“The gratitude of every home in our Island, in our Empire, ae indeed throughout the world, except in the abodes of the guil ty, goes out to the British airmen, who, undaunted by odds, unwearied in their constant challenge and mortal danger, are turning the tide of world war by their prowess and devotion. Never in the field of human conflict was so much owed by so many to so few.” Winston Churchill, Speech to the House of Commons, August 20, 1940 ~.\, BATTLE OVER BRITAIN 8 euguete at September 1940 by davidc.isby8 The great certainty of the summer of 1949 — that loss of control of the skies over southern England would result in invasion by the Wenrmacht — has net remained so cer: tain in the light of history, Hitler, the master planner, had not prepared for the invasion, but then nether had Mitlo, the master op pportunist, boen presented with the favorable ‘occasion’ The war of handfuls of men in the sirnever became the war of divisions an Eng lish sol, nor of destroyers against the barges inthe Channel. ‘The Battle in History ‘The Battle of Britain was the first mod- fin clash between air forces. Previously, ‘whenever aircraft clashed, it was in suppert ‘fr inoppasition to same specific operation by armies or fleets, Over Britain it would prove to be purely a confrontation of air forces. The Luftwaffe aimed to achieve air superiority of, after the change in strategy that led to sttecks on London and other ties, to destroy the will and means of Brit ain to survive. As it turned out, it faled at both; in tuth, it may nat have been capable ofetther mission In the Battle of Britain, the strength of ‘each side lay in its abilty to react quickly when their prewar systems and concepts were challenged by 8 changing situation or by harsh realty. The Luftwaffe could not transform itself from @ tactical force ~ the swift-stiking arm of the biitzkviag ~ into 3 strategie force at the sayso of Herren Hitler ‘and Gooring any mare than the aircraft, such fs the Ju-87 Stuka and the Boulton-Paul De- fiant, could be changed into anything other ‘than’the deatheraps they becamo in the face ‘of competent opnosition. The Battle clearly shows whore the strengths and weaknesses ‘of each institution lay. “Tha Fronch Atmy had failed toreact 03 ‘new war of mobility and infitration in the ‘months bofore the Battie, It had taken the lessons of the past and allowed them to be- ‘come staigntjackets — the Maginot Line, the Dyle Plan — which held the body and mind of the French Army motionless before the advancing enemy. A few months later the Luftwaffe would also fall in action. Un like the French Army, however, the Luft \affe’s foundations wore sold, It would last as an effective fighting force until the final few months of the war. Ye, its leaders failed to note the change in conditions caused by the relentless advance of modem technolo 4, and s0 did not comprehend what was ‘needed to wage and win an air campaign. ‘The Luftwatfe'schiofs sl retained thoi irrational “knights of their’ outlook, aview= point encouraged by the even less rational Nazileadership. Hermann Goering distrusted technolegy and believed ~ asdid so many of his fellows, too many of whom were Luft vwatfe officers ~ that all that was needed for Viotory was courage, the Germanic spirit, {nd whatever was good enough in 1918. While this attitude was certainly a hindrance in the Battle twas by no means decisive. The Luftwaffe like every other airforce In 1840, had to decide through its limited Combat experience how it would fight the ext air war. The German involvement in the Spanish Civil War was quite useful — though the lessons were often not as wide spread as they might havo bean — as was their peacetime analysis and exercises. The Royal Air Forco, on the other hand, had not ‘even the Spanish experience to guide them, ‘except second-hand. Both air forces had be lieved, in the words of Stanley Baldwin, “the bomber will always get through.” Yet the RAF leamed, in the Battle of Heligoland Bight in 1989 and in bomber raids through: ‘out the Norwegian and French campsigns, that despite its power turrets and splendid formation diseipine an unescorted bomber ‘went nowhere but down, burning. The Luft waite learned too. They had also believed in ‘the bomber. During the Battle, they commit- ted formations of unescorted bombers by aylignt against targets in north England ‘They suffered a predictable defeat ‘The Right System The German defeat was predictable fs perhaps was the whole Battlo ~ because the British understood what was required for ‘winning an air campaign, such as the Battle, batter than the Germans, Numbers did not ‘riumph aver Britain in the summer of 1940, just as they did not triumph in the fields of Franoe in the months before. It was the system, the way of fighting that determined Victory or defeat, rather than the amount of alcraft The British had failed to provide ther solves with adequate aireraft — or what was the more pressing problem, enough pilots — but they did have an adequate system. The British had spent the 1930's putting together the wespons that would win the Battle, even if they did not have the money to field large ‘quantities. The Spitire end Hurricane were ‘excallont aircraft, with their Mesin engines and e.ghtmachinegun armament. Yet they were By no means more advanced tech olagically than the BF-103, and the Hurt: ‘cane was at a decided disadvantage when fighting Messerschmitt, British fignter tactics at wing, squadron, ‘and flight levels were generally not a5 well Suited fo modern ait fighting as those of the Germans, whe had refined them in Spain and Poland; es the war went on, the British ‘Adopted many elements of Gotran tactics Nor 2ould the British claim an advantage in pilot skill, The Luftwaffe's veterans were Comparable in skill and experience to the RAF's superbly trained prewar pilots, while many of the British pilots hastily thrust into Operational squadrons during the Bate fften had no chance to Gain any experience whatsoover By 1940 the atmed forces of the world understood that to contol the field of battle albeit land oF sea — they must first conto! the air above it The British were ahead in realizing that such control depended upon their command of the electromagnetic spec- trum, They would never have been able tore tain dominion of the alr over Britain were t not for that, at the time, undisputed dom- ination of radar and radio use “The Luftwaffe’ falings wore 2 deep ‘and important reasons for its defeat In the Battle, Most important was thet it was a tac: tical foree trying to accomplish a strategic mmission. The planes the Luftwaffe used, the tactics which the pilets employed, and, most importantly, the war its commanders from Goering on down had imagined were all or- ‘ented toward helping the Garman Army win itsland battles — thatis, through tactical at- ower. Only belatedly did they realize thet the Battle of Britain was a strategic air cam. paign: they had to defeat Britain's means f’nd will to resist. The Wehrmacht did not Seize the only option that would have admit: ted 6 tactical solution — the direct coup de ‘main invasion of Britain in which the Channel ‘Would have boon tested as ust one very wide river. In that case, all they needed to do was ‘protect their arrmy and navy. Tis net surprising thet the Luftwaffe's, ‘other major failure — their planning feilure — ‘came trom this first misconception. The story of the Battlo shows how the Germans ‘were Unable to decide upon a strategy, fist trying to bring the RAF to battle over the ‘coastal convoys, then attacking airfields ‘and finaly switching to daylight attacks on London ust asthe airfield attacks were start= ing to yield results. After the defeat of 15 September, they then attempted a policy of fighter sweeps and fighter-bomber attacks by day and bomber raids by night. The Ger: mans had no real idea of now to carry out their mission. The aften irational demands Of Hitler and Goering which had tobe follow: {6 certainly aggravated the situation, but did not createit The fallure of German inteligence throughout the the Battle contributed neavi Iy to the final cutcome. Equally important Was the Lutwatfe’s inability to grasp the im ortance cf critical new British develop: rents. Had the Germans perceived the im portance of radar and the revolutionary im pact of such hardware as the drop tank, they might have overcome their indecisiveness nd altered their tactics, thus changing the Battl’'s outcome, OF course, the British ‘made mistakes too, but in the énd the com bination of events and decisions was enough to provide the nartow margin of victory that was all Britain ~ and the world ~ required. The Planning and Intelligence Battle The efficiency of the British radar system should not have surprised the Ger- mans as it did. Today, Electionic Inteligenos {ELINT] is a vital necessity in both war and peace, ELINT sensors gauge the efficacy and Capabilities of enemy radars and electronic tmitters. To criicke the Germans for not mounting an effective ELINT effort is not ‘necessarily n exercise in hindsight. The Ger- ‘mans were aware of ELINT procedures end equipment. in 1888, the Germans decided to macity the Graf Zeppalin, arigid dingible, for SLINT missions. Two sorties — one in May and one in August — Taled to produce any usable in- tellgence largely due to British use of selec tive radar silence and the mechanical prob Jems with the airship andits electronics. This limited effort seems to have satisfied the Ger- ‘man high command By July 1940, it was too late to start an effective ELINT campaign. At the outbreak ‘of the war, the Germans had only two experi mental radar stations. That the British had a complete and integrated air defense system ‘which gava total radar coverage of the south ‘and east coasts was all but ignored. Further, , 4 ace ni mmmmaaaaGoering did not ike rader — it was neither fun nor glamorous, and thus, in his mind, was untit for a true fighting man. This antire- tional Contempt of support services appear: ‘od at crucial moments throughout the war in all the major Axis forces. Ths full scope of the Luftwaffe inteli- {gence failure was apparent throughout the Battle. The Luftwaffe had no idea where the RAF's fighter folds were, she only maps us ed for planning