RULES 110 TO 127: CRIMINAL PROCEDURE In civil cases, there are 5 parties.
In civil cases, there are 5 parties. The court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the
I. PRINCIPLES ON JURISDICTION
Principles on Jurisdiction in Civil Cases:
 Any judgment, decision, resolution or order rendered by a court without jurisdiction
is null and void.
 Concurrence of jurisdiction
 Hierarchy of courts
 Principle of transcendental importance
 SC is not a trier of facts
 Primary jurisdiction – [original meaning] exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Even before you go to the regular court, you have to avail of administrative bodies or
entities with quasi-judicial power.
o “Primary” pertains to the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman has
primary jurisdiction over all cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan in the exercise
of its original jurisdiction. Sandiganbayan has both appellate and original
jurisdiction, unlike the CA and SC which do not have original jurisdiction over
criminal cases.
o Example where the Sandiganbayan takes cognizance of a criminal case in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction: Escobal vs Garchitorena: Appeal is to the
Sandiganbayan because the accused is a Police Inspector with salary grade 23. It
must be brought before the RTC, and then appealed to the Sandiganbayan.
o When will the Sandiganbayan exercise original jurisdiction? Anti-graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Ill Gotten Wealth, Bribery, PCGG, Falsification and Estafa
(pursuant to jurisprudence).
 Additional requirements: the public officer was charged before the Sandiganbayan
must have salary grade 27 and above. This is not absolute because there are certain
public officers which are not salary graded (like the Dean of Pamantasan ng
Lunsod ng Maynila, Directors of GOCCs). See Salary Classification and
Compensation Act (will come out in the finals).
 Also, the crime was committed in relation to one’s office. Should the public office
be an ingredient of the offense? When the public office or public function
“facilitated” the commission of the crime, it is already in relation to one’s office
(Serana case). Before, you must be an accountable officer. In other words, the
public office must be an ingredient of the crime pursuant to Sanchez vs Demetriou
and Lacson vs Executive Secretary. But this was modified in Hannah Serana,
where it does not have be an element of the crime.
 Residual jurisdiction
Principles on Jurisdiction in Criminal Cases:
1. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law
2. Jurisdiction over the territory is conferred by law since venue is jurisdictional
Venue is jurisdictional in criminal cases. That is why jurisdiction over the territory does not
apply in civil cases.
3. Jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired through arrest or voluntary
surrender
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intervenor upon approval of the motion to intervene. One cannot intervene pursuant to
Rule 19. You can only intervene after the court approves your motion for intervention. It
must always be by leave of court.
4. Jurisdiction of the court is determined by the law enforced at the time of the
commission of the offense
In civil cases, the court does not have to acquire jurisdiction over the res as long as it has
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. But if it cannot acquire jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant, and acquires jurisdiction over the res, the case can continue. The
limitation is: upon satisfaction of judgment, only the res is answerable. Beyond the
proceeds from the sale of the res, it can no longer be taken.
In civil cases, jurisdiction over the issue is determined by the allegations in the pleadings.
Jurisdiction over the res is not applicable in criminal cases. Rather, it is jurisdiction over
the offense.
Does the principle of adherence to jurisdiction apply in criminal cases? Yes. Once
jurisdiction is acquired by the criminal court, it has to continue until final judgment. [Venue
is the one that may change]. But it has to have jurisdiction. If it takes cognizance of a case
and it has no jurisdiction, the judgment is null and void.
Which court has jurisdiction over offenses? What is the determinant? Penalty imposable,
not penalty imposed.
Exception: Sandiganbayan. [determinants: public officer, salary grade, etc.]
Exception to the exception:
If penalty is the determinant of jurisdiction, when is a crime or offense cognizable by
the RTC and when is it cognizable by MTC? Take note that SC and CA have no original
jurisdiction. The penalty imposable is found in the RPC or in the special law. MTC has
jurisdiction where penalty is 6 years and below. RTC will have jurisdiction where penalty is
6 years & 1 day and above.
If an ordinance says the penalty is death, which court has jurisdiction? No court has
jurisdiction because death penalty has been suspended.
Examples: MTC has jurisdiction over jaywalking, which is a city ordinance. BP 22,
irrespective of the amount of the check, must be filed with the MTC because it is governed
by Rules on Summary Procedure.
A. Supreme Court
1. Appellate
a. By appeal
b. By petition for review
(No original jurisdiction)
B. Court of Appeals
 b. Violence against Women and Children
1. Appellate c. Drug cases
a. By appeal
b. By petition for review F. Metropolitan/Municipal Trial Courts

(No original jurisdiction) 1. All violations of city/municipal ordinances

2. All offenses punishable with imprisonment of not more than 6 years
C. Sandiganbayan 3. Violations of Traffic rules and regulations
4. Violations of Bouncing Check law
1. Original and exclusive under the following guidelines 5. Damage to property with fine of not more than P10,000

a. what crime or offense was committed G. Courts of Muslin Mindanao (RA 6734 as amended)

(a) R.A. 3019 – Anti-graft and corrupt practice act 1. Shari’ah Appellate Court
(b) R.A. 1379 – Law on ill-gotten Wealth 2. Shari’ah District Court
(c) Chap. II, Title VII, Bk. 2 – Bribery under the RPC 3. Shari’ah Circuit Court
(d) Ex. Orders 1, 2, 14, 14-A – on PCGG
(e) Estafa – Hannah Serana vs Sandiganbayan De Vera vs De Vera
(f) Falsification – Garcia vs Sandiganbayan People vs Benipayo
Fox, Jr. vs People
b. who committed the offense/crime People vs Sandiganbayan
Ramiscal, Jr. vs Sandiganbayan
(a) public officers in the legislative, executive and judicial branches with salary grade 27 People vs Racho
according to R.A. 6758, the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989. People vs Henry Ty Go
Escobal vs Garchitorena

c. how was the offense/crime committed

- in relation to one’s office or function II. RULE 110 – PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES [of criminal actions]
- R.A. 7975; R.A. 8249
A. Institution of Criminal Actions (Sec. 1)
Lacson vs Executive Secretary
Sanchez vs Demetriou Section 1. Institution of criminal actions. — Criminal actions shall be instituted as follows:

2. Appellate Jurisdiction (a) For offenses where a preliminary investigation is required pursuant to section 1 of
Rule 112, by filing the complaint with the proper officer for the purpose of
All cases from RTC where salary grade of public officer is below 27, whether exercising conducting the requisite preliminary investigation.
original or appellate jurisdiction (b) For all other offenses, by filing the complaint or information directly with the
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, or the complaint with the
D. Regional Trial Courts office of the prosecutor. In Manila and other chartered cities, the complaint shall be
filed with the office of the prosecutor unless otherwise provided in their charters.
1. Original Exclusive
The institution of the criminal action shall interrupt the running period of prescription of
All criminal cases which are not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court. the offense charged unless otherwise provided in special laws.

2. Appellate How do you institute civil actions? By the filing of the complaint and the timely payment
of the correct docket fees.
All criminal cases from the MTC.
- how is criminal action instituted
E. Family Courts
Where do you commence a criminal action? To answer this, you must know how to
1. Exclusive original commence a criminal action. It depends upon how you commence a criminal action that
you will be able to answer where to commence it. A criminal action is commenced either
a. where a party to the crime/offense is a minor at the time of commission through a (1) complaint; or (2) an information.
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When does one commence a criminal action through a complaint? through an
information?
A was walking along Avinida. A is murdered with the aggravating circumstance of
superior force by clubbing him to death and then shooting him and then tying his genitals
[ignominy]. How will you commence the case? Avinida is in Metro Manila. All cases in
Metro Manila, and other chartered cities, must always pass through the fiscal’s office. There
can be no direct filing.
If this happened outside Metro Manila [example: Kalawang, Laguna], there can still be no
direct filing because it is punishable by more than 4 years, 2 months and 1 day [prision
correccional maximum]. It can be cognizable by the MTC. It may still pass through
preliminary investigation because RA 7691 was enacted to expand the jurisdiction of the
lower courts. When it comes to preliminary investigation, 4 years, 2 months & 1 day and
above is still cognizable by the MTC but it requires preliminary investigation. This is
definitely initiated through a preliminary investigation.
Example where a criminal action can be commenced through a complaint and directly
filed with the court: A policeman was walking along Avinida at the back of Santa Cruz
Church. He saw teenagers gambling. The police arrested them. There can be no direct filing
because even though the penalty is only 1 day to 30 days, it is in Metro Manila.
A policeman caught them gambling behind the Church in Kalawang, Laguna. This shall be
directly filed because the penalty is definitely less than 4 years 2 months and 1 day. No
need to go through preliminary investigation.
- when is it deemed instituted
- who is qualified to instituted it
Section 5. Who must prosecute criminal actions. — All criminal actions commenced by a
complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the
prosecutor. However, in Municipal Trial Courts or Municipal Circuit Trial Courts when the
prosecutor assigned thereto or to the case is not available, the offended party, any peace
officer, or public officer charged with the enforcement of the law violated may prosecute
the case. This authority cease upon actual intervention of the prosecutor or upon elevation
of the case to the Regional Trial Court. (This Section was repealed by A.M. No. 02-2-07-SC effective
May 1, 2002)
The crimes of adultery and concubinage shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint
filed by the offended spouse. The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution
without including the guilty parties, if both alive, nor, in any case, if the offended party has
consented to the offense or pardoned the offenders.
The offenses of seduction, abduction and acts of lasciviousness shall not be prosecuted
except upon a complaint filed by the offended party or her parents, grandparents or
guardian, nor, in any case, if the offender has been expressly pardoned by any of them. If
the offended party dies or becomes incapacitated before she can file the complaint, and she
has no known parents, grandparents or guardian, the State shall initiate the criminal action
in her behalf.
The offended party, even if a minor, has the right to initiate the prosecution of the offenses
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of seduction, abduction and acts of lasciviousness independently of her parents,
grandparents, or guardian, unless she is incompetent or incapable of doing so. Where the
offended party, who is a minor, fails to file the complaint, her parents, grandparents, or
guardian may file the same. The right to file the action granted to parents, grandparents or
guardian shall be exclusive of all other persons and shall be exercised successively in the
order herein provided, except as stated in the preceding paragraph.
No criminal action for defamation which consists in the imputation of the offenses
mentioned above shall be brought except at the instance of and upon complaint filed by the
offended party.
The prosecution for violation of special laws shall be governed by the provisions thereof.
There are certain crimes or offenses that can only be initiated by the offended party:
concubinage, adultery, seduction, acts of lasciviousness, abduction. Rape may now be filed
de oficio (not de parte anymore). The parents, grandparents and guardian ad litem may
also commence (in that order). If there are parents, the grandparents cannot file. If there are
no parents, but there are grandparents, the guardian ad litem cannot file.
Albert and Beatrice are married. Beatrice committed adultery with X, who is married to Y.
Can Y file a case of adultery against Beatrice? No, only the offended spouse can commence
it. She is the offended spouse in concubinage but not in adultery. X may have committed
concubinage as far as Y is concerned. But as far as adultery is concerned, Y is not the
offended spouse. Only Albert can file a case of adultery against Beatrice.
Defamation on these matters cannot be prosecuted de oficio. Defamation on other matters
may be prosecuted de oficio. Oral defamation was laid down in Benipayo: He talked before
the UP community and he reiterated what he discussed in the Drilon program. Photokina
filed a libel case against Benipayo before the Sandiganbayan. SC: RTC has jurisdiction over
the libel case.
Fox, Jr: SC acquitted the accused on the ground that the information contained facts which
do not constitute an offense. Under the law on libel, it must be written. There was no
allegation in the information as to where it was printed. In order for one to be charged with
libel, the libelous remark or article must be circulated where, among others, the private
complainant resides, is located/found.
Any ingredient of the offense, that will be the proper venue. Example: A is in Laguna. B
posted a libelous remark against A on facebook. A can file the case in Laguna or in B’s
residence.
Elements of Libel (IMPI): identification, malice, publication, injury
If the facts charged do not constitute an offense and a motion to quash is filed on that
ground, Rule 117 states that it can be corrected by amendment. The only grounds that
cannot be corrected under motion to quash would be extinction of criminal liability and
double jeopardy.
Who files the complaint? The aggrieved party, who is the State. The private complainant is
only a witness. That’s why in evidence, trial is public but the court may exclude the public
including the private complainant. But not in civil cases because in civil cases, the private
complainant or plaintiff is a party to the case.
The difference upon a complaint and an information depends upon the verification. If it is
verified by a private party, it is a complaint. If it is verified by a public officer, it is an
Information.
a) by complaint – de parte
Section 2. The Complaint or information. — The complaint or information shall be in writing,
in the name of the People of the Philippines and against all persons who appear to be
responsible for the offense involved.
Section 3. Complaint defined. — A complaint is a sworn written statement charging a person
with an offense, subscribed by the offended party, any peace officer, or other public officer
charged with the enforcement of the law violated.
b) by information – de oficio
Section 4. Information defined. — An information is an accusation in writing charging a
person with an offense, subscribed by the prosecutor and filed with the court.
B. Sufficiency of Complaint or Information (Sec. 6)
Section 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. — A complaint or information is sufficient
if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the
acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party;
the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was
committed.
When an offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the
complaint or information.
When is an information sufficient?
a) name of accused
Section 7. Name of the accused. — The complaint or information must state the name and
surname of the accused or any appellation or nickname by which he has been or is known.
If his name cannot be ascertained, he must be described under a fictitious name with a
statement that his true name is unknown.
If the true name of the accused is thereafter disclosed by him or appears in some other
manner to the court, such true name shall be inserted in the complaint or information and
record.
b) name of offended party
Section 12. Name of the offended party. — The complaint or information must state the name
and surname of the person against whom or against whose property the offense was
committed, or any appellation or nickname by which such person has been or is known. If
there is no better way of identifying him, he must be described under a fictitious name.
(a) In offenses against property, if the name of the offended party is unknown, the
property must be described with such particularity as to properly identify the offense
charged.
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(b) If the true name of the of the person against whom or against whose properly the
offense was committed is thereafter disclosed or ascertained, the court must cause the
true name to be inserted in the complaint or information and the record.
(c) If the offended party is a juridical person, it is sufficient to state its name, or any
name or designation by which it is known or by which it may be identified, without
need of averring that it is a juridical person or that it is organized in accordance with
law.
c) name of offense
Section 8. Designation of the offense. — The complaint or information shall state the
designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the
offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation
of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing
it.
How is the offense designated? Under the Rules, in layman’s language so that it is
understandable by an ordinary individual. The essential ingredients of the offense must
always be stated. If you miss 1 essential ingredient of the offense in the information, that is
dismissible on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense [Rule 117].
d) cause of accusation
Section 9. Cause of the accusation. — The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and
concise language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms
sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is being
charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court to
pronounce judgment.
e) place of commission
Section 10. Place of commission of the offense. — The complaint or information is sufficient if
it can be understood from its allegations that the offense was committed or some of the
essential ingredients occurred at some place within the jurisdiction of the court, unless the
particular place where it was committed constitutes an essential element of the offense or is
necessary for its identification.
There are crimes where the place is an essential ingredient. Example: Theft in the national
library and highway robbery.dupi
f) date of commission
Section 11. Date of commission of the offense. — It is not necessary to state in the complaint or
information the precise date the offense was committed except when it is a material
ingredient of the offense. The offense may be alleged to have been committed on a date as
near as possible to the actual date of its commission.
Regarding the place and time, they do not have to be exact. If it is committed in Manila,
you do not have to specify that it was committed in Tondo or Malate. The information
usually just says “within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court.”

Example of a crime where time is an element: under the aggravating circumstances,
nighttime may increase the penalty.
Section 13. Duplicity of the offense. — A complaint or information must charge but one
offense, except when the law prescribes a single punishment for various offenses.
There can be no joinder of causes of action here. Even in BP 22, each check is equivalent to
one information. Exception: in cases of complex crimes where one act or omission violates
2 laws.
C. Amendment vs Substitution (Sec. 14)
- distinguish
- compare with Rule 10
Section 14. Amendment or substitution. — A complaint or information may be amended, in
form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea.
After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of
court and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.
However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the offense
charged in or excludes any accused from the complaint or information, can be made only
upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of court.
The court shall state its reasons in resolving the motion and copies of its order shall be
furnished all parties, especially the offended party.
If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the
proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing
of a new one charging the proper offense in accordance with section 19, Rule 119, provided
the accused shall not be placed in double jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses to
give bail for their appearance at the trial.
D. Place where action is to be instituted (Sec. 15)
Section 15 speaks of the venue of a criminal action, which is jurisdictional.
Section 15. Place where action is to be instituted. —
(a) Subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court
of the municipality or territory where the offense was committed or where any of
its essential ingredients occurred.
(b) Where an offense is committed in a train, aircraft, or other public or private vehicle
while in the course of its trip, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the
court of any municipality or territory where such train, aircraft or other vehicle
passed during such its trip, including the place of its departure and arrival.
(c) Where an offense is committed on board a vessel in the course of its voyage, the
criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the first port of entry or
of any municipality or territory where the vessel passed during such voyage,
subject to the generally accepted principles of international law.
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(d) Crimes committed outside the Philippines but punishable under Article 2 of the
Revised Penal Code shall be cognizable by the court where the criminal action is
first filed.
E. Intervention of offended party (Sec. 16)
Section 16. Intervention of the offended party in criminal action. — Where the civil action for
recovery of civil liability is instituted in the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111, the
offended party may intervene by counsel in the prosecution of the offense.
Is this similar to Rule 19? No. The intervenor here is the counsel for the private
complainant.
In a prosecution for murder, there is a counsel de parte. This counsel de parte of the
private complainant manifests before the court that they are reserving the filing of the
civil action arising from the offense. If you were the judge, what will you do? I will grant
it. The court will say present evidence. The public prosecutor will present evidence, not the
private counsel. The prosecution is always by the public prosecutor because the offended
party here in effect is the State. In that manifestation of the lawyer, the counsel for the
private complainant, he disqualifies himself. He can no longer participate in the
proceeding. He can no longer intervene. If a private lawyer prosecutes, it is only to
establish the civil liability of the accused. The criminal liability must be established by the
public prosecutor.
Miaque vs Patag
Baltazar vs Chua
People vs Teodoro
Leviste vs Alameda:
III. RULE 111 – PROSECUTION OF CIVIL ACTION
You are cross-referred to Rule 112.
A. Civil liability arising from the offense is deemed instituted (Sec. 1)
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. — (a) When a criminal action is instituted,
the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be
deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil
action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the
criminal action.
The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made before the
prosecution starts presenting its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended
party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.
General rule: Once a criminal case is filed, the civil aspect is deemed instituted with it.
Exceptions: waiver, reservation, prior institution (WaRP)
- filing fees; counterclaim; cross-claim; third party complaint
“When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of
moral, nominal, temperate, or exemplary damages without specifying the amount thereof
in the complaint or information, the filing fees thereof shall constitute a first lien on the
judgment awarding such damages.
Where the amount of damages, other than actual, is specified in the complaint or
information, the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the
filing thereof in court.
Except as otherwise provided in these Rules, no filing fees shall be required for actual
damages.
No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the accused in the
criminal case, but any cause of action which could have been the subject thereof may be
litigated in a separate civil action. ”
- compare with Rule 6, Sec. 7, 8, 11
- BP 22, peculiar nature
(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include
the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be
allowed.
Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay in
full the filing fees based on the amount of the check involved, which shall be considered as
the actual damages claimed. Where the complaint or information also seeks to recover
liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the offended party shall pay
additional filing fees based on the amounts alleged therein. If the amounts are not so
alleged but any of these damages are subsequently awarded by the court, the filing fees
based on the amount awarded shall constitute a first lien on the judgment.
Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it
may be consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the court trying the
latter case. If the application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance
with section 2 of this Rule governing consolidation of the civil and criminal actions.
BP 22 can never have a reservation.
Can you file a separate civil action for BP 22? Yes, you can file. When? Prior to the
institution of the criminal case. Once you institute the criminal case, you can no longer
separate it. Exceptions: In BP 22, what is prohibited is only reservation. Waiver and prior
institution are not prohibited.
If you institute the civil aspect of the bouncing check prior, what happens when you file
the criminal case? It can either be suspended and you proceed to the criminal case, or the
cases can be consolidated. When you file a case of BP 22 civilly, and thereafter you file a
criminal case, the 2 possible effects are suspension or consolidation.
Is filing fee jurisdictional in BP 22? It constitutes a first lien on the judgment. First lien on
the judgment means the filing fee will be deducted from the award. In other civil cases, the
principle of first lien can also apply.
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The criminal aspect in BP 22 [as in any other crimes] has no fee. But because of the civil
aspect, you have to pay. Example: A filed for murder. There is no payment. But there will
always be a civil aspect/liability. A does not pay for it because it was not alleged in the
information. But when the court awards damages, first lien on the judgment will be
applied.
B. Suspension of civil action (Sec. 2)
- when suspended, consolidated
- Bar Rule in Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data
Section 2. When separate civil action is suspended. — After the criminal action has been
commenced, the separate civil action arising therefrom cannot be instituted until final
judgment has been entered in the criminal action.
If the criminal action is filed after the said civil action has already been instituted, the latter
shall be suspended in whatever stage it may be found before judgment on the merits. The
suspension shall last until final judgment is rendered in the criminal action. Nevertheless,
before judgment on the merits is rendered in the civil action, the same may, upon motion of
the offended party, be consolidated with the criminal action in the court trying the criminal
action. In case of consolidation, the evidence already adduced in the civil action shall be
deemed automatically reproduced in the criminal action without prejudice to the right of
the prosecution to cross-examine the witnesses presented by the offended party in the
criminal case and of the parties to present additional evidence. The consolidated criminal
and civil actions shall be tried and decided jointly.
During the pendency of the criminal action, the running of the period of prescription of the
civil action which cannot be instituted separately or whose proceeding has been suspended
shall be tolled.
The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil action.
However, the civil action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is a finding
in a final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil
liability may arise did not exist.
C. Independent Civil Action (Sec. 3)
General rule: Once you file a criminal case, the civil aspect is deemed instituted within.
Exception: Violations of Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code – These are 2 cases
that can run parallel lines. You can file both because these particular provisions violate both
the Civil Code and the RPC.
Example: A is the driver of B. There was a collision where someone died, due to the fault of
A {reckless imprudence resulting to homicide]. A case may filed against A under the RPC
and against B under the Civil Code. They can move on parallel lines. You can file both
cases.
What is the only limitation? You cannot have double recovery. The criminal case that
moved independent of civil case can no longer award civil damages. The criminal case that
moved independent of the civil case can no longer award civil damages.
Section 3. When civil action may proceeded independently. — In the cases provided for in
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action
may be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action
and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the offended
party recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action.
Article 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or
indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the
following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages:
(1) Freedom of religion;
(2) Freedom of speech;
(3) Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical publication;
(4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;
(5) Freedom of suffrage;
(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;
(7) The right to a just compensation when private property is taken for public use;
(8) The right to the equal protection of the laws;
(9) The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures;
(10) The liberty of abode and of changing the same;
(11) The privacy of communication and correspondence;
(12) The right to become a member of associations or societies for purposes not contrary to
law;
(13) The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition the Government for redress of
grievances;
(14) The right to be a free from involuntary servitude in any form;
(15) The right of the accused against excessive bail;
(16) The right of the accused to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to meet
the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of
witness in his behalf;
(17) Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against one's self, or from being forced
to confess guilt, or from being induced by a promise of immunity or reward to make such
confession, except when the person confessing becomes a State witness;
(18) Freedom from excessive fines, or cruel and unusual punishment, unless the same is
imposed or inflicted in accordance with a statute which has not been judicially declared
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unconstitutional; and
(19) Freedom of access to the courts.
In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the defendant's act or omission
constitutes a criminal offense, the aggrieved party has a right to commence an entirely
separate and distinct civil action for damages, and for other relief. Such civil action shall
proceed independently of any criminal prosecution (if the latter be instituted), and may be
proved by a preponderance of evidence.
The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated.
The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge unless his act or
omission constitutes a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.
Article 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a civil action for damages,
entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured
party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall
require only a preponderance of evidence.
Article 34. When a member of a city or municipal police force refuses or fails to render aid
or protection to any person in case of danger to life or property, such peace officer shall be
primarily liable for damages, and the city or municipality shall be subsidiarily responsible
therefor. The civil action herein recognized shall be independent of any criminal
proceedings, and a preponderance of evidence shall suffice to support such action.
Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is
governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
D. Effect of death on the civil actions (Sec. 4)
Section 4. Effect of death on civil actions. — The death of the accused after arraignment and
during the pendency of the criminal action shall extinguish the civil liability arising from
the delict. However, the independent civil action instituted under section 3 of this Rule or
which thereafter is instituted to enforce liability arising from other sources of obligation
may be continued against the estate or legal representative of the accused after proper
substitution or against said estate, as the case may be. The heirs of the accused may be
substituted for the deceased without requiring the appointment of an executor or
administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.
The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to appear and
be substituted within a period of thirty (30) days from notice.
A final judgment entered in favor of the offended party shall be enforced in the manner
especially provided in these rules for prosecuting claims against the estate of the deceased.
If the accused dies before arraignment, the case shall be dismissed without prejudice to any
civil action the offended party may file against the estate of the deceased.
Compare with Sec. 17, 18, 20 of Rule 3
Section 17. Death or separation of a party who is a public officer. — When a public officer is a
party in an action in his official capacity and during its pendency dies, resigns, or otherwise
ceases to hold office, the action may be continued and maintained by or against his
successor if, within thirty (30) days after the successor takes office or such time as may be
granted by the court, it is satisfactorily shown to the court by any party that there is a
substantial need for continuing or maintaining it and that the successor adopts or continues
or threatens to adopt or continue to adopt or continue the action of his predecessor. Before
a substitution is made, the party or officer to be affected, unless expressly assenting thereto,
shall be given reasonable notice of the application therefor and accorded an opportunity to
be heard.
Section 18. Incompetency or incapacity. — If a party becomes incompetent or incapacitated,
the court, upon motion with notice, may allow the action to be continued by or against the
incompetent or incapacitated person assisted by his legal guardian or guardian ad litem.
Section 20. Action and contractual money claims. — When the action is for recovery of money
arising from contract, express or implied, and the defendant dies before entry of final
judgment in the court in which the action was pending at the time of such death, it shall not
be dismissed but shall instead be allowed to continue until entry of final judgment. A
favorable judgment obtained by the plaintiff therein shall be enforced in the manner
especially provided in these Rules for prosecuting claims against the estate of a deceased
person.
The following are related to the death of a party in civil actions:
 Section 16 of Rule 3 – the one who dies is either the plaintiff or defendant
Section 16. Death of party; duty of counsel. — Whenever a party to a pending action dies, and
the claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty of his counsel to inform the court
within thirty (30) days after such death of the fact thereof, and to give the name and
address of his legal representative or representatives. Failure of counsel to comply with his
duty shall be a ground for disciplinary action.
The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without
requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint a
guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.
The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to appear and
be substituted within a period of thirty (30) days from notice.
If no legal representative is named by the counsel for the deceased party, or if the one so
named shall fail to appear within the specified period, the court may order the opposing
party, within a specified time to procure the appointment of an executor or administrator
for the estate of the deceased and the latter shall immediately appear for and on behalf of
the deceased. The court charges in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the
opposing party, may be recovered as costs.
 Section 7 of Rule 39 – the one who dies is either the judgment obligor or judgment
obligee
Section 7. Execution in case of death of party. — In case of the death of a party, execution may
issue or be enforced in the following manner:
8 GING 
(a) In case of the death of the judgment obligee, upon the application of his executor or
administrator, or successor in interest;
(b) In case of the death of the judgment obligor, against his executor or administrator or
successor in interest, if the judgment be for the recovery of real or personal property,
or the enforcement of a lien thereon;
(c) In case of the death of the judgment obligor, after execution is actually levied upon
any of his property, the same may be sold for the satisfaction of the judgment
obligation, and the officer making the sale shall account to the corresponding
executor or administrator for any surplus in his hands.
 Section 20, Rule 3 – contractual money claim
Section 4, Rule 111 deals with the death of the accused.
Example: Reckless imprudence resulting to homicide. The accused dies. What is the civil
liability that dies with the accused? All civil liabilities arising from the offense dies as well.
Those civil liabilities are: hospital bills, funeral expenses arising from the crime What will
not die? transportation contract, which you can claim against the estate. Section 20, Rule 3
(contractual money claims) does not apply here. [this can also be an example of an
independent civil action because this is under Art. 2176]
Section 5. Judgment in civil action not a bar. — A final judgment rendered in a civil action
absolving the defendant from civil liability is not a bar to a criminal action against the
defendant for the same act or omission subject of the civil action.
E. Prejudicial Question
- Elements (Sec. 7)
Section 7. Elements of prejudicial question. — The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a)
the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the
issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue
determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
- Suspension (Sec. 6)
Section 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. — A petition for suspension of the
criminal action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be
filed in the office of the prosecutor or the court conducting the preliminary investigation.
When the criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be
filed in the same criminal action at any time before the prosecution rests.
Pimentel vs Pimentel: The husband, who was charged for frustrated parricide, filed for
annulment of their marriage, and moved that the case be suspended on the ground of
prejudicial question. SC: This is not a ground for suspension. The requirements for
suspension on the ground of prejudicial question were not present in this case. The first
requirement is there must be a prior civil action instituted. The second requirement is that
the issue in the civil action is determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the
criminal case. The second ground is present because if there will be no marriage, there can
be no parricide. It is really prejudicial but it was denied by the SC because the annulment of
marriage case was filed after the frustrated parricide charge was already filed. Lawyers
used to do this, that’s why they amended the Rules. To suspend the criminal case, they will
file a civil case.
Example: A is charged with bigamy. His lawyer would advice him to file an action for
declaration of nullity of marriage. It becomes prejudicial in that if there really was no
marriage, there will be no bigamy.
Sps. Gaditano v. San Miguel Corp.: The position of the petitioner was that it was
prejudicial. The account on which they issued the check would not have been insufficient.
It would have been funded because there was automatic transfer from savings and current.
SC: There was no prejudicial question. The issue in the civil case will not determine the
innocence or guilt of the accused in the criminal case because in the case of bouncing
checks, mere issuance of the check is already criminal. Secondly, Asia Trust Bond is not a
party to the contract.
After the filing of the complaint or information in court without a preliminary
investigation, the accused may, within five (5) days from the time he learns of its filing, ask
for a preliminary investigation with the same right to adduce evidence in his defense as
provided in this Rule. (7a; sec. 2, R.A. No. 7438)
- when P.I. is a matter of right
- P.I. vs Preliminary Examination
B. Who may conduct P.I.
- purely executive function (Oct. 5, 2003)
Section 2. Officers authorized to conduct preliminary investigations. —
The following may conduct preliminary investigations:

Capistrano vs Lincuando (c) Provincial or City Prosecutors and their assistants;

Albert vs Sandiganbayan (d) Judges of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;
People vs Cabales (e) National and Regional State Prosecutors; and
Heirs of Eduardo Simon vs Chan (f) Other officers as may be authorized by law.
Reyes v. Rossi
Their authority to conduct preliminary investigations shall include all crimes cognizable by
the proper court in their respective territorial jurisdictions.
IV. RULE 112 – PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
Who are the other officers authorized to conduct preliminary investigation?
A. Definition Ombudsman, panel of prosecutors (every now and then, the DOJ will create special panel
of prosecutors like the case of Onasan vs Panel of Special Prosecutors).
Section 1. Preliminary investigation defined; when required. — Preliminary investigation is an
inquiry or proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well- NBI is not authorized. If they investigate, it is only in aid of the prosecution. They will give
founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty their report to the DOJ.
thereof, and should be held for trial.
The police are not authorized as well.
Except as provided in section 7 of this Rule, a preliminary investigation is required to be
conducted before the filing of a complaint or information for an offense where the penalty Before October of 2005, the Municipal Trial Court Judges can conduct preliminary
prescribed by law is at least four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day without regard investigation. This has been removed already. Rightly so because there exists a
to the fine. complication where the MTC Judge will conduct the preliminary investigation and then the
case happens to be brought before them. Basic in the rule that preliminary investigation is
In what instances is preliminary investigation not necessary? (1) When the imposable purely an executive function as against the preliminary examination which is a judicial
penalty is less than 4 years 2 months and 1 day; and (2) Section 7 of Rule 112. function.

