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 PEYANA (HLONONO)

SKETCH PLAN

Dispositions at the beginning of the action.

REFERENCE

A = Neck.
B = Peyana hill.
C = Gun position.
D = N.C. position.
E = Where decoys were seen.
F = Trig. beacon.
N.C., etc. See Abbreviations.
The enemy. = Scrub and swamp.
Line of troops' advance is from Thring's Post viâ F towards E.
Retreat of Impi 1 as per arrows; Impi 2 made off through bush in its
rear towards Umvoti R.

FOOTNOTES:
[251] Nkandhla column: C squadron N.C.; N.D.M.R.; Z.M.R.; 150
N.P.; pompom section, N.F.A.; and 3 companies N.R. The N.P. at
this time had only one officer, Sub-Inspector F.B.E. White. Royston
was, at the same time, given command of a column, known as
Royston's Brigade, consisting of R.H.; D.L.I.; 4 companies, B, C,
G, and H, Natal Rangers; and one section, 15 pounders, B battery,
N.F.A.
Before the O.C. Troops left Nomangci, his Intelligence Officer,
Capt. E.J.B. Hosking, asked for a squadron in order to search for
Bambata's body, said to be lying in the Mome gorge. The
application however, could not be granted, as there were no men
to spare, and because McKenzie realized that, if Bambata was
dead, his body could no doubt be recovered later. Under the
circumstances, it was certainly wiser to act on the assumption,
weak though it was, that Bambata was still at large, than on the far
stronger one that he was already dead, and that, therefore,
absolute proof of such fact was necessary.
[252] From ufa or ulufa, a crack.
[253] Conclusive as is the evidence as to Bambata's death, strong
rumours nevertheless got afloat shortly after the Rebellion that he
was still alive and in hiding, first in one part of Zululand then in
another. To this day, there are Natives and Europeans who believe
the rumours, but such beliefs have probably been formed without
due consideration of the facts here set forth. For the most part,
they rest on the mere fact that Bambata's wife, Siyekiwe, did not
go into mourning. Under normal conditions, this would
undoubtedly have been an important criterion, but the conditions
were clearly very abnormal.
[254] This officer had been to explain more thoroughly than could
be done on paper the particular problems that confronted the
troops at Nkandhla.
[255] It was composed as follows: N.D.M.R. (with one Maxim),
198; Z.M.R. (with three Rexer guns), 99; N.P., 147; N.R. (three
companies, A, D and E), 290; N.F.A. (one 15-pounder and two
pompoms), 26; departmental corps, 19; staff, 11. Total, 790. There
were also Native levies (Lieut. W.H. London).
[256] Woolls-Sampson was ordered to Empandhleni. Leaving his
infantry at Ensingabantu store, he reached Empandhleni with the
rest of the force on the 22nd. The D.L.I., detached from Royston's
brigade, joined Woolls-Sampson, whilst three companies of
Rangers (A, D and E), under Boyd-Wilson, became attached to
Royston, in lieu of B, C, G and H, whose disposition is referred to
further on. The N.F.A. (B battery), moreover, detached from
Royston's brigade, returned to Empandhleni to join Mackay, whilst
N.F.A. (two guns, 15-pounders), detached from Mackay, joined
Royston.
Mackay was directed on the 22nd to move to Empandhleni as
speedily as possible.
Dick, with N.R. (C, F, G and H companies), left on the 23rd for Fort
Yolland. He had with him 40 N.N.H. B company, N.R. remained as
garrison at Empandhleni. He moved to Middle Drift on the 26th, to
Krantzkop on the 28th, and to Thring's Post on the 2nd July.
The Cape squadron of R.H. (about 100), arrived at Gingindhlovu
on the 23rd, where it was directed to remain pending further
orders.
Part of the C.M.R. Maxim detachment, after being detained for a
few days at Melmoth, came on to Nkandhla and eventually joined
Mackay's column.
[257] He escorted about 230 Native prisoners from the place
referred to to Fort Yolland.
[258] A brother of Cetshwayo. Cetshwayo had, years before,
attempted to put him to death, when he was obliged to take refuge
for some years in Natal.
[259] Colonel Maxwell, a firm ruler, with a varied and life-long
experience in Natal in different official capacities, was selected for
