Peace Building Handbook As of April 10 2019 - FINAL

By 2028, a world-class Army that is a source of national pride.
PEACEBUILDING
OPERATIONS HANDBOOK
Empowering soldiers to be Champion of Peace.
Honor. Patriotism. Duty.

peacebuilding operations handbook
PUBLISHED BY:
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF FOR CMO, G7
Philippine Army
Fort Andres Bonifacio, Taguig City
Landline: (+632) 845 9555 loc. 5724
Facsimile: (+632) 845 9555 loc. 5722
E-mail: cmo.og7.pa@gmail.com
og7_pa@yahoo.com
COPYRIGHT 2018
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF FOR CMO, G7
Philippine Army
HEADQUARTERS
PHILIPPINE ARMY
Fort Andres Bonifacio, Metro Manila
T
he Philippine Army continuously conducts various campaign plans
all over the country, in support of the strategic objective of the AFP
to attain lasting peace and sustainable development. Achieving
lasting peace, however, is always full of challenges and requires our
soldiers to adopt specific processes and strategies in order to address
peculiar security environment conditions.
The ability of our soldiers to effectively conduct peace and development

activities at the grassroot level needs to be standardized and yet remain
efficient. This Peacebuilding Operations Handbook, therefore, will serve
as a reference to standardize our peacebuilding efforts throughout the
country. This volume supplements previously published references on
topics related to peace and development activities such as the conduct
of Community Support Programs and “Rido” Settlement initiatives in
Muslim Mindanao. Experience has taught us that peacebuilding initiatives
significantly contribute to the success of the Army’s ongoing military
campaign plan.
Let this book always reminds us of the importance of our continued

partnership with the Filipino nation in building peace. We must always
remember that achieving genuine peace and security requires the
collective efforts of our organization and different stakeholders, because
stability and progress for our country is a shared responsibility of all
Filipinos.
LTGen MACAIROG S ALBERTO AFP

Commanding General, PA
HEADQUARTERS
PHILIPPINE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF CMO, G7
FOREWORD
T
he Philippine Army will always strive to achieve peace in conflict-
affected communities through an extensive collaboration with
government and non-government agencies, as well as with private
corporations and key individuals. We will bridge better communication
to the people and create better partnerships with other organizations and
agencies. This shall establish an environment of peace and harmony,
wherein everyone will have the chance to help one another and contribute
towards a nation that is free from violence and oppression.
Toward this end, all Army units and offices must work for peace
in a synchronized and integrated manner. It is in this regard that the Army
publishes a handbook that will guide peacebuilding operations at the
tactical level.
This Peacebuilding Operations Handbook contains important

information that will help soldiers in planning, implementing, and
evaluating peacebuilding activities. By adhering to concepts and TTPs in
this handbook, the soldiers will surely act in accordance with the intent of
our military campaign in achieving a just and lasting peace in our country.
PATRICIO RUBEN P AMATA

Colonel, GSC (INF) PA
AC of S for CMO, G7, PA
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
T
his Peacebuilding Operations inputs during consultation meetings
Handbook was inspired by while crafting this handbook.
the clamor of the people for
genuine and lasting peace. The To the main author, LTC ELMER M
officers, men and women of the BOONGALING, and contributors, LTC
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff BENJAMIN C SOLIS JR, LTC ALLAN M
for Civil-Military Operations, G7 have TESORO, MAJ GENESIS R GABRIDO,
the ardent desire to contribute to CPT FRANCO SALVADOR M SUELTO,
the realization of that dream, while CPT MALCOLM DOWELL C DOMINGO,
attending with day-to-day office Ms. Lyca Sarenas, Ms. Aya Suzuki,
requirements. In a simple way, this Ms. Erica Testa, Ms. Maria Farina Kim
handbook is our contribution to our Santos, Ms. Nicole Jane Rebellon, and
fellow soldiers in the frontline, in Ms. Nicole Matib for their invaluable
sustaining the peace. help in writing, editing, and finalizing
this handbook.
We are ever grateful as we
acknowledge the efforts and Balay Mindanaw Foundation Inc.,
contributions of everyone who made MGEN JON N AYING AFP (RET),
this handbook a reality. We would like and COL MANUEL V SEQUITIN
to express our humble gratitude for (GSC) INF PA, for allowing us to use
the assistance and service extended their publications as annexes of this
by the following: handbook.
Former G7s of PA, MGEN RAMIRO S Ms. Abegail Garcia and Mr. Harold
REY AFP, BGEN ARNULFO BURGOS Canlas for skillfully managing and
AFP, and COL FACUNDO O PALAFOX creating the layout of this handbook.
IV GSC (CAV) PA for their constant Those we failed to name but
support to make this project a reality. nonetheless contributed invaluable
Most Reverend Patricio A Buzon, service to the completion of this work,
SDB, D.D. and Most Reverend Vicente please accept our apologies and
M Navarra, D.D. for guiding us on sincere thanks.
how active non-violence could be a And above all, to the Almighty and
powerful tool in peace-making. Allah for blessing us with wisdom
LTC ALEXEI C MUSNGI, LTC MICHAEL and strength to make this handbook a
G LOGICO, LTC JACOB THADDEUS reality.
OBLIGADO, LTC HAROLD M
CABUNOC, and all Infantry Battalion
Commanders who shared their valued The Project Management Team
PREFACE
T
his Peacebuilding Operations
Handbook will guide Unit
Commanders and Soldiers,
personnel, staff, and planners who
directly engage in the conduct of 3. Provide particular details on
peacebuilding. A go-to handbook how to implement, monitor,
that explains peacebuilding evaluate, and assess the
operations – from planning and peacebuilding plan.
implementation of its programs
to the evaluation and monitoring Although this handbook contains
of its effectiveness. It also seeks a detailed guideline in conducting
to aid in the courses conducted peacebuilding activities and could
within AFP training institutions, be helpful in resolving conflicts or
to serve as a ready reference violence within their mission areas,
material for students, particularly it does not promote the replacement
in their modules that tackle Peace of a soldier’s basic skills, i.e., war-
Activities. fighting competency, with non-
traditional roles of peacebuilding.
A foundational guide in conducting
peacebuilding activities that Peacebuilding may be used in
support the theme “winning the varying settings, under different
peace”, this handbook aims to: circumstances. It does not only
cater the resolution of conflicts
1. Deliver information that will and such, but it also helps in
enhance the peacebuilding sustaining development within the
knowledge and skills of every community. And although conflicts
Army personnel, especially are multi-dimensional in nature,
those at the tactical levels; Peacebuilding aims to be universal.
Thereby, effectively answering the
2. Prescribe guidelines on
challenges of a conflict when it
how to intensively plan a
arises. Hence, peacebuilding is a
peacebuilding activity; and
powerful tool in helping the Army
to successfully accomplish its
mission.
CONTENTS
Promulgation I
Foreword II
Acknowledgement III
Preface IV
CHAPTER 1
The Need for Peacebuilding 1
1.1 Rationale 2
1.2 Understanding Peace, Conflict, 5
and Violence
1.2.1 Peace 5
1.2.2 Conflict 7
1.2.3 Violence 11
1.3 A Philippine Framework toward a 14
Culture of Peace
CHAPTER 2
Achieving Peace Through Peacebuilding 17
2.1 Peacebuilding Operations 18
2.1.1 Peacebuilding, Peacemaking and 19

Peacekeeping
2.1.2 Immediate Objectives of Peacebuilding 20
2.1.3 Principles of Peacebuilding 21
2.1.4 Dimensions of Peacebuilding 24
2.1.5 The Role of the Military in Peacebuilding 25
CONTENTS
CHAPTER 3
Conflict Analysis 27
CHAPTER 4
Peacebuilding Operations Framework 41
Phase I : Analysis & Planning 43

Phase II : Preparation 56
Phase III : Immersion 57
Phase IV : Implementation of 60
Peacebuilding Interventions
Phase V : Monitoring, Evaluation, and 69
Assessment
Annexes 76
CONCLUSION 85
CHAPTER
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1
The Need for
PEACEBUILDING
the need for

peacebuilding 1
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2 Peacebuilding operations handbook
The Need for

PEACEBUILDING
1.1 Rationale
The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) is the protector of
the people and of the state. Protection of the people espouses
promoting and upholding human rights, paving the way for
delivery of basic services, and eliminating armed violence. Toward
this end, the AFP crafts and implements campaign plans which do
not merely aim to meet security challenges to protect the state,
but more importantly to help in nation building and establishment
of sustainable peace. This includes managing conflicts so they do
not escalate to armed confrontation, resolving hostilities, dealing
with its effects on affected communities, and rehabilitating efforts
when the conflict is resolved.
Peacebuilding is categorized as part of the Peace Support

Operations. These are activities that are aimed to prevent
disputes from arising, stopping existing disputes from escalating
into conflicts and controlling existing conflicts. Peacebuilding as
defined in the Civil Affairs Manual is critical in the aftermath of
a conflict. It includes the identification as support measures and
structures that will promote peace, build trust, and interaction
among former enemies in order to avoid a relapse into conflict. It

involves a wide range of political, developmental, humanitarian,
human rights programs and mechanism.
Peacebuilding is a not an entirely new concept to the AFP particularly

the Philippine Army. Throughout different military campaigns, the
role of the military has evolved from purely warfighting to a more
complex conflict dynamics which involves civil and humanitarian
components. It has implemented community development
initiatives, facilitated delivery of basic services to the community,
and conducted conflict management albeit in varying levels of
intensity, approach and objectives. These activities highlight the
important role of soldiers in nation building. As such, it is important
to equip them with skills necessary for building sustainable peace
and promoting human security. For these reasons, the Philippine
Army came up with this handbook in an attempt to mainstream a
uniform peacebuilding approach.
Community Support Programs (CSP), an evolution of the Special

Operations Team (SOT) in the late 1980s to 2000s and Peace and
Development Teams (PDT) in 2008 to 2016, can be considered
as peacebuilding. CSP conducts activities that espouse localized
peace and development. However, its goal is to identify, coopt
and defeat enemy organization and infrastructure in a particular
community. Peacebuilding does not divide friends and enemies.
Peacebuilding aims to build positive peace in the communities.

Specifically, the following are the immediate objectives of
peacebuilding that will contribute to the attainment of positive
peace:
a. Reduce the risk of a conflict from spiraling into a violent

one. Peacebuilding activities strengthen social relationships. It
enhances and facilitates dialogue where issues can be resolved.
b. Reduce the risk of a resolved violent conflict from

recurring. Violent conflicts that have been resolved should be
nurtured. Peacebuilding includes reconciliation among the parties
and provides mechanisms for dialogue.
c. Reconcile opponents. Peacebuilding activities provide

opportunities for parties in conflict to reconcile their differences
and come into terms agreeable to both or among them.
d. Create an environment conducive to self-sustaining

and durable peace. Peacebuilding includes activities that enhance
social relationships as well as economic productivity. These are
vital for the establishment of sustainable peace.
1.2 Understanding Peace, Conflict, and Violence

In achieving peace, an interplay of three (3) principles is present.
1.2.1 Peace
The definition of peace has evolved from merely the absence

of war and violence. A comprehensive view of peace is now
defined as “the eradication of all facets of injustice”. By this, it
is not only direct violence that must be eradicated. We must
also fight against a new form of threat to peace – that is indirect
or structural violence. It is not only war and direct violence
that cause death and disfigurement. Structural violence
also causes death and suffering and are manifested by the
conditions that resulted from it: extreme poverty, starvation,
avoidable diseases, discrimination against minority groups
and denial of human rights. These circumstances breed anger
and generate tension leading to armed conflict and eventually,
war (Monez, 1973 as cited from Peace Education book).
With peace as our end goal, we should keep in mind that it

is importantly characterized by justice, well-being, mutual
respect, and good will. This is achieved when:
• Everyone feels safe, without fear or threat of violence;
• Everyone is equal before the law; legal justice system is

fair and effective and has the ability to protect the rights
of the people;
• Everyone is able to participate in decision-making and the

government in accountable to the people;
• Everyone has fair and equal access to basic needs for their
well-being such as food, water, shelter, education, and
health care; and
• Everyone has an equal opportunity to work and make a

living.
In establishing a peaceful and stable environment, it is

vital to adopt a human security-focused approach. This
focused approach needs an environment that reinforces the
structures of equality and a culture of understanding and
tolerance. If we are to envision a world that is founded on
peace and justice, we must understand that diversity is a
universal fact. Sustaining a stable peace means upholding
the value of tolerance, understanding, and respect for
diversity among individuals.
1.2.2 Conflict
Conflict, on the other hand, is the perceived opposition of

needs and values, standpoints, and interests. It occurs because
of the incompatibility of goals or values between two or more
parties in an antagonistic relationship that is combined with the
attempts to be in control of the other.
a. Elements of a Conflict
The probability of a conflict is highly influenced by three

(3) fundamental elements. These are: attitude, behaviour,
and context.
BEHAVIOR
ATTITUDE CONTEXT
Attitude refers to how the parties view themselves

and their adversaries which include perceptions and
misconceptions. Perceptions or misconceptions develop
into prejudices, stereotyping, and biases which worsen
as violence increases. Emotions such as fear, anger, and
hatred are heightened when a latent conflict escalates into
violence.
Behaviour refers to the outward manifestation of the

attitude of the parties. It means the acts, statements, attacks,
and other actions that a party does. Anger and hatred are
expressed through violent attacks, coercion, and threats.
Context refers to the situation or condition in which the

parties are defined or situated based on values, culture,
and others. Context is the root cause that led to the
establishment of certain behaviours and attitudes.
A conflict may start at any point in the triangle above.

