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 commands Bayonne reserve, 595;
his torpor, 602, 713.
Villena, castle of, capitulates to Suchet, 287, 288.
Vittoria, battle of, 384-450;
retreat of the French from, 433-50.

Wachholz, Ludwig, captain, notes of, 432;

on combat of the Linduz, 618-19.
Waldron, John, captain, exploit of, at Castalla, 295.
Wellesley, Hon. Henry, ambassador to Spain, his correspondence
with Wellington, 196-7, 525;
his dealings with the Regency of Spain, 205.
Wellesley, Richard, marquis, resigns from Perceval Cabinet, 214.
Wellington, Arthur Wellesley, Marquis of, marches to Burgos, 3;
crosses the Douro, 12-13;
his pursuit of Clausel, 16-20;
siege of Burgos, 21-51;
his instructions to Hill, 57;
retreats from Burgos, 66-86;
orders Hill to retire from Madrid, 99;
his reasons for retreat, 111;
operations round Salamanca, 111-37;
retreats on Ciudad Rodrigo, 137-53;
his strictures on officers commanding divisions and brigades,
156-61;
criticism of his campaigns of 1812, 170-6;
at Freneda, 194;
made Generalissimo of Spanish armies, 196-204;
at Cadiz, 201;
on Portuguese finance, 211-13;
his relations with Whitehall, 214-24;
with the Duke of York, 223-4;
intrigues of Gordon against, 224-6;
his plan for campaign of 1813, 299-305;
plan for Tarragona expedition, 308;
leaves Hill in command of Southern Army, 320;
joins Graham, 329;
 occupies Toro, 331-3;
his plan for transferring British base to the Bay of Biscay, 348-9;
for driving the French out of the Peninsula, 359;
his operations on the Ebro, 364-82;
plan of attack at Vittoria, 394;
his derogatory remarks on his army, 452, 453;
marches for Navarre, 455;
severity towards Norman Ramsay, 456-8;
pursues Clausel in vain, 467;
his orders for Murray’s expedition to Tarragona, 488;
dissatisfaction with Murray, 521;
influence of Armistice of Plässwitz on his plans, 525-6;
in the Bastan, 537-43;
in correspondence with Bathurst and Liverpool, rejects their
suggestion of transfer to Germany, 558, 561;
controversy with Melville, 567-8;
goes to St. Sebastian, 585;
his dispositions for the defence of the Pyrenees, 603-6;
concentrates against Soult, 647, 659;
his ride to Sorauren, 658-62;
prepares to attack Soult, 694;
at second Sorauren, 694-701;
pursuit of Soult, 707-40;
renounces advance into France, 737-40.
Whittingham, Sir Samford, general, his Spanish division, 163, 276;
at combat of Albeyda, 282;
at battle of Castalla, 293, 294;
in the Tarragona expedition, 492.
Wimpffen, Louis, general, Spanish chief of the staff to Wellington,
201.

Xixona, plot to betray, 279.

Yanzi, combat of, 720-4.

Yecla, combat of, 286-7.
York, Frederick, Duke of, his relations with Wellington, 223;
opposes Beresford’s claims to seniority, 228, 229;
 disapproves of Provisional Battalions, 232-4.
Yrurzun, combat of, 461.

Zadorra, the river, its importance in battle of Vittoria, 384;

crossed by Kempt, 407;
by Picton, 411;
Reille’s defence along, 435.
Zamora, French garrison of, relieved by Foy, 11;
occupied by Daricau, 327;
occupied by Graham, 330.
 THE CAMPAIGN OF VITTORIA
May 22nd.-June 21st., 1813
Map to illustrate the positions of the armies at the commencement of hostilities
and the subsequent marches of Wellington’s Columns.
 FOOTNOTES
[1] August 23, from Madrid, Dispatches, ix. p. 374.

[2] Certainly Carlos de España and Morillo, probably some of the Galicians, and
even some of Elio’s or Ballasteros’ troops from the South, if they proved able to
feed themselves and march.

[3] Dispatches, ix. p. 424, to General Dumouriez, to whom Wellington often sent
an illuminating note on the situation.

[4] Dispatches, ix. pp. 390-1. Alten had the 3rd, 4th, Light, and España’s
divisions.

[5] Dispatches, ix. p. 377.

[6] Ibid., ix. pp. 383-4 and 386-7.

[7] Ibid., ix. p. 398.

[8] The best account of all this is in the diary for August of Tomkinson of the 16th
Light Dragoons, who was in charge of the outlying party that went to Valtanas.