the position, after the Magistrate, who had been defied by
Ngobizembe's men when the poll tax was proclaimed, had left
Mapumulo.
[260] A broad, continuous tract of country, which runs through
portions of Mapumulo and Ndwedwe divisions, and extends further
south, is reserved entirely for Native occupation. The three
districts mentioned had, in 1906, a total population of 80,000
Natives.
[261] Qwabe, the progenitor of the tribe was, like the founder of
the Zulu tribe, a son of Malandela, who flourished probably at the
beginning of the sixteenth century. As Qwabe was Zulu's elder
brother, the tribe, though politically subordinate to the Zulu one, is
regarded as senior in a social sense.
[262] Being of the Zulu tribe, he was, of course, related to
Dinuzulu.
[263] The following is a digest of interesting evidence given for the
prosecution at the trial of Ntshingumuzi, Mbombo and another
before the Native High Court. Mbombo was a doctor from
Zululand, living near Usutu kraal under Dinuzulu, and one of that
Chief's domestic physicians. It was alleged that Ntshingumuzi had
called the tribe to his own kraal, early in 1906, to be doctored for
war. In response to the summons, the people came carrying sticks
and dancing-shields. They formed a circle (umkumbi) in the cattle-
kraal. Mbombo then came out of a hut with his face smeared with
black powder, and carrying a smoking firebrand. He went round
the men, first on the inside and then on the outside of the circle,
flourishing the smoking brand wherever he went. He then threw it
away and sprinkled the people with medicine, by means of two
Native brooms, one being held in each hand. After this, the
company was sent by him to a stream. His boy followed with a
basket of medicine, which was put into deep running water, so that
the water flowed into the basket and out of it. The basket was
retained in position by the doctor's boy, assisted by one of the
boys from the kraal. The warriors drank of the water, some from
the basket itself, and others just below it. This done, they
individually moved down the stream and vomited into the water.
After washing their bodies, they moved back to the cattle-kraal,
chanting as they went in company formation. Thus clean of body
and stomach, they dipped their fingers in the war medicine,
prepared on heated potsherds, and brought it to their lips. The
Chief was not doctored. When sprinkling the warriors, the doctor
asked them if they wanted war, they replied in the affirmative. They
were then allowed to return to their kraals, but told to sleep on
their weapons.—Decisions, Native High Court, 1907, p. 93.
It seems that the warriors were also invited by the doctor and
Ntshingumuzi to make money contributions, and that shillings and
sixpences were given. The money, it was said, was to be sent to
the 'Chief of Zululand' (Dinuzulu) to buy drugs, to render their
bodies impervious to bullets.
[264] These squadrons, when preparing to move from Dundee to
Helpmakaar, got orders on the 20th to move to Chaka's Kraal, on
the north coast. The destination was altered to Stanger and, on
21st, to Otimati, for which latter place the troops marched from
Stanger on the 22nd, having by then been joined by C Battery,
N.F.A. (Major Currie); Durban Reserves (Chief Leader N.
Chiazzari); and the Indian Stretcher-bearers (Sergt.-Major M.K.
Gandhi). The column was placed under the command of Lieut.-
Col. W. Arnott.
[265] Although giving the command to Arnott, Leuchars
accompanied the column, and, with his staff officer (Major Carter),
witnessed the operations from the field gun position referred to
later on in the text.
[266] Probably the first time this type of gun was used in action.
[267] The artillery fired about fifteen rounds, viz. shrapnel, from C.
To begin with, the shells burst on graze; later on, good bursts were
obtained.
[268] This squadron had been sent out in the morning to patrol
near Tugela. It arrived at a most opportune moment.
 XVII.
GENERAL CONCENTRATION AT THRING'S POST.—ACTIONS
AT MACRAE'S STORE, INSUZE AND PONJWANA.—
CONVERGING MOVEMENT ON MESENI'S WARD.

