Asian Journal of Philosophy (2023) 2:31

https://doi.org/10.1007/s44204-023-00088-w

ORIGINAL ARTICLE

Nāgārjuna, Madhyamaka, and truth

Chris Rahlwes1

Received: 7 October 2022 / Accepted: 12 June 2023

© The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature B.V. 2023

Abstract
In reading Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, one is struck by Nāgārjuna’s sepa-
ration of conventional truth and ultimate truth. At the most basic level, these two
truths deal with emptiness and the appearance of fundamental existence, but the
meaning of “conventional” lends itself to two key senses: concealing and socially
agreed-upon norms and practices. The tension between these two senses and how
they relate to truth leads Nāgārjuna’s Tibetan commentators in different directions in
their exegesis on conventional truth. Based on the debate between Tsongkhapa and
Gorampa, I propose a Madhyamaka account of truth as trust. In so doing, I provide a
novel account of truth, in which propositions and phenomena are truth-bearers, and
one’s ability to trust in them establishes their truth-value.

Keywords Truth · Two truths · Nāgārjuna · Emptiness · Pragmatism

1 Introduction

In reading Nāgārjuna’s (c. 200 CE) Fundamental Verses on the Middle Way
(Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, MMK henceforth), one is struck by Nāgārjuna’s separation of
conventional truth (saṃvṛti satya) and ultimate truth (paramārtha satya). Nāgārjuna takes
our day-to-day world to characterize conventional truth and ultimate truth to be character-
ized by emptiness (śūnyatā), which is the absence of a fundamental existence (svabhāva).
Indian and Tibetan philosophers continue Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka project and focus on
delineating these two truths. In what follows, I argue for an account of truth (satya) as
essentially trust that allows me to characterize an overlapping notion of truth between the
two truths. In so doing, I take propositions and phenomena as truth-bearers and trust as
the critical criterion for truth.
In understanding truth as trust, I provide a novel account of truth that follows
closely to the Indo-Tibetan Madhyamaka literature. This leads me to a direct rejec-
tion of Newland and Tillemans’ (2011, pp. 4–5) claim that only propositions can

* Chris Rahlwes
chris.rahlwes@uconn.edu
1
Philosophy Department, University of Connecticut, Storrs, CT, USA

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be true as well as Priest et al.’s (2011) assertion that the Madhyamaka account of
truth is deflationary.1 Such accounts fail to seriously consider that Madhyamaka’s
fundamental truth-bearers (or satya-bearers) are phenomena, not propositions. We
must first focus on phenomena to articulate a complete account of what Nāgārjuna
and the Madhyamaka philosophers have in mind. To explain how a phenomenon can
be true, I depend on Nāgārjuna and vital Indo-Tibetan commentators on Nāgārjuna’s
work. More specifically, I rely on Candrakīrti (c. 600 CE), Tsongkhapa, (1357–1419
CE),2 and Gorampa (1429–1489 CE).3 In transitioning from phenomena as truth-
bearers to propositions, I lean on William James’ (1912, 1922, & 1987) pragma-
tist account of truth. The reason I do this is twofold: (i) James’ account provides
a bridge for the two truth-bearers (unlike a deflationary account of truth), and (ii)
it is unclear if Indo-Tibetan Madhyamaka philosophers have anything to say about
propositional truth (see § 2).
This paper is divided into five sections. First, I define “truth” (satya) in the con-
text of MMK and show the importance of phenomena as truth-bearers within the
Indo-Tibetan frame. Second, I provide a general synopsis of Nāgārjuna’s analysis
of the two truths. Third, I turn to Tsongkhapa’s and Gorampa’s debate over the Two
Truths through Thakchoe’s (2007) careful analysis. In so doing, I provide two com-
peting interpretations of the Madhyamaka use of “truth” as it refers to phenomena.
Fourth, I utilize James’ pragmatist theory of truth to put forward a Madhyamaka
account of propositional truth. Finally, I combine Madhyamaka’s two truth-bearers
into a pragmatist account concerning trust.
A quick note on terminology is in order. By “propositions,” I mean semantic
truth-bearers. These truth-bearers can be “typical” propositions (as mental content)
or may be statements or utterances. I am uncommitted to their exact nature, but I
take the Sanskrit dṛṣṭi (“view”) as representative of a proposition. By “phenomena,”
I mean objects, events, cognitions, and their appearances to an individual.

2 The meaning of satya

Before moving to Nāgārjuna’s account of the two truths, it is of help to discuss what
exactly satya—the “truth” of the “two truths”—means. To do this, let us briefly dis-
cuss the general meaning of satya and sat (“true,” “existent”). After so doing, we
can evaluate Nāgārjuna’s use of both terms.
Satya has two components: sat, which means “existing,” “existent,” “real,” and
“true,” and the suffix ya, which means “relating to” or “having.” Based on these two
components, satya means “relating to truth,” “possessing truth,” “relating to exist-
ence,” or “possessing existence.” Generally, translators do not focus on the suffix ya.
Monier-Williams (1899, p. 1135), Apte (1890, p. 1084), and Macdonell (1893, p.

1
Guerrero (2015) notes that a deflationary account of Madhyamaka truth is problematic and would sep-
arate the two truths.
2
Tsongkhapa’s full name is Tsong kha pa blo bzang graps pa.
3
Gorampa’s full name is Go rams pa bsod nams seng ge.

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Asian Journal of Philosophy (2023) 2:31 Page 3 of 24 31

30) follow such a tendency in defining satya as “true,” “real,” “genuine,” and “sin-
cere.” These definitions downplay sat’s meaning of “existing” or “existent”; yet,
some, such as Monier-Williams, do emphasize satya to have two primary senses:
(i) satya as “truth” and (ii) satya as “reality.” Satya as “reality” aligns with sat as
“existing” or “existent.”
Many contemporary scholars of Madhyamaka—for example, Siderits (1988 &
2007), Newland and Tillemans (2011), and Priest (2011)—adopt these two senses.
In so doing, they emphasize a division of these senses by what satya modifies.
They argue that satya as “truth” only applies to propositions, and satya as “reality”
applies to phenomena. Further, they explicitly endorse propositions as the only pos-
sible truth-bearers. Phenomena are ignored or left as existence-bearers.
These scholars’ appeal to satya as modifying propositions is extrapolatory since
Nāgārjuna in MMK only uses satya to refer to the Four Noble Truths (catvāri
āryasatyāni, MMK 24.1–3) and the Two Truths (dve satye, MMK 24.8–10). Satya,
in either case, does not appear to modify a proposition. Temporally leaving aside the
two truths, let us focus on the Four Noble Truths. While Nāgārjuna never explicitly
lists the Four Noble Truths in MMK 24, they are generally listed as “suffering,”
“suffering’s origin,” “suffering’s cessation,” and “the practice for suffering’s cessa-
tion”.4 In listing the Four Noble Truths in this way, it remains unclear if they refer
to phenomena or propositions. I suggest they refer to the phenomena, but one could
argue that each is shorthand for a proposition. For example, “suffering’s origin’ may
be shorthand for cravings accompanied by pleasures and desires lead to rebirth. If
Nāgārjuna has something like propositions in mind, he never makes this clear.
While one may cautiously approach the primacy of Nāgārjuna’s use of satya as
modifying phenomena, one should not doubt his use of sat (“true,” “existent”) as
referring solely to phenomena. Unlike satya, Nāgārjuna uses sat throughout MMK.
A few choice instances are as follows. In MMK 1.7, sat modifies dharma. In MMK
2.7, asat (the negation of sat) modifies “the act of going” (gamana). In MMK 4.4,
sat modifies “appearance” (rūpa). In MMK in 6.1, sat modifies “desire” (raga). In
MMK 15.9, satī (the feminine form of sat) modifies “nature” (prakṛti). In MMK
20.15, satī modifies “connection” (saṃgati).5 Regarding each, translators—such as
Siderits and Katsura (2013)—typically translate sat as “exist” or “existent”.6 I sug-
gest that these translations are mistaken, and, instead of “exist” or “existent,” sat
should be translated as “true.”