purposes being marked only for military airfields, though notspectying os totype. Thus, during the Battle they repeat edly attacked Coastal, Bomber and Training Command fields. While some attacks: de stroyed 2 goodly number of aitoraft ~ an at (on one trainer field burned out almost fifty primary trainers; repeated attacks foro fed the evacuation of light bomber aircraft from RAF Eastchurch — these attacks can only be regarded as wasted effort. The Gerrans understood tle about their opponents. Examination of the intel {gence and planning documents that fll nto Allied hands at the end of the war revealed that the Luftwaffe based much of ts efforts of false hopes, promises, erroneous supgo: sitions, mitrorimaging, and selFpreserving les. Hermann Goering preferred the BI-110 it was his personal contribution to the German fighter program — andhe would not Fear that it would fal against Spitfires and Hurricanesin daylight combat, Therefore a though the evidence was emole from the fighting aver France and at Dunkirk, the Ger rmens were stil surprised that their vaunted BF-110 fighter itsef nesded an escort in the skies over Briain, “The type of staffwork that most made, atmod forcos take for granted was stil in its infancy in 1840, Prewar Luftwaffe Human In- lligence efforts were_no more effectve han their ELINT work, The various German intelligence services eperating in prewar Bri {ain were more concerned with. spying on ‘each other tan on the British, They had al most no idea what they were looking for None af the German intaligence agencies forinstsnce, bothered much about zhe radar ‘chain. No one reported that most of the con teol centers linked to the radar stations wer above groundin unarmored structures. Signal Intoligence (SIGINT) was ane of the few effective elemonts of German intelli gence during the Baie. British electronic discipline showed some unfortunate lapses, and most of the usable German information that did not come from photographic recon: naissance was delivered by SIGINT. In one instance, ithelped ead to German radar jar rmingin September, German photographic reconnaissance airraft wore forced 10 carry the burden of the inteligence-gathering effort, Starting before the war, they used civilegistered He- TIC aircraft’ on. “airline route proving flights” for this purpose, Before and during the Battle, each day's operations were nor mally pracded by a large number of recon Nalssanca sorties, The Luftwaffe was far dahoad of most ar forces’ practioa in regards to the systemization of reconnaissence ang in the provision of suitable aircraft and cam eras interpretation analysis and data process ing skils may have zen lacking, But the Luttwatfe possessed @ vital capability that ‘many of its previous opponents lacked. In 1940, the British were only beginning the Photo reconnaissance effort that would be- Come the finest in the wor'd, and at that time they sutfered for lack of suitable planes. Sturdy armed with the benefits of hindsight, it would appear thet German int ligence and planning should have concen: ‘ated on attacking the coment that held the British system together. By destroying tha radar stations and pilot room facilities rather than the airoraft and hangars, the Luftwaffe ‘ould have shattered British resistance, The System that Failed The falings of the Luftwaffe were con siderable, but so were its strengths. Though it was a new force which emerged from iis clandestine status in 1836, it was highly sol ssulficient, owing this. status as much to Gooring’s empire-building within the Nazi hierarchy 25 to any sense of the value of an independent air force. It had also been the first air force in history to take tactical air power and use it as a powerful and decisive ‘weapon, The German use of tactical ai pow fer was not new — the British had used iret fectively in 191Bin France and Palestine, and in many colonial conflicts (as had the Amat icans] — but the scale, scope and power was ‘onginal. Whan whole brigades of Polish troops were deteates by the Stukas, the G mans learned @ new lesson in how ta wage Each element in the Luftwaffe was to serve the blitzkrieg. The BI-109 was to se ‘eure air superiority over the battlefield and the areas behind . The BF-110 was to de. Stroy unescorted bombers attacking the Reich and was to range deeply into enemy Territory in support of the win-engine bar ‘erS as well as participating in offensive coun terair missions. The Ju-87 Stuka was basi cally the heavy artilery of the bitzkiieg; oper aling closely with ground forces, it was tohit targets in close proximity to Getrnan troops, lis targets were intended to be pilboxes, de fensive positions, warships, and the like — never factories. The twin-engine bombers were employ: edin stratouic, operational, and tactical mis Sons. Stategic bombing was not a maior Luftwaffe mission in 1938, They had planes ‘Spttre of 03rd Squadron downed in France vs his capable of carrying bombs, but they lacked the strategy or the planning on haw %0 use them elfectvely ~ as the Battlo consequent ly showed. Generalmajor Wever, the Luft: watfe's frst chief of staff, had been » devo tee af Douhet. He believed the twin-engine bbomiter fleet was only the predecessor of @ force using four-engine bombers that could strike out of Germany at targets from land to the Urals. Wavar, however, died in an air crash in 1998, and his disciples comaines in pasts of lesser responsibilty Emphasis was placed on light, fast bombers — numbers counted — and Goer ing, Udet, and even Hitler ware soon caught Up with “Stuks fever,” as soon as tha dive bomber had demonstrated its potential, The twin-engine Bombers were seen as nothing more than bigger and more powerful Stukas, Everything had to have dive-brakes, anc Crews were trained in dive-bombing ~ even the lerge, fourengine He-177's that ap peared during the war were So used, They Were to attack operational-evel targets — rallyards, concentration ress, headquar- ters, and defended cities — as they had done sa effectively in Poland and France, end they Could also be used against tactical targers, especialy shipping. But strategic bombing ~ sinking irectly at the enemy's means and Will to resist — had eluded the Luftwaffe, un ti July 1940 brought home realty along wath the victory laurels from France. Behind the aircraft and the half-baked ‘concepts was a weak industrial and training base. The German aircraft industry proved snaqual 0 the damands of modern warfare There was no industrial mobilization on a scale comparable to that in Britain, and thore ¥was-no centralized economic planning and allocation of resources. Manpower palicy was haphazard and poorly directed, Bortle ‘necks soon formed as expansions in one part of industry were quickly cancellad due to Shortages in other areas, The whole Garman economy in 1940 was in its pre-Spaer, ira tional era. The Germans would suffer dus to the insufficient aircraft and spare parts, The ‘tremendously harmful industrial demobiize ion that occurred after the fall of Franca did not have its full impact felt during the Batlle, butit surely cid not helo. 39German pilot traning also failed to & ppand to meet the demands of modern war- ‘ate, though they were fortunate instil hav- ing sufficient numbers t prewer pilots t0 Carry them through the Battie, Their replace- ment training, however, wes stil et an un- realistically aw level — some trainees having ben sent home after France fell ~ and a battle of atirtion would leave the Luftwaffe as severaly short of plotsas ine RAF. Inthe final analysis, the Luftwaite in the Battle of Britain was primarily a collection of aircraft — a number of good planes, flown by fine crews, and using decent tactics, tobe sure. It was not a coordinated, integra fighting force, the way RAF Fighter Com- mand was, The lessons of the Battlo show ‘that having sufficient aircraft is less impor- ‘ant than the planning, the command, con- ‘vol, and coordination, and the thought that into ther use. The Bulwark of Britai During the Frst World War, the British had a foretaste of what they would later en- Counter. when raiding Gothas and Zeppetins praved difficult to intercept and destroy. This ‘experience, which inspired much of Douhet’s theories, reinforced the belief that the offensive was the prime form of air war- fare and that the bomber had to be is chiet ‘lament. The defense of the United King: dom, as a result, started with the establish mont of @ Metropolitan Air Force in 1922, By 1926, it had become Air Defense of Great Britain (ADGB) Command, which was the tarform of the system in 1940. The ADGB was surprising 24 forts time, bring ing observers, antraicraft, fighters, and, at the time, b under a Single command, Airfields were positioned so that thet fi ers could interoept raiders over a specific section of the coast; these later would be- ‘Come the Sector Stations of the Battle, When ADGB became Fighter C ‘mand in 1995, the rearmament brought the [Brtish defense system into line with modern realities. Its first commanding offic Marshal Sir Hugh Dowding, also rmander during the Battle, set up 4 central headquarters at Bentley Priory, Middlesex not far ftom London, mands. The southeast of Eng would bear the Drunt of the der 11 Group, north of London was 12 Group, while the southwest of England was 10.Group. Defending the industrial north and midlands was 13 Group, backed by 9 Group in northwest England. Northem Scotland was defended by 14 Group, The airfields ‘yore transformed into Sector S, each major airfield obtaining dispersal folds away from the main facility. The Sector Stations and Group Headquarters both were to i “lly operational command and potting faci ies, with secure landline communications riot only with Fightor Command but also with local anti-airraft, observer, and other ‘assets, The Sector Stations were much more ‘than just places for aircraft to land: They be- ‘amo the nerve canters of thodefense. Ittook thtee years forthe system to take: form, andittook eight manths of the “Phony War"! to remove most of its imperfections ‘and flings. During this time, the system ‘evelved the two catalysts it needed to make itwork: modem fighters and radar. ‘The Spitfire and Hurricane fighters were more recent than the system that they relied Upon. At