Section 7. When accused lawfully arrested without warrant. — When a person is lawfully Preliminary investigation Preliminary examination
arrested without a warrant involving an offense which requires a preliminary
investigation, the complaint or information may be filed by a prosecutor without need of Quantum of evidence: probable cause
such investigation provided an inquest has been conducted in accordance with existing
rules. In the absence or unavailability of an inquest prosecutor, the complaint may be filed executive function judicial function
by the offended party or a peace office directly with the proper court on the basis of the
affidavit of the offended party or arresting officer or person. finding of probable cause for the purpose The purpose is for the issuance or non-
of filing an information issuance of the warrant of arrest
Before the complaint or information is filed, the person arrested may ask for a preliminary
investigation in accordance with this Rule, but he must sign a waiver of the provisions of a process to determine whether a crime is conducted by the judge, to determine the
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, in the presence of his counsel. committed and the accused or respondent probability also of the accused having
Notwithstanding the waiver, he may apply for bail and the investigation must be is probably guilty thereof and this is committed a crime and therefore a warrant of
terminated within fifteen (15) days from its inception. conducted by the prosecutor arrest is issued

9 GING 
A common practice among lawyers is asking the court for determination of probable cause
(motion for judicial determination of probable cause). That’s wrong.
In the process of P.I., as to the timeframe, the complainant files a complaint affidavit. After,
the fiscal will commence the preliminary investigation. The preliminary investigation will
not start without the complaint affidavit.
The complaint here is different from the complaint filed in court (which is filed to
commence the criminal action). The latter (complaint in direct filing) is similar to the
information. It has the charges and need not use legal terms (while the Information has
requirements as to the legal terms). On the other hand, the complaint affidavit is the
starting point of preliminary investigation.
You file a complaint with the prosecutor’s office. What should the fiscal do with that
complaint? The fiscal shall subpoena (not summons) the respondent who has a period of 10
days within which to file a counter affidavit. On the basis of the counter-affidavit, the
complainant may file a reply-affidavit. On the basis of the reply-affidavit, the respondent
may file a rejoinder. On the basis of the rejoinder, the complainant may file a surrejoinder.
Most of the time, only the complaint affidavit and counter-affidavit are filed. On the basis
of that, the fiscal will submit for resolution.
When you file a case with the fiscal’s office in Manila, Makati, QC, Caloocan, that is raffled
to the investigation prosecutor (as against the trial prosecutor). The investigation
prosecutor is the one who determines whether the case should be filed or not. Once it is
filed, another will prosecute it, called the trial prosecutor. Before the chief prosecutor signs
it, it is reviewed by the reviewing prosecutors.
The investigating prosecutor may either find probable cause or not. If it finds probable
cause, what does it do? He prepares a resolution. He resolved either finding probable
cause or not. In the investigating prosecutor’s resolution, he attaches the information. This
is not for filing yet. This is for review by the chief prosecutor.
If the investigating prosecutor recommends the filing, that can be overturned by the chief
prosecutor.
Suppose the finding of the chief prosecutor is different from that of the investigating
prosecutor, what will the chief prosecutor do?
The investigating prosecutor finds probable cause. He attaches a copy of the information.
That goes to the chief prosecutor. What should the chief prosecutor do? He outright
dismisses it. He does not return the information to the fiscal.
If the investigating prosecutor finds no probable cause and upon review by the chief (more
specifically, upon review by the reviewing prosecutors, he finds probable cause, what shall
the latter do? He does not return the finding. He himself files the information without
returning it for another investigation.
The chief prosecutor has the final say.
Once the information is filed with the court, apply the Crespo doctrine. Reiterated in
Ramiscal vs Sandiganbayan: Once an information has been filed with the court, the court
has an absolute control over the case.
10 GING 
An information has been filed with the court. Does the accused still have a remedy as
regards the information? Petition for review with the DOJ (his last resort). Not appeal
because this is not a court. This is one of the grounds for suspension of arraignment. But
the suspension should only last for 60 days. Beyond that, arraignment can proceed with or
without the resolution.
Is there another remedy? Yes.
Heirs of Nestor Tria vs Obias: While Tria was waiting for his flight to Manila, he was shot.
Atty. Obias was sued along with 2 other people. The fiscal did not include Atty. Obias
among the accused. SC: From the office of the DOJ, you can still appeal to the Office of the
President and the Office of the President prevails over that of the DOJ. OP ruled in favor of
Atty. Obias. Remember that DOJ is under the executive branch of the government, whose
chief is the President himself.
This is in conflict with the doctrine of alter ego because the Secretaries are alter egos of the
President. They don’t have to go to the OP. This is different from Rule 43 (appeal from
quasi judicial bodies) where one of the quasi-judicial bodies is the OP and from there you
go up to the CA. Considering that the DOJ is the alter ego of the President, there should
have been no need to appeal to the OP.
Even if the OP reverses the DOJ, still, it is under the absolute control of the court.
Example: The case is already filed in court. The OP says there is no probable cause and
therefore, we direct the DOJ to file a motion to withdraw the information. A motion is
within the absolute control of the court. The court may deny (and proceed with the case) or
grant said motion.
C. Procedure: in Metro Manila; Outside Metro Manila
Section 3. Procedure. — The preliminary investigation shall be conducted in the following
manner:
(g) The complaint shall state the address of the respondent and shall be accompanied by
the affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses, as well as other supporting
documents to establish probable cause. They shall be in such number of copies as
there are respondents, plus two (2) copies for the official file. The affidavits shall be
subscribed and sworn to before any prosecutor or government official authorized to
administer oath, or, in their absence or unavailability, before a notary public, each of
who must certify that he personally examined the affiants and that he is satisfied that
they voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits.
(h) Within ten (10) days after the filing of the complaint, the investigating officer shall
either dismiss it if he finds no ground to continue with the investigation, or issue a
subpoena to the respondent attaching to it a copy of the complaint and its supporting
affidavits and documents.
The respondent shall have the right to examine the evidence submitted by the
complainant which he may not have been furnished and to copy them at his expense.
If the evidence is voluminous, the complainant may be required to specify those
which he intends to present against the respondent, and these shall be made
available for examination or copying by the respondent at his expense.
 Objects as evidence need not be furnished a party but shall be made available for
examination, copying, or photographing at the expense of the requesting party.
(i) Within ten (10) days from receipt of the subpoena with the complaint and supporting
affidavits and documents, the respondent shall submit his counter-affidavit and that
of his witnesses and other supporting documents relied upon for his defense. The
counter-affidavits shall be subscribed and sworn to and certified as provided in
paragraph (a) of this section, with copies thereof furnished by him to the
complainant. The respondent shall not be allowed to file a motion to dismiss in lieu
of a counter-affidavit.
(j) If the respondent cannot be subpoenaed, or if subpoenaed, does not submit counter-
affidavits within the ten (10) day period, the investigating officer shall resolve the
complaint based on the evidence presented by the complainant.
(k) The investigating officer may set a hearing if there are facts and issues to be clarified
from a party or a witness. The parties can be present at the hearing but without the
right to examine or cross-examine. They may, however, submit to the investigating
officer questions which may be asked to the party or witness concerned.
The hearing shall be held within ten (10) days from submission of the counter-
affidavits and other documents or from the expiration of the period for their
submission. It shall be terminated within five (5) days.
(l) Within ten (10) days after the investigation, the investigating officer shall determine
whether or not there is sufficient ground to hold the respondent for trial.
Section 4. Resolution of investigating prosecutor and its review. — If the investigating
prosecutor finds cause to hold the respondent for trial, he shall prepare the resolution and
information. He shall certify under oath in the information that he, or as shown by the
record, an authorized officer, has personally examined the complainant and his witnesses;
that there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the
accused is probably guilty thereof; that the accused was informed of the complaint and of
the evidence submitted against him; and that he was given an opportunity to submit
controverting evidence. Otherwise, he shall recommend the dismissal of the complaint.
Within five (5) days from his resolution, he shall forward the record of the case to the
provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor, or to the Ombudsman or his deputy
in cases of offenses cognizable by the Sandiganbayan in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction. They shall act on the resolution within ten (10) days from their receipt thereof
and shall immediately inform the parties of such action.
No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating prosecutor
without the prior written authority or approval of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief
state prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy.
Where the investigating prosecutor recommends the dismissal of the complaint but his
recommendation is disapproved by the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state
prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy on the ground that a probable cause exists,
the latter may, by himself, file the information against the respondent, or direct any other
assistant prosecutor or state prosecutor to do so without conducting another preliminary
investigation.
11 GING 
If upon petition by a proper party under such rules as the Department of Justice may
prescribe or motu proprio, the Secretary of Justice reverses or modifies the resolution of the
provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor, he shall direct the prosecutor
concerned either to file the corresponding information without conducting another
preliminary investigation, or to dismiss or move for dismissal of the complaint or
information with notice to the parties. The same rule shall apply in preliminary
investigations conducted by the officers of the Office of the Ombudsman.
Section 5. Resolution of investigating judge and its review. — Within ten (10) days after the
preliminary investigation, the investigating judge shall transmit the resolution of the case
to the provincial or city prosecutor, or to the Ombudsman or his deputy in cases of offenses
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, for appropriate
action. The resolution shall state the findings of facts and the law supporting his action,
together with the record of the case which shall include: (a) the warrant, if the arrest is by
virtue of a warrant; (b) the affidavits, counter-affidavits and other supporting evidence of
the parties; (c) the undertaking or bail of the accused and the order for his release; (d) the
transcripts of the proceedings during the preliminary investigation; and (e) the order of
cancellation of his bail bond, if the resolution is for the dismissal of the complaint.
Within thirty (30) days from receipt of the records, the provincial or city prosecutor, or the
Ombudsman or his deputy, as the case may be, shall review the resolution of the
investigating judge on the existence of probable cause. Their ruling shall expressly and
clearly state the facts and the law on which it is based and the parties shall be furnished
with copies thereof. They shall order the release of an accused who is detained if no
probable cause is found against him.
D. Inquest
What is an inquest? Summary investigation conducted by an inquest prosecutor. If there is
no inquest fiscal, then the case can even be filed. The case can be filed directly with the
court.
However, the accused is not barred from asking for preliminary investigation, provided
waiver of Art. 125 is signed.
- when applied
Section 6. When warrant of arrest may issue. —
(a) By the Regional Trial Court. — Within ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint or
information, the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and
its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on
record clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall
issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if the accused has already been
arrested pursuant to a warrant issued by the judge who conducted the preliminary
investigation or when the complaint or information was filed pursuant to section 7 of
this Rule. In case of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the
prosecutor to present additional evidence within five (5) days from notice and the
issue must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the filing of the
complaint of information.
(b) By the Municipal Trial Court. — When required pursuant to the second paragraph of
section 1 of this Rule, the preliminary investigation of cases falling under the original
 jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
Municipal Trial Court, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court may be conducted by either
the judge or the prosecutor. When conducted by the prosecutor, the procedure for the
issuance of a warrant or arrest by the judge shall be governed by paragraph (a) of this
section. When the investigation is conducted by the judge himself, he shall follow the
procedure provided in section 3 of this Rule. If the findings and recommendations
are affirmed by the provincial or city prosecutor, or by the Ombudsman or his
deputy, and the corresponding information is filed, he shall issue a warrant of arrest.
However, without waiting for the conclusion of the investigation, the judge may
issue a warrant of arrest if he finds after an examination in writing and under oath of
the complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching question and answers,
that a probable cause exists and that there is a necessity of placing the respondent
under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.
(c) When warrant of arrest not necessary. — A warrant of arrest shall not issue if the
accused is already under detention pursuant to a warrant issued by the municipal
trial court in accordance with paragraph (b) of this section, or if the complaint or
information was filed pursuant to section 7 of this Rule or is for an offense penalized
by fine only. The court shall then proceed in the exercise of its original jurisdiction.
Section 7. When accused lawfully arrested without warrant. — When a person is lawfully
arrested without a warrant involving an offense which requires a preliminary
investigation, the complaint or information may be filed by a prosecutor without need of
such investigation provided an inquest has been conducted in accordance with existing
rules. In the absence or unavailability of an inquest prosecutor, the complaint may be filed
by the offended party or a peace office directly with the proper court on the basis of the
affidavit of the offended party or arresting officer or person. xxx
- waiver of provisions of Art. 125 of RPC
Delay in the delivery refers to the filing of the information. Rather than the information will
immediately filed in court, you try to delay it by signing a waiver.
But if the information is already filed, can you avail of preliminary investigation? Yes,
under the warrantless arrest paragraph.
Section 7. When accused lawfully arrested without warrant. — xxx Before the complaint or
information is filed, the person arrested may ask for a preliminary investigation in
accordance with this Rule, but he must sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, in the presence of his counsel. Notwithstanding the
waiver, he may apply for bail and the investigation must be terminated within fifteen (15)
days from its inception. Xxx
Article 125. Delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial authorities. - The
penalties provided in the next preceding article shall be imposed upon the public officer or
employee who shall detain any person for some legal ground and shall fail to deliver such
person to the proper judicial authorities within the period of; twelve (12) hours, for crimes
or offenses punishable by light penalties, or their equivalent; eighteen (18) hours, for crimes
or offenses punishable by correctional penalties, or their equivalent and thirty-six (36)
hours, for crimes, or offenses punishable by afflictive or capital penalties, or their
equivalent. In every case, the person detained shall be informed of the cause of his
detention and shall be allowed upon his request, to communicate and confer at any time
with his attorney or counsel.
12 GING 
E. Quantum of Evidence
- probable cause vs prima facie
Section 8. Records. —
(a) Records supporting the information or complaint. — An information or complaint filed in
court shall be supported by the affidavits and counter-affidavits of the parties and
their witnesses, together with the other supporting evidence and the resolution on
the case.
(b) Record of preliminary investigation. — The record of the preliminary investigation,
whether conducted by a judge or a fiscal, shall not form part of the record of the case.
However, the court, on its own initiative or on motion of any party, may order the
production of the record or any its part when necessary in the resolution of the case
or any incident therein, or when it is to be introduced as an evidence in the case by
the requesting party.
Section 9. Cases not requiring a preliminary investigation nor covered by the Rule on Summary
Procedure. —
(a) If filed with the prosecutor. — If the complaint is filed directly with the prosecutor
involving an offense punishable by imprisonment of less four (4) years, two (2)
months and one (1) day, the procedure outlined in section 3(a) of this Rule shall be
observed. The prosecutor shall act on the complaint based on the affidavits and other
supporting documents submitted by the complainant within ten (10) days from its
filing.
(b) If filed with the Municipal Trial Court. — If the complaint or information is filed directly
with the Municipal Trial Court or Municipal Circuit Trial Court for an offense
covered by this section, the procedure in section 3(a) of this Rule shall be observed. If
within ten (10) days after the filing of the complaint or information, the judge finds
no probable cause after personally evaluating the evidence, or after personally
examining in writing and under oath the complainant and his witnesses in the form
of searching question and answers, he shall dismiss the same. He may, however,
require the submission of additional evidence, within ten (10) days from notice, to
determine further the existence of probable cause. If the judge still finds no probable
cause despite the additional evidence, he shall, within ten (10) days from its
submission or expiration of said period, dismiss the case. When he finds probable
cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if the accused had
already been arrested, and hold him for trial. However, if the judge is satisfied that
there is no necessity for placing the accused under custody, he may issue summons
instead of a warrant of arrest.
Metropolitan Bank vs Gonzales
Alawiya vs Datumanong
Viudez II vs CA
People vs Castillo
V. RULE 113 – ARREST
Section 5 is the most important in this Rule. When may a person be arrested without a
warrant? (Memorize) in flagrante delicto, hot pursuit and escape rule. Tie it up with
section 6 of preliminary investigation. Tie up also with Rule 126, for search and seizure and
distinguish it with warrantless arrest.
Where do you apply for the warrant of arrest? Where the case is pending. You can never
apply for a warrant of arrest if there is no case. First is the preliminary investigation and
then the preliminary examination for applying for the warrant of arrest.
A. Definition
- how made; time; method
Section 1. Definition of arrest. — Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that
he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense.
Section 2. Arrest; how made. — An arrest is made by an actual restraint of a person to be
arrested, or by his submission to the custody of the person making the arrest.
No violence or unnecessary force shall be used in making an arrest. The person arrested
shall not be subject to a greater restraint than is necessary for his detention.
Section 6. Time of making arrest. — An arrest may be made on any day and at any time of
the day or night.
Section 7. Method of arrest by officer by virtue of warrant. — When making an arrest by virtue
of a warrant, the officer shall inform the person to be arrested of the cause of the arrest and
of the fact that a warrant has been issued for his arrest, except when he flees or forcibly
resists before the officer has opportunity to so inform him, or when the giving of such
information will imperil the arrest. The officer need not have the warrant in his possession
at the time of the arrest but after the arrest, if the person arrested so requires, the warrant
shall be shown to him as soon as practicable.
Section 8. Method of arrest by officer without warrant. — When making an arrest without a
warrant, the officer shall inform the person to be arrested of his authority and the cause of
the arrest, unless the latter is either engaged in the commission of an offense, is pursued
immediately after its commission, has escaped, flees or forcibly resists before the officer has
opportunity so to inform him, or when the giving of such information will imperil the
arrest.
Section 9. Method of arrest by private person. — When making an arrest, a private person
shall inform the person to be arrested of the intention to arrest him and cause of the arrest,
unless the latter is either engaged in the commission of an offense, is pursued immediately
after its commission, or has escaped, flees, or forcibly resists before the person making the
arrest has opportunity to so inform him, or when the giving of such information will
imperil the arrest.
- who may arrest
Who may arrest? It can either be a public officer or a private person. In actual practice,
when a private person makes an arrest, he makes the arrest together with the tanod force.
13 GING 
Section 3. Duty of arresting officer. — It shall be the duty of the officer executing the warrant
to arrest the accused and to deliver him to the nearest police station or jail without
unnecessary delay.
Section 10. Officer may summon assistance. — An officer making a lawful arrest may orally
summon as many persons as he deems necessary to assist him in effecting the arrest. Every
person so summoned by an officer shall assist him in effecting the arrest when he can
render such assistance without detriment to himself.
Section 11. Right of officer to break into building or enclosure. — An officer, in order to make an
arrest either by virtue of a warrant, or without a warrant as provided in section 5, may
break into any building or enclosure where the person to be arrested is or is reasonably
believed to be, if he is refused admittance thereto, after announcing his authority and
purpose.
Section 12. Right to break out from building or enclosure. — Whenever an officer has entered
the building or enclosure in accordance with the preceding section, he may break out
therefrom when necessary to liberate himself.
Section 13. Arrest after escape or rescue. — If a person lawfully arrested escapes or is rescued,
any person may immediately pursue or retake him without a warrant at any time and in
any place within the Philippines.
- when to arrest
Section 4. Execution of warrant. — The head of the office to whom the warrant of arrest was
delivered for execution shall cause the warrant to be executed within ten (10) days from its
receipt. Within ten (10) days after the expiration of the period, the officer to whom it was
assigned for execution shall make a report to the judge who issued the warrant. In case of
his failure to execute the warrant, he shall state the reasons therefor.
B. Warrantless Arrests (Sec. 5)
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based
on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraph (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant
shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded
against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.
a) flagrante delicto rule
“When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or custody at any hour of the day or night. Subject to reasonable regulations, a relative of the
is attempting to commit an offense;” person arrested can also exercise the same right.

“has” – still in the vicinity of continuance. If it were had, it would have been done already. - right to counsel
- right to visitation
“attempting to commit” – there must be an overt act. Otherwise, it is only in the mind and
the person cannot be arrested. Example: The act of pouring gasoline all over the place is an 1. Borlongan, Jr. v. Pena
overt act in committing arson. 2. People v. Grey
3. People v. Gadiana
Whose presence? The private person or the peace officer. 4. People v. Ng Yik Bun
5. People v. Uyboco
b) hot pursuit rule
VI. RULE 126 - SEARCH AND SEIZURE
“When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed 1. The constitutional provision on searches and seizures
it”
Article III, Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
The arresting individual must know through his personal knowledge, not merely hearsay. and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
Example: A told a policeman than X shot Y. The policeman cannot arrest X without a purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
warrant based on the hearsay. upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
Under the rule of evidence, perception is not limited to seeing. Who may testify? One who describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
may perceive, and perceiving can make known his perception. Perception is not limited to
seeing. Any exercise of any of the 5 senses may be considered as perception. 2. Search warrant vs warrant of arrest

Example: A police officer heard a gunshot. He knew it was a .45 caliber based on his Warrant of Arrest Search Warrant
training. He saw a man running, holding a gun. He can arrest the man because he had
personal knowledge. Although he did not see what happened, he heard it. Preliminary investigation leads to its issuance or non-issuance

May a blind man testify on what he saw? Ugh foolish! Both rendered by the judge

c) “escape” rule A search warrant is an order in writing

issued in the name of the People of the
Arrest is the taking of a person into custody
“When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment Philippines, signed by a judge and directed
in order that he may be bound to answer for
or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is to a peace officer, commanding him to
the commission of an offense
pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.” search for personal property described
therein and bring it before the court.
d) Sec. 23, par. 2 of Rule 114 or “abscond” rule
For the purpose of taking a person into the For the purpose of taking personal
“An accused released on bail may be re-arrested without the necessity of a warrant if he custody of the law property* into the custody of the law
attempts to depart from the Philippines without permission of the court where the case is
pending.” The judge is required to conduct an
investigation or examination but the court The court must always conduct searching
Procedure: delivery to the nearest police station or jail: When you arrest, you can may dispense with the personal questions upon the complainant and his
immediately file an information against whom you arrested, provided you complied with examination and may simply rely on the witnesses
Section 6 of Rule 112 regarding inquest. You file the information with the court. So there report of the fiscal
can be no preliminary investigation proper.
An arrest may be made on any day and at Should be executed only on daytime unless
C. Republic Act 7438: Rights of person arrested any time of the day or night otherwise stated in the warrant itself**

Section 14. Right of attorney or relative to visit person arrested. — Any member of the Only good for 10 days; whether
Has an immortal life; until and unless
Philippine Bar shall, at the request of the person arrested or of another acting in his behalf, implemented or not, the search warrant dies
implemented, it continues to live
have the right to visit and confer privately with such person in the jail or any other place of on the 11th day***

14 GING 

as long as the person is identifiable, you can The things to be seized and the person to be
already implement the warrant lawfully. searched must be specifically identified****
* The personal property here is not any kind of property. Section 3. Personal property to be
seized. — A search warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of personal property:
(a) Subject of the offense;
(b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the offense; or
(c) Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.
** Section 9. Time of making search. — The warrant must direct that it be served in the day
time, unless the affidavit asserts that the property is on the person or in the place ordered
to be searched, in which case a direction may be inserted that it be served at any time of the
day or night.
*** Section 10. Validity of search warrant. — A search warrant shall be valid for ten (10) days
from its date. Thereafter it shall be void.
**** Those outside the identification are beyond the search.
Where do you apply for the search warrant? If there is a pending case, apply for the search
warrant in nowhere else except where the case is pending. If there is no pending case,
apply before the court which has jurisdiction over the place where the search is to be made
(or where the search is to be implemented).
Exception: for valid reasons, you can apply anywhere within the judicial region. Example:
You are going to implement the search warrant in Caloocan. You can apply for the search
warrant in Makati. That is within the judicial region (it used to be judicial district). But this
is for a special circumstance only.
Magsaysay vs Magsaysay: The search warrant was applied for in Manila. It was
questioned because the search will be done in Zambales. SC: This is a special case because
it will be implemented against the Magsaysay family.
Section 2. Court where application for search warrant shall be filed. — An application for search
warrant shall be filed with the following:
a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed.
b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within the judicial region
where the crime was committed if the place of the commission of the crime is known, or
any court within the judicial region where the warrant shall be enforced.
However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the application shall only be made in
the court where the criminal action is pending.
Section 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. — A search warrant shall not issue except
upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.
Section 5. Examination of complainant; record. — The judge must, before issuing the warrant,
personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under
oath, the complainant and the witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to
15 GING 
them and attach to the record their sworn statements, together with the affidavits
submitted.
Section 6. Issuance and form of search warrant. — If the judge is satisfied of the existence of
facts upon which the application is based or that there is probable cause to believe that they
exist, he shall issue the warrant, which must be substantially in the form prescribed by
these Rules.
Section 7. Right to break door or window to effect search. — The officer, if refused admittance to
the place of directed search after giving notice of his purpose and authority, may break
open any outer or inner door or window of a house or any part of a house or anything
therein to execute the warrant or liberate himself or any person lawfully aiding him when
unlawfully detained therein.
Section 8. Search of house, room, or premise to be made in presence of two witnesses. — No search
of a house, room, or any other premise shall be made except in the presence of the lawful
occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of the latter, two witnesses
of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality.
Section 11. Receipt for the property seized. — The officer seizing property under the warrant
must give a detailed receipt for the same to the lawful occupant of the premises in whose
presence the search and seizure were made, or in the absence of such occupant, must, in the
presence of at least two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same
locality, leave a receipt in the place in which he found the seized property.
Section 12. Delivery of property and inventory thereof to court; return and proceedings thereon. —
(a) The officer must forthwith deliver the property seized to the judge who issued the
warrant, together with a true inventory thereof duly verified under oath.
(b) Ten (10) days after issuance of the search warrant, the issuing judge shall ascertain if the
return has been made, and if none, shall summon the person to whom the warrant was
issued and require him to explain why no return was made. If the return has been made,
the judge shall ascertain whether section 11 of this Rule has been complained with and
shall require that the property seized be delivered to him. The judge shall see to it that
subsection (a) hereof has been complied with.
(c) The return on the search warrant shall be filed and kept by the custodian of the log book
on search warrants who shall enter therein the date of the return, the result, and other
actions of the judge.
A violation of this section shall constitute contempt of court.
3. When searches and seizures allowed without warrants
6 Warrantless searches:
(1) plain view doctrine
There are 3 requirements: i. valid intrusion; ii. inadvertent discovery; and iii. immediately
apparent. If you have to look for it first, this doctrine will not apply.
(2) search in connection with a lawful arrest
Section 13. Search incident to lawful arrest. — A person lawfully arrested may be searched
for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the Section 1. Bail defined. — Bail is the security given for the release of a person in custody of
commission of an offense without a search warrant. the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, to guarantee his appearance before any court as
required under the conditions hereinafter specified. Bail may be given in the form of
This cannot be inverted. Arrest first before you search. There can be no arrest on the basis corporate surety, property bond, cash deposit, or recognizance.
of a lawful search. By virtue of a warrantless search and then you arrest, that could be
unconstitutional, illegal and a violation of the bill of rights. In civil cases, there is bond. In criminal cases, there is bail. These are called bail bonds. You
post a bail because you are deprived of your liberty, so that you will be in liberty.
(3) Search of a moving vehicle
B. Conditions; Requirements
(4) Customs search
Section 2. Conditions of the bail; requirements. — All kinds of bail are subject to the following
(5) Stop and Frisk doctrine conditions:

(6) ????
A search warrant was already implemented. On the way out, they found articles which are
illegal. They searched it after they have already searched the place pursuant to the search
warrant. The illegal articles last searched were considered inadmissible evidence because it
was illegally obtained.
(a) The undertaking shall be effective upon approval, and unless cancelled, shall remain
in force at all stages of the case until promulgation of the judgment of the Regional
Trial Court, irrespective of whether the case was originally filed in or appealed to it;
(b) The accused shall appear before the proper court whenever required by the court of
these Rules;

4. Motion to Quash (c) The failure of the accused to appear at the trial without justification and despite due
notice shall be deemed a waiver of his right to be present thereat. In such case, the
How do you quash a search warrant? File a motion to quash on the ground that the trial may proceed in absentia; and
property is not particularly described in the search warrant. That would amount to an
illegal search. (d) The bondsman shall surrender the accused to the court for execution of the final
judgment.
When a search warrant is implemented, the things seized pursuant to search warrant must
be taken into legal custody (like in preliminary attachment). When it is investigated and the The original papers shall state the full name and address of the accused, the amount of the
things are not found, aside from applying disciplinary action, this is an immediate way to undertaking and the conditions herein required. Photographs (passport size) taken within
quash the search warrant. the last 6 months showing the face, left and right profiles of the accused must be attached to
the bail.
Section 14. Motion to quash a search warrant or to suppress evidence; where to file. — A
motion to quash a search warrant and/or to suppress evidence obtained thereby may be - effective upon approval and shall remain in force at all stages of the case until
filed in and acted upon only by the court where the action has been instituted. If no promulgation of the judgment by the RTC (Sec. 2)
criminal action has been instituted, the motion may be filed in and resolved by the court
that issued the search warrant. However, if such court failed to resolve the motion and a - appearance; when required
criminal case is subsequent filed in another court, the motion shall be resolved by the latter
court. Section 3. No release or transfer except on court order or bail. — No person under detention by
legal process shall be released or transferred except upon order of the court or when he is
1. Miclat v. People admitted to bail.
2. People v. Mariacos
3. People v. Tuan C. Bail
4. Esquillo v. People
5. ‘The Constitutional Validity of Warrantless Search and Seizure of Prohibited Drugs - as a matter of right (Sec. 4)
and Eventual Arrest’
Section 4. Bail, a matter of right; exception. — All persons in custody shall be admitted to bail
as a matter of right, with sufficient sureties, or released on recognize as prescribed by law
or this Rule (a) before or after conviction by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial
Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court, and (b) before
VII. RULE 114 – BAIL conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment.
A. Definition

