Offences Against Human Body & Individual Autonomy

Offences relating to Physical Assault 1

1. Assault 2
2. Criminal Force 2
3. Injuries and Wounds 3
4. Hurt (§319) and Grievous Hurt (§320) 5
5. Culpable Homicide 7
6. Differences in §299 and §300 7
7. Culpable Homicide not Amounting to Murder: Exceptions to §300 9
7.1. Grave and sudden provocation 9
7.2. Right to P.D. 10
7.3. Excessive use of force by a public servant for the advancement of public justice 10
7.4. Sudden Fight 11
7.5. Consent 11
8. Murder 11
9. Attempt to Murder (§307) and Attempt to CH (§308) 12
10. §354 12
11. §345A 13
12. §354B 13
Offences affecting liberty of Movement and Exploitation 13
1. Wrongful Restraint (§339) 13
2. Wrongful Confinement 13
3. Kidnapping 14
4. Abduction (§362) 14
5. Trafficking, Slavery, and Forced Labour 15
6. Individual Autonomy 15
7. Marital Rape 16
8. §377 16
Offenses Affecting Common Well Being
Offence Against Public Tranquillity 18
1. Unlawful Assembly and Rioting 18
2. Affray 19
Offences Against the State 19
1. Waging war 19
2. Sedition 20
Offences Against Public Health, Safety, Convenience, Decency and Morals 20
1. Public Health 20
1.1. Relating to diseases 20
1.2. Relating to food, drink and drugs 21
2. Convenience 21
3. Public Morals and Decency 21
OFFENCES RELATING TO PHYSICAL ASSAULT
Hierarchical order of offences according to the gravity of the crimes

● Assault – apprehension about criminal force

● Criminal Force – use of force with intention or knowledge for committing offence or
causing injury/ fear/ annoyance
● Simple Hurt & its aggravated forms – causing hurt with intention or knowledge

● Grievous Hurt & its aggravated forms – 8 kinds of hurt

● Attempt to commit Culpable Homicide

● Attempt to Commit Murder

● Culpable Homicide not amounting to murder

● Culpable Homicide amounting to murder

1. ASSAULT
The offender wants to make the victim believe that he will use criminal force (For e.g. a
punch without someone’s consent to cause injury) upon the victim.
Mere words will not amount to assault unless they are indicative of some act. For e.g. if the
offender does not follow his words, with some action (for e.g. removing a chain from his
pocket) then they do not amount to assault. Words require accompaniment.
Upheld by Kundan v. Vasudeo, where the court held that mere shouting when not coupled
with any other gesture, will not amount to assault. Therefore, the alleged offender will not be
punished under §353 (which defines assault and criminal force as under §351 and §350).
The use of emojis or a very suggestive message, even when combined, cannot be understood
to come under the ambit of assault. There needs to be a physical, or overt act involved in
the transaction.
Upheld by the court in Manik Taneja v State of Karnataka, the court held that posting a
comment on the Facebook of the traffic police does not amount to assault under §353.
However, assault can be committed even if there is no instance of the offender actually doing
something of his own person to cause it. For e.g. if the offender loosens the leash of a very
ferocious dog, which indicates that the dog will pounce on the victim, assault has been
committed.
In Bula Sarkar v State of Assam, the concepts of criminal force and assault were clearly
expressed.
“Thus, whoever makes even a gesture intending or knowing to be likely that such gesture or
preparation will cause any person present to apprehend that he who makes that gesture or
preparation, is about to use CF to that person, is said to commit offence of assault.”
2. CRIMINAL FORCE
Needs to be used against another person. Does not include damage to property or inanimate
objects. Offender needs to cause, through his actions (i.e. involving his own bodily power or
through disposing a substance which does not then require any further act to cause the
motion, or through inducing an animal), a substance (for e.g. a bat) to go through a motion
(or change or cease a motion), resulting in contact with another person (or with something he
is carrying or something that is so closely situated that such contact affects the others sense of
feeling) to come under the ambit of §349 [force]. Criminal force requires the intention or
knowledge that it is likely to cause some kind of injury, hurt or frighten the victim.
Upheld in AK Bohra v Raja Ram Mallah, that Criminal force requires the intention or
knowledge that it is likely to cause some kind of injury, hurt or to frighten the victim; without
the person’s consent. In the case, the accused-petitioner had allegedly pushed the complainant
away by his own bodily power without the consent of the complainant and intending to
injure, frighten or annoy the complainant or knowing it to be likely that he may do the above;
the accused had used criminal force against the complainant.
Assault and Criminal force can exist in their aggravated forms as well

§353 Assault or criminal force to deter a public servant from discharge of his duty

