed to feed Europe’s ageing These food products have high ecologi-
sumption population. This can have positive cal footprints and require large amounts
impacts for land use change, GHG of land, water, and energy for their pro-
emissions, and soil and water pollu- duction.
tion.
Healthy diets sourced from sustaina-
ble food production could reduce en-
vironmental impacts and contribute
to healthy ageing.
Changes in Advocating accessible public trans- In the future autonomous vehicles could
travel by the portation and active travel as popu- be used at the expense of private and
elderly lations age in Europe can have dual public transport. This would raise mo-
positive impacts by both increasing bility in an ageing population, particu-
physical activity and general health larly in rural areas, but in turn may in-
of the elderly while also reducing air crease demand for personal transport
pollution (Mavrodaris et al., 2021). and hence increase fuel consumption
and congestion.
Burden of Reduce emissions from the supply of Environmental pressures associated
health con- health services, optimising the effi- with increasing provision of healthcare
sumption ciency and environmental perfor- i.e., energy usage, land-use for
due to popu- mance of care delivery. healthcare facilities, non-circular use of
lation aging Digital technologies, such as the provisions, wastewater contaminants,
emergence of robotic assistants in and air pollution. Additionally, the in-
care homes, may help reduce the creased use of new technologies will
burden of healthcare for the working likely have potentially significant impli-
February 2023 97
population while automation of pro- cations in terms of material use and en-
cesses can improve energy effi- ergy demand.
ciency. Ability of governments to be able to
keep pace with health costs and risks
for the economy and puts pressure on
governmental environment expendi-
tures (see Issue 10 which explores the
fiscal implications of ageing).
Relocation of Smart mobility (e.g., electric bicy- If transport networks are not efficient it
more people cles, autonomous vehicles, and will become increasingly difficult to pro-
from larger ridesharing services) can address vide care to the growing number of el-
cities to pro- some of the shortcomings in the pro- derly people in Europe living in rural ar-
vincial vision of traditional public transport eas.
towns/rural for elderly people and reduce the
areas need for personal vehicles. This can
help alleviate several disadvantages
of rural living for older people includ-
ing access to different amenities
while also reducing GHG emissions.
Ageing will Older people will be both directly and
create con- indirectly disproportionately affected by
straints for disturbances in climate and ecosys-
meeting tems. This creates its own problems for
SDG13 (Cli- health and care services if more of the
mate action) population will face severe conse-
and particu- quences from rising temperatures and
larly target extreme events.
13.1 (resili-
ence and
adaptive ca-
pacity to cli-
mate-related
hazards and
natural dis-
asters)
Utilisation of Promoting initiatives that boost older Older adults can have reduced cognitive
sustaina- people’s digital inclusion and com- capabilities affecting memory and infor-
ble/alterna- puter literacy as they age e.g., finan- mation processing speed and as a re-
tive technol- cial incentives to buy new technolo- sult, they may struggle to use technol-
ogies gies ogies such as smart thermostats.
Additional risks need to be considered if
older people more regularly utilise new
technologies. These include the use of
personal data and privacy concerns,
plus the possibility that their behaviour
may be manipulated by malicious actors
or artificial intelligence programs (Euro-
pean Commission, 2021).
Reduced pro- Lower workforce participation may Financial pressures from retirement
portion of the also have indirect impacts through conflicts with the utilisation of more
population in reducing long-term CO2 emissions sustainable products and systems (e.g.,
employment due to a slowdown or even reverse in in housing) that require high invest-
economic growth. ment installing and maintaining tech-
nologies.
Reduced proportion of people in work
could generate staffing problems across
sectors such as healthcare where an
ageing population will lead to increased
demand for services.
Discrimina- Investments in interventions that Ageism can have an adverse effect on
tory atti- have already been found to be effec- the health of older adults (Officer et al.,
tive for reducing ageism 2020).
February 2023 98
tudes to-
wards certain
age groups
This is a long-term issue, but which is already emerging with ageing being a
current trend in the EU population. The number of older people in the Euro-
Timeframe of pean Union (EU) is projected to rise steadily, peaking at 129.8 million inhab-
emergence itants in 2050 (Eurostat, 2020). Additionally, there is a territorial dimension
of ageing with within Europe as older adults report a higher propensity to
move from urban to rural areas resulting in potential acceleration the ageing
process in rural regions (Goujon et al., 2021). Therefore, we should expect
to observe changes in consumption patterns over the next three decades.
The implications of ageing for sustainability have received limited attention
in policy and practice. For example, in the UN’s New Urban Agenda, the chal-
lenges posed by ageing urban populations are mentioned in only one sen-
tence. While there is growing awareness of and need to understand the sus-
tainability challenge posed by ageing populations, there has been little fore-
sight research to date assessing how consumption patterns may change as
Europe’s population changes (EEA, 2020). There is also uncertainty regard-
ing how behaviours will change as cohorts age, particularly current younger
generations who hold different beliefs towards sustainability and environ-
mental protection than their older counterparts.
The uncertain pathway and uses of new technologies, including by older peo-
Uncertainties ple, also make it very difficult to predict how consumption patterns may
evolve, particularly in the longer term.
The current literature examining ageing populations and relationships with
consumption is also somewhat inconclusive and contradictory in many areas.
For example, there is no consensus on the relationship between ageing and
domestic energy consumption or transport preferences, with outcomes var-
ying according to the level of development in the sample nations. Research
into consumption by older age groups in OECD nations demonstrated signif-
icant heterogeneity in consumption patterns between different countries due
to other factors (e.g., wealth, retirement age) (Zheng et al., 2022). These
uncertainties indicate that population ageing and consumption should there-
fore be considered in the broader context of the society and the economic
development of a country.
Additional re- • More foresight studies on future consumption patterns as population co-
search or evi- horts age, particularly in a European context.
dence that • Lack of consensus in the literature regarding older people’s attitudes
may be towards sustainable consumption indicates that there is a need for new
needed evidence on the role of ageing on the transition towards a climate-neu-
tral, resource- efficient, clean, and circular economy and how this may
evolve as younger generations age.
• Research in this sphere requires more longitudinal research into the ef-
fect of population aging at the societal level on individual pro-environ-
mental behaviour.
• There is little literature on the long-term impact of ageing trends on
carbon emissions, especially in developed countries.
• The linkage between population aging, health expenditures, renewable
energy budgets and CO2 emissions remains unexplored.
• More research into the use of sustainable technologies by elderly people
and what will the benefits for population health and the environment.
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February 2023 103

Issue 7: Will internal and international migration help or hinder the green
transition?
This issue explores whether migration31 may influence Europe’s ability to
achieve the green transition, with an explicit focus on the skill requirements
necessary for the transition to a green and low-carbon economy. Internal and
external migrants can bring opportunities for the transition in terms of skill di-
versification, collaboration and networking opportunities, and innovation (see
(Grubanov Boskovic et al., 2021; JRC, 2022)). Due to its ageing and declining
population, if current trends continue, the European labor force will be 30 million
people smaller in 2060 than it was in 2015 (Lutz et al., 2019), and this is a
further reason migrant labour will be necessary. Whilst green jobs are difficult
to define (see ‘Uncertainties’), it was estimated in 2019 that there were 4.5
million linked to the environmental goods and services sector economy in Eu-
rope (Eurostat, 2021). Looking ahead, the European Commission’s Green Jobs
foresight study indicates that delivering a green transition in the EU by 2030,
could lead to a net increase of up to 884,000 jobs (Asikainen et al., 2021). In
addition, there are estimates that between 700,000 and 1,000,000 green jobs
could be created in Europe in the next ten years if the European Green Deal is
Emerging successfully implemented (Forética, 2022). Whilst not the primary focus of this
issue de- issue, there will also be a limited discussion on the wider effects of the green
scription transition on job creation in sectors not necessarily termed green, and how the
rate of decarbonisation will influence this (see (Asikainen et al., 2021)). This is
in part related to this issue because migrant labour will inevitably play a role
also in filling these jobs.
This issue focuses on both internal and third-country migratory trends and skills
imbalances within Europe and between its regions. The importance of recent
migration policies for future trends, are discussed. Important current drivers of
migration are explored, including longer term trends concerning welfare and
labour, but also accelerating incidences of climate-related mobility, as well as
the Ukrainian humanitarian crisis and its associated uncertainties. The primary
objective is to consider how these changes might collectively impact the capac-
ity of EU countries to have the correct skill requirements to achieve the green
transition in the short, medium and long term. However, secondary sustaina-
bility related implications of migration are also explored. These include potential
changes in consumption patterns and resource use; changes in material pro-
duction; effects on the provision of services (for example sustainable housing
provision (Hunt, 2009)) as well as social issues surrounding labour market
changes.
Europe’s declining workforce and the need for migration
Europe, with low fertility rates (all EU countries have a fertility rate lower than
the replacement rate of 2.1 (Eurostat, 2022a)) and an ageing population, needs
migrants to help maintain its working age population. This compares with re-
gions like Africa, which have rapidly expanding populations. Indeed, under one
modelled scenario in a recent report for the European Commission, Africa’s pop-
ulation could reach 3.1bn people by 2060, up from approximately 1.2bn cur-
rently (Lutz et al., 2019). There is a debate concerning the extent to which a
Key driv-
declining workforce is an issue due to the potential offset from technological
ers: what
developments and increases in efficiency (SCHEER, 2022). However, it is indic-
is driving
ative that the Federal Labour Agency for Germany has stated that the country
the emer-
will need to attract at least 400,000 skilled immigrants annually to keep up with
gence of
demand due in part to its shrinking workforce, with its chairman, Detlef Scheele,
this issue?
stating that “Germany is running out of workers” (Deutsche Welle, 2021).
Migrants can fill skill gaps and employment demands for a host country. Not
only do they bring a wide breadth of skills necessary to meet the ambitions of
the green transition (see section below), but they should also be seen as poten-
tial entrepreneurs able to bring new ways of thinking and development oppor-
tunities across sectors (Nijkamp, Poot and Sahin, 2012).
Nonetheless, it should also be recognised that migrants will come with a variety
of backgrounds, with varying degrees of competencies in environmental related
31See definition of migration as used by European Commission’s Migration and Home Affairs:
https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/pages/glossary/migration_en
February 2023 104

knowledges (see (JRC, 2022)) and attitudes toward sustainability. While no

general assumption can be made, migrants from less developed countries may
have a lower awareness of environmental issues (although migrants also tend
to have reduced consumptive habits) (Ma, 2020).
As a whole the EU has a low share of migrant population (8.4%) compared to
e.g. Australia (30%), Canada (21%), and the US (15%) (IOM, 2021). None-
theless, there is significant variation within the EU: in North-Western Member
States, for example, the figure is 16%, while in Eastern EU the number of for-
eign-born individuals is much smaller (around 4%) (European Commission,
2022a). In the past 20 years, the number of non-EU immigrants and mobile EU
citizens living in EU-27 Member States has increased by about 60% (European
Commission, 2020).
The Green Economy: jobs growth and skills and competency require-
ments
The green economy has been growing in Europe and is expected to continue to
grow, with associated employment. Eurostat data indicate that the European
economy had 4.5 million employees in the environmental goods and services
sector in 2019 (Eurostat, 2021). A central facet of the European Green Deal is
that it will create new opportunities for employment creation (European Com-
mission, 2022c). The sectors most in demand are in (skilled) construction, min-
ing, (skilled) manufacturing, transport, and agriculture (ODI, 2022). The most
widespread skills and labour shortages relevant to the green transition are in
system analytics, civil engineering, software development, and skilled agricul-
ture and forestry (European Labour Authority, 2021). Workforces with higher
numbers of STEM32 graduates are likely to be most able to implement the green
transition, although a wide variety of skills are required. The JRC (JRC, 2022)
green competencies report identifies 12 competencies required for a green
economy, including skills in thinking and behaviour, but also beliefs and atti-
tudes. For example, the competencies include systems and critical thinking,
future literacy and adaptability, but also individual initiative, valuing sustaina-
bility and supporting fairness.
Skills deficiencies and regional imbalances in Europe
At least in part due to historic and ongoing internal migration, there are signif-
icant inter-regional skills imbalances in Europe, whilst demographic profiles are
also heterogenous across EU regions (Ghio, Goujon and Natale, 2022). In East-
ern Europe, in 2019, the largest perceived shortages were in the manufacturing
and construction sectors, where 39% and 42% of companies respectively re-
ported labour shortages as factors limiting growth (Weber and Dragos, 2021).
Eastern European countries, as well as some Mediterranean countries, continue
to experience a ‘brain drain’ as skilled workers move to Northern and Western
Europe. The most important EU destination countries are Germany, Spain,
France, Belgium and Austria. Major sending countries for highly skilled migrants
are Poland, Romania and Italy, but also Bulgaria and Portugal. The proportion
of high-skilled internal migrants compared to the high-skilled in the country of
origin is largest among Romanians (22%), Bulgarians (13%), Portuguese (10%)
and Polish (8%) (European Commission, 2020a).
Emigration out of Europe and a continental ‘brain drain’
In 2020, 0.96 million people emigrated from the EU to another country outside
of it (European Commission, 2021). Emigration out of Europe can contribute
toward a ‘brain drain’ for Europe as a whole, and the loss of workers with the
skills crucial for the green transition. Countries outside of Europe are increas-
ingly competing for European skills and talent. For example, in September
2021, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang announced that China will further expand
channels to attract and utilise foreign talent, improve work permit and visa sys-
tems, and create more convenient working/living conditions (China Embassy,
2021). In the past decade, the United States has also sought to enhance STEM
education, with the implementation of the ‘Educate to Innovate’ program and is
looking to increasingly attract foreign students and nurture talent, from other
countries and regions including Europe.
Member state and EU immigration policy
32 Science, technology, engineering, and mathematics
February 2023 105

Individual EU Member States are increasingly looking to attract migrants with

particular skills. In Germany, for example, there is the Fachkräfteeinwander-
ungsgesetz (“Skilled workers immigration law”) that was introduced in 2019
(BMWK, 2021). The development of rapid qualification systems helps to enable
this, as do the development of skill/talent partnerships which are being used to
train potential migrants in their country of origin with targeted skills, prior to
migration (GSP, no date a). As a whole, the EU is looking for individual Member
States to form Talent Partnerships with partner countries. Talent Partnerships
are one of the key aspects of the external dimension of the New Pact on Migra-
tion and Asylum, combining direct support for mobility schemes for work or
training with capacity building and investment in human capital, including skills
development (European Commission, 2022b). Several Member States are pi-
loting this approach. In Belgium, for example, the Pilot Project Addressing La-
bour Shortages Through Innovative Labour Migration Models (PALIM) was de-
livered between 2019 and 2021 with support from the EU International Centre
for Migration Policy Development and trained over 400 trainees in Morocco and
Tunisia to meet identified labour market needs in Flanders (GSP, no date b).
Another example is MOVE_GREEN, an initiative between Andalusia in Spain and
Northern Morocco which develops Moroccan talents in the renewable energy
sector and fosters cross-border cooperation beyond the end of the project (Eu-
ropean Union Global Diaspora Facility, 2022).
EU policy has also sought to increase the attractiveness of the EU to highly
skilled workers by adopting the ’blue card directive’ (European Commission,
2022b). These rules further harmonise the conditions of entry and residence
for highly qualified workers from non-EU countries (the blue card allows migra-
tion into the EU and for holders to be treated in the same way as nationals). In
April of this year the European Commission proposed a new package of
measures to strengthen the bloc’s approach to legal migration (European Com-
mission, 2022d). These concern new proposals around the Long-term Residents
and Single Permit Directives. These changes will further support simplifying
entry rules, and address labour shortages, and are discussed further in the fu-
ture developments section.
In 2020, the European Union unveiled its New Pact on Migration and Asylum
(European Commission, 2020b), a raft of policies including solidarity measures
to provide more flexible options for Member States on their return and ac-
ceptance policies, with tailored solidarity responses for specific scenarios. The
solidarity mechanism is part of a draft regulation and must be approved by the
EU Council and the European Parliament before entering into force.
However, it should also be recognised that there are important differences be-
tween different EU Member State’s migration policies, due to, for example, high
unemployment rates in some countries and political objectives to fill jobs inter-
nally rather than to look to abroad (see e.g.(Mendoza, 2018)).
Other drivers of migration, the Ukraine war and the COVID-19 pandemic
There may be a host of reasons why people decide to migrate. These include
labour markets and employment opportunities, desire for changes in living
standards and public service improvements, internal population squeezes, en-
vironmental conditions (explored in Issue 8 looking at environmental drivers of
migration in Europe) and natural shocks exacerbated by climate change, and
concerns with safety and security in the country or place of origin (Castelli,
2018). Regarding employment opportunities, the evidence suggests that for
the foreseeable future most migrants may not be entering the green economy.
Globally, new green jobs were equivalent to 2% of the global labour force in
2019 (ODI, 2022), although the figure for Europe may be somewhat higher.
An example of safety and security concerns is the war in Ukraine, which has
resulted in a huge refugee crisis in Europe. As of September 2022, over 7
million people had left Ukraine (the majority to neighbouring countries), but
more than 5.5 million had returned home. In the specific case of Ukraine, it
may be that the effects of migrants on the green transition is not particularly
significant (Conkling, 2022). Firstly, the majority have returned to Ukraine, and
more are expected to do so. Secondly, many are women or children – the
difficulties of looking after dependants unsupported may mean that these
women are less able to integrate into the labour market (Lloyd, 2022). Many
may also be suffering from severe trauma, and they cannot always speak the
February 2023 106