[9] The actual numbers (as shown in the tables given in vol. v, Appendix xi—
which I owe to Mr. Fortescue’s kindness) were July 15, 49,636; August 1, 39,301.
The deficiency of about 600 cavalry lost had been more than replaced by
Chauvel’s 750 sabres. There was a shortage of twenty guns of the original artillery,
but Chauvel had brought up six.

[10] Dispatch printed in King Joseph’s Correspondence, ix. p. 64.

[11] Clausel to Clarke, August 18th, 1812.

[12] The 2nd, 4th, 6th, and 25th Léger, the 1st, 15th, 36th, 50th, 62nd, 65th,
118th, 119th, 120th Line had to cut themselves down by a battalion each: the 22nd
and 101st, which had been the heaviest sufferers of all, and had each lost their
eagle, were reduced from three to one battalion each. There had been seventy-
four battalions in the Army of Portugal on July 1st: on August 1st there were only
fifty-seven.
[13] See ‘Memorandum for General Santocildes’ of August 5. Dispatches, ix. pp.
344-5.

[14] Dispatches, ix. pp. 389-90.

[15] The best account of all this is not (as might have been expected) in Foy’s
dispatches to Clausel, but in a memorandum drawn up by him in 1817 at the
request of Sir Howard Douglas, and printed in an appendix at the end of the life of
that officer (pp. 429-30). Sir Howard had asked Foy what he intended to do on the
23rd-27th August, and got a most interesting reply.

[16] Diary of Foy, in Girod de l’Ain’s Vie militaire du Général Foy, p. 182.

[17] Wellington to Bathurst, August 18th.

[18] Wellington to Castaños, September 2. Dispatches, ix. p. 394.

[19] See especially Sir Howard Douglas’s Memoirs, pp. 206-7, and Tomkinson’s
diary, p. 201. Napier is short and unsatisfactory at this point, and says wrongly that
Clausel abandoned Valladolid on the night of the 6th. His rearguard was certainly
there on the 7th.

[20] Castaños’s explanation was that Wellington’s letter of August 30, telling him
to march on Valladolid, did not reach him till the 7th September, along with another
supplementary letter to the same effect from Arevalo of September 3.

[21] ‘The proclamation was made from the town-hall in the square: few people of
any respectability attended.’ Tomkinson, p. 202.

[22] Tomkinson, p. 203.

[23] Wellington to Henry Wellesley, Magaz, September 12. Dispatches, ix. p. 422.

[24] Napier, iv. p. 335.

[25] Napier was not with the main army during this march, the Light Division being
left at Madrid. On the other hand Clausel had been very polite to him, and lent him
some of his orders and dispatches (Napier, iv. p. 327). I fancy he was repaid in
print for his courtesy. The diaries of Tomkinson, Burgoyne, D’Urban, and Sir
Howard Douglas do not give the impression that the French ever stayed to
manœuvre seriously, save on the 16th.

[26] Head-quarters were at Valladolid, September 9; Cigales, September 10;

Dueñas, September 11; Magaz, September 12; Torquemada, September 13;
Cordovilla, September 14; Villajera, September 15; Pampliega, September 16;
Tardajos, September 17; Villa Toro, September 18. Ten stages in about 80 miles!

[27] Wellington to Sir E. Paget, September 20. Dispatches, ix. p. 436.

[28] One of the regiments withdrawn to the north after suffering at Arroyo dos
Molinos, see vol. iv. p. 603.

[29] Wellington to Castaños. Dispatches, ix. p. 394.

[30] Wellington to George Murray. Dispatches, ix. p. 398.

[31] Wellington to Lord Bathurst. Dispatches, ix. p. 442.

[32] Jones, History of the Peninsular Sieges, i. p. 473.

[33] There were eight rank and file of the Royal Military Artificers only, of whom
seven were hit during the siege, and five R.E. officers in all.

[34] By an odd misprint in Wellington’s Supplementary Dispatches, xiv. p. 120, the

order is made to allot the flank-battalions instead of the flank-companies to the
task.

[35] This narrative of the assault, not very clearly worked out in Napier—is drawn
from the accounts of Burgoyne, Jones, the anonymous ‘Private Soldier of the
42nd’ [London, 1821], and Tomkinson, the latter the special friend and confidant of
Somers Cocks.

[36] Wellington to Lord Bathurst. Dispatches, ix. pp. 443-4.

[37] For a dispute between the chief engineer, Burgoyne, who blamed the
Portuguese, and some officers in the Portuguese service who resented his words,
see Wellington, Supplementary Dispatches, xiv. p. 123.