Once the conflict has started, the other two points are
strengthened. For example, A killed B. The attitude of B’s
relatives would be antagonistic against A, or even against
his/her relatives. They might even think of retaliating if no
intervention is done. Should there be retaliation, this would
escalate into violent retaliatory attacks on both sides. The
context or condition is thus strengthened.
b. Sources of Conflict
According to Johann Galtung – a renowned sociologist

and the principal founder of peace and conflict studies,
conflict may also result from highly uneven distribution
of wealth and resources as well as the uneven
distribution of power to decide over the distribution of
said resources. These sources of conflict are generalized
into the following:
Economic Conflict involves competition over scarce

resources. Conflict arises when the behaviour and
emotions of each party directed toward maximizing its
own gain.
Value Conflict involves differences in ways of life and

ideologies, as well as the preferences, principles, and
practices that people believe in.
Power Conflict involves the disposition of each party

to maintain or maximize the amount of influence that it
exerts in the relationship and the social setting where it
operates.
Conflict is a complex phenomenon that embodies a

mixture of sources. Conflicts are not linear occurrences
that may only involve a single cause. The timeframe may
be generational (such as the CNTs and Muslim Mindanao
conflicts) or may even be a culmination of a sequence
of events that reinforces structures of injustice and
inequality.
Conflict is a normal aspect of everyday life and it exists in

all levels of human existence. It is natural and everybody
experiences conflict. Every single day, people may have
different conflicts, of varying intensities. If managed non-
violently, a conflict can be a positive source of social
progress and transformation. Conflict only becomes
problematic when it escalates to violence. However,
violent conflict can be prevented. Conflict need not
cross the line into violence. Whether on a personal,
community, national or international level, peace is
possible when parties use peacebuilding tools to manage
their disagreements.
What makes a democratic society successful is its ability

to deal with conflict, to allow and manage disagreement
and dissent among people, eventually turning them into
foundations for improvement.
1.2.3 Violence
Violence refers to the use of force or power to cause injury,

death, psychological harm or deprivation. Violence occurs
when a conflict has been mismanaged or neglected. When
conflict becomes violent, it usually does more harm than
good. It cannot transform the conflict constructively, and often
leads to an ever-worsening cycle of violence. Unfortunately,
violence is sometimes accepted and seen as a legitimate way
of responding to conflicts within the society.
CONFLICT VIOLENCE
Results from mismanaged
Natural
or neglected conflict
Occurs in everyday life Harmful and destructive
May result in positive May lead to loss of lives,
change homes, and livelihoods
May cause suffering and a
CANNOT BE PREVENTED breakdown of trust
CAN BE PREVENTED
Table 1: Difference of conflict and violence

A conflict escalates into violence when:
• Channels for dialogue are inadequate. When people

do not have or there is an inadequate venue or
mechanism to talk about issues, there would be
mistrust and animosity.
• Dissenting voices and deeply held grievances cannot

be heard. When grievance mechanisms are not
established in order to hear out the opinions of the
people, their attitude will strengthen and may manifest
thru violent behaviours.
• Prevalence of instability, injustice, and fear. When the

rights of the people are not respected and their needs
are not met due to unfair practices, violent acts are not
far behind.
• Perceived advantages from violence. Other people

see violence as an effective way of changing the status
quo into their favour.
According to a report by the Carnegie Commission on

Preventing Deadly Conflict (1997), a violent conflict results
from the choices of leaders and people, and is facilitated
through the institutions that bind them. Unforeseen events
also trigger the outbreak of a deadly conflict, but it is the state
of mind of powerful actors and leaders that remain to be a
crucial factor in determining the possible courses of events
during a conflict situation.
Forms of violence are categorized into three (3) and these are:
Physical Violence (overt or direct violence) – it is physical

and readily apparent through observable body injury and/or
the infliction of pain. Examples include domestic violence,
armed encounters, ambuscades, acts of intimidation, tortures,
abuses, mass killings, and other acts that aim to kill or hurt
other people.
Structural Violence – is a systematic exploitation that

eventually becomes part of the social order. People can be
killed, psychologically harmed, or deprived because of the
presence of unjust socioeconomic or political structures
established by laws or policies. Examples include lack of
political participation, lack of equal economic and social

opportunities, inequitable access to resources, and poor
governance.
Socio-cultural Violence – these are aspects of cultures,

belief systems, and ways of viewing the world that legitimize,
enforce, and make structural and direct violence seem
acceptable, normal, and just. Examples include prejudice and
biases against people from a different class, race, religion,
group, or sexual orientation.
1.3 A Philippine Framework toward a Culture of

Peace
The attainment of a Culture of Peace varies among different
nations. One framework may work on one nation but may not
be compatible when applied on another due to differences on
circumstances and sources of conflict or violence.
A culture of peace framework has been specifically developed

for the Philippines out of the experiences and reflections of
peace advocates in the country. The figure below is a graphic
representation of this framework and was culled from the work
of an active Mindanao peace advocate, Antonio J. Ledesma, S.J.,

Archbishop of Cagayan de Oro (Ledesma, 2007 as cited from the
Peace Education book).
In the following figure, the categories represent the major

concerns and the needed values for building a culture of peace
in the Philippines. The goal of establishing a peace is first and
foremost founded on the protection and promotion of personal
and family integrity. Keeping the self and family whole despite
potentially inevitable forms of brokenness that surround them
is a foundation of a peace culture. Respect for human dignity,
fundamental freedoms, democratic participation, the fulfilment
of basic needs and economic equity are also major concerns
in this framework because the aforementioned are roots of
peace. Likewise, intercultural understanding or the acceptance
and respect for the “different other” as well as caring for the
environment contribute to peace.
I. Social Continuum
PERSONAL &
II. Political
FAMILY INTEGRITY Continuum
ENVIRONMENTAL Spirituality HUMAN RIGHTS

PROTECTION AND DEMOCRACY
Stewardship Justice
CULTURE OF III. Economic

PEACE Continuum
Active Compassion
DISARMEMENT & Non-Violence POVERTY
CESSATION OF ERDICATION
HOSTILITIES Dialogue
INTERCULTURAL
UNDERSTANDING
AND SOLIDARITY
Promoting a Culture of Peace: Six Dimensions and Operative Values
In view of the continuing threat of armed conflicts in the country,

the cessation of armed hostilities is a major concern as well as the
re-allocation of scarce resources from “arms to farms” or from
buying/stockpiling weapons to undertaking activities that would
redound to people’s benefit.
The values that correspond to these dimensions are spirituality,

justice, compassion, dialogue, active non-violence, and
stewardship with the environment.
CHAPTER
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2
ACHIEVING PEACE THROUGH
PEACEBUILDING
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2
ACHIEVING PEACE
THROUGH
peacebuilding
ACHIEVING PEACE THROUGH

PEACEBUILDING
2.1 Peacebuilding Operations
Peacebuilding, according to Johann Galtung, is the “process
of creating self-supporting structures that remove the causes
of wars and offer alternatives to situations where war might
occur”. It also facilitates the establishment of sustainable peace
by addressing the root causes of a conflict or violence through
different peacebuilding methods. Moreover, it is the rebuilding of
the economic, social and institutional structures necessary for a
country to function in a way that provides for at least a degree of
security and well-being for its citizens.
It should be noted, however, that the task of peacebuilding has to

be carried out primarily by the citizens of the country concerned
in accordance with their own values and traditions. Outside
agencies can only play an enabling and supportive role if this is
to be a genuine peacebuilding rather than pacification and the
imposition of a possibly inappropriate and political structure.
The concept of peacebuilding can be applied across different
forms of conflict and violence, ranging from interfaith divisions
down to conflicting tribes and clans for reasons that range from
personal to minor in manner. Peacebuilding is a universally
acceptable means of keeping the harmony.
Adopting a holistic approach to social change, peacebuilding is

both a concept and a strategy. As a concept, its goal is to establish
positive peace – a condition wherein there is not only an absence
of violence, but also the presence of equality and the protection
of human rights. As a strategy, it is about finding ways to resolve
old and new disputes without using threat, force, or coercion.
With this, peacebulding seeks to change not only the attitude of
people, but also the unjust and unequal structure of a specific
community.
2.1.1. Peacebuilding, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping
How does peacebuilding differ from peacemaking and

peacekeeping? By definition peacemaking basically addresses
the attitude and behaviour of the parties in a conflict. It is
about convincing other people to sign an agreement or decide
to stop fighting. Peacekeeping, on the other hand, is dealing
with the behaviour of the parties. It maintains the initial peace
or ceasefire that has been established. Peacebuilding is about
addressing the root causes, the context or conditions, which
gave rise to the attitudes and behaviours of the parties to the
conflict. Thus, peacemaking and peacekeeping are necessary
for the conduct of peacebuilding.
2.1.2 Immediate Objectives of Peacebuilding
Peacebuilding aims to build positive peace in the communities.

Specifically, the following are the immediate objectives of
peacebuilding that will contribute to the attainment of positive
peace:
a. Reduce the risk of escalation of conflict. Peacebuilding

activities strengthen social relationships. It enhances
and facilitates dialogue where issues can be resolved.
b. Reduce the risk of recurrence of resolved conflicts.

Violent conflicts that have been resolved should
continuously be nurtured. Peacebuilding includes
reconciliation among parties and provides mechanisms
for dialogues.
c. Reconciliation between/among opponents.

Peacebuilding activities provide opportunities for
parties in conflict to reconcile their differences and
come into terms agreeable to both or among them.
d. Create an environment conducive to self-sustaining

and lasting peace. Peacebuilding includes activities
that enhance social relationships, as well as economic
productivity. These are vital for the establishment of
lasting peace.
2.1.3. Principles of Peacebuilding
Peacebuilding is conducted on the basis of five (5) principles:
• A sense of local ownership and accountability (Putting

local people at the heart of building peace) – Peace cannot be
imported from the outside. Peace must be built from within
societies. Together with local partners, create spaces for
dialogue that allow for the active participation of local people
to identify peacebuilding challenges and to develop their own
solutions. By ensuring local ownership, we pave the way
for the sustainability of peacebuilding efforts. In order to be
effective and sustainable, it should be able to address the
multiple sources of conflict and the needs of those who are
involved in the conflict.
Accordingly, ensure that priorities are determined locally and

not imposed from the outside. Local ownership ensures that
local concerns are at the center of peacebuilding. If people
participate in defining the problem, they have a sense of
responsibility and ownership of the solutions. Through this,
they help ensure the sustainability of peacebuilding efforts.
• Trust-building (Trust is the keystone of peace) – Trust is

the glue that holds relationships, societies, and economies
together. Violent conflict results in the breakdown of trust and
that is why rebuilding it should be the core element of our
approach. By working with all sectors and levels of society
to develop a common vision for the future, we contribute to

increased mutual understanding and the rebuilding of trust.
Conflict tears apart the fabric of societies. Mistrust negatively

affects all relationships, including between people and
their leaders. In such contexts, even small problems can
escalate into wide-scale violence. By providing safe spaces
for dialogue, we can help societies re-establish trust through
the collaborative identification of obstacles to lasting peace
and the development of solutions to common problems.
Aside from the physical efforts to rebuild after a conflict, it
is also equally important to focus on the intangible part of
the rebuilding process and these includes the reconciliation
between former antagonists, trust in public institutions, and
traditional practices of dispute resolution. Through this, we
give legitimacy to concerned institutions and encourage
groups and parties to conflicts remain engaged in the long
and difficult process of building lasting peace.
• Interdependence and Inclusiveness (Building peace

involves everyone) – peacebuilding should encompass the
linkage among variety of actors, their roles, and the problems
in a conflict. In this way, peacebuilding can support the
interdependence of these relationships in order to come up
with an effective and efficient solution.
In contrast, exclusion or marginalization of key groups of

society sows the seeds for renewed violence, deepening
resentment and giving them the opportunity to undermine

the process. Peacebuilding programs are designed to include
participants from across society – even those who are typically
overlooked or seen as difficult to engage with. This inclusive
approach ensures that a broad base of social groups share
a sense of ownership and responsibility for reconciliation
and the rebuilding of their society. Inclusion engages all
parties in a process of change and begins to build bridges of
understanding. This, in time, enables the society collectively
to move towards moderation and compromise.
• Sustainability – peacebuilding solutions should not only

be confined to immediate and effective responses. Solutions
should be sustainable; it should be long-lasting and can span
generations.
Building lasting peace is a long-term commitment and takes

time. The road to peace is bumpy, long, unpredictable and
anything but straight. Transforming the way a society deals
with conflict is a complicated process that cannot be achieved
instantly. Peacebuilding efforts take this into account and are
designed as long-term initiatives. Hence, support of local
efforts must be patient and consistent.
• Strategy – the design of a peacebuilding process should

plan and implement specific actions in specific time and
should be able to actively respond to social situations and
other occurring events.
There is a need not only to focus on the end goal of building

peace, but also on making sure that the process leading to it
is managed in a way that allows for inclusion, constructive
dialogue and consensus-building – rather than confrontation
and power games. This is the only way to build sustainable
peace.
Strengthening the foundations of a society that is divided is

not a simple task. Mistrust tends to be deeply engrained. Major
issues tend to be politically sensitive and urgent. Because of
this urgency, the tendency is to propose technical solutions
rather than to seek holistic solutions to complex problems.
How the process is managed and how engagement of all
sides is carried out will determine, in large part, the success
of an initiative.
• Infrastructure – infrastructure in peacebuilding is vital in

order to deliver logistical mechanisms, social space, and
needed institutions that will support the peacebuilding
process. Infrastructure is the very foundation that holds the
peacebuilding process.
2.1.4 Dimensions of Peacebuilding

Lastly, peacebuilding is also dimensional. It spans among
personalities, relationships, systems, transactions – everything
that’s within the community. This could be:
• Structural Dimension. This dimension acknowledges the

social, economic, political, and cultural conditions in a specific
area that can be sources of conflict and if not properly addressed,
lasting peace may not be achieved. Examples are unfair land
distribution, environmental degradation, and unequal political
representation.
• Relational Dimension. This is the dimension of peacebuilding

that focuses on reducing the negative effects of conflicts by
using reconciliation, forgiveness, and trust building. It aims
to repair and transform damaged relationships between two
conflicting parties.
• Personal Dimension. This centers on bringing about a change

at the individual level. An individual in the peacebuilding process
is a significant factor. If one individual is not able to undergo a
healing process, there may be social, political, and economic
consequences.
According to the United Nations, peacebuilding is both a

national challenge and a responsibility. Therefore, everyone
can have a role in peacebuilding. However, the most common
set-up for peacebuilding is done for the citizens, with support
from the government, non-governmental organizations, private
organizations, and other support organizations with means and
resources.
2.1.5 The Role of the Military in Peacebuilding

Traditionally, the military’s role in establishing peace is through
peacekeeping and peace enforcement. However, with the
onset of multi-dimensional campaigns, peacebuilding has also
become an important aspect of military activities.
Although the combat skills of our soldiers are appreciated in

instances that they have to secure people and properties, it
is still desirable to resort to non-combat approach in terms of
facilitating peacebuilding.
Peacebuilding in the Army can be divided into three (3) levels:

strategic, operational, and tactical.
• Strategic – Interventions at this level are mainly concentrated

on policy-making which is geared towards the promotion
of national economic and social development to address
structural issues. Other measures may include the promotion
and enforcement of human rights and democratic principles and
the establishment of various national governing structures to
promote peaceful conflict resolutions.
• Operational – Interventions at this level are may involve local

policy making, disarmament, demobilization, reintegration of
combatants, suppression of the armed forces, and security force
reform to include training of security forces in human rights
and international humanitarian law practices, institutionalizing
human rights education into training programs, and ensuring
the prosecution of human rights violators.
• Tactical – Interventions at this level are designed to address

conflicts and violence at the grassroots level. These may
include human rights trainings, social and economic programs,
and cultural sensitivity forums. It is important to note that
peacebuilding programs at this level are conducted by Army
units in the batallion, companies, and platoons. Community
Support Programs in barangays are examples of peacebuilding
at the tactical level.
CHAPTER
////////////////////////////////////////////////
3
CONFLICT
ANALYSIS
////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
3
CONFLICT
ANALYSIS
CONFLICT
ANALYSIS
Conflict analysis is the systematic look at the profile, causes,
actors, and dynamics of a conflict context. It is a practical exercise
that provides an in-depth understanding of the conflict’s context,
and is applicable for a long-term approach to social development.
Wars and armed conflict embody intricacies that are rooted in

values and innate differences between opposing groups. To
be able to preserve the remaining opportunities for a peaceful
resolution of disputes, it is of great importance to absorb the
significance of non-violent means of managing such situations.
Analyzing the root causes of conflict may be difficult because of
the complex relationship of factors that can influence it.
Peacebuilding programs or activities can be best formulated

when the conflict is well understood. If these programs are to be
responsive, they have to be based on sound understanding of the
context and the actors, their interests, values, and needs. Building
peace in itself is challenging and doing it without understanding
the reasons why the parties are in conflict would be even more
difficult.
A careful analysis of a conflict should shed light on the root causes,

manifestations of actions, and their effects and consequences.
Behaviour and tendencies of the parties can also be detected,
as well as the possible harmful consequences which can be
prevented to pre-empt the escalation of conflict.
Peacebuilding programs or activities can be best formulated

when the conflict is well understood. If these programs are to be
responsive, they have to be based on sound understanding of the
context and the actors, their interests, values, and needs. Building
peace in itself is challenging and doing it without understanding
the reasons why the parties are in conflict would be even more
difficult.
A careful analysis of a conflict should shed light on the root causes,

manifestations of actions, and their effects and consequences.
Behaviour and tendencies of the parties can also be detected,
as well as the possible harmful consequences which can be
prevented to pre-empt the escalation of conflict.
Conflict analysis also helps the parties distinguish their positions

from their interest and needs. Often, the parties in a conflict cannot
distinguish their interests and needs as the conflict escalates and
the stakes become high. Interests are perceived as needs, which
they would want to get at all cost. By breaking down the details of
the conflict, the parties, with the help of the interveners, would be
able to clarify their interests from needs.
There are key dimensions in a strategic conflict analysis and

these are:
Actors and their relations – the people or groups involved in

the conflict. The attitudes, behaviour, goals, capacities, and
perceptions of each actor are crucial in crafting the possible
courses of action that may be adopted in order to prevent the
conflict from escalating.
Issues – the topics of the conflict. These are what people disagree
about.
Profile – the political, economic, and social context of the area.