McKenzie reached Krantzkop on the same day that the action at

Peyana[269] was fought. He met and discussed the position with the
Acting Commandant (Major-General Sir John Dartnell)[270] and
Leuchars on the 29th June. Owing to its appearing that disaffection
was spreading from Mapumulo towards Tongaat, and not being
confined to Mapumulo division, as had been supposed, he gave up
the idea he had first entertained of trying to force the rebels towards
the Tugela, where they would have found themselves opposed by
Mansel and Woolls-Sampson on the Zululand side, for one that
involved a far more extensive field of operations. In pursuance of the
fresh plan, Barker (then at Middle Drift) was detached from Mansel,
[271] and, on account of being closer than Mackay, and having mule-
transport which had been resting a few days, was sent round by
Dalton and Great Noodsberg to take up a position at Esidumbini, that
is, on the far or south-western side of the disturbed area. Barker
reached Krantzkop from Middle Drift on the 29th. He left the same
afternoon and got to Dalton on the 30th. On the night of the 29th, two
guns, A Battery, N.F.A., were pushed forward to reinforce him, as it
was reported the enemy was in force at the junction of Umvoti and
Hlimbitwa rivers. The artillery was sent, as it appeared possible to
shell the rebels from the slopes of Noodsberg and drive them back to
the sphere of intended operations, viz. that part of Umvoti valley
occupied chiefly by Meseni's and Swaimana's people. Woolls-
Sampson was instructed to move viâ Bond's Drift and Bulwer to
Thring's Post, whilst Mansel, supplemented by such police as, up till
then, had been attached to Woolls-Sampson's column, proceeded to
the position just vacated by the latter column.[272] A detachment of
D.L.I. formed a garrison at Bond's Drift. At this point was a large
railway bridge connecting Natal with the coastal districts of Zululand.
Mackay's column, by this time hastening to concentrate with the other
troops at Thring's Post, reached Krantzkop at mid-day on the 30th,
only to move later the same day towards its destination.
The necessity for swiftness of movement was in the air. Every man
knew that Mapumulo was one of the most densely-populated districts
in Natal. It was a purely Native district in which the ancient
superstitions, habits and customs of the Zulus were still generally
observed. The country was open and picturesque, with water and
pasture abundant. The climate, moreover, was as fresh and
exhilarating as that at Nkandhla. Such troops, e.g. Mackay's, as had
not as yet clashed with the enemy, betrayed irrepressible eagerness
to do so as soon as possible. Not less keenness was displayed by
the Transvaalers under Barker, flushed with their recent and brilliant
successes in Zululand. Thus, although at this critical moment, some
8,000 rebels were reported to have massed in Umvoti valley, barely a
dozen miles from Thring's Post, the morale of the troops was
excellent. And, one and all, the crushing blow at Mome still in their
minds, were inspired with the feeling, not only that the concentration
taking place was opportune and fitting, but that they were on the
winning side and would still further stamp out the Rebellion, be the
insurgents 10,000 or 20,000 in number. If ever a man rode a winning
horse, knowing he was winning, that man at this moment was
McKenzie. Eager co-operation by the Government in every
conceivable direction, with a vigilant and sympathetic Governor, and
every combatant, white or coloured, animated with a desire to put
forth his best, that was what all these neo-Usutuites of Natal had to
contend with. Thus, although some sharp conflicts with the rebels had
still to come, it was a foregone conclusion that the Rebellion in those
parts, notwithstanding the formidable numbers that had massed,
would be crushed, and crushed in the speediest manner possible.
As soon as Woolls-Sampson reached Bond's Drift on the 1st July,
after traversing an exceedingly difficult country for ox-transport, he
received orders to push on with all speed to Thring's Post. At Bond's
Drift he was joined by a squadron of Royston's Horse that had been
recruited in the Cape Colony. He decided to leave his transport at
Bond's Drift and to make a night march. Thring's Post was reached at
3 a.m. on the 2nd.
On leaving the drift, Woolls-Sampson instructed Major S.G.