language of the country they arrive in. With that said, the country also has a
fast-growing IT sector and produces 130,000 engineering graduates annually.
Some may be bringing relevant skills and qualifications for the green transition
in EU. (Colvill, 2022).
Prior to the war in Ukraine and the COVID-19 pandemic, internal migration had
been rising in Europe over the last two decades. Mobility across borders in-
creased, by more than 50% between 2003 and 2017. The number of working-
age Europeans who live and work in another European country doubled from
2003 to 2018 (Smit et al., 2020). Whether moving within or between countries,
or from inside (internal) or outside the EU (external), most skilled migrants
move to urban areas. For example, in the Netherlands, 84% of all foreign highly
skilled workers who came to the Netherlands over the period 2000-2009 settled
in urban regions. Nonetheless, country differences, and the type of migrant
prioritised, should be taken into account. Seasonal migrants, particularly those
that work in the food and agricultural sectors and who tend to be lower skilled,
will be more likely to move to rural regions as part of what has been termed the
‘agriculture migration nexus’ (King, Lulle and Melossi, 2021).
However, the pandemic halted established migration patterns. In 2020, Europe
saw a great reverse migration, as those who had sought work abroad returned
home. For example, an estimated 1.3m Romanians returned home (The Econ-
omist, 2021). It remains unclear the extent to which this effect will continue;
this is explored in the future development section below.
Environmental conditions and change, including climate change, may also be-
come an increasing driver of internal and international migration in future. En-
vironmental drivers of migration are discussed in Issue 8.
Migration can increase population pressure but present both challenges
and opportunities regarding consumption and housing
As people move from less developed to more developed regions, their consump-
tion habits will usually increase, causing an absolute increase in global emissions
and the use of resources. Nonetheless, immigrants from less developed coun-
tries tend to use less energy, drive less, and generate less waste than their
native counterparts in developed regions, such as Europe (Ma, 2020). Migrants
that move from richer to poorer countries consume more energy intensive goods
than the population of the recipient country (Winkler and Mattarita-Cascante,
2020). Migration is also a key driver of international aviation growth with fre-
quent inter-country passenger journeys to visit friends and relatives, with con-
sequences GHG emissions as well as potential epidemic outbreaks. Whilst mi-
gration is expected to be increasingly needed to keep populations in European
countries from declining (see also future development section below), migrants
tend to move to urban areas, increasing pressures in these areas such as on
housing supply, waste generation and the supply of adequate public services.
Language and cultural barriers can also sometimes mean that some migrant
populations may find difficulty in engaging in public services like recycling (Perry
and Williams, 2007). However, it is recognised this is temporary not structural,
and can be ameliorated through interventions (SCHEER, 2022). Migrants may
also revitalise deprived neighbourhoods by living in poor vacant housing (Car-
mon, 1998).
Green economy and job growth forecasts
The Green Deal and transition to a green economy implies the transformation
of entire value chains in sectors such as energy and transport, and construction
and renovation, with a stated aim of creating sustainable, local and well-paid
jobs across Europe. For example, the target to upgrade 35 million buildings
How might with improved sustainability standards by 2030 is expected to create 160,000
the issue additional green jobs in the construction sector. The new Social Climate Fund
develop in will provide EUR 72.2 billion over 7 years in funding for renovation of buildings,
future? access to zero and low emission mobility, or even income support (European
Commission, 2022c).
The total forecasted gross job growth by 2030 in the EU for science and engi-
neering professionals is estimated at 2.6 million jobs (Smit et al., 2020), and
400,000 of these will be needed specifically for the green economy (Huckstep,
Kenny and Dempster, 2022). Two specific areas that will be essential in the
green transition will be soft skills and the STEM areas of Science, Technology,
February 2023 107

Engineering and Mathematics. Jobs that will be in particularly high demand will
include sustainability managers, ecologists, wind energy experts, and sustaina-
ble transport professionals. Specific niche industries are also accelerating rap-
idly – demand for experts in sustainable fashion, for example, in the last five
years has grown by 90% (European Training Foundation, 2022).
In addition, the green transition can bring employment benefits across a variety
of work sectors not classified as green jobs. Whilst not the primary focus of this
issue, this will in turn influence labour mobility patterns across Europe to meet
these job demands. Policies delivering a 55 % reduction in greenhouse gas
emissions in the EU by 2030 has been forecasted to result in job creation in
sectors such as electric goods (up to 3.8 %), energy-intensive transforming
sectors (up to 2.4 %) and equipment goods (up to 2.4 %) (Asikainen et al.,
2021). However, there could be aggregate job losses if the EU fails to decar-
bonise quickly enough. Overall, the European Commission estimates that at the
aggregate level, climate goals are not likely to have “very significant effects on
employment”, but the fabric of the economy and the employment sector will
certainly change (Piccard and Šefčovič, 2021). Certain sectors will lose out of
course - the coal industry most notably (Piccard and Šefčovič, 2021) – but also
the automotive industry as combustion engines will be banned in the EU as of
2035 (Euractiv, 2022).
Deficit in skilled workers necessary to implement the green transition
In the context of anticipated skills needs for (and job creation through) the
green transition, Europe’s ageing and falling population will mean that the EU
(even accounting for the impacts of automation) could be short of 44 million
workers overall by 2050 without an increase in migration (Kenny and Yang,
2021). This includes both less skilled workers, and the more skilled workers
who will be particularly important to the green transition. Nonetheless, from
2014 onwards, there has been a progressive increase in the proportion of STEM
graduates within the European Union (Eurostat, 2022b), although a relative lack
of representation of women in STEM related careers and studies is likely to re-
main a persistent issue (Stolton, 2020). This will need to be tackled going for-
ward. Despite these incremental gains, there remains a deficit in the number
of students studying STEM subjects compared to other nations in the world, and
the US and China in particular (Stolton, 2020).
Increasing global competition for skilled migrants
The issue of not producing enough STEM graduates is exacerbated by forecasts
of an increasingly competitive market for such graduates globally. By 2030, the
EU may no longer be among the most attractive destinations particularly for
highly skilled migrants coming from the EU neighbourhood, Africa and South-
east Asia, because other countries such as Singapore and China could offer bet-
ter economic and social prospects to foreign workers and their families (JRC,
2018). For less skilled workers EU’s geographical proximity to their country of
origin might still be an attractive factor when deciding to seek work in EU.
Seeking to address this, on 27 April 2022, the European Commission proposed
a set of ‘Skills and Talent’ proposals under the Pact on Migration and Asylum to
address the current demographic and migration challenges in the EU and pre-
pare for future needs. The Commission proposes to revise the Long-term Res-
idents and Single Permit Directives, and aim to make procedures more efficient
and quicker, promote integration and prevent labour exploitation (European
Commission, 2022e). This will further enable desirable migration and increase
retention of migrants, and will be a new layer of policy on top of the Blue Card
Directive. Meanwhile National ‘skills-based immigration’ policies are also ex-
pected to become more common and intensive (Aydemir, 2020), whilst skill and
talent partnerships (as part of the Talent Partnerships Initiative) are becoming
more prevalent and are extending to new countries, as discussed in the drivers
section. Yet, Europe is expected to face increasing competition globally for
skilled workers in coming decades. The skills-based immigration policies and
incentives being used by countries outside of Europe to attract European skills
and talent (and those from elsewhere), is also likely to increase within the con-
text of a global market that is becoming increasingly competitive and intercon-
nected. In countries like China, this could accelerate as ‘new industries’ spring
up, for which there are no readily available national or local talent pools for
these sectors (Bradley and Chan, 2022). Indeed, as much of the rest of the
February 2023 108

world develops, these countries may be looking increasingly to Europe, which

has the established industries and workers with the right educations to facilitate
their transitions. This will be especially true for the Green Transition: the green
skills shortage is global - no country, for example, has sufficient wind turbine
engineers, heat pump installers or electric vehicle mechanics (Huckstep, Kenny
and Dempster, 2022).
The effect of remote working on international and internal migration
The digital transition and the associated improved possibilities for remote work-
ing may mean migration will be less necessary to fill skill gaps than previously
thought (Smit et al., 2020). In regard to international migration, workers in
third countries employed remotely could potentially be offered lower wages, due
to lower living costs in their resident country (Smit et al., 2020), although this
may raise concerns about equality and exploitation, and could also undermine
wages in the EU with knock-on effects for the wider economy. However, as is
discussed further in the uncertainties section, remote working is not applicable
for a number of jobs relevant to the green transition, e.g. in construction and
skilled-agriculture. Digitalisation and the transition to remote working could
also mean that migration within a country for work, particularly rural-urban mi-
gration, may be less necessary as there is no need commute into an office or
other place of work.
What might the future of internal EU migration and regional skill bal-
ances look like?
Overall, internal EU migration flows may be slowing due to knowledge equalisa-
tion, and also decreased wage gaps between EU regions. Since 2014, Cyprus
has experienced a 50% increase in ‘knowledge-intensive enterprises’ per capita,
while Slovakia, Hungary, Poland, Latvia, Portugal and Bulgaria have experienced
an increase of a third or more (Sanandaji, 2021). It is also increasingly common
for Nordic and Western European companies to outsource part of their work to
knowledge centres in Eastern and Central Europe to reduce costs, a trend likely
to continue and strengthen according to some research (Sanandaji, 2021). This
will improve retention of workers in traditional migrant exporting countries. In
Eastern Europe, wage gaps with the rest of Europe are falling. In 2010 a Ro-
manian who moved to Italy could expect to earn five times more; in 2019, only
three times (IOM, 2021). These trends are expected to continue. The future
trend regarding whether migrants who returned home during the pandemic is
difficult to determine exactly as it is an ongoing development. Nonetheless,
according to a 2021 survey, 10% of Eastern European migrants who had re-
turned home after the pandemic wanted to stay, and 25% were unsure (Mencu-
tek, 2021).
Whilst inter-regional skill imbalances in Europe may ease in coming decades,
they will remain significant for many years to come. ‘Dynamic hubs’ in the north
and west of Europe will continue to attract more skilled workers (Smit et al.,
2020). These regions, which make up just 20% of the EU’s population, are
home to 83% of STEM graduates, with 40% of the population having tertiary
education. Among the highest-ranking countries for STEM graduates (as a pro-
portion of their total population) are Ireland, Finland, Germany, Denmark and
Poland. Those lagging furthest behind are Slovakia, Hungary, Latvia, Malta,
Cyprus and Luxembourg (Alvarez, 2022). Germany has been perhaps the most
successful European country in attracting more educated migrants (Lulle, Janta
and Emilsson, 2019). However, if these countries are unable to address afford-
able housing shortages, then the ability to attract skilled migrants may be re-
duced (Smit et al., 2020). The green transition will require a variety of jobs
across different skill levels, but is biased toward ‘highly skilled’ workers. Despite
the potential slowdown in migration discussed above, Romania's population
could still decline by a further 30% by 2060 (European Commission, 2020a).
The global south will be a growing source of migrant potential
Burgeoning population growth due to high fertility rates in the global south,
especially in Africa, is one important factor that can cause, or exacerbate, a host
of drivers of migration to Europe. Population growth is a key contextual factor
influencing poverty, conflict, disaster and deterioration of ecosystems. These
will co-interact with other factors including climatic instability (exacerbated by
climate change) and its negative impact on food production, disruption to global
trade (e.g. due to wars, future pandemics) and consequences for food security,
February 2023 109

local economies, and culture (SCHEER, 2022). Whilst co-interactional, analyses

can attempt to disaggregate them. In recent study for the Joint Research Cen-
tre showed that in North Africa, the duration and the frequency of heat waves
are positively associated with displacement. However, this link is less clear in
areas where the population is expanding, either due to natural increase or ur-
banisation. These results show that population growth and/or the level of ur-
banisation are the prevailing factors which influence migration in the Northern
African territories, while climate change impacts appear less important in such
demographic processes (Migali and Natale, 2021).
However, a substantial portion of international migrants from the global south
do not reach western nations, but resettle in neighbouring low-income coun-
tries; the most vulnerable generally do not have the means to journey or settle
in Europe (Castelli, 2018). This is supported by the JRC’s conclusion that mi-
gration can be an adaptation strategy to climate change only in those contexts
where people have the economic means to migrate (Migali and Natale, 2021).
Such findings highlight that some of the most significant sources outside of Eu-
rope for migration into the continent will be those countries with significant
numbers of well-educated, skilled and relatively affluent citizens. An example
could be somewhere like Nigeria, a country with a rapidly growing population
that is also emerging as a hub for innovation, with schemes to educate Nigerians
in computer literacy and the creation of regional innovation and collaboration
centres (Umar, 2022).
Need for ongoing upskilling
To meet the needs of a green transition, migrants will need to be up- or re-
skilled, along with non-migrant workers. For example, in the agriculture and
fashion sectors: transitioning to more sustainable farming practices that opti-
mise yields while controlling the use of pesticides, chemical fertilisers and water;
or manufacturing garments with increased energy efficiency, waste-water treat-
ment and green renewable technologies, will both not be possible without re- or
upskilling the significant numbers of migrant workers currently employed in
those sectors – alongside non-migrants (ODI, 2022).
Attitudes toward migrants and future trends
Attitudes toward migrants vary between and also within European countries.
Attitudes are most positive in Sweden, Denmark, Germany and Norway, and
least positive in Portugal, Czech Republic and Hungary, whilst within countries,
education, wealth and being younger are all positively correlated with favouring
migrants (Heath and Richards, 2017). Migrants who are of similar ethnicity,
more skilled and from wealthier countries tend to be favoured (Heath and Rich-
ards, 2017). The density of extant migrant populations is also an important
factor when aggregating attitudes for specific countries (Blinder and Markaki,
2018). The future trajectory of such attitudes within Europe is subject to con-
siderable uncertainty. Attitudes shift through time as they are influenced by
phases of economic growth and decline, and the degree to which migrants are
seen as competitors by workers and unemployed people, or as benefactors
(Blinder and Markaki, 2018). A recent study has shown that increased rates of
immigration do influence negative attitudes towards migrants in host countries,
but this co-interacts strongly with the nature of the cohort (Schmidt, 2021).
Therefore, it may be inferred that if larger numbers of migrants were to arrive
in Europe, this may exacerbate negative attitudes where these exist, but this
may be tempered if the migrants are seen as being skilled and filling an im-
portant role within society. Nonetheless, it may also be possible that the filling
of skill gaps could be perceived by host country populations as migrants taking
jobs.
Another emergent discourse, which could become more prevalent in future is
that of European far-right political parties focusing on an environmental politics
of ‘eco-bordering’, whereby immigration is blamed for national environmental
degradation. Historically, foreign populations are often blamed for crises. Anal-
ysis of the environmental discourse of 22 European far-right parties shows that
in the context of the existential threat of climate change and environmental
degradation, migrants could increasingly be blamed for environmental harms in
a host country (Turner and Bailey, 2021).
February 2023 110

Potential impli- Opportunities Risks

cations
for the environ-
ment / human
health
Skilled migrants, EU policies are already seeking to Even skilled migrants’ talents are
including those attract third country skilled mi- not always recognised and may
that are STEM ed- grants to the EU, and future devel- have difficulty being integrated into
ucated, are opments could include expanding their new country’s economies (EC,
needed to fill jobs skill and talent partnerships. 2022).
in the sectors If successful this could enhance Allocating a higher share of immi-
most in need for ‘green competencies’ in the EU, e.g. grant admissions based on skills
the green transi- in systems thinking, problem fram- usually comes at the expense of kin-
tion ing and futures literacy (see JRC ship- and humanitarian-based ad-
2022). missions (Aydemir, 2020)
Supporting an increase in women’s
share in STEM education and partic-
ipation in sectors such as renewable
energy or construction could in-
crease women’s participation in
growing sectors, increasing the po-
tential pool of talent for skilled mi-
grant workers (Asikainen et al.,
2021).
The EU will be Larger pools of talent arriving from The ability of dynamic hubs in Eu-
able to increas- rapidly developing regions with di- rope to attract skilled migrants will
ingly draw on verse backgrounds could assist with be hampered if they cannot address
skilled migrants inter-regional networking and inno- affordable housing crises.
from rapidly de- vation opportunities, important in
veloping regions facilitating new green tech develop-
with large popula- ment.
tions Upskilling programs can additionally
support the integration of new
workers into relevant sectors.
However, the EU The EU will find it harder to source
may be less able the skills and competencies for a
to attract skilled successful green transition, as it
foreign workers finds itself outcompeted by other re-
and skilled immi- gions like China to attract foreign
grants talent.
Skilled immigrants and foreign
workers outside of the EU now enjoy
greater degrees of mobility, and are
less discouraged by far-away desti-
nations for relocation
The EU may find Migrants may have opportunities for The emigration of EU’s skilled work-
itself on the re- up-skilling in the countries where ers could decrease the pools of tal-
ceiving end of its they move to work or study in, ent available to the EU to implement
own brain drain which they can use should they re- the green transition.
as skilled workers turn to Europe.
are attracted to
third countries.
Demand for mi- By creating incentives to attract mi- The most skilled migrants may not
gration is primar- grants to the green sector, potential be attracted to the green jobs,
ily driven by the risks can be mitigated. which may not necessarily pay as
need for eco- well as some other jobs (e.g. in fi-
nomic growth, nance)
not to realise sus-
tainability ambi-
tions
February 2023 111