16 GING 
Bail is a matter of right before or after conviction by the MTC (only MTC because only
offenses with low penalties [6 years maximum] are cognizable by the MTC).
Bail is a matter of right before conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.
Reclusion perpetua, with a period of 20 years & 1 day up to 30 years, is usually given by the
RPC while life imprisonment, with a period of 40 years, is usually given by special penal
laws.
- as a matter of discretion (Sec. 5)
Bail is a matter of discretion after conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by
reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment.
Even if the penalty imposable is less than reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, after
conviction by the RTC, but he is a habitual delinquent, etc., then it is a matter of discretion.
Section 5. Bail, when discretionary. — Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an
offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail
is discretionary. The application for bail may be filed and acted upon by the trial court
despite the filing of a notice of appeal, provided it has not transmitted the original record to
the appellate court. However, if the decision of the trial court convicting the accused
changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can
only be filed with and resolved by the appellate court.
Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed to continue on
provisional liberty during the pendency of the appeal under the same bail subject to the
consent of the bondsman.
If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, the
accused shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a showing by the
prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or other similar circumstances:
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the
crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated
the conditions of his bail without valid justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail;
or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of
the appeal.
The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party, review the resolution of
the Regional Trial Court after notice to the adverse party in either case.
Section 6. Capital offense defined. — A capital offense is an offense which, under the law
existing at the time of its commission and of the application for admission to bail, may be
17 GING 
punished with death.
Section 7. Capital offense of an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not
bailable. — No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong,
regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.
Section 8. Burden of proof in bail application. — At the hearing of an application for bail filed
by a person who is in custody for the commission of an offense punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, the prosecution has the burden of showing that
evidence of guilt is strong. The evidence presented during the bail hearing shall be
considered automatically reproduced at the trial, but upon motion of either party, the court
may recall any witness for additional examination unless the latter is dead, outside the
Philippines, or otherwise unable to testify.
Bail is always a matter of right when the evidence of guilt is not strong, irrespective of
the crime and irrespective of the imposable penalty. This is not a mere statutory right; it is a
constitutional right.
What quantum of evidence has to be established for an application for bail? For the
crime committed, the quantum of evidence is proof beyond reasonable doubt. But for bail,
the quantum of evidence is only clear and convincing evidence.
Proof beyond reasonable doubt  clear and convincing evidence  preponderance of
evidence
Government of the USA v. Purganan: Old doctrine. USA, represented by the DOJ, filed a
petition for extradition against Mark Jimenez (duel citizen) on the ground of tax evasion,
among others. He was charged before a U.S. Court. The memoranda was required,
referring to the issue of whether or not Mark should be extradited in the main. The issue on
bail and arrest are ancillary only. The warrant of arrest was issued. One cannot apply for
bail if he is not under custody. Bail is a provisional remedy. If you are not deprived of your
liberty, you cannot avail of it. If there is a pending warrant which is not yet implemented,
you cannot apply for bail. The court must first acquire jurisdiction over your person by
voluntarily surrendering yourself. Mark applied for bail, which was granted, in the amount
of P1,000,000 cash bail. The DOJ contested that. Why give too much leniency? It is against
the Rules because extraditee is beyond bail.
The issues are as to Rule 113 (arrest) and 114 (bail).
How is a warrant of arrest issued? When may a court issue a warrant of arrest? The
means is preliminary examination. The court should never issue a warrant of arrest if he
has not examined, and he is convinced not solely on the basis of the prosecution’s report.
He should conduct the examination personally. Only when the court is convinced that
there is probable cause can he issue the warrant of arrest. Without examination, the
issuance of the warrant of arrest is quashable and questionable.
Will that doctrine apply in this case? No. An extraditee is not entitled to a hearing. Not
even a summary hearing. The warrant of arrest may be issued immediately without
undergoing preliminary examination. The rationale is an extraditee is a flight risk. He is not
a citizen of this country. If he goes outside the jurisdiction of this court, you cannot run
after him anymore. It is included in the treaty.
Whether or not an extraditee is entitled to bail. No. What is the nature of a petition for
extradition? It has peculiar characteristics because it is not based on the law of either
country; it is based on the agreement or the principle of pacta sunt servanda.
Hong Kong Special Adm. Region v. Olalia: Prevailing doctrine. In a political view, Olalia
does not really overturn the Purganan case. But as far as criminal procedure is concerned, it
is overturned. An extraditee is entitled to bail, provided several conditions are complied
with. The grant of bail to an extraditee is absolutely within the sound discretion of the
court. It can never be a matter of right. The court took into consideration the new trends in
international law, the law of nations to which we are a signatory, etc. One Justice was
saying that it is enshrined in the Bill of Rights that the right to bail is constitutional,
provided the evidence of guilt is not strong. If we give bail to an extraditee, we are not
violating the Constitution. The flight risk must also be considered.
Under the Rule of Evidence, the SC defined the quantum of evidence required in bail
application for an extraditee, which is clear and convincing evidence, which is one step
lower than beyond reasonable doubt and one step higher than preponderance of evidence.
D. Kinds of bail
(a) corporate surety (Sec. 10)
Section 10. Corporate surety. — Any domestic or foreign corporation, licensed as a surety in
accordance with law and currently authorized to act as such, may provide bail by a bond
subscribed jointly by the accused and an officer of the corporation duly authorized by its
board of directors.
The problem with this is you pay a premium annually. If you fail to pay, the other party
can ask that you be returned to prison.
Upon approval of the bond (any bond), the bond is effective until final conviction or
acquittal.
Even if you fail to pay the premium, it is not a ground for you to be reincarcerated because
the rule is clear: once the bond is approved, the bond is effective from the time that it is
approved until final judgment.
If you really want the accused to be sent back to prison, talk to the bonding company. Tell
the bonding company to go to court and say that accused failed to pay and so you are now
surrendering the accused. The bonding company may file a motion to surrender the
accused.
There are a lot of requirements: joint affidavit of the accused and the authorized officer of
the bonding company, present picture with 3 poses which shall not be older than 6 months,
etc.
(b) property bond (Sec. 11)
Section 11. Property bond, how posted. — A property bond is an undertaking constituted as
lien on the real property given as security for the amount of the bail. Within ten (10) days
after the approval of the bond, the accused shall cause the annotation of the lien on the
certificate of title on file with the Register of Deeds if the land is registered, or if
unregistered, in the Registration Book on the space provided therefor, in the Registry of
18 GING 
Deeds for the province or city where the land lies, and on the corresponding tax declaration
in the office of the provincial, city and municipal assessor concerned.
Within the same period, the accused shall submit to the court his compliance and his failure
to do so shall be sufficient cause for the cancellation of the property bond and his re-arrest
and detention.
Section 12. Qualifications of sureties in property bond. — The qualification of sureties in a
property bond shall be as follows:
(a) Each must be a resident owner of real estate within the Philippines;
(b) Where there is only one surety, his real estate must be worth at least the amount of
the undertaking;
(c) If there are two or more sureties, each may justify in an amount less than that
expressed in the undertaking but the aggregate of the justified sums must be
equivalent to the whole amount of bail demanded.
In all cases, every surety must be worth the amount specified in his own undertaking over
and above all just debts, obligations and properties exempt from execution.
Section 13. Justification of sureties. — Every surety shall justify by affidavit taken before the
judge that he possesses the qualifications prescribed in the preceding section. He shall
describe the property given as security, stating the nature of his title, its encumbrances, the
number and amount of other bails entered into by him and still undischarged, and his
other liabilities. The court may examine the sureties upon oath concerning their sufficiency
in such manner as it may deem proper. No bail shall be approved unless the surety is
qualified.
The property need not be owned by the accused. It can be owned by anyone. The only
requirement is that the owner must be a residence of the Philippines.
It has to be registered with the Register of Deeds where the property is located. So it does
not follow that if you are an accused in Manila, you can only post a property bond over
properties located in Manila. Any property located in the Philippines may be subject to
this. This is only done upon approval.
The accused goes to court. He posts property bond. He is given 10 days to have it
annotated. He had it annotated. He went back to court with the annotation (lien). The court
approves. Only upon approval of the property bond will the court set out a release order.
(c) cash bond (Sec. 14)
Section 14. Deposit of cash as bail. — The accused or any person acting in his behalf may
deposit in cash with the nearest collector or internal revenue or provincial, city, or
municipal treasurer the amount of bail fixed by the court, or recommended by the
prosecutor who investigated or filed the case. Upon submission of a proper certificate of
deposit and a written undertaking showing compliance with the requirements of section 2
of this Rule, the accused shall be discharged from custody. The money deposited shall be
considered as bail and applied to the payment of fine and costs while the excess, if any,
shall be returned to the accused or to whoever made the deposit.
Depends upon the recommendation of the prosecutor. This is the best kind of bail bond
because you can recover it (minus costs). It is only security for one’s provisional liberty.
Upon acquittal, you can recover it.
(d) Recognizance (Sec. 15) – is “an obligation of record entered into before some court
magistrate duly authorized to take it, with the condition to do some particular act,
particularly the appearance of the accused for trial”
The accused is released on recognizance. Given on your own representation. Wrong
interpretation: one is set free on the account of a third party (the law only says “or”).
Recognizance is given on your own representation. If the court knows you, the court will
believe that you will appear when summoned. If the court doesn’t know you, the court
may ask you to bring a third person the court knows.
This can only be granted in light offenses.
Section 15. Recognizance. — Whenever allowed by law or these Rules, the court may release
a person in custody to his own recognizance or that of a responsible person.
- RTC; MTC exercising special jurisdiction
Section 17. Bail, where filed. —
(a) Bail in the amount fixed may be filed with the court where the case is pending, or in
the absence or unavailability of the judge thereof, with any regional trial judge,
metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit trial judge in the
province, city, or municipality. If the accused is arrested in a province, city, or
municipality other than where the case is pending, bail may also be filed with any
regional trial court of said place, or if no judge thereof is available, with any
metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit trial judge
therein.
(b) Where the grant of bail is a matter of discretion, or the accused seeks to be released
on recognizance, the application may only be filed in the court where the case is
pending, whether on preliminary investigation, trial, or on appeal.
(c) Any person in custody who is not yet charged in court may apply for bail with any
court in the province, city, or municipality where he is held.

Section 16. Bail, when not required; reduced bail or recognizance. — No bail shall be required
when the law or these Rules so provide.
When a person has been in custody for a period equal to or more than the possible
maximum imprisonment prescribe for the offense charged, he shall be released
immediately, without prejudice to the continuation of the trial or the proceedings on
appeal. If the maximum penalty to which the accused may be sentenced is destierro, he shall
be released after thirty (30) days of preventive imprisonment.
A person in custody for a period equal to or more than the minimum of the principal
penalty prescribed for the offense charged, without application of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law or any modifying circumstance, shall be released on a reduced bail or on his
own recognizance, at the discretion of the court.
E. Amount of bail; Guidelines (Sec. 9)
Section 9. Amount of bail; guidelines. — The judge who issued the warrant or granted the
application shall fix a reasonable amount of bail considering primarily, but not limited to,
the following factors:
Section 18. Notice of application to prosecutor. — In the application for bail under section 8 of
this Rule, the court must give reasonable notice of the hearing to the prosecutor or require
him to submit his recommendation.
Section 19. Release on bail. — The accused must be discharged upon approval of the bail by
the judge with whom it was filed in accordance with section 17 of this Rule.
Whenever bail is filed with a court other than where the case is pending, the judge who
accepted the bail shall forward it, together with the order of release and other supporting
papers, to the court where the case is pending, which may, for good reason, require a
different one to be filed.
Section 20. Increase or reduction of bail. — After the accused is admitted to bail, the court
may, upon good cause, either increase or reduce its amount. When increased, the accused
may be committed to custody if he does not give bail in the increased amount within a
reasonable period. An accused held to answer a criminal charge, who is released without
bail upon filing of the complaint or information, may, at any subsequent stage of the
proceedings and whenever a strong showing of guilt appears to the court, be required to
give bail in the amount fixed, or in lieu thereof, committed to custody.

(a) Financial ability of the accused to give bail; G. Forfeiture vs Cancellation of bail
(b) Nature and circumstances of the offense;
(c) Penalty for the offense charged; - forfeiture (Sec. 21)
(d) Character and reputation of the accused; failure to appear/ jump bail
(e) Age and health of the accused;
(f) Weight of the evidence against the accused; The bond is forfeited upon failure to appear when ordered.
(g) Probability of the accused appearing at the trial;
(h) Forfeiture of other bail; Section 21. Forfeiture of bond. — When the presence of the accused is required by the court
(i) The fact that accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested; and or these Rules, his bondsmen shall be notified to produce him before the court on a given
(j) Pendency of other cases where the accused is on bail. date and time. If the accused fails to appear in person as required, his bail shall be declared
forfeited and the bondsmen given thirty (30) days within which to produce their principal
Excessive bail shall not be required. and to show cause why no judgment should be rendered against them for the amount of
their bail. Within the said period, the bondsmen must:
F. Where to file bail (Sec. 17)
19 GING 
(a) produce the body of their principal or give the reason for his non-production; and
(b) explain why the accused did not appear before the court when first required to do so.
Failing in these two requisites, a judgment shall be rendered against the bondsmen, jointly
and severally, for the amount of the bail. The court shall not reduce or otherwise mitigate
the liability of the bondsmen, unless the accused has been surrendered or is acquitted.
Ivler v. Modesto-San Pedro: He failed to appear so they wanted to re-arrest him. SC: No, it
is not automatic arrest because the bondsman is given 30 days within which to surrender
the accused. If you have a corporate bond, the insurer is the corporation. When the court
says bring him to the court, it should be the bondsman who should bring him. The
bondsman has to be given an opportunity to show cause why it should not be forfeited.
Once forfeited, that is a ground for recommitting the accused to jail.
- cancellation (Sec. 22)
death; acquittal; conviction; dismissal
Forfeiture is different from cancellation. It is cancelled upon acquittal, conviction, dismissal
or execution of the judgment.
Final judgment in criminal cases is also executory (different from civil cases where a final
judgment may not necessarily be executory). Criminal cases do not use the term “executory
judgment.” Example: A judgment of final conviction – no longer appealable.
It becomes confusing because sometimes they say “final judgment of the RTC” when in fact
that is not really final under the civil concept. Under the criminal concept, it is not
executory but it is already final in a sense.
You must understand the use of the word final judgment. It has several meanings in
criminal procedure. There are some provisions where the word final judgment refers to
executory judgment; there are some provisions where it really refers to final judgment.
“The judgment of RTC imposing reclusion perpertua to life imprisonment.” This is final
but actually it is still appealable. When the period to appeal has already lapsed, it is still
called final judgment (not executory judgment).
The judgment in criminal cases becomes “executory” not only when the time to appeal has
lapsed. If you start serving sentence, it is already executory even if the appeal has not
lapsed. This happens when you waive or you fail to file an appeal or a motion for new
trial/reconsideration.
Section 22. Cancellation of bail. — Upon application of the bondsmen, with due notice to the
prosecutor, the bail may be cancelled upon surrender of the accused or proof of his death.
The bail shall be deemed automatically cancelled upon acquittal of the accused, dismissal
of the case, or execution of the judgment of conviction.
In all instances, the cancellation shall be without prejudice to any liability on the bond.
Section 23. Arrest of accused out on bail. — For the purpose of surrendering the accused, the
bondsmen may arrest him or, upon written authority endorsed on a certified copy of the
undertaking, cause him to be arrested by a police officer or any other person of suitable age
20 GING 
and discretion.
An accused released on bail may be re-arrested without the necessity of a warrant if he
attempts to depart from the Philippines without permission of the court where the case is
pending.
Section 24. No bail after final judgment; exception. — No bail shall be allowed after the
judgment of conviction has become final. If before such finality, the accused has applies for
probation, he may be allowed temporary liberty under his bail. When no bail was filed or
the accused is incapable of filing one, the court may allow his release on recognizance to
the custody of a responsible member of the community. In no case shall bail be allowed
after the accused has commenced to serve sentence.
Section 25. Court supervision of detainees. — The court shall exercise supervision over all
persons in custody for the purpose of eliminating unnecessary detention. The executive
judges of the Regional Trial Courts shall conduct monthly personal inspections of
provincial, city, and municipal jails and their prisoners within their respective jurisdictions.
They shall ascertain the number of detainees, inquire on their proper accommodation and
health and examine the condition of the jail facilities. They shall order the segregation of
sexes and of minors from adults, ensure the observance of the right of detainees to confer
privately with counsel, and strive to eliminate conditions inimical to the detainees.
In cities and municipalities to be specified by the Supreme Court, the municipal trial judges
or municipal circuit trial judges shall conduct monthly personal inspections of the
municipal jails in their respective municipalities and submit a report to the executive judge
of the Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction therein.
A monthly report of such visitation shall be submitted by the executive judges to the Court
Administrator which shall state the total number of detainees, the names of those held for
more than thirty (30) days, the duration of detention, the crime charged, the status of the
case, the cause for detention, and other pertinent information.
Section 26. Bail not a bar to objections on illegal arrest, lack of or irregular preliminary
investigation. — An application for or admission to bail shall not bar the accused from
challenging the validity of his arrest or the legality of the warrant issued therefor, or from
assailing the regularity or questioning the absence of a preliminary investigation of the
charge against him, provided that he raises them before entering his plea. The court shall
resolve the matter as early as practicable but not later than the start of the trial of the case.
Pico v. Combong: Pico’s brother, Father Narciso Pico was murdered by Eddie Villegas.
Father Narciso was a minister of Iglesia and Eddie was a part of the “Brotherhood of
Organized Returnees.” The provincial fiscal filed an information charging Villegas with
murder. Respondent Judge issued a warrant for the arrest of Villegas; in this warrant, the
words "no bail recommended" were typed in on the appropriate space.
Complainant charges respondent Judge with serious misconduct and grave abuse of
discretion for having granted bail to the accused, who had been charged with an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua, without notice and hearing and even before the accused
had been arrested or detained. Complainant alleges that Judge granted the motion for bail
on the same day that the motion was filed, i.e., on 2 August 1991, without setting the
motion for bail for hearing and without giving the prosecution the opportunity to challenge
the application for provisional liberty. A copy of the motion for bail, according to
complaint, was received by the prosecution only on 7 August 1991, and the prosecution
moved for a hearing on the application for bail on 9 August 1991.