Campbell, D.L.I., to establish the garrison referred to with 35 D.L.I.
(mounted infantry), 145 D.L.I. and one N.F.A. gun. At 11 a.m. on the
2nd, however, Campbell, then on the Zululand side, received a wire
from Woolls-Sampson ordering him to come on at once to Thring's
Post with a convoy of twenty-two waggons of supplies, it being
imperative for these to reach Thring's Post the same night. By
double-spanning (no punt being available, as the water was too low),
the waggons were got across, and at 1 p.m. the convoy, consisting of
70 D.L.I., one N.F.A. gun (Beningfield), 50 Z.M.R. (Flindt), and some
15 N.D.M.R., moved forward. When about a mile from Mr. Hulett's
house at Bulwer, a Native was seen on the road. As he appeared
suspicious, he was made to accompany the convoy. Questioned as to
the whereabouts of the enemy, who, it seemed, from a subsequent
telegram from Woolls-Sampson, was lurking in the vicinity, the man
denied all knowledge of it, though later on said he had heard it might
assemble where the springs of two streams were but a few yards
apart. A short halt was made at Bulwer and, just after sunset,[273] the
convoy pushed on.
In the ordinary course, the best plan, with an enemy close at hand,
would have been to lager at Bulwer. It was owing entirely to the
stringency of the orders that an advance was made at that late hour.
All were warned to be ready in case of attack. Bayonets were fixed
and flankers thrown out. With darkness rapidly coming on, the
flankers, for fear of being cut off, were not more than thirty yards off
the road. Four mounted men of the advanced guard, consisting of a
troop Z.M.R., under Capt. D.J.C. Hulley, marched along the road. A
couple on the right and another couple on the left did the flanking,
whilst seven were in the road in immediate rear of the front four.
Behind, with an interval of about fifty yards, came 70 D.L.I. (with a
Maxim gun), N.F.A. gun, an ambulance, and 22 waggons. A number
of N.D.M.R. were riding on the vehicles. Z.M.R. (35) formed the rear-
guard with two Rexer guns. The Native referred to was now noticed
staring frequently to the right.
Owing to the likelihood of attack, the men marched as compactly as
possible. The worst spot was undoubtedly the long cutting a mile after
leaving Bulwer; nothing, however, was seen or heard of the enemy at
that point. The little column next moved slowly across the low ridge
between the end of the cutting and a small zinc store, known as
Macrae's, on a knoll. The small clump of trees between the road and
the store could be seen on the horizon ahead. The country about this
part is rugged, though the three or four valleys in the vicinity, if steep,
are, just there, small and not deeper than 100 feet. The road was
hard and in good condition. After passing the store (at a distance of
thirty yards), it is practically level and easy-going the whole way to
Thring's Post.
The convoy moved along well, at an average speed of two and a half
miles an hour (the usual pace for oxen on good roads). As, after
leaving the cutting, danger of attack did not appear so imminent,
Capt. Robert Armstrong, N.M.R., was sent on by himself to select a
suitable bivouac. The advanced guard now went up the slight incline
to the left of the store. When passing, a black dog that was following
Hulley stood, and, ruffling its hair, began to growl and bark in the
direction of the plantation on the right. Seeing this, Hulley became
suspicious; the same instant, noticing a mass of armed Natives
springing up from among the trees[274] (the sound they made being
similar to the rising of a flock of guinea-fowl), he shouted a warning.
The guard swung their horses round and began to fall back on the
main body in rear as the rebels, some 300 strong, dashed forward
from both sides of the road,[275] crying "Usutu! Usutu!" and using their
knobsticks as well as assegais. Armstrong, by this time some 200
yards ahead, finding himself cut off, galloped back through the
enemy, knocking down two or three, and using his revolver freely as
he did so; notwithstanding the heavy fusillade then going on towards
him, he succeeded in reaching the main body on the right without
mishap. Steady and well-directed volleys were poured into the
advancing enemy. He did not assume his characteristic formation,
probably owing to the nature of the ground, but moved along the road
en masse and with great dash. The distance from the store to the