§354 Assault or CF to woman with intent to outr

§354A Sexual harassment and punishment for sexual harassment

§354B Assault or use of CF to a woman with intent to disrobe

§354C Voyeurism

§354D Stalking

§355 Assault or CF with intent to dishonour person, otherwise than on grave

provocation

§356 Assault or CF in attempt to commit theft of property carried by a person

§357 Assault or CF in attempt to wrongfully confine a person

§358 Assault or CF on grave provocation

3. INJURIES AND WOUNDS

Abrasion:
- damage occurring in the epidermis; some dermal papillae may also be damaged
 - caused by rough hard, blunt objects or surfaces or by drawing the tip of the pointed
objects against the skin or mucous membrane.
- Caused by rubbing effect or vertical pressure
- Impacting object may leave behind its pattern on abraded area
Bruise:
Extravascular collection of blood in the tissue (dermis of skin, subcutaneous tissue or deeper
tissues)
- Due to rupture of blood vessels
- By application of blunt force
- Overlying tissue remains intact (therefore, blood cannot escape outside)
- If lesion is visible it is called bruise, if not it is called contusion
- May vary in size – petechial haemorrhage of pin head size, purpura of size 2-5mm,
ecchymosis of more than 5 mm, or haematoma casing local swelling.
Laceration
- Tearing or splitting or skin, mucous memberane or surfaces of any internal organs
- By application of blunt force
- Blood escapes the wound to the exterior or any body cavity
Fracture
- Breach of continuity of bone or tooth, dislocation of the joint – the bone ends get
displaced completely from their normal anatomical positions with damage to adjacent
tissues
- By application of blunt force
- Clinical features and X-ray required to diagnose
Incised wound
- By sharp edge of weapon applied to skin perpendicularly or obliquely making regular
clean edges of the wound
- Called Slash wound when length of wound is greater than its depth
- Called Stab wound when depth of wound is greater than its length.
- Called Puncture wounds when pointed thin bodied weapon is pushed into the body –
depth is greater than the diameter. Legally a type of stab wound.
- Called Penetrating wound when a bigger type of pointed weapon is pushed into the
body making greater depth. Legally a type of stab wound.
- Called Perforating wound when the puncture/penetrating wound has an entry and an
exit and tract through the tissue
Firearm Wounds
- By bullets or pellets fired through guns
- Bullets usually cause perforation while pellets cause penetrating wounds
- Entry wounds are associated with burning, blackening, tattooing of surrounding skin
Blast Wounds
- Produced by explosion of bombs
- Due to blast pressure wave (shock wave), blast wins, heat, splinters, shrapnel,
surround small fragments propelled by blast winds
Burns
- Classified as first degree, second degree and third degree depending on depth and
severity.

First Degree Second Degree Third Degree Fourth Degree

Superficial Burns Partial Thickness Full thickness burns

burns

Affect only epidermis Involve epidermis Destroy epidermis and Also damage
and part of dermis dermis and may go to underlying bones,
subcutaneous tissue muscles, and
tendons

Burn site is red, Burn site is red, Burn site may appear No sensation in
painful, dry, with no blistered, and may be white or charred area since nerve
blisters swollen and painful endings are
destroyed

Long term tissue

damage is rare and
usually consists of an
increase or decrease
of skin colour

e.g. mild sunburn

Wallace rule of Nine

For adults only, widely used to determine the percentage of total body surface area (TBSA)
that has been burnt.
Chart divides body into sections that represent 9 percent of the body surface area.
Inaccurate for children