the time of Munich in 1838, the ‘was only one squadron of Spitires, and bi planes carried much af the defense burden [At the declaration af war, Fighter Command hhad.369 Hurricanes and 251 Spitfires, a wall as 76 Gauntlets, 202 Gladiators, and 151 Blonheims — these last three being hardly more than labilit Gauntlets or Spitfires, however, would have been equally blind in finding the enemy ‘The Defenses of Great Britain, 1940 ‘wereitnot for radar. Without radar, the claim ‘that “the bomoee will always get through, ‘which nad become a truism in prewar defense planning, would have been true in 140, On the night of 26 February 1935, when the first ‘experimental radar set Was proven to work. fone of its inventors, Robert Watson-Watt, f3i. "Bran has once more become an By July 1998, the Chain Home radar sy ‘tom waain place, although in 2 much roduc five-station form. In exercises during that vear, the tactic of “coming in low under the ‘m= Sector Staton = Aird Locationswith AA defenses (oumberof guns!radan’" known today by every schoolboy, was fist discovered by the RAF. As a result the Chain Home Low radars were daveloped toppick up lowefiying erat. To fillany gaps that mnt be caused by the destruction of Permanent radar faclities, Mobile Rader Units wore designed and putinto the tel All this emplacement took place with & ‘speed and urgency that sooms incredible in today’s world, when even the simplest ‘weapons system takes years upon years 10 develop and deploy. By July 1940, the five Station chains of tho previous two years had (grown 1021 Chain Haine and 30 Chain Home Low Stations, There were only afew gaps in the British radar bulwark “Scramble! The first indication the British had on an incoming raid came from the coastal Chain Home radar stations. It 1a0k considerable time fora formation of bombers end fighters 10 take aff and join up, and then for the cit ferent formations to climb to altitude and get in theirassigned positions fora mission. Ths ‘assemblage gave the British information and the time to act upon it. Using the secure landlines, the Chain Home radar operator passed along the grid position, altitude, and umber of the force fo the Filter Center at Fighter Command HO at Bentley Priory. ['50-plus forming up over Boulogne, Grid Whiskey 276, angols one-five.") At the Filter Center, the plots were checked against known positions of friendly areralt . Once it was known they were hos tile, the enemy force was placed on the plot board. Its data was put on a wooden block, which was then positioned on the plot board = a map of Bitain and the lands and seas adjacent. Its location was updated by the plotters — members of the Womens Aux: lity Air Force WWAAF] — who repositioned the blocks with long cue sticks. Meanwhile, the information was passed by landline from ‘the Fighter Command operations room t0 the Groups and Sector Stations throughout England. On. their identical but smaller boards, WAAF's placed markers indicating he now:incoming raid While the Chain Home radar operator provided updates of the raid’s movement Mifty-plus now Whiskey 2060, an five"), the Group Controllers prepare ‘ception. Each Group Controllr sat overiook ing his plot board and his Tote Board, alarge board with a column of lights showing the status of each fighter squadron in the Group at any given moment. Over the landline the controler aleried the squadrons at the Sec tor Stations nearest the incoming. enemy (Biggin Hill, order 72 Squadron to immedi ate readiness"), the lights flashing to a dif ferent column to reflect the fact that the ‘squadron was standing by, ready to bo in the airinfiverinutes. The pilots meanwhile weited by their sispersal huts forthe telephone cal fram the Sector Station control room. ("Scramble! Fiftyplus approaching Folkestone from the South, angels one-ivo."| The pilots then rac to their fighters. The ground crews helped them strapin, fired the Koffman cartridge to Start the Merlin engine, and gave a final shout of encouragement as the fighters tax edaway and took off, two or tree ata time, ‘As the British fighters climbed, they 0 appeared on the plot boards, their prosence marked by a block of wood with their squad- ron number, also moved by the WAAF plot- ters. At Group HQ, the squadron's indicator fon the Tote Bosrd flashed to “left the ‘ground The British fighters had to be track- 4 by Direction Finding and “Pip-Squeak, for the radar chain only looked out to sea. ("Pip-Squeak” was a radio signal emitted for 14 seconds each minute by each British fighter) For those over the sea, IFF lidentit cation Friend ot Fos) transponders — an in ovation in the summer of 1940 — distin- {ished British from German airraft, Having sorted itself out into its “vi” lor se line astern fight formations, the British ‘Squadrons were guided to the enemy ey the lear, precise voice of the contraller at the Sector Station, himself a fighter pilot. ("Veo tor 176 — fifty-plus bandits over Folkestone, angels one-five.") He gave the fighters the {Course to steer and the latest information on the enemy, including akitude in thousands of feet (“engols"), As the German planes crossed the coast, they became lost from British radar Tracking them now fall to the Observer Corps lookout posts, whose members would call Fighter Command with their visual est mate of the incoming rai, including for the first time the types of aircraftinvolved ("Thit ty-six Heinkel-111's at 14,000 feet, twenty four Messerschimiti-109's 2,000 feet higher’) a8 well as thei direction and speed. This in formation was also passed to the Sector Sta tions and tothe fighter controllers who pase editon to theplots, The fighters were steor- fed toward the enemy, whose position was ‘constantly being updated by Observer Corps posts inland. Meanwhile, Group may have ‘ordered other squadrons, fram the same of other Sector Stations into the air against raid When the fighters spotted the enemy ("Tally He, bags of bloody great Heinkels with close escort"), the lights on the Tote Board flashed again, shawing the squadron inaction. The two wooden blocks were now adjacent to each other. The fight was in the hands of the pilots. The squadron leader quickly barked his decisions. ("Red fight, Stay high and try to keop the fighters off us Yellow and Biue fights, follow mein against the bombers, line astern — head-on attack ‘goingin — now!”) Dogfight The radio frequency now filed with ‘chatter from the pilots, the position of en emy aircraft ("Gaggle of Messerschmitts coming down from ebove and 10 port"), warnings ("Red Three, break hard right!) commands ("Stay with me") and — while there would bo fewer in a well-coordinated squadron with good radio discinine — cries cf trumph, oaths, and demands that they cease ("Shutupl) Allof this came over theloudspeakors at the Sector Station plot room, heard by the Controlless and the plot. They recognized the pilots by their voices, accents, and their call Signs, and each bartle was very much shared by those listening to It But the con: ‘rollers were by no means spectators. They a would be vectoring in more squadrons in ‘against tho raid, and would call the army's anti-aircraft gun positions, alrting them to friendly fighters in the area. If an aircraft went down, they initiated search and rescue activities. They warned ather installations that appeared to be the targets of incoming raids. The Sector Station contialers and plotters did So even when ther locetion was under attack. They simply donned. thei helmetsand carried on Once @ squadron found itselt low on ammunition snd fuel, i was forced to diser ‘gage. The fighters would not come home as they had gone out, in squadron formation, Dut rather in ones, twos, and threes, spit up by the dogfighting. The Sector Station con trollets would vector them back to base — sometimes o ether bases! bombing hed put their own out of action. As the planes return ed, some pilots might da ilcit victory rolls to ‘announce a kill. A quick debriating would ‘ascertain the success or failure of the battles an accounting of victories and lasses would immediately be sent to Group by landin the Tote Board lighted up under "Landed ‘and Refueling” for that squadron. Meanwhile, other Sector Station would have directed their fighters against @ raid. Perhaps other Groups would join in as well — as when wings of 12 Group fighters cutin to German bombers over London on the 15th of September. The British system did not al Ways work, butt worked often enough forit robeettectve The “Big Wing” ‘Tho workings of the British fighter ot rection and control system shows the impor- tance of the “big wing” controversy. In ite ‘August and early September, Air Vico Mar shal Si Trafford Leigh-Mallary ~ command erof 12.Group north of Londan — backed by tone of his wing commanders — the redoubt able, legless ace Douslas Bader — urged thatthe fighters from each Sector Station be formed up together into ane wing before be ing vectored against a raid, By using this method, the British would not attack piece meal, by individual squadron, as had bean happening. The time it took to combine the wings in theie suggested manner, however, mest that they engaged the German bombers after the targets were hit. The targets were often the airfields of 11 Group, whose commander Air Vice Marshal Sir Keith Perk, backed by his senior pilots, emphasized the “snuacron forward!" type of interception — getting the aircraft off the ground and hitting the Gee ans a8 soon a8 possible 1a break up their formations, cause losses, and disrupt the-en ‘omy before they could hit thelr targets, even If this meant fewer German aitorah destroy ‘edi the end af the day. This difference in tactical outlook result fe in some stormy disagreements between the two commanders before Air Marshal Dowding. The wings of 12 Group, it must be admitted, did tend to show up too late to be fective in battle on most occasions. During the climactic Gorman daylight raids on Lone don on 18 September, hewever, they show: od how devastating @ “big wing’ could be But unless they could strike the Germans before they hit thar targets, which was not42 possible unless the target was London, the 12 Group wing was basically an attrition ta tic. In the long run, it would shoot down ‘more aireraft than itlostin