Remote working The opportunity for workers to work If remote workers in third countries
abroad could rad- abroad (or in another region within are willing to work for lower wages,
ically alter the mi- the EU) without moving home and this could suppress EU salaries in
gration / employ- family, could help improve access to those sectors affected, and drive-up
ment paradigm green skills and competencies unemployment rates
and potentially Remote working also reduces Remote working may lead to exploi-
enhance talent transport emissions. tation of workers in third countries
acquisition oppor- due to lack of oversight of employ-
tunities. ment conditions such as working
hours, health and safety, leave en-
titlements etc.
For many green jobs, e.g. in skilled
agriculture, this will be unsuitable.
Increase in emissions from energy
production as remote workers in-
crease their energy use at home (for
heating, cooling, appliances) while
businesses also maintain their office
spaces and keep on their heat-
ing/cooling (to previous levels) even
though the number of people at of-
fice is significantly reduced.
There could be a Reduced wage gaps and increasing The brain drain from Eastern Europe
rebalancing of education opportunities mean it will is still significant and is expected to
skill distributions be easier for Eastern European remain so for many years. The ef-
across Europe countries to retain, and develop, the fects of the pandemic which saw
job competencies and skills required many people returning to home-
for the green transition. countries may well be a short-term
trend that reverses in coming years
(Ruin, 2021).
Increased migra- Consequences of increased GHG
tion can result in emissions through airline travel
a rise in interna-
tional aviation
An increased chance of epidemic
outbreaks and the developments of
pandemics (SCHEER, 2022)
An increase in mi- Attitudes become more positive Increasing immigration corresponds
grants may lead when these migrants are seen as with a hardening of attitudes to mi-
to negative atti- bringing skills and wealth opportu- grants in host countries.
tudes towards nities that will benefit the country. The filling of skill gaps could be per-
them in host In the context of migrants bringing ceived by host country populations
countries skills necessary for the green tran- as migrants taking jobs.
sition, this will certainly be the case.
As the environmental crises deep-
Communication related to the bene- ens, the blame apportioned to mi-
fits of migration in delivering a grants for environmental harms (a
green economy to enhance migrant- phenomenon emergent within the
host population relationships. European far-right) could worsen.
Increasing resentment leads to
worse social outcomes for migrant
populations, as well poorer integra-
tion into society (and economy).
International and Concentration of migrants in urban The tendency of migrants to con-
internal migrants areas can lead to improved net- centrate in urban areas increases
tend to move to working opportunities and innova- strain on urban services (e.g. hous-
urban areas tion potential, a pillar of the green ing and transport infrastructure)
transition. and may exacerbate environmental
pressures in cities and urban areas
(this is discussed in Issue 4 on the
demographic makeup of cities).
Innovative talent is also needed in
February 2023 112

sectors predominantly based in ru-

ral regions, like sustainable agricul-
ture and nature-based tourism
(SCHEER, 2022).
Large-scale mi- Migrants moving to richer countries Migrants moving from poorer to
gration will in- tend to consume less energy and richer countries tend to have higher
crease population waste less than natives. There are consumptions of energy and re-
pressures and opportunities for learning from dif- sources than in their origin country.
could alter estab- ferent cultures regarding e.g. re- Due to language barriers, migrants
lished consump- source efficiency. may find difficulty in engaging in
tion patterns Migrants may also revitalise de- public services like recycling. How-
prived neighbourhoods by living in ever, it is recognised this is tempo-
poor vacant housing. rary not structural.
Difficulty engaging with e.g. recy-
cling can be ameliorated through
behaviour change interventions and
attempts to spread awareness
amongst hard to reach communi-
ties, for example through working
with faith leaders.
This issue is already established, with millions of green jobs already having been
Timeframe created, and it will further evolve in the short, medium, and long- term.
of emer- The global market for skilled migrants needed for the Green Transition is already
gence competitive, and if globalisation trends and increasing reliance on skills-based
immigration policies, continue, this will accelerate.
Overall, there is a degree of uncertainty whether migration will stimulate and
speed up the green transition, by providing the skills essential to the green
transition, or whether – on the other hand – it may slow it down due to, for
example, increasing urban population pressures, and the diverse set of environ-
mental competencies that migrants may bring (SCHEER, 2022). Therefore, it
is premature to definitively determine whether migration will help or hinder the
green transition, although it is likely that it will bring more benefits than nega-
tives, because of the diverse skill requirements crucial to the transition, that
migration will help meet. The true impact of migration on the green transition
will likely be borne out in the medium to long term.
The lack of an agreed definition of green job means there is uncertainty (or at
least divergence) about the types and quantities of skills shortages that need
‘addressing’. Moreover, discourses are often skewed by politicians; construction
of a new pipeline may be defined as a green job, but these jobs will be tempo-
rary in nature (Economist, 2011) and not necessarily beneficial for the green
transition. In addition, whilst skills are important to the transition, sectors like
the energy sector tend to be capital intensive rather than labour intensive. Un-
certainties exist around the degree of future funding available for this, and how
Uncertain-
much addressing skill shortages alone will achieve. As noted, there is scope for
ties
increases in remote working to meet some skills for the green transition without
the need for migration. However, there are significant uncertainties relating to
labour law, taxation, social security, and residence status (visa and work per-
mits) that will need to adapt to, or which may even block, these opportunities.
It is also uncertain how much remote working could contribute to the jobs that
are needed – skilled agriculture, for example, would certainly require workers
be ‘on the ground’.
As discussed in the risk section above, attracting skilled workers to sectors de-
fined as crucial to the green transition like manufacturing and construction may
in practice increase environmental pressures, e.g. if skilled migrants are em-
ployed in the mass production of unsustainable housing or products. The same
is true for tech specialists and innovators, who could theoretically (for example)
drive down prices of consumer electronics hardware. Policy incentives alone to
attract workers for these sectors to a country may not achieve much (or in fact
have a negative effect) if more precise measures are not introduced to encour-
age those who enter the country to enter jobs which help preserve/protect the
environment. Uncertainties exist around the extent to which this will be possi-
ble.
February 2023 113

The future direction of the development of EU migration policy is not entirely

defined currently, since various options concerning relative measures on border
control, as well as return and asylum procedures have not yet been agreed upon
by all Member States. The 2020 New Pact on Migration and Asylum (European
Commission, 2020b) is still under negotiation, and thus the options it proposes
are subject to finalisation. Attitudes amongst Member States and their popula-
tions are also subject to flux; as an example, the war in Ukraine may have
created a spirit of unity among EU countries, who opened their borders to wel-
come the millions of fleeing refugees (Liboreiro, 2022) and such events can have
lasting impacts on perceptions and attitudes.
Additional • Greater insight into precisely what employment sectors are required for the
research or green transition, with greater specificity than e.g. manufacturing or skilled
evidence agriculture. Relatedly, the numbers required for employment. Basing these
that may on broad definitions of a ‘green job’ may not be sufficient and should be
be needed specific to independent countries, and perhaps regional, requirements.
• Greater understanding about what factors attract migrants to Europe in par-
ticular, and the root causes behind increasing numbers of migrants being
drawn to destinations outside of Europe.
• Greater understanding of both the desire for remote working abroad in both
EU countries and third countries, and a situational assessment of the needs
and changes that would be required to enable this to functionally happen.
• Understanding what controls or incentives may help to ensure that enough
migrants (skilled and un-skilled) are entering jobs that assist with the green
transition.
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February 2023 118

Issue 8: Will environmental factors have a growing influence on intra-EU mi-

gration flows within the EU?
Migration is one of the key factors behind demographic change across the
globe. According to the International Organisation for migration (IOM), migra-
tion is an umbrella-term that refers to people person who move away from
their place of usual residence, whether within a country or across an interna-
tional border, temporarily or permanently, and for a variety of reasons.
In Europe, the free movement of European citizens enables internal migration
between regions and Member States. Reasons to move from one Member State
to another vary, including e.g. moving to places that offer better study, work
or quality of life opportunities (European Commission, 2020). Quality of life is
a broad term and can relate to several aspects including the environmental
conditions in a certain area. In fact, environmental changes, such as biodiver-
sity loss and climate change, are expected to significantly influence global mi-
gration patterns in the future: in many parts of the world, environmental
changes such as floods, droughts and desertification are expected to have a
major, direct impact on people’s lives as well as on their capacity to thrive in
certain areas (European Commission, 2020). For instance, according to the
Global Report on Internal Displacement 2022, disasters triggered 276,000 in-
ternal displacements in Europe and Central Asia in 2021 with the most signifi-
cant being wildfires in the Mediterranean, storms and flooding in western and
central Europe and a volcanic eruption in Spain’s Canary Islands (Internal Dis-
placement Monitoring Centre, 2022).
In this context, migration within Europe is expected to be affected by various
issues, including environmental factors. Currently, environmentally forced in-
ternal migration is quite rare in Europe, however there is evidence to suggest
it could become more frequent in the future (European Commission, University
of the West of England, Science Communication Unit, 2015). For the time
being, Europe and North America are considered the two global regions with
the lowest level of ecological threats (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2021
and 2022). Nonetheless, according to the Internal Displacement Monitoring
Emerging Centre, in 2020, nearly 40,000 people were forcibly (though temporarily) dis-
issue de- placed within the EU because of climate disasters, with the main reason for this
scription being wildfires (European Parliament, 2021).
In addition to the environmental factors that are linked to climate change, en-
vironmental drivers such as air and noise pollution are expected to affect intra-
EU migration. Many of these issues are also exacerbated by climate change,
or people’s vulnerability to them increased (e.g. heat and air pollution) (Amer-
ican Public Health Association, no date). A study published in 2021, focusing
on Italy, concluded that air pollution can influence internal migration to less
polluted areas of a country or region (Germani et al., 2021; European Com-
mission DG Environment News Alert Service, edited by SCU, The University of
the West of England, Bristol., 2022). In particular, people with an underlying
disease such as asthma may decide to move to less polluted areas because of
their health condition (cai et al., 2017). Together with air pollution, noise pol-
lution from heavy traffic and traffic jams can also significantly affect the quality
of life and, therefore, be among the reasons for moving to another location
(Eurocities, 2021), although this may in some cases result in people moving
locally (e.g. within a city) rather than migrating to another area entirely.
Factors such as the preference of people to live in areas with healthier envi-
ronment, for example closer to green urban spaces or rural areas, could po-
tentially affect the migration flows within the EU (Issue 3 on rural settlement
patterns discusses this aspect in more detail). For example, a recent study
conducted in Poland concluded that the factors with the most significant impact
on the decision to move from the city to the countryside were those of an
environmental nature (Jończy, et al., 2021). In general, the health of people
residing closer to natural environments is considered to be better (EEA, 2010
modified in 2020; Jimenez et al., 2021).
While environmental factors might influence EU citizens to migrate to other
regions within their Member State or to other Member States, it can also en-
courage more local shifts in population, for example away from neighbourhoods
in busy urban centres or near industrial areas to nearby suburban and rural
areas.
February 2023 119

The following environmental and climate pressures have been linked to migra-
tion in Europe. These are divided into two main areas, environmental pollution
and climate issues. As noted, climate change may also influence or exacerbate
some pollution pressures.
Environmental pollution
• Air pollution. Air pollution leads to a significant burden of premature death
and disease within the EU, attributed to chronic exposure to fine particulate
matter, nitrogen dioxide as well as acute ozone exposure (EEA, 2021a). As
noted, this already appears to be a factor in migration in the EU.
• Noise pollution. Together with air pollution, noise pollution contributes to
the annual number of premature deaths and diseases in Europe. Annoy-
ance, sleep disturbance and ischaemic heart disease constitute the main
effects of noise on human health (EEA, 2020a). Noise could also influence
migration in the EU (SCHEER, 2022).
• Land degradation. According to a report published in 2020, more than
two thirds of soils in the EU are degraded as a result of unsustainable man-
agement practices in agriculture and forestry, as well as industry. This
degradation limits the ability of the soil to provide ecosystem services, such
as water storage and filtering, along with crop productivity (Ferreira et al.,
2022).
• Water pollution, particularly wastewater and diffuse pollution, can also
lead to environmental degradation and could, for example, reduce the
productivity of agricultural land as well as have impacts on human health
(SCHEER, 2022).
Climate change
In general, climate change is expected to be a growing driver for the emer-
gence of future intra-EU migration. Coastal and inland flooding risks are high-
Key drivers:
lighted below as a key consequence of climate change. Other climate-related
what is
issues, such as temperatures, are also expected to influence migration. How-
driving the
ever, climate change and its impacts have been extensively covered in litera-
emergence
ture (see for example, Burzyński et al., 2022). Some of the main climate re-
of this is-
lated changes that are likely to drive migration include:
sue?
• Sea-level rise. According to the regional fact sheet for Europe, published
in 2021 by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), ex-
treme sea level events are expected to increase in frequency and intensity,
resulting to more coastal flooding (IPCC Fact Sheets, 2021; European Com-
mission, 2022). In fact, environmental changes, such as an increase in
flooding (as well as in drought, as described further below), are considered
inevitable in certain regions across Europe, e.g. around the North Sea (Eu-
ropean Commission, University of the West of England, Science Communi-
cation Unit, 2015).
• Inland flooding. Pluvial flooding is projected to increase in all European
regions except the Mediterranean if global warming exceeds 1.5°C (IPCC
Fact Sheets, 2021). In 2021, extreme weather events, including heavy
flooding, led to more than 126,000 at least temporary displacements in
Europe (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), 2022).
• Food security. Although Europe has a relatively low prevalence of food
insecurity (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2021), several environmen-
tal factors, such as temperature, humidity, as well as extreme weather
events, can significantly harm food production (EFSA, no date). Addition-
ally, environmental factors together with the current consumption patterns
could potentially affect food security across Europe (EEA, 2020b).
Environmental inequalities
• Environmental inequality results from the unequal distribution of the

risks and benefits that stem from interactions with the environment
(Ganzleben and Kazmierczak, 2020). Evidence shows that groups of peo-
ple with lower socio-economic status are considered to suffer more often
from environmental pollution, including air pollution (Deguen and Zmirou-
Navier, 2010) and noise pollution (Verbeek, 2019). In this respect, the
February 2023 120