head of the column was barely eighty yards. The hot and effective
fire, however, including case from the 15-pounder, stopped the
advance, and caused the rebels to break to rear and right of the
store.
Two minutes after the attack had failed, reinforcements having, in the
meantime, moved up from the rebels' rear, another attack came,
slightly to the left of where the first had taken place. This was well
met by rifle fire and case, and resulted in a second and speedy
retreat.
There being reason to suppose a third would follow, Campbell drew
the men up in half-moon formation across the road, the convex side
facing the store. The 15-pounder was placed in the centre of the
road, the rear-guard was brought up, and the N.D.M.R. directed to
fire right and left as necessity arose.
As anticipated, the third attack came, some twenty minutes after the
second. It was from the same quarter, and was delivered after
darkness had set in. It met with no better luck than the others. During
this attack, one of the three Rexer guns was brought into action.[276]
Two hundred yards beyond the store, a road branched off to the left.
At this point, a second impi, also about 300 strong, had at first lain in
waiting, its object evidently being to allow the convoy to get between
both impis, when it would have been attacked front and rear. The plan
failed on account of the foremost body being prematurely forced to
take action.
The rebel forces were composed of men of Matshwili's and
Ntshingumuzi's tribes, under the indunas Dabulumbimbi and Mvukazi
respectively. Mahlanga also accompanied Ntshingumuzi's men as
second in command. He remained in rear whilst urging others to
charge.
During the engagement, forty rebels were killed and others wounded.
Tpr. G. Coll, Z.M.R., was seriously wounded with assegais. He
received every attention from Major Campbell, M.D., C.M. (Edin.), but
afterwards succumbed to his injuries at Thring's Post.
The dog which had been the first to detect the enemy, and practically
saved the column, was accidentally shot by its own side when trying
to get back.
The column bivouacked for the night where it had been engaged.
Apart from the proximity of the enemy and the darkness, it was
impossible to move, because waggons and oxen, owing to Native
drivers and voorloopers having run away, had either capsized or
become considerably disorganized. Thring's Post was reached at
mid-day on the 3rd without further incident.
The smart manner in which these attacks were met and repelled
reflects the greatest credit on Campbell and his men, who were not
only ambushed at dusk by an enemy far outnumbering them, but
were considerably encumbered by slow transport, which had already
come some nineteen of the twenty-eight miles to be done that day.
Even the 15-pounder was being drawn by oxen. Having regard to the
enemy's most determined charges, only remarkable promptitude and
resourcefulness on the part of the officer in command turned a
threatened calamity into a decisive victory.
But other and even more important developments were occurring
almost simultaneously not many miles away. To these we must now
hasten to draw the reader's attention.
The last we saw of Barker was his departure from Krantzkop to take
up a position at Esidumbini. His force then consisted of four
squadrons T.M.R. His orders were to reach Esidumbini as soon as
possible and be on high ground overlooking Umvoti Drift at Gaillard's
store by daybreak, 3rd July, to co-operate with three other columns
from Mapumulo, Thring's Post and Glendale in a general converging
movement on Meseni's ward, where, it was known, the rebels had
assembled in great force.
A delay occurred at Dalton from 9 a.m. (30th) until 2 p.m., owing to
Barker having to wait for supplies. These had to come from
Pietermaritzburg and Greytown by rail. He resolved to push forward
at 2 p.m., with thirteen waggons, though still somewhat short of
supplies. During the same afternoon, he was joined by the guns that
had been sent after him.
About 8 p.m., a message came from Chief Leader H. Ehlers, in
command of the New Hanover Reserves (70), to say he was in lager
at Little Noodsberg Hall, and that intelligence had come in to the
effect that he was to be attacked at daybreak on the 1st July by an
impi that had been seen during the afternoon on the Great
Noodsberg.[277] Barker immediately decided to march to the Hall with
three squadrons (each about 100 strong), leaving the fourth as escort