return ‘Wile looking nie in the history books, this concent did not answer the needs of Fighter Commandin August and September. The Germans could field more resources han the British, even ata favorable loss ra 12, The Germans also had the distinet 23 vantage of bsing able to destroy British ai Craft on the ground {itis always preferable to destroy aircraft on the ground rather than in the al whore they have an annoying nabit ‘of shooting back and not holding still. Fur ther, the Germans did not nava to destroy Fighter Command, just force it from the south of England to prevent it from interfer ing with any invasion and to allow the Ger rman bombers free range overall targets in the area, The flaws and falings in the British sys tomy were Fea, It proved sufficient in battle, however, and the Germans did not think of a Ccounteemeasure, The British, whatever their falings in producing aircraft and pilots before the war, at least produced a system that_ maximized the effectiveness of the planes and orews they had Tactical Limitations Other questionable decisions in RAF tactics limited the efficency of the system. The RAF tactical ‘books’ belonged tothe bi plane era. Each squadron linerally nad to im- provse is own tactics or face defeat i they encountered a force of Bf-108's. The Ger- mans had learned tho basis of madern fighter tactios — the fist airforce to do so — and stressed flights of four planes made up of two elements, the grouping of leader and wingman — the lowest common donomina {ot of all fighter tactics today. Thay also knew height gave an advantage and that the Sun was a pewerful ally when used properly. AAs befited a tactical force, the Luftwaffe had its maneuvers in much better order than Itdidits operational or strategic concepts. For much of the Battle, the RAF fought in “vis” of three airraft in tight formation The two wingmen focused mast of their at- tention on staying with the leader, however, and the whole arrangement lackodfloxibity. Unlike the two-plane element, the vcs often fell apart in the pressure of a dogfight into three independent and unsupported aircraft Considering that @ considerable percentage Of British plots during the Battle were inex- perienced, ths often proved fatal (ther British squadrons adopted varia: tions on the fight or section "ine astern” for Imation, each fighter following he leader, but this was not practical in combat. Combined With the fact that the German planes were Formally higher (having climbed to altitude ‘vet France) and had an average 4to-1 nu: merical advantage, itis nat surprising that the BE GD gave baer tan tey got during the Battle ‘Another RAF tactical limitation — farin thet ease they wore weeker here than in their Strstebie and operational thinking — was a tendency, until September, to view al fighter Squadrons as being essentially similar. Thoy id not take adventage of the strengths of ‘ach type of fighter. In September, Air Mar- shal Park ordered that Spitfire and Hurricane squadrons should be “paired” whenever possible, and that the Hurricanes shoulé Concentrate on the bombers while the Spit: fires kept the escorts at bay. Similarly, in the early stages of the Bat- tle, RAF fighter controle faled to make ‘bast use of the sun when setting up their in torcepts — a lesson paid for with losses. The use of the RAF's second-class fighters also ‘causad unnecessary casualties. The Bou! ton-Paul Defiant. squadrons, intended as bomber-destroying interceptors able to stand long petals, shoula all have been packed off to 13 Group in the Midlands to watch day and nignt far unescarted bomb- fs, Instead, they ended up confronting Bt 100's and suffered for i. Likewise, Blen- heim fighter squadrons were used in July as convay escorts — a tactic worked out botore the war, when the projected threat to con- ‘yoys was unescorted twin-engine bombers ‘and not Stukas with heavy B-109 escort. By Fecognizing and optimizing the differences ‘among types of fighters, the RAF might have limited losses eariyin the Battle The RAF's greatest shortage, of course, ‘was in trained pilats, not fighter planes. The increased output ofthe British aicraft indus try left the RAF with more planes then it ‘could use. The fighter pilot shortage was ‘considerable: Fighter Command was 362 pr lots undersirenath in the wake of Dunkirk, ‘and in the “crisis wesk" of eatly September, it was down 207 plots. As losses abated, more foreign pilots, pilots pulled from bomb- er units, and hastily graduated new pilots fil fed out the ranks (the decreasing tempo of at tacks meaning those in the last category ‘were not shot down as rapidly as they had been earlier). By the end of Ociober, the shortage had disappeared. The Empire Air Training Scheme further rollified the situa- tion since large number of pilots tained ‘overseas were soon available to the RAF. Despite the strenaths of the British sys tom, it was hardly infallible nor was it more than @ relatively primitive errangement. Had the Germans been able te sustain ahigh lavel of "maximum effort” days — thatis, sending fut all their aircraft, subjoct to tho ability of heir fighters to provide sufficient escort — y could have stretched RAF resources to breaking point. Fortunately, each time the situation became dangerous, a breathing space of bad weather ora change in German strategy allowed the system to repair the emageend carry on. ‘Additionally in the heat of bette it was ‘quite easy for the British interceptors to miss ‘heir targets, Even against raids on London, ‘only 40 percent of the fighter sortios made ‘contact with the enemy. If this contact rate had been doubled by the British — asit was ‘on 15 September, when itrase to 78 percent ~ it would have had the seme effect as doubling the RAF fighter force. The system ‘was stil a force multiplier well before the termwas ever conceived The British failed 10 coordinate the ef forts of their Bomber forces with the main task of tha RAF: the dafense of Groat Britain ‘Sixty percent of the British bomber sorties ‘were simed atthe invasion ports, where they destroyed a tenth of the assembled shipping, ‘Squadrons were also held aside in readiness for anti-inyasion duties. While the strategic bombing effort surely: helped provoke. the German raids on London talthough the deck sion to switch German efforts seems to have Dredated the reid on Betin), meny sorties hadino prospect of immediate results. Sever- ‘al maximum efforts, By day or night, aainst the crowded German airfields in the Pes de Colais area could have yielded a considerable numberof planes destroyed and eased Fight- erCommand'stask In his spsech bofore the House of Com ‘mons on 18.June, Churchill decared, "Let us therefore brace ourselves to our dues, and 50 bear ourselves thet, if the British Empire And its Commonwealth lest for a thousand years, men wil stil say, This was their finest hour. Churchill was indeed prophetic: The Battle of Brtain was more than a clash of mil itery systems, although that is what deter mined the outcome, It was far more than @ vast aerial kragspial. I represented the first victory over Hitler's Geemany, A Battle Bibliography ‘A bibliography is crucial for this article, because the analysis has only scratched the surface and presented afew oblique views of {an important subject, | can only paint out @ few books thet should have all he material the reader may desir on the Battle Francis. Mason's Bartle Over Brtainis. ‘containiy the most exhaustively researched book on the subject, and is close to dein: tive, though Derek Wood and Derek Demp- ster’s The Narrow Margin cavers the ground well Ithough with less accuracy! and with 3 high sense of drama. Other worthwhile nar- ralives include the offical ones. Denis Rich aid's The Royal Air Force 1999-45 Volume I:The Fighe at Odds and Basi Colie’s The Air Defense of the United Kingdom. Any- thing by the prolific Alfred Price is worth reading on the Battle: Bitz on Britein, Lute wate Hendbook, Instruments of Darkness, The Hardest Day, World Wart Fighter Com ‘bat to name buta few. Simileriy, anything by William Green on the aircraft, especially Ger man aircraft is of great value. Other worth~ ‘whilebooks, particularly on hardware issues, {are The Origins and Development of Opera tional Research in the RAF, Owen Thetford’ s Fl Cite fighter tactics), and books by Pile ‘and Hogg on ant-arcraft defenses, The Battle of Britain has produced no. ‘great art it was drama enough in itl. It Shates the characteristics of most of the great twentieth century events as being big ‘ge¢ than human imagination or ski. There fore, fora sense of what the Battle was actu ally ike, one must turn to the memoirs or ‘gtold-to” accounts of thase who were there, These include Adolf Gelland's The First and Last, Al Deere's Nine Lives, Johnny Kent's One of the Few, Peter Town send's Duel of Eagles, R.1. Bicker's Ginger Lacey, Lamy Forester’s Fly for Your Life, Bob Brahamn’s Scramble, Richard Hilary's The Last Enemy, Rawnsley and Wright's ‘Night Fighter, Hans Ruedel’s Stuke Pict, Oi ver Walker's Sailor Molan, ric Baker's Fighter Aces of the RAF, Toliverand Consts- bie's Homidol, Shores and William's Aces High, Paul Bricknil’s Reach for the Sky ‘These are good for starters, ut By na means are an exhaustive list. CIC]THE LONG SUMMER OF 1940: ABATTLE CHRONOLOGY The events that shaped the Battle — ‘and those that flowed from it — are best seen in context with the flow of action ‘during the Battle itset. The phases of the Battle — the six different approaches the Gormans tried in their attempt to defeat Fighter Command and Great Britain — are apparent, 28 isthe importance of the different links in the defense system, May May 10. Fail Gefo, the German invasion of Wester Europe, commences with the most intensive and costly ai fighting of the war — the Luftwaffe loses 304 air- craft, the Allies many mor. June June 4, The evacuation from Dunkitk is ‘completed, In the nine days of the evacu: ation, RAF Fighter Command loses 106 aircraft, the Luftwaffe loses 133, June 18. Prime Minister Winston Chur chil declares: “The Bato of France is over, | expect that the Battle of Britain is about to begin.” July July 2, Hitler drscts the expansion of plans for an invasion of Britain, A special force of Luftwaffe units, under