Body Parts Percentage

Head, incl. face and neck 9

Chest, front and back 9*2

Abdomen, front and back 9*2

 Upper Limbs (R +L) (front and back) 9*2

Lower Limbs (R +L) (front and back) 9*4

External Genitals 1

Total 100

4. HURT (§319) AND GRIEVOUS HURT (§320)

Types of Grievous hurt (§320)
Only,
- Emasculation (cl 1)
- Permanent privation of the sight of either eye or hearing of either ear (cl 2+3)
- Privation, destruction or permanent impairing of any member or joint (cl 4+5)
- Permanent disfiguration of head or face (cl 6)
- Fracture or dislocation of a bone or tooth (cl 7)
- Any hurt which endangers life or which causes the sufferer to be during the space of
20 days in severe bodily pain, or unable to follow his ordinary pursuits. (cl 8)
Hurt cannot be self-inflicted.
Permanent injuries can be of curable or incurable nature. The development of science to an
extent where it can cure what would have otherwise been permanent damage, should not be
beneficial to the accused. Thus, injuries which have the potential to cause permanent damage
is left untreated may come under the ambit of grievous hurt.
Hospitalisation for 20 days does not convert simple hurt to grievous hurt. Nature of injury is
crucial.
Upheld in Sompal Singh v State of U.P., the Supreme Court said “Nature of the injuries is to
be determined taking into consideration the intense suffering to which it gives rises and the
serious disability which it causes the sufferer. However, in the clause seventhly, as the term
‘fracture’ has been referred to, it may be necessary that the bone is broken. Mere abrasion
would not amount to fracture. Even a cut that does not go across the bone cannot be terms as
a fracture of the bone. But if the injury is grave even partial cut of the skull vault (root or
chamber) may amount to fracture. However, clause eighthly refers to the injuries which are
not covered under any one of the above clauses of the section. However, it labels the injuries
as grievous if it endangers life or it causes the sufferer to be during the space of 20 days in
severe bodily pain or which causes the sufferer to be during the space of 20 days unable to
follow his ordinary pursuits and all three clauses have to be read independently. This is a very
thin and subtle demarcation line between ‘hurt which endangers life’ and ‘injury as likely to
cause death’. Therefore, sometimes it becomes very difficult as to whether a person is liable
under §325 for causing grievous hurt or under §304 for culpable homicide not amounting to
murder when the injury results in the death of the victim. In the present case, the injuries no1
and 2 are beyond ‘hurt which endangers life’ and clearly falls in the category of ‘injuries as
are likely to cause death’ even though each injury may not be individually sufficient to cause
death.”
TL; DR: for all clauses, nature of injury + suffering must be taken account. While usually
fracture requires breaking of bone, but in serious injury partial breakage of skull will also be
fracture. All clauses of clause 8 to be read separately. Thin line separating hurt which
endangers life and injury likely to cause death (CH). Nature of injury may cause injury to be
beyond the scope of endangering and into the scope of likely to cause death, as in present
case.
If the offender intends to cause grievous injury of one kind (for e.g. fracture), but ends up
causing another kind (for e.g. permanent disfiguration of face). He will be liable.
For §326,
Ambit of dangerous weapon is highly subjective. What matters is the context and form in
which it is used.
In Prabhu v State of M.P.,
- Some hurts may be more than simple hurt but not falling into any of the clauses.
Before a conviction however, one of the injuries defined in §320 must be proved.
- 8th clause has to be construed strictly
- What would constitute a ‘dangerous weapon’ under §326 will depend on the facts of
each case, and not generalisation can be made. No such thing as an earmarked weapon
for committing murder / hurt (State of U.P. v Indrajeet)
- Some essential ingredients are (1) voluntarily causing hurt, (2) must be grievous hurt,
and (3) must be caused by dangerous weapons or means.
- The facts involved, depending on various factors like size, sharpness, would throw
light on whether the weapon was dangerous (in §324,326) or deadly (in §397,398)
weapon or not.
Cases of medical negligence or administering of medicine where the likely result is the
causing of injury may be covered under §328.
5. CULPABLE HOMICIDE
If an offender, puts the victim in a situation where he knows that death is likely to be caused,
he is liable for CH. If someone else gets into the above situation, even though the offender
did not intend to cause their death, the offender will be liable. For e.g. if the offender hides a
ditch (which he knows will likely cause death if someone falls in) cleverly, and someone
other than the intended victim falls into it.
Intention of the offender is relevant, not what was projected to other people or what other
people thought. Component of mens rea is crucial, and without it if the acts are done in good
faith, the liability does not exist.
If the offender encourages another person to make the situation which he knows will likely
cause death of the victim, and the other person does so in a bona fide manner, the offender
will be liable for CH. For e.g. if A heavily encourages B shoot at the bushes where A knows
that C is hiding. B, honestly believing that C is elsewhere, takes the shot. A is liable for CH.
Even if the death could be prevented by resorting to skilful treatment and proper remedies,
CH has been committed. Lack of skilful remedies is not an intervening factor.
In Richpal Singh Meena v Ghasi,
- Accused must be deemed to know the consequences of his act, unless it was
unintentional or accidental. The intention of the accused must be found from the facts
of each case.
- Sections of IPC relating to hurt, do not postulate death as the end result. Even cl 8,
states hurt which endangers life not extinguishes it. Offences causing hurt are distinct
from offences affecting life. If hurt results in death, intended or unintended, it will be
within the ambit of offences affecting life.
- Five step inquiry – is there a homicide? Is it CH or not-culpable homicide? Is it CH
amounting to murder? If not-CH, case must be made out under 304-A. If offender
cannot be identified or pinner down, he must be given the benefit of §72.
6. DIFFERENCES IN §299 AND §300
R. v Govinda is one of the earliest cases which attempted to separate different types of
culpable homicide on the basis of different imports of mens rea in §299 and §300. Technical
meanings of intention, knowledge, likely, rashness, and negligence must be understood.
Intention is a purpose or desire to bring about a contemplated result of foresight. As mens rea,
it comprises of cognition and volition. Cognition is the process by which knowledge and
understanding is developed in the mind (speculative faculty). Volition is the power to choose
something freely (voluntarily make decisions).
Intention denotes the state of mind of a man who not only foresees but also desires the
outcome.
Knowledge contains only cognition. Therefore, it is a subset of intention.
In Basdev v State of Pepsu, the court held that sometimes, knowledge and intention can
merge together and mean the same thing and intention can be presumed from knowledge.
Likely means probably i.e. the chances of the event happening are greater than it not
happening.
Rashness or Negligence denote only foresight but the actor does not intend to cause harm.
Between them, Rashness is the aggravated form.
So hierarchically, intention has the highest degree of mens rea and negligence has the lowest.
The only possible way to explain mens rea is to read it from the circumstances.
In William Stanley v State of MP, there was a heated exchange and the accused slapped the
deceased. The deceased reacted with a gesture that he would give a blow but the accused
gave one blow to the head of the deceased with a hockey stick, resulting in fracture of skull.
Court held
 - that it was obvious that there was no intention to kill.
- The fact that injury is likely to cause death, does not bring it within the ambit of §300.
- Nothing to warrant that accused has knowledge that injury was liable to cause death,
or that it was so dangerous that it must in all probability cause death.
In Virsa Singh v State of Punjab, the accused thrusted a spear once which caused injury in the
abdominal wall. Doctor opined that it was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of
nature.
Supreme Court held that (for clause thirdly of §300)
- Bodily injury must be caused + nature of the injury (where it was, depth, etc) must be
taken into account. These are the objective parts of the enquiry.