geographic centrality of polluting facilities within the urban space is high-

lighted (Rüttenauer, 2019).
People tend to migrate for a range of reasons, and social, economic and envi-
ronmental factors (perhaps considered together) are expected to significantly
influence future migration within the EU. Migration will in turn influence the
makeup of local and regional workforces, which in turn can affect the availabil-
ity of skills for the green transition (see issue 7).
As to the environmental factors, these are expected - in some respects - to be
especially affected by the evolution of climate change, which as a result will
strengthen as drivers in coming decades.
Regarding air pollution, the annual concentration of pollutants such as fine par-
ticulates in urban areas of EU has been gradually decreasing - a trend that has
been reinforced by COVID-19 restrictions (Eurostat, 2021). Air pollution comes
as the consequence of several activities, such as transport, industrial pro-
cesses, burning of fossil fuels, as well as agriculture (EEA, 2020c). Environ-
mental targets have been set in regard to emissions from various sectors, in-
cluding transport and industry, aiming to mitigate air pollution in Europe. Ad-
dressing air pollution requires a holistic approach, including the adoption and
implementation of respective measures at national, regional and local levels.
EU policy and legislation has already made important strides in addressing air
pollution, and further actions are planned (European Commission, 2021a), for
instance, the introduction of energy policies favouring renewable energies and
electrification of transport is expected to contribute to this effort (Tarín-Car-
rasco, 2022). However, the problem remains and there is still room for pro-
gress. In the past few years, the outbreak of COVID-19 accompanied by the
decrease in transport has also contributed to the reduction of air pollution levels
(EEA, 2020d), although there is evidence that the key driver of urban air pol-
lution (car trips) has returned to pre-pandemic levels in many cities, although
patterns of usage have changed (TomTom, 2022). Air pollution is also linked
How might to climate, as extreme weather, especially heatwaves, can significantly affect
the issue air quality (Centre for Science Education, 2020).
develop in
As to the number of people exposed to noise pollution, this is unlikely to de-
future?
crease in the short term, due to the growth of many urban areas and increased
demand for mobility (EEA, 2020e). However, it is expected that, with EU policy
and legislation on noise and on urban sustainability, noise pollution deriving
from road traffic as well as aviation sector could potentially start decreasing,
with technological improvements introduced in the recent years (EIONET 2018;
EEA, 2020f).
Regarding land and soil across Europe, this continues to be degraded by human
activities, including agriculture, as well as environmental factors, and could
potentially influence migration withing the EU in the long-term. Soil loss, as a
form of land degradation (FAO, no date), will be affected by increased rainfall
intensity, especially in central and northern Europe (JRC, European Soil Data
Centre, no date). However, there are different levels and causes of land deg-
radation across Europe. While rainfall is a factor in some areas, 13 Member
States have declared themselves as affected parties under the United Nations
Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD). Efforts to tackle land degra-
dation at both European and national level can influence other environmental
factors, such as soil erosion and water pollution (European Commission, no
date). These factors could increase migration away from some agricultural
areas in the EU in coming decades.
Regarding flooding, this is the result of several factors including heavy rainfall,
melting snow and ice, as well as deforestation and inappropriate agricultural
practices. Extreme weather patterns caused by climate change can signifi-
cantly contribute to flooding events. In particular, it is expected that as tem-
perature rises, extreme rainfall and flooding events will increase especially in
western and central Europe (WMO, 2021; IPCC, 2021). In addition to this, ac-
cording to the European Environment Agency (EEA), it is expected that, even
under a low emissions scenario, by 2100 coastal floods are projected to occur
at least once a year along the Mediterranean and Black Sea coasts, and at least
once a decade along almost all remaining European coasts (EEA, 2021b). EU
February 2023 121

policy and legislation promote greater flood awareness and preparedness,

which could reduce internal migration pressures.
Regarding food security, this is an issue that is not expected to affect intra-EU
migration in a significant way in the near future; however, the evolution of
climate change and other environmental changes will significantly affect the
food supplies of Europe, especially in cases where Europe is highly depended
on imports from other places around the globe. In 2016, the EU imported
almost 93 million tonnes of food from outside the EU. Imports of food into the
EU come mainly from Brazil, and the United States, followed by Argentina,
China and Turkey (Eurostat, 2017).
Although climate change factors are not explicitly covered under this issue, due
to the fact that climate change and migration has been extensively studied
already, it is to be noted that environmental factors linked to climate impacts
– including extreme high temperature events (Cattaneo and Peri, 2016), along
with wildfires (Chergui et al., 2018; Bruno et al., 2021; Oliveira et al., 2017),
hydrological drought and desertification (Smirnov et al., 2022; Delju et al.,
2019; Karamesouti et al., 2018; Salvati et al., 2015) – are expected to highly
influence intra-EU migration.
Potential implications Opportunities Risks
for the environment / human
health
Increasing number of people Development of EU policies Lack of resources to address
move away from urban areas focusing on intra-EU migra- environmental problems in
facing higher environmental tion, e.g. increasing support shrinking cities and urban
pressures, seeking better en- for regions of out-migration, areas (see also Issue 3).
vironments. to improve their quality of life
and their environment.
Migration to rural areas could
see a renaissance of regions
suffering from de-population
(see also Issue 3)
Successful urban areas in- Local policy and technical in- High-quality urban environ-
crease their efforts for high novations for climate adapta- ments are expensive places
environmental quality (see tion, mobility and other is- to live – lower income com-
also Issue 5). sues reduce pressures and munities may not benefit,
keep these areas liveable and and this may increase ine-
attractive. qualities.
In general, younger and
more skilled people are more
likely to move; conse-
quently, migration can in-
crease social inequities.
EU population becomes more As their population declines, Dispersion, together with the
dispersed across territories. dense urban areas with building of new infrastruc-
greater environmental pres- ture, can contribute to
sures may become more live- greater traffic and conges-
able. tion, and thus more wide-
EU and national policies sup- spread environmental im-
port infrastructure, e.g. effi- pacts, including further habi-
cient transport connections, tat fragmentation (see also
for more sustainable travel Issue 3).
among high-quality urban
and rural areas.
More frequent flooding in ar- Policies at multiple levels of Governments face dilemmas
eas at risk due to climate governance (from EU to local) protecting communities at
change. address flood risks in many high risk of flooding – includ-
areas of Europe, including by ing conflicts over the need to
expanding nature-based solu- move some inhabitants to
tions for water retention. low-risk areas. In high-value
urban areas, significant re-
sources may be needed to
February 2023 122

ensure future flood protec-

tion.
More people moving to more Sustainable planning can in- Sprawl in rural areas with
attractive rural areas (see tegrate new arrivals in exist- the risk of fragmenting the
also Issue 3). ing rural areas and supports natural environment.
greater environmental aware- Potential conflicts of interest
ness and protection. between local residents and
relocated populations due to
differences in the mode of
living in urban areas and
livelihoods in the country-
side.
While some trends are seen already (the role of air and noise pollution, for
example), the influence that environmental and climate factors can have on
Timeframe intra-EU migration is an issue that is considered likely to emerge in the long-
of emer- term.
gence Nonetheless, the influence of environmental factors on the quality of life of
European citizens and on migration could already start to be more visible in the
medium-term, therefore in the next 5-10 years.
A key uncertainty is the evolution of climate change and the consequent miti-
gation or aggravation of the impact of environmental factors on the places
people live and their quality of life / wellbeing. Most research has focussed on
economic and social drivers (and most migrants indeed do move to seek better
employment or educational opportunities, or for family reasons), however the
extent of influence environmental considerations have on migration decisions
appears (based on evidence identified) to be not well understood.
For environmental drivers themselves, such as air and noise pollution, key un-
certainties surround the implementation of EU policies, especially in lower in-
come regions and cities. Other uncertainties associated to the growth of intra-
EU migration affected by environmental drivers are related to climate impacts
and climate adaptation.
For climate drivers, despite the progress made regarding knowledge on climate
change, gaps and uncertainties remain as to how fast and to what extend cli-
Uncertain- mate change will affect natural and human systems. In this context, it is un-
ties clear to what extent the policies and measures introduced to mitigate and adapt
to climate change will eventually be proven effective and sufficient (European
Commission, 2021b). Notably, the European Commission adopted, in 2021, its
new EU strategy on adaptation to climate change setting how the EU will adapt
to the impacts of climate change and become climate resilient by 2050 (Euro-
pean Commission, 2021b). Adaptation needs to be undertaken at national,
regional and local levels, and lack of preparedness has been highlighted in mul-
tiple reports, as well as in practice. Stronger action, especially in vulnerable
regions across Europe, could potentially reduce the pressures for intra-EU mi-
gration linked to environmental changes.
The links between environmental and climate drivers and internal EU migration
remain uncertain. In particular, these links may vary across regions, and en-
vironmental and climate drivers will interact with social and economic drivers
of migration. Nevertheless, extreme weather events, such as floods, drought,
as well as extreme high temperatures are considered factors that could signif-
icantly influence the migration choices of European citizens (Euronews, 2022).
Additional Key areas for further research include the following:
research or • The role of environmental drivers in current and future EU migration, as
evidence this is as noted not well studied or understood;
that may be
• Data on specific environmental factors as the reason for intra-EU migration;
needed
• Data on intra-EU migration from urban to rural areas by sub-categories
such as city centres, small cities, suburbs, etc.;
• Risks of future land degradation and migration in Europe;
• Further estimates of climate-related impacts in the EU.
February 2023 123

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February 2023 127

Issue 9: How will environmental and associated lifestyle choices impact on

fertility rates and what are the environmental consequences of this?
A range of factors can influence fertility rates33. This issue explores one po-
tential factor: how environmental and associated lifestyle choices are impact-
ing fertility rates. It aims to explore the way in which current and future
decisions taken by people about whether to have children or not may be influ-
enced by environmental motives. The issue does not consider environmental
factors impacting human reproductive health, i.e., fertility, but rather the de-
Emerging is- cision-making regarding having children, and the influence of concerns about
sue descrip- the environment’s current and perceived future state.
tion
The issue considers the difference between choices made passively and ac-
tively. While the two are not strictly separate, there can be, on the one hand,
people who make decisions about having children as a consequence of the
current state of the environment and their concerns for the future environment
in which their children will live; on the other hand, others actively choose to
have fewer or no children as a preventive measure to protect the environment.
Current population and fertility rates and projections
While the world population keeps increasing and projections suggest this pat-
tern will continue (with the UN suggesting it may not peak until 2100), this
growth is uneven and in some global regions, population has already started
to fall.
Worldwide, the UN projections are that global population is expected to in-
crease by 2 billion in the next 30 years, from 7.7 billion in 2021 to 9.7 billion
in 2050 and could peak at nearly 11 billion around 2100. Afterwards, a global
decrease in population is expected. UN population projections forecast that
the EU population will decrease by 10 % by 2050 (UN DESA 2019). There is
some discrepancy between UN and EC (eurostat) projections, with the latter
projecting that Europe’s population are that it is expected to increase from
446.8 million in 2019 and peak at around 449.3 million in 2026 (+0.6 %),
then gradually decrease to 441.2 million in 2050 and to 416.1 million in 2100,
thus with an overall decrease of 30.8 million (-6.9 %) (European Commission
2020a). While the European Commission and UN estimates are not quantita-
tively aligned, they forecast similar demographic patterns (see also issue 7 on
internal and international migration).
Key drivers:
what is driv- Overall the populations of 55 countries or areas in the world are already ex-
ing the pected to decrease by 2050, including many EU Member States (UN DESA
emergence 2019). Moreover, these projections indicate fertility rates in all European
of this is- countries are now below the level of full replacement for the long run (approx-
sue? imately 2.1 children per woman). Since the mid-1960s, fertility rates have
declined across Europe. In 2018, these rates had fallen to 1.55 per woman.
While there are differences across countries, as noted above, all European
countries are below the 2.1 level of full replacement (European Commission
2020c).
Growing environmental and climate pressures
Fast-paced environmental and climate change is motivating people around the
world and particularly within Europe to change their lifestyle choices. These
changes are made because of ecological anxiety but also as a preventive
measure in an attempt to reduce environmental footprints as well as environ-
mental damage.
Based on research by (Steffen et al. 2015)), the European Environment
Agency — state and outlook 2020 report (EEA 2020) noted that there has
been, after the 1950s, a ‘great acceleration’ in human-induced global change.
This research also pointed to the middle of the 20 th century marking the start
of the “Anthropocene” Era (Steffen et al. 2015). This ‘great acceleration’ has
caused widespread environmental damage, is driving climate change and is
leading to unprecedented reductions in species populations and damage to
ecosystems. For example, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
33 This issue focuses on the fertility rate, which measures the number of children per woman. It
mentions but does not focus on a related measure, the birth rate, the number of children per a
given population.
February 2023 128

Nations assessment is that at least 31 % of global fish stocks are overfished

(FAO 2016). Moreover, evidence shows global carbon dioxide emissions are
forecast to increase to some 43.08 billion metric tons in 2050, in comparison
to 35.3 billion metric tons of carbon dioxide in 2018 (Tiseo 2020). Although a
five percent decrease was registered in 2020, due to the COVID-19 pandemic,
compared to 2019, it was projected that emissions would rebound in
2021.(Tiseo 2022). Indeed, a recent study (March 2022) has shown that
emissions rose by 6% in 2021, reaching its highest registered level yet (IEA
2022). Although the rebound of the world economy in a post-pandemic sce-
nario has certainly played a role in these numbers, it is nonetheless a reason
for concern.
Climate change and the environment are considered priorities by European
citizens, as demonstrated by a 2020 survey conducted by the European Com-
mission, which has shown more than nine in ten respondents (94%) say that
protecting the environment is important to them personally, including just over
half (53%) who say it is very important (European Commission 2020b). How-
ever, environmental pressures and climate change impacts are expected to
increase even further in coming years, as global CO2 emissions keep rising at
a dangerous rate, habitat and ecosystem destruction and resource / material
use continue to accelerate (see also resource use driven by population below).
Overpopulation
Young people are increasingly concerned about the overpopulation of the
planet, with many concerned that the projected increase in global population
(in particular when combined with Western patterns of consumption) is not
sustainable for the future of the planet. Population has risen from 2.5 billion
in 1950 to 7.5 billion in 2020 and the number of people living in cities has
more than quadrupled over the same period (EEA 2020) (see also issue 4 on
the environmental impact of changes in the demographic makeup of urban
areas). An article by Population Media Center (a population and global devel-
opment focussed charity) notes that overpopulation carries many risks and
raises problems, namely a higher demand for food, water, housing, energy,
healthcare, transportation. According to the same article, ‘all that consump-
tion contributes to ecological degradation, increased conflicts, and a higher
risk of large-scale disasters like pandemics’ (Bish 2020).
Resource use driven by population
A study conducted by the UN reports that higher-income countries make up
for 85 % of global emissions of carbon dioxide, while only including about 50
% of total world population, thus having a disproportionate environmental im-
pact due to high consumption levels (United Nations 2022). In fact, evidence
shows 'per capita impacts of consumption in high-income regions are between
three and six times larger than those of low-income regions’, considering also
that some high-income countries outsource environmental impacts to other
regions, causing those countries’ environmental impact to occur abroad.
(United Nations Environment Programme 2020). Moreover, these countries
‘consume 27 tons of materials on average, which is 60 % higher than the
upper-middle countries and more than thirteen times the level of the low-
income group’ (United Nations Environment Programme 2020). The increase
in demand for ‘material goods (food, feed, timber and fibre) vary greatly, and
unequal access to material goods can be associated with inequity and may
lead to social conflict’ (IPBES 2019). Despite having higher consumption lev-
els, these are the regions which display the lowest fertility rates, compared to
low-income countries.
This impact is causing rapid change to ecosystems and biodiversity, causing
them to change swiftly, which indicates that factors other than population
growth are contributing to the environmental crisis (United Nations 2022).
Considering these concurrent factors that affect the environment, some au-
thors have deemed the idea of people reducing births as a measure to counter
climate change “an exaggeration” (Chittilapally 2020).
Eco anxiety and anti-natalism
These increasing pressures have led to alarm and concern about the future of
our Earth among citizens. In fact, according to a recent survey (Marks et al.
2021) of 10,000 people in selected countries (including EU member states),
namely Australia, Brazil, Finland, France, India, Nigeria, Philippines, Portugal,
February 2023 129

the UK, and the USA, nearly 60% stated they felt ‘very worried’ or ‘extremely
worried’ about the environment and the future. Furthermore, according to the
same study, 45% of participants said their feelings about climate change im-
pacted their daily lives.
This is leading people to adopt new lifestyle choices. In Europe, many citizens
are eating less meat (Bechtold,et. al. 2021), reducing their energy consump-
tion (e.g., window opening patterns, lighting control, efficiency of devices and
appliances, and use of hot water) (Gaspari et al. 2021), reducing driving (EIB
2022), and, as a consequence of the 'flight shaming movement’, choosing al-
ternative means of transport rather than flying (Timperley 2019).
Some young adults fear for the planet their children will grow up in and that
having them would inevitably increase their environmental footprint. This is
leading to some deciding not to have children altogether. The idea behind
such decisions arises from the fear for the future of generations to come. It
is a phenomenon called “eco anxiety”. In fact, the global survey mentioned
above which included of more than 10,000 participants concluded that four
out of ten young people around the world are “hesitant” to have children as a
result of the climate crisis (Marks et al. 2021; Harvey 2021). The same study
concluded that nearly six out of ten people aged 16 to 25 years were “very or
extremely worried about climate change”. Should this concern and hesitancy
translate into actual decisions to not have children, fertility rates might de-
crease. Studies have also explored the relationship between stress and infer-
tility. Although these have been focused general personal stress and anxiety,
the findings that ‘psychological symptoms have a negative impact on fertility’
(Rooney and Domar 2018) may also be relevant for eco-anxiety: meaning that
as well as people choosing not to have children, the stress caused by eco-
anxiety may also directly reduce fertility.
Moreover, another study which included a survey of 600 people in the US found
that 6% of surveyed parents felt some remorse about having children, while
96% of the overall group were very or extremely concerned about the wellbe-
ing of their potential future children in a climate-changed world (Schneider-
Mayerson and Leong 2020). While this study was conducted outside of Eu-
rope, it may give an insight for Europe on the topic.
One recent study concluded that the “movement to not have children owing
to fears over climate change is growing and impacting fertility rates quicker
than any preceding trend in the field of fertility decline” (Shead 2021). Global
warming being the main symptom of climate change, and the most noticeable
one, UCLA researchers have observed, in the nine months after an extreme
heat event in the United States, the number of births significantly decreased
(Shead 2021) (see also issue 8 on intra-EU migration). It seems possible that
this is a result of the anxiety of young generations, who felt they were wit-
nessing the consequences of climate change on first hand during said event.
A study conducted in 2017 (Wynes and Nicholas 2017) has recommended four
“high-impact” actions to slow down climate change, which included having one
fewer child (the study means, by “high impact”, that these actions reduce “an
individual’s greenhouse gas emissions by at least 0.8 tCO2e per year.”). This
idea has led to another growing movement, ‘anti-natalism’, which argues peo-
ple should have fewer or no children altogether to reduce personal contribu-
tions to global carbon emissions (Chittilapally 2020). While data on this
trend’s progress is not readily available, it seems to be growing. As a proxy
indicator, the term ‘environmental anti-natalism’, according to Google Trends
Analytics, has seen a steady rise in the last 2 decades, with high relative levels
of ‘interest’ seen in Northern Europe (especially Scandinavian countries) and
the US (Google 2022).
The overall impact of these movements on fertility and birth rates is, as yet
difficult to quantify, and sources did not provide relevant statistical infor-
mation. Other factors influencing birth and fertility are also expected to have
a major impact. Moreover, it is not clear to what extent these movements are
relevant outside higher-income countries (such as EU Member States). None-
theless, based on the information presented above, these trends seem to be
gaining relevance, especially among higher-income countries.
Social factors impacting on women’s decisions to have children
February 2023 130