4
For example, in the Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta, the Four Noble Truths are presented as
follows: the noble truth of suffering (dukkhaṃ ariyasaccaṃ), the noble truth of suffering’s ori-
gin (dukkhasamudayaṃ ariyasaccaṃ), the noble truth of suffering’s cessation (dukkhanirodhaṃ
ariyasaccaṃ), and the noble truth of the practice for suffering’s cessation (dukkhaniordhagāminī
paṭipadā ariyasaccaṃ).
5
Nāgārjuna rejects each of these as being sat through his prasaṅga arguments. The prasaṅga appears to
be something similar to a reductio ad absurdum but likely utilizes a non-truth functional negation. Such a
negation may be a denegation as Kajiyama (1973) and Matilal (1986, pp. 66–67) argue, a metalinguistic
negation as Rahlwes (2022) argues, or a non-implicative propositional canceling negation as Westerhoff
(2006 & 2018) argues.
6
I am unaware of any instance that a translator has translated sat as “truth” for these or other instances
in MMK.

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While such claims could lead the reader to reject sat or satya as “true” or “truth”
in favor of “exist,” “existent,” or “existence,” I encourage caution. Even if phenom-
ena are the primary bearers of satya or sat in MMK, this does not entail that they
cannot modify propositions.7 Instead of a dismissal reading, I suggest we open our-
selves up to the following guiding question: what notion of truth allows phenomena
and propositions to be truth-bearers?
The best way to answer this question is to (at least temporarily) refrain from
deflationary or correspondence theories of truth, which primarily take propositions
as truth-bearers, in favor of theories that allow phenomena to be truth-bearers. The
Yakherds (2021a) provide a possible route to such a theory. While the Yakherds gen-
erally define satya as “real,” “true,” “genuine,” and “pure,” they provide an under-
standing of satya as trust. The Yakherds (2021a, pp. 7–8) find this understanding in
the relationship between satya and “conventional” (samvṛti), which they derive from
Candrakīrti’s Clear Words’ (Prasannapadā, which is a commentary on MMK) divi-
sion of “conventional” into three senses (see §3.2).
In their connection of truth to trust, the Yakherds focus on “conventional”
as “concealing” and “ignorance” (ajñāna). This focus leads them to understand
“conventional” to be in opposition to truth. The conventional obscures knowl-
edge. That is, conventional as concealing and ignorance is inherently decep-
tive. Hence, they argue that truth should be understood as non-deceptive since
it does not obscure knowledge. This is a point that Nāgārjuna makes in MMK
13.1, when he states, “the Bhagavan said ‘that which has a deceptive nature is
false (mṛṣā)’”.8 And Tsongkhapa defends (with a mention to MMK 13.1) in
Ocean of Reasoning (rTsa she tik chen rigs pa’i rgya mtsho, which is a com-
mentary on MMK):
Thus, since it is said that the meaning of “nondeceptive” is true, . . . and since
the meaning of “unreal” in “all compound phenomena are unreal, deceptive
phenomena” is deceptive, the meaning of “true” should be understood as non-
deceptive. (Samten & Garfield, 2006, trans., p. 488)
Both philosophers ground truth in a non-deceptive nature and falsity in
deceptive nature. The Yakherds (2021a, p. 22) argue that for something to be

7
Since this paper concerns Tibetan sources, it is important to discuss our Tibetan equivalent of satya:
bden pa. dBen pa is translated by Jäschke (1881, pp. 270–271) and Chandra Das (1908, p. 871) as “true,”
“right,” and “sincere.” Jäschke argues that bden pa can be used in the abstract but is typically used to
mean that something is true (e.g., “words”). While neither Jäschke nor Chandra Das explicitly define
bden pa as “exist,” each provides the term bden po (“a true man”), which is a case of truth being applied
to a phenomenon and not a proposition. The relationship between bden pa and “exist” is made more
explicit by Newland (2011, p. 57), who argues that Tsongkhapa (especially 195.2–3 of his commentary
on Candrakīrti’s Introduction to the Middle Way (Madhyamakāvatāra)) uses bden pa to refer to the exist-
ence (yod pa) of things or phenomena and not to the truth of propositions (or statement-like beliefs or
views). Hence, satya and bden pa are primarily used to refer to phenomena as truth-bearers, but this does
not limit their use from propositions as truth-bearers.
8
tan mṛṣā moṣadharma yad bhagavān ity abhāṣata| Unless otherwise noted, translations from the San-
skrit are my own.

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non-deceptive, its appearance and what it actually is must align.9 To be true,

the truth-bearer must actually be what it appears to be. The Yakherds (2021a, p.
8) explicitly connect this sense of truth to phenomena. They provide examples
of a true friend, a false coin, and the appearance of an oasis.
A true friend is somebody that is reliable and responds to you with care and
respect. You can trust that they will be there for you. If somebody you think of as a
friend is not there for you or lacks respect or care, they are not a true friend. They
may still have the appearance of a friend, but their actions separate how they appear
from what they actually are. Hence, they are a false friend. The example of a false
coin is a counterfeit coin. The coin seems to be legitimate and something you can
trust for your commerce, but, in actuality, it is not legitimate and will likely fail in
your attempt to purchase an item.
A mirage of an oasis is a phenomenon (a heated mass of air) that appears
as something that it is not (an oasis). One cannot trust in a mirage to quench
one’s thirst or allow one an escape from the desert heat. Thus, a mirage is a
false oasis. In contrast, a spring in the desert would be a true oasis. One could
trust this body of water to quench their thirst and cool down. In each case, the
phenomenon is true when it can be trusted to fulfill its purpose and false when
it cannot.
While the Yakherds provide these examples of phenomena being true (or
false), they do not offer concrete examples of how a proposition can be true or
false. Without this, they leave the meaning of trusting in a proposition unclear.
In Section 5, I suggest a pragmatist route to understand the connection between
trust and truth regarding propositions. But before bridging the gap to proposi-
tions, we must look at phenomena. Let us turn to the Madhyamaka account of
two truths.

3 The two truths

In MMK 24.8, Nāgārjuna announces that there are two truths:

The teachings of the Buddhas rest on two truths: the conventional truth and the
ultimate truth.10
And in MMK 24.9–10, Nāgārjuna states the following:
They, who do not know the division of the two truths, do not know the
reality of the Buddha’s profound instructions. The ultimate is not taught

9
This notion of truth as trust and non-deceptive may help bridge a gap between “ontological truth,”
which takes objects or phenomena as truth-bearers, and “semantic truth,” which takes propositions as
truth-bearers. Traditions that have a robust account of ontological truth include Euro-Arabic Medieval
philosophy (see Cameron (2018)), Nahua (Aztec) philosophy (see Maffie (2014, pp. 100–113)), and early
Chinese philosophy (see McLeod (2016)).
10
dve satye samupāśritya buddhānāṃ dharmadeśanā | lokasaṃvṛtisatyaṃ ca satyaṃ ca paramārthataḥ
||24.8 ||

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without depending on custom. Nirvana is not achievable with an unascer-

tainable ultimate.11
In these verses, Nāgārjuna emphasizes that to understand the Buddha’s teaching,
one must understand the division of the two truths, which directly connects to Nir-
vana. In claiming that the ultimate truth depends on custom (vyavahāra), Nāgārjuna
joins the two truths. On Nāgārjuna’s account, one understands the ultimate truth—
all phenomena are empty (i.e., they lack fundamental existence)12—through customs
and convention. In these three verses, Nāgārjuna grounds what will be his Madhy-
amaka heirs’ debate over truth, and Candrakīrti, as Nāgārjuna’s commentator, fuels
the fire of this debate.