It includes the history of conflict(s) and the important social,
economic, political or environmental issues affecting the
community. Social profile will include the relationships between
the local government units, the church and the families within the
community.
Causes – conflict occurs because of the interaction of many

factors. It will be helpful to determine the proximate causes of the
conflict among the many reasons or factors.
● Structural causes – factors built into the fabric of society

which include cultural differences and biases.
● Proximate causes – factors that contribute to a climate of

violence.
● Triggers – key actions or events that may trigger violence.

Context/Structure – This defines the structure or root cause

of the conflict. The factors to consider are culture, economic
development, equity of distribution, political system, structures
of democracy, respect for human rights, and condition of the
environment and the presence of natural resources. In addition to
this, the capability of institutions to reinforce peace or otherwise
aggravate the conflict situation must also be analysed.
Dynamics – trends in the conflict, ‘windows of opportunity’, and

future scenarios.
Options/Strategies – at this point, various contingencies are

formulated in order to craft specific actions that need to be
implemented under a range of circumstances. It is of great
importance to establish a flexible approach in terms of assessing
the possible future scenarios that may contribute to changing the
dynamics of the conflict.
REMEMBER
● A conflict analysis has to be regularly reviewed and updated.

● Focus on the conflict analysis on the area of operation but bear
in mind the effect of events in other areas/levels which you do
not control (e.g., armed encounter in the neighbouring area).
● Understand how people see things. Put yourself in their shoes.
● Look at as many different perspectives as possible especially
among people directly affected by violent conflict.
Conflict is best analysed and understood through the

participation of the parties themselves. The parties should be
able to provide the context of why they engage in the conflict.
The intervener’s role is to let the parties articulate their view
of the conflict, their interests, and needs. The challenge here
is how to let the parties talk about the conflict objectively and
share their ideas on how to resolve such conflict. Parties would
normally put their interests forward, especially when the conflict
has escalated and the stakes have become higher.
It is critical for the intervener to be able to objectively assess

what the parties claim to be the truth. However, the intervener
should be very careful in not falling into the trap of theorizing the
conflict for the parties. A common mistake is for the interveners
to tell the parties on what their conflict is all about. It is important
that the parties articulate their understanding of the conflict,
while the interveners assess their position, interests, and needs
so that the intervention would be acceptable to them.
It will be important to address the following:

a. Who are the parties involved in the conflict?
b. What is the history of the conflict? Were there casualties?
c. How do they view their conflict? Do they regard it as
intractable?
d. What are the non-negotiables? What can be agreed upon?
What are their interests and needs?
Encourage identified parties to the conflict to participate in

dialogues to share their views of the conflict. Let the parties
determine their sense of the conflict. The role of the soldiers is
to facilitate and provide a venue for them to air their side and an
understanding of their conflict.
TOOLS FOR CONFLICT ANALYSIS
Conflict Wheel – It is used to give an overview of the conflict. This

covers the six (6) key dimensions of conflict analysis.
2
ISSUES
1 3
Actors/
Dynamics
parties
Options/ Context/
strategies Structure
6 Causation 4
5
Figure #1: Conflict Wheel
PMESII
Why is there a need to study an area?

a. To reiterate, people / communities are the “Key Terrains” in a
socio-politico-economic conflict
b. CMO as lead role in dominating this particular area
c. In order to navigate any particular area, we first need to have
an accurate map
d. An area study is the map of the civil environment
● Political System
● Military/Security System
● Economic System
● Social System
● Infrastructure (and Technology) System
● Information System
● Physical Environment System
● Time
P M E S I I
In order to further simplify (and specify) the things that

we need to look for in an area, the PMESII are further
subdivided into 6 sub-categories
P T
ASCOPE Matrix
● Areas ● Capabilities ● People
● Structures ● Organizations ● Events
ASCOPE / PMESII
P M E S I I
Political Military/ Economic Social Infra Information
Police Structure
Political Military Areas Irrigation Radio/TV/
A Social
Areas (District (Coalition/LN Economic areas networks, newspapers
Areas (parks
Boundary, bases, historic (bazaars, shops, water tables, (where people
and other
Party affiliation ambush/IED markets) medical gather for
Areas meeting areas)
areas) sites) coverage word-of-mouth)
Political Military/Police Economic Social Infrastructure

S Info Structures
Structures buildings Structures Structure Structures
(Cell/Radio/TV
(town halls, (police HQ, (banks, markets, (Churches, (roads, bridges,
towers, print
government Military HHQ storage restaurants, power lines,
Structures shops)
offices) locations) facilities) bars, etc.) walls, dams)
Economic
Political Military
Capabilities Social Infrastructure Info Capabilities
C Capabilities Capabilities
(access to Capabilities Capabilities (Literacy rate,
(Dispute (security
banks, ability (Strength of (Ability to build/ availability of
resolution, posture,
to withstand local & national maintain roads, media/phone
Capabilities Insurgent strengths and
natural ties) walls, dams) service)
capabilities) weaknesses)
disasters)
Political Military Social Infrastructure Info

Economic
O Organizations Organizations Organizations Organizations Organizations
Organizations
(Political (What units of (tribes, clans, (Government (NEWS groups,
(Banks, large
parties and military, police, families, youth ministries, influential
land holders,
Organizations other power insurgent are group, NGO/ construction people who
big businesses)
brokers, UN) present) IGO) companies) pass word)
Social Infrastructure
Military People Economic Info People
P Political People People People
(Leaders from People (Media owners,
(Government, (Religious (Builders,
coalition, LN (Bankers, mullahs, heads
councils, leaders, contractors,
and insurgent landholders, of pwerful
People elders) influential development
forces) merchants) families)
families) councils)
Infrastructure
Military Economic Events Info Events (IO
E Political Events Social Events
Events (kinetic Events (drought, (road/bride campaigns,
(elections, (holidays,
events, loss harvest, construction, project
council weddings,
of leadership, business open/ well digging, openings,
Events meetings) religious days)
operations) close) scheduled CIVCAS events)
maintenance)
The availability of PMESII/ASCOPE data is required to have a better

understanding of the tools of conflict analysis. The area study is always
a first requirement and part of any CMO discipline and processes to give
a clear picture of the situation and environmental condition in order to
arrive with a right assessment and approach in peace-building activities.
1. The actors or parties refer to the people or groups that

are involved in a conflict. Those that are directly involved are
called conflict parties, while those that only become involved
in the conflict through intervention such as peacebuilding,
conflict resolution, conflict transformation, and others are
referred to as third parties. Third parties have interests in the
outcome of the conflict.
2. Issues refer to the topics of the conflict. These are what

people fight about.
3. Dynamics refer to the manner on how the conflict

transformed from one stage or level to another. It also
describes the interaction that happened between the parties.
4. The conflict context and structural factors are often

situated outside the conflict system that one is looking at.
Structural violence refers to the violence that is not directly
caused by people, but by the economic and political systems
in place, e.g. causing poverty.
5. Causation refers to the factors which are directly brought

about by the conflict. They should be differentiated from
factors which merely influence the conflict. There is no
particular reason for a conflict to occur; a conflict is usually
caused by the interaction of multiple reasons and factors.
6. Options/Strategies refer to the means by which the

actors or parties can use to deal with the conflict.
Conflict Mapping – focuses on actors and their interrelationships.

It shows the relationship of the conflict actors to each other and
to the prioritized conflict. Conflict maps clarify where the power
lies. These maps are helpful in identifying potential allies and
opportunities.
The conflict map depicts not only the relative power or influence
of different actors in conflicts; it also identifies the alliances and
blockages between actors. Review the relationships between
the conflict actors on your map, think about the work you are
already undertaking (or planning to undertake) and how it can
better influence or shape these relationships to reduce conflict
and promote peace.
The illustration below is an example of a conflict map. However, it

should be noted that not all conflict map should follow the conflict
map below:
PARTY
C
PARTY
PARTY
F
B
ISSUE
PARTY
A
PARTY
D
OUTSIDE PARTY
PARTY E
Figure #2: Conflict Map

The circles symbolize the different actors. The

size of the circles symbolizes each actor's power
in relation to the issue of the conflict.
A solid line symbolizes a close relationship.
A double line symbolizes an alliance.
A dotted line symbolizes a weak relationship.
Zigzags symbolize conflict.
A flash symbolizes that the conflict is violent.
An arrow symbolizes the domination of one actor

over another.
A triangle symbolizes actors who are not directly

involved and who might contribute constructively
to the transformation of the conflict.
All lines and symbols in a conflict should have a corresponding meaning.

For example, in the given conflict map, the following are the meaning:
A Conflict Tree provides an overview of all known causes and

effects of a conflict. It aids in visualizing the relationship between
root causes, issues, and dynamic factors. It shows how conflict
issues link with effects and causes.
1. The effects are dynamic. Working with dynamic factors

involves a short time horizon; reactions to interventions
are quick and at times, unpredictable.
2. The core issue is the core problem; it is the one that

brings the effects to the front.
3 . Root causes are the structural factors that are the basic
reasons of the core issue. As they usually involve
systemic issues, these are the difficult ones to influence
on a short time basis.
Long term and systemic interventions are needed to address

aforementioned issues. If these remain unattended, conflicts may
become dormant but will most likely manifest again.
Below is an example of a conflict tree:
effects
fear
unfair
representation
looting
killing
hatred & suspicion
Land
Alienation
Core Problem
Corrupt
political leaders Freedom & Equity Unequal development
Current
constituencies Unjust Law
Causes
CHAPTER
////////////////////////////////////////////////
4
peacebuilding
Operations framework
////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
4
Peacebuilding
Operations
Framework
OUTCOME: CULTURE OF PEACE, UNDERSTANDING,

AND RESPECT IS ESTABLISHED
Phase V:
Phase IV:
MONITOR-
Phase II: IMPLEMEN-
Phase I: Phase III: ING, EVAL-
PREPARA- TATION OF
PLANNING IMMERSION UATION
TION PB INTER-
& ASSESS-
VENTIONS
MENT
ESTABLISH PROMOTE MONITOR
DEFENSIBLE DIALOGUE - Daily
PATROL - Facilitate activities
BASE issue-based - Immediate
- Secure but dialogue activities
not isolated with con-
with the com- cerned EVALUATE
EQUIP THE munity agencies - Contri-
ANALYZE: END STATE
TROOPS: - Communi- bution of
- Mission
- Logistics ENGAGE ty dialogue programs,
- Troops Dialogue,
Support STAKEHOLD- & fora projects, &
- Commu- Security
- Capability ERS activities to
nity & Structural
- Community PROMOTE the objec-
- Conflict Stability
LINK & - LGUs/LGAs SECURITY tives
COORDI- - Physical - Conduct of promoted
DETER-
NATE: CONTINUE - Psycholog- activities
MINE:
- LGUs COORDINA- ical - Capability
- Objectives
- CSOs TION of imple-
- Programs
PROMOTE menters
CLEAR THE EXTENSIVE STRUCTUR-
COMPLETE
TARGET ANALYSIS AL ASSESS
THE PLAN
AREA - Community STABILITY - Probability
- Conflict - Good of success-
governance fully
REVISE - Delivery attaining the
PEACEBUILD- of basic objectives
ING services - New
PLAN - Good options
(as necessary) citizenship (COAs)
Establish rapport with all sectors and stakeholders. Build relationships and partnerships.
Table #2: Peacebuilding operations framework

PHASE ONE (1): PLANNING

Adopting the principles of The Military Decision Making Process
(MDMP), the Peacebuilding program will have to be planned
carefully in order to ensure its success and efficiency. The figure
below shows the peacebuilding planning process that will result
in a peacebuilding plan.
STEP 1: Analyze higher unit's mission (2 levels up) to

ANALYZE MISSION identify peacebuilding task.
STEP 2:
ANALYZE OWN Analyze troops to determine capabilities.
TROOPS
Conduct initial community analysis to identify

STEP 3:
key decision makers and the general values,
ANALYZE TARGET
cultures, interests, behaviour and other factors
COMMUNITY
which can influence the community.
STEP 4: Identify the contributory factors of the prevailing

ANALYZE CONFLICT conflict/potential conflicts.
STEP 5:
Develop initial peacebuilding objectives based
DETERMINING
on data gathered.
PEACEBUILDING
Determine what intervention/activities to
STEP 6:
counduct and the key stakeholders who can be
DETERMINE
tapped to support our peacebuilding programs
INTERVENTION
and activities.
STEP 7:
COMPLETE THE
Refine and complete the plan
PEACEBUILDING
PLAN
Figure #5: MDMP in Peacebuilding

STEP ONE (1): MISSION ANALYSIS
STEP 1: Analyze higher unit's mission (2 levels up) to

ANALYZE MISSION identify peacebuilding task.
Analyzing the mission of your Higher Unit (HU) two levels up is

the first step in mission analysis. This mission is stated in the
OPLAN or OPORD. Afterwards, identify its peacebuilding mission.
In cases where the peacebuilding mission is not explicitly stated,
look at the Commander’s intent. Determine how peacebuilding
activities would be relevant.
Major
Objectives Tasks/TTPs Deliverables
Activities
Know the
Commander’s intent
Sound
Understand the understanding of
concept of the the intent of the
Know how higher units Commander and
your unit will his concept of
Mission Determine the
contribute to operation
Analysis priorities of higher
the overall
(2 levels up) units (area, target
effort of
higher units audience, etc.)
Identify
peacebuilding
mission: specified, Task list
implied, & mission
essential tasks
Table #3: Mission Analysis

STEP TWO (2): TROOPS ANALYSIS
STEP 2:
ANALYZE OWN Analyze troops to determine capabilities
TROOPS
Evaluating the capability of your troops who will undertake

peacebuilding programs are essential to ground their skills. This
will entail determining their knowledge, skill level, and attitude.
Not all soldiers who are trained would be able to do what is
needed to successfully implement a peacebuilding plan. The point
here is that soldiers who are not prepared to undertake such task
may become a liability to the unit that is already immersed in the
community.
In doing the analysis, the following guide questions would help

in determining your unit’s capability to undertake peacebuilding:
1. Are your troops trained or equipped to implement

peacebuilding programs and activities?
2. Do they need training? If yes, what skillset should they

have?
3. What support, in terms of personnel capability, can the

higher unit provide? If none, are there other skills/training
that the troops can acquire from personnel outside the
organization?
Implementing peacebuilding programs may need, but are

not limited to, the following skills: negotiation, consensus
building, problem-solving, decision making, critical thinking,
communication skills, interpersonal relationship skills, active

listening skills, coping with stress, coping with emotions, and
more importantly, self-awareness.
In determining your troops’ capability, you should also consider

the support that your higher unit could provide. Aside from the
support within the organization, the troops may also ask for the
support of certain stakeholders within or outside the community.
Adding this to your unit’s present capability, you will now be
able to identify the shortfalls, which are the difference between
what you need and what you have. These shortfalls could then be
addressed through training.
REMEMBER
These basis skills should be complemented by the discipline

and the dedication of the troops. Otherwise, the effort would be
futile.
Major
Activities
- Determine the
troops’ capabili- Frequent obser-
ties to implement vation of troops;
peacebuilding inventory of
programs relevant skills of
personnel that will Personnel skill
- Determine limita- be deployed for list and skill
tions/shortfalls of the activity shortfalls (for
troops training con-
Troops sideration or
Analysis Request/coordi- reorganization)
nate with HHQs
Identify capabilities
and/or other
that the higher
competent orga-
units can provide
nizations (Gov’t or
Non-gov’t)
Improved
Enhance peace- Conduct training
peacebuilding
building skills (as necessary)
knowledge
Table #4: Troops Analysis
STEP THREE (3): INITIAL COMMUNITY (TARGET AREA) ANALYSIS
STEP 3:
Conduct initial community analysis to identify key
ANALYZE
decision makers and the general values, cultures,
TARGET
interests, and behaviour of the community.
COMMUNITY
Evaluate the general culture, values, attitudes, interests, and

behaviour of various individuals, families, and groups, especially
key decision-makers in the community. Moreover, identify key
decision-makers who have influence or control over community
decisions and/or resources.
Gathering information will be helpful in establishing rapport with

the community and can serve as a basis for conflict analysis.
Major
Activities
Identify terrain,
infrastructure,
weather conditions, List of leaders,
etc. decision makers and
key communicators
Identify leaders, (with a short profile of
Gather data
decision- each)
form various
makers and key
sources;
communicators
interview
Identify groups the general List of groups and
Community and organizations populace; organizations in or
Analysis existing within the research have access to the
(target area target area from community or target
analysis) Know the general documents area; description of
interests, values, of their general interests,
cultures, attitudes, government values, attitudes &
and behaviour and non- behaviour
government
Determine key agencies List of issues in
issues in the
the community
community
categorized into:
(political, social,
political, social,
economic &
economic, & security
security)
Table #5: Community Analysis
Table #5: Community Analysis