While environmental concerns are among the factors affecting women’s fertil-
ity rates, these need to be put in the context of a range of other factors.
Among these are their decisions related to the tensions between fully dedicat-
ing oneself to the workforce and demands of childbearing, as mentioned in
one study, “comprehensive maternal leave policies and cash benefits do not,
in themselves, encourage fertility” (Rindfuss and Brewster 1996). Moreover,
the lack of affordable childcare and the economic costs of raising children is a
key concern (Givord and Marbot 2015). Consequently, declining fertility can
be attributed to several causes including higher education among women,
changing gender roles and women undertaking new social roles. (Gold-
scheider, Bernhardt, and Lappegård 2015). The lack of a proper childcare
system in many countries leads to negative and unequal social impact, as
women might see themselves forced to drop out work. Other potential social
and economic factors include increasing costs of housing, which can lead to
people to live in smaller houses and thus being able to accommodate fewer
children.
Both eco-anxiety and environmental choices to reduce fertility could lead to
steeper declines in the EU’s population than currently projected. This would
potentially accelerate the EU’s already ageing population and the growth in
the age dependency ratio (proportion of those older than working age com-
pared to working age). Already without this factor, a study conducted by the
UN in 2015 (United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Pop-
ulation Division 2015) concluded that countries such as Portugal, Greece and
Spain are expected to have a decrease in births of 15 percent already in the
years 2015 to 2030, as compared to the registered numbers between 2000
and 2015. As noted above, a range of social and economic factors influence
fertility and birth rates. Implications of ageing for the green transition are dis-
cussed in Issues 6 and 10, and the political and democratic implications in
Issue 1.
On the other hand, policy drivers, if implemented fully, could attenuate the
rise in eco-anxiety. Within Europe, the Fit for 55 package and EU Green Deal
are among the policy steps that have been taken to address climate and en-
vironmental issues. These are other policy actions at EU, national, regional
and local levels to address climate pressures could alleviate eco-anxiety. Alt-
How might hough current trends point to ongoing increases, there remains hope at least
the issue that the climate and environmental footprints of future EU generations could
develop in be lower than those at present.
future?
A further choice for potential parents is to make parental lifestyle choices to
protect the environment, a phenomenon called green parenting. This would
provide environmentally aware potential parents a way to address environ-
mental footprints. For example a survey conducted by a UK based producer
of organic baby foods found that almost half the surveyed parents (47%) have
developed a newfound appreciation for protecting the environment and nature
after the pandemic (Gordon 2020). Another study has shown 76% of Ameri-
can households say their children are the reason they strive to be eco-friendly
(Haaland 2021). The same report points out various lifestyle choices that
could be made to achieve a more sustainable way of living, namely recycling,
reducing energy usage etc. (Haaland 2021). 41% of parents in this survey
expressed that having children was what made them want to live in a more
sustainable manner. Moreover, public authorities are also seeking to encour-
age parents to make environmental choices. For example, UNICEF has issued
a number of tips for new parents to follow, in order to make parenting more
sustainable (UNICEF 2021).
As a result, the issue could lead to a range of potential implications and out-
comes.
Potential impli- Opportunities Risks
cations
for the environ-
ment / human
health
Acceleration in EU Reducing population related envi- Reduction in workforce due to pop-
population decline ronmental pressures felt in the EU ulation decline. Aggravation of re-
February 2023 131

due to changing at- gional workforce and skills imbal-

titudes towards ances, which can potentially under-
having children mine the green transition, as well
as economic efforts (see also Issue
7 on migration and the green tran-
sition and Issue 8 on intra-EU mi-
gration).
For countries as a whole, further
population decline can lead to a po-
tential challenge for pensions and
social security schemes (see Issue
10 on fiscal and financial implica-
tions).
Potential population collapse in
some regions: if fertility rates in EU
fall much below projections, this
could compromise the social and
economic viability of some regions.
Potential impact caused by the ten-
dency to have children later in life.
Increased interest Maintaining the population growth Potential disparities and inequality,
in combining cli- at a sustainable level, i.e., aiming as well as negative social impacts.
mate and popula- for fertility rates at replacement As seen in the Chinese one-child
tion policy levels, for instance by creating fi- policy example, issues in such poli-
nancial incentives at EU level for cies have been raised, due to social
young couples to have children impacts and it has been abolished
(but limiting said incentives to re- in 2016, with a strong backlash
placement levels) from Chinese society
Growing adoption Potential increase of fertility rates The promotion of green parenting,
of green parenting and promoting a more sustainable if not clearly communicated, could
to reduce the envi- way of living while decreasing envi- lead to confusion and uncertainty
ronmental foot- ronmental pressures per person about lifestyle choices, potentially
prints of having and ensuring a greener Europe exacerbating eco anxiety. Moreo-
children ver, it could lead to social inequity,
as the adoption of these practices
potentially may create a burden
which lower income groups might
not be able to bear.
International dis- Furthering and deepening the EU As the environmental and climate
cussions link popu- principles regarding sustainability, crisis which was first caused by de-
lation and environ- changing the paradigm beyond EU veloped countries, discussions
ment borders to include population is- about population and environment
sues in climate and environmental could lead to claims of racism and
concerns. This could strengthen the discrimination and harm interna-
international dimension of the EU tional cooperation.
Green Deal beyond EU borders and
strengthen international action for
sustainable development.
This is an issue that is already seen today and is likely to emerge in the short-
to medium-term, but with long-term implications (as this is a generational
change and such demographic changes are slow to emerge and develop).
All of the above key drivers will potentially be problematic in the future, by
Timeframe putting a burden on younger generations. Fertility rates will be influenced by
of emer- the number of people who will support the anti-natalism movement and expe-
gence rience eco anxiety. These trends seem to be growing, due to the rise in envi-
ronmental awareness, which is noticeable, namely in Europe. In the short-
term, eco anxiety might affect fertility rates, however, its full effect is expected
to be felt in the longer-term. This will consist of lowering fertility rates to
levels below the level of full replacement, which, e.g. for Europe, has already
been the case for decades.
Uncertain- No information was found to quantify how eco-anxiety or anti-natalism are
ties affecting birth rates in the EU at present, nor how these social concerns will
February 2023 132

evolve in the near and longer-term future. Nor is it clear how lifestyle changes
such as green parenting could influence decisions to have or not children.
While bringing fewer children to the planet would reduce environmental foot-
prints, it is still difficult to project this impact, due to uncertainties in the re-
sults of ongoing policy and technical developments. Consumption and emis-
sions per capita are the key drivers of environmental change rather than pop-
ulation per se. EU actions (including those under the European Green Deal)
to phase out fossil fuels, reach net zero carbon emissions by 2050, halt and
reverse biodiversity loss, and move towards zero pollution will change the en-
vironmental footprints of future EU generations.
The emergence of this issue may vary greatly between regions and countries.
In fact, concerning demographics, Europe already has significant regional im-
balances. In coming decades, the southern and eastern Europe are expected
to experience significant declines in population compared to the northern re-
gions of the continent.. This is due to lower fertility rates and higher numbers
of emigration in those areas. This phenomenon can be explained by several
cultural reasons and greater uncertainties (ECR Working Group, 2021). On this
topic, see also issue 8, which discusses intra-EU migration, as well as issue 7,
which deals with the environmental impact caused by internal and interna-
tional migration
Additional Impact of eco anxiety on fertility rates
research or The sources reviewed did not provide any data to quantify how this trend is
evidence
actually impacting the fertility rates. While the evidence available seems to
that may be
indicate that this trend is growing and people are making decisions based on
needed
their anxiety towards the future of the planet, it remains unclear the conse-
quences for actual fertility rates.
Policymaking that brings together population and climate goals
Current European legislative initiatives and policy frameworks are tackling cli-
mate change and environmental degradation, but yet they do not appear suf-
ficient to address eco-anxiety. Could future policies link environment and EU
demography more closely?
Eco parenting
Although it seems to be growing as a movement, as demonstrated by the
growing climate awareness shared among younger generations, eco-parent-
ing’s possible impacts on the environment are not well-studied. It would be
beneficial to have further research and information on more sustainable ways
of raising children.
References Bechtold,et. al., Kai-Brit. 2021. ‘What Consumers Want: A Survey on Euro-
pean Consumer Attitudes towards Plant-Based Foods’.
https://smartproteinproject.eu/wp-content/uploads/FINAL_Pan-EU-
consumer-survey_Overall-Report-.pdf.
Bish, Joe. 2020. ‘Overpopulation: Cause and Effect’. 2020. https://info.popu-
lationmedia.org/blog/overpopulation-cause-and-effect.
Chittilapally, Joslyn. 2020. ‘Antinatalism, Why People Are Going Child-Free
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February 2023 135

Issue 10: How will the fiscal and financial implications of demographic
change shape the green transition?
This issue explores how the long-term fiscal and financial implications of an
ageing society might shape the ability of the EU to deliver a green transition.
A key long-term demographic trend related to this issue is the dependency
ratio, i.e. the ratio between those in the labour force and those not in the
labour force. The issue focusses on the impact of a higher dependency ratio
in EU countries on fiscal revenues and government expenditure, but also its
wider impact on productivity and economic growth. Potential long-term impli-
cations are expected on pensions, health and social care provision, productiv-
Emerging is- ity and innovation, and changes in levels of income tax. The issue looks at
sue descrip- how these changes are forecast to develop and how their implications may
tion shape sustainability transitions in the future.
Potential reactions to the monetary implications of an ageing society, in terms
of changes in fiscal policy, changes in labour markets and longer working lives,
and the need for lifelong learning, are discussed along with what this may
mean for the green transition. An ageing society may also increase the need
for (and tendency towards) private and alternate (e.g. crowdsourced) forms
of funding for the green transition, due to reduced fiscal revenue and therefore
the size of governmental budgets. This could in turn impact on which sustain-
ability objectives are prioritised.
Europe’s population is already amongst the oldest in the world
Currently, one in four Europeans are aged over 60 (Eurostat, 2020) and the
live birth rate in the EU was 1.5 in 2020, far below the average 2.1 per women
generally considered the ‘replacement level’ at which a population will sustain
itself from one generation to the next. There are regional differences in Eu-
rope, with Malta, Spain and Italy (all countries in the Southern Mediterranean)
having the lowest fertility rates at 1.13, 1.19 and 1.24 respectively (Eurostat,
2022b). The EU therefore has a high, and increasing, old-age dependency
ratio. Indeed, for every person in the EU older than 65 years in 2019, there
were almost 3 persons aged between 20 and 64 (European Commission,
2021c). If current trends continue (as they are projected to) this dependency
ratio will become more severe, falling to 2 by 2040, and 1.7 by 2070 (European
Commission, 2021c).
There are also strong inter-regional variations in the dependency ratios.
Within countries also, the prevalence of certain geographic features can also
Key drivers: cause dependency ratios to be very high in discrete areas that are particularly
what is driv- rural, remote, or mountainous. For example, Evrytania, a mountainous region
ing the in Greece, is the territory with the highest old-age dependency ratio at 78.3%
emergence (Interreg Europe, 2021)
of this is- Reduced fiscal contributions and a smaller economy
sue?
A higher dependency ratio has fiscal revenue implications. Due to a fall in the
proportion of working age people, revenues from labour taxes (income taxes,
social security contribution) are lower (de Biase, Dougherty and Lorenzoni,
2022). As pension income will be typically lower than the earnings from labour
(wages) during a worker’s career, ageing will result in lower income tax reve-
nues even in countries where pensions are taxed as income (OECD, 2021).
Older people also on average spend less, as their behaviour switches due to
income constraints, with poorer pensioners focussing spending on necessary
goods and services (Yoshino, 2019) (this is also explored in Issue 6 on how
ageing may influence consumption). This reduces sales tax revenues (VAT)
and can also mean a smaller functional economy.
Changing government expenditure priorities
An ageing population means rising public sector pension costs in absolute
terms and as a ratio of all public spending. In the period before 2019, many
Member States already registered rising pension costs. Between 2003 and
2019 the pension expenditure-to-GDP ratio across the EU rose, and sharply in
February 2023 136

countries including Spain, Finland, Italy, Romania, Estonia and Norway (Euro-
pean Commission, 2021c). The COVID-19 crisis also led to a surge of the
public pension spending-to-GDP ratio in 2020, which reverted in 2021. Most
EU countries encourage people to invest in supplementary private pension
savings to soften the burden of ageing populations on social security schemes.
However, privately managed schemes still represent only a fraction of total
pension benefits in most countries in the EU (European Commission, 2021c).
In the EU in 2018, total expenditure on public health care (including long-term
nursing care) represented 7.8 % of GDP on average. There is significant re-
gional variation: the largest shares were recorded in Germany (11.5%) and
France (11.3%), and the lowest in Luxembourg (5.3% of GDP) and Romania
(5.6%). Increased longevity, without an improvement in health status, leads
to increased demand for services over a longer period of the lifetime, increas-
ing total lifetime health care expenditure and overall health care spending
(Breyer, Costa-Font and Felder, 2010). Health expenditures generally in-
crease with age, but appear to decline slightly amongst the very elderly (90+
years) (Williams et al., 2019).
Whilst innovations in healthcare related technology help people to live longer,
this contributes toward a very large drain on the sustainability of public fi-
nances, and is estimated to require between 27% and 75% of all public health
expenditure growth in European countries (European Commission, 2021c).
An additional public expenditure is long term care (LTC) for the elderly in terms
of providing for residential and nursing care homes. EU countries spend on
average 1.47% of GDP on LTC. The Netherlands has the highest expenditure
at 4.27% of GDP (European Commission, 2021c). An increasing elderly pop-
ulation also increases the proportion of primary caregivers: people who may
be required to look after loved ones at home, and due to these responsibilities,
will not have the time to work and therefore contribute economically.
Uncertainties around expenditure
However, some research has also shown that ageing can contribute much less
than widely thought to growth in expenditure, and in many Member States an
actual reduction in per capita spending at very old age can be observed (Wil-
liams et al., 2019; Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2022). This could reflect the fact
that a more rapid adoption of automation and digital technologies will occur in
countries undergoing more pronounced demographic changes (Acemoglu and
Restrepo, 2022). Indeed, eHealth systems, including smart implants on the
body, and improved data monitoring could help older adults to avoid unnec-
essary and prolonged hospital stays (Valokivi et al., 2021) (this is explored
further in Issue 2 on the implications of increased digitalisation and automa-
tion/use of other technology in an ageing society). Different age groups can
also require significant amounts of public expenditure (e.g. in youth education)
to meet social, welfare and economic needs, and this will also vary according
to different political and cultural contexts.
Productivity and innovation
Innovation may decrease in ageing societies, and thus slow down further eco-
nomic growth and workforce replacement (Haga, 2015). Indeed, a recent
analysis of 41 countries showed that population ageing has a significant neg-
ative effect on skills, experience and knowledge transmission, thereby imped-
ing technological innovation (Wang, Hao and Liu, 2021). However, there is
ambiguity in this driver, as population ageing has also been associated with
technological innovation. Here the logic is that a smaller labour force increases
the need for human labour-saving devices, whilst the increasing health care
demands of an elderly population stimulate technological innovation to assist
with this (e.g. development of robotic ‘care-bots’) (Cylus, Figueras and Nor-
mand, 2019) (see also Issue 2 for further discussion of an ageing population
and technology / innovation).
It has been shown that the elderly find it more difficult to rapidly upskill, in
particular around the use of digital technologies (Ramely, Ahmad and Nor,
February 2023 137