The Judge denied that he had granted the application for bail even prior to the arrest or
detention of the accused. He, however, admits having failed to hold a hearing on the
application for bail. He had deliberately omitted holding a hearing because he had been
fully convinced that the possibility of the accused jumping bail "was practically nil."
SC: The respondent judge should NOT have granted the application for bail even without
notice and hearing. A person applying for admission to bail must be in the custody of the
law or otherwise deprived of his liberty. A person who has not submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the court has no right to invoke the processes of that court. The Judge should
have diligently ascertained the whereabouts of the applicant and that he indeed had
jurisdiction over the body of the accused before considering the application for bail.
An application for bail from a person charged with a capital offense (now an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua) must be set for hearing at which both the prosecution and
the defense must be given a reasonable opportunity to prove (in the case of the
prosecution) that evidence of guilt of the applicant is strong, or (in the case of the defense)
that such evidence of guilt was not strong. In the instant case, where the offense charged is
murder and punishable by reclusion perpetua or death, respondent Judge's deliberate failure
to set the application for bail hearing effectively deprived the People of its right to due
process. Granting the application for bail and fixing the amount thereof, absent any taking
of evidence as to whether or not the guilt of the accused was strong, constitutes arbitrary,
capricious and whimsical action. Respondent Judge's alleged impression that the
probability of flight on the part of the accused was "practically nil," was obviously not
based on evidence of record; he had no right to act on the basis of such merely personal
impression. He himself had issued the warrant of arrest stating that no bail was
recommended and then, inexplicably, without any evidence being presented to support the
application for bail, released the accused on bail of P50,000.00.
Zuno v. Cabebe: Petitioner filed the instant administrative case against respondent Judge
Cabebe, alleging that a criminal case was filed with Cabebe’s court for illegal possession of
prohibited or regulated drugs against some police officers; that prosecution filed for change
of venue, but was denied; that prosecution filed MR, however the proceedings were
suspended.
Accused filed motion to dismiss invoking as ground the right to speedy trial. Cabebe, motu
propio, issued an order granting bail to the accused. Cabebe issued the order without the
accused’s application or a motion for bail. Prosecution filed MR. Instead of action thereon,
Cabebe issued an order inhibiting himself from further proceeding with the case.
Cabebe alleged that he granted the bail as it was premised on the constitutional right of the
accused to speedy trial. There was delay in the proceedings due to complainant’s frequent
absences and failure of the witnesses to appear in court, resulting in the cancellation of the
hearings. The prosecution did not also object to the grant of bail.
SC: Cabebe violated the Rules. Jurisprudence is replete with decisions on the procedural
necessity of a hearing, whether summary or otherwise, relative to the grant of bail,
especially in cases involving offenses punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment, where bail is a matter of discretion.
Under the present Rules, a hearing is mandatory in granting bail whether it is a matter of
right or discretion. It must be stressed that the grant or the denial of bail in cases where bail
is a matter of discretion, hinges on the issue of whether or not the evidence of guilt of the
21 GING 
accused is strong, and the determination of whether or not the evidence is strong is a
matter of judicial discretion which remains with the judge. In order for the latter to
properly exercise his discretion, he must first conduct a hearing to determine whether the
evidence of guilt is strong. In fact, even in cases where there is no petition for bail, a
hearing should still be held.
Cabebe granted bail to the accused without conducting a hearing, in violation of Sections 8
and 18, Rule 114.
In Cortes vs. Catral, we laid down the following rules outlining the duties of the judge in
case an application for bail is filed:
1. In all cases whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, notify the prosecutor of the
hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation
(Section 18, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail
regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that
the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its
sound discretion (Section 7 and 8, id.);
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence
of the prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of
the bail bond (Section 19, id.); otherwise the petition should be denied.
After the hearing, the court’s order granting or refusing bail must contain a summary of the
evidence of the prosecution and based thereon, the judge should formulate his own
conclusion as to whether the evidence so presented is strong enough to indicate the guilt of
the accused.
Cabebe did not follow the above Rules and procedure. He did not conduct a hearing before
he granted bail to the accused, thus depriving the prosecution of an opportunity to
interpose objections to the grant of bail. Irrespective of his opinion on the strength or
weakness of evidence to prove the guilt of the accused, he should have conducted a
hearing and thereafter made a summary of the evidence of the prosecution. The
importance of a bail hearing and a summary of evidence cannot be downplayed, these are
considered aspects of procedural due process for both the prosecution and the defense; its
absence will invalidate the grant or denial of bail.
Neither did Cabebe require the prosecution to submit its recommendation on whether or
not bail should be granted. He maintains that the prosecution did not object to the grant of
bail to the accused, hence, he cannot be held administratively liable for not conducting a
hearing. The failure to raise or the absence of an objection on the part of the prosecution in
an application for bail does not dispense with the requirement of a bail hearing. Even if the
prosecution refuses to adduce evidence or fails to interpose any objection to the motion for
bail, it is still mandatory for the court to conduct a hearing or ask searching and
clarificatory questions from which it may infer the strength of the evidence of guilt, or lack
of it, against the accused. Where the prosecutor refuses to adduce evidence in opposition
to the application to grant and fix bail, the court may ask the prosecution such questions as
would ascertain the strength of the State’s evidence or judge the adequacy of the amount of
bail. Irrespective of Cabebe’s opinion that the evidence of guilt against the accused is not
strong, the law and settled jurisprudence demand that a hearing be conducted before bail
may be fixed for the temporary release of the accused, if bail is at all justified.
Cabebe contends that the accused were entitled to their right to a speedy trial, hence, he
granted bail without a hearing. He blames the prosecution for the delay. There is no
indication in the records of the criminal case that the prosecution has intentionally delayed
the trial of the case. Even assuming there was delay, this does not justify the grant of bail
without a hearing.
Leviste v. CA: This case discusses bail when it is a matter and when it is a matter of
discretion. The majority decision in Leviste invoked the general rule that it is not a matter
of right after conviction with the RTC. Before conviction, it is a matter of right. But after
conviction with RTC, it is a matter of discretion. But the dissenting opinion of Justice
Peralta is persuasive. Leviste was convicted with homicide but tried for murder.
Considering that conviction is for homicide, a bailable offense, why not give bail to a
person who is appealing the decision for homicide?
Re: Anonymous Letter
Gacal v. Infante
Okabe v. Gutierrez: Cecilia Maruyama executed an affidavit-complaint and filed the same
with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasay City charging Lorna Tanghal and petitioner
Teresita Tanghal Okabe with estafa. In her affdavit, Maruyama alleged, inter alia, that she
entrusted Y11,410,000 to the petitioner, who was engaged in the business of “door-to-door
delivery” from Japan to the Philippines. It was alleged that the petitioner failed to deliver
the money as agreed upon, and, at first, denied receiving the said amount but later
returned only US$1,000 through Lorna. After the City Prosecutor came out with a
resolution finding probable cause for estafa against petitioner, an Information against
petitioner was filed with the RTC-Pasay. RTC issued a warrant for the arrest of the
petitioner with a recommended bond of P40,000.
Petitioner posted a personal bail bond in the said amount, duly approved by the Judge of
RTC-QC, who recalled the warrant. The approved personal bail bond was transmitted to
the RTC-Pasig on 21 June 2000. The petitioner left the Philippines for Japan on June 17, 2000
without the RTC’s permission, and returned to the Philippines on June 28, 2000. She left the
Philippines anew on July 1, 2000, and returned on July 12, 2000. On July 14, 2000, RTC
issued an Order setting the petitioner’s arraignment and pre-trial at 2:00 p.m. of July 16,
2000. On the same day, the private prosecutor filed an urgent ex parte motion for the
issuance of the hold departure order. RTC issued an order on the same day, granting the
motion of the private prosecutor for the issuance of a hold departure order and ordering
the Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID) to hold and prevent any attempt
on the part of the petitioner to depart from the Philippines.
Petitioner filed on July 17, 2000 a verified motion for judicial determination of probable
cause and to defer proceedings/arraignment, alleging that the only documents appended
to the Information submitted by the investigating prosecutor were respondent Maruyama’s
affidavit-complaint for estafa and the resolution of the investigating prosecutor; the
affidavits of the witnesses of the complainant, the respondent’s counter-affidavit and the
other evidence adduced by the parties were not attached thereto. The petitioner further
alleged that the documents submitted by the investigating prosecutor were not enough on
which the RTC could base a finding of probable cause for estafa against her. On July 19,
2000, the petitioner filed a Very Urgent Motion To Lift/Recall Hold Departure Order dated
July 17, 2000 and/or allow her to regularly travel to Japan.
22 GING 
The private prosecutor opposed the petitioner’s motions during the hearing on July 21,
2000 which was also the date set for her arraignment. The hearing of the motions as well as
the arraignment was reset to 2:00 p.m. of July 26, 2000. On the said date, petitioner filed a
manifestation objecting to her arraignment prior to the resolution of her pending motions.
She alleged that her arraignment for the crime charged should not be made a condition for
the granting of her motion to recall the hold departure order issued against her. When the
case was called for the petitioner’s arraignment at 2:00 p.m., on August 28, 2000, she
refused to plead. The court then entered a not guilty plea for the petitioner.
Petitioner then filed with the CA a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with a plea for a
writ of preliminary injunction. CA ruled that by posting bail and praying for reliefs from
the RTC, the petitioner waived her right to assail the respondent judge’s finding of the
existence of probable cause. CA cited the ruling in Cojuangco, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan.
Thus, CA affirmed the assailed order of the RTC, based on the respondent judge’s personal
examination of respondent Maruyama’s affidavit-complaint, the resolution of the
investigating prosecutor and the Information approved by the city prosecutor, a finding of
probable cause was in order.
The petitioner filed a motion for a partial reconsideration of the decision of the CA
contending that CA erred in applying the ruling of this court in Cojuangco, Jr. v. CA
instead of Section 26, Rule 114. The petitioner posited that the said rule, which took effect
on December 1, 2000, before the court rendered its decision, had superseded the ruling of
this Court in the Cojuangco case. However, CA held that Section 26, Rule 114 cannot be
applied retroactively, because the petitioner had posted bail on June 15, 2000 before the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure took effect.
SC: The petitioner did not waive her right to assail the respondent judge’s finding of the
existence of probable cause by mere posting of bail and praying for reliefs from the trial
court. Sec. 26, Rule 114 should be applied retroactively. Section 26, Rule 114 modified the
previous rulings of this Court that an application for bail or the admission to bail by the
accused shall be considered as a waiver of his right to assail the warrant issued for his
arrest on the legalities or irregularities thereon. The new rule is curative in nature because
precisely, it was designed to supply defects and curb evils in procedural rules. Hence, the
rules governing curative statutes are applicable. Curative statutes are by their essence
retroactive in application.
Moreover, considering the conduct of the petitioner after posting her personal bail bond, it
cannot be argued that she waived her right to question the finding of probable cause and to
assail the warrant of arrest issued against her by the respondent judge. There must be clear
and convincing proof that the petitioner had an actual intention to relinquish her right to
question the existence of probable cause.
A warrant was issued by the respondent judge in Pasay City for the arrest of the petitioner,
a resident of Guiguinto, Bulacan. When the petitioner learned of the issuance of the said
warrant, she posted a personal bail bond to avert her arrest and secure her provisional
liberty. Judge Demetrio Macapagal of the RTC-QC approved the bond and issued an order
recalling the warrant of arrest against the petitioner. Thus, the posting of a personal bail
bond was a matter of imperative necessity to avert her incarceration; it should not be
deemed as a waiver of her right to assail her arrest.
Moreover, in June 16, 2000, the petitioner, through counsel, received certified true copies of
the Information, the resolution of the investigating prosecutor, the affidavit-complaint of
the private complainant, respondent Maruyama, and a certification from the branch clerk
of court that only the Information, resolution and affidavit-complaint formed part of the
entire records of the case. The next day, June 17, 2000, the petitioner, through counsel, filed
a verified motion for judicial determination of probable cause and to defer the proceedings
and her arraignment. All the foregoing are inconsistent with a waiver of her right to assail
the validity of her arrest and to question the respondent judge’s determination of the
existence of probable cause for her arrest. Neither can the petitioner’s filing of a motion for
the lifting of the hold departure order and for leave to go to Japan be considered a waiver
of her right to assail the validity of the arrest warrant issued by the respondent judge.
When the petitioner filed the motion to lift the hold departure order issued against her by
the respondent judge, her motion for a determination of probable cause was still
unresolved. She sought a lifting of the hold departure order on July 14, 2000 and filed a
motion for leave to go to Japan, to give the respondent judge an opportunity to reconsider
the said order, preparatory to assailing the same in the appellate court in case her motion
was denied
VIII. RULE 115 – RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED
Section 1. Rights of accused at the trial. — In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
entitled to the following rights:
A. Presumption of Innocence
(a) To be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved beyond reasonable doubt.
B. To be informed of the nature and cause
(b) To be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
C. Right to counsel
(c) To be present and defend in person and by counsel at every stage of the proceedings,
from arraignment to promulgation of the judgment. The accused may, however,
waive his presence at the trial pursuant to the stipulations set forth in his bail, unless
his presence is specifically ordered by the court for purposes of identification. The
absence of the accused without justifiable cause at the trial of which he had notice
shall be considered a waiver of his right to be present thereat. When an accused
under custody escapes, he shall be deemed to have waived his right to be present on
all subsequent trial dates until custody over him is regained. Upon motion, the
accused may be allowed to defend himself in person when it sufficiently appears to
the court that he can properly protect his right without the assistance of counsel.
Attached from the time of investigation. When the accused, or any person, is taken into
custody, then the right to counsel attaches already. That ends after promulgation of
sentence.
The right to counsel can only be waived with assistance of counsel. There are 2 kinds of
counsel: de oficio and de parte. If you cannot have a de parte counsel, the State gives a de
oficio counsel. Can the prosecutor or fiscal be the counsel de oficio? No there is a conflict
of interest.
D. Right against self-incrimination
23 GING 
This can be invoked at the very start, before any question is propounded, or during the
questioning. You may have waived the first part (constitutional right) without waiving the
second part (statutory right).
(d) To testify as a witness in his own behalf but subject to cross-examination on matters
covered by direct examination. His silence shall not in any manner prejudice him.
(e) To be exempt from being compelled to be a witness against himself.
(f) To confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him at the trial. Either party
may utilize as part of its evidence the testimony of a witness who is deceased, out of
or can not with due diligence be found in the Philippines, unavailable or otherwise
unable to testify, given in another case or proceeding, judicial or administrative,
involving the same parties and subject matter, the adverse party having the
opportunity to cross-examine him.
(g) To have compulsory process issued to secure the attendance of witnesses and
production of other evidence in his behalf.
E. Right to speedy, impartial and public trial
(h) To have speedy, impartial and public trial.
F. Right to appeal
(i) To appeal in all cases allowed and in the manner prescribed by law.
Right under the Constitution vs rights under the law
People v. Ayson: Private respondent Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of PAL,
assigned at its Baguio City station. It having come to light that he was involved in
irregularities in the sales of plane tickets, PAL management notified him of an investigation
scheduled in accordance with PAL’s Code of Conduct and Discipline, and the CBA. On the
day before the investigation, Ramos gave to his superiors a handwritten note stating that he
is willing to settle irregularities allegedly charged against him in the amount of P76,000. At
the investigation, Ramos’ answers in response to questions, were taken down in writing.
His answers were to the effect inter alia that he had not indeed made disclosure of the
tickets mentioned in the Audit Team’s findings, that the proceeds had been “misused” by
him, that although he had planned on paying back the money, he had been prevented from
doing so, that he was still willing to settle his obligation, and proferred a compromise to
pay on staggered basis. No compromise agreement was reached.
An information was filed against Ramos charging him with the crime of estafa. On
arraignment, Ramos entered a plea of “Not Guilty,” and trial thereafter ensued. The private
prosecutors made a written offer of evidence which included the statement of Ramos
(during the investigation) (Exhibit A) and his handwritten admission (Exhibit K). Both
were objected to since said documents, appearing to be a confession, were taken without
Ramos being represented by a lawyer. Judge Ayson rejected Exhibits A and K. His Honor
declared Exhibit A inadmissible in evidence, since it does not appear that the accused was
reminded of this constitutional rights to remain silent and to have counsel, and that when
he waived the same and gave his statement, it was with the assistance actually of a counsel.
He also declared inadmissible Exhibit K, since it does not appear that the accused was
assisted by counsel when he made said admission.
SC: It was grave abuse of discretion for respondent Judge to have excluded the People’s
Exhibits A and K. Ramos was not under custodial interrogation prior to and during the
administrative inquiry into the irregularities in ticket sales in which he appeared to have
had a hand. The constitutional rights of a person under custodial interrogation under
Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution did not therefore come into play, were of no
relevance to the inquiry. Ramos had voluntarily answered questions posed to him on the
first day of the administrative investigation and agreed that the proceedings should be
recorded, the record having thereafter been marked during the trial of the criminal action
subsequently filed against him as Exhibit A, just as it is obvious that the note (Exhibit K)
that he sent to his superiors offering to compromise his liability in the alleged irregularities,
was a free and even spontaneous act on his part. They may not be excluded on the ground
that the so-called “Miranda rights” had not been accorded to Ramos.
His Honor adverts to what he perceives to be the “greater danger x x (of) the violation of
the right of any person against self-incrimination when the investigation is conducted by
the complaining parties, complaining companies, or complaining employers because being
interested parties, unlike the police agencies who have no propriety or pecuniary interest to
protect, they may in their overeagerness or zealousness bear heavily on their hapless
suspects, whether employees or not, to give statements under an atmosphere of moral
coercion, undue ascendancy, and undue influence.” Disciplinary sanctions may not be
imposed on any employee by his employer until and unless the employee has been
accorded due process, by which is meant that the latter must be informed of the offenses
ascribed to him and afforded adequate time and opportunity to explain his side. The
requirement entails the making of statements, oral or written, by the employee under such
administrative investigation in his defense, with opportunity to solicit the assistance of
counsel, or his colleagues and friends. The employee may, of course, refuse to submit any
statement at the investigation, that is his privilege. But if he should opt to do so, in his
defense to the accusation against him, it would be absurd to reject his statements, whether
at the administrative investigation, or at a subsequent criminal action brought against him,
because he had not been accorded, prior to his making and presenting them, his “Miranda
rights” (to silence and to counsel and to be informed thereof, etc.) which are relevant only
in custodial investigations. Indeed, it is self-evident that the employee’s statements are
submitted by him precisely so that they may be admitted and duly considered by the
investigating officer or committee, in negation or mitigation of his liability.
The possibility cannot be discounted that violence or intimidation, undue pressure or
influence be brought to bear on an employee under investigation—or on a person being
interrogated by another whom he has supposedly offended. In such an event, any
admission or confession wrung from the person under interrogation would be inadmissible
in evidence, on proof of the vice or defect vitiating consent, not because of a violation of
Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, but simply on the general, incontestable
proposition that involuntary or coerced statements may not in justice be received against
the makers thereof, and really should not be accorded any evidentiary value at all.
People v. Morial: The appellants were sentenced for Robbery with Homicide. Upon
arraignment, the 3 accused pleaded not guilty. During trial, they interposed denial and
alibi as their defense denying that they were together at the time of the incident. After trial,
the RTC rendered a decision convicting the 3 accused. The appellant’s conviction rested on
2 vital pieces of evidence: the extra-judicial confession of appellant Leonardo Morial and
the eyewitness account of Gabriel Guilao. CA found the extra-judicial confession as invalid
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since he was effectively deprived of his right to counsel during custodial investigation on
the ground that his counsel, Atty. Aguilar was not present throughout the investigation,
instead he left after the “material points” were asked as stated by the said counsel.
SC: The extra-judicial confession was admissible as evidence. In a custodial investigation,
the counsel afforded to the accused should be present the entire investigation. If for
instance, the said counsel should go someplace else, he could either terminate the
investigation until such time that he is again available or he could designate a new counsel
so as not to delay the process.
People v. Basada: Respondents were charged with the murder of “Jill”. All of the accused
pleaded not guilty except for Reynaldo and Buyo since they were at large. 3 witnesses
testified that the respondents invited Jill for a drinking session, and that Jill and Reynaldo
had an altercation. Reynaldo boxed Jill and after Jill ran, Reynaldo ran after him and
stabbed him with a balisong. The others held Jill as Reynaldo struck him. The autopsy
report on Jill’s cadaver showed that he sustained a contusion on the head, multiple
abrasions, and 6 stab wounds, all on the left part of his body, 3 of which were fatal. It
seemed probable to the medico-legal examiner that only one weapon was used in stabbing
Jill. RTC convicted Pedro, Ricardo, Crisanto, and Reynaldo. CA affirmed the RTC with
Reynaldo as principal, and the others as accomplices.
SC: The evidence presented was not sufficient to establish proof beyond reasonable ground
of the accused’s guilt. The prosecution has the burden of proving the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt. The overriding consideration is not whether the court doubts the
innocence of the accused but whether it entertains a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. The
prosecution amply proved that Reynaldo stabbed Jill but utterly failed to show the
involvement of the others in the offense.
Despite proof of Reynaldo’s guilt, however, the evidence is lacking as to the existence of the
qualifying circumstance of treachery. CA was correct in holding that treachery was not
present in this case. For treachery to qualify Jill’s killing to murder, the prosecution had to
prove (1) that Reynaldo used means to ensure his safety from Jill’s defensive or retaliatory
acts; and (2) that Reynaldo deliberately adopted such means. Prosecution had been unable
to prove that Reynaldo used means of attack that prevented Jill from defending himself.
One witness, Catalo, testified that it was actually Jill who struck first, precluding any
notion of treachery on Reynaldo’s part. The Court finds Reynaldo guilty merely of the
lesser offense of homicide and acquits the rest of the accused.
People v. Siangco
People v. Francisco
Imperial v. Joson: A truck, owned by petitioner Imperial and being driven by petitioner
Francisco, collided with a truck, owned by respondent. After colliding with respondent’s
truck, Imperial’s truck rammed into a KIA Besta Van killing the driver and 7 of its
passengers, and inflicting serious physical injuries upon 3 other passengers. A criminal
complaint for Reckless Imprudence resulting to Multiple Homicide, Multiple Serious
Physical Injuries and Damages to Property was filed against petitioners with the MTC.
Francisco proposed a series of facts for stipulation with the prosecution. Prosecutor Zabella
refused to stipulate. Court issued pre-trial order to that effect. Francisco filed motion to
“compel and disqualify Prosecutor Zabella and to correct the pre-trial order”, on the
ground, among others, that the latter cannot refuse to stipulate on matters which he has
personal knowledge. MTC denied motion. However, it directed another pre-trial
conference in view of the reassignment of the case to another prosecutor, and appearance
of a new private prosecutor.
Francisco filed petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with the RTC. He further
moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground that his right to speedy trial was violated
in view of the 9 postponements of the pre-trial conference. This was denied, so again he
filed a CPM petition with the RTC, which was consolidated with the previous CPM
petition. Both CPM petitions were dismissed for lack of merit. Francisco elevated this to the
CA. CA upheld the RTC.
SC: The accused’s right to speedy trial was not violated. Designed to prevent the
oppression of the citizen by holding criminal prosecution suspended over him for an
indefinite time and to prevent delays in the administration of justice, said right is
considered violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious and
oppressive delays.
Corpuz vs. Sandiganbayan: “In determining whether the accused has been deprived of his
right to a speedy disposition of the case and to a speedy trial, four factors must be
considered: (a) length of delay; (b) the reason for the delay; (c) the defendant’s assertion of
his right; and (d) prejudice to the defendant.”
Far from being vexatious, capricious and oppressive, however, the delays entailed by the
postponements of the hearings were, to a great extent, attributable to Francisco’s own
pursuit of extraordinary remedies against the interlocutory orders issued by the MTC and
the assignment of at least 3 public prosecutors to the case.
Although the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure concededly mandates commencement
of the trial within 30 days from receipt of the pre-trial order and the continuous conduct
thereof for a period not exceeding 180 days, Section 3 a (1), Rule 119 provides that delays
resulting from extraordinary remedies against interlocutory orders shall be excluded in
computing the time within which trial must commence. In determining the right of an
accused to speedy trial, moreover, courts are "required to do more than a mathematical
computation of the number of postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case" and to
give particular regard to the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.
IX. RULE 116 – ARRAIGNMENT AND PLEA
A. What is arraignment
Arraignment does not simply consist in the reading of the information. A copy must also be
furnished to the accused. It must be in a language [“dialect” is the more appropriate term]
known to the accused.
- how; when; where; why
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The court will ask you 2 important antecedent questions during arraignment: (1) do you
have a counsel?; (2) would you like to have a counsel of your choice? The court will give
the accused a lawyer. If the accused refuses, that is a ground for postponement.
In what language do you want the information to be read to you? If he says in Greek and
no one knows how to speak in Greek, that is a ground for postponement.
The court asks, “how do you plead?” guilty, not guilty, or silence (the accused does not
enter a plead, where the court will enter a plead of not guilty for him)
Section 1. Arraignment and plea; how made. —
(a) The accused must be arraigned before the court where the complaint or information
was filed or assigned for trial. The arraignment shall be made in open court by the
judge or clerk by furnishing the accused with a copy of the complaint or information,
reading the same in the language or dialect known to him, and asking him whether
he pleads guilty or not guilty. The prosecution may call at the trial witnesses other
than those named in the complaint or information.
(b) The accused must be present at the arraignment and must personally enter his plea.
Both arraignment and plea shall be made of record, but failure to do so shall not
affect the validity of the proceedings.
(c) When the accused refuses to plead or makes a conditional plea, a plea of not guilty
shall be entered for him.
(d) When the accused pleads guilty but presents exculpatory evidence, his plea shall be
deemed withdrawn and a plea of not guilty shall be entered for him.
(e) When the accused is under preventive detention, his case shall be raffled and its
records transmitted to the judge to whom the case was raffled within three (3) days
from the filing of the information or complaint. The accused shall be arraigned within
ten (10) days from the date of the raffle. The pre-trial conference of his case shall be
held within ten (10) days after arraignment. (
(f) The private offended party shall be required to appear at the arraignment for
purposes of plea bargaining, determination of civil liability, and other matters
requiring his presence. In case of failure of the offended party to appear despite due
notice, the court may allow the accused to enter a plea of guilty to a lesser offense
which is necessarily included in the offense charged with the conformity of the trial
prosecutor alone.
(g) Unless a shorter period is provided by special law or Supreme Court circular, the
arraignment shall be held within thirty (30) days from the date the court acquires
jurisdiction over the person of the accused. The time of the pendency of a motion to
quash or for a bill of particulars or other causes justifying suspension of the
arraignment shall be excluded in computing the period.
Section 6. Duty of court to inform accused of his right to counsel. — Before arraignment, the
court shall inform the accused of his right to counsel and ask him if he desires to have one.
Unless the accused is allowed to defend himself in person or has employed a counsel of his
choice, the court must assign a counsel de oficio to defend him.
Section 7. Appointment of counsel de oficio. — The court, considering the gravity of the
offense and the difficulty of the questions that may arise, shall appoint as counsel de oficio
only such members of the bar in good standing who, by reason of their experience and
ability, can competently defend the accused. But in localities where such members of the
bar are not available, the court may appoint any person, resident of the province and of
good repute for probity and ability, to defend the accused.
Section 8. Time for counsel de oficio to prepare for arraignment. — Whenever a counsel de oficio
is appointed by the court to defend the accused at the arraignment, he shall be given a
reasonable time to consult with the accused as to his plea before proceeding with the
arraignment.
Section 9. Bill of particulars. — The accused may, before arraignment, move for a bill of
particulars to enable him properly to plead and to prepare for trial. The motion shall
specify the alleged defects of the complaint or information and the details desired.
Suppose what was charged was not the proper offense. Amendment or substitution. In
amendment, there is no need for another preliminary investigation, but it is needed in
substitution. The word “upon” in upon “filing of a new information” must be emphasized.
Otherwise, the accused may be placed in double jeopardy.
B. Plea; kinds
What kind of plea, among the list, would be a valid plea? Unconditional plea is the only
kind of plea that is valid. Take note of these because one of the requirements for double
jeopardy is that there must be a valid plea.
(a) Conditional
(b) Unconditional
(c) negative/indirect (refusal to plead)
(d) inverted plea (pleads guilty with exculpatory evidence)
(e) improvident plea (not knowing fully well)
What is an improvident plea? One which is unintelligent plea. The accused did not
understand.
People v. Estomaca: It is an improvident plea. He was being charged for a capital offense.
After arraignment, he said he was guilty, while he was smiling. The judge said don’t you
know that this entails the death penalty? The accused said he understood. The judge had it
on record that he was smiling and he has no remorse of conscience at all. The prosecution
set the presentation of evidence. This case was submitted for decision for judgment. He was
meted out the death penalty. At that time, there was automatic review. SC: overturned the
death penalty and remanded the case. SC said no man in his right mind, when he is about
to approach death, will ever plead guilty. This is an improvident plea. Return the case for
further proceedings.
Section 5. Withdrawal of improvident plea of guilty. — At any time before the judgment of
conviction becomes final, the court may permit an improvident plea of guilty to be
withdrawn and be substituted by a plea of not guilty.
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C. Plea of guilty; requirements
- to capital offense
Section 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence. — When the accused pleads
guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness
and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and require the prosecution to
prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may present evidence in
his behalf.
When one entered a plea of guilty to a capital offense, what happens? This is only
relevant if the problem took place when the death penalty was still effective.
When are questions considered searching? What is sought to be determined by
searching questions? Voluntariness and full comprehension of the accused. Voluntariness
is dependent upon full comprehension.
Example: Nakalagay dito na ikaw ay nangrape. Pano ba nangyare yun? Bakit mo ginawa
yun? “Naiintindihan mo ba ano pinapasukan mo” is not sufficient as a searching question.
The first requirement is the searching question. The second is for the prosecution to
establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The accused may present
evidence. When the accused presents evidence, what is that for? To determine the
qualifying, mitigating and aggravating circumstances.
Suppose in the course of he proceedings, the accused puts up a valid defense. Re-
arraignment. The information will be read again and the court will ask the accused if he
will plead not guilty considering the circumstances.
- to a lesser offense (plea bargaining)
Section 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. — At arraignment, the accused, with the consent of
the offended party and the prosecutor, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to
a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged. After arraignment but
before trial, the accused may still be allowed to plead guilty to said lesser offense after
withdrawing his plea of not guilty. No amendment of the complaint or information is
necessary.
This is still applicable up until now.
If the charge is not punishable by capital penalty and the accused enters a plea of guilty,
what should the court do? Presentation of evidence is not for the purpose of establishing
the guilt but for meting out the appropriate penalty. If the accused insists on presenting
countervailing evidence, the court cannot refuse that. But it shows that the plea is
improvident.
(a) receive evidence from both
Section 4. Plea of guilty to non-capital offense; reception of evidence, discretionary. — When the
accused pleads guilty to a non-capital offense, the court may receive evidence from the
parties to determine the penalty to be imposed.
What if the offense necessarily includes another or is necessarily included in another?
Example: If the charge is murder, it necessarily includes homicide. If the charge is
homicide, then it is included in murder. How should the court mete out the penalty here?
For murder or for homicide? If what was charged was murder and what was proved was
homicide, penalty must be for homicide. If what was charged was homicide but what was
proved was murder, the penalty is for homicide. Any judgment must always be in favor of
the accused.
D. Presentation of Inspection of material evidence in possession of prosecution (Sec. 10)
- mode of discovery (Rule 23-29)
Section 10. Production or inspection of material evidence in possession of prosecution. — Upon
motion of the accused showing good cause and with notice to the parties, the court, in
order to prevent surprise, suppression, or alteration, may order the prosecution to produce
and permit the inspection and copying or photographing of any written statement given by
the complainant and other witnesses in any investigation of the offense conducted by the
prosecution or other investigating officers, as well as any designated documents, papers,
books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things not otherwise privileged,
which constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the case and which
are in the possession or under the control of the prosecution, police, or other law
investigating agencies.
E. Suspension of arraignment
Section 11. Suspension of arraignment. — Upon motion by the proper party, the arraignment
shall be suspended in the following cases:
(a) when suffering from unsound mental condition
“The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition which effective
renders him unable to fully understand the charge against him and to plead intelligently
thereto. In such case, the court shall order his mental examination and, if necessary, his
confinement for such purpose;”
If the judge finds out that the accused does not really understand what he is undergoing,
he does not have to be pronounced to be mentally unsound for the arraignment to be
postponed.
Example: He only understands Panggalatok dialect and no one knows how to speak it, it
may be postponed.
(b) prejudicial question
“There exists a prejudicial question;”
What are the 2 requirements for prejudicial question? There is prejudicial question when
first, the issue in the civil case is determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in
the criminal case. The issues are intimately related to each other. Second, the civil case must
have been filed ahead of the criminal case. If it is only used to suspend the proceedings,
then that’s no longer prejudicial.
(c) petition for review (60 days from filing)
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“A petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending at either the
Department of Justice, or the Office of the President; provided, that the period of suspension
shall not exceed sixty (60) days counted from the filing of the petition with the reviewing
office.”
See Nestor Tria case where the preliminary examination ended up in the Office of the
President, which sustained the DOJ. SC held there was no grave abuse of discretion.
There is a limitation: within 60 days from filing. The judge will require you to show proof
as to when you filed it. If the 60-day period has lapsed, the court can continue the
arraignment. The court is strict because it will unduly delay the proceedings.
(d) when judicial personnel are absent
Other instances: Judge is sick. Fiscal is not around. Public prosecutor is not around, even if
the private prosecutor is there.
Samson v. Daway: 2 informations for unfair competition under the Intellectual Property
Code were filed against Manolo Samson, registered owner of ITTI Shoes. Samson sell
CATERPILLAR products which are closely identical to the authentic Caterpillar products
and likewise using trademarks, symbols, designs as would cause confusion, mistake or
deception on the part of the buying public and prejudice to Caterpillar Inc.
Samson filed a motion to suspend arraignment in view of the existence of an alleged
prejudicial question involved in a civil case for unfair competition pending with the same
branch, and also another pending petition for review filed with the Secretary of Justice
assailing the Chief State Prosecutor’s resolution finding probable cause to charge petitioner
with unfair competition. RTC denied the motion to suspend arraignment. Samson filed a
twin motion to quash the informations and motion for reconsideration of the order denying
motion to suspend by challenging the jurisdiction of the RTC, that imprisonment for unfair
competition does not exceed 6 years therefore lies within MTC. RTC denied the twin
motions.
SC: Samson is not entitled to the suspension of the arraignment. He did not show the date
of the filing of the petition for review with the Secretary of Justice. While the pendency of a
petition for review is a ground for suspension of the arraignment, the deferment is limited
to a period of 60 days reckoned from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office.
After expiration of said period, the trial court is bound to arraign the accused or to deny the
motion to defer the arraignment
Samson failed to establish that respondent judge abused his discretion in denying his
motion to suspend. His pleadings do not show the date of the filing of the petition for
review with the Secretary of Justice. Moreover, the Order denying his motion to suspend
was not appended to the petition. He thus failed to discharge the burden of proving that he
was entitled to a suspension of his arraignment and that the questioned orders are contrary
to Sec 11, R116.
(Prejudicial Questions; Independent Civil Actions) There is no prejudicial question if the
civil and criminal action can, according to law, proceed independently of each other; An
action for unfair competition is an independent civil action under Art 33 NCC, and, as
such, it does not operate as a prejudicial question that will justify the suspension of the
criminal case.

People v. Pangilinan: 2 informations were filed charging appellant with raping AAA, his
daughter. Appellant, who was arrested and detained with no bail recommended, filed a
petition for bail. Trial court finding that the evidence against the accused is strong, denied
the bail petition. Thereafter, the defense presented its evidence with the appellant as sole
witness. Trial court, having discovered that the appellant had not yet been arraigned,
scheduled his arraignment. Prosecution adopted all evidence it adduced during the bail
hearing as part of its evidence-in-chief, and was admitted by the trial court. Trial court
found accused guilty.
Appellant assails his conviction because he was not properly arraigned. Since he was
arraigned only after the case was submitted for decision, said irregularity, he argues, is a
procedural error which is prejudicial to the appellant and is tantamount to denial of his
constitutional right to be informed of the accusation against him. He claims that his
subsequent arraignment did not cure the defect in the trial proceedings because at the time
the petition for bail was heard, the trial court had not yet acquired jurisdiction over his
person.
SC: Appellant is mistaken. When the hearings for his petition for bail were conducted, the
trial court had already acquired jurisdiction over his person. Settled is the rule that
jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary
appearance. The trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the appellant when he
was arrested on 19 March 1997. His arrest, not his arraignment, conferred on the trial court
jurisdiction over his person.
Were appellant’s rights and interests prejudiced by the fact that he was arraigned only at
this stage of the proceedings? We do not think so. Appellant’s belated arraignment did not
prejudice him. This procedural defect was cured when his counsel participated in the trial
without raising any objection that his client had yet to be arraigned. In fact, his counsel
even cross-examined the prosecution witnesses. His counsel’s active participation in the
hearings is a clear indication that he was fully aware of the charges against him; otherwise,
his counsel would have objected and informed the court of this blunder. Moreover, no
protest was made when appellant was subsequently arraigned. The parties did not
question the procedure undertaken by the trial court. It is only now, after being convicted
and sentenced to 2 death sentences, that appellant cries that his constitutional right has
been violated. It is already too late to raise this procedural defect. This Court will not allow
it.
People v. Aguilar
Daan v. Sandiganbayan: Petitioner, one of the accused, questions the denial by the
Sandiganbayan of his plea bargaining proposal. He, together with his co-accused, was
charged for 3 counts of malversation of public funds which they purportedly tried to
conceal by falsifying the time book and payrolls. The accused were also indicted for 3
counts of falsification of public document by a public officer or employee.
In the falsification cases, the accused offered to withdraw their plea of "not guilty" and
substitute the same with a plea of "guilty", provided, the mitigating circumstances of
confession or plea of guilt and voluntary surrender will be appreciated in their favor. In the
alternative, if such proposal is not acceptable, said accused proposed instead to substitute
their plea of "not guilty" to the crime of falsification of public document by a public officer
or employee with a plea of "guilty", but to the lesser crime of falsification of a public
document by a private individual. On the other hand, in the malversation cases, the
28 GING 
accused offered to substitute their plea of "not guilty" thereto with a plea of "guilty", but to
the lesser crime of failure of an accountable officer to render accounts.
Insofar as the falsification cases are concerned, the prosecution found as acceptable the
proposal of the accused to plead "guilty" to the lesser crime of falsification of public
document by a private individual because it will strengthen their cases against the
principal accused, Municipal Mayor Benedicto Kuizon, who appears to be the master mind
of these criminal acts. Insofar as the malversation cases are concerned, the prosecution was
likewise amenable to the offer of said accused to plead "guilty" to the lesser crime of failure
of an accountable officer to render accounts because Daan has already restituted the total
amount.
The Sandiganbayan denied petitioner’s Motion to Plea Bargain, despite favorable
recommendation by the prosecution, on the main ground that no cogent reason was
presented to justify its approval. This compelled petitioner to file the present case for
certiorari.
SC: Sandiganbayan’s rejection of petitioner’s plea offer was not justified. Plea bargaining in
criminal cases is a process whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a mutually
satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval. It usually involves the
defendant's pleading guilty to a lesser offense or to only one or some of the counts of a
multi-count indictment in return for a lighter sentence than that for the graver charge. Plea
bargaining is authorized under Section 2, Rule 116. Ordinarily, plea bargaining is made
during the pre-trial stage of the proceedings. Sections 1 and 2, Rule 118 require plea
bargaining to be considered by the trial court at the pre-trial conference. But it may also be
made during the trial proper and even after the prosecution has finished presenting its
evidence and rested its case.
In Section 2, Rule 116, the basic requisites upon which plea bargaining may be made are: it
should be with the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor, and that the plea of
guilt should be to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged. The
rules however use word may in the second sentence of Section 2, denoting an exercise of
discretion upon the trial court on whether to allow the accused to make such plea. Trial
courts are exhorted to keep in mind that a plea of guilty for a lighter offense than that
actually charged is not supposed to be allowed as a matter of bargaining or compromise for
the convenience of the accused.
People v. Villarama: the acceptance of an offer to plead guilty to a lesser offense is not
demandable by the accused as a matter of right but is a matter that is addressed entirely to
the sound discretion of the trial court. However, Villarama involved plea bargaining after
the prosecution had already rested its case.
As regards plea bargaining during the pre-trial stage, as in the present case, the trial court's
exercise of its discretion should neither be arbitrary nor should it amount to a capricious
and whimsical exercise of discretion. The Sandiganbayan rejected petitioner's plea offer on
the ground that petitioner and the prosecution failed to demonstrate that the proposal
would redound to the benefit of the public. The Sandiganbayan believes that approving the
proposal would "only serve to trivialize the seriousness of the charges against them and
send the wrong signal to potential grafters in public office that the penalties they are likely
to face would be lighter than what their criminal acts would have merited or that the
economic benefits they are likely to derive from their criminal activities far outweigh the
risks they face in committing them; thus, setting to naught the deterrent value of the laws
intended to curb graft and corruption in government."