3.1 Three desert travelers

To explain the distinction between the ultimate truth and the conventional truth, I turn
to Candrakīrti’s analogy of the mirage from his commentary on Nāgārjuna’s Sixty
Stanzas of Reasoning (Yuktiṣaṣṭikā) 8. More specifically, I turn to Garfield’s (2011, pp.
29–30) updated version of Candrakīrti’s analogy (which I have slightly tweaked), which
goes as follows. Three friends—Alice, Bill, and Charlie—are traveling down a long
stretch of desert highway in the middle of the day. Alice is an expert traveler, Bill is a
novice traveler, and Charlie is wearing polarized sunglasses. After traveling throughout
the morning into mid-afternoon, they approach a mirage of water on the road.
In seeing what appears to be water on the road, Bill cries out in warning to watch
out for the water. (Perhaps, Bill is worried about a flash flood in the desert.) Alice
sees the mirage as a mirage and assures Bill that there is no danger. Charlie, who
cannot see the mirage due to his sunglasses, has no idea what either Alice or Bill
is talking about. Relating the mirage to the two truths, Bill sees only the conven-
tional truth (the appearance of water as fundamentally existing) and is deluded by
it, Charlie sees only the ultimate truth (the emptiness of water), and Alice sees (or
understands) both truths.
Bill’s understanding of the mirage is how conventional truth is often portrayed.
The conventional truth is what worldly, deluded beings take as truth. It is this under-
standing that Candrakīrti focuses on his commentary on Nāgārjuna’s Sixty Stanzas
of Reasoning 8. Candrakīrti states the following:
When surveying from a great distance the country in the region before him, a
traveler sees something as if filled with abundant, pure [water], and wants to
cross it. Yet from his experience, [thinking] he will not be able to, and being

11
ye ‘nayor na vijānanti vibhāgaṃ satyayor dvayoḥ | te tattvaṃ na vijānanti gambhīraṃ buddhaśāsane
||24.9|| vyavahāram anāśritya paramārtho na deśyate | paramārtham anāgamya nirvāṇaṃ nādhigamyate
||24.10||
12
Thakchoe (2023, pp. 77–79) emphasizes that Nāgārjuna rejects Sarvāstivada (Vaibhāṣika) and
Yogācāra appeals to a fundamental existence (svabhāva). The Sarvāstivadin position is that a phenom-
enon fundamentally exists when it cannot be further divided into pieces or has a unique characteristic
mark (svalakṣaṇa). The Yogācāra position is that consciousness fundamentally exists.

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afraid, he asks a farmer who comes from the region, “Just how [expansive] is
this water?” That [farmer] may say to him, “Where is this water? This resem-
bles water but it is a mirage. If you don’t believe my words about it, go there
and look – you will directly experience . . . my words.” (Loizzo, 2007, trans.,
p. 152.)
In this passage, we see that Candrakīrti’s potential advice for Bill is to keep going
until the experience of the mirage alleviates his ignorance. In gaining this under-
standing, Bill would see the mirage as Alice or the farmer sees it.
Nāgārjuna takes all phenomena to be like the mirage. The water that makes up the
oceans is as empty as the mirage—it appears to have fundamental existence but does
not. The oceans’ appearance of existence characterizes conventional truth. They
seem to fundamentally exist, but they do not. Further, both Alice and Bill experience
conventional truth in drastically different ways. Candrakīrti’s explication of “con-
ventional” (saṃvṛti) in his commentary on MMK 24.8 explains this difference.

3.2 Candrakīrti’s three senses of “Conventional”

In Clear Words, Candrakīrti provides three senses of “conventional”: “obscuring,”

“mutual dependence,” and “socially agreed-upon norms and practices.” These are
the principal elements of conventional truth that fodder the Tibetan debate over the
two truths. For the first sense, Candrakīrti states the following:
Conventional is universal obscuration. For the conventional is said to be
the ignorance derived from a universal concealing of every phenomenon’s
nature.13
This sense of conventional characterizes Bill’s initial experience of the mirage, in
which the actual nature of the mirage (as empty of water) was concealed from him.
For the second sense, Candrakīrti states the following:
Or the meaning of conventional is mutual dependence in which [phenomena]
rely on each other.14
“Mutual dependence” is synonymous with “dependent origination”
(pratītyasamutpāda), a fundamental Madhyamaka teaching. The inclusion of this syno-
nym places the fact that all phenomena are empty and arise together through causes and
conditions that interconnect them without ultimately grounding them onto the side of
conventional truth.15 This sense of “conventional” may capture Alice’s experience of the
mirage. Perhaps, Alice is well versed in optics and understands that this mirage is caused
due to a mass of heated air over the scorching asphalt, the light’s refraction through this
air, the eyes seeing this refraction, the brain’s interpretation of this refraction as a pool of
water, and the fact that there is no actual water on the road. In understanding the mirage

13
samantādvaraṇaṃ saṃvṛtiḥ | ajñānaṃ hi samantātsarvapadārthatattvāvacchādanāt-saṃvṛtirityucyate |
14
parasparasaṃbhavanaṃ vā saṃvṛtiranyonyasamāśrayeṇetyarthaḥ |
15
Berger (2021, pp. 57–100) disagrees with Candrakīrti on this point and argues that dependent origina-
tion is just emptiness and should be placed on the ultimate truth side and not the conventional truth side.

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in this way, she understands the causes and conditions that give rise to this phenomenon.
This sense of “conventional” establishes the fact that all phenomena are constituted in a
similar way to the mirage.
For the third sense of “conventional,” Candrakīrti states the following:
Or the meaning of conventional is agreed-upon worldly discourse, which is charac-
terized by expression, objects of expression, cognition, objects of cognition, etc.16
This last sense focuses on the “worldly” convention of conceptualization and lan-
guage. That is, “conventional” means that the relationship between words and their
referents is conventional. In designating referents by our words, we also carve phe-
nomena out of the world in a way that we can conceptualize. In this way, conven-
tional is how we designate phenomena as cars, tables, water, galaxies, and neutrons.
The Yakherds (2022a, pp. 7–8) claim that this sense of “conventional” characterizes
our (normal) understanding of everyday experiences in this mundane world.
For a concrete example, Buddhists tend to focus on a chariot.17 The phenomena that
compose a chariot are called “chariot” based on our conventional practices and not on
some inherent connection between the word and an existent object. We all agree to call
the phenomena that compose a chariot “a chariot.” According to Madhyamaka philoso-
phers, these phenomena arise through conditions and causes but do not fundamentally
exist. Our naming practices and their corollary conceptions lead us to see chariots and
engage in a meaningful world—even when chariots or their parts do not fundamentally
exist. Alice’s and Bill’s ability to refer to the water on the road constitutes this sense of
“conventional.” They see the phenomenon and can designate it as water. Of course, Alice
understands that this mirage is not even conventional water (such as an ocean) since it is
a mirage.
The Tibetan debate over conventional truth we see in the next section is over
which sense should be fundamental in understanding conventional truth. Tsong-
khapa and his Geluk (dGe lugs) side of the debate emphasize the third sense—
socially agreed-upon norms and practices.18 Gorampa and the Sakya (Sa skya)
side, to which he belongs, emphasize the first sense—concealing and ignorance.
Hence, the debate between Tsongkhapa and Gorampa is over how each interprets
Candrakīrti’s commentary on MMK 24.18.