2016; Yoshino, 2019). This could negatively impact on productivity and there-
fore stagnate economic growth.
A growing need for public investment in the sustainability transition
In the context of the above fiscal and financial consequences of an ageing
society, is the challenge that the current (and historic) levels of investment in
sustainability transition is already considered to be far lower than necessary
to meet Europe’s long-term objectives – public investment in the environment
in EU countries is structurally low and has not increased in the last decade
(EEA, 2020). Over the period 1995-2020, EU expenditure remained relatively
stable, ranging between 0.7 % of GDP and 0.9 % of GDP (Eurostat,
2022b)(Eurostat, 2022). These expenditures need to rapidly increase if EU
sustainability objectives are to be met (EEA, 2020). A recent study estimates
that additional public investments required to meet the European Union's cli-
mate goals to be between 0.5% and 1% of GDP annually during this decade
and points out that increasing green public investment while consolidating def-
icits will be a major challenge (Darvas and Wolff, 2021).
The EU will become an increasingly old society
Europe’s population is getting increasingly old. The population of those aged
65+ in the EU-27 is projected to increase from 90.5 million in 2019 to 129.8
million by 2050. The number of people aged 75-84 years will increase by 56.1
%, while the number aged 65-74 years by 16.6 % (Eurostat, 2020). Current
projections also show, however, a slowing down of ageing from 2050 onwards
(Eurostat, 2020). Therefore, this issue is likely to become an increasingly
pressing concern in EU countries in the next three decades.
Pension fund forecasts, future changes and investments
Public pension expenditure is projected to increase from an EU average of
11.6% of GDP in 2019 to 12.7% in 2045. Between 2045 and 2070, spending
is projected to fall again to 11.7% of GDP by 2070. Greater public pension
expenditure is one factor which could limit the long-term availability of public
funding available to finance the green transition.
Responding to this, governments may introduce a range of potential measures
to mitigate the public expense implications of larger pension payments, includ-
ing raising the retirement age by removing mandatory retirement laws and
prohibiting discrimination against the elderly, and encouraging government-
job creation for the elderly, as well as removing unjustified pension benefits.
The financial status of pension schemes could also be improved by increasing
contribution rates from employers (Yoshino, 2019). The imbalance may lead
How might to a reduction in the pension funding from contributions, and in seeking new
the issue sources, for example VAT; this may make it difficult to levy environmental fees
develop in and to invest in green development.
future?
Specifically concerning pension funds, it is increasingly common for invest-
ments to be aligned along ESG (environmental, social and governance) prin-
ciples and this could accelerate as environmental agendas embed themselves
more deeply in the private and finance sectors (Cumbo, 2021). An institutional
and regulatory framework for this can be seen in the EU's 2021 ‘Strategy for
Financing the Transition to a Sustainable Economy’(European Commission,
2021b). Some of its proposals include extending the EU sustainable finance
standards and labels to recognise transition efforts. It also aims to provide
tools and incentives to access transition finance (ibid).
Theoretically, individual governments could provide incentives like tax breaks
to those funds that invest a certain proportion of assets in ‘green companies’
and sustainable initiatives. Investors are now more able to align their values
with their investments. Global ESG-linked funds took almost €330bn in 2020,
compared to €150bn in 2019 (Cumbo, 2021), and seem likely to continue to
grow in popularity. Whilst there are risks of pension funds greenwashing and
/ or investors still choosing less sustainable portfolios, there is clear potential
for pension funds to be used to finance more sustainable business.
With that said, an increasingly ageing EU population will mean that pension
funds will be somewhat smaller (because the proportion of working adults pay-
ing in will be reduced whilst the proportion of retirees receiving money from
the funds is increased), so that the capacity to invest sustainably is reduced.
Furthermore, revenues from pension funds are expected to decrease in eleven
February 2023 138

countries, in particular in Finland, Portugal, Greece, Latvia and Estonia (Euro-

pean Commission, 2021c). Reforms to shift contributions of pay-as-you-go34
pension schemes to pre-funded statutory pension schemes have been re-
versed by some EU member states in the past (Eatock, 2015), and it may be
that the effects mentioned above will provide an incentive in some countries
to move to pay-as-you-go pension schemes.
Future expenditure on healthcare and its impacts
Population ageing on its own is expected to slowly (and only modestly) in-
crease health spending as a share of the economy between now and 2060 in
the EU (increased share of 1.3% by 2060). It may however be slightly higher
in countries with relatively younger populations who are scaling up their health
systems (Williams et al., 2019). A modest increase in health-related public
expenditures due to an ageing society might mean there is somewhat less
revenue to invest in the green transition, such as in green technology and
clean energy. That said, spending cuts may not necessarily hit ‘the green
sector’, which could be ringfenced and instead fall on other parts of the public
budget. However, due to the integrated nature of a green economy it seems
probable there would still be effects on the green transition. For example,
financial constraints will affect public sector procurement, as well as financial
incentives that could assist businesses with green credentials. However, de-
cision-makers can also manage high expenditures if services find a better bal-
ance between treating disease and managing symptoms (Normand et al.,
2021).
The recent COVID-19 pandemic could indicate a significant future trend for the
expenditure implications of an ageing society. It has been estimated that the
probability of a pandemic like COVID-19 occurring is approximately 2% each
year, and this probability is growing (Marani et al., 2021). In health impact
terms the pandemic disproportionately affected older people: in 2020 in Eu-
rope, 70% of COVID-19 related deaths were in those aged 70 years or over
(Goldstein and Lee, 2020). Therefore, in an ageing European society, it is
possible that future pandemics will have an even greater impact, with in-
creased chances of severe lockdowns and the financial burden that these entail
(although greater preparedness following the experience of COVID-19 could
reduce these burdens). The pandemic has also had severe financial implica-
tions. European countries began borrowing at unprecedented rates to provide
economic relief to businesses and workers (Alderman, 2021). The causes of
the current (March 2022)inflation rate of approximately 8% in Europe, and the
associated cost of living crisis are complex. Nonetheless, the pandemic was
certainly a contributing factor, along with more recent developments in geo-
political instability; it is revealing that inflation rose by 4% in the Eurozone
between May 2021 and February 2022, and has risen by 2% since February
2022 (Eurostat, 2022a).
The mismatch between reduced government revenues because of an ageing
society (as already discussed) and increased demands on healthcare spending,
is expected to grow in OECD countries. This is because, due to the effects of
population structure changes, government revenues will grow slightly less
than GDP, but health expenditures will grow significantly more than GDP (de
Biase, Dougherty and Lorenzoni, 2022)
Changes in fiscal and monetary policy
In order to counter the effects of significant reductions in income taxes and
social security contributions in an ageing society, European governments may
turn to a range of fiscal measures. Governments may increasingly rely on
corporate tax and indirect taxes like VAT, as well as rely increasingly on envi-
ronmental taxation, in order to reduce the dependency on individual taxation
like income tax (Yoshino, 2019).
34 Pay-as-you-go pensions systems are those in which pensions of current retirees are paid out
of the income contributions of current workers. Funded pension schemes rely on workers pay-
ing some of their income into a fund of financial assets (investment in a fund) from which pen-
sions are eventually paid out. If investment and returns from funded pensions falls, then coun-
tries may feel obliged to rely more on pay-as-you-go systems.
February 2023 139

More environmental taxation (energy taxes, transport taxes, pollution and re-
source taxes) could be necessary to counter the reductions in other taxation
revenue streams that come with an ageing society (European Environment
Agency, 2022). However, decarbonising the European economy is also ex-
pected to erode the traditional tax base as current energy taxations and carbon
pricing schemes rely heavily on non-renewable products (OECD, 2021; Euro-
pean Environment Agency, 2022), thus highlighting the need for alternative
funding sources.
Other options to reduce the negative fiscal consequences of an ageing society
include removing personal income tax (PIT) and social security contributions
(SSC) exemptions when applied to pensioners, as well as making labour in-
come taxes more resilient to demographic change by raising labour force par-
ticipation by, for instance, encouraging women, the elderly and foreign or im-
migrant workers to join the labour force. An alternative option could be to tax
pensions under PIT and health SSCs and, thus, minimise the decrease in tax
revenues that will happen when people retire. Finally, there are options to
increase property taxes, since these are invariant to population ageing (de
Biase, Dougherty and Lorenzoni, 2022).
Making changes to the tax base as described above, would, in theory, mean
the elderly pay more than they do currently, and this could reduce the quality
of life for the elderly who may struggle financially. However, the shift to an
increasing reliance on VAT through rate increases, could also mean that people
are less likely to buy more than they need, shift to less polluting alternatives
(if more sustainable items had a lower corresponding VAT rate), and may be
more incentivised to reuse or repair material goods as opposed to replace
them.
Decreasing taxable incomes and a shrinking consumer economy could lead to
austerity measures to curb public expenditure. This could in turn have nega-
tive repercussions for education, health and social equality. Notably, social
inequality is strongly correlated with worse environmental outcomes for a
country (OECD, 2021).
A changing labour market and longer working lives
By 2070, the average age at which people exit the labour market in the EU is
expected to have increased by 1.6 years for men and by 1.8 years for women
(European Commission, 2021c). However, governments and companies may
introduce incentives to keep people in employment for longer through, for ex-
ample, flexible retirement schemes (Eurofound, 2022). With longer careers,
there may be increasing opportunity to diversify into fields/sectors that may
explicitly support the green transition. Longer working lives can also have
non-financial benefits for individuals, including social, cognitive and health
benefits if work is appropriate in its nature (Normand et al., 2021).
The private sector and crowd-funding green investments
As traditional (public) funding sources decline, it will likely be that the role of
the private sector will become increasingly important to finance the green
transition. There is a general trend in institutional and private investors taking
an increasingly discriminatory attitude toward investments (European Envi-
ronment Agency, 2022). However, lack of adequate data is a key obstacle to
implementing sustainable investment strategies and proper regulatory over-
sight is needed to prevent greenwashing (IMF, 2021).
Many green technologies and solutions are novel and untested, making it hard
to secure loans. However, equity-based crowdfunding can provide an answer.
It has grown substantially over the last decade, leading to regulatory changes
that have enabled small investors to join early-stage investments in start-ups
that previously were available only to venture capitalists (Buttice et al., 2018).
Many of these small-scale investors are looking to ensure that their investment
decisions are sustainable, and numerous websites exist which provide guid-
ance to green minded investors (Buttice et al., 2018). Furthermore, proposals
are currently under development for a European green bond standard for the
EU that could encourage market participants to issue & invest in EU green
bonds and improve the effectiveness, transparency, comparability & credibility
of the market (European Commission, no date). With that said, the rapid
democratisation of investment (i.e. increased prevalence of crowd sourcing,
February 2023 140

small scale investment) in an era of declining public expenditure may make it

harder to coordinate such shifts in investment around EU strategic goals for
the green transition.
Ageing and charitable giving
As people grow old, they may increasingly look beyond their own and house-
hold’s welfare, and pursue pro-social environmental goals (Wang, Hao and Liu,
2021). If this is seen then it could mean that a population with greater num-
bers of elderly people would be more likely to contribute financially toward
NGOs and other organisations or even businesses that may be promoting an
environmental agenda. Donation-based crowd funding is also becoming in-
creasingly common (Kenton, 2019). An international study analysing data
from 67 countries found that the elderly were significantly more likely to do-
nate to charity than younger adults (Melore, 2021), although this propensity
may of course change in future if the pension incomes of retired people are
reduced or increasingly uncertain.
tions
for the environment
/ human health
Reduced public rev- Unbalances in the pensions system Less public money available to in-
enues (rising pen- could be mitigated through e.g. vest in green transition e.g. green
sion costs, reduced raising the retirement age, increas- technologies and clean energy,
income tax, a ing minimum compulsory contribu- green public sector procurement,
smaller economy) tion rates (for private pension financial incentives to green busi-
funds), abolishing unjustified bene- nesses etc.
fits and increasing the contribution
burden for employer’s paying in. Increasing the retirement age
could increase job competition
Fiscal changes like giving greater
weight to VAT as opposed to income and unemployment amongst
tax could be made (see additional young people
implications)
Increased reliance Could help alleviate the reduction in Fiscal changes could shrink the
on corporate tax, fiscal contributions from an elderly economy further, reducing the
VAT and environ- population, and thus enable in- amount of public revenue availa-
mental taxes creased revenue for the green tran- ble to invest in the green transi-
sition. tion.
Environmental taxation (energy Environmental taxes will reduce
taxes, transport taxes, pollution (or need to be amended and in-
and resource taxes) will be more at- tensified) as the EU progresses
tractive to policy makers looking to toward carbon neutrality.
compensate for reduced income tax
Concerns over fairness for the el-
returns.
derly to bear more taxation whilst
Higher VAT would de-incentivise
not receiving a salary, having
consumer spending on 'unneces-
worked for most of their lives.
sary’ goods and services, and en-
courage reuse or repair options, Unless changed, environmental
leading to more responsible and tax contributions will wane as EU
sustainable living. If VAT rates were countries approach climate goals.
correspondingly lowered, or re-
mained fixed, for ‘green’ or more
sustainable products, this could en-
courage the consumption of more
environmentally friendly goods.
Increased public ex- Population growth is expected to Greater expenditure on
penditures (rising only modestly increase health healthcare means less public
health and social spending as a share of the economy money available to invest in
care costs, exacer- in Europe (increased share of 1.3% green transition (assuming over-
bated by pandemic by 2060). all spending does not increase
risks) and other types of spending can-
For healthcare, better understand-
ing of what drives end-of-life costs not be reduced).
February 2023 141

can help manage health expendi- Future pandemics are more likely
tures. and with an ageing population
more deadly. Repeating lockdown
policy will lead to further cycles of
inflation and reduced capacity to
invest in the green transition
without targeted policy and
ringfencing of sustainability re-
lated funds.
Increase in austerity Careful and early planning for Negative impact on spending on
measures to man- measures to manage declining pub- health and long-term social care
age public finances lic revenues could prevent the need for the elderly, leading to reduced
for future austerity. wellbeing outcomes.
Could increase social inequality,
which is strongly correlated with
worse environmental outcomes.
With other socioeconomic related
life pressures, e.g. health and fi-
nancial insecurity, becoming
more prevalent, people may
themselves care about the envi-
ronment less.
Longer working lives Many personal non-financial bene- Will need to address negative at-
to help address the fits, including cognitive and health titudes, health needs, workplace
growing depend- benefits, if the work is appropriate design, technology and adapta-
ency ratio in the EU in its nature. tions in HR policies and working
practices.
Future generations that live longer
may have multiple careers, giving There are questions over fairness
greater scope to work in the envi- and humanitarian welfare; is it
ronmental sector. just to require people continue to
work for longer than the previous
generation?
Increased invest- For those involved in the green Failure will likely result in skills
ment in lifelong economy, lifelong learning will sup- gaps at the same time as older
learning port enabling older generations to people are leaving the labour
keep pace with the sector, and en- market.
hance the size of the innovation
pool.
Pension funds will There is increasing tendency for Pension fund investments in
have a greater role pension fund investments to be ‘green companies’ or those that
in financing the aligned with ESG principles and sus- score well on ESG are susceptible
green transition tainable investment. to green washing.
Pension funds can be encouraged to Public pension fund revenues are
invest sustainably by policy still expected to decline in 11 Eu-
measures that demand greater
ropean countries (European Com-
public transparency, or by giving
mission, 2021).
tax breaks to funds that invest more
sustainably.
Increased role of Businesses utilising finance to sup- Private sector finance and invest-
private finance in port the green transition also future ment may not align with EU policy
the green transition proof their business. goals, which could undermine
long-term achievement e.g. of
the Green Deal.
Lack of adequate data is a key ob-
stacle to implementing sustaina-
ble investment strategies.
February 2023 142