Oberst Johannes Fink of KG2 is set up to take Control of the air over the Channel, with the hope of destroying RAF Fighter Com- mand in air combat. Most of the Luft: ‘atte has sil not recovered from the ex- ertions ofthe spring campaign. July 4. Stukas attack a coastal convoy, Sinking 4 ships. July 5. Fighter ar cover is ordered for ll future British Channel convoys. July 7. Stukas attack coast artillery on ihe lao of Wight, July 8. A raid by RAF Blenheim bombers fon the Luftwaffe bomber field at Stan vvanger, Normay, is defeatod withthe loss (of 5 of 9 Blenheim. Stukas sink a British ‘coaster in the Channel Atturicane ‘oing ht July 10. In what is considered the actual ‘opening ofthe Battle, an attack by Do-17s ‘ona convoy leads to pitched air battle July 11. Stukas and Do-t17's attack 3 Convoy and shore installations at Portia, July 12-13. Bad weather severely re- stricts operations. July 16. Fuchrer Directive 16 calls for the invasion of Britain. Operation Sealion is underway. July 14, Stukas damage 2 coasters. At night, Bo-8 fying boats drop mines off the east coast July 19. Hitler gives his “final appeal to Feason,” demanding capitulation, Stukas attack destroyers off Dover. British Defi: ant fighters are trounced by Bf-108s,los- ing 6 of 9 aireraft. At night, the British continue strategie bombing in the Ruhr and attack German warships at Wilhem- shaven at dawn, July 22. Ju-88's lay mines off Plymouth atnight. July 24. An unsuccessful Dornier attack fon 8 convoy results in a pitched air battle ‘off Dover. July 25. In the climax ofthe first phase of ‘the Battle (the attacks on coastal con- vyoys), two large Stuka raids sink 5 coast- ‘ers and damage 2 destroyers. The Admi- ralty halts the coastal convoy and sends ‘their goods by rll July 27. Artacks on convoys stil at sea sink 2 destroyers and damage? more. July 29. Stuka attacks on Dover and Portland sinka destroyer anda patrol ship and force the Royal Navy to pul its ships ‘ut of Dover August ‘August 1. Fuchrer Directive 17 calls for the defest of the RAF as the first part of Sealion, August 2. Poor weather limits opera tions. Goering issues his Battle of Britain directive, 2 concerted attack calling for ‘the collapse of air defenses south of Lon- don in four days and total defeat of the RAF in four wooks. ‘August 6. Goering designates August 10 {as Adfertag (Eagle Day), the day to start 3 the decisive battle, Germans step up re ‘connaissance activity over England. ‘August 7. Another coastal convoy loses 1Oships to Stukas. pitched air battle en- sues, with the Stukas suffering heavy losses despite their fighter escort. ‘August 8. British Skua dive-bombers at tack oll tanks at Bergen, Norway. At night, the Germans resume intensive minelaying, which they maintain for the next four nights, August 9. Scatterod Luftwaffe sorties re ‘ult in the oss of bombers, ‘August 10. Bad weather forces the post ponement of Adlertag and limits activity tonuisance aids by both sides. August 11. A oress-rehearsal for Adler. tag, with raids on Dover and Portland re sulting in pitched battles, ‘August 12. Preliminary stage ofthe Bat tle ends with attacks on radar stations (destroying that at Ventnor, Isle of Wight), and airfields (Lympne, Manston, and Hawkingel. Since 10 July, the Ger: fans have lost 286 aircraft, Fighter Com: mand 160. High levels of British produc: tion have allowed Fighter Command to bulid up reserve strength. ‘August 13 Adlertag turns into a disaster for the Luftwaffe through bad weather ‘and poor coordination of forces. Stukes hit Portand, Southampton, and join in @ number of raids by twin-engine bombers fon RAF airfields (Deting, Manston, Mid dle Wallop, Andover, and Eastchurch), which were not fighter fields. The Ger: mans lose 48 aircraft, Fighter Command only 13. Atnight, a Spitfire Factory in the Midlands and a Sting bomber factory in Belfast are attacked. RAF Bomber Com: mand hits aly at night August 14. Worsening weather forces postponement of intense operations, The Luftwaffe attacks airfields, Southampton and targets of opportunity The British ro: tato in fresh squadrons from.the north. Four British and 19 German aireraft are shotdown, August 15. The second day of the Ger- rman air offensive starts off with the Brit- igh messacring the raids coming in from Norway. Raids on aircraft factaries and airfields at West Malling, Croydon, East- Church, Driffield, Worthy Downe, Biggin Hil, Lympne, Middle Wallop. The Ger- mane intend to draw the RAF into dec! sive combat and destroy them, with BF-109's and BF-110', The British suffer considerable damage on the ground, (2 fighters and 14 bombers) plus 34 fighters, ‘while destroying 75 German aircraft Goering, angry atthe high losees, orders his fighters to fly closer escort to the bombers, limiting ther freedom of action, August 16. The German offensive con: tinues with heavy aids on airfields, Mans ton, Harwell, Brize Norton, Hawkinge, ‘West Malling, Farnborough, Tangmere, Lee-on-Solent, Gosport are hit — again ‘most are not fighter fields. The Germanslost 45 sircratt and the Brtish21 in the alr, plus 68 (mainly trainers) on the ground ‘August 17. The strain is beginning to tel fon the Luftwaffe, Despite the fine westh: er, they stay on the ground to maintain aircraft and rest the crews. One German bombers shot down at night. ‘August 18, The fourth day of the offen. sive — the coup de grace against RAF Fighter Command according to the orig- inal plan — brings heavy air caids on air- fields at Biggin Hil, Kenley, Thorney Is land, Ford, Debden, and the radar station at Poling. Stukas take particularly heavy losses, and obviously are no longer cap- able of being used. Fighter Command loses 27 aircraft and the Germans lose 71, 16 of them Stukas. Elsewhere, Skua dive- bombers return to the Bergen tank farm, August 19. As the withdrawal of Stukas begins, Goering issues orders for the next stage in the Battle, withthe size of bomb- forces to be limited to those that can be heavily escorted. tis also racognized that BE-10s roquire Bf109 escorts. Three British and 3 Garman airraft are lost in limited action forced by bad weather. August 20. Continued bed weather brings minor raids and reconnaissance sorties, Two British and 6 German aircraft arelost. ‘August 22. Bad weather limits opera tions to attacks against a Channel convoy ‘and scattered raids. Fighter Command loses 4and the Germanslose aircraft. ‘August 24. This day is the start of the third phase of the Battle, the one thatisto bring. the crisis of Fighter Command. Heavily’ escorted bomber formations prove formidable opposition as they hit industrial targets and airfields. The Luft. \waffe loses 38 aircraft, Fighter Command 22. At night bomber crews accisentally hit London. ‘August 25. Heavily escorted raids hit Portland, Weymouth, and RAF Warm well. A furry of minor raids result in a total of 20 German and 16 British aircraft lost. RAF Fighter Command is running short of pilots its eirerews are becoming fatigued. At night the Luftwaffe attacks Birmingham while the RAF, in retaliation for the attacks on London, bombs Betin. ‘August 26. The Germans repeat the pr Vous day's formula, but this time with less success, as the RAF gets through to the heavily defended formations that hit Hornchurch, North Weald, Debden ir- fields and Portsmouth. British losses are 31 shot down while the Germans lose 41 Hitlr is schaduled to decide whether or not the progress of the air offensive just fies completion of invasion preparations bbuthemakes no decision August 27. Scattered raids and recon naissance in bad weather yield 2 British ‘and German aircraftlost. ‘August 28. Despite reasonable weather, ‘the Germans limit their efforts to fighter ‘sweeps, each side losing 9 aircraft. At right, @ four-ight offensive against Liv- terpoot opens. August 23. Fighter sweeps result in 17 German and 9 rtish losses. August 30. The tempo picks up with raids on airfields and industrial sites — Biggin Hills badly hit. Manston can no longer be used. Tha Germans lose 36 ai craft, Fighter Command 26. Hitler an- rnources that the decision on Sealion wil bemede on or abour September 10. ‘August 31, The crisis week begins. RAF Fighter Command is running short of pi: lots and those it has are becoming more and more exhausted. The Germans again hammer fighter fields, including Debden, Duxford, North Weald, Hornchurch, and Biggin Hil. British commanders argue the issue of “big wings” versus “squadrons forward” tactics. Fighter Command su fers badly against the heavily escorted bombers; 30 planes are lost, along with 35 German aircraft. At night, Liverpool and Borin are bombed. Luftwaffe staff is ordered to start planning reprisal raids ‘against London — escalation that will provide deliverance. September September 1. Fighter sweeps and a heavy raid on Biggin Hill yield 15 British {and 14 German losses. September2. Tho assault continues, hit ting Biggin Hill, North Weald, Debden, Eastchurch and Detling airfields with 35 Gorman and 31 British losses. The British ‘wil face only five more days of this offen- sive, for on this day Hitler orders reprisal raids on London in response to British at- tacks on Borin, September 3. The offensive continues against RAF fields at Debden and North ‘Weald — score 16 each side. Hitler agrees that 21 September is the earliest possible date for Sealion. September 4. An aircraft factory at Brooklands is the subject of the main as- sault; 17 RAF and 21 German aircraft are lost. September, Ason the previous days of the offensive against airfields and factor- les, the heavily escorted attacks come in two phases. Targets include Croydon, Biggin Hil, Eastchurch, North Weald, Lympne, Detling and the tank farm at ‘Thameshavon. British and German losses are20 and 23 respectively. September 6. With Fighter Command ‘now’ positioning its squadrons to defend fighter factories in the south es well es its airfields, an attack on the Hawker works at Brooklands is defeated. Many of the airfields hit on the 6th have repeat visi- tots. The RAF loses 23 aircraft tothe Ger ‘mans’ 35 — evidence of several German attacks being beaten off, September 7. The British, knowing that reconnaissance photographs show an in ‘creasing concentration of invasion barges in the Channel Ports (despite nightly sir attacks by RAF bombers), aware that ‘Stukas are being held in readiness behind ‘the Pas de Calais, and hearing hints from agente’ reports, issue an "invasion Im ‘minent” alert, The fifth stage of the Battle of Britain — the atack against London — begins after several sifield raids in the moming. German bombers hit London ‘throughout the aftemoon and night. Losses are heavy: 41 German aircraft, 28 RAF fighters. ‘September 8. A few attacks on airfields in the day lead to extensive bombing of London by night. The British lose 2 sir- craft, the Germans 15. ‘September 9. A massed daylight raid on London draws a heavy RAF response and is defeated, 28 German and 19 British ar craft being lost. At night, the raids against London continue. September 10. Hiter postpones the de- tision on the invasion until the 14th; Sep- ‘ember 2ath is seen as D-Day. A few sor ‘tes in bad weather result in 2 Gorman craft boing shot down. A daylight raid by FRAF Blenheim bombers on Eindhoven fild destroys 9 German bombers without loss ~ an example of what the RAF could have sdone’on the packed German airfields. ‘September 11. The British change theit ‘actos to meet the mass raids on London, In addition to the attack on London, 3 ‘coastal convoy and several aifields aro hit. The Germans also start cadar jamming ‘with ground-based equipment, but Brit ish ECCM (Electronic Counter-Counter. ‘measures) prove generally adequate. 