4 The Tibetan debate over truth

The debate between Tsongkhapa and Gorampa is characterized by the status of con-
ventional truth. Tsongkhapa argues that conventional truth is true; Gorampa argues
that conventional truth is false. Relating truth to trust, Tsongkhapa takes it that we
can trust conventional truth, and Gorampa takes it that we cannot trust conventional
truth. Both philosophers and their respective schools (Geluk and Sakya) agree that

16
athavā saṃvṛtiḥ saṃketo lokavyavahāra ityarthaḥ | sa cābhidhānābhidheyajñānajñeyādilakṣaṇaḥ |
17
Nāgasena (c. 150 BCE) uses a chariot as his example in Milinda’s Questions (Milindapañha), and
Candrakīrti uses the example of a chariot in his commentary to MMK 24.18.
18
Tsongkhapa founded the Geluk school of Madhyamaka thought.

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the conventional is deceptive but not to which degree. Gorampa and Sakya philoso-
phers take the deceptive element of the conventional to the extreme in which it can
never be trusted. Tsongkhapa and Geluk philosophers take the deceptive element to
a less extreme, allowing for some sense of trust within the conventional.19

4.1 Tsongkhapa and true conventional truth

Tsongkhapa carefully considers Candrakīrti’s autocommentary on Introduction to

the Middle Way (Madhyamakāvatāra). This consideration leads him to a unique
ontology in which phenomena possess both a conventional nature and an ultimate
nature. Additionally, Tsongkhapa attempts to incorporate Dignāga’s (c. 500 CE)
and Dharmakīrti’s (c. 600 CE) Buddhist epistemology into Madhyamaka. Bringing
these ontological and epistemological concerns together, Tsongkhapa articulates an
account of conventional truth as true.
Starting with ontology, Candrakīrti, in his autocommentary to Introduction to the
Middle Way 6.28, states the following:
Although partly unreal, dependently arisen things such as reflective images
and echoes do appear to those who possess cognitive confusion. So also appear
entities such as forms – colors, thoughts, feelings, etc. – which are partly real.
(Thakchoe, 2023, trans., p. 172)
In this passage, as Thakchoe (2023, p. 172–173) emphasizes, Candrakīrti accepts
an account in which phenomena are unreal and real. Phenomena are partly unreal
in that they do not exist as they appear to be; phenomena are partly real in that they
conventionally appear to exist in how they are mundanely cognized. This mundane
cognization depends on norms and conventions; magician illusions and mirages are
conventionally unreal since they fail to be mundanely cognized like sprouts, water,
and chariots.
This combination of real and unreal appears to be what Tsongkhapa, in Ocean of
Reasoning, embraces as his ontology.20 He states the following:
Each of the internal and external phenomena has two natures: an ultimate and
a conventional nature. The sprout, for instance, has a nature that is found by a
rational cognitive process, which sees the real nature of the phenomenon as it
is, and a nature that is found by a conventional cognitive process, which per-
ceives deceptive or unreal objects. The former nature is the ultimate truth of
the sprout; the latter nature is the conventional truth of the sprout. The empiri-
cal nature of a sprout would be its appearance as a sprout, and the ultimate
nature would be its emptiness. (Samten & Garfield, 2006, trans., p. 483)

19
This tension between the Sakya and Geluk schools of Madhyamaka philosophy appears to be a con-
sistent theme. The Yakherds (2021a, pp. 22–25 & 61) show that Taktsang (sTag tshang lo tsa ba shes rab
rin chen, c. 1405–1455 CE), who was another Sakya philosopher, criticized Tsongkhapa’s account for
failing to show the degree that falsity thoroughly saturates the conventional.
20
More specifically, Tsongkhapa refers to Introduction to the Middle Way 6.23 for his account of phe-
nomena as partly real and partly unreal.

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 31 Page 10 of 24 Asian Journal of Philosophy (2023) 2:31

Thakchoe (2007, pp. 10–11) emphasizes that Tsongkhapa in this sprout example
takes it that there is a single phenomenon, but this phenomenon can be cognized as
having the appearance of a sprout (as its conventional empirical nature) or as being
empty (as its ultimate nature). All phenomena possess two natures that align with
the two truths, and a mind can conceptualize the phenomena by their empirical/con-
ventional nature or their ultimate nature.
Additionally, a defense for the one phenomenon, two natures’ ontology is located
in Tsongkhapa’s Elucidation of Thought (dBu ma dgongs pa rab gsal, which is a com-
mentary on the Introduction to the Middle Way). Tsongkhapa states the following:
Therefore an enlightened mode of knowing ultimate and conventional truths
should be understood with reference to the individual objects (Thakchoe,
2007, pp. 151–152).
Like in the Ocean of Reasoning, Tsongkhapa focuses on the fact that phenomena
have two natures, and the understanding of each nature is important.
Generally, Tsongkhapa posits that the conventional nature of a phenomenon is decep-
tive for most people. When a phenomenon appears to have a fundamental existence, peo-
ple generally accept that it does. In Ocean of Reasoning, he states the following:
Under the influence of this kun rdzob [convention] – the conception of true exist-
ence – things such as blue colors appear to have essential existence, while in fact
they have no essence whatsoever. False constructions fabricated [by the igno-
rance] appear so real to sentient beings that they are described by the Buddha as
“truths for worldly beings,” i.e., they are real [only] from the perspective of the
erroneous consciousness of ordinary beings. (Thakchoe, 2007, trans., p. 51)
Thakchoe (2007, p. 51) emphasizes that ordinary beings see phenomena—like the
color blue—and reify them as fundamentally existing. No phenomenon (including
emptiness) fundamentally exists on Tsongkhapa’s account, and, as Thakchoe shows,
no phenomenon should conventionally be understood to have a fundamental exist-
ence. According to Tsongkhapa, a phenomenon’s conventional truth is its appear-
ance of having fundamental existence but not actually having such an existence.
For Tsongkhapa’s epistemological account, I follow Garfield’s (2015, p. 237–241)
analysis of Tsongkhapa as a robust epistemologist, in which phenomena are con-
ventionally true things. According to Garfield, Tsongkhapa (as well as Nāgārjuna
and Candrakīrti) makes a clear distinction between ultimate and conventional proofs
(pramāṇa). On this account, conventional proofs take us to conventional truths,
and ultimate proofs take us to ultimate truth. Yet, as Garfield emphasizes, ulti-
mate proofs fail to do so since the ultimate truth is that all phenomena are empty.
That is, these proofs cannot take us anywhere since even emptiness is empty. To put
this bluntly, Tsongkhapa and his fellow Madhyamaka philosophers believe that no
proof (pramāṇa) can take us to ultimate truth. Garfield (2015, p. 234) grounds such
a claim in Nāgārjuna’s Reply to Objections (Vigrahavyāvārtanī).
To focus on an oft-cited passage, Nāgārjuna in Reply to Objections 29 states the
following:

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Asian Journal of Philosophy (2023) 2:31 Page 11 of 24 31

If I had any thesis, my (argument) would be defective. But I have no thesis.