Significant risk of green washing

around some of the investment
opportunities.
Increase in Many green technologies and solu- It may be harder to coordinate
crowdsource fund- tions are novel and untested, mak- small equity investments around
ing for green transi- ing it hard to secure loans. EU strategic goals.
tions Crowdsourcing can provide the an-
Significant risk of green washing
swer.
around some of the investment
Crowdsourcing can also help solve opportunities.
complex problems and provide in-
novative solutions due to the diver- Issues around ability of the casual
sity of potentially contributing investor to discern sustainability
thinkers. (and financial) credentials of the
opportunity.
An increased num- Since old age appears to correlate There is no prerogative for these
ber of elderly people with pro-social spending, increasing charitable donations to contribute
could result in in- proportions of the elderly may to environmental objectives.
creased (environ- mean that more money is donated Potentially, reduced financial sup-
mental) pro-social to charitable funds, which could be port from the future structure of
spending. environment related. pension systems as well as poten-
tial increased tax burdens, may
mean the elderly’s capacity to do
so will be diminished.
This is a long-term issue, which reflects structural changes in demography

anticipated in coming decades (to 2050 and beyond). The changes are also
Timeframe
expected to be incremental, with average ages only slowly climbing through-
of emer-
out Europe.
gence
Theses change in demography, however, will require short- to medium-term
action: indeed, the policy implications are already being discussed in European
Policy papers.
Some researchers have suggested that ageing may be a driver of increased
technological investment and innovation, which is crucial to the green transi-
tion. However, the current environmental consequences are difficult to predict
because other factors may lead to opposite effects. Technological progress
can also lead to disruptive changes in an economic system that have fiscal
implications relevant to investment in the sustainability transition (EEA, 2020).
There are also studies which suggest that technological innovation decreases
in an ageing society (Haga, 2015).
The relative importance governments ascribe to both public welfare and the
environment will determine where spending cuts will be implemented most
Uncertain- strongly, e.g. whether to save on healthcare or green technology investment.
ties Although guided by EU frameworks such as the Green Deal, individual Member
State decisions are likely to vary significantly and co-interact with a variety of
other factors, including – for example – voter trends toward the left or right.
There is considerable uncertainty over the degree to which an ageing popula-
tion actually increases public expenditure. Many researchers have shown that
ageing has contributed much less than widely thought to the observed growth
in expenditure, and in many Member States an actual reduction in per capita
spending at very old age (85+) can be observed. This is because alongside
real needs, social, economic and cultural considerations determine the alloca-
tion of resources to the sector and use of resources across different age
groups.
There is also uncertainty over the extent to which ageing inhibits economic
growth (see additional research needs).
Additional Some studies report that there is no evidence of a negative relationship be-
research or tween aging and economic growth (Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2022). The main
evidence difference in studies relates to whether ageing leads to more rapid adoption of
that may be automation technologies, or technological innovation decreases in an ageing
needed
February 2023 143

society (Haga, 2015). Further research could explore how exactly technolo-
gies which increase productivity, and/or help accommodate the elderly, can
directly assist with the green transition (this is explored more in Issue 2).
Both life expectancy, and the rates of ageing, vary significantly within Europe.
For example, the proportion of elderly people in Eastern Europe is currently
lower than in the European region as a whole, but life expectancy and the
proportion of elderly people in the population is increasing at a significantly
faster rate. Accounting for the different trajectories within Europe will be key
to understanding how long-term implications may differ by region, and to im-
plementing appropriate policy.
While lifelong learning may be key to reducing the productive decline associ-
ated with an elderly population, participation in lifelong learning is decreasing
across the EU (European Commission, 2021a). Further research could explore
why this is the case and how it may be alleviated.
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February 2023 146

APPENDIX B VALIDATION OF ISSUES BY SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEES

This Appendix summarises the key findings of peer-reviews by members of the European
Environment Agency (EEA) Scientific Committee and the Scientific Committee on Health,
Environmental and Emerging Risks (SCHEER) of the 10 priority issues identified in relation to
the achievement of Europe’s green transition.
The issues were divided between the two Scientific Committees for review based on the
relevance of each issue to the Committees areas of expertise.
On this basis the SCHEER reviewed and validated issues 2, 4, 7, 8 and 9; and the EEA Scientific
Committee issues 1, 3, 5, 6 and 10. A summary of the review is presented below. In addition,
some additional in-text comments and edits were provided my members of the Committees to
the text of issues 1, 3, 5, 6, 7 and 10.
Where possible, the opinions of the Scientific Committees have been incorporated into the issue
characterisations (listed in full in Appendix A), including edits (provided in form of tracked-
changes), in-text comments and suggested additional and/or alternative references.
In some cases particular suggestions and comments were not included, including in particular:
• Requests that would change the focus or scope of particular issues, beyond that which
was collectively agreed through the FORENV process (in particular sense-making
workshops). For example the review of Issue 4 proposed widening significantly the issue
description (and therefore scope) to include more detail on e.g. income differences in
urban populations, exploration of cycles of urbanisation and relationship between urban
core, periphery and suburbs. While all such suggestions were considered valuable and
relevant it was not possible to expand the scope in this manner. Some minor scope
changes were made however, for example, clarifying the focus and subsequently the
title of Issue 1 related to the political preferences of an ageing population, to better
reflect the evidence and narrative (i.e. predominant focus on voting preferences rather
than governance processes).
• Requests to re-write issues to be informed by more comprehensive literature and
evidence reviews (e.g. see EEA review comments on Issue 2, Issue 3). These
comments were understood and accepted as valid, however the design of the FORENV
approach is that issues are characterised based on the outcomes of scanning and
sensemaking, and the intention is that issues are selective and thus inevitably limited,
incomplete and partial in terms of evidence. Their aim is to spark discussion and
thinking rather than to attempt a complete assessment of literature in relation to the
topics identified. As noted in previous cycles, the FORENV emerging issue descriptions
are intended to be a selective, exploratory assessment of emerging evidence to identify
plausible future risks and opportunities rather than comprehensive evidence reviews.
The aim none-the-less is that the issues are as balanced as possible, and the views and
comments from both SCHEER and EEA scientific committees are invaluable in ensuring
this.
Summary of review by the SCHEER
This section presents verbatim the comments provided by the SCHEER on Issues 2, 4, 7, 8 and
9.
Issue 2: What will be the environmental impact of increased digitalisation and
automation/use of other technology in an ageing society?
General comments
The SCHEER agrees that digital technologies hold great potential for creating environmental
benefits, e.g., reduced air pollution due to less commuting journeys, but these technologies
themselves require considerable energy, use potentially scarce raw materials and contribute to
February 2023 147

environmental pollution, such as additional electronic waste, or mining of the raw materials, ei-
ther in the EU or elsewhere. Therefore, although digitalisation would reduce some sources of
traditional pollution, it would increase some emerging pollution sources, such as the e-waste
stream.
Taking into consideration the EU new circular economy policy (EEA, 2019), there is a need to
improve the waste management and recycling of e-waste.
Digitalisation will certainly transform energy supply to a more sustainable, reliable, convenient,
personalised, and controllable paradigm. At the same time information and communications
technologies (ICT) – including data centres, data networks and connected devices – have
emerged as an important source of energy demand (about 1%-2% of total demand). Therefore,
during energy crises, like the one we are currently experiencing, when decarbonization of en-
ergy production does not keep pace with the energy demands of digitalization, the digital trans-
formation may pose a risk to the environment.
As the SCHEER have commented previously, there is a risk of widening existing spatial or social
inequalities. Improvements in connectivity are required as well as enhancement of digital skills.
“To be fully empowered, people should have access to affordable, secure and high quality con-
nectivity, have a right to learn basic digital skills, and be equipped with other means which to-
gether allow them to fully participate in economic and societal activities (European Commission,
2022a)”.
Answers to mandate questions
Question 1: Is the emerging issue identified likely to have the risks and/or opportunities de-
scribed, or also additional ones? And if so, which ones?
It is the opinion of the SCHEER that, although the analysis provides a realistic picture of a
changing situation, some additional risks/opportunities have been identified.
• While some forms of technology may have brought positive changes in the world,
there is also evidence that technology overuse has some negative effects. Mobile
devices may lead to physical issues or exacerbate existing health conditions as the us-
ers get older. Such physical issues may include eyestrain (Sheppard and Wolffsohn,
2018), musculoskeletal degeneration (Zhuang et al., 2021) or sleep problems (Chang et
al., 2015).
• Elderly people are very often reluctant to engage in physical activity, due to the lack of
interest or motor impairments that are common for older ages. A number of environ-
mental factors make it difficult for older people to take exercise outdoors, such as the
weather or insecurity, but also the perception of the elderly of their physical abilities and
the conditions of outdoor spaces (Eronen et al., 2014). However, digital technology pre-
sents an opportunity by providing the tools and scenarios where physical activity and
social/cognitive development are combined (Boj et al., 2018) to encourage active and
healthy aging, through outdoors social activity. In this way digital technology can help
prevent or delay health conditions (obesity, diabetes, cardiovascular disease, depres-
sion, dementia) that may, in turn, require eHealth technology to support the elderly pa-
tient.
• Within the environmental sphere, increasing digitalisation of key infrastructure such as

electricity supply, or water treatment may leave such facilities open to disruptive cyber-
attacks.
Question 2: In your view, are there additional long -term development/s related to the issue
that the issue description currently omits? If so, please describe them briefly. Do these develop-
ment/s pose additional risks and/or opportunities?
February 2023 148

• The SCHEER did not identify any additional long-term developments, other than increas-
ing societal disaggregation and widening inequalities (risk), and the energy needs to
support such a transformation.
Question 3: Are the described expected implications (positive or negative) for the environment
and human health plausible, including the expected timeframe of emergence?
• The SCHEER is in agreement with the risks and opportunities identified in the FORENV
process and agrees that they are plausible. The SCHEER has also identified some addi-
tional environmental risk and opportunities as listed in the previous answers.
• The timescales are short to medium term.
Issue 4: What will be the environmental impact of changes in the demographic

makeup of urban areas?
General comments
The SCHEER has noted a number of gaps in the description of this issue.
• The term population or social structure of cities should be preferred, as used in the liter-
ature of population studies or demography. An early case is Scott (1965), who used
population structure, and an example of a recent case is e.g. Jones (2019), who uses
urban social structure. The issue of social structure is barely addressed as, on the con-
trary, it mostly focuses on secondary, related issues, particularly housing and contem-
porary family structures.
• Key drivers of change in urban population structure, such as trends (ageing, migration,
low fertility rate) are not carefully examined or identified (e.g. increasing spatial popula-
tion mobility, gentrification, economic restructuring of cities driven by deindustrialisation
and decline of the manufacturing industry due to globalisation, touristification, and plat-
form economies, or urban sprawl.
• Although migration is examined, migration flows imply a change of the urban population
structure. The immigrant community often has very specific social, cultural, and eco-
nomic needs and this is not addressed properly. Additionally, spatial mobility within the
city, or out of the city also changes population structure.
• Importantly, social structure - in terms of income or rent - is not addressed, which im-
plies that urban population is considered to be homogeneous in terms of income, rent,
employment, housing, mobility, needs and interests. It does not take into consideration
that the poor are more exposed to natural hazards and climate extremes as they settle
in more hazard-prone areas, which other residents - who can afford higher rents and
chose better neighbourhoods avoid.
• There is also no examination of the cycles of urbanisation (suburbanisation, counter-

urbanisation and reurbanisation) and their impact in population structure, since the is-
sue takes the city as a whole rather than identifying the diversity of processes in diverse
parts of the city: urban core area, urban periphery, and suburbs, inhabited by distinct
social groups (Moulaert et al., 2003; Pratschke and Morlicchio, 2012; Cunningham-
Sabot and Fol, 2010; Sequera and Nofre, 2018; Gould and Lewis, 2016; Hardaker, S.,
2021; Drahokoupil and Fabo, 2016).
February 2023 149

• The SCHEER identified and expanded on other environmental risks including the impact
of large cities: Concentrated vulnerability, Food-water-energy security, High density
emission of GHG and air/water pollution, Heat-island effect, Extreme heat waves, and
the effects of exposure to them on health.
• Shrinking cities lose their economic and financial basis to support the transition and the
provision of social and environmental services required by an aged population.
• Yet, shrinking cities could also bring opportunities: such as city greening, urban farming
or more suitability to implement nature-based solutions.
• While shrinking in population, some cities may still be growing in terms of land use or
extent, particularly in the peripheral areas. In some cases, it may be positive if the in-
crease of occupied land also brings growth of green areas, of services and utilities.
• Risks associated with negative impacts on landscape, erosion, or loss of biodiversity

pertain more to rural areas than to cities.
• Retrofitting should also be interpreted as saving natural resources, through recycling

material, with such materials having a life-cycle (Thormark 2001; Blengini 2009) and
preventing the extraction of additional raw materials.
• Tourism gentrification and Airbnb-induced tourism are the main factors of ghost dwell-
ings in tourist cities/regions out of season, with over-dimensioned infrastructure resi-
dents cannot afford to pay for with their taxes. This leads to residences without resi-
dents (Caramaschi and Chiodelli, 2021). This process of gentrification typically displaces
more vulnerable populations, particularly older adults from urban areas.
• Micro-housing has a negative side effect of increasing the consumption rate of natural
resources and energy per capita/resident.
• Shrinking cities also offer new opportunities for the elderly, with the development of lei-
sure-based communities or retirement communities (Nefs et al., 2013).
• Different types of migration change the structure of the urban population, for example
leisure and retirement communities within the cities increases the percentage of older
adults living in urban areas.
• SCHEER notes that the use of a qualifier such as “good” to refer to migration integration
policies and practices has a moral value.
Question 2: In your view, are there additional long -term development/s related to the issue
that the issue description currently omits? If so, please describe them briefly. Do these develop-
• The SCHEER has no additional developments to add.

• The SCHEER is of the view that the expected implications are plausible including the
time frame, which is medium to long term.
Issue 7: Will internal and international migration help or hinder the green
transition?
General comments
• The SCHEER notes that this issue is strongly related to issue 8, where climate-related
migration is discussed, thus it is difficult to separate the discussion of these two issues,
although the focus on social and economic drivers is the major emphasis.
February 2023 150

• It is noted that migrants bring human capital with them, education and skills as well as
local and indigenous knowledge. Migrants may also revitalise deprived neighbourhoods
by living in poor vacant housing (Carmon, 1998). IAdditionally, the migrant should also
be seen as a potential entrepreneur, although EU lags behind other regions of the world
in recognising this (Sahin et al.,2007).
• The document ‘The future of jobs is green’ (Asikainen et al., 2021) should be examined
in light of EU human mobility. There are issues relating to broader existing, emerging
and future jobs/business that should be taken into account to diversify the economic
scope.
• Also, social dimensions such as gender, not incorporated in the issue, or the re-skilling
of workers, should have been taken into consideration.
• The concept of climate-related mobility, rather than climate migrancy, better reflects
the complexities of the multiple forms and directions of human movement.
• The SCHEER has identified some additional risks including that skilled immigrants, like
any other skilled worker, now enjoy a greater degree of mobility, including having the
possibility to migrate outside of the EU.
• It is not clear that migrants working in the green sector have a lower environmental im-
pact than workers in other sectors.
• While remote working might reduce some emissions, it might also generate some new
types of emissions and use of ecosystem services and natural resources, through the
increasing use of computers, the internet and ICT technologies
• There is an increasing risk of pandemic or epidemic outbreaks due to the increased

number of travellers, as well as for the increased diversity of origins, intermediate stop-
overs, and destinations, due to the increased globalisation.
Question 2: In your view, are there additional long -term development/s related to the issue that
the issue description currently omits? If so, please describe them briefly. Do these development/s
pose additional risks and/or opportunities?
The SCHEER note the relation to Issue 8. The implications for the green transition are both positive
and negative, as identified in the SCHEER comments above.
and human health plausible, including the expected time-frame of emergence?
The SCHEER agrees that the implications are plausible and given that migration is a current fea-
ture, the time frame of emergence is current and short.
Issue 8: Will environmental factors have a growing influence on intra-EU migration

flows within the EU?
General comments
• Migration both within the EU and into the EU are covered in this issue. The main focus of
the issue is intra-EU migration. Climate change is one of the drivers, but environmental
factors including air and noise pollution, flooding and drought and land degradation also
contribute and while they may be related to climate change, they are also stand-alone
issues. The main implications identified in the issue concern the mobility of populations
February 2023 151

(both from urban centres to rural areas and at the same time to urban centres from ru-
ral). With the factors contributing to migration being climate change and other environ-
mental factors, taken together, they are labelled as quality of life (which presumably
also must have economic and social components).
• The issue should clarify the concept of migration. Mobility caused by air and noise pollu-
tion are frequently very limited in space. Just moving from the centre of the cities to-
ward less polluted surrounding areas, at short distances, usually does not involve
changing jobs. Could this movement be called “migration”?
• As argued, there is evidence of the significance - involving large numbers - of inter-EU

migration, some eventually driven by climate change or climate extremes, such as that
provided by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) in their yearly report
Global Report on Internal Displacement (Norwegian Refugee Council, 2021) where it
states that “Disasters triggered 276,000 internal displacements in Europe and Central
Asia in 2021. The most significant included wildfires in the Mediterranean, storms and
flooding in western and central Europe and a volcanic eruption in Spain’s Canary Is-
lands”.
• The evidence that Europe and North America are considered the two global regions with
the lowest level of ecological threat cannot be validated as the reference is not provided.
• The increased vulnerability of population to environmental drivers is not explained and

the appropriateness of the statement cannot be validated.
• Moving to areas with healthier environments by personal preference is interpreted as

migration. Suburbanisation is a process driven at least partly by this preference, but it is
unclear that this relocation can be interpreted in these terms.
• Some of the factors identified by the FORENV document (such as the increased mobility
due to disease and EU being at the lowest level of ecological threat) do not seem to be
backed-up by strong scientific evidence. As a Scientific Committee bound to scientific
integrity, the SCHEER does not wish to comment on these somewhat speculative factors
(unless they are properly supported by scientific data).
• The SCHEER has noted that there are a number of climate change drivers that were not
explicitly discussed in the issue and which should be developed and considered in this
issue. These include extreme temperatures, wildfires and drought/desertification.
• The SCHEER missed the discussion of age distribution of those who are migrating (pop-
ulation structure also referenced in Issue 4). The migration questions are nuanced in
terms of young people moving and leaving behind communities with a disproportion-
ately high number of elderly people. This is an additional risk, as well as the social and
environmental inequalities that stem from this.
• Changes in the demographic structure of urban populations would necessitate changes

in the functioning and management of cities. This may be positively combined with the
recent trends, as in many important European cities, toward more human and environ-
mentally friendly city planning (increase of pedestrian areas, of green areas, reduction
of car traffic in the centres, etc.).
• Connections to previous issues, notably Issue 7 are missing.
February 2023 152