STEP FOUR (4): INITIAL CONFLICT ANALYSIS
STEP 4:
Conduct initial conflict analysis to identify existing
ANALYZE
and potential conflicts.
CONFLICT
For the initial conflict analysis, the following elements should be

determined: elements which divide people and serve as sources
of tension (dividers) and elements which connect people and
serve as mediators or facilitators (connectors).
Elements Dividers Connectors
Parties & Key

decision-
Parties to the conflict Possible mediators
makers in the
community
Poor governance (i.e., unfair/
Community organizations,
biased justice system,
Systems & community planning, civic
inequitable delivery of
Institutions organizations, NGOs; forums,
basic services, inequitable
POCs, dialogues
development)
Ethics orientation, gender

Discrimination based on sensitivity orientation, values
Attitudes & tribes, cultural clans, religious formation seminar, inter-
Actions affiliation, gender orientation, faith awareness dialogues/
etc. engagements; inter-cultural
awareness
Sectarian difference, Shared religious beliefs; equal

competition over resources, and unhampered delivery
Values &
land feuds, religious & cultural of basic services; shared
Interests
traditions, competition over interests (security, basic
political control needs, peace of mind)
Abuses, attacks on civilians

by armed groups/terrorists,
Establishment of “peace
Experiences violation of peace agreements,
zones” and evacuation/
& History all-out wars; displacement
resettlement areas
resulting from violent conflicts/
disaster
Red letter dates (i.e., CPP-

NPA anniversary, Plaza
Christmas, Holy Week,
Symbols & Miranda bombing, Rizal day
Ramadan, Fiestas (periods
Occasions bombing, Jabidah massacre,
when conflicts de-escalate)
Mamasapano incident; periods
when conflict escalates)
Major
Activities
Identify Get data from

prevailing or available
potential conflict sources (e.g.,
intelligence General
reports, understanding of the
barangay conflict in the target
Initial profiles, police area
conflict reports),
analysis interview known
Identify elements personalities
(dividers and
connectors) List of key decision-
Interview the makers and
residents of the organizations which
community could be of help to
the effort
Table #7: Conflict Analysis

STEP FIVE (5): DETERMINE UNIT’S PEACEBUILDING OBJECTIVE
STEP 5:
Develop initial peacebuilding objectives based
DETERMINING
on data gathered.
PEACEBUILDING
Based on the results of the conflict analysis, formulate

peacebuilding objectives by determining what situation must exist
in order to avoid violence and resolve the conflict between/among
involved parties. Then, determine who must be engaged to help
facilitate the change and how it will be done. Change can be in
the system or institutions existing or affecting the community or
conflicting parties and in the attitude and perception of conflicting
parties among or towards each other.
Objectives should be Specific, Measurable, Attainable, Realistic,

and Time-bound (SMART).
Objective Result Indicators

Decrease number of incidents; participation of
parties to dialogues, forums;
Decrease violent
Decrease in hostile exchange of words or
confrontation between
interactions between conflicting parties
warring parties in the
community within six
Participation in joint activities
months (e.g., rido,
tribal wars, political
Willingness to interact with members of
killings)
conflicting communities
Peace agreements between conflicting parties
Table #8: Example of a SMART objective

Major
Activities
Review higher
unit’s mission
and align your List of peacebuilding
objective. objectives
Determine
peacebuilding
Formulate Identify indicators to
objective
peacebuilding measure attainment
objectives based of objectives
on the conflict
analysis.
Table #9: Determining Peacebuilding Objective
STEP SIX (6): DETERMINE INTERVENTIONS
- Determine programs and activities that will

STEP 6: address the peacebuilding objectives.
DETERMINE - Determine key stakeholders who can be
INTERVENTION tapped to support our peacebuilding
programs and activities.
Disseminate ISA materials to change stereotypes and

Attitude
biases.
Conduct checkpoint operations and security patrols
Behaviour to decrease the chances of armed confrontation be-
tween conflicting parties.
Support confidence-building activities (e.g., fellow-
Context ship, dialogue, livelihood activities) to improve under-
standing of the all/both parties.
Table #10: Interventions to address issues in a conflict

The intervention/s should be focused on: Attitude, Behaviour, and

Context. Taking the example objective in Step Five (5), the following
are the possible areas for intervention:
• Include other necessary details such as logistics and

transportation requirements.
• Coordinate with other units, government agencies, and civil

society organizations for appropriate support and assistance.
Major
Activities
Develop peacebuilding List of peace-

program/s according building pro-
to possible areas of grams or activ-
intervention (Attitude, ities that will be
Identify
Behaviour, Context) implemented
Determine peacebuild-
peace- ing activities
Include other necessary
building that will
details such as logis-
interven- accomplish
tics and transportation Initial work plan
tion the set objec-
requirements for the implemen-
tive/s
tation of peace-
Coordinate with other building program
agencies (AFP units,
government, CSOs)
Table #11: Determining peacebuilding intervention

STEP SEVEN (7): COMPLETE THE PEACEBUILDING PLAN
Having identified the interventions or programs, partner agencies,

and/or organizations, the peacebuilding plan should be refined.
Thus, partner agencies and other organizations involved should
be notified about the peacebuilding plan in order for them to be
prepared. This will allow them to actively help in the preparation
or refinement of the peacebuilding plan.
At this stage of the planning process, all the necessary details

should have already been considered.
Major
Activities
Coordinate with
and get the support
of key government
& non-government
agencies/organi-
zations needed to
Integrate the support the plan Pecebuilding plan
Refine and essential peace- Check Local De- with specific roles
complete building pro- velopment Plan/s and functions of
the plan grams, projects, of LGU which units and other
and activities contains objectives, agencies
programs, strate-
gies and concepts
on how various
agencies will
contribut to local
development.
Table #12: Finalizing Peacebuilding Plan

Reminders in Drafting the Peacebuilding Plan
Force protection and security should always be a

Consider force paramount concern, whatever activity the troops are
protection and engaged in. While peacebuilding requires peaceful
security mea- means to establish peace, it is always necessary to
sures protect the troops. However, this must be carefully
planned or executed.
Include/con- This will depend on the capability of the personnel
duct training if to conduct peacebuilding activities. Training may be
necessary conducted during the planning phase.
As much as possible, stick to your permanent unit
organization. Train them if they are not capable, but
Task organize
don’t reorganize them as the unit’s integrity may be
troops for the
compromised. Remember that while they are doing
activity
peacebuilding activities, they can be targeted by
armed elements, thus, security cannot be neglected.
Key decision-makers may not necessarily be those
in elected positions nor the heads of government
Identify key
agencies. They could be anyone who has the ability
decision-makers
to influence the decision of a group of people or the
and leaders
community. They could be religious leaders, political
figures, and people recognized as community leaders.
The completed plan was based on initial community
Adjust the plan
and conflict analyses. It should be adjusted as new
as necessary
information comes in.
When it comes to planning for logistical and manpow-
er support, it is important that we identify our poten-
Identify po-
tial support partners in the area who can be tapped.
tential sup-
However, it should be noted that careful discernment
port-partners in
and caution should be exercised when dealing with
the area
stakeholders who use leverage for their business
expansion, political gains, or other vested interests.
Table #13: Reminders in drafting the Peacebuilding Plan

PHASE TWO (2): PREPARATION

This step aims to prepare the troops, the stakeholders, and the
community for the implementation of the program.
After preparing the plan, or even while preparing it, the following
activities should be conducted as soon as practicable to prepare
for the immersion of the troops in the target area.
It should be noted that key community leaders are not limited

to elected officials. They can also include traditional leaders
(e.g., “datu”, council of elders), leaders of local organizations or
associations (e.g., cooperatives, farmers/fishermen associations,
and women’s groups), religious groups, etc.
Main
Activities
Conduct training as nec- Checklists
essary of tasks and
Equip the Prepare the
activities of
troops troops
Let them understand their all personnel
roles and tasks involved
Establish Render courtesy calls
Link and rapport and
coordinate get support of Dialogue with the local
with local all LGAs and Local leaders
leaders and other key
govern- CSOs and CSOs’
community leaders
ment commitment
agencies, to support
Conduct awareness briefs
CSOs, Identify key peacebuilding
about the peacebuilding
and other community program
program among LGU
organiza- leaders officials, CSOs, and other
tions
groups
Protect the
Sustained and focused
troops and the
Clear the military operations Area cleared of
community
target area armed threats
from violent
Checkpoint operations
incidents
Table #14: Preparation for the implantation of the peacebuilding Program
REMEMBER
It is vital to get the support of local leaders before entering the
community. Usually, elders, barangay business ownerism, tribal chiefs,
and other informal communicators are vital to establish legitimacy and
rapport among stakeholders.
PHASE THREE (3): IMMERSION

Community immersion seeks to establish rapport with the host
community, and generate support for the peacebuilding programs.
This phase can be integrated into the current community support

programs. This is not a standalone concept and can complement
other CMO activities.
a. Establish a defensible patrol base. While peacebuilding will be

your main activity in the area, it does not mean that the security of
your team and unit could be neglected. Establishing a defensible
patrol base is a critical activity that must be immediately done.
REMEMBER
As a general selection of rule, patrol bases must NOT be in public
infrastructures or places of convergence and must not interfere with
the day-to-day lives of the community.
b. Conduct initial dialogues, film showings, briefings, and other

activities that will facilitate interaction between the troops and
the populace to develop rapport.
c. Conduct extensive community analysis interviews and/or

house visits. The initial community analysis during the planning
phase should be validated to have a deeper understanding of
the community.
d. Conduct extensive conflict analysis. The initial conflict

analysis should be validated and updated as often as
necessary.
REMEMBER
Use various data gathering methods and get data from as many
sources as possible to generate a comprehensive and valid
community analysis.
Conflict analysis is a systematic and continuous process of

analyzing the situation and the effects of conflict. You cannot
possibly get a comprehensive analysis while you are not yet
immersed in the community.
(See Section on Conflict Analysis for a more detailed explanation

on conflict analysis).
From the updated community and conflict analyses, revise your

peacebuilding plan as necessary. Furthermore, coordinate with
other stakeholders to establish a good working relationship,
always keep them informed, and be ready to provide the necessary
support and assistance.
As you continue to gather detailed information, prevailing issues

in the community would surface. These issues could serve as the
basis on knowing what agencies you would partner with. Issues
of land tenure, for example, would need the expertise of the
Department of Agrarian Reform.
PHASE FOUR (IV): IMPLEMENTATION OF PEACEBUILDING

INTERVENTIONS
At the tactical level, interventions or programs are facilitated and

coordinated by Army units together with the appropriate agencies
and organizations. These programs provide opportunities for the
people to improve their way of life, as well as to understand other
people, including the organizations around them – their values and
interests. They could also take advantage of more opportunities
as basic social services and development options are put in place.
a. Promoting Dialogue for Peacebuilding
A dialogue provides a venue for the people to air their

concerns and grievances so appropriate actions can be done
in order to avoid violent confrontations or repressive actions.
Moreover, it seeks to change the attitudes of the people and
create conditions for a more peaceful negotiation towards
conflict resolution.
To promote and sustain a culture of dialogue, soldiers need

to prove that they are approachable and reliable. Being
impartial and neutral, they should talk and listen to as many
community members as possible.
Part of the tasks in promoting dialogues is for soldiers to

act as mediators. Mediation helps the disputants understand
the conflict issues and negotiate solutions to their conflict.
Mediation is not only a tool for dispute resolution, but also a
means of conflict prevention.
Main
Activities
1. Gather primary issues of
the community members List of primary
which can be elevated to issues for reso-
the LGU or other con- lution
cerned agencies.
Bring the 2. Coordinate and initially
government discuss with concerned Initial answers
closer to the government agencies the to the issues
people issues
Com- Clarify issues Commitment
munity to prevent from con-
3. Invite concerned govern-
dialogue exploitation cerned agen-
ment agencies’ participa-
with gov- of interest cies to tackle
tion in the dialogue
ernment groups or deal with the
agencies issues
Promote List of com-
culture of 4. Facilitate the discussion
mitments on
dialogue to (Q&A) of the issues
issues raised
settle issues
and concerns 5. Follow-up to commit-
ments made by concerned
government agencies
6. Update the community
on the feedback of govern-
ment agencies
Table #15: Peacebuilding Interventions

Parties’ com-
1. Establish relationship mitment to
with parties the mediation
2. Collect and analyze procedure
background information
Ensure a 3. Convene parties togeth- Identified
good and er strategies that
mutually 4. Deal with the cause/s of will enable
acceptable conflict (usually sensitive the parties to
agreement issues), identify interests, move towards
between and assess the alternatives agreement
Mediation
conflicting 5. Broker ideas and draft
parties initial proposals Multiple op-
6. Develop and manage tions identified
Rebuild procedures (mediation
strained rela- session/s) Consensual
tionships 7. Generate options for formula
settlement
8. Finalize agreement Steps to imple-
9. Achieve formal settlement, monitor,
ment and evaluate
the agreement
REMEMBER
You are there to mediate, not to judge.
Alertness
The mediator must be alert on several levels while mediating. The medi-
ator must concentrate on the information being provided by the source
and must constantly evaluate the information for both value and truth.
The mediator should observe how it is said and the accompanying body
language to assess the party’s truthfulness, degree of cooperation, and
current mood. The mediator needs to know when to give the party a
break and when to press the party harder. In addition, the mediator must
constantly be alert to his environment to ensure his personal security
and that of the parties.
Patience and Sensitivity
The mediator must have patience and sensitivity in creating and main-
taining rapport between himself and the party. Displaying impatience
may encourage a difficult party to think that if he remains unresponsive
for a little longer, the process will end; and/or cause the party to lose
respect for the mediator, thereby reducing the mediator’s effectiveness.
Credibility
The mediator must provide a clear, accurate, and professional prod-
uct and an accurate assessment of his/her capabilities. S/he must be
able to clearly express complex situations and concepts. The mediator
must present himself in a believable and consistent manner, and follow
through on any promises made, as well as never to promise what cannot
be delivered.
Objectivity and Self-control
The mediator must be objective in evaluating the information obtained.
The mediator must maintain an objective and unemotional attitude
regardless of the emotional reactions s/he may actually experience or
simulate during a questioning session. Without objectivity, s/he may
unconsciously distort the information acquired. S/he may also be unable
to vary his/her questioning and approach techniques effectively. S/he
must have exceptional self-control to avoid displays of genuine anger,
irritation, sympathy, or weariness that may cause him/her to lose the
initiative during questioning but be able to fake any of these emotions as
necessary. S/he must not become emotionally involved with the party.
Table #16: Reminders in mediating conflicts
Adaptability
A mediator must adapt to the many and varied personalities which s/
he will encounter. S/he must also adapt to all types of locations, opera-
tional tempos, and operational environments. S/he should try to imagine
herself/ himself in the party’s position. By being adaptable, s/he can
smoothly shift his/her questioning and approach techniques according to
the operational environment and the personality of the party.
Perseverance
A persistence of purpose can be the difference between a mediator who
is merely good and one who is superior. A mediator who becomes easily
discouraged by opposition, non-cooperation or other difficulties will
not aggressively pursue the matter to a successful conclusion or exploit
leads to other valuable information.
Appearance and Demeanour
The mediator’s personal appearance may greatly influence the conduct
of any mediation and attitude of the party toward the mediator. Usually
an organized and professional appearance will favourably influence the
party. If the mediator’s manner reflects fairness, strength, and efficiency,
the party may prove more cooperative and more responsive to question-
ing.
Initiative
Achieving and maintaining the initiative are essential to a successful
questioning session just as the offence is the key to success in com-
bat operations. The mediator must grasp the initiative and maintain
it throughout all questioning phases. This does not mean s/he has to
dominate the party physically; rather, it means that the mediator knows
his/her requirements and continues to direct the collection toward those
requirements.
Table #16: Reminders in mediating conflicts
Source: Human Intelligence Collector Operations Headquarters,