Hence, my (argument) is not defective.21
Garfield suggests that Nāgārjuna dismisses the type of thesis (pratijñā) that the
Nyāya school (a non-Buddhist Indian school of epistemology) require. That is,
Nāgārjuna rejects the Nyāya position in which proofs (pramāṇa) are foundational to
all knowledge. According to Nāgārjuna, proofs fail to take us to the ultimate truth and,
as such, cannot take us to all knowledge. Garfield (contra Siderits (2011)) suggests
that this leaves room for proofs to take us to conventional truths. This position allows
Tsongkhapa to incorporate Dignāga’s and Dharmakīrti’s Buddhist epistemology into
his Madhyamaka system at the conventional level.
On Garfield’s reading of the Reply to Objections, conventional proofs take us to con-
ventional truths or what we conventionally accept. According to Garfield, the focus is that
these proofs cohere to our conventions (even as they change and expand our knowledge of
such conventions). Based on this account, Tsongkhapa accepts conventional truths to be
true. That is, we can trust proofs to lead us to inferences within our agreed-upon norms
and practices. Hence, as long as we understand proofs as being conventionally situated,
they are non-deceptive and can be trusted. Proofs become deceptive only when we think
they lead us to foundational knowledge or fundamental existences. In these moments, they
obscure the ultimate truth, in which all phenomena are empty of fundamental existence,
and fail to accurately capture the conventional truth of the appearances of phenomena.
Bringing Tsongkhapa’s ontology and epistemology together, he privileges the read-
ing of “conventional” as “socially agreed-upon norms and practices” in understand-
ing the conventional nature of phenomena as strictly the appearances of phenomena.
Within norms and practices, proofs cohere, and we can use them to discover new phe-
nomena or beliefs about phenomena. Viewing Tsongkhapa’s epistemology and its role
in beliefs will also help flesh out how Tsongkhapa finds propositions to be true (as we
will see in §5.2). Yet, one of the issues that Tsongkhapa discusses is that we, as typical
beings, cannot see the two truths at once (see Ocean of Reasoning on MMK 24.8–10).
Tsongkhapa suggests in the Elucidation of Thought that a Buddha could simulta-
neously know the conventional and ultimate truth. He states the following:
When every misconception is eradicated without a trace each individual
moment of every single enlightened consciousness (ye shes) embodies an
interplay of dual consciousness that arises uninterruptedly with the identical
characteristics. (Thakchoe, 2007, trans., p. 150)
Thakchoe (2007, p. 150) emphasizes that a developed individual, who is not a Bud-
dha, could alternate between seeing a phenomena’s ultimate truth and conventional
truth, but only a Buddha can see both uninterrupted. The reason for this is that Buddhas
must know the conventional truth as a way of leading others to the knowledge of the
ultimate truth, as Nāgārjuna in MMK 24.10 appears to articulate, and Garfield (2015, p.

21
yadi kā cana pratijñā syān me tata eṣa me bhaved doṣaḥ | nāsti ca mama pratijñā tasmān naivāsti me
doṣaḥ ||29||

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 31 Page 12 of 24 Asian Journal of Philosophy (2023) 2:31

239) emphasizes. On Tsongkhapa’s account, one, as a Buddha, can cognize a phenom-

enon’s ultimate and conventional natures and completely see both truths.
Returning to our mirage, Alice (the expert), Bill (the novice), and Charlie (the polar-
ized sunglass wearer) observe the same phenomenon but with radically different cogni-
tions. Bill’s experience of the mirage is akin to the deceptive element of conventional. He
can only see the deceptive nature of the mirage and, as such, fails to see the conventional
truth that the mirage is formed from a mass of heated air, the light’s refraction, and the
eyes’ and brain’s interpretation of this refraction. Thus, Bill fails to really see the mirage’s
conventional truth as well as its ultimate truth. Charlie’s experience (or lack of experi-
ence) pertains to the mirage’s ultimate truth. Charlie only sees emptiness and does not see
the appearance of water. Yet, such an understanding would be lacking for Tsongkhapa.
Neither Bill nor Charlie sees the conventional and ultimate truth together. Alice is the
only one that sees the conventional truth of the mirage. She sees the appearance of the
mirage as a body of water but knows that it is a mere appearance. She understands that
this appearance is due to the mass of heated air (etc.).
Additionally, Alice understands the ultimate truth—that there is no mirage. While
she would be a highly enlightened individual, she does not appear to be a Buddha.
For her to be a Buddha, she would have to see the mirage as Charlie sees it and its
conventional nature simultaneously. If she could see both, she would see the appear-
ance of water, know its causes and conditions, and see its emptiness.

4.2 Gorampa and false conventional truth

While Tsongkhapa provides a way of understanding conventional truth as being true,

Gorampa does not. Gorampa grounds conventional truth within the sense of “conven-
tional” as concealing and ignorance. This focus on ignorance leads Gorampa to argue that
all phenomena are illusory and, as such, must be rejected. For this reason, Gorampa takes
the two truths not as concerning ontological qualities of a phenomenon but, instead, as
two distinct perspectives. The first perspective is defined by what worldly beings take to
be true. The second is the perspective of those who are enlightened. The first perspective
adheres to phenomena, and the second completely lacks phenomena.
The principal difference between Gorampa (along with other Sakya philosophers)
and Tsongkhapa is that Gorampa rejects conventional proofs (pramāṇa) along with
ultimate proofs. As a Sakya philosopher, Taktsang (c. 1405–1455 CE) clearly rejects
the comingling of the Dignāga’s and Dharmakīrti’s proof system within Madhyam-
aka philosophy.22 In dismissing all proofs, he and other Sakya philosophers (e.g.,
Gorampa) reject conventional truth as being any sort of truth. Conventional phe-
nomena are always deceptive—they appear to fundamentally exist when they are
empty—and, as such, can only be false. Hence, Gorampa and his fellow Sakya phi-
losophers explicitly reject Tsongkhapa’s epistemology to jettison all proofs.

22
See the Yakherds (2021b, pp. 8–148) for a translation of Taktsang’s Freedom from Extremes Accom-
plished through Comprehensive Knowledge of Philosophy, where he directly challenges Tsongkhapa.

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Asian Journal of Philosophy (2023) 2:31 Page 13 of 24 31

Gorampa in The General Meaning of Madhyamaka (dBu ma’i spyi don)23 directly
rejects Tsongkhapa’s ontology, in which phenomena (e.g., a sprout) has two natures.
Gorampa states the following:
[If it were true that each phenomenon has two natures], it would absurdly fol-
low that even one particular phenomenon, such as a sprout, must possess [two]
empirically retrievable imputed objects [or natures] merely by designating
the two truths. . . . [I]t would then follow that the object found by the false-
perceiving consciousness must also be absurdly found by an aryas meditative
equipoise. This must follow because [according to you] the object [verified by
the false-perceiving consciousness] would be affirmatively grasped by the real-
ity-perceiving consciousness since the two [apprehended] objects have a single
ontological identity. (Thakchoe, 2007, trans., p. 68)
He argues that if a phenomenon has two natures that correspond to each truth, an
arya (or one who is highly spiritually developed) would see both the actual nature
of the phenomenon—emptiness—and the conventional deceptive nature of the phe-
nomenon. In focusing on “conventional” as ignorance, Gorampa suggests that the
phenomenon’s dual nature would lead the arya to take what is false—the conven-
tional—as true. The arya would accept that the phenomenon’s conventional appear-
ance is true in the same sense that its emptiness is true.
Gorampa alleges that such an understanding of a phenomenon is incoherent and
that all phenomena have only one nature—the conventional one. The phenomenon
itself is conventional. There is no phenomenon of emptiness (since emptiness also
lacks a fundamental existence) or, at least, no conceptual experience of emptiness.
In considering all phenomena conventional, Gorampa argues that all phenomena are
inherently false. They are always deceptive and must be rejected.
Instead of taking the two truths as two natures corresponding to a phenomenon,
Gorampa suggests they are two different perspectives. He states the following:
Although there are not two truths in terms of the object’s mode of existence
(gnas tshul), the truths are divided into two in terms of [the contrasting per-
spectives of] the mind that sees the mode of existence and the mind that does
not see the mode of existence. This makes perfect sense. (Thakchoe, 2007,
trans., p. 13)
As Thakchoe (2007, p. 13) stresses, Gorampa holds that there are two perspec-
tives (conventional and ultimate) regarding one phenomenon. We can either see the
phenomenon as a phenomenon and, in so doing, perceive it conventional, or we can
see the phenomenon as empty. If we saw the phenomenon as empty, we would see
no phenomenon at all. Only deluded beings trapped in a world of convention see the
phenomenon.
Bringing Gorampa’s views together, he argues that there is only one
truth—the ultimate truth—and no phenomenon possesses this truth since all

23
The full title of this work is rGyal ba thams cad kyi thugs kyi dgongs pa zab mo dbu ma’i de kho na
nyid spyi’i ngag gis ston pa nges don rab gsal.