• This issue cannot be separated from the social and environmental inequality agenda.
Food security is only mentioned briefly but the SCHEER considers should have a higher
profile, as well as the issues concerning water quantity (floods are specifically men-
tioned but perhaps droughts should be as well, as this year has shown that they are of
similar importance and considering that floods and droughts are two aspects of the
same problem of climate change).
and human health plausible, including the expected time frame of emergence?
• Migration has been happening for many years, so this is not a new issue. Historically,
the main drive would be opportunity (especially in terms of employment and economic
benefits), so the FORENV process has identified additional, but currently considered to
be small, drivers of migration, relative to the economic and social drivers. Environmen-
tal degradation and climate change are already happening, and again differentially im-
pacting specific parts of the EU population and geographic locations.
Issue 9: How will environmental and associated lifestyle choices impact fertility rates
and what are the environmental consequences of this?
General comments
• The SCHEER notes that birth rate is a more useful concept in relation to demographic
changes for this issue but have retained fertility rate as the term used in the mandate.
• Drivers of the declining fertility rate are both social and biological. While there is a de-
cline in male fertility due to environmental factors, women’s choice to have fewer chil-
dren and to have them at an older age is the most significant driver. Women’s decisions
are driven by the incompatibility between fully dedicating oneself to the workforce and
the demands of childrearing (Rindfuss and Brewster, 1996), the lack of affordable child-
care alternatives, the economic costs of children (Givord and Marbot, 2015), and the
view that couples’ relationships are increasingly transitory. According to one study,
“comprehensive maternal leave policies and cash benefits do not, in themselves, en-
courage fertility” (Rindfuss and Brewster, 1996) and ultimately the declining fertility
rate can be attributed to several causes including higher education among women,
changing gender roles and women undertaking new social roles (the gender revolution,
Goldscheider et al., 2015). Moreover, the decision to have children later in life also de-
creases female fertility.
• Fertility rates tend to be higher in poorly resourced countries but due to high maternal
and perinatal mortality, there is a reduction in birth rates. In developing countries, chil-
dren are needed as a labour force and to provide care for their parents in old age. In
these countries, fertility rates are higher due to the lack of access to contraceptives and
generally lower levels of female education. The social structure, religious beliefs, eco-
nomic prosperity and urbanisation within each country are likely to affect birth rates, as
will abortion rates. Developed countries tend to have a lower fertility rate due to life-
style choices associated with economic affluence. Where mortality rates are low, birth
control is easily accessible and children often can become an economic drain caused by
housing, education cost and other cost involved in bringing up children. Higher educa-
tion and professional careers often mean that women have children late in life.
February 2023 153

• There are several factors such as urban lifestyle factors including arise in obesity and
environmental factors involved in urbanisation that are affecting fertility and have led to
rise in male and female subfertility. In addition, there are socio-economic factors that
have led to women and couples to delay having children. Lack of affordable housing,
flexible and part-time career posts for women and affordable and publicly funded (free)
childcare have contributed to the current low fertility/birth rates. Couples/women are
delaying starting a family, which has led to a true decline in their fertility levels due to
ovarian ageing and related reasons leading to a reduced chance of conception.
• Declining population, particularly the working population, presents a challenge for the
social security and pension systems (Amaglobeli et al., 2019; Yenilmez, 2015).
• The issue has not fully addressed the counterbalance of a female working population,
the necessary childcare to allow mothers to work.
• Financial incentives to drive change in the decline of fertility rate do not demonstrate a
substantive impact (Givord and Marbot, 2015; Bick, 2016; Gracia and Esping-Andersen,
2015).
• The issue as described has identified the potential developments, were the declining
population to continue. This is also linked to migration into the EU, as are Issues 7 and
8.
• The implications are plausible, any counter measures are likely to have a medium to
long time frame.
February 2023 154

Summary of review by the EEA Scientific Committee
This section presents verbatim the comments by the EEA Scientific Committee on issues 1, 3, 5,
6 and 10.
Issue 1: How might Europe’s ageing population influence political and governance
processes for the green transition?
Two separate reviews were provided for Issue 1.
Review 1
I read the text related to this issue with interest. It held several important ideas, but I found
myself rather confused by the overall text. Here I provide some comments that I hope will be
useful for further reflection. See also a few comments provided directly to the text.
1. Reliance on certain bodies of literature: The text ends with the assertion that there is insuffi-
cient research on the specific topic of how an ageing population might affect governance and
the democratic process in the green transition. I wish that the text had started in this manner
and had done a better job of identifying (in a transparent manner) the related bodies of litera-
ture upon which the text relies. This seems to be around topics such as generational voter pref-
erences; youth participation in democratic processes; climate/environment activist movements;
and relying on survey data. Because we don’t really get this early overview, we are presented
upfront with the results of literature on generational voter preferences, as if this is the most im-
portant body of literature we should rely on here. This literature clearly states differences in
voting preferences of current older and younger generations. The rest of the text seems to build
around this literature, acknowledging that it is more complex but never really challenging the
basic assumptions of that body of literature for the specific issue at hand. In this text, we are
clearly concerned about ageing populations, so we are also looking at those people that will in
the future be considered an older voter, not the differences in voting preferences between cur-
rent older and younger generations. The literature presented later adds so many caveats and
contextual factors and uncertainty that the potential implications, and the proposed opportuni-
ties and risks seem questionable.
2. Timeline: Many of the findings discussed seem to be focusing too much on the current
older/younger generations. In other words, we can expect future older generations to have dif-
ferent preferences based on different lived experiences. So why build the list of implications and
their risks/opportunities based on this current assessment? It seems to me that there would
also be differences if we were to look at the older population in 10 years rather than the older
population in 30 or in 50 years. This is not broken down, and it is not really explicitly reflected
upon in the paper. In that regard, I am not sure how applicable or relevant the implications are
(or if they are, then when are they applicable).
3. Where is the focus on broader governance and political processes?: I find it strange that the
issue is interested in the influence of an ageing population on political and governance pro-
cesses, but the text focuses exclusively on voting. The generations are discussed in terms of
who votes and who doesn’t (more older people eligible to vote, young people under 18 cannot
vote). But political and governance processes are far more than occasional elections. Protests,
activism, direct action – these are also political and governance processes. Our democratic and
governance systems are also changing. There is more interest in direct citizen participation pro-
cesses, in acknowledgement of the failure of traditional electoral democracy to effectively repre-
sent the interests of the population. These democratic shifts could be discussed more (not fo-
cusing on voting tendencies, voting eligibility only).
4. Data gaps: I feel it would be important to present some more data. How many people are
part of the different generations today in Europe, versus expectations in 2030, 2040, 2050,
February 2023 155

2060…? What is meant by ‘older’? A 90 year old in 2022 is unlikely to be engaged with social
media, I suppose, but what about a 65 year old? How represented are young people in the polit-
ical systems in Europe in 2022, and can we really say that young people will be less represented
in future? Also proportionally, it would be interesting to see data on current generational repre-
sentation. Because a later implication that representation will reduce is mentioned without the
current figures being presented.
5. Potential implications, opportunities, risks: I am afraid I am not convinced by the list of impli-
cations, opportunities and risks, for three main reasons: (1) it is not clear which of these impli-
cations is expected over what sort of timeline, and why these are expected, given the many
contextual factors/uncertainties laid out; (2) many of the opportunities and risks are not new –
these are current risks/opportunities with the green transition that are somehow the status quo,
so how are they really related to the ageing population issue? (3) some of the risks are just re-
lated to climate impacts, rather than to ageing population.
Review 2
1. Scope: the article is about voters and restricts political involvement of people to elections
(calling people ‘voters’), whereas in reality people, young as well as old, are involved in many
more policy influencing activities than only voting. Why this restriction? Or is the author coming
from the USA tradition of calling policymakers ‘regulators’ and citizens ‘voters’? Or is he/she
giving an economists’ perspective on public policy and governance (then that should be men-
tioned). The reality in Europe is that people, young and old equally I believe, are involved in all
kinds of civil society organisations/networks to influence policymaking and political decision-
making. Conclusion: either the title should be changed into something confined to elections, or
the content should be elaborated with sections on other forms of policy and governance influ-
encing, such as through public consultation processes in e.g. regulatory impact assessment,
through CSO advocacy, through CSO-Government partnerships, through co-creation and co-de-
cision, etc.
2. Foresight?: How is this paper meant to contribute to foresight for the environment? It is not a
vision, nor a scenario, nor a horizon scan. It merely assumes certain trends based on an eclectic
selection of academic and grey literature. Many assumptions I do not share and I am not con-
vinced that they are based on empery. The idea, for example, that the elderly will be less envi-
ronmental-friendly because they are not educating themselves anymore and then do not under-
stand the complex environmental problems. The author seems not aware that the aging genera-
tion is the one who started environmental awareness and protection. And the current aging pop-
ulation also started the practice of life-long learning and many of them keep on learning. Other
facts in the paper are surprising: on p 2 I read that the current young generation finds mental
health an important issue; is that really the case?
3. Central thesis: The whole argument in the paper seems to be built on an assumed environ-
mentally-relevant tension between older and younger generations, without looking at other pos-
sibilities (one could, for example, also claim that there is a silent agreement between young and
elderly that environmental protection is the top priority, and that the ‘middle’ generation who is
in power currently neglects the crises we are in). The paper also ignores the different situation
across the EU member states. There is not one topic where the societal situation is the same in
all EU MSs, so this theme would be an exception – but why? Not convincing.
Additional overall comments
Reviewer 1: The implications, opportunities, risks seem to build upon findings of one main
body of literature, and I am not sure this is really the most appropriate way to generate the im-
plications, given the many other uncertainties and contextual factors that are also mentioned in
the text.
February 2023 156

Reviewer 2: Unless the paper is rewritten in a more sound and evidence-informed way, with a
clear scope, link to foresight, and an underpinning of the central thesis, I am not able to see
how this could be the basis for a fruitful discussion.
Issue 3: Will changes in the organisation of work change the structure of rural settle-
ment, mobility and land use with an impact on environmental quality?
Missing a balanced literature research. The story seems to be written before literature search,
and then only literature was sought that fitted with the story.
Issue 5: Will urban greening emerge as a key tool in thriving cities of the future?
Reviewer 1: Document is well structured and convincing.
Reviewer 2: I enjoyed reading the document very much and only have some minor comments
and suggestions to make (see the issue characterisation).
Issue 6: As Europe’s population ages, will consumption patterns change and what will
this mean for the environment?
Reviewers submitted comments and revised text in the issue characterisation document only.
Issue 10: How will the fiscal and financial implications of demographic change shape
the green transition?
See response to the next question.
Question 2: In your view are there additional long-term development/s related to the issue that
the issue description currently omits? If so please describe them briefly. Do these develop-
Already today, ageing of the population has serious implications for the green transition in the
short and medium term. It is widely reported that Europe currently lacks tens of thousands of
people who could work on green energy and mobility projects. Although demography is not the
sole factor causing these personnel shortages, population ageing is partly responsible for this
problem, both in Central and Eastern European countries where the old-age dependency ratio
has deteriorated sharply, and in highly industrialised countries like Germany and France. This
development makes it clearly more difficult to achieve the objectives of the European Green
Deal. In turn, this calls for:
• Stronger public support of green projects (e.g. in the energy, mobility and waste pre-
vention field) in order to make such investments more attractive to private investors
and to employees to work in these sectors.
• A need to intensify the re-skilling or up-skilling large parts of the workforce; this will
need both public and private financial support to design and implement specific pro-
grammes to train sufficient technicians in critical green transition jobs such as energy
renovations35, installation of heat pumps36, construction and maintenance of electric
35 According to the European Federation of Building and Wood Workers, “We have an ageing
workforce in many countries. This is mainly because we have seen that there’s not enough in-
flow of young workers”.
36 According to the European Heating Industry (2021), “In Germany and in Poland, only 10% of
installers are qualified to work with heat pump technologies.”
February 2023 157

vehicles37, etc. The linkage between demography, training, and the green transition is
particularly emphasized by trade unions38.
Such expenditures are likely to reduce the available funds for other public investments and can
put challenges to public finances in addition to the other demography-related risks outlined in
the draft note of issue 10.
and human health plausible, including the expected time-frame of emergence?
Yes, the expected implications and the time-frame are plausible.
Additional overall comments from a member of the EEA Scientific Committee on Is-
sues 3, 5 and 6
• I found all of them well researched and convincingly summarised. Well done!
• It may be good to include an overview table summarising the different drivers/risks with
a colour code (get worse, improve etc), accompanied by the level of confidence we have
in the existing evidence, so that these can be compared and understood quickly. Per-
haps this may be considered in the next round of the foresight exercise.
• It may also be useful to highlight if some hypotheses were covered in the text due to
insufficient evidence (e.g. impact of aging on political landscapes, electoral preferences
and green behaviour). Just a suggestion
37 “According to industrial estimates, 800,000 workers will need to learn new or additional skills
in the battery industry by 2025”. See https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/de-
tail/en/QANDA_22_1257
38 See e.g. the comments of the European Trade Union Confederation on the European Commis-
sion’s Green Paper on Ageing
February 2023 158

APPENDIX C KEY TO ICONS USED IN ISSUE CLUSTERS
February 2023 159

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The EU Environmental

Foresight System (FORENV)

Emerging environmental issues due to demographic changes in the EU

More information on the European Union is available on the Internet (http://www.europa.eu).

Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2023

PDF KH-03-22-246-EN-N ISBN 978-92-76-60198-2 doi: 10.2779/495525

© European Union, 2023

1 FORENV Rationale and Method 13

2 Summary of the Ten Priority Emerging Issues 19

3 Clusters of Disruptive Changes from the Priority Emerging

4 Policy Questions and Concluding Reflections 31

Appendix A Full Characterisation of Emerging Issues

Appendix B Validation of Issues by Scientific Committees

Appendix C Key to Icons Used in Issue Clusters

FORENV is based on a systematic, 5-

Box A: Topic for FORENV 2021-22 – Emerging environmental issues due to

Cluster 1: Lifelong learning and skills for the green transition

Cluster 2: Cities innovating to manage the

Cluster 3: Can an ageing society be a green one?

Cluster 4: Demographic change, social and environmental inequalities

Cluster 5: Will there be a convergence between green, digital and demographic

Key policy questions

2. Supporting green skills throughout society

3. Addressing environmental footprints and equity

governments at all levels ensure that lower-income segments of the population

4. Changing settlement patterns of skilled workers

5. Sustainably “downsizing” cities

1 FORENV RATIONALE AND METHOD

1.1 Background and rationale

1.2 Objectives and process

1. Bring together in a systematic framework existing knowledge and expertise in the

4. Communicate emerging issues to EU policy makers and stakeholders in a timely manner

1.2.2 Process amendments in response to the COVID-19 pandemic

1.2.3 Previous amendments to FORENV to enhance policy relevance (third annual

1.2.4 Fourth annual cycle:

Box A: Emerging environmental issues due to demographic changes in the EU

In Europe detailed demographic projections exist, such as those developed by EUROSTAT,

1.2.5 Summary of outputs and structure of this report

Table 1: FORENV Process 2021-22

Step 1: Information gathering

Picture 1: Example screenshot from items collation using Pearltrees software

Step 2: Sense-making and selection

7 Social, Technological, Environmental, Economic, Political, Legal

Step 4: Validation by a scientific committee

Step 5: Outputs and communication

2 SUMMARY OF THE TEN PRIORITY EMERGING ISSUES

How might Europe’s ageing population influence political prefer-

What will be the environmental impact of increased digitalisation

Will changes in the organisation of work change the structure of

What will be the environmental impact of changes in the demo-

Will urban greening emerge as a key tool in thriving cities of the

As Europe’s population ages, will consumption patterns change

Will internal and international migration help or hinder the green

Will environmental factors have a growing influence on intra-EU

How will environmental and associated lifestyle choices impact

How will the fiscal and financial implications of demographic

3 CLUSTERS OF DISRUPTIVE CHANGES FROM THE PRIORITY

The clusters presented in this Section are:

corresponds to one of the ten priority emerging

3.3 Cluster 3: Can an ageing society be a green one?

3.4 Cluster 4: Evolving inequalities driven by demographic change

4 POLICY QUESTIONS AND CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS

4.1 Financing the green transition in an ageing society

4.2 Supporting green skills throughout society