to the guns and transport. The Hall was reached at midnight.
Everything there was quiet. When daylight appeared, the expected
attack was not made. Barker then left for the Great Noodsberg, where
he waited till 11 a.m. for the rest of the column to come up. That night
the column bivouacked on the Great Noodsberg. A number of scouts
had been noticed during the day, all of whom retired suspiciously to
the front of the column as it advanced.
By 7 a.m. on the 2nd (Monday), having been joined by the New
Hanover Reserves on the preceding afternoon, the column was again
on the move.[278] After travelling about a mile and a half, the
advanced guard (B squadron, T.M.R.), came upon an impi some 300
strong, concealed on both sides of the road in a wattle plantation (site
of the Newspaper Mission Station), which had been thinned out, but
had a lot of scrub about it. Steps were now taken to drive the place,
with the result that many armed Natives, particularly near their small
church, where it had evidently been intended to lie in ambush for the
troops, were discovered and shot. Scarcely any other portion of the
column, except the advanced guard, came into action. As the enemy
retreated, he was pursued by the advanced guard and two troops of
A squadron, T.M.R. The operations lasted about twenty minutes. After
the fighting was over, the plantation was again, but more thoroughly,
driven. About sixty rebels were killed.
At 9.30 a.m., the column moved along easy slopes towards Insuze
river, the advanced guard being increased to two squadrons. The
strength of the column now was four squadrons, T.M.R. (400); two
Maxims and one Colt gun (25); two guns, 15-pounders, N.F.A. (25);
and the Reserves (70). There were no Native levies.[279] Many
Natives were observed on high ground to the right and left fronts.
After passing Butler's store, about a thousand yards from Insuze Drift,
Barker, seeing the place was a suitable one for watering, decided to
halt. The column accordingly began to pull out on to level ground
immediately across and to the right of the drift. The guard, under
Lieut. H.S. Liddle, went forward to establish itself on a long grassy
ridge, parallel with the river at that part. This ridge rises to a height of
60 ft. above the drift and increases gradually to 80, 100 and 150, as it
extends further to left and right fronts. On the immediate right of the
small neck through which the road passes over the ridge, was a
police station, consisting of two or three small buildings. Three or four
Native kraals were also to be seen on the ridge to the left of the road.
With the object of protecting the column against surprise, the guard
occupied ground (C), some thirty yards to the right of the station. A
troop was sent to kopje F, whilst a section (four men), under Sergt.-
Major S.L. Neville, was sent to B, i.e. within fifteen or twenty yards of
the kraal—round which grew a thick, bushy fence.[280] Here three of
the men dismounted and were just handing over their horses, with the
object of searching that and the other kraals, before occupying a
kopje near by, when an impi, some 500 strong, sprang from behind
the nearest kraal and hedge, and charged round both sides of the
kraal at the men, shouting the usual war-cry as they did so. The latter,
having no time to fire, mounted and retired to the guard, wheeling
slightly to the right, to avoid masking the fire. The enemy continued
their charge. The troops at the drift, as well as the guard, opened a
hot fire as they ran. In the meantime, another impi, as strong as the
first, began to appear from a bush some forty yards to the guard's
right rear. The bush, showing but slightly on top, extended down a
steep incline on the far side of the ridge. At this moment, Barker, who
was watering his horse when the charge began, galloped to the
troops at the police station. Whilst six men were told off to check this
latter charge, others were engaged with the impi rushing down from
the kraal. It was all a matter of seconds. The guard stood their ground
and opened smartly with magazine fire. Notwithstanding the cross-
fire, flank and front, that was being poured into them by the men near
the drift, some of whom had lined the left bank below the drift, whilst
others were on higher ground in rear, the impi succeeded in getting
within a very few yards of the guard. The leader did not fall until within