- Intention is subjective to the offender and it must be proved that he had a intention to
cause the bodily injury that is found to be present.
- Prosecution must prove particular intent on basis that the result was the natural
consequences for the act. The accused will be held liable if he cannot provide an
explanation. Doubt will acquit the accused.
- It is not enough to prove that the injury found is sufficient to cause death in the
ordinary course of nature, it must in addition be shown that the injury present was the
injury that was intended to be inflicted.
- Intention to inflict injury must be found on broad lines such as whether there was an
intention to strike at a vital part. The offender need not intend ever last detail.
- 1. Establish bodily injury(obj)
2. establish nature of injury (obj)
3. establish that present injury was the one intended to be caused (subj)
4. establish that present injury is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary nature of
things. (obj)
State of Andhra Pradesh v Rayavarapu Punnayya, held that sometimes the accused can
intend to cause the exact injury (in present case, haemorrhage).
Distinction has been laid down in Thangaiya v State of T.N., which upheld Virsa Singh,
- Clause (a) of §299 and (4) of §300 both require knowledge of the probability of the
act causing death.
- Clause (4) of §300 would be applicable where knowledge of the offender as to
probability of death approximates to practical certainty. Such knowledge must be of
the highest degree of probability.
Some factors that the courts take into consideration while determining mens rea are:
i. Circumstances of incident
ii. Nature of weapon used
iii. Whether the weapon was taken or carried on spot
iv. Whether the assault was aimed on vital part of the body
v. The amount of force used
vi. Whether the deceased participated in the sudden fight
vii. Whether there was any previous enmity
viii. Whether there was any sudden provocation
 ix. Whether the attack was in the heat of passion
x. Whether the person inflicting the injury took any undue advantage or acted in a
cruel or unusual manner
xi. Motive of crime
xii. Number of blows
Medical evidence is crucial in determining mends rea and the relevant information provided
by it can be classified in five heads
a. Nature of injury (type, size, external element, location)
b. Type of weapon used (from examining the wound edges, margins, etc)
c. Age of injury
d. Cause and manner of death (natural or unnatural, if unnatural, whether homicidal,
suicidal or accidental. Even if death results from injury which is hastened from a pre
existing disease, death is unnatural)
e. Opinion as to offence (simple hurt, etc)
Explanation of injury is a matter of fact as held in State of Gujarat v Bai Fatima.
Medical evidence is an opinion, having only corroborative value and must be distinguished
from fact based substantive evidence. Direct evidence prevails over medical evidence. In case
of difference in opinion of experts, the once which supports direct evidence is taken by the
court. Held in Piara Singh v State of Punjab.
In case of balance of medical evidence of both sides, benefit goes to accused.1
7. CULPABLE HOMICIDE NOT AMOUNTING TO MURDER: EXCEPTIONS TO §300
1.1. Grave and sudden provocation
- Provocation must not be sought
- Cannot be evoked by anything done in the obedience of law, or by a public servant
discharging his duties lawfully
- Cannot be evoked in cases of lawful exercise of private defence
- Its existence is a question of fact and not a question of law.
Nanavati v State of Maharashtra
The test of grave and sudden provocation is whether a reasonable man, belonging to the same
class of society as the accused, placed in the situation in which the accused was placed would
be so provoked to lose his self-control.
In India, words and gestures may in certain circumstances cause grave and sudden
provocation.
The mental background created by the previous acts of the victim may be taken into
consideration in ascertaining whether the subsequent act caused grave and sudden
provocation.
The fatal blow should be clearly traced to the influence of passion arising from the
provocation and not after the passion had cooled down by lapse of time, or otherwise giving
room and scope for premeditation and calculation.
1
This has a ton of footnotes and pertinent questions, which I didn’t think were important. Pg. 231
In BD Khunte v UOI, the SC held that time can act as a cooling off period. The provocation
must be grave and sudden. Also laid down the ingredients for the Exception:
i. Deceased must have given provocation to the accused
ii. Provocation so given must be grave
iii. The provocation given byt the deceased must be sudden
iv. The offender by reason of such G&S provocation must be deprived of his power
of self-control
v. The offender must have killed the deceased or any other person by mistake or
accident during the continuance of the deprivation of the power of self-control.
In Budhi Singh v State of HP, the court upheld that the provocation must be sudden and the
test of the reasonable man, and the fact that the act must be done while the temporary loss of
self-control is subsisting.
State of Punjab v. Jagtar Singh – honour killing, when caught sister in a compromising
position with lover – G&S upheld
Raj Kumar v State of Maharashtra – denial of wife to withdraw maintenance proceedings
cannot amount to G&S
1.2. Right to P.D.
Requires subsisting right to P.D
In Raj Singh v State of Haryana,
- CH not murder, if offender in right of P.D in good faith, without premeditation, and
without an intention to cause more harm than necessary, exceeds right to P.D and
causes death
- Right to P.D must be subsisting
Upheld in Ranbir Singh v State of Haryana, which also stated that burden of proof is on
Defendant.
1.3. Excessive use of force by a public servant for the advancement of public
justice
Applicable to public servant or individual aiding public servant, while in their official
discharge of duties, in good faith and without malice, believing it is their lawful right,
exceeds their right.
In Dakhi Singh v the State, reduced murder to CH of appellant because he was a public
servant, who in good faith and without malice, believing that it was lawful and necessary for
the due discharge of his duties, exceeded his right. His object was advancement of public
justice.
In Sukumaran v State, same.
In RS Dahiya v State, the court, holding that custodial violence for the purpose of
interrogation is not necessary or lawful, laid down the principles of the exception
i. Must be public servant as defined by §21 of IPC
 ii. Act must be done in good faith
iii. Offender must believe act to be lawful and necessary for discharge of his duties
iv. Act must be done without ill will to victim
1.4. Sudden Fight
In Suchand Bouri v State of West Bengal,
- Ingredients for sudden fight: the death has occurred
1. In a sudden fight (mutual provocation)
2. Without pre-meditation
3. Act was committed in the heat of passion (no time to cool), and
4. Offender did not take undue advantage or act in a cruel manner
In Surain Singh v the state of Punjab,
- In exception 1 there is a total deprivation of self-control, in exception 4 there is only
the heat of passion which clouds a sober man’s judgement
- There is provocation in exception 4 as in exception 1, but the injury done is not the
direct consequence of the provocation. Notwithstanding a blow, etc.; the subsequent
conduct of both the parties put them on an equal footing in respect of guilt.
- Undue advantage means unfair advantage.
1.5. Consent
Court emphasises on the fact that deceased is over 18
In Dasrath Paswan v State of Bihar, an adult man killed his adult wife, after she insisted
when he told her about his intention to commit suicide. He was found before killing himself,
and after killing his wife. Court held that it cannot be reasonably held that consent was given
under fear of injury or misconception of fact (as contemplated under §90).
In Prabhat Uppal v State, which also dealt with a suicide pact by a couple, the court held that
the deceased had given consent.
8. MURDER
Even if ordinarily there would be no liability, if the accused knew a special fact and took
advantage of it (for e.g. fatal allergies), he will be liable.
If there was no special knowledge, the court in Anda v State of Rajasthan held: The
knowledge must be in relation to the person harmed and the offence is murder even if the
injury may not be generally fatal but is so only in his special case, provided that knowledge
exists in relation to that particular person. If the element of knowledge be wanting, the
offence would not be murder but only CH or even lesser.
Intention to kill is not restricted only to kill with ‘premeditated design’ but if there is