[38] Clarke to Marmont of August 18, and to Masséna of August 19.

[39] Napoleon to Clarke, Moscow, September 12.

[40] See Wellington to Hill of October 2. Dispatches, ix. p. 463.

[41] Jones, i. p. 329.

[42] Indeed the besiegers had largely depended on a dépôt of French picks and
shovels found by chance in the town of Burgos, after the siege had begun.
[43] See especially Tomkinson, an old comrade of Cocks in the 16th Light
Dragoons, pp. 211-17.

[44] Wellington says 18 prisoners in his return. Dubreton claimed to have taken 2
officers and 36 men in his report. Possibly the difference was mortally wounded
men, who were captured but died.

[45] Dispatches, ix. p. 450.

[46] Ibid., ix. p. 465.

[47] See Wellington to Castaños of 7 October. Dispatches, ix. p. 477.

[48] See Napier, iv. p. 412, who had the fact from Sir Edward Pakenham’s own
mouth.

[49] Howard Douglas’s proposal to get up big guns at once on September 20 is

detailed at length in his biography, pp. 210-11. Napier has a good deal to say on it.
Jones and Burgoyne tell nothing about it, but they were evidently nettled at the
idea that Douglas, who had no official position in the army, should have raised a
proposal and got Wellington to listen to it. I fancy that Douglas is one of the officers
alluded to by Burgoyne (Correspondence, i. p. 234) as unauthorized persons, who
volunteered useless advice. Gomm, p. 287, says, ‘we have set to work idly without
having the means we might have commanded.’

[50] Burgoyne, i. p. 220.

[51] Ibid., i. p. 233.

[52] Alexander Dickson remarks in his diary, p. 772, ‘This was done to please
General Clinton, and had nothing to do with the attack.’ Clinton’s troops were
opposite this side of the Castle, and had as yet not been entrusted with any
important duty.

[53] Jones, i. p. 357.

[54] For this dialogue, told at length, see Burgoyne’s Correspondence, ed.
Wrottesley, i. p. 235.

[55] So I make out from the returns, but Beamish’s and Schwertfeger’s Histories
of the K.G.L. both give the lesser figure of 75—still sufficiently high!

[56] Wellington to Lord Bathurst, October 26.

[57] Burgoyne’s Correspondence, i. p. 236.

[58] Dubreton and Belmas speak of a ‘grand nombre d’Anglais écrasés,’ the latter
says 300! (Belmas, iv. pp. 501 and 548). Putting aside the fact that there were no
English here at all, we may remark that Burgoyne (i. p. 226) says that three
Spaniards were buried in the ruins, and that the loss of the Portuguese in the
whole affair is put at 8 killed, 44 wounded, and 2 missing in Wellington’s report.

[59] By knocking off their remaining trunnions, which made them permanently
useless. Some of the captured French field-guns from the hornwork were also
destroyed.

[60] For detailed losses see table in Appendix I.

[61] See vol. v. pp. 255-6.

[62] Burgoyne commanding, John Jones the historian, Captain Williams, and
Lieutenants Pitts and Reid.

[63] Burgoyne, i. p. 230.

[64] Ibid., i. p. 233. There is much more in this interesting page of Burgoyne’s
explanation of the failure, which I have not space to quote.

[65] See above, pp. 3-4.

[66] Pringle was commanding the 5th Division (Leith being wounded); Bernewitz
the 7th (Hope having gone home sick on September 23): Campbell, in charge of
the 1st since Graham was invalided, was off duty himself for illness when relieved
by Paget. Bock commanded the Cavalry Division vice Stapleton Cotton, wounded
at Salamanca.

[67] Clearly expressed in letters as late as that to Hill of October 12.

[68] Viz. (figures of the Imperial Muster Rolls for October 15) Army of Portugal
32,000 infantry, 3,400 cavalry; Army of the North: Chauvel’s cavalry brigade (lent
to the Army of Portugal since July) 700 sabres, Laferrière’s cavalry brigade 1,600
sabres, parts of Abbé’s and Dumoustier’s divisions 9,500 infantry. Allowing another
2,000 for artillery, sappers, &c., the total must have reached 53,000. Belmas says
that Caffarelli and Souham had only 41,000 men. Napier gives them 44,000. Both
these figures are far too low. No one denies that Caffarelli brought up about 10,000
men; and the Army of Portugal, by the return of October 15, had 45,000 effectives,
from whom there are only to be deducted the men of the artillery park and the
‘équipages militaires.’ It must have taken forward 40,000 of all arms. See tables of
October 15 in Appendix II.
[69] Wellington on the 11,000 Galicians, Hill on Carlos de España (4,000 men),
Penne Villemur and Murillo (3,500 men), and the Murcian remnants under Freire
and Elio, which got separated from the Alicante section of their Army and came
under Hill’s charge, about 5,000.