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 31 Page 14 of 24 Asian Journal of Philosophy (2023) 2:31

phenomena are deceptive. The only way that we can engage the ultimate truth
is through a non-conceptual meditative equipoise. On this, Gorampa in The
General Meaning of Madhyamaka states the following:
Yet ultimate truth . . . is experienced by aryas in their meditative equi-
poise, and is free from all conceptual categories. It cannot be expressed
through definition, through any defined object, or through anything else.
(Thakchoe, 2007, trans., p. 69–70)
To paraphrase, Gorampa argues that there are no truth-bearers for ultimate
truth. Only a meditative experience with no conceptualization or phenomena
characterizes the experience of the ultimate truth. This meditative experience is
one of complete emptiness with no phenomenon.
Before checking in on our desert travelers, it is helpful to show what posi-
tive value Gorampa gives to the conventional truth. In The General Meaning
of Madhyamaka, Gorampa slightly defends the conventional as necessary for
pedagogy. He states the following:
Yet [reality] is nominally expressed through terms. The two truths,
although indivisible, are presented to disciples as distinct. In this way,
looking at the consistency of the whole [philosophical system], from the
beginning until the end, I think [the subjects of the Buddhas discourses
provide] a perfectly plausible [basis of the division]. (Thakchoe, 2007,
trans., p. 13)
While Gorampa holds that there is only ultimate truth, he argues here that
the two truths are taught through terms belonging to conventions, for disciples
to learn and potentially later realize the ultimate truth. The focus on terms here
is significant, and we will return to it shortly in connection to propositions.
Ultimately, Gorampa’s and Tsongkhapa’s accounts of proposition will depend
on use and pedagogy.
Applying Gorampa’s account to our desert travelers, Alice’s, Bill’s, and Char-
lie’s experiences indicate radically different levels of development. Bill’s experi-
ence of the mirage is plagued by ignorance. He is entirely deluded. Alice is not
approaching enlightenment but, instead, would be a traveler in training who still
has much work left to do. She still conceptualizes the conventional understanding
of the world and must learn to go beyond this for a complete ultimate understand-
ing (i.e., emptiness). Charlie is the fully enlightened traveler who sees only the
ultimate truth without a tinge of conventional ignorance. For Gorampa, all phe-
nomena and cognitions, which inherently rely on phenomena, lead to ignorance
that constitutes the perspective of conventional truth. Only Charlie’s experience
lacks any deception. Charlie’s experience (or lack of experience) of the mirage is
the contentless ultimate truth.

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Asian Journal of Philosophy (2023) 2:31 Page 15 of 24 31

4.3 Phenomena and their truth conditions

The debate between Tsongkhapa and Gorampa is on the truth status of phenom-
ena. Tsongkhapa argues that phenomena are conventionally true and ultimately true.
Gorampa argues that all phenomena are false. The best way to navigate this debate
is to understand truth as trust. That is, if we can trust the phenomena to be what it
appears to be, it is true. Hence, true phenomena will be non-deceptive, and false
phenomena will be deceptive. The issue with conventional truth is that the conven-
tional is deceptive (as Candrakīrti establishes), but the conventional is also charac-
terized by mutual dependence and socially agreed-upon norms and practices. The
central tension in the Tibetan debate is if we should prioritize the deceptive nature
of the conventional or the conventional as socially agreed-upon norms and practices.
I suggest that Tsongkhapa privileges socially agreed-upon norms and practices
in his attempt to incorporate Dignāga’s and Dharmakīrti’s Buddhist epistemology
into Madhyamaka. This move leads Tsongkhapa to what Garfield (2015) describes
as a type of coherentism. This type of coherentism is between proofs (pramāṇa) and
the understanding of phenomena that they (conventionally) prove (prameya). Proofs
create a coherent whole in which they and what they entail form a consistent set of
understanding phenomena, which also helps demarcate phenomena. Hence, this sys-
tem of proofs coheres with how we experience the appearance of phenomena. If the
phenomenon coheres with this system and experiences (while being able to change
this system), then the phenomenon is conventionally true.
From this, we can formulate Tsongkhapa’s account of the conventional truth of
phenomena as the following:

φ is conventionally true iff φ is consistent with our socially agreed-upon norms

and conventions.
φ is conventionally false iff φ is inconsistent with our socially agreed-upon norms
and conventions.

“φ” represents a phenomenon, and “socially agreed-upon norms and conven-

tions” constitutes our set of how we understand phenomena. Importantly, consist-
ency directly connects to trust. The consistency of φ to our socially agreed-upon
norms and conventions is why we can trust φ. It allows us to learn new things about
φ and our conventions. The discovery of this consistency ultimately depends on our
proof system, and there is room for our conventions to change based on our proof
system. Discoveries may lead to new conventions and new truths replacing the old.
Thakchoe (2023, p. 166) provides a helpful example of a pig (or the conven-
tional appearance of a pig), which I have slightly modified to delineate conven-
tional truth. The pig we normally observe with correctly functioning sense organs
and mind is conventionally true. That is, we can trust that this phenomenon has
four legs, squeals, and is raised for its meat or truffle-finding ability within our
broader system of conventions. The flying pig we see after consuming psycho-
tropic drugs would not be conventionally true. This unconventionality is because
our perception (pratyakṣa), which typically constitutes proofs that cohere with

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convention, is unreliable as we are under the influence of psychotropic drugs.

Hence, the phenomenon of a flying pig no longer coheres with our system of
proof or conventions. Due to this, we cannot trust the flying pig to have four legs,
squeal, be served up as pork chops, or find truffles. A flying pig will be false, and
a regular pig will be true.
Overall, Tsongkhapa holds that this coherence of phenomena is the conventional
truth. Such a system of proof that underlies it directly connects to the sense of “con-
ventional” as “mutual dependence.” To understand the pig’s truth, we must know
the causes and conditions that define it. For example, we may want to know its anat-
omy (including biochemistry), how it came to be in this place, and why we think of
bacon when we look at it. A regular pig is conventionally true, and inquiry into it
provides us with information on the world of socially agreed-upon norms and prac-
tices in which we reside. A hallucinated pig is false, but an inquiry into its appear-
ance may help one understand what has gone wrong in one’s proof and why one sees
flying pigs.
Tsongkhapa does not just take phenomena as conventionally true but also as ulti-
mately true. To completely capture Tsongkhapa’s account of the truth of phenom-
ena, we need to incorporate ultimate truth. In so doing, a new formulation of truth
appears as follows:

φ is true iff φ is consistent with our socially agreed-upon norms and conventions
and φ is empty.
φ is false iff φ is inconsistent with our socially agreed-upon norms and conven-
tions or φ fundamentally exists.

On the first condition, φ is true when it is conventionally and ultimately true. On

the second, φ is false if it is conventionally false (as the flying pig is) or is ultimately
false. Since Tsongkhapa takes all phenomena to be ultimately true—all are empty—
this disjunct is never met.
Gorampa would not differentiate regular pigs from flying pigs. All pigs (hallu-
cinated or otherwise) are deceptive. Just like the flying pig, the regular pig is not
ultimately true. No phenomenon is ultimately true. In judging all phenomena on the
level of ultimate truth, Gorampa finds them all to be false. Even if we know the pig
is empty, the appearance of the pig remains deceptive as it appears to fundamentally
exist. An inquiry into the pig’s proofs (even if they cohere with convention) does not
bring us to an experience of its emptiness.
To re-emphasize, Gorampa holds that all phenomena are false by focusing on the
ultimate truth. Flying pigs and regular pigs deceive individuals into believing that
pigs or the appearance of pigs fundamentally exist. Hence, Gorampa’s account of
phenomena’s truth appears as follows:

φ is true iff φ appears empty.