sufficient knowledge that the act will cause death in the ordinary course of nature, an offence
of murder is made out. For e.g. firing at a crowd without the intent to kill a particular person.
Upheld in Santosh v State of M.P, an intention to kill is not required in every case. A
knowledge that the natural and probable consequences of an act would be death will suffice
for conviction under §302.
In State of Maharashtra v. Santosh Maruti Mane, the court said that intention to kill is not
required in every case. The knowledge that inevitable consequence is death is enough.
Probability has to be understood as a view of normal human knowledge and experience.
9. ATTEMPT TO MURDER (§307) AND ATTEMPT TO CH (§308)
Threshold of attempt is extremely high under §307.
Attempt can be of acts that are possible, and those that are not, because of legal and factual
reasons. In the acts that are factually and legally possible to do, they can result in being cases
of attempts as opposed to commission because of either failure to commission the offence, or
by intervention – either from third parties, or law enforcement agencies.
All elements for conviction of murder are required to be present except that this attempt
failed.
There is a difference in preparation and attempt.
In the event that any exception is applicable, offender will be punished under §308.
10. §354
The court in Rupal Deol Bajaj, held that since modesty was not defined in the IPC, the court
looked at dictionary meanings of the same.
In State of Punjab v Major Singh, the majority held that any act done to or in the presence of
a woman which is clearly suggestive of sex according to the common notions of mankind
falls under the mischief of §354. Common notions of mankind should be judged by
contemporary social standards.
From both these interpretations the court in Rupal Deol Bajaj, understood that the ultimate
test for ascertaining whether modesty has been outraged is, is the action of the offender such
as could be perceived as one which is capable of shocking the sense of decency of a woman.
The court also understood the intention of the offender from the circumstances and held that
even if its is presumed that there was no intention, he had the requisite knowledge and it was
not accidental.
The court uses leniency and does not apply the reasonable man standard, but attempts to look
at the cases through the perspective of a woman.
Also, through the dicta, it holds that even if the accused did not intend, requisite knowledge
will attract the section.
11. §345A
In T. Manikadan v the State, the court held that when the modesty of a woman is outraged or
it is likely to be outraged coupled with an assault or criminal force, §345 is attracted. Though
assault can be by mere gesture or preparation intending or knowing that it is likely that such
gesture or preparation will use any person present to apprehend use of CF. Mere physical
contract with advances will attract §354A. There may be an overlap. Once a case falls in
§345, even if S54A is attracted, accused should be punished for 354.
12. §354B
In Sunil Mishra v State of Jharkhand, the court held that for the section, the act of disrobing
contemplates either intention of disrobing or compelling her to be naked and in pursuance
thereto this intention if that person either uses Assault or CF or abets this use, becomes liable
for punishment under §354B. Success does not matter.
OFFENCES AFFECTING LIBERTY OF MOVEMENT AND EXPLOITATION
1. WRONGFUL RESTRAINT (§339)
Partial restraint on movement. Must be voluntarily caused and not accidental.
- Aggrieved party must have a legal right to move in that direction
- Obstruction must be voluntarily caused
- Must be total obstruction from moving in that direction
- Physical presence of accused is not necessary
- Relevant factor is effect and not nature of offence
- Only applicable to people, and not modes of transport.
In Vijay Kumari Magee v Smit. SM Rao, the court held that the victim must have a legal right
to go in that direction in the first place. A trespasser has no right, and therefore cannot be
wrongfully restrained.
It was remarked in Madala Peraiah v Voruganti Chendriah, that the physical presence of the
accused is not necessary not is any actual assault necessary, fear of immediate harm
restraining a man out of a place where he wishes to be and has a right to be is sufficient to
constitute an offence under §341.
2. WRONGFUL CONFINEMENT
Time period of detainment is largely irrelevant. Held by the court in Hafizur Rahaman v
State of West Bengal.
The accused will be held liable for wrongful confinement of a person if it happens in
circumstances where there is no protest because of loss of consciousness. Especially if the
loss of consciousness was also a direct result of the act of the accused. Held by the court in
Subhash Krishnan v State of Goa.
It was held in Santosh Kumar Roul v. State of Orissa, that if an impression is created in the
mind of a person detained so as to lead him to believe reasonably that he was not free to
depart or that he would forthwith be restrained if he attempted to do so, the same comes
within the ambit of wrongful confinement.
Also upheld in Om Prakash Tilakchand v the State where the court also remarked that same
reasoning as in Madala Peraiah v Voruganti Chendriah for §341, will apply to §342.
In Jay Engineering Works v State of West Bengal, the court held that gheraos that prevent
members of the management of any establishment from leaving are ways or wrongful
restraint.
However, that is a grey area. The court must have a way to balance the right of the protestors
with those protested against.
Position of law on whether a parent can wrongfully confine his child is also unclear. In
Atowar Ali v Mustt Jaitun Nessa Bibi the court held that a father can wrongfully confine his
child while in Kakkananttu Balagopalan Nair Deepu v State of Kerala, the court held that
considering the social realities of India it is hard to believe that wrongful confinement can
happen at the hands of a parent. Further, that no parent can takes away a minor from the
custody of the other parent who holds such custody by law.2
In Kuldip Sharma v State of Gujarat, the court has elucidated the difference between
wrongful restraint and wrongful confinement.
3. KIDNAPPING
There are two kinds of kidnapping (§359) namely kidnapping in India (§360) and Kidnapping
from lawful guardianship (§361). Punishment for kidnapping (§363).
Force and fraud are not necessary. Any form of persuasion the results in a minor leaving the
house of his lawful guardians constitutes kidnapping. Mens rea is irrelevant for this offence.
Kidnapping requires an active and overt act – if a minor leaves from his own volition, it
cannot be kidnapping.
If the accused is intercepted before crossing the boundaries of India, it cannot qualify as
kidnapping outside the territory of India – if not a minor (could qualify as kidnapping from
lawful guardianship), there will be no offence of kidnapping, may at best be an attempt.
Held in Vikas Chaudhary v State, that since the objective of kidnapping was to extort money,
and even after the death of the victim, calls were made for ransom, offence under §364A
(kidnapping for ransom) can be made out. The offence thus continues till the calls for ransom
to kidnapping are made.
Intention of offender for conviction under aggravated forms of kidnapping is important and
can be ascertained from the conduct of the parties.
When there exists intention to compel the woman into marrying the accused, or there is
knowledge that she will be compelled to marry another person or that she will be seduce or
forced into illicit intercourse, §366 will apply.
4. ABDUCTION (§362)
Kidnapping requires taking away from lawful guardianship or outside India, these
requirements are waived away for abduction. Therefore, abduction from previous abductors
will also constitute abduction.
To constitute a substantive offence abduction must be read along with the sections of its
aggravated forms. (§364, 365,366, 367, and 369). It is thus a means to commit an offence,
and not actually an offence per se.
Fraud and Deceit are essential components of abduction. Not only should they exist, the
victim must be lured into going from A to B or physically taken. Movement is crucial.
In Malleshi v State of Karnataka, it was held that there cannot be a very strict interpretation
of the aggravated forms of kidnapping or abduction. Even if intention was not communicated
to the payer of ransom, it does not absolve the accused of their liability.
When this section talks about unsound mind, it does not address temporary insanity or
unsoundness by way of alcohol consumption. Held in Din Mohammad v the Crown, that
unconsciousness due to dhatura poisoning cannot be insanity, as her insanity is temporary.