Apparently, the Sandiganbayan has proffered valid reasons in rejecting petitioner's plea
offer. However, subsequent events and higher interests of justice and fair play dictate that
petitioner's plea offer should be accepted. The present case calls for the judicious exercise of
this Court's equity jurisdiction and of its power of control and supervision over the
proceedings of lower courts, in order to afford equal justice to petitioner.
People v. Estrada: Sandiganbayan approved the Plea Bargaining Agreement entered into by
the prosecution and one of the accused, Charlie "Atong" Ang. The agreement provided that
the accused undertakes to assist in the prosecution of the case and promises to return the
amount of P25,000,000. In approving the Plea Bargaining Agreement, the Sandiganbayan
took into consideration the timeliness of the plea bargaining and whether the agreement
complied with the requirements of Section 2, Rule 116. The Sandigabayan noted that the
accused had already withdrawn his earlier plea of "not guilty"; and that the prosecution
consented to the plea of guilt to a lesser offense; and the lesser offense, which is Corruption
of Public Officials in relation to Indirect Bribery, is necessarily included in the offense
charged, which is Plunder.
The Court sees no reason why the standards applied by the Sandiganbayan to Estrada
should not be applied to the present case. Records show that there was a favorable
recommendation by the Office of the Special Prosecutor to approve petitioner's motion to
plea bargain.
Dino v. Olivares: Bienvenido Diño and Renato Comparativo instituted a complaint for
vote buying against respondent. 2 Informations were filed before the RTC charging
Olivarez with Violation of Section 261, paragraphs a, b and k of Article XXII of the
Omnibus Election Code. The arraignment of Olivarez was initially set on 18 October 2004.
On 7 October 2004, Olivarez filed before the Law Department of COMELEC an "appeal of
the Joint Resolution of the City Prosecutor with Motion to Revoke Continuing Authority.”
Olivarez argued that the pendency of the appeal of the Joint Resolution before the
COMELEC should prevent the filing of the Informations before the RTC as there could be
no final finding of probable cause until the COMELEC had resolved the appeal. COMELEC
directed the city prosecutor to transmit or elevate the entire records of the case and to
suspend further implementation of the Joint Resolution until final resolution of the appeal
before the COMELEC en banc.
Olivarez filed a Motion to Quash the 2 criminal informations on the ground that more than
one offense was charged therein. This caused the resetting of the scheduled arraignment on
18 October 2004 to 13 December 2004. Before Judge Madrona could act on the motion to
quash, Assistant Prosecutor Pablo-Medina, with the approval of the city prosecutor, filed
its "Opposition to the Motion to Quash and Motion to Admit Amended Informations."
Judge Madrona reset the hearing scheduled on 13 December 2004 to 1 February 2005 on
account of the pending Motion to Quash of Olivarez and the Amended Informations of the
public prosecutor.
On 14 December 2004, Olivarez filed an "Opposition to the Admission of the Amended
Informations," arguing that no resolution was issued to explain the changes therein.
Moreover, he averred that the city prosecutor was no longer empowered to amend the
informations, since the COMELEC had already directed it to transmit the entire records of
the case and suspend the hearing of the cases before the RTC until the resolution of the
appeal before the COMELEC en banc.
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On 12 January 2005, Judge Madrona issued an order denying Olivarez’ Motion to Quash,
and admitted the Amended Informations. Respondent filed an Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration. On 1 February 2005, Judge Madrona reset the arraignment to 9 March
2005, with a warning that the arraignment would proceed without any more delay, unless
the SC would issue an injunctive writ. On 9 March 2005, Olivarez failed to appear before
the RTC. Thereupon, Judge Madrona, in open court, denied the Motion for Reconsideration
of the Order denying the Motion to Quash and admitting the Amended Informations, and
ordered the arrest of respondent and the confiscation of the cash bond.
Olivarez filed an "Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and/or to Lift the Order of Arrest of
Accused Dr. Pablo Olivarez," which was denied. The Order directed that a bench warrant
be issued for the arrest of Olivarez to ensure his presence at his arraignment. COMELEC
filed before the RTC a Manifestation and Motion wherein it alleged that pursuant to the
COMELEC’s powers to investigate and prosecute election offense cases, it had the power to
revoke the delegation of its authority to the city prosecutor, which it did. Thus, COMELEC
moved (1) that the RTC hold in abeyance further proceedings in the Criminal Cases until
the COMELEC has acted on Olivarez’ appeal; and (2) to revoke the authority of the city
prosecutor to prosecute the case, designating therein the lawyers from the COMELEC to
prosecute the Criminal Cases.
Olivarez filed a Special Civil Action for Certiorari before the CA. CA declared that the
COMELEC had the authority to conduct the preliminary investigation of election offenses
and to prosecute the same. CA also pronounced that Judge Madrona erred in admitting the
amended informations, since they were made in excess of the delegated authority of the
public prosecutor, and his orders to arrest the respondent and to confiscate the latter’s cash
bond were devoid of legal basis.
SC: Judge Madrona had acted in accordance with law when he issued the warrant for the
arrest of respondent and ordered the confiscation of his cash bond due to the latter’s failure
to appear for arraignment. The filing of an information in the trial court initiates a criminal
action. The trial court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case. After the filing of the
complaint or the information, a warrant for the arrest of the accused is issued by the trial
court. When the accused voluntarily submits himself to the court or is duly arrested, the
court then acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused. In this case, the trial court
acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the accused Carmelo Jaro, Remedios Malibaran,
and Olivarez, who posted bail bonds after the trial court issued a Warrant of Arrest. While
it is true that the fiscal has the quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether or not a
criminal case should be filed in court, once the case has been brought to court, whatever
disposition the fiscal may feel is proper in the case should be addressed to the
consideration of the trial court.
Thereafter, arraignment shall follow as a matter of course. Section 11, Rule 116 of the Rules
of Criminal Procedure, enumerates the instances that can suspend the arraignment of the
accused. “(c) A petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending at either
the Department of Justice, or the Office of the President; Provided, That the period of
suspension shall not exceed sixty (60) days counted from the filing of the petition with the
reviewing office.”
The arraignment of the accused is not indefinitely suspended by the pendency of an appeal
before the Department of Justice or, in this case, Law Department of the COMELEC; rather,
the reviewing authority is allowed 60 days within which to decide the appeal. In this case,
Olivarez filed his Appeal of the Joint Resolution at the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Parañaque on 7 October 2004. Thus, the arraignment that was scheduled on 11 October
2004 was re-scheduled to 13 December 2004, approximately 60 days thereafter. On 1
December 2004, the arraignment scheduled on 13 December 2004 was reset to 1 February
2005 because of the pending Motion to Quash. When the respondent failed to appear on the
scheduled arraignment, Judge Madrona nonetheless reset the arraignment to 9 March 2005,
with the warning that the court would impose the appropriate sanctions, should
respondent still fail to appear therein. It was only on 9 March 2005, or 5 months after
Olivarez filed his appeal before the COMELEC that Judge Madrona held the arraignment
and issued the Bench Warrant of Arrest against respondent. 5 months, which far exceeded
the 60 days provided by the rules, was ample time for the respondent to obtain from
COMELEC a reversal of the Joint Resolution.
People v. Janjalani: February 14, 2005 - An RRCG bus was running from Navotas terminal
to Alabang bus terminal via EDSA when the conductor noticed 2 men running after the bus
after a passenger alighted from its Guadalupe bus stop. The conductor, Elmer Andalay was
wary of the men because of how they are seated: one is 2 seats behind the driver, while the
other sat at the back and there were only 15 passengers. Their eyes are also reddish and
when asked for payment, both men paid for 2 persons. The man at the back appeared to be
tinkering something and whenever Andales will approach, the former will glare at him.
When they arrived at Ayala Ave., the 2 men insisted on getting off the bus even if the
driver refused because of a Makati ordinance prohibiting unloading anywhere. The 2 men
ran away and then there was an explosion at the back with fire engulfing the bus. Shortly
before the explosion, Abu Solaiman (spokesperson of Abu Sayyaf Group) announced over
DZBB that the group had a Valentine’s Day “gift” for former President GMA. After the
incident, he went on radio again and warned for more bomb attacks.
Angelo Trinidad, one of the accused gave ABS-CBN an exclusive interview confessing his
participation in the incident. Gamal Baharan likewise admitted his role. Gappal Bannah
Asali confessed that he supplied the explosive devices on a television interview. These 3
along with members of the Abu Sayyaf group, Khaddafy Janjalani, Jainal Asali, Rohmat
Abdurrohim (Asali’s teacher in making explosives) a.k.a. Abu Jackie or Zaky and other
unnamed members were charged with multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder.
Arraignment: Multiple murder – Baharan, Trinidad, Asali pleaded guilty. Multiple
Frustrated Murder – Asali pleaded guilty; Trinidad and Baharan pleaded not guilty.
Trial Court asked whether Baharan and Trinidad were amenable to changing their not
guilty pleas considering that they pleaded guilty to a heavier charge, multiple murder. The
defense counsel conferred with them and explained to them the consequences of their
pleas. The 2 accused acknowledged the inconsistency and asked for re-arraignment. They
then pleaded guilty to multiple frustrated murder.
SC: The judge should have conducted searching inquiry but since they already made
confessions and pleaded guilty on a higher crime, the court deemed it unnecessary to rule
on this matter and besides, the independent evidence presented by the prosecution is
sufficient to warrant a judgment of conviction.
People v. Apduhan: “all trial judges must refrain from accepting with alacrity an accused's
plea of guilty, for while justice demands a speedy administration, judges are duty bound to
be extra solicitous in seeing to it that when an accused pleads guilty, he understands fully
the meaning of his plea and the import of an inevitable conviction.” Thus, trial court judges
are required to observe the procedure under Section 3, Rule 116.
30 GING 
The requirement to conduct a searching inquiry applies more so in cases of re-arraignment.
In People v. Galvez, the Court noted that since accused-appellant's original plea was “not
guilty,” the trial court should have exerted careful effort in inquiring into why he changed
his plea to “guilty.”
The stringent procedure governing the reception of a plea of guilt, especially in a case
involving the death penalty, is imposed upon the trial judge in order to leave no room for
doubt on the possibility that the accused might have misunderstood the nature of the
charge and the consequences of the plea.
The requirement to conduct a searching inquiry should not be deemed satisfied in cases in
which it was the defense counsel who explained the consequences of a “guilty” plea to the
accused.
Nevertheless, we are not unmindful of the context under which the re-arraignment was
conducted or of the factual milieu surrounding the finding of guilt against the accused.
Baharan and Trinidad previously pled guilty to another charge – multiple murder – based
on the same act relied upon in the multiple frustrated murder charge. Prior to the change of
plea to one of guilt, Baharan and Trinidad made 2 other confessions of guilt – one through
an extrajudicial confession (exclusive television interviews, as stipulated by both accused
during pretrial), and the other via judicial admission (pretrial stipulation). Considering the
foregoing circumstances, we deem it unnecessary to rule on the sufficiency of the
“searching inquiry” in this instance. Remanding the case for re-arraignment is not
warranted, as the accused’s plea of guilt was not the sole basis of the condemnatory
judgment under consideration.
X. RULE 117 – MOTION TO QUASH
1. Motion to Quash vs Motion to Dismiss
Motion to Dismiss Motion to Quash
Plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue That the officer who filed the information
had no authority to do so
Litis pendentia Duplicity of offense
Cause of action is barred by prior judgment Double jeopardy
or statute of limitation (res judicata)
Condition precedent No equivalent
There are 10 grounds in Motion to Dismiss while there are 9 grounds in Motion to Quash
because venue is jurisdictional in criminal cases. Where the offense was committed, that is
where you have to file the case. It cannot be subject to agreement of the parties.
Do conditions precedent (barangay conciliation, exhaustion of administrative remedies,
earnest efforts between members of the same family) apply in criminal cases? Yes and
no. Under the LGC, all cases, whether criminal or civil, must undergo barangay conciliation In civil cases, jurisdiction over subject matter is conferred by law. Is that principle
proceedings. There is really no equivalent. applicable or has an equivalent in criminal cases? Yes, Jurisdiction over the offense.

Section 1. Grounds. — Within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or Section 1. Time to move to quash. — At any time before entering his plea, the accused may
pleading asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on any of the following move to quash the complaint or information.
grounds:
Section 2. Form and contents. — The motion to quash shall be in writing, signed by the
(a) That the court has no jurisdiction over the person of the defending party; accused or his counsel and shall distinctly specify its factual and legal grounds. The court
(b) That the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim; shall consider no ground other than those stated in the motion, except lack of jurisdiction
(c) That venue is improperly laid; over the offense charged.
(d) That the plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue;
(e) That there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause; Section 4. Amendment of the complaint or information. — If the motion to quash is based on an
(f) That the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment or by the statute of limitations; alleged defect of the complaint or information which can be cured by amendment, the court
(g) That the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action; shall order that an amendment be made.
(h) That the claim or demand set forth in the plaintiff's pleading has been paid, waived,
abandoned, or otherwise extinguished; If it is based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the
(i) That the claim on which the action is founded is enforceable under the provisions of prosecution shall be given by the court an opportunity to correct the defect by amendment.
the statute of frauds; and The motion shall be granted if the prosecution fails to make the amendment, or the
(j) That a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been complied with. complaint or information still suffers from the same defect despite the amendment.

2. Grounds (Memorize) 4. Effects when motion is granted; denied

Section 3. Grounds. — The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on
any of the following grounds:
(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;
(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;
(c) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the accused;
(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;
(e) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;
(f) That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for various
offenses is prescribed by law;
(g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
(h) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or
justification; and
(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged,
or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express
consent.
That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the
case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. In
what instance can the court dismiss without the express consent of the accused? How can
this happen when every case dismissed in favor of the accused must be at the instance of
the accused?
Section 5. Effect of sustaining the motion to quash. — If the motion to quash is sustained, the
court may order that another complaint or information be filed except as provided in
section 6 of this rule. If the order is made, the accused, if in custody, shall not be discharged
unless admitted to bail. If no order is made or if having been made, no new information is
filed within the time specified in the order or within such further time as the court may
allow for good cause, the accused, if in custody, shall be discharged unless he is also in
custody for another charge.
Section 6. Order sustaining the motion to quash not a bar to another prosecution; exception. — An
order sustaining the motion to quash is not a bar to another prosecution for the same
offense unless the motion was based on the grounds specified in section 3 (g) and (i) of this
Rule.
Section 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. — When an accused has been
convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without
his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or
information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction
and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused
or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or
for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which
necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former
complaint or information.