six. On his falling, the remainder broke and ran down the slopes on
the far side, looking from the drift. When the action was at its height,
Barker, whose horse was wounded with an assegai, instinctively
perceived that the critical point was the one to which he had just
ridden. He at once sent for reinforcements. Such men as were
immediately available dashed up. Neither of the two guns at the drift
came into action. Had case been promptly fired at those who came
from the kraal, it must have proved very destructive at a range of 400
yards. A few seconds later, however, it became impossible to open,
owing to the guns being masked by the reinforcements that sprang
forward from the drift to the ridge.
A and B squadrons, as well as two troops of D, were sent in pursuit of
the now flying enemy. The two 15-pounders were placed at the kraal
from which one of the impis had been in hiding, whilst the Maxims
and Colt gun took up positions on the ridge between the police station
and the bush.
The rebels retired in a northerly direction, down Insuze valley. They
were hotly pursued by the troops, who rode along the ridges. The
field guns fired about twenty rounds with great effect at ranges
varying from 600 to 1,800 yards, but were eventually forced to cease
fire, on account of the pursuing squadrons too closely approaching
the enemy. The machine guns, too, did excellent work.
A third impi, also about 500 strong, which up till then had taken no
part whatever in the engagement, was accidentally come upon by A
squadron (Lieut. R.V. Saner).[281] The attack made by about fifty of
this impi was promptly and effectively repelled, whereupon the rebels
joined the others in a general retreat.
At a distance of three or four miles from the scene of action, about
thirty fugitives got into a narrow valley (through which the pursuing A
squadron had to pass), evidently to lie in ambush. They were,
however, seen, and dispersed with loss. Still another impi was
observed by the same squadron about a mile to the left, composed
apparently of men who had not been engaged at all. They did not,
however, come into action.
Two troops of C squadron were ordered to turn out the rebels who
were hiding in the long grass and rushes in a valley between the gun
position, near the police station, and the pursuing squadrons.
By 11 a.m., the squadrons, having by that time pursued the enemy for
four or five miles, were recalled, as a number of rebels had shown
themselves on both flanks near the police station. The troops
reassembled by about 1.30 p.m., when they off-saddled for an hour
on different parts of the ridge.
The casualties were Tpr. Robert Knight, D squadron, T.M.R., killed;
Tprs. Simcox and Tobin, A squadron, T.M.R., wounded. The enemy's
losses amounted to about 400.
A local Native Chief, Mahlube, who was with Barker's column when
the foregoing action was fought, although many of his tribe had joined
the rebels, expressed the following opinion: "My belief is that the
enemy intended disputing the drift with the troops as they were
watering their horses. The T.M.R. saved themselves by their
courageous stand. Had they betrayed the slightest weakness, they
would have fared badly, for I could see the enemy were reckless and
did not care what happened."
The march to Esidumbini was resumed at a quarter to three. A camp
was formed at that place on its being reached two hours later. The
night passed without incident.
The demeanour of the local and apparently neutral Natives was
unsatisfactory. They were very reticent and pretended to know
nothing whatever of the intentions of the enemy. They professed to
be ignorant of the impis that had attacked but a few miles away at
Insuze. One of the Chiefs, Njubanjuba, living on high ground, must
have seen the fight and could have given valuable information had he
chosen. He maintained a sullen and insolent attitude all the time the
column was in the district. It was in view of these facts that Barker
decided not to leave camp until after daybreak, a decision which, as it
happened, was one McKenzie had also come to, in consequence of
information obtained by him on the night of the 2nd that the rebels
proposed to attack Barker at dawn on the 3rd.
When the column started (7 a.m.), one squadron, T.M.R., and the
New Hanover Reserves being left to guard the camp, it proceeded
along the Mapumulo road towards the high ground overlooking
Umvoti Drift.
 INSUZE