2
Second case is more recent, but first case is SC, so idk. The book says it’s a grey area.
Hague Convention on civil Aspects of International Child Abduction addresses issues of
wrongful removal or retention of children internationally.
Kidnapping Abduction
Substantive Incidental act
Not a continuing offence Continuing
Taken away from guardianship Related exclusively to victim
Means are irrelevant relevant
Consent is irrelevant Relevant
Mens rea is irrelevant Relevant
Age is relevant irrelevant

5. TRAFFICKING, SLAVERY, AND FORCED LABOUR

§370 lays down in detail he acts the constitute trafficking of persons – people involved in
every step can be held liable. The section also accounts for softer influences like abuse of
power as opposed to only physical force as a means to traffic people.
In Bachapan Bachao Aandolan v UOI, the Supreme court held that in every reported case of
missing child, there must be presumption of abduction or trafficking unless proven otherwise.
If guardians of wards commit this offence, they are also liable under §370. This was upheld
by the court in Rashmi Behl v State of UP.
For the purpose of trafficking, consent of the victim is irrelevant regardless of age. Position
of law on voluntary sex work in unclear. In KK Sud v The State, the court held that the
possibility of consent cannot be ruled out.
6. INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY3
In Common Cause v UOI, the court emphasised on factors of choice and self determination as
foundational bases of individual autonomy. The court also emphasises on the right against
interference by the state or others is also a part of individual autonomy.
In Gobind v the State of MP, the court recognised individual autonomy as the ‘central
concern of any system of limited government’ and went on to say that it was protected by the
constitution explicitly. Protection of privacy was also held as an integral component of
individual autonomy.
In Anuj Garg v Hotel Association of India, the court held that it is for the court to review that
the majoritarian impulses rooted in moralistic tradition do not impinge upon individual
autonomy. Legislations which have expression of biological and social detriments of the time
deserve more judicial scrutiny.