29 British and 25 German aircraft are lost, [Night brings more raids on London and extensive British attacks on the invasion ports. The Germans are forced to pull ‘more BI-109's away from escort duties to tend their ports September 12. ed weather greatly re- duces operations — one aircraft lost on each side. ‘September 13, Continued bad weather leads to limited operations by day. Night raids on London and the Channel Coast Three British, one German aircraft are ‘shot down. Hitler, in conference, now ap pears even more disenchanted than be- ‘ora with the ea of invasion. September 14. Continued bad weather leads to a number of small rids, heavily ‘escorted. German radar jarmming contin- tues. The Germans lose 4, the British lose 12 largely due toa Spitfire squadron at- tacking a Hurrieane squadron in bad vsi- lity. In conference, Hitler postpones the Sealion decision until the 17th. September 6. In the day celebrated ever after as Battle of Britain Day, Goering takes advantage of clear weather to send two maximum-effort raids against Lon- don, Both 11 and 12 Group fighters re- ppoatedly attack the formations, with a to- tal loss of 26 British and 6) German air craft. (The British claimed, at the time, 486 destroyed.) The Germans are shatter:ed of any illusions they may have that Fighter Command is down to “its last 50 Spitfires.” ‘September 16. Goering calls high-level ‘conference in France at which the Luft- waffe's objective is allegedly changed from the destruction of London to the de feat of Fighter Command. Minimal activ. ity by day; London is raided by night. Two British and 6 Germen aircraft are shot down. The final phase of the Battle — fighter sweops, “tip and run" fighter. bomber raids, and daylight bomber at- tacks with the main efor going into night bombing — is about to begin. ‘September 17. The new tactics of fighter sweeps seem only to bring about a battle Of attrition that the Germans are too ex- hausted to sustain and cannot win In any event. Five British, 8 German aircraft are lost. At night, London and the invasion ports are heavily bombed, Hitler decides that Sealion is tobe postponed “until fur- ther notioe.” September 18. Fighter swoops and an attempted daylight raid on oll targets near London yield 12 British, 19 Gorman ir Craft lost. At night, London and the inva: sion ports are again hit. Hitler agrees to isperse the invasion barges to minimize losses. ‘September 19. Hitler finally abandons plans for an invasion of Britain, Bad ‘weather limits operations; one British, 7 ‘German airerat are shot down, Soptember 20. A single, powerful fight. le sweep over Kont with 7 British and 2 Gorman siroraft shot down shows that the B-109's are no less powerful for their earlier defeats, ‘September 22. Bad weather mits oper: ations; two German aireraft are los. September 23, Fighter sweeps during the day and raids on London and Berlin at hight; 8 British, 12 German aircraft are shotdown. September 24. A fighter bomber attack ‘on the Supermarine works at Southamp- ton, fighter sweeps, night attacks on London and other British attacks result in Bosses apiece. Septomber 25. Fighter swoops and a bomber raid on the Bristol factory (mod- ‘rately damaged) result in3 British and 10 German aircraft being shot down. The in vasion floethas now been well dispersed, Soptember 26. The Spitfire factory at Southampton suffers considerable cam age ftom He-111’s. London and Liverpool are hit at night. Eight British, 4 German, aireraf are shot down, September 27, Tho Luftwatte tries to hit London again in daylight. The incoming raid is mauled and aborted with heavy losses. Othor Luftwaffe activity includes fighter-bomber raids, fighter swoops, and ‘an attack on Bristol. London is raided at night. 55 German and 28 British aireraft are lost in the last grast massed daylight faid ofthe Battie. September 28. The Germans demon- strate tactics that could have been deadly trier in the month — using @ small Ju formation bound for London (which it never reaches) as the anvil and several hundred 81-1095 as the hammer Four German and 18 British alroraf aco lost; ‘not one of the German's is an escorted bomber. London is hit at night. September 29. Nuisance raids and a dusk attack on Liverpool leave 6 British ‘and2 German aircraft shot down, September 30. The Germans try to re peat the "hammer.and-anvi” tactics, but ‘ilo have the suffiolenty massed forme ‘dons of escorts. Twenty British and 47 Gorman aireraft are lost. London is bomb: edat night, October October 1. The first raids by bomb-carry- 12 BF-109's on London occurs. London and industrial towns are bombed at night October 2. Fighter sweeps by day; Lon- don and Midlands hit by night. Qctober 4, In 2 meeting with Mussolini Fitior blames the failure ofthe invasion on bad weather. Single raiders over Britain, October 5. Fighter and fighter bomber attacks over south England. London bombed by night. October 7. A large force hits the West land factory by day, London and Liver- oly night. ‘October 8-17. Fighter-bomber raids and fighter sweeps by day; heavy attacks on London, Liverpool, and other industrial cities at night. Other targets include ar: fields and convoys. ‘October 18-19. Quit; bad weather ‘October 21-24. Only sporadic activty by ‘day; London and industrial cities Bombes atnight October 25-27. Fighter sweeps and fighter-bomber raids (including some Do-17’s and Ju-88's) over Kent and Lon: ddon. Widespread night raids with the Ia: jan Expeditionary Ale Corps joining in on the25th, October 28. Convoy and shipping at tacks, followed by fighter-bomber raids fon London. Widespread bombing at ight. October 29. n the last day of large-scale Lutwatte operations, fighter-bombers, Covered by sweeps, attack London and Southampton, The italiane bomb Rams- gate without damage or loss. Widespread Right attacks, October 30. Fighter swoops and fightor- bomber attacks before the waathar closes October 31. The Battle ends not with bang but with a whimper in cold, wet, weather, with no aireraft lost in combat. ‘That the Battle was over was not immed ately apparent, but the end of October hhas been the tracitional point of the Battle ending. 0 ‘THE MEN OF THE BATTLE Like any world-quality drama, the Battle had an allstar cas. It was @ battle that was shaped by personality from top to bottom. Not only was national policy shaped by a Hitler or Churchill, but the Imenner in which each squadron or Gruppe fought was very much a function of its “skipper.” During the Battle, the skip- pers, the low-level commanders on both Sides, literally wrote the book on ait-to-ait and, ‘to a lesser extent, air-to-ground ‘combat — lessons that endure to this day, ‘As a result of this learning process, the squadron or Gruppe that hed @ litle ‘more practice and a bettor understanding Of tactics than its opponent had the 2d- vantage — en advantage that time after time spelled the difference between vi tory and defeat. The experience ofthe ai ‘crew was absolutely orca. Men, such as Bader or Malan, had an importance that far outstripped their relatively junior rank, ‘The Germans Hermann Goering. Reichsmarshall end Commander of the Lufwatte, Goering shaped the form tho Luftwaffe would hhave when it confronted the RAF far ‘more than he affected its strategy during the Battle. In both cases, his influence Was a powerful drawback. Far more com plex than the obese buffoon of popular legend, Goering stamped his personality onthe Luftwaffe and how i foughe Albert Kessolring. Gonoralfeldmarshall ‘and Commander of Luftflotte2 — one of the two such organizations that carried the burden during the Battle — Kessel- fing was an army officer by taining: he was politically raiable, and an optimist Whose belief in the endsieg colored his ‘Spproach to the Gattle — he truly believed the British were down to thei last 50 Spi fires. His plan was for one massive assault against one key objective — which, after 7 September, became London. However, he lacked a plan to carry this idee five to reality Hugo Spertle. Goneralfeldmarshall and Commander of Luftfotte 3, Sperrle was ‘commander of the Legion Kondor in Spain. professional sir force office, Spertle was not the Stuka enthusiast Kes- selring wes. Rather, he believed in a plan fof strategic warfare: hitting. ports and supplies, and isolating Britain from over ‘8085 support. While this was probably the ‘most strategically foresighted of any of the Naz plans, it did not sit well with the ideologists who desired the quick end easy viclory that had stood them in good stead since 1833, However, his idaas were relatively inflexible and neither he nor his staff were able to produce a workable plan that might have convinced therest of the high command. Hans-Juergen Stumpf. Generaloberst ‘and Commander of Luffione 5 based in Norway, Stumpf was a staff officer by ‘ade, His command suffered severe loss cs early in