[70] i. e. if they brought up Suchet’s troops from Valencia, beside their own
armies.

[71] Wellington to Hill, October 10. Dispatches, ix. p. 82.

[72] Wellington to Hill, October 12. Ibid., p. 485.

[73] Wellington to Popham, October 12. Ibid., p. 486.

[74] Wellington to Mackenzie, October 13. Dispatches, ix. p. 487.

[75] See Wellington to Hill of October 14, and Wellington to Popham of October
17. Ibid., pp. 490 and 495.

[76] Dispatches, ix. p. 467.

[77] Schepeler, pp. 672-3.

[78] Wellington to Hill, October 5. Dispatches, ix. p. 469: ‘I do not write to General
Ballasteros, because I do not know exactly where he is: but I believe he is at
Alcaraz. At least I understand he was ordered there [by the Regency]. Tell him to
hang upon the left flank and rear of the enemy, if they move by Albacete toward
the Tagus.’

[79] Wellington to Popham. Dispatches, ix. p. 494.

[80] See above, pp. 1-2.

[81] Wellington says in his Dispatch to Lord Bathurst of October 26 that the
Brunswick officer disobeyed orders, and was taken because he did not retire at
once, as directed.

[82] Souham to Clarke, October 22.

[83] This is the figure given by Colonel Béchaud in his interesting narrative of the
doings of Maucune’s division (Études Napoléoniennes, ii. p. 396). Martinien’s lists
show 3 casualties of officers only, all in the 86th of Maucune’s division.

[84] For details see Wellington’s Order of March in Supplementary Dispatches,

xiv. pp. 144-5.
[85] The wheels of the artillery were all muffled with straw. The cavalry went at a
walk.

[86] So Colonel Béchaud’s narrative, quoted above, and most valuable for all this
retreat.

[87] These figures look very large—and exceed Napier’s estimate of 5,000
sabres. But I can only give the strength of the French official returns, viz. Curto’s
division 2,163, Boyer’s division 1,373, Merlin’s brigade 746, Laferrière’s brigade
1,662; total 5,944. All these units were engaged that day, as the French narrative
shows, except that 4 only of the 6 squadrons of gendarmerie in Laferrière’s
brigade were at the front.

[88] Owing to losses at Garcia Hernandez and Majadahonda the Germans were
only 4 squadrons, under 450 effective sabres. The Light Dragoons of Anson, all
three regiments down to 2-squadron strength, made up about 800.

[89] See vol. iv. pp. 565-9.

[90] Who was not himself any longer at their head, having been killed in a private
quarrel some weeks before. His men were this day under his lieutenant Puente
(Schepeler, p. 680).

[91] To Caffarelli’s high disgust: see his dispatch to Clarke of October 30, where
he calls Boyer’s action a ‘fatalité que l’on ne peut conçevoir.’

[92] As Lumley did at Usagre against L’Allemand, see vol. iv. p. 412.

[93] Anson’s brigade fought, it is said, with only 600 sabres out of its original 800,
owing to heavy losses in the morning, and to the dropping behind of many men on
exhausted horses, who did not get up in time to form for the charge. Bock’s
brigade was intact, but only 400 strong. Of the French brigade 1,600 strong on
October 15 by its ‘morning state’ two squadrons out of the six of gendarmes were
not present, so that the total was probably 1,250 or so engaged.

[94] Most of this detail is from the admirable account of von Hodenberg, aide-de-
camp to Bock, whose letter I printed in Blackwood for 1913. There is a good
narrative also in Martin’s Gendarmerie d’Espagne, pp. 317-19.

[95] In a conversation with Foy (see life of the latter, by Girod de l’Ain, p. 141)
when he said that all the cavalry generals of the Army of Portugal except
Montbrun, Fournier, and Lamotte were ‘mauvais ou médiocres’—these others
being Curto, Boyer, Cavrois, Lorcet, and Carrié.
[96] Details are worth giving. The 2nd Dragoons K.G.L. had 52 casualties, the 1st
44. In Anson’s brigade the 11th Light Dragoons lost 49, the 12th only 20, the 16th
47. The officers taken prisoners were Colonel Pelly and Lieutenant Baker of the
16th, Major Fischer (mortally wounded) of the 1st Dragoons K.G.L., and Captain
Lenthe and Lieutenant Schaeffer of the 2nd Dragoons K.G.L. The two infantry
battalions had 18 casualties, of whom 13 were men missing, apparently
skirmishers cut off in the fight earlier in the day on the Hormaza, or footsore men
who had fallen behind.