Dispositions at the beginning of the action

REFERENCE

A = First attacking impi

B = Pickets

C = Two troops, T.M.R.

D = Impi; out of sight at drift

E = Where part of enemy gathered when about to retreat

F = Hill to which pickets were sent

 G = Police Station

H = Six men posted here to check impi in bush

J = Butler's store

K = Position of 15-pdrs. during enemy's retreat. Maxims and Colt gun

were then between G and L

(arrow)= Direction of enemy's retreat

(crescent)= Enemy

(block)= Waggon

(dashes)= Swamp, with long grass and rushes

(circle)= Kraal
On the march, a number of Natives was seen on a ridge at Sikota's
kraal in the neighbourhood of a prominent detached hill Ponjwana.
[282] Word was passed on to the advanced guard, A squadron (78),
who, however, had already perceived the rebels' movements. As
further attack was imminent, the main body was kept within two to
three hundred yards of the advanced guard. About three miles from
Esidumbini Mission Station, the Mapumulo road passes over two
well-defined hills about a thousand yards apart, and connected by a
hog-backed neck. The country on either side of the road is steep and
thickly covered with thorn bush. As the road approaches Sikota's
kraal from the hog-backed hill, the ground rises immediately on the
left to about fifty feet above the road, such elevation extending for
about 200 yards, when the road enters and ascends open ground for
another 200 yards. It is about a hundred and twenty yards from the
road at this point that the kraal referred to was situated. On the
immediate right of the road is a dense, precipitous bush, 100 yards
broad at the top and extending some 400 yards down into an
enormous, steep, and wooded valley. On the left of the road where
Sikota's kraal was, and opposite that kraal, is a patch of open, high
ground extending some two or three hundred yards, and about a
hundred and fifty broad. To the west of this, the country falls away
into another great valley, similar to the one already referred to. At the
front, again looking from the road where it is nearest the kraal, the
ground slopes gently to the front and right front, but more sharply to
the left, where the trees grow more closely together.
As the column came along the hog's back, it became a little "crushed
up," whereupon the advanced guard cantered forward a little way to
the knoll on which Ngembudi's kraal stood.[283] At this point, a section
was marching some thirty to sixty yards ahead along the road, whilst
half a dozen scouts moved out to their positions on the right and left
fronts, owing to the ground there lending itself to better deployment.
No sooner, however, was the top of the knoll reached at A than the
enemy, some three to four hundred strong, was observed 150 yards
to the right front, that is, some way down an incline, but not
concealed from view of the leading section. The scouts fell back to
the troop in rear, which, at the same time, advanced to a point in sight
of the enemy and immediately lined across the road.
Fire was opened at the rebels then swiftly charging, with uplifted
shields, like a hive of bees upset, over somewhat uneven ground.
Some of the guard at first fired from the saddle, aiming rather at the
oncoming mass than at particular individuals.
The men, ordered to dismount, handed over their horses to be held,
and, dropping quickly on one knee, opened a hot and rapid fire. The
charge was direct and determined. Some of the enemy came to
within ten feet of the rifles when, their centre by that time blown out
by the first-class marksmen that happened to be among the troops,
they swerved off to right and left. Those going to the right were in the
act of passing between the flank and the kraal, when C squadron was
moved smartly to the right, only to come to so close quarters with the
strong force then at and about the kraal as to be obliged to fall back
to hold the line B indicated on the plan. Barker had, in the meantime,
moved up from the main body, some 200-300 yards in rear at the
moment of attack, and addressed himself to the situation on the right,
then the most critical. At the same time, the left flank being
threatened, support was also pushed forward there. This caused the
rebels opposite that flank to retreat to west and down the steep
inclines.
After the main fire had been turned towards the impi at the kraal, that
impi was also repulsed, when it forthwith precipitated itself into the
dense bush on the immediate east of the kraal, and from thence
down the great, steep valleys and ravines which were near at hand.