φ is false iff φ does not appear empty.

Gorampa believes that no phenomenon appears empty. Therefore, all phenomena

are false on his account. A hallucinated or normal pig will appear to be fundamentally

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Asian Journal of Philosophy (2023) 2:31 Page 17 of 24 31

existent and, as such, false. According to Gorampa, conventional truth simply means
the perceived truth of deluded people and is not an actual form of truth.
To summarize, Gorampa rejects the truth of phenomena, and Tsongkhapa accepts
the truth of phenomena. Gorampa argues that phenomena necessarily do not appear
empty and are not ultimately true, which is his only consideration of truth. Tsong-
khapa focuses on conventional truth and allows phenomena to be true when they
cohere with our socially agreed-upon norms and conventions through a consistent
system of proofs. Overall, the debate between these two Madhyamaka philosophers
is over phenomena and not over propositions. Neither overtly connect “truth” or
“falsity” to propositions. To flesh out how they may bring their account of the truth
of phenomena to an account of the truth of propositions, I turn to James’ pragma-
tist account of propositional truth. In so doing, I suggest Tsongkhapa and Gorampa
allow some degree of truth within conventional truth.

5 Propositions as true

The claim that Buddhism has a pragmatist account of truth is not novel. Priest et al.,
(2011, p. 143) briefly suggest such an account, and Ziporyn (2013) staunchly defends
one. The principal reason for accepting a pragmatist account of truth in Buddhism is a
focus on the importance of skillful means (upāya). Skillful mean is the ability that allows
one to teach in different ways to help disparate individuals along the path toward libera-
tion. Buddhists (esp. Mahāyāna Buddhists) use skillful means to justify why the Buddha
taught contrasting things to different people. One ought to say something that will lead
the person towards liberation and the ultimate truth (even if this is to posit a self). This
account of teaching allows a straightforward transition to a pragmatist account of truth,
in which successful practices help an individual towards a goal, including the realization
of the ultimate truth. I frame my discussion around William James’ pragmatist theory of
truth to capture a Madhyamaka account of propositional truth.

5.1 William James’ pragmatist account of truth

James (1987, p. 923) argues that his pragmatist theory of truth concerns an agreement
in the mind between objects and our beliefs that leads to satisfaction in the result of a
belief. He defines “satisfaction” as an inherent (pleasant) feeling that we have when
our beliefs and their objects are connected in the way we thought they were. This satis-
faction is meant to show how the pragmatist account of propositional truth deals with
some correspondence, but James fundamentally sees truth as utility.24
James (1922, pp. 198–199) asks if we are to take a belief or idea as true, what
difference does its being true make in our life? James (1922, p. 58) answers the
following:

24
James (1987) raises this point in response to Russell’s (2010) charge against pragmatism (see Misak
(2018, pp. 292–293) for a summary of Russell’s and G. E. Moore’s critiques of James).

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 31 Page 18 of 24 Asian Journal of Philosophy (2023) 2:31

Any idea upon which we can ride, so to speak; any idea that will carry us pros-
perously from any one part of our experience to any other part, linking things
satisfactorily, working securely, simplifying, saving labor; is true for just so
much, true in so far forth, true instrumentally (James’ emphasis).
True ideas (or propositions) for James are not an end goal but, rather, plastic
instruments we use to achieve a goal.
James (1922, p. 203) provides an example of how true propositions serve as an
instrument based on someone lost in the woods. Bringing his example back to our
desert travelers, let us say that Bill is lost in the woods. If Bill is lost in the woods,
starving, and comes across an apparent cow path, Bill should have the true thought
that this path leads to civilization. This thought is deemed true since it has practi-
cal value in leading Bill to save himself. Since James takes the truth of a thought as
being plastic and not static, the truth of the thought that this path leads to civiliza-
tion can change into a false thought as soon as Bill realizes that he is on a deer path
going deeper and deeper into the woods. When a thought loses its usefulness, it is no
longer considered true.
Based on this example, we can formulate James’ account of truth as follows:

x is true iff x corresponds with some object and x leads to successful practices.
x is false iff x does not correspond to some object or x does not lead to successful
practices.

The truth-bearer x is a proposition (e.g., the path leads to civilization), “corre-

sponds” means some connection, “successful practices” fleshes out what James has
in mind for correspondence, and “some object” refers to an external object or phe-
nomenon (e.g., the path). This account of truth has some elements of correspond-
ence, but it is fundamentally concerned with successful practices.
While James (1922 & 1914) appears to take “object” as denoting an actual exter-
nal object (as seen in the above formulation), James (1912, pp. 1–31) allows for true
beliefs that may not refer to an existent object, such as God (see Misak, 2018, pp.
290–291). Such tension—and an attempt to avoid Meinongism—tends to lead to the
removal of “object” in the formation of a pragmatist account of truth, which results
in the typically received pragmatist account of truth among Anglo-Analytic circles:

x is true iff x leads to successful practices.

x is false iff x does not lead to successful practices.

The dropping of “object” to focus on “successful practices” leaves James’ gen-

eral structure but provides an interesting possibility for the Madhyamaka rejection
of fundamental existence (esp. Gorampa’s).
These two formulations of the pragmatist account of truth will guide our analysis
of an account of propositional truth for Tsongkhapa and Gorampa. The incorpora-
tion of an object by James allows for incorporation of a phenomenon that will nicely
bridge Tsongkhapa’s truth regarding phenomena and propositions. The collapsed
version of the pragmatist account may align with an account regarding the truth of

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Asian Journal of Philosophy (2023) 2:31 Page 19 of 24 31

propositions that Gorampa may endorse. By no longer being committed to the (fun-
damental) existence of phenomena, this account of truth can function within a rejec-
tion of the conventional truth of phenomena.

5.2 Tsongkhapa’s coherent pragmatism

James’ model of truth is an ideal account to transition Tsongkhapa’s account of truth

to propositions. Additionally, Tsongkhapa’s coherentism will directly impact his
potential view of propositions. If we only based our analysis on Tsongkhapa’s coher-
entism, his view of phenomena and propositions would nearly align. Using “x” to
represent a proposition, this account of truth appears as follows:

x is conventionally true iff x is consistent with our socially agreed-upon norms

and conventions.
x is conventionally false iff x is inconsistent with our socially agreed-upon norms
and conventions.

While this preserves Tsongkhapa’s epistemological coherentism, the importance

of proofs (pramāṇa) appears reduced. It is unclear how proofs can lead to new
knowledge that challenges previous norms and conventions. While Garfield (2015)
defends a coherentist view, he (pp. 236–237) also notes the importance of pragma-
tism within the system of proofs on which Tsongkhapa leans.25
Focusing on the importance of pragmatism, I suggest we understand Tsong-
khapa’s account of propositional truth based on James’ account:

x is true iff x corresponds with some phenomenon and x leads to successful practices.
x is false iff x does not correspond to some phenomenon or x does not lead to
successful practices.

Our proposition about some phenomenon allows us to engage successfully in a prac-

tice we are undertaking regarding that phenomenon. A successful practice occurs when
it is consistent with the socially agreed-upon norms and conventions but also can change
such norms and conventions. Like how Bill’s belief of the cow trail can change, our
socially agreed-upon norms and conventions can change. To continue being successful,
one must be willing to see where the proof system leads and how these proofs not only
cohere but may also transform our conventions (including our general knowledge).