the Battle, and thereafter only launched sporadic ais.46 Wolfram, Freiherr von Richthofe The “Stuka General” was a general com rmanding Flogerkorps Vill in Luftlotte 2. Cousin ofthe Red Baron, he was the fore- most advocate and practitioner of close airsupport, and the Stuka was his chosen instrument. He supported their use over Britain until cruel reality. forced thelr withdrawl Ethard Milch. Generafeldmarschall and Inspector General of the Luftwaffe, Milch was one of the architects of the Luft- \Waffe, He also had @ stormy love-hate re- lationship with Goering. Milch was in volved in the strategic decisions that shaped German policy during the Battle, {and he came up with one plan that made Sense in terms of German strategy and Capabilities — for an immediate assault lupon Britain after Dunkirk. Goaring con. sidated this “nonsense,” ‘The RAF Al Chief Marshal Sir Hugh Dowding, The first commander-in-chiof of Fighter Command, Dowding was instrumental in setting up the system that he led into bat- tle, The British decisions to change tac- ties throughout the Battle were ordered bby Dowaling, who in the station room at Bentley Priory had the moment-by-mo: ‘ment control through Fis Group command 8 of the British forces in the Battle. He had a greater degrae of command control ‘than any previous commander-in-chigt in ‘a major campaign in modern warfare. Dowding refused to allow British fighters ‘to bewhitled away in frultiess actions, be it in France (where he opposed Churctill lover the convoys, or defending second ary airfields. In an act of astonishing in gratitude, Dowding was forced into ce tirement by Churchilin 1941, Air Vice-Marshal Sir Keith Park. A Now Zealander, Park commanded. 11 Group, the area of Fighter Command that lay between the German bases and Lon: don. Park's squadrons had been heavily ‘engaged at Dunkirk. Park proved himself equal to every challenge, and kept his ‘group together even when it was being Subject to constant raids on its airfields He believedin “squadrons forward” ~ in- ‘tercepting the Germans before they could hit their target, by individual squadrons if required. Itwas Park who ordered Spitfire ‘and Hurricane squadrons to start operat- ing together and insisted thet Spitfires ‘engage the fighters and Hurricanes on 3Ge the bombers, @ decision which groat Iy improved British tactics. After the Bat- tle he was shuffled off to Training Com- mand, despite his success. Park, along ‘with Dowding, will always be considered the victorious lesdersin the Battle Air Vice-Marshal Sir Tratford Leigh- Mallory. Commender of 12 Group, which Was responsible for defenses north of London, Leigh-Mallory Is know for his Support of the “big wings.” There was a ‘considerable personality clash between the plunging, offensive minded Leigh Mallory and Park, the master defensive tactician. Leigh-Mallorys view appealed ‘0 Churchill, and so he received Park’sjob after the Battle. When the “big wings” ‘could get organized and airborne, theiref- fect was devastating — witness the Ger ‘man bomber losses over London on 15 September, Air Vice-Marshal_ Sir Christopher Brand. Commander of 10 Group, Brand's ‘command was out of the main German effort, but stil received @ great many faids, ‘Brand's leadership and tactics ap- peated effective despite his aroup's rel tively low priority for trained aircrew and fresh squadrons. ‘Squadron Leader Douglas Bader Bader, the principle architect of the “big wing” strategy, had an impact on British tactics far beyond his relatively junior rank. He was an example of the best in British squadron and wing leaders, a5 ‘well as being a super fighter pilot himself {he eventually scored 22 kills). A prewar regular, Bader was all the more remark ‘able for being a double amputee; he flew fn artificial logs. He still received @ full pension as 100% disabled throughout the Battle in addition to his salary, donating ‘the excoss to charity, Squadron Leader Adolf “Sailor” Mal an. An example of one ofthe strengths of the RAF — its cadre of highly trained pre war regulars ~ Malan was one of themen Who tray wrote the book on fighter Combat. His “ten commandments” are sill found posted in ready rooms through fut the world. Malan commanded 74 Squadron, based at Biggin Hil, at the height of the Battle, destroying six air- craft during the Battle himsel. ‘The Few. There has been no demograph- ic or sociological study made ofthe 3,080 men who made up the RAF Fighter Com- mand, They inluded officers, warrant of ficers, and NCO's. Prowar regulars pro~ vided a cadre of highly trained pilots with, excellent technical (but not always tact tall skis. Others came from the Royal Air Force Reserve, Royal Auxiliary Air Force, land Royal Air Force Volunteer Reserve. ‘The Ric Force Reserve was compos- ed largely of excRAF types recalled to ac- tive service. Many of the fighter control- lers were reservists, some with Great War combat experience, The Auxillary Air Force was a “weekend warrior” opera tion, but they were nonetheless as ade quate as the regular units. The Volunteer Reserve embraced everyone else through ‘a taining program that started before the war, The vast majority were British — 2543, Others included 147 Poles, 101 New Zealanders, 94 Canadians, 87 Creche, 29 Belgians, 22 South Africans, 22 Australians, 14 Fronch, 10 Irish, 7 ‘Americans, 2 Rhodesians, 1 Jamaicen ‘and 1 Palestinian, Of these, 620 were kill- ed during the Battle, 17.2% losses. Many ‘more did not survive the war. 10) ‘THE WEAPONS OF THE BATTLE {tis the way of modern warfare that even the most global and significant con- flicts resolve themselves into the micro- cosm of weapons and tactics. A batle be ‘ween the foreesof reason and chilation nd those of "a now dark ago made more sinister, and perhaps more proteoted, by the lights of perverted science,” resolved itself nto a battle between Fighter Com- mand and the Luftwaffe. In turn, this Conflict became the sum total of thou: sands of bettles, some lasting but sec- conde — the Spitfires and the Hurricanes against the. Mosserschmitts, Heinkts, omiers, and Junkers The Fighters The single-engine fighters were the main characters of the drama. While the German bombers were tasked with carry- ing out the orders ofthe High Command, the success or failure of the Bf-109 ‘against the Spitfire or Hurricane deter mined whether or not they would catry ‘ut thelr missions. “The dasigns of the British Hurricane: and the German Bf-109 were contempo- rary. The Spitfire represented a more ad vanced stage of development, ast enter fed service two years after the other de- signs. The Bf-109 maintained its advan- tage over the Hurricane by continuous ‘modifications, The 8f-109&-8 model used in 1940 was a significant improvement ver the Bf-1080 of the Munich era and the 8f-1098 and BF-108C used in Spal ‘The Hurricanes used in the Battle, how- fever, were almost all the original Mark I version, although a few Mark IIA Hurri- canes were delivered to squadrons start- ing n September. ‘All three fighters were designed pri ‘marily 2s Intorcoptors. n the final anaty- 8, although it was outclassed by the other two, the Hurricane stil remained a Viable fighter in the summer of 1940. The differences between the Spitfie and the [BF-109 were more subtle, and the advan- tage in battle greatly depended on the tactical situation and the skill of tha plots. Speed. Down on the deck — as it would be when operating as a fighter. bomber in Cotaber — the Bf-109 had a significant speed advantage. Higher up, vihere the decisive bartles of August and ‘September were fought, the Spitfire had the advantage and the Hurricane closed the gap. ‘Maneuverebility. The ability to me- rnouver is pethaps best expressed in terms of instantaneous “G" forces the aircraft can pull, This means that an aireraft can change its flight attitude at a force equal 10 one to eight times the force of gravity, dopending on its airspeed. If an aircraft ‘ries to “pull” more "6" than it has ai. speed available fo, it will enter a stall. A ough guide is that one “G' enables you to move the direction of an siteraft two degrees a second. Instantaneous. "G”cannot be sustained, An alreraft pulling this amount of "G" will lose alrspaed ‘and/or altitude. From comparing the aval able instantaneous, G," it becomes ap parent that both British aircraft could pul ‘more "G” at any given airspeed than the BF-108. Thus, the two British aircraft were: ‘more maneuverable, (One advantage the Bf-103E-3 has in maneuversbility was its leading-edge wing slats, which gave it better handling and, more important, stall warning cher acteristics. Many Spitfire plots — espe Gially those less experienced — did not use ‘their eircrat’s maneuverability to the full ‘because they wore atraid of stalling and spinning. Thus, experienced B¢-109 pilots such as Adolf Galland wore able to turn inside inexperty-flown Spitfires. Rate of Climb. As the chart 2c- ‘companying this module shows, the BF- 109E-3 had the advantage over the Spit- fire at low altitude and an advantage over the Hurricane throughout. At the altitude at which the decisive battles were fought, however, the Spitfire ad the advantage. Diving. As it is well known, the B-109 had an advantage in diving over the British fighters. Equipped with fuel in Jection, while the British fighters used float carburetor, the BE-IO9E-3 could put Ins nose straight over and pull into a dive ‘The British fighter pursuing it would lose ground as its engine would quit until it Went into @ half-roll and pulled towards the ground, ‘The diveaway thus became the standard Bf-109E-3 evasive maneuver in the Battle, Even better, from the Gorman ‘perspective, this maneuver put the Bf-108, down at low altitude, where it was fastor than any Spitfire and could outclimb it, ‘and was at its best all-around perfor. mance. However, bombers cannot be de- fended by diving down to the deck when- ever an aircraft fs engaged. The Bf-103's had to stay and fight to defend the bomb: ers. Twin-engine bombers cannot oper ate at sea level, where their escorts wll be better able to defend them. The bombers ‘could suffer losses to anti-aircraft artillery ‘and barrage balloons (with crews to0 low +0 bal out), and the fuel demands of low. altitude cruising reduced their bombioad. ‘The