US Department of the Army, September 2006
b. Promoting Security
It is important to create an environment that rules out violence

and reduces fear and insecurity. To do this, alternative
mechanisms have to be established in partnership with other
agencies, so that the people will be empowered to air and
address their security issues and concerns without resorting
to violent means. Activities that will promote security may
include the establishment of a peace and human rights
monitoring system or an integrated defense system.
By empowering the community, the military will be able to

ensure sustainability and effectively mobilize as many people
as possible for peacebuilding.
Main
Activities
Ask for volunteers

List of peace
Develop a from the community,
monitors
sense of including women
responsibility
Group them into Organization of
that peace is
teams (if appropriate) teams
everyone’s
Organize
concern Designate area
peace Designated area
to monitor (if
monitoring per team
Ensure appropriate)
groups
sustainability Help develop
of monitoring and
peacebuilding reporting system Monitoring
mechanisms in through the Barangay guide/checklist
the community Peace and Order
Council (BPOC)
Increase
security in the Regular
community monitoring
House and/or area
Conduct reports
visits by unarmed
community Venue for
peace monitoring
monitoring venting Feedback
groups
community to relevant
issues and agencies
concerns
Invite representatives
Increase
from the Commission Documentation
Human awareness of
on Human Rights reports
rights the community
(CHR) and/or HR
seminars about their
advocate groups Community
and forums rights and
(CSOs) to facilitate the action plans
responsibilities
seminar/forum
c. Promoting Structural Stability
The structural or root causes of the conflict must be

addressed in order to lay down the long-term structures
for peace. This can be done through activities that aim to
establish or strengthen equality and justice.
Examples include facilitation of delivery of basic services,

promotion of good governance, increased participation in
decision-making, and the establishment of organizations
that will facilitate the conduct of continuous efforts towards
addressing the root causes of conflict.
Main
Activities
Involve as many
members of the
community as pos-
sible.
Increased
participation in Guide the partici-
Local decision mak- pants. Do not dictate.
devel- ing processes.
Community plan
opment Ensure participation
planning Develop a of local officials.
sense of own-
ership Incorporate in
municipal/provin-
cial Integrated Area
Community Public
Safety Plan
Project identification
List of proposed
with community
projects/activities
Joint civic members
actions
(e.g., Contribute to Coordination with List of participating
MEDCAP, the improved government agen- groups and kinds of
Brigada quality of life cies and other CSOs assistance
Eskwela,
etc.) Feedback mecha-
Community valida-
nism to the commu-
tion
nity

Increase sense
of ownership
Youth
and participa-
Lead-
tion
ership
Summit
Develop the Community support
youth to be in project implemen-
responsible tation
and produc-
tive citizens Conduct lectures and List of volunteers
group activities that
Enhance will develop the po- Group activity
leadership tential of the youth outputs
Values potential
For- Conduct values for-
mation Develop mation lectures and
seminars responsible activities
citizenry/family
Cohesive
family/closer
family ties
Coordinate with the
LGUs/LGAs on the List of potential
Liveli- livelihood programs livelihood projects
hood and skills training and skills training
and skills Contribute to activities; solicit sup- seminars
devel- addressing port from other CSOs
opment poverty situ-
seminars ation Coordinate/facilitate Number of com-
and train- the implementa- munity members
ings tion of LGUs/LGAs accessing livelihood
available livelihood projects and skills
programs training

Note: Peacebuilding interventions are not limited to the above examples.
For the civilian populace, security does not only mean physical
security or protection from physical harm caused by overt or direct
violence. It also includes the psychological aspect, the feeling
and/or thought of being free from physical harm, exploitation and
inability to exercise their freedom and rights as human beings.
In restoring or establishing a sense of security among affected

individuals or communities in a conflict situation, there has to be
an assurance that their rights will be respected.
The use of violent means to get respected, to enforce their rights,

or to secure themselves from physical harm has to end. Otherwise,
the cycle of violence will continue.
PHASE FIVE (V): MONITORING, EVALUATION, AND

ASSESSMENT
Monitoring, evaluation, and assessment are continuing processes

that aim to increase the probability of success of peacebuilding
programs. Resources that can be used in this stage are finite.
Thus, only those programs that have the best potential to achieve
the objectives should be embarked on.
While peacebuilding program/s are implemented to mitigate or

address a conflict, it forms part of the conflict that it intends to
deal with. Toward this end, implementers must be aware at all
times, of the consequences, whether intended or not, of these
peacebuilding activities.
What do we monitor and evaluate?
1. The peacebuilding program/s itself; and
2. The manner by which these programs will be implemented.

A large part of the success in peacebuilding comes from
the manner on how they will be implemented. Proper
implementation needs the capability, developed through
training and experience, of implementers to execute well-
meaning programs.
Main
Activities
Document or record:
Generate day- 1. Peacebuilding ac-
to-day status tivities
Daily activity
updates 2. Results of peace-
report (as part of
Monitoring building intervention/s
daily operations
(Daily) Gauge imme- 3. Mapping of interven-
report submitted
diate results tions (areas covered;
to HHQs)
and significant participants/stakehold-
change/s ers involved; reach
and depth)
Table #19: Monitoring, Evaluation, and Assessment of the PB Plan

Collate and review dai-

ly monitoring reports
Analyze data based on

set of objectives
Analysis of
past interven- Gather feedback from
tions various sources (e.g.,
key informant inter-
Identify factors views, focus-group
Evaluation
that can help discussion, surveys,
(Periodic)
and hinder; observation, etc.)
strengths and Evaluation and
weaknesses, Determine success/ assessment
opportunities failure of peacebuilding report (as part
and threats interventions of Accomplish-
ment Report,
Adjust peacebuilding see Annex B for
plan, if necessary, format)
based on significant
changes
Identify possible sce-

narios
Assess-
ment
Determine Generate options for
(End of an
next courses next courses of action
activity or
of action (stop, start, continue)
a certain
period based on evaluation
results and other new
data
Table #19: Monitoring, Evaluation, and Assessment of the PB Plan

Proposed Guide Questions:
For evaluation:
• What are the intended consequences of the activities?
• Do the programs being implemented directly contribute to
the attainment of the objectives?
• Did the troops implement the activities properly?
• If no, what additional skills and training do they need? How
will these trainings be conducted?
• What are the probable unintended consequences of the
activities (possible/negative outcomes)?
• Will the programs to be implemented contribute to the
attainment of the objectives?
• What are the recommendations to the HHQs? What
peacebuilding interventions should be stopped, continued,
or started?
• What are the next courses of actions that should be taken?
Below is an example of a monitoring and evaluation matrix. It is

emphasized that other matrices can be developed and used as
peacebuilding implementors see fit as they will be the ones who
will use the data gathered.
Example of a Monitoring and Evaluation Matrix
Source &
Indicator Time-
Indicators Method of Remarks
Type frame
Collecting Data
Objective: Increase delivery of basic services within 1 year
Records of These indicators
Increase in the number of
recipients per shall gauge the
residents provided with Monthly
activity; MHO effectiveness of
medical/dental services
Result records the projects in
the short term.
Records of They are used
(short recipients per to monitor the
Increase in the number of
term) activity; fre- effectiveness
residents provided with Monthly
quent observa- of projects/
livelihood projects
tion; municipal activities being
records conducted.
Regular access of resi-

MHO records;
dents to medical/dental Annual
survey
services
Impact These indicators

shall gauge the
Barangay/mu- long term impact
(long Increase in the number of of implemented
nicipal records;
term) residents with source of Annual projects.
frequent obser-
regular income
vation
Objective: Increase people’s trust with government forces within 1 year.

This shall indi-

cate that less (if
Increase in the number
Survey; police not zero) cases
of cases referred to the Quarterly
records are brought
Result police
before the “kan-
garoo court”.
(short This shall

term) Decrease in the number indicate that
Frequent obser-
of residents participat- residents are
vation; munici- Quarterly
ing in anti-government starting to trust
pal records
forces’ rallies government
forces.
Impact
Increase in the number of Frequent obser-
residents participating in vation; munici- Annual
(long government projects. pal records
term)
Troops’ security comes first. If this will be compro-

Guarantee troops’
mised during the implementation of peacebuilding
security
project/s, consider other options.
Community protection and security is of utmost
Guarantee commu-
importance. Peacebuidling interventions should
nity protection and
always consider the community’s safety and reduce
security
potential risks and threats.
In implementing the peacebuilding program, the best
asset is a disciplined soldier. Understand what con-
Ensure credibility
flict is and recognize that conflict does not just affect
us, we affect it too.
Take practical steps to at least avoid making violent
Act responsibly conflict worse and look for opportunities to make it
better.
All interventions have an impact on both dividers
Do no harm and connectors which can be positive or negative.
Actions and behaviours have consequences.
Protect and promote Soldiers, as state agents, have the responsibility to
human rights uphold human rights and human dignity.
Maximize resources (material and non-material) from
Work with various
various key stakeholders that can be provided for the
stakeholders
peacebuilding project/s.
Peacebuilding activities should be inclusive rather
than exclusive. Actively promote the involvement of
participants from all sectors. Do not exclude partici-
Ensure inclusiveness pants based on their religion, sex, gender orientation,
class, or disability. Parties left out will have little or no
interest in supporting the eventual outcome and can
contribute to its failure.
Maximize local Always consider the community’s existing alterna-
mechanisms for tive dispute resolution mechanisms (e.g., council of
peacebuilding elders)
Adjust the plan as The peacebuilding plan should be regularly reviewed
necessary and updated.
Table #20: Reminders in Peacebuilding implementation
Annex A GLOSSARY
• Negotiation - discussion aimed at reaching an agreement.
• Consensus-building - the term "consensus-building"

(sometimes called "alternative dispute resolution" or ADR)
actually refers to a variety of approaches. Generically, they
are voluntary processes in which the participants seek a
mutually acceptable resolution of their differences.
• Problem solving - the process of working through details

of a problem to reach a solution.
• Peace Building - a process that facilitates the

establishment of durable peace and tries to prevent the
recurrence of violence by addressing the root causes
and effects of conflict through reconciliation, institution-
building, and political as well as economic transfortmation.
• Attitude - a settled way of thinking or feeling about

someone or something, typically one that is reflected in a
person's behavior.
• Behavior - the way in which one conducts oneself,

especially towards others.
• Violence - a behavior involving physical force intended to

hurt, damage, or kill someone or something.
• Conflict Analysis - a systematic study of the profile,

causes, actors, and dynamics of conflict. It helps
development, humanitarian and peacebuilding
organizations to gain a better understanding of the context
in which they work and their role in that context.
Annex B GUIDE QUESTIONS IN THE CONDUCT OF

COMMUNITY ANALYSIS INTERVIEWS
• What are the primary and other sources of livelihood?
• Who controls and has access to resources? What organizations are

operating in the community and how do they help to maximize/
minimize the conflict or community issues?
• Do existing organizations tend to segregate the family members

according to social sectors (women, youth, farmers, etc.)? If they
do, part of the program could be towards strengthening the basic
unit of the community – the family.
• What are the land tenure arrangements? In fishing communities,

what are the issues related to access to fishing grounds? In IP
communities, what is the ancestral domain arrangement? Are there
conflicting claims (e.g., IPRA and CARP)?
• Who are the informal leaders in the community? What are their
sources of power?
• Has the community experienced natural disasters and what are the
natural risks and hazards in the community?
• Are there mining activities within the community? What are the
problems related to mining that can directly affect the community
(e.g., displacement, community consent, environmental
damage, etc.)?
• What are the sentiments of the people in the community?

• How do the people see/feel if they are supported or not

supported by the LGUs, LGAs, and other sectors of the
society?
• How do the people see or understand the role of military in

peacebuilding initiatives?
Annex
A. 66IB, C
PA PEACEBUILDING STORIES
1. PEACEBUILDING IN NEW BATAAN, COMPOSTELA
VALLEY
The 66th Infantry Battalions (66IB) experience in the municipality of

New Bataan in the COMVAL Province exemplifies peacebuilding at
the grassroots. The unit transformed the municipality from one that
was in conflict with the ideals of good governance and democracy
to one that is a partner in socio-economic development. Further,
the battalion also helped them realize that it is only the people
themselves who can ultimately change their plight.
The Threat and Area of Operations
New Bataan has an estimated total land area of 55,315 hectares

of which 45.37% is timberland, 24.11% is forest reserve, 0.93% is
public forest and 22.50% is alienable and disposable. The terrain of
the municipality of New Bataan consists of gently sloping, rolling
and mountainous areas. 23% of the land is used for agricultural
purposes.
As of 2007, it has a total population of 42,812 with 9,259 households

consist mainly of migrants from Bohol and Cebu. Meanwhile,
1,791 households are from the Manday tribe. The populace uses
18 dialects. Roman Catholicism, Protestantism and Iglesia ni
Cristo are the three major religions in the municipality. Majority
of the people farm coconut, rice, corn, cacao, coffee, abaca and
banana as their major source of livelihood.
The terrain of New Bataan favours the insurgents. Its forests

provide cover and concealment to their activities while restricting
movement of government forces. In fact, a guerrilla base along
the tri-boundary of Compostela-New Bataan both of COMVAL
Province and Bagangga of Davao Oriental existed. It has also
become a mobility corridor to other neighbouring Guerrilla Fronts.
The people of New Bataan were organized in order to control them,

as consistent with the Protracted People War concept of encircling
the cities and urban centers from the countryside. The insurgents
had a firm grip on the people creating for themselves a haven.
Out of fear and misinformation, the people became subservient
to the insurgents. Domestic problems were no longer brought to
police authorities as the people resorted to the swiftness of the
insurgent’s Kangaroo court.
One of the major obstacles to peace and development was the

occurrence of a series of violent incidents in the municipality.
These incidents which include burning of construction equipment
and telecommunication facilities were perpetrated by the
Communist Terrorists (CTs) belonging to Guerrilla Front 25 of the
Southern Mindanao Regional Committee (SMRC).
Immersion in New Bataan, Compostela Valley
The clearing operations of Army troops led to encounters with

the insurgents. Unable to meet the military capabilities of 66IB,
the armed elements of the GF 25 withdrew hastily. However,
they resorted to propaganda circulating information that the