3
Lots of feminist theory given but not included in the notes, because I did not see the point of it exam-wise. Pg.
261.
 7. MARITAL RAPE4
In Independent Though v UOI, SC was faced with marital rape of child brides below 18. The
Supreme Court in its obiter also discussed marital rape for women above 18, and said a rapist
remains a rapist after marriage.
In Nimeshbhai Bharathai Desai v State of Gujarat, the court recognised marital rape is a
societal evil but held that IPC provisions must be interpreted strictly and legislature must
bring change. Three types of marital rape were recognised: 1. Battering Rape (both physical +
sexual violence), 2. Force only rape (force only to commit rape), and 3. Obsessive Rape
(assaults involve brutal torture)
8. §3775

4
Talks about how marital rape should be criminalised, and lots of feminism. Not included because I fail to see
exam usage. Pg. 264 onwards.
5
My module has pages missing – so someone else will have to make this
OFFENCE AGAINST PUBLIC TRANQUILLITY
[Chapter 8]
1. UNLAWFUL ASSEMBLY AND RIOTING
§141 defines, §149 punishes
Offence aggravates if any of them is armed with a deadly weapon
In Janmed v State of U.P., the court decided the case by establishing a common object and by
attaching vicarious liability. The Court held that §149 would be attracted whenever any
offence is committed by any member of an unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common
object of that assembly or when the members of the assembly knew to be likely to be
committed in prosecution of said object, so that every person, who at the time of committing
of that offence is a member, will also be held vicariously liable and guilty of the offence. The
Court decided that the Common object had been murder through previous enmity + statement
of the accused + lethal weapons carried to scene + merciless beating after surrounding (i.e.
through the circumstances of the case).
In Lalji v State of UP, the Supreme Court held that everyone must have taken to have
intended the probable and natural results of the combination of the acts in which he joined.
Every member is liable to the extent of pursuance of common object. If an act falls within it,
then no member can escape liability by saying he didn’t commit the actual offence.
Technically, Rioting is an aggravated form of unlawful assembly. Aggravates if armed with
deadly weapons.
In Vinubhai Ranchhodbhai Patel v Rajivbhai Dudabhai Patel, the court explained that if
force or violence is used by an unlawful assembly or any member thereof in prosecution of
the common objective of such assembly, every member is declared guilty under §146
(rioting) and punished under §147. Employment of force or violence need not result in
commission of a crime or achievement of any one of the five enumerated objects under §141.

Rioting

Unlawful Use of force r

Assembly violence (need
not result in...)