3. When and how to move to quash However, the conviction of the accused shall not be a bar to another prosecution for an
offense which necessarily includes the offense charged in the former complaint or
When can you file it? Any time before arraignment. After arraignment, you can still file a information under any of the following instances:
motion to quash on the ground of jurisdiction.
(a) the graver offense developed due to supervening facts arising from the same act or
Jurisdiction here refers to jurisdiction over the person of the accused and jurisdiction over omission constituting the former charge;
the offense. What are the principles behind these? (b) the facts constituting the graver charge became known or were discovered only after
a plea was entered in the former complaint or information; or
31 GING 
(c) the plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made without the consent of the
prosecutor and of the offended party except as provided in section 1 (f) of Rule 116.
In any of the foregoing cases, where the accused satisfies or serves in whole or in part the
judgment, he shall be credited with the same in the event of conviction for the graver
offense. (7a)
Section 8. Provisional dismissal. — A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with
the express consent of the accused and with notice to the offended party.
The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six (6)
years or a fine of any amount, or both, shall become permanent one (1) year after issuance
of the order without the case having been revived. With respect to offenses punishable by
imprisonment of more than six (6) years, their provisional dismissal shall become
permanent two (2) years after issuance of the order without the case having been revived.
Section 9. Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground therefor. — The failure of the
accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or
information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in
said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any objections based on the grounds provided for
in paragraphs (a), (b), (g), and (i) of section 3 of this Rule.
5. Remedies against denial/grant of motion
A motion may be granted or denied. What are the remedies against the denial or grant of
a motion?
Granted: It depends on the ground. An order granting a motion to quash does not
necessarily result into an acquittal. The court may allow amendment or substitution. There
are instances the court cannot do that and re-filing also cannot be allowed (examples:
extinguishment and double jeopardy)
The equivalent of double jeopardy in civil cases is res judicata. Will the requirements in
res judicata apply in double jeopardy? Res judicata requires that (1) there be a final
judgment granted by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) it is a judgment on the merits;
and (3) there is identity of parties, cause of action and subject matter. Yes. It is called double
jeopardy because there was a first jeopardy. The first jeopardy requires all the requirements
of res judicata. In double jeopardy, there is a second decision. The second decision
principally requires the first decision. This refers to conviction, acquittal or dismissal
without the express consent of the accused.
There is no problem as to conviction as far as double jeopardy is concerned. Example:
Convicted of murder and they charged you for killing the same person you previously
killed. You are already meting out the penalty. This is not allowed.
Which does not apply here? Is trial on the merits in res judicata applicable? Trial on the
merits does not necessarily mean there is presentation of evidence. As long as the parties
are granted the opportunity to present their side, even if there is no presentation of
evidence proper. Example: Default, where there is no presentation of evidence, is a trial on
the merits.
32 GING 
In criminal cases, can there be judgment without trial? No. In criminal cases there is no
default. Even the plea of guilty requires presentation of evidence. It can never be
understood as we understand it in civil cases.
People v. Abad: The Director of Mines issued Felix de Castro a permit to extract sand and
gravel from Sumigar Quarry, Banaue, Ifugao. An information was filed with the CFI of
Ifugao charging Felix with “Theft of Minerals”, under Sec. 78, PD 483. Felix filed a motion
to quash the information on the ground that they had actually paid sand and gravel tax, as
evidenced by 3 official receipts to the Municipal Treasurer of Ifugao. Thus, the taking was
with the consent of the government.
Petitioner opposed the quashal arguing that it is error to imply that consent was given by
the Government through the Municipal Treasurer inasmuch as the taxes paid to the
Municipal Government are not the fees required by the Bureau of Mines, which is the
government entity empowered to approve permits and licenses and to regulate the
exploitation of mineral resources.
Respondent judge granted the motion to quash on the basis that violation of PD 463 is
limited to administrative violation; and that the crime Theft of Minerals was not committed
with malice, which is essential to the crime.
SC: The allegations in the complaint satisfy the requisites to constitute the offense as
enumerated under PD 463. Since Felix invoked the ground "that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense,” the sufficiency of the Information hinges on the question of whether
the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, meet the essential elements of the offense as
defined in the law.
The Information charged private respondents with the crime of "Theft of Minerals" defined
and penalized under Section 78 of P.D. No. 463, as amended by Section 23 of P.D. No. 1385.
The elements of the offense, therefore, are that : (1) the accused extracted, removed and/or
disposed of minerals; (2) these minerals belong to the Government or have been taken from
a mining claim or claims leased, held or owned by other persons; and (3) the accused did
not possess a mining lease or a temporary permit or any other permit to mine granted by
the Secretary or the Director under existing mining decrees, laws and regulations.
Evidently, the Information filed includes all the elements. Thus, it alleged (1) that the
accused, conspiring and mutually helping one another, wilfully and feloniously extracted,
removed and/or disposed of minerals or material aggregates like sand and gravel; (2) the
minerals were taken from the Sumigar Quarry, Banawe, Ifugao, which is covered by a
commercial permit issued by the Bureau of Mines, Baguio City, in favor of complaining
witness Felix de Castro; and (3) the extracting was done without any mining lease or permit
of their own pursuant to law.
Thus, respondent Judge, in considering as evidence the 3 receipts of tax payments issued
by the Municipal Treasurer exceeded his jurisdiction amounting to grave abuse of
discretion when he considered matters of defense extrinsic to the allegations in the
Information and which should be substantiated during the trial. Moreover, said receipts
merely show payment of taxes pursuant to Provincial Ordinance No. 14 and not the
authority to extract, remove, and/or dispose of minerals from the Sumigar Quarry as
required by P.D. No. 463. Those receipts are insufficient evidence to prove that the proper
Government office had, in effect, granted the required permit to extract minerals from said
quarry.
People v. Panfilo Lacson: Murder charges were filed with the Office of the Ombudsman
against 97 officers and personnel of ABRITFG. The next-of-kin of the slain KBG members
also filed murder charges against them. The Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan
11 Informations for murder against Panfilo Lacson and 25 others, as principals.
Upon motion of Lacson, the criminal cases were remanded to the Ombudsman for
reinvestigation. Amended Informations were filed against the 26 suspects but the
participation of Lacson was downgraded from principal to accessory. Lacson entered a plea
of not guilty. With the downgrading of charges against him, Lacson questioned the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as none of the "principal" accused in the Amended
Informations was a government official with a Salary Grade 27 or higher. Sandiganbayan
ordered the cases transferred to the RTC.
In Lacson v. Executive Secretary, Lacson challenged the constitutionality of the amendment
and contended that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the criminal cases. This
Court, while dismissing the constitutional challenge, nonetheless ordered the transfer of
the criminal cases to the RTC on the ground that the Amended Informations for murder
failed to indicate that the offenses charged therein were committed in relation to, or in
discharge of, the official functions of the respondent, as required by R. A. No. 8249.
Before the accused could be arraigned, prosecution witnesses recanted their affidavits
which implicated Lacson. Private complainants also executed their respective affidavits of
desistance declaring that they were no longer interested to prosecute these cases. Thus, the
Criminal Cases were dismissed because the Informations in support thereof have been
rendered meaningless, if not absurd.
New affidavits regarding the Kuratong Baleleng incident were indorsed to the DOJ for
preliminary investigation. Secretary of Justice formed a panel to investigate the matter.
Lacson was subpoenaed to attend the investigation. Lacson, et al., invoking, among others,
their constitutional right against double jeopardy, filed a petition for prohibition with the
RTC, primarily to enjoin the State prosecutors from conducting the preliminary
investigation. The same was denied by Judge Pasamba.
11 Informations for murder involving the killing of the same members of the Kuratong
Baleleng gang were filed before the RTC. The new Informations charged as principals 34
people, including Lacson and his 25 other co-accused. Lacson filed before the CA a petition
for certiorari. CA found Judge Pasamba committed grave abuse of discretion.
CA rendered the now assailed Decision. It characterized the termination of the Criminal
Cases as "provisional dismissal," and considered the new Criminal Cases as mere revivals
of the same. Applying Section 8, Rule 117, it dismissed the criminal cases against the
respondent.
Whether Section 8, Rule 117 bars the filing of the 11 informations against Lacson.
SC: Like any other favorable procedural rule, this new rule can be given retroactive effect.
However, this Court cannot rule on this jugular issue due to the lack of sufficient factual
bases. Thus, there is need of proof of the following facts: (1) whether the provisional
dismissal of the cases had the express consent of the accused; (2) whether it was ordered by
the court after notice to the offended party, (3) whether the 2-year period to revive has
already lapsed, and (4) whether there is any justification for the filing of the cases beyond
the 2-year period.
33 GING 
The records of the case do not reveal with equal clarity and conclusiveness whether notices
to the offended parties were given before the cases against Lacson were dismissed by then
Judge Agnir. It appears from the resolution that the relatives of the victims who desisted
did not appear during the hearing to affirm their affidavits. Their affidavits of desistance
were only presented by Atty. Godwin Valdez who testified that he assisted the private
complainants in preparing their affidavits and he signed them as a witness.
The fact of notice to the offended parties was not raised either in the petition for prohibition
with application for TRO or writ of preliminary injunction filed by Lacson in the RTC,
presided by Judge Pasamba, to enjoin the prosecutors from reinvestigating the said cases
against him. Nor was the fact of notice to the offended parties the subject of proof after the
11 informations for murder against Lacson and company were revived in the RTC. This is
not to be wondered at. The applicability of Section 8, Rule 117 was never considered in the
trial court. It was in the CA where Lacson raised for the first time the argument that Section
8, Rule 117 bars the revival of the multiple murder cases against him.
The reception of evidence on these various issues cannot be done in the SC but before RTC.
The case is remanded to the RTC so that the State prosecutors and Lacson can adduce
evidence and be heard on whether the requirements of Section 8, Rule 117 have been
complied with.
People v. Navarro
Panaguiton v. DOJ
Jumaquio v. Villarosa
People v. Dumlao: An information was filed before the Sandiganbayan charging
respondents Dumlao, La’o and others with violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. The information alleged that the respondent-members of the Board of
Trustees of GSIS entered into a contract of lease-purchase with La’o, a private person,
whereby GSIS agreed to sell to La’o, a GSIS-acquired property consisting of a land and
building and grant La’o the right to sub-lease the ground floor during the period of lease,
from which he collected yearly rentals in excess of the yearly amortization causing gross
disadvantage to the government.
During arraignment, Dumlao pleaded not guilty, and as agreed by prosecution and
respondents, a Joint Stipulation of Facts and Admission of Exhibits was submitted to the
court. The Joint Stipulation admitted additional facts: (1) 3 members of the Board, Dumlao
being one of them, signed the Minutes; (2) 7 members of the Board were present during the
board meeting; and (3) the documentary evidence of was authentic and duly executed. It
was further decided for the pre-trial to be terminated limiting the course of the subsequent
trial to “matters not disposed of... unless modified by the court.”
Dumlao filed a Motion to Dismiss/Quash on the ground that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense. He stated that the prosecution’s main thrust against him was the
alleged approval by the GSIS Board of the Lease-Purchase Agreement. He argued that the
Resolution was not in fact approved by the GSIS Board. Since the signatures of fellow
respondents did not appear in the minutes of the meeting, these people did not participate
in the Lease-Purchase Agreement. There was no quorum of the board; thus no resolution
approving the Agreement. Since the resolution was not approved, he was innocent. He
added that the person liable was Atty. Javellana who actually executed the contract.
Sandiganbayan ruled in favor of Dumlao, finding that the minutes shows that the Board
failed to approve the Agreement. As evidenced by the Joint Stipulation, of the 7 members,
only 3 signed. It did not validly pass a resolution because at least a majority of 4 votes were
required. Therefore prosecution had no cause of action against Dumlao.
SC: The fundamental test in determining the sufficiency of the material averments of an
information is whether the facts alleged therein, which are hypothetically admitted, would
establish the essentials elements of the crime defined by law. Evidence aliunde, or matters
extrinsic of the Information, are not be considered.
The elements of the crime under Section 3(g) of Republic Act No. 3019 are as follows: (1)
that the accused is a public officer; (2) that he entered into a contract or transaction on
behalf of the government; and (3) that such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly
disadvantageous to the government. The ground raised by Dumlao in his Motion to
Quash/Dismiss is that the facts charged do not constitute an offense. After examining the
information, we find that the facts alleged therein, if hypothetically admitted, will prove all
the elements of Section 3(g) as against Dumlao. The motion to quash should not have been
granted.
It can also be gathered from the resolution of the Sandiganbayan that it did not consider the
ground invoked by Dumlao (that the facts charged do not constitute an offense); otherwise,
it could have denied Dumlao’s motion. From the reasoning given by the Sandiganbayan, it
is clear that it dismissed the case because of insufficiency of evidence.
According to Sec. 3, Rule 117, insufficiency of evidence is not one of the grounds of a
Motion to Quash. It is only a ground for dismissal of an action only after the prosecution
rests its case as provided in Sec. 23, Rule 119 on demurrer to evidence. Sandiganbayan
dismissed the case against Dumlao for insufficiency of evidence, even without giving the
prosecution the opportunity to present its evidence. In so doing, it violated the
prosecution’s right to due process. It deprived the prosecution of its opportunity to
prosecute its case and to prove the accused’s culpability.
Soriano v. People
People v. Tan: 2 informations were filed charging accused of violations of the Revised
Securities Act. Respondent pleaded not guilty. Petitioner made its formal offer consisting
of 14 exhibits. RTC admitted only 4 of the exhibits. Respondent then filed Omnibus Motion
for Leave to File Demurrer to Evidence and to admit attached Demurrer to Evidence,which
was granted. RTC ordered petitioner to file an opposition. Petitioner filed opposition. RTC
issued order granting respondent’s demurrer to evidence. Petitioner filed certiorari before
the CA. CA dismissed outright for evident want of merit. It ruled that the dismissal of a
criminal action by the grant of a Demurrer to Evidence is one on the merits and operates as
an acquittal, for which reason, the prosecution cannot appeal therefrom as it would place
the accused in double jeopardy.
SC: People v. Sandiganbayan: general rule: the grant of a demurrer to evidence operates as an
acquittal and is, thus, final and unappealable.
The elements of double jeopardy are (1) the complaint or information was sufficient in form
and substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the court had jurisdiction; (3) the accused had
been arraigned and had pleaded; and (4) the accused was convicted or acquitted, or the
case was dismissed without his express consent. These elements are present here: (1) the
Informations filed in Criminal Cases Nos. 119831 and 119832 against respondent were
34 GING 
sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the RTC had jurisdiction over
Criminal Cases Nos. 119831 and 119832; (3) respondent was arraigned and entered a plea of
not guilty; and (4) the RTC dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. 119831 and 119832 on a
demurrer to evidence on the ground of insufficiency of evidence which amounts to an
acquittal from which no appeal can be had.
The rule on double jeopardy, however, is not without exceptions. In People v. Laguio, Jr., the
only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is when the RTC acted with grave
abuse of discretion.
This exception is inapplicable here. This Court finds that the RTC did not abuse its
discretion in the manner it conducted the proceedings of the trial, as well as its grant of
respondent’s demurrer to evidence. The question to be resolved, given the factual molding
of herein petition, is “did the RTC violate petitioner’s right to due process?” Petitioner was
given more than ample opportunity to present its case as gleaned from the factual
antecedents which led to the grant of respondent’s demurrer. Unlike in Bocar and Saldana
where the prosecution was prevented from completing its presentation of evidence,
petitioner was given the opportunity to present its case, formally offer its evidence and
oppose respondent’s demurrer. RTC even allowed petitioner to withdraw its formal offer
of evidence after having initially rested its case and then continue its presentation by
introducing additional witnesses. Thus, no grave abuse can be attributed to the RTC as
petitioner’s right to due process was not violated.
Note: Demurrer to evidence, just relate this to Motion to Quash, both are like MTD
Cerezo v. People: Cerezo filed a complaint for libel against respondents and Mapalo.
Finding probable cause to indict respondents, the QC Prosecutor’s Office (OP-QC) filed the
corresponding Information against them before the RTC. Respondents thereafter filed a
Motion for Reconsideration and/or Motion to Re-evaluate Prosecution’s Evidence before
the OP-QC. OP-QC reversed its earlier finding and recommended the withdrawal of the
Information. Consequently, a Motion to Dismiss and Withdraw Information was filed
before the RTC.
During the intervening period, respondents were arraigned. All of them entered a “not
guilty” plea. In deference to the prosecutor’s last resolution, RTC ordered the criminal case
dismissed.
Cerezo moved for reconsideration, arguing that the OP-QC resolution has not yet attained
finality, considering that it was the subject of a Petition for Review filed before the DOJ.
RTC deferred action on the motion to await the resolution of the DOJ. The Secretary of
Justice promulgated his resolution reversing and setting aside the OP-QC’s resolution, and
directing the latter to refile the earlier information for libel. RTC issued its first assailed
Order granting petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, conformably with the resolution of
the DOJ Secretary.
Respondents elevated their predicament to the CA through a Petition for Certiorari under
Rule 65, arguing that the RTC Orders violated their constitutional right against double
jeopardy. CA found the RTC to have gravely abused its discretion in ordering the
reinstatement of the case. CA annulled the impugned RTC orders, ruling that all the
elements of double jeopardy exists. CA further found that the DOJ Secretary improperly
took cognizance of the Petition for Review because DOJ Department Order No. 223
mandates that no appeal shall be entertained if the accused has already been arraigned or,
if the arraignment took place during the pendency of the appeal, the same shall be
dismissed.
SC: There was no valid termination of the case so as to usher in the impregnable wall of
double jeopardy. Once a case is filed with the court, any disposition of it rests on the sound
discretion of the court. In thus resolving a motion to dismiss a case or to withdraw an
Information, the trial court should not rely solely and merely on the findings of the public
prosecutor or the Secretary of Justice. It is the court’s bounden duty to assess
independently the merits of the motion, and this assessment must be embodied in a written
order disposing of the motion. While the recommendation of the prosecutor or the ruling of
the Secretary of Justice is persuasive, it is not binding on courts.
From the Order of the RTC dismissing the criminal case, the RTC judge failed to make his
own determination of whether or not there was a prima facie case to hold respondents for
trial. He failed to make an independent evaluation or assessment of the merits of the case.
RTC judge blindly relied on the manifestation and recommendation of the prosecutor when
he should have been more circumspect and judicious in resolving the Motion to Dismiss
and Withdraw Information especially so when the prosecution appeared to be uncertain,
undecided, and irresolute on whether to indict respondents. The same holds true with
respect to the Order which reinstated the case. The RTC judge failed to make a separate
evaluation and merely awaited the resolution of the DOJ Secretary. By relying solely on the
manifestation of the public prosecutor and the resolution of the DOJ Secretary, RTC
abdicated its judicial power and refused to perform a positive duty enjoined by law. The
said Orders were thus stained with grave abuse of discretion and violated the
complainant’s right to due process. They were void, had no legal standing, and produced
no effect whatsoever.
This Court must remand the case to the RTC, so that the latter can rule on the merits of the
case to determine if a prima facie case exists and consequently resolve the MTD and
Withdraw Information anew.
Double jeopardy did not set in. Double jeopardy exists when the following requisites are
present: (1) a first jeopardy attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy has been
validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first. A first
jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after
arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered; and (e) when the accused has been
acquitted or convicted, or the case dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express
consent. Since we have held that the Order granting the MTD was committed with grave
abuse of discretion, then respondents were not acquitted nor was there a valid and legal
dismissal or termination of the case. Ergo, the fifth requisite which requires the conviction
and acquittal of the accused, or the dismissal of the case without the approval of the
accused, was not met.
XI. RULE 118 – PRE-TRIAL
1. Pre-trial in civil cases vs Pre-trial in criminal cases
Section 1. Pre-trial; mandatory in criminal cases. — In all criminal cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan, Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in
Cities, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the court shall after
arraignment and within thirty (30) days from the date the court acquires jurisdiction over
35 GING 
the person of the accused, unless a shorter period is provided for in special laws or
circulars of the Supreme Court, order a pre-trial conference to consider the following:
(a) plea bargaining;
(b) stipulation of facts;
(c) marking for identification of evidence of the parties;
(d) waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence;
(e) modification of the order of trial if the accused admits the charge but interposes a lawful
defense; and
(f) such other matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial of the criminal and civil
aspects of the case.
Section 2. Pre-trial agreement. — All agreements or admissions made or entered during the
pre-trial conference shall be reduced in writing and signed by the accused and counsel,
otherwise, they cannot be used against the accused. The agreements covering the matters
referred to in section 1 of this Rule shall be approved by the court.
2. Non-appearance at pre-trial; effects
Section 3. Non-appearance at pre-trial conference. — If the counsel for the accused or the
prosecutor does not appear at the pre-trial conference and does not offer an acceptable
excuse for his lack of cooperation, the court may impose proper sanctions or penalties.
3. Pre-trial Order
Section 4. Pre-trial order. — After the pre-trial conference, the court shall issue an order
reciting the actions taken, the facts stipulated, and evidence marked. Such order shall bind
the parties, limit the trial to matters not disposed of, and control the course of the action
during the trial, unless modified by the court to prevent manifest injustice.
XII. RULE 119 – TRIAL
1. Period of trial; the Speedy Trial Act, R.A. 8493
The first issue in Rule 119 is the timeframe. This is not provided for in civil cases. In
criminal cases, there is a timeframe: from the time of arrest to arraignment, from
arraignment to trial, from trial to judgment, there is a specific provision of the rule relative
to the timeframe. Cross-refer that to Rule 116 (extended time limit).
According to Section 1, after a plea of not guilty is entered, the accused shall have at least
15 days to prepare for trial. The trial shall commence within 30 days from receipt of the pre-
trial order.
The difference in pre-trial in criminal cases is that it includes plea bargaining. All the rest
are practically the same. In civil cases, there is no plea bargaining. Example: If you are
charged with homicide, you cannot plea for jaywalking. Your plea must be necessarily
included in the offense. If you are charged with murder, you can plea for homicide. If you
are charged for homicide, can you enter a plea for murder? No, because it’s foolish.
Because of the timeframe provision (15 days and 30 days from receipt of pre-trial order),
the trial must commence and must end within 180 days. Presentation of first evidence, and
then after 180 days, decision.
Speedy Trial Act are partly repeated or integrated in Rule 119. If you relate that to the
extended time limit, do you add or subtract that to the 180 days? You add. How many
more days? 180 120 180 days. At present, that is 80. That is from arrest to arraignment. If he
has been arraigned immediately because there is already a provision that he must be
immediately arraigned, no need to add days.
From these 180 days, pursuant to the Speedy Trial Act, you can deduct as many days.
What do the deductions consist of? Delay in the proceeding. This can happen 1,001 times.
There are many ways of delay.
The usual delay is legal proceedings. Examples: (1) File a motion for inhibition. You want
the judge to be inhibited because the judge is partial. It was denied. You appeal or you file
certiorari. This delays the proceedings. (2) Motion for bail also delays the proceedings. All
these will be deducted from 180 days.
During the pre-trial, the marking of evidence will be done. This is now pre-trial as
amended by mediation conciliation proceeding.
Example: How many witnesses do you have? I have 3 witnesses. How long will it take to
present evidence? 3 settings. Pursuant to the Speedy Trial Act, they will already set these 3
settings: 1 in September, 2 in November. By November, you would have already completed
presenting your evidence. We give you 1 month for formal offer of evidence. That will be at
the end of December. By January, the defense will present evidence. The defense will say
he will need 5 meetings: 1 in January, 2 in February and 2 in March. The trial will only be
from September to March.
On the first hearing (September 15), for the presentation of the plaintiff’s/prosecutor’s
evidence, the judge is not around because of stomach trouble. During the second setting
(November 2), the fiscal is not around because there is a conference in Baguio. Third setting
was again postponed. The Clerk of Court will say they will use the dates the defense has
set. By March, the presentation of prosecutor’s evidence is not yet finished. The last setting
which is March 10 (last day for defense’s presentation of evidence), the court will ask when
the next hearing should be. The designated time will have been used up already. They will
have to reset, to be held on (not April or May) December because the calendar will be full.
What are the sanctions for unreasonable postponements? P20,000 for private lawyers;
P5,000 for public prosecutors.
Section 1. Time to prepare for trial. — After a plea of not guilty is entered, the accused shall
have at least fifteen (15) days to prepare for trial. The trial shall commence within thirty
(30) days from receipt of the pre-trial order.
Section 2. Continuous trial until terminated; postponements. — Trial once commenced shall
continue from day to day as far as practicable until terminated. It may be postponed for a
reasonable period of time for good cause.
The court shall, after consultation with the prosecutor and defense counsel, set the case for
continuous trial on a weekly or other short-term trial calendar at the earliest possible time
36 GING 
so as to ensure speedy trial. In no case shall the entire trial period exceed one hundred
eighty (180) days from the first day of trial, except as otherwise authorized by the Supreme
Court.
The time limitations provided under this section and the preceding section shall not apply
where special laws or circulars of the Supreme Court provide for a shorter period of trial.
Section 3. Exclusions. — The following periods of delay shall be excluded in computing the
time within which trial must commence:
(a) Any period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the accused,
including but not limited to the following:
(1) Delay resulting from an examination of the physical and mental condition of the
accused;
(2) Delay resulting from proceedings with respect to other criminal charges against
the accused;
(3) Delay resulting from extraordinary remedies against interlocutory orders;
(4) Delay resulting from pre-trial proceedings; provided, that the delay does not
exceed thirty (30) days;
(5) Delay resulting from orders of inhibition, or proceedings relating to change of
venue of cases or transfer from other courts;
(6) Delay resulting from a finding of the existence of a prejudicial question; and
(7) Delay reasonably attributable to any period, not exceed thirty (30) days, during
which any proceeding which any proceeding concerning the accused is actually
under advisement.
(b) Any period of delay resulting from the absence or unavailability of an essential
witness.
For purposes of this subparagraph, an essential witness shall be considered absent
when his whereabouts are unknown or his whereabouts cannot be determined by
due diligence. He shall be considered unavailable whenever his whereabouts are
known but his presence for trial cannot be obtained by due diligence.
(c) Any period of delay resulting from the mental incompetence or physical inability of
the accused to stand trial.
(d) If the information is dismissed upon motion of the prosecution and thereafter a
charge is filed against the accused for the same offense, any period of delay from the
date the charge was dismissed to the date the time limitation would commence to
run as to the subsequent charge had there been no previous charge.
(e) A reasonable period of delay when the accused is joined for trial with a co-accused
over whom the court has not acquired jurisdiction, or, as to whom the time for trial
has not run and no motion for separate trial has been granted.
(f) Any period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by any court motu proprio,
or on motion of either the accused or his counsel, or the prosecution, if the court
granted the continuance on the basis of its findings set forth in the order that the ends
of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the
accused in a speedy trial.
Section 4. Factors for granting continuance. — The following factors, among others, shall be
considered by a court in determining whether to grant a continuance under section 3(f) of
this Rule.
(a) Whether or not the failure to grant a continuance in the proceeding would likely
make a continuation of such proceeding impossible or result in a miscarriage of
justice; and
(b) Whether or not the case taken as a whole is so novel, unusual and complex, due to
the number of accused or the nature of the prosecution, or that it is unreasonable to
expect adequate preparation within the periods of time established therein.
In addition, no continuance under section 3(f) of this Rule shall be granted because of
congestion of the court's calendar or lack of diligent preparation or failure to obtain
available witnesses on the part of the prosecutor.
Section 5. Time limit following an order for new trial. — If the accused is to be tried again
pursuant to an order for a new trial, the trial shall commence within thirty (30) days from
notice of the order, provided that if the period becomes impractical due to unavailability of
witnesses and other factors, the court may extend it but not to exceed one hundred eighty
(180) days from notice of said order for a new trial.
Section 6. Extended time limit. — Notwithstanding the provisions of section 1(g), Rule 116
and the preceding section 1, for the first twelve-calendar-month period following its
effectivity on September 15, 1998, the time limit with respect to the period from
arraignment to trial imposed by said provision shall be one hundred eighty (180) days. For
the second twelve-month period, the limit shall be one hundred twenty (120) days, and for
the third twelve-month period, the time limit shall be eighty (80) days.
Section 7. Public attorney's duties where accused is imprisoned. — If the public attorney
assigned to defend a person charged with a crime knows that the latter is preventively
detained, either because he is charged with a bailable crime but has no means to post bail,
or, is charged with a non-bailable crime, or, is serving a term of imprisonment in any penal
institution, it shall be his duty to do the following:
(a) Shall promptly undertake to obtain the presence of the prisoner for trial or cause a
notice to be served on the person having custody of the prisoner requiring such
person to so advise the prisoner of his right to demand trial.
(b) Upon receipt of that notice, the custodian of the prisoner shall promptly advise the
prisoner of the charge and of his right to demand trial. If at anytime thereafter the
prisoner informs his custodian that he demands such trial, the latter shall cause
notice to that effect to sent promptly to the public attorney.
(c) Upon receipt of such notice, the public attorney shall promptly seek to obtain the
presence of the prisoner for trial.
(d) When the custodian of the prisoner receives from the public attorney a properly
supported request for the availability of the prisoner for purposes of trial, the
prisoner shall be made available accordingly.
Section 8. Sanctions. — In any case in which private counsel for the accused, the public
attorney, or the prosecutor.
37 GING 
(a) Knowingly allows the case to be set for trial without disclosing that a necessary
witness would be unavailable for trial;
(b) Files a motion solely for delay which he knows is totally frivolous and without merit;
(c) Makes a statement for the purpose of obtaining continuance which he knows to be
false and which is material to the granting of a continuance; or
(d) Willfully fails to proceed to trial without justification consistent with the provisions
hereof, the court may punish such counsel, attorney, or prosecution, as follows:
(1) By imposing on a counsel privately retained in connection with the defense of an
accused, a fine not exceeding twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00);
(2) By imposing on any appointed counsel de oficio, public attorney, or prosecutor a
fine not exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000.00); and
(3) By denying any defense counsel or prosecutor the right to practice before the
court trying the case for a period not exceeding thirty (30) days. The punishment
provided for by this section shall be without prejudice to any appropriate
criminal action or other sanction authorized under these rules.
Section 9. Remedy where accused is not brought to trial within the time limit. — If the accused is
not brought to trial within the time limit required by Section 1(g), Rule 116 and Section 1, as
extended by Section 6 of this rule, the information may be dismissed on motion of the
accused on the ground of denial of his right of speedy trial. The accused shall have the
burden of proving the motion but the prosecution shall have the burden of going forward
with the evidence to establish the exclusion of time under section 3 of this rule. The
dismissal shall be subject to the rules on double jeopardy.
Failure of the accused to move for dismissal prior to trial shall constitute a waiver of the
right to dismiss under this section.
Section 10. Law on speedy trial not a bar to provision on speedy trial in the Constitution. — No
provision of law on speedy trial and no rule implementing the same shall be interpreted as
a bar to any charge of denial of the right to speedy trial guaranteed by section 14(2), article
III, of the 1987 Constitution.
2. Order of Trial
Section 11. Order of trial. — The trial shall proceed in the following order:
(a) The prosecution shall present evidence to prove the charge and, in the proper case,
the civil liability.
(b) The accused may present evidence to prove his defense, and damages, if any, arising
from the issuance of a provisional remedy in the case.
(c) The prosecution and the defense may, in that order, present rebuttal and sur-rebuttal
evidence unless the court, in furtherance of justice, permits them to present
additional evidence bearing upon the main issue.
(d) Upon admission of the evidence of the parties, the case shall be deemed submitted
for decision unless the court directs them to argue orally or to submit written
memoranda.
(e) When the accused admits the act or omission charged in the complaint or
information but interposes a lawful defense, the order of trial may be modified.
3. Modes of Discovery in criminal cases
Section 12. Application for examination of witness for accused before trial. — When the accused
has been held to answer for an offense, he may, upon motion with notice to the other
parties, have witnesses conditionally examined in his behalf. The motion shall state: (a) the
name and residence of the witness; (b) the substance of his testimony; and (c) that the
witness is sick or infirm as to afford reasonable ground for believing that he will not be able
to attend the trial, or resides more than one hundred (100) kilometers from the place of trial
and has no means to attend the same, or that other similar circumstances exist that would
make him unavailable or prevent him from attending the trial. The motion shall be
supported by an affidavit of the accused and such other evidence as the court may require.
Section 13. Examination of defense witness; how made. — If the court is satisfied that the
examination of a witness for the accused is necessary, an order will be made directing that
the witness be examined at a specified date, time and place and that a copy of the order be
served on the prosecutor at least three (3) days before the scheduled examination. The
examination shall be taken before a judge, or, if not practicable, a member of the Bar in
good standing so designated by the judge in the order, or if the order be made by a court of
superior jurisdiction, before an inferior court to be designated therein. The examination
shall proceed notwithstanding the absence of the prosecutor provided he was duly notified
of the hearing. A written record of the testimony shall be taken.
Section 14. Bail to secure appearance of material witness. — When the court is satisfied, upon
proof or oath, that a material witness will not testify when required, it may, upon motion of
either party, order the witness to post bail in such sum as may be deemed proper. Upon
refusal to post bail, the court shall commit him to prison until he complies or is legally
discharged after his testimony has been taken.
Section 15. Examination of witness for the prosecution. — When it satisfactorily appears that a
witness for the prosecution is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial as directed by the
order of the court, or has to leave the Philippines with no definite date of returning, he may
forthwith be conditionally examined before the court where the case is pending. Such
examination, in the presence of the accused, or in his absence after reasonable notice to
attend the examination has been served on him, shall be conducted in the same manner as
an examination at the trial. Failure or refusal of the accused to attend the examination after
notice shall be considered a waiver. The statement taken may be admitted in behalf of or
against the accused.
The second issue in Rule 119 is with respect to Sections 12, 13 and 15. This is only akin to
the modes of discovery. Pursuant to the doctrine laid down in People vs Webb, Rule 23 is
not applicable in criminal cases. This was reiterated in Vda. de Manguerra vs Risos.
Vda. de Manguerra v. Risos: Applies section 15. This is advance examination of
prosecution’s witness. She was examined while she was in the hospital, invoking Rule 23 as
a mode of discovery (deposition pending action). SC: There is no deposition pending action
in criminal cases. Advance examination of prosecution’s witness must be before a judge or
anyone authorized by the judge. On appeal, the appellate court can assign the presiding
judge of a lower court. But not similar to Rule 23.
The respondents were charged with estafa for falsifying a deed of real estate mortgage,
where they apparently forged the signature of petitioner. Petitioner Concepcion vda. De
Manguerra was confined in a hospital for gastro-intestinal bleeding. Respondents filed a
motion for suspension of the criminal proceedings on the ground of a prejudicial question,
alleging that the action for declaration of nullity of the contract of mortgage should be
resolved first. The motion was granted. Petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari
with the CA to nullify the RTC orders.
38 GING 
Petitioner’s counsel filed a motion to take her deposition, explaining the need to perpetuate
her testimony due to her weak physical condition. Her deposition was taken at her house.
RTC granted the motion for her deposition to be taken. The MR by the respondent was
denied by the court stating that procedural technicalities should be “brushed aside because
of the urgency of the situation.”
Respondents assailed the RTC orders. CA ruled in favor of the respondents stating that in
examination of prosecution witnesses, Rule 119, Section 15 and not Rule 23 applies. Rule 23
applies only to civil cases. Also, Rule 119, Section 15 provides that the deposition should
have been taken before the judge or court where the case is pending, which is the RC of
Cebu, and not the clerk of Court of Makati. The CA added that this requirement is
pursuant to the constitutional right of the accused to meet the witnesses face to face. It also
ruled that Rule 23 cannot apply in a suppletory manner because the rules of criminal
procedure adequately addressed the issue.
SC: Rule 23 does apply to the deposition of the petitioner. Rule 119 categorically applies in
this case. All witnesses shall give their testimonies at the trial of the case in the presence of
the judge. This is especially true in criminal cases in order that the accused may be afforded
the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses pursuant to his constitutional right to
confront the witnesses face to face. It also gives the parties and their counsel the chance to
propound such questions as they deem material and necessary to support their position or
to test the credibility of said witnesses. Lastly, this rule enables the judge to observe the
witnesses’ demeanor.
This rule, however, is not absolute. As exceptions, Rules 23 to 28 provide for the different
modes of discovery that may be resorted to by a party to an action. These rules are adopted
either to perpetuate the testimonies of witnesses or as modes of discovery. In criminal
proceedings, Sections 12, 13 and 15, Rule 119 allow the conditional examination of both the
defense and prosecution witnesses.
In issue is the examination of a prosecution witness, who, according to the petitioners, was
too sick to travel and appear before the trial court. Section 15 of Rule 119 thus comes into
play.
Petitioners contend that Concepcion’s advanced age and health condition exempt her from
the application of Section 15, Rule 119, and thus, calls for the application of Rule 23. The
contention does not persuade. The very reason offered by the petitioners to exempt
Concepcion from the coverage of Rule 119 is at once the ground which places her squarely
within the coverage of the same provision. Rule 119 specifically states that a witness may
be conditionally examined: 1) if the witness is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial; or 2)
if the witness has to leave the Philippines with no definite date of returning. Thus, when
Concepcion moved that her deposition be taken, had she not been too sick at that time, her
motion would have been denied. Instead of conditionally examining her outside the trial
court, she would have been compelled to appear before the court for examination during
the trial proper. It is also necessary that the accused be notified, so that he can attend the
examination, subject to his right to waive the same after reasonable notice. As to the
manner of examination, the Rules mandate that it be conducted in the same manner as an
examination during trial, that is, through question and answer.
In granting Concepcion’s motion and in actually taking her deposition, the above rules
were not complied with. The taking of deposition before the Clerk of Court of Makati City
was erroneous and contrary to the clear mandate of the Rules that the same be made before
the court where the case is pending. Accordingly, said the CA, the RTC order was issued
with grave abuse of discretion. Unlike an examination of a defense witness which,
pursuant to Section 5, Rule 119 of the previous Rules, and now Section 13, Rule 119 of the
present Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, may be taken before any “judge, or, if not
practicable, a member of the Bar in good standing so designated by the judge in the order,
or, if the order be made by a court of superior jurisdiction, before an inferior court to be
designated therein,” the examination of a witness for the prosecution under Section 15 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (December 1, 2000) may be done only “before the
court where the case is pending.”
Rule 119 categorically states that the conditional examination of a prosecution witness shall
be made before the court where the case is pending. Contrary to petitioners’ contention,
there is nothing in the rule which may remotely be interpreted to mean that such
requirement applies only to cases where the witness is within the jurisdiction of said court
and not when he is kilometers away, as in the present case. Therefore, the court may not
introduce exceptions or conditions. Neither may it engraft into the law (or the Rules)
qualifications not contemplated. When the words are clear and categorical, there is no
room for interpretation. There is only room for application.
4. The “State-Witness” Rule; requirements
Section 16. Trial of several accused. — When two or more accused are jointly charged with
any offense, they shall be tried jointly unless the court, in its discretion and upon motion of
the prosecutor or any accused, orders separate trial for one or more accused.
Section 17. Discharge of accused to be state witness. — When two or more persons are jointly
charged with the commission of any offense, upon motion of the prosecution before resting
its case, the court may direct one or more of the accused to be discharged with their consent
so that they may be witnesses for the state when, after requiring the prosecution to present
evidence and the sworn statement of each proposed state witness at a hearing in support of
the discharge, the court is satisfied that:
(a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is
requested;
(b) The is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense
committed, except the testimony of said accused;
(c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material points;
(d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and
(e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral
turpitude.
Evidence adduced in support of the discharge shall automatically form part of the trial. If
the court denies the motion for discharge of the accused as state witness, his sworn
statement shall be inadmissible in evidence.
The third issue under Rule 119 is as to the state witness rule.
What is a crime involving moral turpitude? a crime that degrades the dignity of men;
perturbation of the person himself. Example: urinating in public, rape even without the
aggravating circumstance of ignominy.
Who decides who will be the state witness? The court, not the prosecution or the accused.
The accused must first be charged, and then you take him off the hook and he will become
a state witness.
39 GING 
In Crespo vs Mogul, once the case is with the court, it is within the absolute control of the
court. The prosecution has nothing to do with that anymore. A motion, whatever kind of
motion, is within the absolute discretion of the court to either grant it or deny it. The filing
of the motion depends upon the party. State Witness Rule is no different at all. You file a
motion. The court may deny it if the requirements for a state witness is not complied with.
If the motion asks for 5 of the accused to be state witnesses [example: in the Maguindanao
massacre, there are 150 charged], and the court grants it, among the requirements is that it
must be substantially corroborated on its material points. Who should corroborate whose
testimony? Although they may corroborate on some material points, their testimonies must
not be corroborative testimonies. All testimonies must be principal testimonies. The second
requirement is that the testimony must not be corroborative; it must be evidence-in-chief.
You ask these 5 witnesses to corroborate each other’s testimony, you would be playing
with the Rules because the 2nd requirement is that there must be absolute necessity and
there is no other evidence. The court must think of a way to allow 5 witnesses to become
state witnesses, taking them off the hook, and then corroborating each other’s testimony.
That would be unreasonable because of the requirements.
Section 18. Discharge of accused operates as acquittal. — The order indicated in the preceding
section shall amount to an acquittal of the discharged accused and shall be a bar to future
prosecution for the same offense, unless the accused fails or refuses to testify against his co-
accused in accordance with his sworn statement constituting the basis for the discharge.
5. Mistake in charging the proper offense
Section 19. When mistake has been made in charging the proper offense. — When it becomes
manifest at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper
offense and the accused cannot be convicted of the offense charged or any other offense
necessarily included therein, the accused shall not be discharged if there appears good
cause to detain him. In such case, the court shall commit the accused to answer for the
proper offense and dismiss the original case upon the filing of the proper information.
Section 20. Appointment of acting prosecutor. — When a prosecutor, his assistant or deputy is
disqualified to act due to any of the grounds stated in section 1 of Rule 137 or for any other
reasons, the judge or the prosecutor shall communicate with the Secretary of Justice in
order that the latter may appoint an acting prosecutor.
Section 21. Exclusion of the public. — The judge may, motu proprio, exclude the public from
the courtroom if the evidence to be produced during the trial is offensive to decency or
public morals. He may also, on motion of the accused, exclude the public from the trial,
except court personnel and the counsel of the parties.
Section 22. Consolidation of trials of related offenses. — Charges for offenses founded on the
same facts or forming part of a series of offenses of similar character may be tried jointly at
the discretion of the court.
6. Demurrer to Evidence
Section 23. Demurrer to evidence. — After the prosecution rests its case, the court may
dismiss the action on the ground of insufficiency of evidence (1) on its own initiative after
giving the prosecution the opportunity to be heard or (2) upon demurrer to evidence filed
by the accused with or without leave of court.

If the court denies the demurrer to evidence filed with leave of court, the accused may
adduce evidence in his defense. When the demurrer to evidence is filed without leave of
court, the accused waives the right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment
on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution.
The motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence shall specifically state its grounds
and shall be filed within a non-extendible period of five (5) days after the prosecution rests
its case. The prosecution may oppose the motion within a non-extendible period of five (5)
days from its receipt.
If leave of court is granted, the accused shall file the demurrer to evidence within a non-
extendible period of ten (10) days from notice. The prosecution may oppose the demurrer
to evidence within a similar period from its receipt.
The order denying the motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence or the
demurrer itself shall not be reviewable by appeal or by certiorari before judgment.
Rule 33 Section 23 of Rule 119
Both motions to dismiss
Available on the same ground: insufficiency of evidence
stated prohibited pleadings under the Rules on Summary Procedure; (2) both these
procedures are for expediting the proceeding. They are not contrary to each other.
7. Reopening vs New Trial
Section 24. Reopening. — At any time before finality of the judgment of conviction, the
judge may, motu proprio or upon motion, with hearing in either case, reopen the
proceedings to avoid a miscarrage of justice. The proceedings shall be terminated within
thirty (30) days from the order grating it.
What are the grounds? To avoid miscarriage of justice in the interest of substantial justice.
This is very broad.
Lugtu v. CA: Domingo Lugtu, with Rosa Cancio and Clodualdo Vitug, were charged in an
information with the crime of estafa. At the arraignment, all the accused pleaded not guilty.
After presenting 3 witnesses, the Provincial Fiscal filed with the CFI a motion to discharge
Lugtu to utilize him as state witness. The motion was denied by Judge Abraham Vera. An
MR was filed, attaching thereto an affidavit of Lugtu, to which motion Cancio filed an
opposition. The parties submitted their respective reply, rejoinder and comment. Judge
Vera reconsidered his earlier order (pursuant to Section 9, Rule 119), and authorized the
discharge of Lugtu. Cancio filed an MR, noting an earlier Sinumpaang Salaysay, executed
by Lugtu before the PC of Bataan. Cancio's motion was denied. On petition for certiorari,
CA set aside the orders of CFI and ordered the reinstatement of Lugtu.