66IB ordered the evacuation of the people from the hinterlands.
This caused inconvenience as evacuees clogged the municipal
gymnasium leaving behind their homes in the immediate
encounter areas. The legal fronts of CPP-NPA-NDF such as Bayan
Muna, Karapatan and Anakpawis were immediately mobilized.
Massive misinformation campaign and protest rallies were

launched demanding the immediate withdrawal of the unit from
New Bataan. Derogatory accusations were hurled with the intent
of provoking violent reactions from the unit. The insurgents
wanted the unit to make drastic moves and commit abuses.
However, the unit instead responded with emphasis on

strengthening its relationship with the people rather than focusing
on exacting vengeance through combat operations. The troops
maintained the highest level of discipline and continued in
building rapport with the populace. Subsequent events later on
indicated that such step incurred more damage to the insurgents
than the combat operations conducted.
The concept of partnership and alliance became the guiding

principle of the unit in the conduct of its activities. The unit did
not assume to be the rescuers of the people, but as facilitators.
The people were given the spotlight of being the prime movers
of the change for development of their place. After all, the people
are the foundation of their hometowns and in them rest the future
direction that all of them will eventually go through.
Recognizing the great potential of the people when properly

motivated and guided, the unit embarked on massive information
dissemination. Leadership seminars and symposia were
conducted involving all the sectors of society. These activities
aim to inculcate into the minds of the people that unless they
do something, their place will remain far behind in terms of
development. From the usual presentations, film viewings and
open forums during seminars, it was made sure that they develop
conviction to act. Furthermore, family values were given emphasis
in every discussion. This is in recognition of the very crucial role
of the family in the development of a society, after the series of
symposia and seminars, the people now ask what they can do to
help their place.
Approaches and Innovations
The 66IB devised a simple concept that delineated the path for
development. It suggests that before the ultimate goal of having
development in their place is achieved, individual actions are
required. Specifically, the people must first have social awareness
(Pagpakabana). They must be concerned and be vigilant to what
is really transpiring in their place, they must also have their own
standpoint (Baruganan). They must not play deaf and blind amidst.
It is in having this common standpoint that the people can be
united which will eventually give them the strength to move and
act. The people then need to be united (Panaghiusa) in order to
collectively pool their resources to easily attain what they desire
for their place to be. Being united, they can now institutionalize
measures and agree on what they can do for the betterment of
their place. Cooperation and collaboration will pave the way for
peace (Kalinaw) which will eventually pave the way for progress
(Kalambuan).
66IB’s Successful Peacebuilding Efforts
The success of 66th IB in establishing peace in New Bataan

can be attributed to several factors. These are the following:
• In-depth understanding of the existing conflict in its area

of operation. The unit had a good understanding of its area
of operation including the dynamics among the people, th
community and the threats, which was a result of a holis-
tic analysis and in-depth study of the characteristics of the
various barangays of New Bataan.
• Discipline and professionalism of soldiers in the perfor-

mance of their tasks. The unit emphasized the need for
competent and disciplined soldiers who have the will and
genuine resolve to establish peace in the municipality of
New Bataan.
• Establishment of rapport with the community and Local

Government Units (LGUs). Recognizing the importance of
a good rapport with the community and the LGUs, the 66IB
focused on strengthening its relationship with the people.
This was done while they were being provoked to do harsh
moves.
• Emphasis on family values and individual safety. The

family is the basic unit of our society. Recognizing its im-
portance in upholding peace and development, the 66IB
emphasized the strengthening of family values. The insur-
gents’ organizing works on the three basic sectors (peas-
ants, women, and youth) of a community into POGs grad-
ually weaken family ties. A weakened and divided family
then becomes a most likely source of unproductive individ-
uals.
• Finding the common purpose among members of the

community and working on them for the people to act.
There always has to be a common purpose which will bind
and unite the group. People form groups and each of them
has a common objective. This unity of purpose serves as
a driving force that would synergize the group’s effort to
make it easier for them to attain such objectives. That driv-
ing force is the main foundation of the organization.
Conclusion
66IB’s experience in New Bataan put forth important lessons for

future activities. First is on the relative duration of PDT activities
in an area. The degree of enemy influence varies from place to
place. With this, it is crucial that the unit must be able to adjust its
approach to the suitability in every area. Second, there must be
a deliberate effort in attaining the grand objective of freeing the
area of operations from enemy influence.
Alongside this, there should be in-depth activities that are high-

impact in nature to offset the usual “boxed” activities. High impact
activities do not have to be grand infrastructure projects. Third,
these high impact activities must be sustained even after the
troops have left the area. Sustainment would therefore come from
the people themselves. Lastly, soldiers’ discipline and dedication
is indispensable in PDT activities.
Analysis of 66IB’s Peacebuilding Experience
66IB’s successful experience in New Bataan has the following

peacebuilding principles:
• Strategy. 66IB focused on rebuilding personal and family

relationships rather than doing vengeful activities. There is
a need not only to focus on the end goal of building peace,
but also on making sure that the process leading to it is
managed in a way that allows for inclusion, constructive di-
alogue and consensus-building – rather than confrontation
and power games. It likewise awakened the people’s con-
ciousness and sense of responsibility without necessarily
engaging in violence.
• A sense of local ownership and accountability. Peace

cannot be imported from the outside of the community. It
has to be developed from within participated by the peo-
ple themselves. 66IB focused on the people and families of
New Bataan, and developed conviction from them to act
on the issues or conflicts in their community. “The peo-
ple were given the spotlight of being the prime movers of
the change for development of their place.” In cooperation
with the LGU and NGOs, 66IB created spaces for dialogue
that allow for the active participation of local people in de-
fining their problems and providing solutions. It also pro-
vided the opportunity to develop rapport which facilitated
understanding of one another. With this, the people owned
the solutions and developed a sense of responsibility to
sustain it.
• Trust-building. Trust is the glue that holds relationships,

societies, and economies together. When trust break-
downs, violent conflict occurs and easily becomes a cycle
of violence. It should be noted that 66IB did not retaliate
againts the people although they were provoked. Instead,
they pursued their objective of establishing good relation-
ship with the people.
• Interdependence and Inclusiveness. 66IB’s peacebuilding

strategy was able to direct the residents towards a com-
mon goal of action and elicit support from all individuals. It
is very important that no one is left behind or made to be
on his own.
• Sustainability. Building lasting peace is a long-term com-

mitment and takes time. The road to peace is bumpy, long,
unpredictable and anything but straight. Transforming the
way a society deals with conflict is a complicated process
that cannot be achieved instantly. Peacebuilding efforts
take this into account and are designed as long-term initia-
tives. Hence, support of local efforts must be patient and
consistent.
• Infrastructure. 66IB developed a good rapport with the

LGU, which presumably provided the needed support to
undertake various activities. The support includes not only
financial and material, but more importantly credibility and
legitimacy to undertake peacebuilding activities.
2. CHURCH-MILITARY AND POLICE ADVISORY GROUP-

NEGROS (CMPAG)
On 04 March 2008, a landmark agreement between the Catholic

Church and the Armed Forces of the Philippines was signed by
both parties in Bacolod City. Top leaders and officials of the
church and the AFP in the Visayas gathered at the Bishop’s Palace
in Bacolod City to sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU),
which subsequently formed the Church-Military Advisory Group
– Negros (CMAG-N). Four years later, on 18 October 2012, the
Philippine National Police represented by the Negros Occidental
and Negros Oriental Police Provincial Offices, was formally
accepted as part of the group. CMAG-N would then become
known as the Church, Military and Police Advisory Group- Negros
or CMPAG-N.
Tracing the roots
During the height of the insurgency problem in Negros Island

in the 1980s, an invisible “wedge” was said to have existed
between the Catholic Church and the AFP (which then included
the defunct Philippine Constabulary), which naturally resulted in
lukewarm working relationships. Although only a few members of
the Church and other religious sects were actively involved in the
underground movement of the Communist Party of the Philippines
– New People’s Army – National Democratic Front (CPP-NPA-

NDF), it was generally branded as “left leaning”, or worse, as
communist fronts. On the other hand, the religious sector also
labelled the military as fascist, human rights abusers, and even
puppets of politicians and private individuals. Naturally, this kind
of labelling or tagging from both sides strained the already volatile
relationship between the two, which lasted for many years.
Hence, even though they have the same goal of bringing peace
and sustainable development to the people of Negros, the church
and the military seemed to have gone separate ways, virtually
ignoring the wedge lodged between them.
The Church-Military Liaison Committee
It took a while before key military and church officials in the

island started reaching out to each other. The series of talks or
engagements between them resulted to the formation of the
Church-Military Liaison Committee (CMLC) during the late 1980’s.
Although no formal agreements were established, the CMLC then
regularly held meetings and dialogues to iron out issues and
concerns affecting or involving the military, the Church, and the
general public. The committee has become an effective venue
or forum for discussing and addressing contemporary social
issues, and eventually paved the way toward the enhancement
of the relationship between the two sectors. Soon enough, the
committee attracted more participants from both sides, and
dialogues and other similar activities were also conducted more
frequently.
The CMLC found itself on the brink of extinction during the early
‘90s when insurgency in the island subsided. Most of the Army
units stationed in Negros left for Mindanao to help contain the
threat posed by the secessionist groups’ threats; hence, the
meetings and engagements became less frequent.
However, it was revived with the assumption of then Colonel

Ibrado (who later became AFP Chief of Staff) as the Commanding
Officer of the 303rd Infantry Brigade. As the highest-ranking
military commander in Negros that time, he actively sought
the restoration of the CMLC by designating the late Maj Nelson
L Gerona, who was then the Brigade’s Civil-Military Operations
Officer, as the military’s liaison with the church. Major Gerona re-
established and strengthened the partnership and coordination
between the two sectors, particularly with the Social Action
Center (SAC) of the Diocese of Bacolod. Dialogues and meetings
were held frequently again as the two sectors jointly addressed
the social issues prevalent in the island during that period.
In 2007, the CMLC achieved another milestone in its history,

with the assumption of then Maj Gen Jovenal C Narcise as the
Commander of the Army’s 3rd Infantry (Spearhead) Division. Major
General Narcise and Brig Gen Gregorio Fajardo, then the 303rd
Brigade Commander, opened up the idea of formally reviving the
CMLC to Bishop Vicente M Navarra, D.D., at the Bishop’s House in
Bacolod City last 02 April 2007. Brigadier General Fajardo lost no
time renewing contacts with the church through the Civil-Military
Operations task Unit-Negros, which was under the supervision of
the Brigade.
The first of many exploratory meetings was held at the Bishop’s

Palace on 27 April 2007, which coincided with the death
anniversary of Rev. Fr. O’ Brien, the founder of Pax Christi –
Pilipinas. Father O’Brien is said to be the pioneer of the advocacy
for “active non-violence” as a means of attaining peace in
Negros. This was followed by a series of formal meetings among
representatives from the four dioceses in Negros – the dioceses
of Bacolod, Kabankalan, San Carlos, and Dumaguete – and key
Army commanders in the island. It was facilitated by Bro. Jack
Pamine of Pax Christi – Negros, and Atty. Francisco Cruz, the legal
adviser of the Diocese of Bacolod. From then on, regular monthly
meetings were held every third Thursday of the month.
The Birth of the CMAG-N
Upon the recommendation of then Lt Col Franco Nemesio M

Gacal, then Commanding Officer of 11th IB, CMLC was christened
as the Church-Military Advisory Group – Negros (CMAG-N). This
was after representatives from both sectors concluded that the
lack of a written agreement containing the common vision and
objectives of the committee was behind the failure of the CMLC
to sustain its activities. As an advisory group, the representatives
saw the need for an MOU that would serve as the basis for their
joint undertakings. This was unanimously agreed upon by the
church and the military leadership in Negros, and soon enough,
the MOU was signed on 04 March 2008.
According to the MOU, CMAG-N shall serve as a body in

resolving issues or conflicts in achieving a harmonious and
proactive relationship and cooperation between the parties. It was
composed of the SAC Directors of the four dioceses and the Civil-
Military Operations Task Unit-Negros (CMOTU-N).
Since then, the CMAG-N convened regularly (every third Thursday

of the month) to discuss prevailing issues related to the church
and the military. Significant matters were resolved through the
active participation of church leaders and military commanders.
The military and police would regularly present updates regarding
operational matters, while the church would tackle the social
and spiritual development aspects. As the partnership became
stronger, the group also began inviting representatives of the
Iglesia Filipina Independiente (Aglipayan) and representatives
from the Philippine National Police (PNP).
Representatives of the PNP began joining the regular group

meetings on 21 May 2009. In September 2010, both the Negros
Occidental and Negros Oriental.
Provincial Police Officers (NOPPO and NORPPO) formally

expressed their desire to be a part of the group, which was
subsequently approved by the body. With the entrance of the
PNP, CMAG-N became Church-Military and Police Advisory Group
– Negros (CMPAG-N), effective 18 October 2012. The new group
committed to actively work on the concretization of the following
principles enshrined in the 1987 Philippine Constitution, along
with the Catholic Church’s mission:
(i) “The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of

life, liberty and property, and the promotion of the general
welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of
the blessings of democracy.” (Article II, Section 5)
(ii) “The Armed Forces of the Philippines is the protector of

the people and the state. Its goal is to secure the sovereignty
of the State and the integrity of the national territory.” (Article
II, Section 3)
(iii) “The Church’s mission is to proclaim good news to the

poor, proclaim freedom for the prisoners, and recovery of
sight for the blind, to set the oppressed free, to proclaim the
year in the Lord’s favor.”
With an expanded constituency, the group came up with the

declaration below:
1) THAT we, with the people of Negros, shall work for an

honest, orderly and peaceful election and shall intelligently
select leaders who can provide good governance that we
need in these crucial times as the outcome of the elections
will affect the future of the Negrenses and the entire country
as well;
2) THAT we shall vigorously support the effective

implementation of agrarian reform as part of social justice;
and,
3) THAT to win the peace in Negros, the Military and Police

shall continue to address security threats and challenges,
working collaboratively with the other stakeholders: the

government, non-government, and other sectors led by the
Church, who shall work hand-in-hand to address the spiritual,
social, economic, and political dimensions to bring the long-
overdue development in the countryside.
CMPAG-N: Five years later
Since its creation, CMPAG-N members have been actively

pursuing their collective vision of upholding human dignity and
sustaining peace and development in the island through close
cooperation and collaborative efforts. It has been conducting
significant activities in various parts of the province and has been
contributing to the peaceful resolution of some social issues,
particularly those related to agrarian reform. CMPAG-N, along
with other groups such as the Negros Occidental Multi-Sectoral
Peace and Development Network (NOMSPDN), currently plays a
significant role in the Security Sector Reform Program of the AFP
as an oversight body
In addition to its main concern of resolving issues and concerns,

the CMPAG-N likewise embarked on implementing a joint
humanitarian and socio-civic activity. On 16 September 2008,
the group facilitated the first ever pilgrimage of uniformed men
and women and peace advocates at the Diocese of Bacolod on
its 75th anniversary. It has also conducted a number of Medical
and Dental Capacity Assistance Programs (MEDCAP) and other
Civic Action programs in selected marginalized or depressed

areas with services such as medical consultation, dental services,
circumcision, haircut, shiatsu massage, feeding, and distribution
of relief goods. It has also played significant roles in disaster relief
and rehabilitation during the aftermath of several calamities such
as the earthquake that hit Negros in 2012 and, more recently, the
super typhoon “Yolanda”.
The Way Ahead
The first six years of the CMPAG-N were both challenging and
productive. Backed up with purpose and meaningful years behind
it, the group shall be ready to embark on more challenging tasks,
starting with the following:
a. Enhancement of communication and collaboration

between military and police units particularly in Negros
Oriental and the SAC of the Diocese of Dumaguete.
b. Promotion of CMPAG-N to the parishes and other