5.3 Gorampa’s weak pragmatism

While I hesitate in attributing Gorampa an account of conventional truth that pos-

sesses truth, I suggest he at least shows some sentiments towards pedagogy in The
General Meaning of Madhyamaka. These sentiments provide some ground for a

25
A connection to Dharmakīrti and pragmatism is also made by Guerrero (2013).

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 31 Page 20 of 24 Asian Journal of Philosophy (2023) 2:31

quasi-pedagogical account of pragmatism. If this is correct, Gorampa’s focus on

conventional truth would be on its use to lead us to the ultimate truth. Unlike Tsong-
khapa’s potential account, I suggest Gorampa would not refer to any phenomenon
to ground his account. Instead, he would focus only on propositions as needed for
successful practices. Focusing on Gorampa’s push for the realization of the ultimate
truth, his potential account of propositional truth appears as follows:

x is true iff x leads to successful practices toward the realization of the ultimate
truth.
x is false iff x does not lead to successful practices toward the realization of the
ultimate truth.

To reiterate my hesitation, Gorampa would likely reject “true” since he relates

truth only to the ultimate truth. Yet, a practitioner may need to understand some
propositions to be true to have a successful practice.
As in Section 4.2, Gorampa notes the importance of conventional truth for achiev-
ing ultimate truth, but the issue is that the conventional is limited. Since Gorampa
takes ultimate truth to be incognizable, non-linguistic, and illogical, as Thakchoe
(2008, p. 275) and Kassor (2011, p. 125) argue, there is a clear limit to the duration
in which a proposition may help us to understand the ultimate truth. As we become
more and more spiritually developed, there will be a point at which all propositions
are false since they no longer lead to a successful practice. Hence, this practice will
be much more individualistic than Tsongkhapa’s account and may explicitly align
with the Buddhist notion of skillful means (upāya). Tsongkhapa’s skillful practices
concern our movement around our conventions and norms, and Gorampa’s skillful
practice is only toward ultimate truth.
One catch for Gorampa’s account is that propositions may qualify as phenomena. If I
take the belief of the proposition that following this cow trail will get me to the ultimate
truth as a thought, it will be a phenomenon that I can observe. Through a quasi-peda-
gogical account of pragmatism, this phenomenon would be true. Yet, Gorampa explicitly
rejects the truth values of phenomena. Hence, it is difficult to tell how a quasi-pedagogical
account of propositional truth can get off the ground. With this concern in mind, I turn to
bringing together the truths of phenomena and propositions.

6 Trust and truth

Tsongkhapa and Gorampa have clear views on the truth of phenomena and provide
ways of understanding the truth of propositions. Still, in presenting these views, I
have given drastically different truth conditions. For Tsongkhapa’s account, the truth
conditions for phenomena appear as follows:

φ is true iff φ is consistent with our socially agreed-upon norms and conventions
and φ is empty.

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Asian Journal of Philosophy (2023) 2:31 Page 21 of 24 31

φ is false iff φ is inconsistent with our socially agreed-upon norms and conven-
tions or φ fundamentally exists.

And the truth conditions for propositions appear as the following:

x is true iff x corresponds with some phenomenon and x leads to successful prac-
tices.
x is false iff x does not correspond to some phenomenon or x does not lead to
successful practices.

Since phenomena are already included in the truth conditions for propositions, it
is unclear how we could incorporate both propositions and phenomena into a single
account of truth for Tsongkhapa. Identity could be a type of correspondence, but the
critical element of correspondence is that it connects to our norms and conventions.
Gorampa’s account has the same problem but is exacerbated. His account for
phenomena appears as follows:

φ is true iff φ appears empty.

φ is false iff φ does not appear empty.

His account for propositions appears as follows:

x is true iff x leads to successful practices toward the realization of the ultimate
truth.
x is false iff x does not lead to successful practices toward the realization of the
ultimate truth.

Gorampa’s problem is more severe than Tsongkhapa’s since Gorampa believes

that no phenomenon can be true, which may also indicate that Gorampa does not
assume that any propositions can be true. If thoughts or utterances constitute propo-
sitions, then they are a phenomenon and are false.
The unifying element between these different accounts of truth is trust. On Tsong-
khapa’s account of phenomena, a phenomenon can be trusted if it coheres to worldly
practices and conventions. On Tsongkhapa’s potential understanding of proposition,
a proposition can be trusted if it leads to a successful practice within these practices
and conventions. Just like Bill can believe in the proposition that this cow trail will
take me to the city to be true as he trusts that the trail will. When this trust is broken,
Bill takes the proposition to be false.
On Gorampa’s account of phenomena, no phenomenon can be trusted since they
all conceal ultimate truth. If a phenomenon accurately shows ultimate truth, then
it can be trusted. Yet, this will never be the case since no phenomenon shows the
ultimate truth. On Gorampa’s potential propositional account, a proposition is true
when we can trust that it will lead us toward the ultimate truth. When it no longer
can, it will be false. Hence, the debate between Tsongkhapa and Gorampa is a debate
about trust. Tsongkhapa holds that we can trust ultimate truth and (conventionally)
trust conventional truth; Gorampa holds that we can only trust ultimate truth.

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Bringing their debate together for a generalized Madhyamaka account of truth

that may apply to Nāgārjuna’s account in MMK, our truth conditions appear as the
following:

z is true iff z can be trusted.

z is false iff z cannot be trusted.

“z” in this case could be either a proposition or phenomenon. “Trusted” must be

relativized by one’s current practices and relationship to z. If we follow Tsongkhapa,
z will (i) show its emptiness or (ii) cohere in some way with our socially agreed-
upon norms and conventions as well as concern our epistemological practices and
their development. On Gorampa’s potential account, z will be distinct for each indi-
vidual and always be false for the enlightened. Now, we may want to ask which side
Nāgārjuna falls under. To this, I remain neutral; but understanding truth as trust fol-
lows an analysis of how satya and sat are used in MMK (see §2). Overall, Nāgārjuna
considers many phenomena that are generally important to Buddhists (e.g., suffer-
ing) and shows that each should be rejected since they cannot be trusted to show
the emptiness of their fundamental existence, which concur with his arguments that
there is no fundamental existence.

7 Conclusion

Nāgārjuna in MMK 24.8–10 introduces two truths: the conventional and the ulti-
mate. In interpreting how the two truths relate to phenomena and propositions
through the commentarial tradition, I provided Tsongkhapa’s and Gorampa’s
accounts of truth. I show that their accounts conflict in how to parse conventional
truth. Tsongkhapa allows for true conventional truths as they lead to successful prac-
tices and cohere to socially agreed-upon norms and conventions. Gorampa overall
disavows all conventional truths. With trepidation, I suggest Gorampa is sympa-
thetic towards a quasi-pedagogical account of conventional truth regarding proposi-
tions but not phenomena. I show that the combining element of this Tibetan debate
is trust and a focus on truth as trust constitutes the Madhyamaka account of truth.
Acknowledgements The comments I received from presenting this project to VICTR, the Truth Without
Borders Workshop, and the Five College Buddhist Seminar greatly helped shape it, and I am thankful
to the participants and panel members of each. I also thank Keith Simmons for his comments, which
improved the clarity of the paper, and the reviewers of this paper, who provided very helpful suggestions.

Data availability The author confirms that all data generated or analyzed during this study are included in
this published article.

Declarations
Competing interests The author declares no competing interests.

Disclosure Earlier drafts of this paper were presented for the Virtual International Consortium of Truth
Research (VICTR), the University of Waikato’s Truth Without Borders Workshop, and the Five College
Buddhist Studies Faculty Seminar.

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Asian Journal of Philosophy (2023) 2:31 Page 23 of 24 31

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