BF-109E-3 was best sulted to dive ing attacks ~ a quick pass, then diving away and climbing back. The British fighters were best suited to horizontal dogfighting. The German advantage was ‘easier to uanslate into Victories in altcom- bat, because most fighters that were shot down never saw what hit them, Thus, the German tactics allowed them greater use of the element of surprise. However, the task of defending bombers prevented the Germans from utilizing these tactics. It explains, however, the frequent devas: tating British losses when a squadron climbing upwards was “bounced” by BrI09s. Armament. The eight .308 Brown- ing gun armament of the two British ‘ightors was designed to put out the max- mum number of projectiles in the mini ‘mum amount of time; before the war the British thought thet the “impossibly high speed of modern aircraft” meant that ‘they would only be in range fora few sec- onds. Originally, the RAF had set their {uns to spray a wide ares, about the size ‘ofan enemy aircraft. Combat experience over France, however, showed that the 303 round had minimal stopping power against a mod- ‘am aireraft. To do any damage, the guns hhad to be harmonized so they’ came to: gether in a point of fire 260 yards in front Of the British fighter’s nose. Because the Hurricane's four guns were all together in each wing, while the Spitfire's were spread along the leading edge, it was eas- jer for Hurricanes to produce this concen- ‘ated fire — another reason why they ‘wore better vectored against the bombers ‘while the Spitfires handled the fighters. A few Spitfires of No. 18 Squadron were ‘armed. with Jam-proned 20mm cannon ‘that rendered thom ineffective, ‘The BF-109E-3 relied on its two slow- {iting MG FF 20mm cannon forthe weight of its firepower, It mounted a third can ron ints propelier hub, but the severe ar: frame vibration that resulted meant that it was soldom used and was frequently re moved. Supplemented by a pait_ of 7.9mm machineguns, the 20mm cannon 2r@ intended to destroy non-maneuver- ing bombers, but they could do a great deal of damage to anything they hit. While its armament was certainly longer ranged and more effective overall than that of the British, the BF-109E-3's arma ment was also inadequate. ‘Vulnerability. Allthree fighters were vulnerable to fighter damage. None had sel-sealing tanks. All had vulnerable I uid-cooled engines. Armor plate and bullet-proof glass were limited. The Hut ccane was the most rugged of the three fighters The BottomLine Spitfire vs. Bf-109 losse (2.82101 ratio) Hurricane vs. Bf-109 losses: 272 to 153 (2.56101 ratio) Average German numerical superiori- ‘yinfighter combat: 4-1 Percentage of aircraft that did not seo ‘who shot them down: 65-80% 219 10 180 ‘Approximate Rate of Climb {Feet per minute) Seale 297 2.600 3.760 4,000 2,300 8,000 2.760 2.000 2,600 — 16,000 2.760 2.265 4 Plane Characteristics CHARACTERS rR yan"! ore Engine Moti i_Matnil_08 e014 Hoxtnan MDhp—TDhp zn. AL 5 16,350 16,250" 14,765" tron tbs Ae eis Comber Biba 6:be 6 Length 211" ata" ee Wingspsn 967107 4a" zie Wing aes —242eq ft 258eq fe 177ea Wing 24.0 2391 31.0 roading Maximum 3240n/ 2.700K7 3790 7 climb minute minuto min Maximum §75mi 425m 410m Ser, a7007" 35300" 35,600 ling Cannon — 5 Bedi fr MGS Ge «eT Imm Timm __ 7.7mm Wiroffite 4.b/ees 4.4ib/see 3.b/e00 Maximum Speed (mph) Sealevel 200 2305 301 zm a 21396 310380 18.500 ae 380 2.000 zi sa7 25,000. 088. 50,000" a6. Air Combat Maneuverability 1 0 96102 2 125 130140 3 155 16017 4 180 166205 Sma oe a Sere aoe 258250 32 20312 King George’s Bad Bargains RAF Fighter Command was fortu- ‘ate in being able to rely chiefly on the Spitfire and Hurricane, but it also felded number of less effective types, The Blenheim IF was the fighter version of the Blenheim bomber. Intend ed for long-range escort tasks and inter- ception of unescorted bombers, the Bln: hheim was t00 slow, weakly armed, and vulnerable to exist in daylight against = ther BF-N10's or Bf-108's. They had @ hard time catching Ju-88's and Do-T7's, espe- ially ones their bombs were dropped. Af.ter some daylight losses, the Blenheims were withdrawn to night fighter duties, and were the first siroraft o carry radar. Flight LioutenantD.H. “Nobby” Clarke called the Boulton-Paul Defiant "that ridiculous ‘chase-me-charle-so-1- can-shoot-you-down deathtrep'.” In tended as 2 bomber-destroyer able 10 stand long patrols at high altitude, the Defiant had no fixed forward guns, its armament being limited to four 303 Browning guns in a power turet. It wes limited in speed and maneuverability be- Cause of its turret. Crew coordination was difficult twas fatally vulnerable to head- nattacks fromastern and below. The Defiant had a brief moment of success over Dunkirk. One squadron claimed 37 Kills on one day alone, includ ing a bunch of BF-108's, which, according to legend, dived in on the tails of what they thought were a formation of careless Hurricanes. (Reality, alas, shows that the Defiant’s actual victories that day were ‘much less.) Despite several defeats over France, the British persisted in deploying Dofiants into 11 Group until August, wit Ile effect except king alrcrows and los ing aireraft, Withdrawn to night-fighting, it was als fitted with radar and wes the ‘most successful night fighter type in the winter of 1940-41 ‘Tho Gloster Gladiator, a squadron cof which helped defend Plymouth, was a splendid airplane, Always the symbol of Britsin’s unpreparedness. — in Norway, France, Greece, Malta, and the Middle East — the Gladiator was totally outdlass- fd by the Luftwaffe's equipment. It was the last biplane fighter to serve with the RAF. : The Luftwaffe RAF Fighters . cxARacreM™ seyret Moemanrs qiaoitor” | ere DoGOIAs mo 211Ds BB GAS Fate 329° Juma 211 8-1 fg Mercury Mein Merry | zi 7 ae sor ic ongines Z ae eons 2 tee «| Meee 8 Pa SE ‘ Mx power —40hp 1080p ih Max. power 130059 {Dp 1 400hp adap 1,206 Zasmph —9O4mph_253mp% | Hse op Smo 236mph —_247mph—265mph —_20mph ono" 7,000", 800 ‘Al talitudel 19,535 410" 16400" 16.09" 1,500" Crise speed__2iGmph_—259mph mph — | Cuigg peed __2TTmoh “2himph 2t2mph—_2i6mph___222mph Loaded woight 12.500be €318be 476002 | caged weight 13250 9 5506s __29,762be 18 ba on Length 39'9" 3514" 275" Length wr eS erie ar Wingspan B84" aera" 23" | Wingspan 89a ‘ee weet ors Wing eo 489° 260" az rare haa ae inti cin 540K 1.90087 200077 | cima —_2.165R/nn SAORI ABO E20 BIO ETE ss ® | Max. range $90ni_—— 1.22mi 745m 050m Max range i 465m 4 ee pe Sen cvling 32.810 255025260 25.000" 26 500" cling 27,750" s0 03,000 | SA erecta aso Sen oeling 276 e xed gune 2» 20/4 7.9mm 27 9mm 1s 7.6mm pre cous as i | peo ee ee ee EGE Max. bombid 1.100 1300 4ac0 2200 4.400 Tim 73mm The Bristol Beaufightor 1 hardly belongs in the category ofa bad bargain, but the first production versions of this highly effective twin-engine fighter sut- fered from teething troubles The Attackers The BI-110 was the siroraft of the Lutwatfe’s elite Zerstrrer units. Yet it ‘was to fell throughout the Battle, as were its hand-picked crews. The Bf-110 design ‘was later to become an effective bomber- destroyer in defense of the Reich, but as {an offensive daylight fighter it could not texistin the face of single-engined opposi- tion, When caught by British fighters without 9 BF109 escort, Bf-110's would be reduced to forming a Lufbery circ, Covering each othor's tal. Some Bf-110D versions used inthe Bartle had drop tanks (which tended to hang up). Others of the C48 version were fighter-bombers, used ‘with good effect by the truly excellent robungsoruppe 210. The Bf-110 was out fits element inthis campaign. “The Ju-87 Stuka was the most high- ly publicized aircraft the Germans had in 1940, and its failure over Britain was the most spectacular, Used in its B-, 8-2 and RR versions, the Stuka was slow, under armed, and highly vulnerable. It needed air superiority to survive effectively, and the Germans never gained air superiority ‘over Britain. The Germans never even ‘tied to exploit the Stuka's pinpoint accu- racy where it would have been most useful = hitting rader stations and the com ‘mand, control and coordination faclities at Sector Stations. The He-111 was the most numerical ly important twin-engine bomber the Luftwaffe had. It was slow, underarmed, ‘and lacked adequate armor plate, self- sealing tanks, and sufficient defensive armament. Unescorted Heinkels. were easy prey for fightors. Yor, because of their numbers, they had to carry the bur den on the bomber offensive, The Ger. mans soon realized thelr vulnarabllty and tied to use Do-17's or Ju-88's for the most demanding raids, but this was not always possible. After 16 September, the He-TIT never returned to Britain by day, although it was @ meinstay of the night bombing effort. A wide variety of He-11 subtypes were used, varying in arma- ment, armor protection, and engine. ‘Thes® ranged from obsolescent He-111D models, He-I1TP-1 though P-5 and H-1 through H-5 models, The crack German night-bombing pathfinder group, KG 100, primarily used He-111Hs, “The Do-17Z lacked bomb load carry- ing capsblity, but offered speed and structural strength: Their armament and armor was both inadequate by 1940 stand- ards. Do-172 units specialized in attacks fn shipping and in lowsaltitude, high speed airfild attacks. They were surpris ingly difficult to catch and shoot down st low speed and high altitude. The Do-172 ‘and 2-2 were the main versions, although ‘Some earlier Do-17P reconnaissance ver- sions remained in use, The Do-216 was a re-engined version (with Db 601's) used forreconnaissance during the Battle. The Ju-88A-1 was the most effective Luftwaffe bomber. It combined. the ‘bomb-carrying capability of the He-11T ‘with speed greater than that of the Do-17 Fast and maneuverable, the Ju-B8 shared the lack of armament and armor protec- tion. When it was unable to use its strength to advantage, it suffered as hheavilyas any other German bomber. (Other Luftwaffe aireraft included the He-59 floatplane used for air-sea rescue; the He-1I5 floatplane used for minelaying and maritime reconnaissance; the four engined Fw-200 used for ant shipping at tacks in the Atlantio, U-boat cooperation and strategic bombing; the Do-18 fiying boat used for minelaying and martime re connaissance, iB