echelons of the church and military and police
subordinate units, particularly companies, stations, and
detachments.
c. Promotion of CMPAG-N as a mechanism to reach out

to other sectors and stakeholders especially on areas of
mutual concerns.
Conclusion
The CMPAG-N is a relatively new organization compared with

other nongovernment organizations, people’s organizations, and
civic organizations that have already been spending decades as
contributors to peace and development in the country. Despite
being young, CMPAG-N has already been demonstrating its great
potential as a catalyst of peace. In keeping up with its momentum,
it is therefore recommended that its founding principles, roles,
and current performance be subjected to documentation and
evaluation in order to facilitate its subsequent adoption in other
areas experiencing the same issues as that of Negros Island.
3. SOLDIERS AS PEACEBUILDERS
Can soldiers who trained to wage war also work for peace? Many
may say no. Others may say it would be difficult. But the soldiers
of Basilan, particularly those of the Philippine Army’s 103rd
Infantry Brigade, have shown that it could be done.
Part of the problem, part of the solutions
For Ferrer, then Commander of the 103rd Infantry Brigade, the

road to peace advocacy began with the realization that the military
had become part of the problem. During a roundtable meeting
among Mindanao’s senior military officers at the Balay Mindanaw
Peace Center in August 2006, he conferred that the stories of
abuses perpetrated by soldiers had earned the anger and distrust
of the civilians.
In particular, he narrated how some soldiers in villages stole fowls

they found roaming around, those abandoned by residents during
the firefight, wrongly assuming that it did not belong to anyone.
Ferrer admits to a similar experience when, as a young lieutenant

in Lanao during the height of the Moro rebellion in the 1970s, he
had taken someone’s duck. In search of food for his troops one
day, he met an old Maranao.
“Bapa, can we buy your ducks? We have nothing else to eat,” he

asked the man.
The old man refused to sell. He explained that he had two left,
a male and a female, and that he needed these to breed more
ducks. As he was talking, a third duck waddled up. Quickly, Ferrer
said, “Paano, bapa, hindi sa inyo ito, di ba? Amin na lang ‘to (So
what now, old man? Since this isn’t yours, I guess we can have
this then!)”, the old man could not reply.
“Unfortunately, people remember these stories,” Ferrer pointed

out. He reflected that war victims who lost a brother or a child in
the war could somehow forgive the soldiers over time because the
loss of human life is very well part of war. But stories of seemingly
trivial abuse, like soldiers stealing farm animals, are difficult to
forget. These stories have a way of spreading so quickly and
are passed on from one generation to the next. This unseemly
conduct tainted the soldier’s image, reducing him to the level of
a common thief who took further advantage of the victims in the
eyes of the people he had sworn to protect.
In recognizing the roots of the civilians’ distrust, Ferrer saw how

the military could move to rebuild confidence. He chooses to see
the positive side of the situation.
“We couldn’t be part of the solution if we weren’t part of the

problem,” he noted.
Being part of the solution meant actively reaching out to the

people of Basilan and engaging them in discussions on how the
military could help bring about peace in the “paradise island,”
which had become a “haven of terrorist” at the peak of the Abu
Sayyaf atrocities. It seems ironic for soldiers to be interested in
peace building in as much as they had been trained to do the
opposite – fight.
But the point to fighting, at least for the military man, is to

bring about peace. Decades of fighting in Mindanao, however,
demonstrate the limits to the military solution to achieve this end.
And so, realizing this, the soldiers of Basilan are now actively
working for peace.
“Maybe it’s about time we teach soldiers to do peacebuilding,”

Ferrer said.
Perhaps there is no better place than Basilan for Ferrer to try

out this innovative alternative. But while the Abu Sayyaf notoriety
rose so quickly, its influence declined just as fast. Balikatan,
the joint Philippine-United States military exercises in 2002,
had contributed for the benefit of Basilan not only in terms of
improving the peace and order situation, but also in terms of the
tangible economic gains from the roads and bridges built around
the island. With these in place, perhaps Basilan was ready for
peace.
Early efforts
Even before, small but consistent efforts among the military and
the civilian populace to bring about peace in the island have
already existed. In 1996, the Final Peace Agreement was signed
between the government and the Moro National Liberation Front
(MNLF), planting the seeds of peace. It was not too long after
those efforts to meet the conditions of the peace agreement
began to be implemented.
The GRP-MNLF Final Peace Agreement mandated the integration

of former MNLF combatants into the Armed Forces. To this end,
the military establishment conducted a series of seminars for the
integrees.
It was also about this time that the military launched the “Sala’am
soldiers” approach that had soldiers in Muslim areas undergo
intensive two-month seminars on the Islamic religion and culture
and a one (1) -month immersion in Muslim communities. The
experience made the soldiers become familiar with the Muslim
peoples’ needs and aspirations.
2LT Julius Pablo oversees the Sala’am operations of the 32nd

Infantry Battalion in the town of Lamitan. The activities include
building latrines, multipurpose halls, community water system,
and other community structures. This Sala’am experience was an
eye opener for many soldiers. 1LT Elvis P Cadwising noted that
the approach made it easier for the soldier to get the people’s
support.
Brute force versus dialogue
Ferrer returned to Basilan as the brigade Commander in 2004 all

set to try a new strategy. His new approach involved reaching
out to dialogue with the people. At that time, Ferrer was taking
up studies on “bridging leadership” at the Asian Institute of
Management (AIM) in Makati City. The AIM prescribes that a
bridging leader is one who can readily see a divide and is “able to
analyze its dimensions clearly, and identify all the stakeholders,
among who, he could form bridges of understanding and action.
Bridging leaders have a vision of a positive resolution of the divide
to transform the lives of the marginalized and the underprivileged.”
Ferrer forged a close friendship with Balay Mindanaw Foundation,

Inc. (BMFI) executive director Ariel Hernandez. The BMFI is an NGO
that heavily invested in peacebuilding, particularly in resolving
conflict among the Higaonon tribes of Misamis Oriental. Ferrer
and Hernandez spent much time discussing how to best integrate
peacebuilding into the operations and concerns of the military.
His friendship with Hernandez made it easy for Ferrer to connect

with Basilan-based NGOs like the Catholic Children’s Fund (CCF)
and the Nagdilaab Foundation, as well as their counterparts in
Zamboanga City. These groups eventually came to trust Ferrer
and help him in his peacebuilding missions.
Ferrer demonstrated a firm commitment to the peace approach

and the recognition of the crucial role played by civil society.
He was, for example, the first representative of the AFP to ever
attend a peacebuilding course ran by the Davao-based Mindanao

Peacebuilding Institute (MPI).
Deng Giguiento of the MPI remembers her own astonishment at

Ferrer’s seeming audacity at that time, “I thought soldiers can’t
be instruments of peace,” she remarked. “To my surprise, it is
possible!”
No Template
The conduct of the very first peacebuilding seminars to the

soldiers of Basilan was fraught with uncertainties. Peace experts
Ma. Priscilla Valmonte and Bong Aranall, tapped to handle the
very first one, recalled that they did not know where to start.
There was no precedence to base their delivery of the course.
Luckily, the peace experts found in the soldiers’ experience

a foundation on which to build the seeds of peace. In close
consultation with Ferrer, Valmonte, Aranal, and their colleagues
at the Zamboanga Life Care Services (ZLCS) and Peace Advocates
Zamboanga (PAZ) designed a seminar that tackled behavioural
change, and conflict management.
‘We wanted the soldiers to discover what they had, what

motivated them to become soldiers, (and) what more they can
do,” Valmonte said.
Although the military did not have budget for programs officially
not within its functions to perform, the Christian Children’s Fund
(CCF) came to the rescue by providing the required logistics
for the conduct of the peacebuilding seminar. The late Lisa del
Puerto, who then headed the CF in Basilan, believed in Ferrer’s
vision and committed CCF support even though her bosses were
not very happy about it.
Meanwhile, Valmonte set out to involve other military units in

Basilan. She went to see Col Apolinario Aloba, Commander of
the 18th Infantry Battalion in Lamitan and Lt Col Casiano Monila
in Maluso.
The seminars, when they finally got underway, involved 2,400

Civilian Armed Auxiliaries (CAAs, the members of the Citizens
Armed Forces Geographical Unit and about 500 officers and men
of the 103Bde.
Over the years, the campaign to educate soldiers about

peacebuilding and conflict management had helped transform the
people’s view of the military. Lawyer Manuel Mamauag, Western
Mindanao regional director for the Commission of Human Rights,
noted a “downtrend in cases of human rights violation” in Basilan.
HR violation cases often involve complaints against soldiers.
Peacebuilding in the Field
It was important that soldiers on the ground be able to discern

which conflicts in the community required military intervention
and which were better left well enough alone. The campaign to
ingrain in the minds of Army troops the idea that soldiers, aside
from being good warriors, should also go into peacebuilding
when opportunities warrant has apparently reached most of the
soldiers down the line.
Take the case of Ahmad Omar, 33, a CAA manning a post at a

major junction in Lamitan.
“Thanks to those intensive seminars on peacebuilding, I have

learned that the military role’s is to protect the civilians in the
best way possible,” he said. “We only need the firearms to defend
against those who try to harm the people we have sworn to
protect.”
Omar noted that in the past civilians rarely came to his detachment
for help. “But now, they come everyday seeking our assistance,”
he observed.
Lt Col Rodel Mauro Alarcon, Commander of the 23rd Infantry

Battalion based in Lamitan, analyzed that the conflict in Basilan
these days is different from those in the other parts of the country.
“We don’t have a communist movement here, so we don’t have
to contend with the ideology that people are fighting ‘for in New
People’s Army (NPA) areas,” he noted. “The Moro rebels here are
fighting for separate Islamic state. Our government is doing its

best to satisfy that demand without disintegrating the country,”
he added.
“We already learned our lesson when it comes to rido,” said

Alarcon, “In a rido, it’s not only the two warring families that are
affected, but the whole community.” He noted that ridos have a
way of claiming victims even among those who were not party to
the conflict.
The military has taken to first determining whether brewing

disputes stems from rido. When initial investigation confirms this,
the military would be reluctant to interfere because, according to
Alarcon, “…once we come in, the other party would accuse us
of taking sides and so they would seek the help of the MILF. It is
possible that we get dragged into the fighting.”
Owning the problem
In August 2006, Ferrer was promoted out of Basilan and sent

to Zamboanga del Sur to command the Philippine Army’s 1st
Infantry Division. His classmate, Colonel Raynard Ronnie Y Javier,
succeeded his command.
Javier continued Ferrer’s initiative to go out of the camp and

reach out the Basileños. Sometimes, he found it sensible to invite
himself to civilian activities just to get the people to know that the
military was there for them. He made it a point to connect with at
least three people every working day.
“That would be somebody in the camp or a civilian outside. I would

meet with NGO volunteers or the priest. The Basileños probably
thought I was a politician the way I joined whatever activities they
were doing,” he noted with wry amusement.
Javier is of the opinion that the key to Basilan’s success in bringing

about peace is the people’s attitude of “owning the problem.” He
sees the Basileños initiative to form the people’s organizations
like the Nagdilaab Foundation and the Pagtabangan Basulta as a
commendable way of instituting self-help on community concerns.
“The people have acknowledged the problem, and they decided

to do something about it,” he remarked.
This strong community involvement was most underlined at the

Peace Caravan for the Mindanao week of Peace that took place
late November to early December 2006. In Basilan, a long queue
of vehicles joined civil society, the military, the Church, and even
the MNLF and other sectors in touring the island to sound out the
call for peace. As the caravan moved from town to town, Javier
got children on the stand to speak for peace.
Headway
Imbued in the hearts and minds of the soldiers in Basilan is their

role to serve the people, such that it has become more than a
functional role for many of them. Javier notes that for many of
the soldiers, the concept of service has taken on the weight of a
solemn commitment for which they would willingly commit their

own personal resources. For instance, when Typhoon Reming
battered the Bicol region in late 2006, Javier reports that his
constituents initiated fund-raising for victim relief.
“It’s now our turn to help,” he stressed.
The mention of Basilan may still evoke fear in the hearts of

outsiders, but newcomers to the island would be pleasantly
surprised these days to see that the island does not live up to its
advance press. There is nothing like the welcoming signage of
Jollibee – that Filipino icon of normalcy – to convey the message
that everything is all right in the capital city of Isabela.
Peace has reigned all over Basilan. You can see it in the leisurely
pace of the children as they stroll off to school. You can see it
as mother and daughter do the laundry by the spring, as elderly
farming folks take a carabao-driven cart along the paved highway,
as passengers patiently get off the jeep and wait for the driver
to fix a flat tire. Peace is in the thriving rubber plantations that
dot the island. You see peace in the rows and rows of palay and
coffee drying in the pavement.
No more is this island province the picture of life suspended until

environmental conditions would allow it. The image of Basilan has
now been replaced by a picture of community life that promises
to go on tomorrow and far into the future.
For Javier, however, the true test of peace in Basilan would be for
a foreign tourist to step on its shores to roam the island without
fear.
The colonel did get his wish, even though he wasn’t in Basilan to
see it.
On February 10, 2007, shortly after Javier’s 103rd Infantry Brigade

was transferred to the Lanao provinces, American Bob Martin who
runs the www.mindanao.com website toured the island without
military escort. He was accompanied by Basilan NGO worker
Rico Valmonte, Ma’am babes’ son. Back in Davao City where he
has made a home with this Filipina wife and kids, Martin fired off
several blog entries about his brief but memorable visit in Basilan.
In Lanao and hearing about it, Javier mused, “How I wish I was
still there. Maybe I could have shown him some more.”
4. GAINING THE EVACUEES’ TRUST
When war erupted in Lanao Del Norte last August 8, 2008, hundreds
left their homes to avoid being caught in the crossfire. Some
were lucky enough that the situation in their home communities
normalized almost immediately. They were able to go home after
just a few days. Many other evacuees, however, had to stay away
from home for months.
Among those unfortunate evacuees or internally displaced

persons (IDPs) were 112 families from the highlands of Paiton in
Kauswagan and Pantaon and Tangclao in Poona Piagapo. They
stayed at the Ma’had Alnor Al-Islamic madrasah (Muslim school)
at the Ceanuri Subdivision in Iligan City.
With the help of some groups and relatives, the evacuees in the
madrasah somehow managed to survive, but the desire to go
home and go back to their livelihood was foremost in their minds.
And when they finally decided to go home in the third week

of October, one issue confronted the groups helping the IDPs.
“How do we haul them back? We don’t have the vehicles to bring
them all up in the mountains,” said Abel Jose A Moya, program
manager of Pagkigdait Alang sa Pag-Amoma sa Kalinaw, Inc.
With their previous engagement with the military in other projects,

Pakigdait told the evacuees of their plan to approach the military
for help so they can use the Army’s 6x6 trucks.
The suggestion met violent reactions because, traditionally,

Maranaos would never be in a military truck. “Maybe because
before, especially during martial law time, Maranaos and Muslims
were automatically treated as enemies by the military,” lamented
Ambor.
The 104th Infantry Brigade in Iligan City sent two of its Muslim
officers – Captains Alonto Maamo and Julakmad Muhalli – to talk
to the IDPs. The two are former members of the Moro National
Liberation Front (MNLF). They were among those integrated into

the Armed Forces after the signing of the 1996 Peace Agreement.
Maamo told the IDPs that it was the military’s duty to see them
safely back to their homes, now that the war was over. He assured
them, too, that the military would escort them back to their homes
no matter what their beliefs were, even if they had relatives who
were with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front.
Apparently sensing the sincerity of the two Muslim military

officers, the evacuees eventually agreed to ride aboard the
military vehicles. The Army provided four 6x6 trucks for the trip.
Maamo shares that, “I joined the evacuees on their way home,

and I could see how happy they were, feeling so secure as they
were being escorted by soldiers on their trip back. The military
even gave relief goods for the evacuees to take home.”
Looking back, Maamo believes that in order to bridge the gap

between the military and the civilians, sincere dialogue is all that
is needed. “We should exert effort to talk to them more because
by doing so we can better understand their problems and we
would be in a better position to help,” he observes.
5. BUILDING RELATIONSHIPS, BUILDING PEACE
The occasions: “Seremonyas sa Pagbalik,” which means a

ceremony for a return to the community. This one was being held
for former rebels who have volunteered to return to the folds of the
law. The city government of Malaybalay, which spearheaded the
activity in partnership with the Philippine Army’s 403rd Infantry
“Peacemakers” Brigade, didn’t call it a “surrender ceremony”,
although in other areas they would certainly call it that way.
Brig Gen Rolito Abad, Assistant Commander of the 4th Infantry