Same timeframe: After the plaintiff/prosecutor has rested its case SC: The conditions required under Section 9, Rule 119 were present when the trial court
approved the discharge of accused Lugtu from the information. In ruling that the 1st and
Both available only to the defendant or accused 2nd conditions are not present, CA considered the sworn statement (Sinumpaang Salaysay)
wherein Lagtu admitted his responsibility in the commission of the offense. Another factor
Preponderance of evidence Proof beyond reasonable doubt (easier to that persuaded the CA to take its position, is the testimony of the 3 prosecution witnesses
avail of) who had already testified on the modus operandi of the swindle, by which Lugtu opened a
checking account with the Continental Bank in Guagua, Pampanga, issued checks that
If the order grants the demurrer, it results in If the order grants the demurrer, it results in were cashed by Vitug with the PNB Branch in Balanga, Bataan, and thereafter it was found
the dismissal of the case acquittal of the accused that the checks were not covered by sufficient funds. These circumstances, according to CA,
constitute direct evidence, available to the prosecution, of the offense committed, such that
No need for a motion for leave of court You may file a motion with leave or the testimony of Lugtu is not absolutely necessary.
without leave of court
Petitioners contend, on the other hand, that Lugtu's Sinumpaang Salaysay was not yet
In case of denial, the defendant presents In case of denial, it depends whether it was presented or before the trial court at the time it resolved their MR of its first order denying
evidence. filed with leave of court. With leave: their motion for discharge of Lugtu. It was only brought to the attention of the trial judge
presents evidence; without leave: loses his after Cancio filed her MR of the order authorizing the discharge of Lugtu. However, said
right to present evidence sworn statement was in fact passed upon by the trial judge in his order. As for the
testimony of the 3 prosecution witnesses, petitioners assert that the said testimony can
Considering an order granting it is a final Considering an order granting it amounts substantially corroborate the testimony of Lugtu in its material points. The testimony of the
order, the same is appealable to an acquittal, there is no appeal 3 witnesses centered on the modus operandi of the swindle perpetrated by the 3 accused.
According to petitioners, the trial court after thoroughly and exhaustively examining and
In case of appeal, if the appellate court evaluating the facts and evidence on record, found Lugtu not to be the most guilty. Being a
reverses the order granting demurrer, the poor and ignorant man, he was easily convinced by Vitug and Cancio (his employer) to
defendant loses his right to present open the account with the Continental Bank in Guagua, which led to the commission of the
evidence offense. Finally, petitioners state that both the court a quo and CA found that Lugtu has not
at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.
Demurrer to evidence, even if it is a kind of motion to dismiss, is allowed in Summary
Procedure because: (1) that which the rules do not include, it excludes. It is not among the From the records and evidence thus far adduced, it appears that there is absolute necessity
for the testimony of Lugtu. In the information, the 3 accused were charged with conspiring
40 GING 
and confederating with one another in the commission of the crime charged (estafa). CA
erred when it considered the testimony of the 3 prosecution witnesses and the Sinumpaang
Salaysay, as direct evidence, available to the prosecution, of the crime charged. For, CA
itself acknowledged that "the 3 prosecution witnesses that were presented by the
prosecution only mentioned Vitug and Lugtu. Cancio has never been brought into the
picture." CA was likewise aware that "under the information there is only 1 conspiracy
alleged which is among the 3 accused and not only between Lugtu and Vitug. The
prosecution has adduced evidence as to the conspiracy between Lugtu and Vitug. What
apparently has not been clearly established is the involvement of Cancio in the conspiracy."
Such being the case, the testimony of Lugtu would be the direct evidence to link the events
starting from the opening of the checking account up to the time the checkbook found its
way to the PNB branch in Balanga. The discharge of an accused should be availed of only
when there is absolute necessity for the testimony of said accused whose discharge is
requested, as when he alone has knowledge of the crime, and not when his testimony
would simply corroborate or otherwise strengthen the evidence in the hands of the
prosecution.
As to Lugtu's Sinumpaang Salaysay, the statement merely complements and supplements
the affidavit of Lugtu and that the first sworn statement, which was executed before a
constabulary soldier who asked the questions of Lugtu, does not contain all the details as
compared to the second statement. Moreover, since there is no showing that the
Sinumpaang Salaysay was executed by Lugtu in the presence or with the aid of counsel in
compliance with Article IV, Section 20, of the (1973) Constitution, the same is inadmissible
in evidence.
The finding of CA that Lugtu is just as guilty as Vitug and should not be discharged as he
does not appear to be not the most guilty, is untenable. The Rules do not disqualify an
accused sought to be discharged as witness for the state merely on the ground that he has
committed a falsification himself, or that he had actually committed the crime charged. The
Rules say that it is necessary that the said defendant does not appear to be the 'most guilty,'
from which the conclusion follows that the guilt of an accused of the crime charged is no
reason why he may not be excluded as witness for the State. As a matter of fact, the candid
admission of an accused, of his participation in a crime, is a guaranty that if he will testify
in court he will testify truthfully; so that even if an accused actually participated in the
offense charged in the information, he may still be made a witness.
The facts of record show that the trial judge who was in a position to evaluate the evidence
available so far, did not abuse his discretion. It is settled that the discharge of an accused
lies within the sound discretion of the trial court which has the exclusive responsibility to
see that the conditions prescribed by the Rule (for discharge of an accused) exist.
Salvanera v. People: Salvanera, together with Feliciano Abutin, Edgardo Lungcay and
Domingo Tampelix are charged with the murder of Ruben Parane. Salvanera was the
alleged mastermind, Lungcay the hired hitman, and Abutin the driver of the motorcycle
carrying Lungcay to the place of the crime, and Tampelix delivering blood money to the
latter. Lungcay was the only one who remained at large.
Salvanera applied for bail. Prosecution moved for the discharge of Abutin and Tampelix to
serve as state witnesses. Trial court granted the application for bail and denied the motion
for discharge. Upon appeal to CA, prosecution contended that their testimonies are
absolutely necessary to establish that Salvanera masterminded the murder. The granting of
bail is also premature and baseless because the prosecution had not yet rested its case in the
41 GING 
hearing for the discharge of accused. CA favored the prosecution so Abutin and Tampelix
were discharged and the bail bond was cancelled.
SC: There is sufficient ground to discharge Abutin and Tampelix to serve as state
witnesses. In the discharge of an accused in order that he may be a state witness, the
following conditions must be present, namely:
(1) Two or more accused are jointly charged with the commission of an offense;
(2) The motion for discharge is filed by the prosecution before it rests its case;
(3) The prosecution is required to present evidence and the sworn statement of each
proposed state witness at a hearing in support of the discharge;
(4) The accused gives his consent to be a state witness; and
(5) The trial court is satisfied that:
a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is
requested;
b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the
offense committed, except the testimony of said accused;
c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material
points;
d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and,
e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral
turpitude.
According to petitioner, the testimony of an accused sought to be discharged to become a
state witness must be substantially corroborated, not by a co-accused likewise sought to be
discharged, but by other prosecution witnesses who are not the accused in the same
criminal case. Petitioner justifies this theory on the general principles of justice and sound
logic. He contends that it is a notorious fact in human nature that a culprit, confessing a
crime, is likely to put the blame on others, if by doing so, he will be freed from any criminal
responsibility. Thus, in the instant case, petitioner supposes that both Abutin and Tampelix
will naturally seize the opportunity to be absolved of any liability by putting the blame on
one of their co-accused. Petitioner argues that prosecution witnesses Parane and Salazar,
who are not accused, do not have personal knowledge of the circumstances surrounding
the alleged conspiracy. Thus, they could not testify to corroborate the statement of Abutin
and Tampelix that petitioner is the mastermind or the principal by induction.
We agree with the CA in dismissing this reasoning as specious. To require the 2 witnesses
Parane and Salazar to corroborate the testimony of Abutin and Tampelix on the exact same
points is to render nugatory the other requisite that "there must be no other direct evidence
available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of the
state witness." The corroborative evidence required by the Rules does not have to consist of
the very same evidence as will be testified on by the proposed state witnesses. We have
ruled that "a conspiracy is more readily proved by the acts of a fellow criminal than by any
other method. If it is shown that the statements of the conspirator are corroborated by other
evidence, then we have convincing proof of veracity. Even if the confirmatory testimony
only applies to some particulars, we can properly infer that the witness has told the truth in
other respects." It is enough that the testimony of a co-conspirator is corroborated by some
other witness or evidence. In the case at bar, we are satisfied from a reading of the records
that the testimonies of Abutin and Tampelix are corroborated on important points by each
other’s testimonies and the circumstances disclosed through the testimonies of the other
prosecution witnesses, and "to such extent that their trustworthiness becomes manifest."
As part of the conspiracy, Abutin and Tampelix can testify on the criminal plan of the
conspirators. Where a crime is contrived in secret, the discharge of one of the conspirators
is essential because only they have knowledge of the crime.8 The other prosecution
witnesses are not eyewitnesses to the crime, as, in fact, there is none. No one except the
conspirators knew and witnessed the murder. The testimonies of the accused and proposed
state witnesses Abutin and Tampelix can directly link petitioner to the commission of the
crime.
People v. De Grano: An Information for murder was filed with the RTC against Joven de
Grano, Armando de Grano, and Estanislao Lacaba, together with their co-accused Leonides
Landicho, Domingo Landicho, and Leonardo Genil, who were at-large. Duly arraigned,
Joven, Armando, and Estanislao pleaded “not guilty.” Respondents filed a motion for bail
contending that the prosecution’s evidence was not strong. RTC found the accused guilty
of the offenses charged. An order was issued that modified the previous decision, from
murder the case was downgraded to homicide. However, Joven, Armando, and Domingo
was not present during promulgation. They maintained that while they were not present
during the promulgation of the RTC Decision, Estanislao, who was under police custody,
attended the promulgation. Thus according to them, when they filed their Joint Motion for
Reconsideration, which included that of Estanislao, the RTC was not deprived of its
authority to resolve the joint motion.
SC: RTC erred in taking cognizance of the joint motion for reconsideration despite the
absence of the other accused during the promulgation of judgment. Section 14(2), Article III
of the Constitution, authorizing trials in absentia, allows the accused to be absent at the
trial but not at certain stages of the proceedings, to wit: (a) at arraignment and plea,
whether of innocence or of guilt; (b) during trial, whenever necessary for identification
purposes; and (c) at the promulgation of sentence, unless it is for a light offense, in which
case, the accused may appear by counsel or representative. At such stages of the
proceedings, his presence is required and cannot be waived.
When the Decision was promulgated, only Estanislao was present. Subsequently thereafter,
without surrendering and explaining the reasons for their absence, Joven, Armando, and
Domingo joined Estanislao in their Joint Motion for Reconsideration. In blatant disregard of
the Rules, RTC not only failed to cause the arrest of the respondents who were at large, it
also took cognizance of the joint motion.
RTC clearly exceeded its jurisdiction when it entertained the joint MR with respect to the
respondents who were at large. It should have considered the joint motion as a MR that
was solely filed by Estanislao. Being at large, Joven and Domingo have not regained their
standing in court. Once an accused jumps bail or flees to a foreign country, or escapes from
prison or confinement, he loses his standing in court; and unless he surrenders or submits
to the jurisdiction of the court, he is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief from
the court.
Cabador v. People: One can avail of a demurrer to evidence only after the plaintiff or the
prosecution has rested its case. Resting one’s case requires a formal offer of evidence which
has been commented on or has been opposed and the court has already ruled on the formal
offer of evidence together with the opposition or comment thereto. SC: It cannot be a
demurrer. At best, it could be a motion to dismiss because it does not comply with the
fundamental requirement that the plaintiff or prosecution must have rested its case.
The public prosecutor accused Cabador of murdering, in conspiracy with others, Atty.
Valerio. After 5 years of trial and 5 witnesses, RTC ended the prosecution's presentation of
witnesses and required the prosecution to make a written or formal offer of its
42 GING 
documentary evidence within 15 days from notice. The public prosecutor asked for 3
extensions of time but was still not able to make the offer.
Cabador filed a motion to dismiss the case, invoking his right to a speedy trial. Moreover,
he claimed that the trial court could not consider any evidence against him that had not
been formally offered. 4 days before such filing, without the knowledge of Cabador,
another extension was asked for, and an offer was made on the day Cabador filed his MTD.
RTC issued an order treating Cabador's MTD as a demurrer to evidence. And since he filed
his motion without leave of court, he waived his right to present evidence in his defense.
RTC submitted the case for decision. Cabador filed an MR which the RTC denied. CA
likewise denied his petition and affirmed RTC. CA denied his MR.
SC: Cabador filed a motion to dismiss, not a demurrer to evidence. He did not waive his
right to present evidence. There are 2 stages in the trial proper of a criminal case: (1)
prosecution's presentation of evidence against the accused; and (2) accused's presentation
of evidence in his defense. If after the first stage, the evidence appears insufficient to
support a conviction, the trial court may at its own initiative or on motion of the accused
dispense with the second stage, and dismiss the criminal action. There is no point for the
trial court to hear the evidence of the accused in such a case since the prosecution bears the
burden of proving his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The order of dismissal amounts to an
acquittal.
But because some have in the past used the demurrer in order to delay the proceedings in
the case, the remedy now carries a caveat. When the accused files a demurrer without leave
of court, he shall be deemed to have waived the right to present evidence and the case shall
be considered submitted for judgment.
To determine whether the pleading filed is a demurer to evidence or a motion to dismiss,
the Court must consider the ff: the allegations in it were made in good faith; the stage of the
proceeding at which it is filed; the primary objective of the party filing it.
Cabador in his MTD pointed out how the trial dragged on for years; the gaps between
hearings were long, with hearings often postponed due to the absence of the prosecutor.
And it was compounded by the repeated motions for extension by the prosecutor to make
the formal offer, and its failure to make such offer. He invoked his right to speedy trial.
In criminal cases, a motion to dismiss may be filed on the ground of denial of the accused's
right to speedy trail. This denial is characterized by unreasonable, vexatious, and
oppressive delays without fault of the accused, or by unjustified postponements that
unreasonably prolonged the trial. This was the main thrust of Cabador’s motion to dismiss
and he had the right to bring this up for a ruling by the trial court.
Cabador did not state what evidence the prosecution had presented against him to show in
what respects such evidence failed to meet the elements of the crime, something that is
fundamental in ay demurrer. It did not touch on any particular testimony or documentary
exhibit. He could not do so because he did not know that the prosecution finally made its
offer of exhibits on the same date he filed his MTD.
A demurrer assumes that the prosecution has already rested its case. In this case, after the
prosecution filed its formal offer, the trial court still needed to give Cabador an opportunity
to object to the admission of those exhibits. It also needed to rule on the formal offer. And
only after such a ruling could the prosecution be deemed to have rested its case. The MTD
was filed before he could object to the offer, before the trial court could rule on the offer,
and before the prosecution could rest its case. It cannot be said that he intended his MTD to
serve as a demurrer. He cannot be declared to have waived his right to present evidence in
his defense.
People v. Tan: 2 informations for violation of Rule 36 (a)-1, in relation to Sections 32 (a)-1
and 56 of the Revised Securities Act were filed against Tan in the RTC. After arraignment,
he pleaded not guilty to both charges and trial commenced. He made his formal offer of
evidence. RTC issued an Order admitting some (Exh. A, B, W and X) but denied admission
of all the other exhibits. Tan filed a MR but this was denied by the RTC. He filed an
omnibus motion for leave to file demurrer to evidence and to admit the attached demurrer
to evidence. RTC granted the motion for leave to file the demurrer and admitted the
attached demurrer. The RTC issued an Order granting the respondent’s demurrer to
evidence.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the CA assailing the Orders of the RTC. CA
denied the petition, ruling that the dismissal of a criminal action by the grant of a demurrer
to evidence is one on the merits and operates as an acquittal, for which reason, the
prosecution cannot appeal therefrom as it would place the accused in double jeopardy.
SC: Double jeopardy applies. In People v. Sandiganbayan, this Court explained the general
rule that the grant of a demurrer to evidence operates as an acquittal and is, thus, final and
unappealable.
The elements of double jeopardy are (1) the complaint or information was sufficient in form
and substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the court had jurisdiction; (3) the accused had
been arraigned and had pleaded; and (4) the accused was convicted or acquitted, or the
case was dismissed without his express consent.
The rule on double jeopardy, however, is not without exceptions. In People v. Laguio, Jr., this
Court stated that the only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is when the RTC
acted with grave abuse of discretion.
This exception is inapplicable to the factual milieu herein. RTC did not abuse its discretion
in the manner it conducted the proceedings of the trial, as well as its grant of respondent’s
demurrer to evidence.
Thus, the question to be resolved, given the factual molding of herein petition, is "did the
RTC violate petitioner’s right to due process?" Petitioner was given more than ample
opportunity to present its case as gleaned from the factual antecedents which led to the
grant of respondent’s demurrer.
Lastly, even if this Court were to review the action taken by the RTC in granting the
demurrer to evidence, no grave abuse can be attributed to it as it appears that the 29-page
Order granting the demurrer was arrived at after due consideration of the merits thereto.
As correctly observed by the CA, RTC extensively discussed its position on the various
issues brought to contention by petitioner. One of the main reasons for the RTC’s decision
to grant the demurrer was the absence of evidence to prove the classes of shares that the
Best World Resources Corporation stocks were divided into, whether there are preferred
shares as well as common shares, or even which type of shares respondent had acquired.
Withal, it bears to stress that the fundamental philosophy behind the constitutional
proscription against double jeopardy is to afford the defendant, who has been acquitted,
43 GING 
final repose and safeguard him from government oppression through the abuse of criminal
processes.
Imperial v. Joson: see Rights of the accused
People v. Sandiganbayan: Respondents were charged for having violated the anti- graft
and corrupt practices act before the Sandiganbayan. During the trial, the prosecution
presented its lone witness, Atty. Pagunuran, legal counsel of the Office of the Ombudsman.
The respondents filed their respective motions for leave to file their demurrer to evidence
and alleged that the witness had no personal knowledge of the transaction and thus it’s a
hearsay and that the prosecution failed to prove that there was an overpricing and (iii) that
the ruling of the CA in an administrative case which upheld the validity of the direct
negotiated contracts, even in the absence of a public bidding, was already the law of the
case.
The demurrer to evidence was denied. It opined that the prosecution’s evidence
substantiated the elements of the crime and that the respondents must present
controverting evidence. The respondents then filed a MR and was granted and the case was
dismissed. The SB based its ruling on the ground that that there being want of substantial
evidence to support an administrative charge, there could be no sufficient evidence to
warrant a conclusion that there is probable cause for a violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019. Thus this petition.
SC: In criminal cases, the grant of a demurrer is tantamount to an acquittal and the
dismissal order may not be appealed because this would place the accused in double
jeopardy; although the dismissal order is not subject to appeal, it is still reviewable but only
through certiorari Rule 65 of the RoC.
Procedurally, the petitioner resorted to a wrong remedy. Section 1 of Rule 122 allows "any
party" to appeal from a judgment or final order, unless the right of the accused against
double jeopardy will be violated. It is axiomatic that an appeal in criminal cases throws the
whole case wide open for review by an appellate court. As a consequence, an appeal by the
prosecution from a judgment of acquittal necessarily places the accused in double jeopardy.
The rule barring an appeal from a judgment of acquittal is, however, not absolute. The
following are the recognized exceptions thereto: (i) when the prosecution is denied due
process of law; and (ii) when the trial court commits grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing a criminal case by granting the accused’
demurrer to evidence.
Where appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper. In the dismissal of a criminal case
upon demurrer to evidence, appeal is not available as such an appeal will put the accused
in double jeopardy. Certiorari, however, is allowed
Bangayan, Jr. v. Bangayan: In 1982, Benjamin Bangayan married Sally Go. Later, Sally
found out that Benjamin had taken Resally as his concubine whom he married in 2001,
under the false name of Benjamin Sojayco. She discovered that in 1973, Benjamin also
married Azucena Alegre. Sally accused Benjamin and Resally of committing bigamy.
After arraignment, where Benjamin and Reslly pleaded not guilty, prosecution presented
and offered its evidence. Benjamin and Resally separately filed their motions for leave to
file demurrer to evidence which was granted by the RTC. Benjamin filed his Demurrer to
Evidence for failure to present evidence of his guilt. He was not legally married to Sally
due to a prior marriage to Azucena and the prosecution was unable to show that he and
Benjamin Sojayco were one and the same person.
RTC dismissed the case for insufficiency of evidence. CA granted Sally’s petition for
certiorari and remanded the case to the RTC for further proceedings. A judicial declaration
of nullity of marriage was required in order for him to use the nullity of his marriage with
Sally as a defense in a bigamy charge. It held that the following pieces of evidence were
sufficient to deny the demurrer: a. Existence of the 3 marriages; Letters and love notes form
Resally to Benjamin; c. Admission of Benjamin as regards his marriage to Sally and
Azucena; and d. Benjamin’s admission that he and Resally were in some kind of
relationship.
SC: The demurrer to evidence granted by the RTC was proper. Petitioner Resally argues
that Sally Go had no personality to file the petition for certiorari before the CA because the
case against them (Resally and Benjamin, Jr.) is criminal in nature.
In criminal cases, the acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case against him can
only be appealed by the Solicitor General, acting on behalf of the State. The private
complainant or the offended party may question such acquittal or dismissal only insofar as
the civil liability of the accused is concerned.
In a special civil action for certiorari filed under Rule 65, the rules state that the petition
may be filed by the person aggrieved. The complainant has an interest in the civil aspect of
the case so he may file such special civil action questioning the decision or action of the
respondent court on jurisdictional grounds.
A perusal of the petition for certiorari filed by Sally before the CA discloses that she sought
reconsideration of the criminal aspect of the case. Specifically, she prayed for the reversal of
the trial court’s order granting petitioners’ demurrer to evidence and the conduct of a full
blown trial of the criminal case. Nowhere in her petition did she even briefly discuss the
civil liability of petitioners.
Neither the Solicitor General nor the City Prosecutor joined the cause of Sally Go, much less
consented to the filing of a petition for certiorari with the CA. The petitioners’ acquittal was
valid, entitling them to invoke their right against double jeopardy.
Petitioners contend that the Order of dismissal issued by the RTC on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence is a judgment of acquittal. The prosecution is, thus, barred from
appealing the RTC Order because to allow such an appeal would violate petitioners’ right
against double jeopardy. On the other hand, Sally counters that the petitioners cannot
invoke their right against double jeopardy because the RTC decision acquitting them was
issued with grave abuse of discretion, rendering the same null and void.
A demurrer to evidence is filed after the prosecution has rested its case and the trial court is
required to evaluate whether the evidence presented by the prosecution is sufficient
enough to warrant the conviction of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. If the court
finds that the evidence is not sufficient and grants the demurrer to evidence, such dismissal
of the case is one on the merits, which is equivalent to the acquittal of the accused. Well-
established is the rule that the Court cannot review an order granting the demurrer to
evidence and acquitting the accused on the ground of insufficiency of evidence because to
do so will place the accused in double jeopardy.
44 GING 
Double jeopardy attaches if the following elements are present: (1) a valid complaint or
information; (2) a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the defendant had pleaded to the
charge; and (4) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted or the case against him was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. However, jurisprudence
allows for certain exceptions when the dismissal is considered final even if it was made on
motion of the accused, to wit:
(1) Where the dismissal is based on a demurrer to evidence filed by the accused after the
prosecution has rested, which has the effect of a judgment on the merits and operates as an
acquittal.
(2) Where the dismissal is made, also on motion of the accused, because of the denial of his
right to a speedy trial which is in effect a failure to prosecute.
In this case, all 4 elements of double jeopardy are doubtless present. A valid information
for the crime of bigamy was filed against the petitioners, resulting in the institution of a
criminal case against them before the proper court. They pleaded not guilty to the charges
against them and subsequently, the case was dismissed after the prosecution had rested its
case. Therefore, the CA erred in reversing the trial court’s order dismissing the case against
the petitioners because it placed them in double jeopardy.
An acquittal by virtue of a demurrer to evidence is not appealable because it will place the
accused in double jeopardy. However, it may be subject to review only by a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 showing that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due process.
CA found that RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in ignoring the evidence
presented by the prosecution and granting petitioners’ demurrer to evidence on the ground
that the prosecution failed to establish by sufficient evidence the existence of the crime. An
examination of the decision of the RTC, however, yields the conclusion that there was no
grave abuse of discretion on its part. Even if RTC had incorrectly overlooked the evidence
against the petitioners, it only committed an error of judgment, and not one of jurisdiction,
which could not be rectified by a petition for certiorari because double jeopardy had
already set in.
Ampatuan v. De Lima: Former DOJ Secretary Devanadera constituted a Special Panel of
Prosecutors to conduct preliminary investigation into the Ampatuan Massacre. The DOJ
resolved to file 25 informations for murder against the petitioner and to subpoena several
persons. Devanadera wrote to Chief Justice Puno to transfer the venue of the trial from
Cotabato to either QC or Manila to prevent a miscarriage of justice. Prior to the transfer of
the venue, the prosecution filed a manifestation regarding the filing of 15 additional
informations for murder against the petitioner in Cotabato. After the transfer of the venue,
additional informations of murder were filed against the petitioner.
During his arraignment, Ampatuan pleaded not guilty to each of the 41 informations for
murder.
In a joint resolution, the panel of prosecutors charged 196 individuals with multiple
murder in relation to the Maguindanao massacre. The panel relied on the twin affidavits of
Kenny Dalandag. In 2010, Dalandag was admitted into the Witness Protection Program of
the DOJ. QC RTC also amended its pre-trial order wherein Dalandag was listed as one of
the prosecution witnesses.
Ampatuan, through counsel, wrote to DOJ Secretary De Lima and Asst. Chief State
Prosecutor Fadullon to request the inclusion of Dalandag in the information for murder
considering that the latter had already confessed his participation in the massacre through
his 2 sworn declarations. Sec. De Lima denied petitioner’s request.
Ampatuan brought a petition for mandamus in the Manila RTC seeking to compel
respondents to charge Dalandag as another accused in the various murder cases
undergoing trial in the QC RTC. RTC Manila issued a subpoena to Dalandag requiring him
to appear and testify. Respondents moved to quash the subpoena. RTC Manila dismissed
the petition for mandamus.
SC: The right to prosecute vests the public prosecutors with a wide range of discretion –
the discretion of what and whom to charge, the exercise of which depends on a
smorgasbord of factors that are best appreciated by the public prosecutors. The public
prosecutors are solely responsible for the determination of the amount of evidence
sufficient to establish probable cause to justify the filing of appropriate criminal charges
against a respondent. Theirs is also the quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether or
not criminal cases should be filed in court.
Consistent with the principle of separation of powers enshrined in the Constitution, the
Court deems it a sound judicial policy not to interfere in the conduct of preliminary
investigations, and to allow the Executive Department, through the DOJ, exclusively to
determine what constitutes sufficient evidence to establish probable cause for the
prosecution of supposed offenders. By way of exception, however, judicial review may be
allowed where it is clearly established that the public prosecutor committed grave abuse of
discretion, that is, when he has exercised his discretion “in an arbitrary, capricious,
whimsical or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, patent and gross
enough as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law.”
The records herein are bereft of any showing that the Panel of Prosecutors committed grave
abuse of discretion in identifying the 196 individuals to be indicted for the Maguindanao
massacre.
However, his exclusion as an accused from the informations did not at all amount to grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the Panel of Prosecutors whose procedure in excluding
Dalandag as an accused was far from arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic. Section
2, Rule 110, which requires that “the complaint or information shall be xxx against all
persons who appear to be responsible for the offense involved,” albeit a mandatory
provision, may be subject of some exceptions, one of which is when a participant in the
commission of a crime becomes a state witness.
The two modes by which a participant in the commission of a crime may become a state
witness are, namely: (a) by discharge from the criminal case pursuant to Section 17 of Rule
119 of the Rules of Court; and (b) by the approval of his application for admission into the
Witness Protection Program of the DOJ in accordance with Republic Act No. 6981 (The
Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Act). These modes are intended to encourage a
person who has witnessed a crime or who has knowledge of its commission to come
forward and testify in court or quasi-judicial body, or before an investigating authority, by
protecting him from reprisals, and shielding him from economic dislocation.
While it is true that, as a general rule, the discharge or exclusion of a co-accused from the
information in order that he may be utilized as a Prosecution witness rests upon the sound
45 GING 
discretion of the trial court, such discretion is not absolute and may not be exercised
arbitrarily, but with due regard to the proper administration of justice.
XIII. RULE 120 – JUDGMENT
1. Nature of judgment in criminal cases vs civil cases
Section 1. Judgment definition and form. — Judgment is the adjudication by the court that the
accused is guilty or not guilty of the offense charged and the imposition on him of the
proper penalty and civil liability, if any. It must be written in the official language,
personally and directly prepared by the judge and signed by him and shall contain clearly
and distinctly a statement of the facts and the law upon which it is based.
What is the equivalent of this in civil cases? Rule 36 on judgment and entry thereof.
Under Rule 36, the second sentence of section 2 was underscored: the date of finality shall
be deemed to be the entry therefor. Will that apply in criminal cases? No. Entry of
judgment in criminal cases is exceptional: only if there is no promulgation. In criminal
cases, technically, what is equivalent to entry is promulgation.
There are only 3 instances where the accused is required to appear in court: (1)
arraignment; (2) when the accused is ordered to appear for identification purposes; and (3)
promulgation.
As to the second ground: In the pre-trial, there are stipulations and admissions. If during
the pre-trial, you already admitted the identity of the accused, you do not have to identify
him in the course of the trial. That is deemed admitted.
Is the accused still required to appear for identification purposes if and when at the pre-
trial, it has been stipulated that the accused admits already the identity of the accused?
Yes because it is an order of the court so you have to comply.
2. Judgment of conviction vs judgment of acquittal
Section 2. Contents of the judgment. — If the judgment is of conviction, it shall state (1) the
legal qualification of the offense constituted by the acts committed by the accused and the
aggravating or mitigating circumstances which attended its commission; (2) the
participation of the accused in the offense, whether as principal, accomplice, or accessory
after the fact; (3) the penalty imposed upon the accused; and (4) the civil liability or
damages caused by his wrongful act or omission to be recovered from the accused by the
offended party, if there is any, unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a separate civil
action has been reserved or waived.
In case the judgment is of acquittal, it shall state whether the evidence of the prosecution
absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from
which the civil liability might arise did not exist.
In criminal cases, the requirements for the judge in rendering his judgment are more
stringent than that in civil cases because Rule 120 specifically provides for what should
constitute a judgment of conviction and a judgment of acquittal.
The degree of participation: whether the accused participated as a principal, accomplice or
accessory.
People v. Montesclaros: If the accused are differently sued in their participation to the
crime. If there are several accused, some of them as principals and others as accomplice and
other as accessories, would the civil liabilities be the same? It contradicts the very notion of
your degree of participation. It cannot be solidary obligation unlike in civil cases.
Why should aggravating and mitigating circumstances be included in the judgment of
conviction? The same will either increase or decrease the penalty, especially if you are
using the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
In the case of judgment of acquittal, what is the most important constituent of the
judgment? It must state whether the prosecution absolutely failed to establish the guilt of
the accused or it only failed to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
Why does the Rule provide that the judge must clearly state in the judgment of acquittal
whether the prosecution absolutely failed to establish the guilt of the accused or it only
failed to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt? For the purpose of
determining the civil liability. If the court failed to prove the guilt absolutely, there is no
basis for civil liability. The crime was not committed so where will any civil liability arise
from?! If the prosecution merely failed to establish the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt, it just did not reach the quantum of evidence required. There is still a
probability that the crime was committed, but the evidence just did not prove it beyond
reasonable doubt. The civil liability arises from such.
What has been proved vs what has been charged: The court might render an erroneous
judgment. An erroneous judgment is not a void judgment because it is an error of
judgment, not an error of jurisdiction. An error of judgment may be corrected but an error
of jurisdiction is void.
When there is proof as against what is charged or vice versa, that which is charged is
against what is proven, you always consider the accused’s situation. It must be always in
favor of the accused.
3. Judgment for 2 or more offenses; accused
Section 3. Judgment for two or more offenses. — When two or more offenses are charged in a
single complaint or information but the accused fails to object to it before trial, the court
may convict him of as many offenses as are charged and proved, and impose on him the
penalty for each offense, setting out separately the findings of fact and law in each offense.
Section 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. — When there is variance
between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and the
offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused
shall be convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the
offense charged which is included in the offense proved.
Section 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. — An offense charged necessarily
includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the
former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an offense
charged is necessarily included in the offense proved, when the essential ingredients of the
former constitute or form a part of those constituting the latter.
46 GING 
4. Promulgation, modification and entry of judgment
Section 6. Promulgation of judgment. — The judgment is promulgated by reading it in the
presence of the accused and any judge of the court in which it was rendered. However, if
the conviction is for a light offense, the judgment may be pronounced in the presence of his
counsel or representative. When the judge is absent or outside of the province or city, the
judgment may be promulgated by the clerk of court.
If the accused is confined or detained in another province or city, the judgment may be
promulgated by the executive judge of the Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over the
place of confinement or detention upon request of the court which rendered the judgment.
The court promulgating the judgment shall have authority to accept the notice of appeal
and to approve the bail bond pending appeal; provided, that if the decision of the trial court
convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the
application for bail can only be filed and resolved by the appellate court.
The proper clerk of court shall give notice to the accused personally or through his
bondsman or warden and counsel, requiring him to be present at the promulgation of the
decision. If the accused tried in absentia because he jumped bail or escaped from prison, the
notice to him shall be served at his last known address.
In case the accused fails to appear at the scheduled date of promulgation of judgment
despite notice, the promulgation shall be made by recording the judgment in the criminal
docket and serving him a copy thereof at his last known address or thru his counsel.
If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was without
justifiable cause, he shall lose the remedies available in these rules against the judgment
and the court shall order his arrest. Within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of
judgment, however, the accused may surrender and file a motion for leave of court to avail
of these remedies. He shall state the reasons for his absence at the scheduled promulgation
and if he proves that his absence was for a justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to avail of
said remedies within fifteen (15) days from notice.
Section 7. Modification of judgment. — A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the
accused, be modified or set aside before it becomes final or before appeal is perfected.
Except where the death penalty is imposed, a judgment becomes final after the lapse of the
period for perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied
or served, or when the accused has waived in writing his right to appeal, or has applied for
probation.
Section 8. Entry of judgment. — After a judgment has become final, it shall be entered in
accordance with Rule 36.
Section 9. Existing provisions governing suspension of sentence, probation and parole not affected
by this Rule. — Nothing in this Rule shall affect any existing provisions in the laws
governing suspension of sentence, probation or parole.
A judgment must be personally written and prepared by a judge. To establish the
truthfulness of such statement, it is only established by the signature of the judge. As long
as the judge signs the judgment, it is considered to have been personally written and
prepared by the judge.
Is it only the presiding judge who may render the judgment on a case he presided on?
No. In what instances may a non presiding judge render the judgment? The executive
judge will render the judgment.
Promulgation – reading of the decision.
Furnishing him a copy of the same? No, that’s in arraignment. Why does the Rules not
state that a copy must be furnished? As an accused, you will definitely get a copy, whether
it is a judgment of acquittal or conviction.
When it cannot be promulgated, for one reason or another, because it must be promulgated
in the presence of the accused, then the Clerk of Court will just enter judgment. Entry here
literally means entry or recording of judgment.
Upon promulgation, irrespective of whether it is recorded or not, it becomes final.
The term final must be clearly understood in criminal cases because it has a different
connotation as it is used in the Rules of Court. Sometimes, the Rules use “final” but it refers
to “executory.” Sometimes, it uses “final” when it means final judgment. In civil cases, it is
very clear that an executory judgment is necessarily final but a final judgment is not
necessarily executor.
A judge of MTC was promoted to the RTC in the same jurisdiction. There are several cases
you handled in the MTC. Can you still render a judgment on the cases you have handled
in the lower court? Yes, provided the sala he vacated has no presiding judge yet. If there is
no presiding judge (if the MTC is vacant), you may. If there is already a judge, on the basis
of the transcripts and records of the case, he can render judgment.
If he was promoted to the SC, he may no longer do this. As a matter of legal ethics, he must
inhibit himself when cases are brought to the SC of which he was the judge. This applies
not only in criminal cases but also in civil cases.
When will a judgment in a criminal case become final [final is used here as executory]? It
is not only when a person fails to appeal. There are many instances where a judgment can
become final in criminal cases. (1) When the accused starts serving sentence; (2) when the
accused applies for probation (only certain cases can be subject of probation. Only those
cognizable by the MTC, where the penalties are below 6 years & 1 day. Even then,
probation is discretionary upon the court); (3) when he failed to appeal; (4) the Rule
provides that it is final.
Llamas v. CA
Hipos, Sr. v. Bay
People v. Lorenzo
People v. Baron
Abellana v. People
People v. Asis
47 GING 
XIV. RULE 121 – NEW TRIAL OR RECONSIDERATION
1. In civil cases vs criminal cases
Section 1. New trial or reconsideration. — At any time before a judgment of conviction
becomes final, the court may, on motion of the accused or at its own instance but with the
consent of the accused, grant a new trial or reconsideration.
Its equivalent in civil cases is Rule 37.
When we were discussing Rule 37, we took up criminal cases with respect to newly
discovered evidence. Will the same cases apply in criminal procedure? Yes. I equated
newly discovered evidence with unavailable evidence, with more stringent requirement in
criminal cases.
“The errors of law or irregularities prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused” – not just
any irregularity in the proceeding will render a judgment re-triable. The irregularities must
be prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused. Go back to the rights of the accused
under the Constitution or the Rules of Court (Rule 115).
Examples: right to confront a witness face-to-face. If the accused is not given an
opportunity, incomplete testimony. You are not given the right to cross-examine the
accused. You are not allowed to present evidence for one reason or another. These are
grounds for new trial because there are prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused.
Has the accused have the right to the records of the prosecutor? Records of preliminary
investigation do not form part of the records of the case. But if the accused would seek to
get copies of that and he is denied, that is an irregularity prejudicial to the substantial rights
of the accused.
Suppose he has a principal witness and he was not allowed to testify and the
disallowance is unreasonable. This is prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused.
There was a case where the accused claimed there was no pretrial. Pre-trial order, under
Rule 118, is mandatory. The pre-trial order was supposed to be the guide of what the
procedure will be. But the accused participated in the hearing without a pre-trial order.
Later, he questioned the fact that there was no pre-trial. This is an irregularity prejudicial to
the substantial rights of the accused. SC: No. Although that is an irregularity in the
proceeding, it seems that the accused waived his right to that because he participated in the
proceeding. When a judgment of conviction was rendered by the court, the accused now
tries to ask for a new trial for an irregularity which he himself committed. He was part of
the irregularity. He participated even if there was an irregularity. You have to raise it at the
earliest opportunity.
2. Grounds; effects
 Motion for new trial in criminal cases
The errors of law or irregularities
prejudicial to the substantial rights of the
accused have been committed during the
trial
The new and material evidence has been
newly discovered evidence, which he could
discovered which the accused could not
with reasonable diligence have discovered
and produced at the trial and which if
introduced and admitted would probably
change the judgment
Motion for reconsideration in criminal
cases
Motion for new trial in civil cases
(b) When a new trial is granted on the ground of newly-discovered evidence, the
FAME, which ordinary prudence could not evidence already adduced shall stand and the newly-discovered and such other
have guarded against and by reason of evidence as the court may, in the interest of justice, allow to be introduced shall be
which such aggrieved party has probably taken and considered together with the evidence already in the record.
been impaired in his rights
(c) In all cases, when the court grants new trial or reconsideration, the original judgment
shall be set aside or vacated and a new judgment rendered accordingly.
not, with reasonable diligence, have
1. Estino v. People
discovered and produced at the trial, and
2. Briones v. People
which if presented would probably alter
3. Saludaga v. Sandiganbayan
the result
4. Lumanog v. People
5. Payumo v. Sandiganbayan
Motion for reconsideration in civil cases

the damages awarded are excessive

errors of law or fact in the judgment, which the evidence is insufficient to justify the
requires no further proceedings. decision or final order
XV. RULES 122-125 – APPEALS
the decision or final order is contrary to law
1. Appeals in Civil cases vs appeals in criminal cases
Section 2. Grounds for a new trial. — The court shall grant a new trial on any of the
following grounds: The landmark case of People vs Mateo provided for what we now call intermediate appeal.