Five persons or Common

more Object

1. Prosecution must prove a nexus between common object and act committed or that it
was incidental to their object
In Alauddin Mian v State, two members of an unlawful assembly went after a person with the
common intention of causing his death, who ran into a room to death a spear to defend
himself. His wife did not allow him to go out as a result of which the attackers, in frustration,
fired at the two daughters of their suspected victim and killed them. The SC held only those
two guilty of the murders, and acquitted the rest of the members as they had no common
object to kill the ultimate victims nor was the same incidental to their object.
2. If the members of an unlawful assembly split into groups and commit offences that
are in furtherance of a common object, everyone is guilty of everything. Upheld in
Vithal Bhimashah Koli v State.
3. Liability ends when a member withdraws from the assembly whether voluntarily or
otherwise. Upheld in Kabil Cazee v Emp.
4. Members who join after the commission of the act, are not liable. Upheld in Shanta v
State.
5. If act is done, which differs from common object and was not likely in pursuance of
common object, all members of unlawful assembly will not be liable. Only offender
liable.
2. AFFRAY
Acc. to Pillai, affray, in the legal sense, is an act of terrorising the people and that people can
only be terrorised when something is done in front of them. Hence presence of public is
necessary.
The State of Maharashtra v Daulat Dashrath Koshare, held that the essential ingredients of
affray are:
1. Fighting between two or more persons
2. Fight should be in a public place
3. Fight must result in disturbing public peace
OFFENCES AGAINST THE STATE
[Chapter VI]
1. WAGING WAR
Three offences where mere preparation is a crime, 1. Offences against the state, 2. Possession
crime, and 3. Dacoity.
- Essential ingredients: 1. Object to be accomplished must be of public nature, 2. There
must be a direct strike against government’s authority.
- Waging war or attempting to wage war both stand on the same footing and are
punishable with the same punishment.
- Challenging the system of government is valid while challenging the government is
not. Held in Vasu Nair v Travancore Cochin State.
- Includes both Indian and non-indians
- Government of India means Indian State and not just the executive
- Waging war is different from rioting inasmuch as there is no minimum requirement of
number of persons in rioting.
In Nazir Khan v State of Delhi, the court held that it is not enough to show that the persons
charged have contrived to obtain possession of an armoury and have, when called upon to
surrender it, used rifles and ammunition so obtained against government troops. It must also
be shown that the seizure of the armoury was part and parcel of a planned operation and that
their intention in resisting the troops of the Government was to overwhelm and defeat these
troops and the go on and crush any further opposition with which they might meet until either
the leaders of the movement succeeded in obtaining the possession of the machinery of
government or until those in possession of it yielded to the demands of the leaders.
In Arvinder Singh v State of Punjab, the Supreme court held that raising slogans without any
other overt act cannot amount to waging a war against the state. Though since the offenders
were collecting men (through social media) with the intention of either waging war or
preparing for it, they would be liable for the same.
2. SEDITION
Essential ingredients are:
Means adopted
i. Whoever
ii. By words, either spoken or written,
iii. Sign, visible representation or otherwise
Consequences
iv. Brings or attempts to bring into hatred or contempt, or
v. Excites attempts to excite disaffection
Means adopted
Not only writer, but printer can be liable to. Requires use of words either printed or spoken
(for e.g. delivering a lecture – Lachchman Das v Emperor). Visible representation includes
engraving, woodcutting, drawing, or projection on a screen.
Consequences
Hatred or Contempt – if object of speech is to attack integrity of government, it amounts to
sedition. In Narayan Vasudev Phalke v Emp., accused was convicted for a speech on
government accusing it for protecting moneylenders and landlords who oppressed the
peasants.
Brings or attempts to bring
Excites or attempts to excite disaffection – In Queen-Emprees v Jogendra Chunder Bose,
disaffection was interpreted as a feeling contrary to affection, in other words, dislike or
hatred. It is quite possible to disapprove of a mens actions and yet like him. Words used are
calculated to excite feelings of ill-will against the government and to hold it up to hatred and
contempt of the people, and that they were used with the intention to create such feeling.
Upheld in Queen-Empress v Bal Gangadhar Tilak.
OFFENCES AGAINST PUBLIC HEALTH, SAFETY, CONVENIENCE, DECENCY AND MORALS
1. PUBLIC HEALTH
1.1. Relating to diseases
§269 penalises a person if he does any act unlawfully or negligently which he knows or has
reason to believe to be, likely to spread the infection of any dangerous disease to life. Upheld
in Chhaya Rastogi v State of UP.
§270 is an aggravated form of §269 and speaks about the mens rea of the offender being
malignant.
In X v Hospital Z, the appellant was HIV+ and this was disclosed by the hospital to his to-be
bride who then called off the marriage. The SC held that when there is a clash of two
fundamental rights (in this case right to privacy and right to life), the right which advances
public morality or public interest would be enforced. §269 and §270 would be redundant if
right to privacy would be enforced in this case. Further held, if a HIV+ person contracts
marriage with a willing partner, it would not be a case under §269 or §270.
1.2. Relating to food, drink and drugs
Special Law: Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954
§272 prohibits adulteration which makes food and drink noxious. Upheld in State v Vikas
Mahajan. §273 prohibits sale of such food and drink. §274 prohibits adulteration of drugs or
medical prep in such was to lessen its efficacy or change its operation or make it noxious.
§275 prohibits the sale of the same
2. CONVENIENCE
§279 prohibits rash driving on a public way. Elements needed: (i) accused was driving on a
public way, (ii) driving was in a rash or negligent manner to endanger human life or likely to
cause hurt or injury to another person
In negligence the wrongdoer breaks a positive duty and does not avert the act which is his
duty to do so; in Rashness the offender does an act which he is bound to forbear and thereby
breaks a negative duty.
In Badri Prasad Tiwari v State, the court held that mere error in judgement does not amount
to a rash or negligent act. If an accused did not drive rashly or negligently, he cannot be held
liable for death caused by misadventure.
§283,284,285,286,287,288,289,290, and 291 deal with convenience as well.
3. PUBLIC MORALS AND DECENCY
§ 292 sale, etc. of obscene books, etc. Two important elements are subject matter and manner
of dealing with subject matter.
In Aveek Sarkar v State of West Bengal, the SC dealt with the case in three parts. Brief facts:
A tennis player and his dark-skinned fiancée posed nude, photographed by the fiancée’s
father. Article spoke about there lives, future and picture was meant to be a protest against
apartheid and show the love triumphs hate. Was reproduced by a magazine and a paper in
W.B, paper was sued.
In Ranjit D. Udeshi v State of Maharashtra, the SC held that the concept of obscenity is
dynamic and changes depending on times. The court hinted that a contemporaneous attitude
should be adopted. Court held that test must be of general character and depend on case to
case. However, nudity and sex in art and literature cannot be regarded as evidence of
obscenity without something more.
Hicklin Test: whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscenity is to deprave and
corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences and into whose hands a
publication of this sort may fall. Essentially, judges isolated paras of test and their influence.
Test not accepted by the SC in this case.
SC believed that a community standard test should be applied. In order to declare a
publication obscene, it must be suggestive of exciting sexual passion in persons who are
likely to see it and this will depend on the particular posture or the background in which it is
depicted. Only those sex-related materials which have a tendency of “exciting lustful
thoughts” can be held obscene, but the obscenity has to be judged from the point of view of
an average person, by applying contemporary community standards.
SC held that the question of obscenity should be considered in light of the background i.e. the
context and the message that is being conveyed through the material.
In Bobby Art International v Om Pal Singh Hoon, the court emphasised on the how the
context and the message of the publication ought to be considered and not be prima facie
declared obscene on basis of isolated instances or portions from publications. It said that in
some instances, nakedness does not always arouse the baser instinct. The court does not
censor to protect the pervert or the oversensitive.
Court held that present instance photo was not obscene.
§294 requires the following elements:
i. That the offender has done any obscene act in any public place or has sung,
recited or uttered any obscene songs or words in or near any public place.
ii. Has caused annoyance to others, held in Dnyanoba v State of Maharashtra.
Without these ingredients a person cannot be convicted under this section. Held in Narendra
H Khurana v Commissioner.
The law disapproves of lottery and gambling and thus punishes them under §294A. Held in
Suresh Kumar v State.