Division, humbly acknowledges that government’s neglect
in providing basic services could be one of the reasons why
ordinary people take up arms. He said, too, that some soldiers,
in their operations against communist rebels, may have violated
the Lumad people’s human rights, pushing them to the wall and
leaving them no choice but to join the insurgency.
He hastened to assure the returnees that they made the right

decision in choosing to return: “I can assure you that the new
generation of soldiers now knows better, especially our soldiers
in the 4th Infantry Division.”
One of such soldiers is 1LT Mario G Goc-ong of the 8th infantry

Battalion who helped Paldon in his journey to a new life. Goc-
ong operates in Bukidnon’s Upper Pulangui area, where Paldon’s
Section Uno of the NPA’s Front 89 also operates, covering the
villages of Cananaan, Indalasa, Zamboanguita and St Peter in
Malaybalay City.
Goc-ong is not the type of soldier the resident there normally

expect. Unlike other officers who would usually stay inside the
camp than talk to people in the community, he would rather go
out and visit 10 houses everyday, meeting new friends. He would
spend time with children, even teaching them how to dance at the
barangay’s covered court.
He would call on the teenagers – members and officers of the

Sanguniang Kabataan – to help organize their sports fest and
to ask their participation in the clean-up drive. He would even
approach members of the women’s organizations, asking them
how he could be of assistance in their undertakings.
Goc-ong has even befriended the Higaunon tribal leaders in

the Northern Mindanao area, earning their trust that they even
conferred him a “datu”. Thus, Goc-ong is also known as “Datu
Malinawon” in the Higaunon community.
To win Paldon over, Goc-ong conducted an extensive research

of the rebel returnees’ background. He got information as to
where he studied, his behaviour in school, his parents, and other
relevant details. Along the way, he learned that Paldon contracted
malaria in the mountains but could not seek treatment for fear of
being arrested.
“I approached his mother and gave her medicines for her son”,
Goc-ong said.
Later, the lieutenant found out that’s Paldon’s father was infected
with tuberculosis, but was refused treatment at a government
health facility. Goc-ong went out of his way to facilitate treatment
for the rebel’s father.
When Paldon and his wife finally decided to call it quits after six
years in the revolutionary movement, he first approached an uncle
who was a member of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical
Unit (CAFGU). However, despite his uncle’s assurance, the young
man could not be sure of the reception he would get.
“When I first entered the premises of the 8IB, I was so afraid

because I heard rumors that I will be killed,” he recalls.
Arriving at 8IB, he was referred to talk to Goc-ong. “It was very

comfortable dealing with him,” he recalls of this first meeting.
Today, along with his 21 companions, Paldon is finding that life

in the mainstream can be peaceful and full of hope for a better
tomorrow.
For Col Nicanor Dolojan, Goc-ong’s Brigade Commander, Paldon’s

case is the classic example of his unit’s thrust in “winning the
peace.” He said that the 114 NPA rebels within the 403IB’s area of
responsibility have returned to the fold of law since he took over
the command in September 2008. “They have now become our
‘Kauban sa Reporma’ (‘Partner in Reform’),” he said.
6. "ARMS TO FARMS"
Usually, USAID programs are organized on the basis of grants for

specific and limited projects. In contrast, GEM arose as a long-
term umbrella organization that oversees the disbursement and
management of American funding across a number of long-term
projects. Coordinators are trained directly in Mindanao and are
encouraged to “go native,” living in the area and becoming part
of the community. GEM prioritizes cultural understanding, respect
for community leaders, an appreciation of the important role that
women play in local societies, and sensitivity to potential divisions
within separatist groups and their security concerns vis-à-vis the
Philippine government.
There has often been a general tendency for aid organizations to

associate the demobilization of warring groups with disarmament.
While Philippine officials on Mindanao have sometimes tried
this approach, cash-for-guns amnesty schemes have opened
up opportunities for corruption and have not been particularly
effective. Understanding that one of the major concerns of guerrilla
rebels is exploitation by corrupt government officials, GEM
established an “Arms to Farms” scheme, whereby Muslim rebels
are trained to engage in agriculture, but are not encouraged to
put away their weapons. In this way, the program keeps potential
guerrillas and Al Qaeda recruits busy with legitimate and peaceful

economic activity, while it assuages their concerns about the
threat from corrupt government officials, who may otherwise take
the fruits of agricultural labor by force.
In fact, Abinales noted that one of the keys to GEM’s success

is that the organization has never submitted to the official local
authorities, and has largely been allowed a free reign by Manila
to conduct its activities on Mindanao. It is precisely because the
state has not been successful in delivering welfare regimes which
provide stability to the area that GEM is seen as an alternate
source of development and security in the region. Moreover,
because of GEM’s activities, other American officials are allowed
relatively free access, and are even welcomed into areas where
the authority of the Philippine government holds no sway. Most
of GEM’s activities are conducted with the MNLF, which has
maintained its own official treaties and agreements with Manila
since the 1970s. However, the American organization is beginning
to enter the territory of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, a
splinter group of the MNLF that rejects relations with the national
government outright, but one whose leaders are jealous of the
development gains the MNLF has made under GEM.
Abinales was quick to point out that although GEM’s activities have
been successful, they are tailor-made to specific circumstances.
It is therefore difficult to present them as a generalized model

that can be applied to other separatist conflicts. Nevertheless,
Abinales’ work suggests that government agencies working on
counterinsurgency efforts elsewhere might do well to examine the
benefits of the flexible civilian approaches to conflict resolution
formed with a deep understanding of the concerns of the specific
communities involved.
7. TWO MAGUINDANAO CLANS END ‘RIDO’
Two ethnic Muslim families in Salipada K. Pendatun town in

Maguindanao have ended over two years of clannish war or “rido”
in solemn rites brokered by civilian and military authorities.
Peace brokers said members of the Samama and Abdul clans

traded hugs and handshakes and were in tears after their leaders
Kindaw Samama and Bong Abdul signed a covenant binding
themselves to peaceful settlement under Islamic tradition.
They said the covenant signing ceremony was held on August 13

at Barangay Midconding, a village in Salipada K. Pendatun town,
where both Abdul and Samama clans are prominent residents.
Lt. Col. Harold Cabunoc, head of the 33rd Infantry Battalion, said
he initiated negotiations with the Samama and Abdul families
to persuade them to end their “bloody” conflict over territorial
dominance that often caught the attention of soldiers.
Cabunoc said he later sought the assistance of Maguindanao

Assemblyman Khadafe Mangudadatu to intervene in the final
stage of negotiation that led to the covenant signing.
The feuding families easily heeded the intercession of a friend

(Assemblyman Mangudadatu) since most of them are related to
him by blood and respect him very much,” the Army official said.
At its most intense point, the “rido” reportedly left fatalities from
both camps, with protagonists and negotiators keeping details
about these casualties among themselves during the conciliatory
rites to avoid unsettling the recently brokered peace.
The reconciliation event was witnessed by S.K. Pendatun Mayor

BoniKali, Datu Apan Piang, Bai Dimple Pendatun, Col. Robert
Dauz, First Mechaized Battalin head; Lt. Col. James Fernando, and
the two brokers – Cabunoc and Mangudadatu.
Cabunoc, who has gained recognition for his command’s

successful combat operations and diplomatic approach in dealing
with enemies of the state, said more such “rido” settlements will
follow with the help of civilian officials.
8. AFP, MILF JOIN FORCES TO OVERRUN ABU SAYYAF CAMP

IN BASILAN
Two years ago, government forces, assisted by members of the

Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), captured an Abu Sayyaf
camp in Al-Barka, Basilan through a joint operation.
The operation signalled cooperation between the two forces

following years of armed conflict that ended with the March 2014
signing of a peace agreement between the government and the
rebel group.
The MILF helped by providing information regarding the Abu

Sayyaf's camp located some five kilometers away from its
community in Sitio Bohe in Barangay Macalang.
The people do not want the presence of the Abu Sayyaf in the
area. Further adding that they are fed up with the group. This
demonstrates that a strong collaboration among members of the
community and the military will go a long way in helping secure a
sustainable peace for the country.
This is not the first time government troops and MILF forces fought
side by side. There were already instances in the past when they
were with directly helping the military during combat operations.
9. 'END OF WAR' WITH MILF
On October 2018 General Carlito Galvez Jr., Chief of Staff of the

Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), officially declared the “end
of war” with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) during a
historic visit to Camp Darapanan in Sultan Kudarat, Maguindanao.
“Today I can now declare that the war between the Armed Forces
and the MILF is finally over,” Gen. Galvez told host MILF leaders
and members led by Chairman Hadji Murad Ebrahim.
Galvez’s visit is a historic gesture as it was the first time that an

AFP Chief of Staff set foot on the main headquarters of the MILF
since the armed group was established in the 1970s.
Galvez recognized in his remarks that it also reflects the heightened

trust and confidence that now exists between the government
and the MILF as unprecedented efforts are underway to bringing
enduring peace to the Bangsamoro Homeland.
“Today, I came back to one of the most revered places; a place

I can call home because here lives those gallant men I consider
my brethren – those whom I had been working with for a peaceful
Mindanao,” Galvez said.
“I am pleased to receive the delegation of the Chief of Staff here

in Camp Darapanan,” said Chairman Ebrahim, who was also
joined by the Vice Chairman of the MILF Alim Solaiman, the BIAF
Chief of Staff Almansour ‘Sammy’ Gambar and the different
Front and Base Commanders in welcoming the visitors.
“General Galvez is well known among our commanders, the

friendship between the MILF and him is already strongly
established due to the numerous incidents and challenges in the
past that we have jointly faced and solved,” Ebrahim said.
The MILF tendered a warm welcome exemplified by the lining

up of some 6,000 of its uniformed members along the seven-
kilometer stretch between this city and Camp Darapanan.
Ebrahim also accorded Galvez a “soldier of peace award” in

recognition of his diplomatic gestures with the MILF that started
years ago when he was head of the government’s ceasefire body
sustaining policies on cessation of hostilities with the front.
In his speech, Galvez, who also once served as commander

of the Maguindanao-based Army’s 6th Infantry Division, said
the AFP is sincere in backing the peace process with the MILF
through the guidance of President Duterte.
“The President is always very supportive and serious in his

guidance to the AFP in sealing the peace process here in Muslim
Mindanao,” Galvez said.
Ebrahim described Galvez as a “friend” of the Bangsamoro.
“(Galvez’s) visit represents the degree of progress we have

made over the years in bringing significant cooperation between
our military officers in our quest for peace in the Bangsamoro
homeland,” he pointed out.
After the 2008 outbreak of major armed clashes with government

forces over its bungled Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral
Domain (MoA-AD) with Malacañang, the MILF has maintained
cordiality with state authorities.
The MILF-government ceasefire faced a snag only when terrorist-

hunting police commandos clashed with MILF field combatants
in Mamasapano, Maguindanao on Jan. 25, 2015 in what the
military and the rebel front deemed as an “isolated” instance of
“lack of coordination.”
The MILF has two standing major peace accords with the
government forged in 2013 and 2014 that served as the basis
for the recent enactment of R.A. 11054. The law prescribes the
creation of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao (BARMM) to replace the 28-year old Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).
AUTHORS
LTC ELMER M BOONGALING (INF) PA
LTC BENJAMIN C SOLIS JR (INF) PA
LTC ALLAN M TESORO (CAV) PA
MAJ GENESIS R GABRIDO (MI) PA
CPT FRANCO SALVADOR M SUELTO (INF) PA
CPT MALCOLM DOWELL C DOMINGO (INF) PA
Ms. Ma. Farina Kim Santos
Ms. Lyca Sarenas
Ms. Aya Suzuki
Ms. Nicole Jane R Rebellon
Mr. Harold E Canlas

Graphic/Layout Artist
The proponent of this handbook is the Office of the Assistant

Chief of Staff for CMO, G7, Philippine Army. The said office is
responsible in the review and update of this publication. Other
units are encouraged to submit their CMO Best Practices in
relations to peacebuilding efforts for the next edition of this
publication.
Send your entries to the:

Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for CMO, G7
Philippine Army
Attn: Plans and Research Branch
Published by
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff

for Civil-Military Operations, G7
Philippine Army

Phone Number: 845-9555 (local 5724 - PRB)
Fax Number: (local 5722)
Email Address: cmo.og7.pa@gmail.com

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By 2028, a world-class Army that is a source of national pride.

Empowering soldiers to be Champion of Peace.

Honor. Patriotism. Duty.

The ability of our soldiers to effectively conduct peace and development

Let this book always reminds us of the importance of our continued

LTGen MACAIROG S ALBERTO AFP

This Peacebuilding Operations Handbook contains important

PATRICIO RUBEN P AMATA

2.1.1 Peacebuilding, Peacemaking and 19

Phase I : Analysis & Planning 43

the need for

The Need for

Peacebuilding is categorized as part of the Peace Support

among former enemies in order to avoid a relapse into conflict. It

Peacebuilding is a not an entirely new concept to the AFP particularly

Community Support Programs (CSP), an evolution of the Special

Peacebuilding aims to build positive peace in the communities.

a. Reduce the risk of a conflict from spiraling into a violent

b. Reduce the risk of a resolved violent conflict from

c. Reconcile opponents. Peacebuilding activities provide

d. Create an environment conducive to self-sustaining

1.2 Understanding Peace, Conflict, and Violence

The definition of peace has evolved from merely the absence

With peace as our end goal, we should keep in mind that it

• Everyone feels safe, without fear or threat of violence;

• Everyone is equal before the law; legal justice system is

• Everyone is able to participate in decision-making and the

• Everyone has an equal opportunity to work and make a

In establishing a peaceful and stable environment, it is

Conflict, on the other hand, is the perceived opposition of

The probability of a conflict is highly influenced by three

Attitude refers to how the parties view themselves

Behaviour refers to the outward manifestation of the

Context refers to the situation or condition in which the

A conflict may start at any point in the triangle above.

According to Johann Galtung – a renowned sociologist

Economic Conflict involves competition over scarce

Value Conflict involves differences in ways of life and

Power Conflict involves the disposition of each party

Conflict is a complex phenomenon that embodies a

Conflict is a normal aspect of everyday life and it exists in

What makes a democratic society successful is its ability

Violence refers to the use of force or power to cause injury,

Table 1: Difference of conflict and violence

A conflict escalates into violence when:

• Channels for dialogue are inadequate. When people

• Dissenting voices and deeply held grievances cannot

• Prevalence of instability, injustice, and fear. When the

• Perceived advantages from violence. Other people

According to a report by the Carnegie Commission on

Physical Violence (overt or direct violence) – it is physical

Structural Violence – is a systematic exploitation that

political participation, lack of equal economic and social

Socio-cultural Violence – these are aspects of cultures,

1.3 A Philippine Framework toward a Culture of

A culture of peace framework has been specifically developed

of an active Mindanao peace advocate, Antonio J. Ledesma, S.J.,

In the following figure, the categories represent the major