(a) The errors of law or irregularities prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused
have been committed during the trial;
(b) The new and material evidence has been discovered which the accused could not
with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the trial and which if
introduced and admitted would probably change the judgment.
Section 3. Ground for reconsideration. — The court shall grant reconsideration on the ground
of errors of law or fact in the judgment, which requires no further proceedings.
Section 4. Form of motion and notice to the prosecutor. — The motion for a new trial or
reconsideration shall be in writing and shall state the grounds on which it is based. If based
on a newly-discovered evidence, the motion must be supported by affidavits of witnesses
by whom such evidence is expected to be given or by duly authenticated copies of
documents which are proposed to be introduced in evidence. Notice of the motion for new
trial or reconsideration shall be given to the prosecutor.
Section 5. Hearing on motion. — Where a motion for a new trial calls for resolution of any
question of fact, the court may hear evidence thereon by affidavits or otherwise.
Section 6. Effects of granting a new trial or reconsideration. — The effects of granting a new
trial or reconsideration are the following:
(a) When a new trial is granted on the ground of errors of law or irregularities
committed during the trial, all proceedings and evidence affected thereby shall be set
aside and taken anew. The court may, in the interest of justice, allow the introduction
of additional evidence.
The concept of intermediate appeal: you do not go directly to the SC. You always have to
pass through the CA. This was before the abolition of the death penalty. The application is
that if the death penalty is imposed by the Sandiganbayan or RTC, there is no more
automatic appeal. In People vs Mateo, the SC said from now on, it should not go to the SC.
It must pass through the CA for intermediate review. If the death penalty is sustained by
the CA, this is the automatic review from the CA to SC. Deprivation of life cannot be
recalled.
When the death penalty was abolished, this doctrine should have been abandoned as well.
But it is retained. Hence, the practical application of People vs Mateo is if you receive a
penalty of reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, you have to appeal that to CA on
intermediate review. How? File a notice of appeal. If you do not file a notice of appeal, the
judgment becomes final (final here means executory).
Example: The client is meted out the penalty of reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. The
lawyer can’t just relax and say it’s okay because the case will be elevated. No! There is no
more automatic review. If you do not appeal, the judgment will become final.
2. Similarities and differences
People v. Morales: Appellant Roldan Morales y Midarasa was charged in 2 separate
Informations before the RTC with possession and sale of methylamphetamine
hydrochloride (shabu). Upon arraignment, appellant, assisted by counsel, pleaded not
guilty to both charges read in Filipino, a language known and understood by him. On
motion of the City Prosecutor, the cases were consolidated for joint trial. Trial on the merits
ensued thereafter. RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal

48 GING 
possession and illegal sale of dangerous drugs. It held that the prosecution witnesses
positively identified the appellant as the person who possessed and sold to the poseur-
buyer the “shabu” subject of this case, during the buy-bust operation. RTC found that from
the evidence presented, the prosecution was able to sufficiently establish the following: (1)
the fact of the buy-bust operation at the parking lot of Jollibee Philcoa which led to the
arrest of the appellant; and (2) the corpus delicti, through the presentation in court of the 2
sachets of white substance which was confirmed by the Chemistry Report to be
methylamphetamine hydrochloride (“shabu”), found in the possession of and sold by the
appellant. CA affirmed. It found that contrary to the allegations of the appellant, there was
no instigation that took place. Rather, a buy-bust operation was employed by the police
officers to apprehend the appellant while in the act of unlawfully selling drugs.
Appellant elevated the case to SC via Notice of Appeal. SC resolved to accept the case and
required the parties to submit their respective supplemental briefs simultaneously, if they
so desire, within 30 days from notice. Both parties adopted their respective appellant’s and
appellee’s briefs, instead of filing supplemental briefs.
SC: Appellant should be acquitted. We draw attention to the unique nature of an appeal in
a criminal case: the appeal throws the whole case open for review and it is the duty of the
appellate court to correct, cite and appreciate errors in the appealed judgment whether they
are assigned or unassigned. On the basis of such review, we find the present appeal
meritorious.
Prevailing jurisprudence uniformly hold that the trial court’s findings of fact, especially
when affirmed by the CA, are, as a general rule, entitled to great weight and will not be
disturbed on appeal. However, this rule admits of exceptions and does not apply where
facts of weight and substance with direct and material bearing on the final outcome of the
case have been overlooked, misapprehended or misapplied. After due consideration of the
records of this case, evidence presented and relevant law and jurisprudence, we hold that
this case falls under the exception.
In actions involving the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following elements must first
be established: (1) proof that the transaction or sale took place and (2) the presentation in
court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence.
On the other hand, in prosecutions for illegal possession of a dangerous drug, it must be
shown that (1) the accused was in possession of an item or an object identified to be a
prohibited or regulated drug, (2) such possession is not authorized by law, and (3) the
accused was freely and consciously aware of being in possession of the drug. Similarly, in
this case, the evidence of the corpus delicti must be established beyond reasonable doubt
With respect to corpus delicti, it is indisputable that the procedures for the custody and
disposition of confiscated dangerous drugs, as mandated in Section 21 of RA 9165, were not
observed. The records utterly failed to show that the buy-bust team complied with these
procedures despite their mandatory nature as indicated by the use of “shall” in the
directives of the law. The procedural lapse is plainly evident from the testimonies of the 2
police officers presented by the prosecution, namely: PO1 Roy and PO3 Rivera. PO1 Roy, in
his testimony, failed to concretely identify the items seized from the appellant. Moreover,
he confirmed that they did not make a list of the items seized.
Other than PO1 Roy and PO3 Rivera, the prosecution did not present any other witnesses.
Hence, the investigator, referred to by PO1 Roy in his testimony as the one who took
delivery of the seized items, was not identified nor was he presented in court. More
49 GING 
importantly, the testifying police officers did not state that they marked the seized drugs
immediately after they arrested the appellant and in the latter’s presence. Neither did they
make an inventory and take a photograph of the confiscated items in the presence of the
appellant. There was likewise no mention of any representative from the media and the
Department of Justice, or any elected public official who participated in the operation and
who were supposed to sign an inventory of seized items and be given copies thereof. None
of these statutory safeguards were observed. Even PO1 Roy, the poseur-buyer, was not
certain as to the identity of the confiscated shabu. The procedural lapses in the handling
and identification of the seized items collectively raise doubts as to whether the items
presented in court were the exact same items that were confiscated from appellant when he
was apprehended.
While this Court recognizes that non-compliance by the buy-bust team with Section 21 of
RA 9165 is not fatal as long as there is a justifiable ground therefor, for and as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending team, these conditions were not met in the case at bar. No explanation was
offered by the testifying police officers for their failure to observe the rule. In this respect,
we cannot fault the apprehending policemen either, as PO1 Roy admitted that he was not a
PDEA operative and the other witness, PO3 Rivera, testified that he was not aware of the
procedure involved in the conduct of anti-drug operations by the PNP. In fine, there is
serious doubt whether the drug presented in court was the same drug recovered from the
appellant. Consequently, the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the
identity of the corpus delicti.
Furthermore, the evidence presented by the prosecution failed to reveal the identity of the
person who had custody and safekeeping of the drugs after its examination and pending
presentation in court. Thus, the prosecution likewise failed to establish the chain of
custody which is fatal to its cause.
In fine, the identity of the corpus delicti in this case was not proven beyond reasonable
doubt. There was likewise a break in the chain of custody which proves fatal to the
prosecution’s case. Thus, since the prosecution has failed to establish the element of corpus
delicti with the prescribed degree of proof required for successful prosecution of both
possession and sale of prohibited drugs, we resolve to ACQUIT Roldan Morales y
Midarasa.
Quidet v. People: Quidet, Feliciano Taban Jr. and Aurelio Tubo were charged with
homicide for the death of Jimmy Tagarda. The accused were also charged with frustrated
homicide for the stab wounds sustained by Jimmy’s cousin, Andrew Tagarda, arising from
the same incident. They all pleaded not guilty on the frustrated homicide case but Taban
pleaded guilty on the homicide case so the trial court rendered a partial judgment
sentencing him to imprisonment. After trial, the court found Tubo and Quidet guilty of
homicide and the 3 of them guilty on frustrated homicide. RTC convicted Tubo of homicide
and all 3 of them of frustrated homicide. Quidet appealed this to CA. It was affirmed but
modified the crime to be a mere attempted homicide with respect to the injuries sustained
by Andrew. The accused failed to inflict mortal wounds because Andrew successfully
deflected the attack. CA also deleted the award of civil indemnity to the heirs of Andrew
because the same were not fully substantiated.
SC: Taban and Tubo, co-accused who did not appeal, can benefit from the favorable
decision. The court first ruled that the existence of conspiracy was not proved beyond
reasonable doubt so Quidet is criminally liable only for his individual acts. Considering
that it was duly established that petitioner boxed Jimmy and Andrew and absent proof of
the extent of the injuries sustained by the latter from these acts, petitioner should only be
made liable for 2 counts of slight physical injuries
Anent the penalty imposed on Taban and Tubo, the CA correctly modified the same. The
crime committed was attempted homicide and not frustrated homicide because the stab
wounds that Andrew sustained were not life-threatening. Although Taban and Tubo did
not appeal their conviction, this part of the CA’s judgment is favorable to them, thus, they
are entitled to a reduction of their prison terms. The rule is that an appeal taken by one or
more of several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal except insofar as the
judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter.
Balaba v. People: Balaba was charged and convicted of Malversation of Funds. The state
auditors found total cash shortage of Php114, 000 in the Municipality of Guindulman,
Bohol. The total shortage was found to be payable to the name of Balaba. After his
conviction, Balaba filed a Notice of Appeal where he indicated that he would file his appeal
before the CA. OSG, instead of filing an Appellee’s Brief, filed a Manifestation and Motion
praying for the dismissal of the appeal for being improper since the Sandiganbayan has
exclusive jurisdiction over the appeal. CA dismissed Balaba’s appeal, declaring that it had
no jurisdiction to act on the appeal because the Sandiganbayan has exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over the case. Balaba filed a MR and asked that he be allowed to pursue his
appeal before the proper court, the Sandiganbayan. CA denied Balaba’s motion.
SC: CA was correct in not giving course to Balaba’s appeal. The Sandiganbayan shall
exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or orders of the
RTCs whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate
jurisdiction as herein provided.
Upon Balaba’s conviction by RTC, his remedy should have been an appeal to the
Sandiganbayan. Paragraph 3, Section 4(c) of RA 8249, which further defined the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, reads: “The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive
appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or orders of the regional trial courts
whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as
herein provided.”
There is nothing in said paragraph which can conceivably justify the filing of Balaba’s
appeal before the CA instead of the Sandiganbayan. Clearly, CA is bereft of any
jurisdiction to review the judgment Balaba seeks to appeal.
In Melencion v. Sandiganbayan: An error in designating the appellate court is not fatal to the
appeal. However, the correction in designating the proper appellate court should be made
within the 15-day period to appeal. Once made within the said period, the designation of
the correct appellate court may be allowed even if the records of the case are forwarded to
the CA. Otherwise, the second paragraph of Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules of court would
apply: “An appeal erroneously taken to the Court of Appeals shall not be transferred to the
appropriate court but shall be dismissed outright.”
Balaba sought the correction of the error in filing the appeal only after the expiration of the
period to appeal. RTC promulgated its Decision on 9 December 2002. Balaba filed his
notice of appeal on 14 January 2003. CA issued the Decision declaring its lack of
jurisdiction on 15 December 2004. Balaba tried to correct the error only on 27 January 2005,
clearly beyond the 15-day period to appeal from the decision of RTC. Therefore, CA did not
commit any error when it dismissed Balaba’s appeal because of lack of jurisdiction.
50 GING 
People v. Olivo: Charmen Olivo, Nelson Danda, and Joey Zafra were charged for the crime
of robbery with homicide of Mariano Constantino. After trial, the trial court found Olivo,
Danda and Zafra, guilty. Only Olivo and Danda appealed to the CAwhich affirmed the
ruling of the trial court, thus, the instant appeal with SC. SC acquitted Olivo and Danda for
the failure of the lone eyewitness of the prosecution to identify the accused-appellants.
SC: The present rule is that an appeal taken by one or more several accused shall not affect
those who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable
and applicable to the latter. Our pronouncements here with respect to the insufficiency of
the prosecution evidence to convict appellants beyond reasonable doubt are definitely
favorable and applicable to accused Joey Zafra. He should not therefore be treated as the
odd man out and should benefit from the acquittal of his co-accused. In fact, under similar
conditions and on the same ratiocination, Section 11(a), Rule 122 has justified the extension
of our judgment of acquittal to the co-accused who failed to appeal from the judgment of
the trial court which we subsequently reversed.
The trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it denied respondent’s
Motion to Amend. The statutory requirement that when no MR is filed within the
reglementary period, the decision attains finality and becomes executory in due course
must be strictly enforced, first, to avoid delay in the administration of justice and, second,
to put an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional errors.
However, in exceptional cases, substantial justice and equity considerations warrant the
giving of due course to an appeal by suspending the enforcement of statutory and
mandatory rules of procedure. Certain elements are considered for the appeal to be given
due course, such as: (1) the existence of special or compelling circumstances, (2) the merits
of the case, (3) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party
favored by the suspension of the rules, (4) lack of any showing that the review sought is
merely frivolous and dilatory, and (5) the other party will not be unduly prejudiced
thereby.
Several of these elements obtain in the case at bar. First, records show that petitioner admits
her civil obligation to respondent for a total of P3,300,000.00. Second, it cannot be said that
petitioner will be unduly prejudiced if respondent’s Motion to Amend for the sole purpose
of including the civil liability of petitioner in the order of acquittal shall be allowed.
Foremost, petitioner admits her civil obligation to respondent.
Guasch v. Dela Cruz
People v. Taruc: Francisco Taruc was charged before the RTC-Bataan, with the crime of
murder in connection with the death of Emelito Sualog. Upon arraignment, accused, duly
assisted by a lawyer from the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO), pleaded not guilty to the
crime charged. After trial on the merits, RTC convicted the accused.
The case was brought to the CA for automatic review. Accused, through the PAO, filed a
Motion for Extension of Time to File Appellant’s Brief. Considering that the Notice to File
Brief addressed to accused was returned to the CA with postal notation “moved out,” the
CA directed accused’s counsel to furnish it with the present and complete address of his
client within 5 days from notice. In compliance, the PAO lawyer informed the CA that
accused escaped from prison.
Notwithstanding the escape of accused from prison, CA granted PAO’s Motion for
Extension of Time to File Appellant’s Brief, in view of the ruling of the SC in People v. Flores,
making the review of death penalty cases mandatory. The period of extension granted had
lapsed without the accused filing his brief; thus, the CA required the PAO to show cause
why the latter should not be held in contempt for failing to file the same. CA found the
explanation valid, and accepted the briefs of both the appellant and the appellee, and
considered the case submitted for decision. CA affirmed with modification the Decision of
the RTC; from death to reclusion perpetua.
Accused, still represented by the PAO, filed a Notice of Appeal stating that he was
appealing the Decision of the CA to the SC on questions of law and fact.
SC: The accused may not appeal the CA decision affirming his conviction.
The trial court promulgated a judgment of conviction while accused was at large. He
remains at large even while his counsel continues to file various pleadings on his behalf
before the RTC, the CA, and SC.
An accused is required to be present before the RTC at the promulgation of the judgment in
a criminal case. If the accused fails to appear before the RTC, promulgation of judgment
shall be made in accordance with Rule 120, Section 6, paragraphs 4 and 5.
Consistently, Rule 124, Section 8, paragraph 2 allows CA, upon motion of the appellee or
motu proprio, to dismiss the appeal of the accused who eludes the jurisdiction of the courts
over his person. In allowing the dismissal of the appeal of the accused under the
circumstances identified by the foregoing rule, the Court, in People v. Mapalao, explained
that: Once an accused escapes from prison or confinement or jumps bail or flees to a foreign
country, he loses his standing in court and unless he surrenders or submits to the
jurisdiction of the court he is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief from the court.
Although Rule 124, Section 8 particularly applies to the CA, it has been extended to the SC
by Rule 125, Section 1.
Accused, by escaping from jail, was not present at the promulgation by the RTC of its
Decision, finding him guilty of the crime of murder. Accused failed to surrender and file
the required motion within 15 days from the promulgation of the RTC Decision. This alone
already deprived him of any remedy against said judgment of conviction available under
the Rules, including the right to appeal the same.
By escaping prison, accused impliedly waived his right to appeal. In People v. Ang Gioc, the
Court enunciated that: There are certain fundamental rights which cannot be waived even
by the accused himself, but the right of appeal is not one of them. This right is granted
solely for the benefit of the accused. He may avail of it or not, as he pleases. He may waive
it either expressly or by implication. When the accused flees after the case has been
submitted to the court for decision, he will be deemed to have waived his right to appeal
from the judgment rendered against him x x x.
The accused cannot be accorded the right to appeal unless he voluntarily submits to the
jurisdiction of the court or is otherwise arrested within 15 days from notice of the judgment
against him. While at large, he cannot seek relief from the court, as he is deemed to have
waived the appeal. Thus, having escaped from prison or confinement, he loses his
standing in court; and unless he surrenders or submits to its jurisdiction, he is deemed to
have waived any right to seek relief from the court.
By putting himself beyond the reach and application of the legal processes of the land,
accused revealed his contempt of the law and placed himself in a position to speculate, at
51 GING 
his pleasure on his chances for a reversal. In the process, he kept himself out of the reach of
justice, but hoped to render the judgment nugatory at his option. Such conduct is
intolerable and does not invite leniency on the part of the appellate court.
Tiu v. People
Colinares v. People: Arnel Colinares was charged with frustrated homicide for hitting the
head of the private complainant with a piece of stone. He alleged self-defense but the trial
court found him guilty of the crime charged and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment
from 2 years and 4 months of prision correccional, as minimum, to 6 years and 1 day of
prision mayor, as maximum. Since the maximum probationable imprisonment under the
law was only up to 6 years, Arnel did not qualify for probation.
Arnel appealed to the CA, invoking self-defense and, alternatively, seeking conviction for
the lesser crime of attempted homicide with the consequent reduction of the penalty
imposed on him. His conviction was affirmed by the CA. Hence, this appeal to the SC.
Given a finding that Arnel is entitled to conviction for a lower [lesser] offense [of attempted
homicide] and a reduced probationable penalty, may he may still apply for probation on
remand of the case to the trial court?
SC: Yes. Ordinarily, Arnel would no longer be entitled to apply for probation, he having
appealed from the judgment of the RTC convicting him for frustrated homicide. But, the
Court finds Arnel guilty only of the lesser crime of attempted homicide and holds that the
maximum of the penalty imposed on him should be lowered to imprisonment of 4 months
of arresto mayor, as minimum, to 2 years and 4 months of prision correccional, as
maximum. With this new penalty, it would be but fair to allow him the right to apply for
probation upon remand of the case to the RTC.
[W]hile it is true that probation is a mere privilege, the point is not that Arnel has the right
to such privilege; he certainly does not have. What he has is the right to apply for that
privilege. His maximum jail term should only be 2 years and 4 months. If the Court allows
him to apply for probation because of the lowered penalty, it is still up to the trial judge to
decide whether or not to grant him the privilege of probation, taking into account the full
circumstances of his case.
If the Court chooses to go by the dissenting opinion’s hard position, it will apply the
probation law on Arnel based on the trial court’s annulled judgment against him. He will
not be entitled to probation because of the severe penalty that such judgment imposed on
him. More, the Supreme Court’s judgment of conviction for a lesser offense and a lighter
penalty will also have to bend over to the trial court’s judgment—even if this has been
found in error. And, worse, Arnel will now also be made to pay for the trial court’s
erroneous judgment with the forfeiture of his right to apply for probation. Where is justice
there?
Arnel did not appeal from a judgment that would have allowed him to apply for probation.
He did not have a choice between appeal and probation. He was not in a position to say,
“By taking this appeal, I choose not to apply for probation.” The stiff penalty that the trial
court imposed on him denied him that choice. Thus, a ruling that would allow Arnel to
now seek probation under this Court’s greatly diminished penalty will not dilute the sound
ruling in Francisco. It remains that those who will appeal from judgments of conviction,
when they have the option to try for probation, forfeit their right to apply for that privilege.
In a real sense, the Court’s finding that Arnel was guilty, not of frustrated homicide, but
only of attempted homicide, is an original conviction that for the first time imposes on him
a probationable penalty. Had the RTC done him right from the start, it would have found
him guilty of the correct offense and imposed on him the right penalty of two years and
four months maximum. This would have afforded Arnel the right to apply for probation.
DISSENTING and CONCURRING OPINION: PERALTA, J.: In view of the provision in
Section 4 of the Probation Law that “no application for probation shall be entertained or
granted if the defendant has perfected an appeal from the judgment of conviction,”
prevailing jurisprudence treats appeal and probation as mutually exclusive remedies
because the law is unmistakable about it.
However, it has been proposed that an appeal should not bar the accused from applying
for probation if the appeal is solely to reduce the penalty to within the probationable limit,
as this is equitable. In this regard, an accused may be allowed to apply for probation even if
he has filed a notice of appeal, provided that his appeal is limited to the following grounds:
1. When the appeal is merely intended for the correction of the penalty imposed by the
lower court, which when corrected would entitle the accused to apply for probation; and
2. When the appeal is merely intended to review the crime for which the accused was
convicted and that the accused should only be liable to the lesser offense which is
necessarily included in the crime for which he was originally convicted and the proper
penalty imposable is within the probationable period.
In both instances, the penalty imposed by the trial court for the crime committed by the
accused is more than 6 years; hence, the sentence disqualifies the accused from applying for
probation. Thus, the accused should be allowed to file an appeal under the aforestated
grounds to seek a review of the crime and/or penalty imposed by the trial court. If, on
appeal, the appellate court finds it proper to modify the crime and/or the penalty imposed,
and the penalty finally imposed is within the probationable period, then the accused
should be allowed to apply for probation.
In addition, before an appeal is filed based on the grounds enumerated above, the accused
should first file a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the trial court anchored on
the above-stated grounds and manifest his intent to apply for probation if the motion is
granted. The motion for reconsideration will give the trial court an opportunity to review
and rectify any errors in its judgment, while the manifestation of the accused will
immediately show that he is agreeable to the judgment of conviction and does not intend to
appeal from it, but he only seeks a review of the crime and/or penalty imposed, so that in
the event that the penalty will be modified within the probationable limit, he will apply for
probation.
It is believed that the recommended grounds for appeal do not contravene Section 4 of the
Probation Law, which expressly prohibits only an appeal from the judgment of conviction.
In such instances, the ultimate reason of the accused for filing the appeal based on the
aforestated grounds is to determine whether he may avail of probation based on the review
by the appellate court of the crime and/or penalty imposed by the trial court. Allowing the
aforestated grounds for appeal would give a qualified convicted offender the opportunity
to apply for probation if his ground for appeal is found to be meritorious by the appellate
court, thus, serving the purpose of the Probation Law to promote the reformation of a
penitent offender outside of prison.
On the other hand, probation should not be granted to the accused in the following
instances:
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1. When the accused is convicted by the trial court of a crime where the penalty imposed
is within the probationable period or a fine, and the accused files a notice of appeal; and
2. When the accused files a notice of appeal which puts the merits of his conviction in
issue, even if there is an alternative prayer for the correction of the penalty imposed by the
trial court or for a conviction to a lesser crime, which is necessarily included in the crime in
which he was convicted where the penalty is within the probationable period.
There is wisdom to the majority opinion, but the problem is that the law expressly prohibits
the filing of an application for probation beyond the period for filing an appeal. When the
meaning is clearly discernible from the language of the statute, there is no room for
construction or interpretation. Thus, the remedy is the amendment of Section 4 of P.D. No.
968, and not adaptation through judicial interpretation.
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION: VILLARAMA, JR., J.: In foreclosing the
right to appeal his conviction once the accused files an application for probation, the State
proceeds from the reasonable assumption that the accused’s submission to rehabilitation
and reform is indicative of remorse. And in prohibiting the trial court from entertaining an
application for probation if the accused has perfected his appeal, the State ensures that the
accused takes seriously the privilege or clemency extended to him, that at the very least he
disavows criminal tendencies. Consequently, this Court’s grant of relief to herein accused
whose sentence was reduced by this Court to within the probationable limit, with a
declaration that accused may now apply for probation, would diminish the seriousness of
that privilege because in questioning his conviction accused never admitted his guilt. It is
of no moment that the trial court’s conviction of petitioner for frustrated homicide is now
corrected by this Court to only attempted homicide. Petitioner’s physical assault on the
victim with intent to kill is unlawful or criminal regardless of whether the stage of
commission was frustrated or attempted only. Allowing the petitioner the right to apply
for probation under the reduced penalty glosses over the fact that accused’s availment of
appeal with such expectation amounts to the same thing: speculation and opportunism on
the part of the accused in violation of the rule that appeal and probation are mutually
exclusive remedies
XVI. RULE 127 – PROVISIONAL REMEDIES
1. Relate to Rules 57-61
What are the provisional remedies in civil case? Are they applicable in criminal cases?
Preliminary attachment: applicable when civil action is deemed instituted. Example: You
can ask for preliminary attachment in estafa because one of the requirements in estafa case
is the element of fraud. In preliminary attachment, the common denominator is fraud
(except the 6th ground: summons may be served through publication or the whereabouts
or identity is unknown). In BP 22, can you ask for preliminary attachment? [civil action
here cannot be separated so there is always a civil aspect] No, there is no fraud. Mere
issuance of a useless or worthless check, you are already liable. No requirement of deceit.
Preliminary injunction:
Replevin: no application. Example: In theft, you cannot ask for replevin.
Appointment for receiver: Yes.
Support pendente lite: Yes. Example: If it is instituted in a criminal case, like seduction,
there is a prayer for acknowledgement of child, then you can ask for support and prayer for
support pendete lite.

2. What provisional remedies are not applicable in criminal cases

Section 1. Availability of provisional remedies. — The provisional remedies in civil actions,

insofar as they are applicable, may be availed of in connection with the civil action deemed
instituted with the criminal action.

“insofar as they are applicable” – applicable as far as the elements are concerned. Example:
There is almost always fraud in preliminary attachment (except the 6th ground).

Section 2. Attachment. — When the civil action is properly instituted in the criminal action
as provided in Rule 111, the offended party may have the property of the accused attached
as security for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered from the accused in
the following cases:

(a) When the accused is about to abscond from the Philippines;

(b) When the criminal action is based on a claim for money or property embezzled or
fraudulently misapplied or converted to the use of the accused who is a public
officer, officer of a corporation, attorney, factor, broker, agent, or clerk, in the course
of his employment as such, or by any other person in a fiduciary capacity, or for a
willful violation of duty;
(c) When the accused has concealed, removed, or disposed of his property, or is about to
do so; and
(d) When the accused resides outside the Philippines.

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