[97] H. Sydenham to Henry Wellesley, printed in Wellington Supplementary

Dispatches, vii. pp. 464-5. Sydenham understates, however, the available force
when he says that Anson had only 460 sabres and Bock only two squadrons.
Hodenberg diminishes less, but still too much, when he gives Bock 300 sabres
and Anson 600. The real numbers are given above.

[98] Napier, iv. p. 361. Corroboration may be had on p. 120 of the Journal of
Green of the 68th, who says that his colonel was much puzzled to know how so
many men had succeeded in getting liquor, and that one soldier was drowned in a
vat, overcome by the fumes of new wine.

[99] This was Bonnet’s old division: Chauvel had been commanding it since
Bonnet was disabled at Salamanca. But he had been wounded by a chance shot
at Venta del Pozo on the 23rd, and Gauthier, his senior brigadier, had taken it over.

[100] Some 27 men of the 3/1st, taken prisoners here, represent this party in the
casualty list of October 25. The battalion was not otherwise seriously engaged.

[101] Who were drawn from the 4th, 30th, and 44th.

[102] For a romantic story of how one was discovered see Napier, iv. p. 363, a
tale which I have not found corroborated in any other authority.

[103] I had not been able to make out how the 1/9th came to lose these prisoners
till I came on the whole story in the Autobiography of Hale of the 1/9th, printed at
Cirencester 1826, a rare little book, with a good account of this combat. He is my
best source for it on the British side.

[104] Hale, p. 95, quoted above.

[105] I have been using for the French side mainly the elaborate and interesting
narrative of Colonel Béchaud of the 66th, recently published in Études
Napoléoniennes, ii. pp. 405-11.

[106] See Béchaud, p. 410.

[107] These modest figures of Foy’s report to Souham are much exaggerated in
most French narratives of the affair.

[108] There is a full account of this business in Foy’s dispatch to Souham of the
next morning, in which occur all the facts given by Guingret in his own little book.
That officer’s narrative must be taken as fully correct.

[109] All this from Burgoyne, i. p. 244. Napier does not mention the earthworks,
which were batteries for six guns each.

[110] There he wrote his dispatch, concerning the late combats, to Clarke. Napier
never mentions Caffarelli’s departure—a curious omission.

[111] p. 437.

[112] See vol. v. pp. 538-9.

[113] Deprez, travelling with great speed, reached Paris and interviewed Clarke
on September 21. The Minister, who was no friend of Soult’s, told him that neither
he himself nor the King could dare to depose the Marshal without the Emperor’s
permission. Deprez then posted on to Moscow, and overtook the Emperor there on
October 18. Napoleon in his reply practically ignored the quarrel, contented himself
with administering a general scolding to all parties, and directed them to ‘unite, and
diminish as far as possible the evils that a bad system had caused.’ But who had
inaugurated the system? He himself!

[114] Joseph to Clarke, September 7.

[115] See Soult to Joseph of October 11, and other days.

[116] Which were the 27th Chasseurs and 7th Polish Lancers.

[117] For details see Table of the Army of Spain of the date October 15th, in
Appendix II to this volume.

[118] Joseph to Soult, Valencia, October 12.

[119] See above, vol. v. p. 332.

[120] Napier and Jourdan say that Cearra was killed; but he only suffered
concussion of the brain, and survived to tell Schepeler (p. 688) how his sword and
its sheath were melted into one rod of metal by the lightning which ran down the
side of the couch on which he was lying at the moment.

[121] See, e. g., Schepeler (p. 689), who was present.

[122] See Dispatches, ix. p. 518.

[123] This is clearly stated in Wellington’s note to Hill of October 10. Dispatches,
ix. p. 481.

[124] Ibid., p. 485.

[125] When Penne Villemur moved in, and went behind the Tagus, I cannot make
out exactly. But it was before October 25th, as at that time Erskine’s British cavalry
had no longer any screen in front of them.

[126] All these dispositions come from a table of routes sent to D’Urban by
Jackson, Hill’s chief of the staff (Quartermaster-general), on the 24th.

[127] Jackson, Q.M.G., to D’Urban, 27th night: ‘Sir Rowland has determined to
concentrate behind the Jarama, on account of the state of the fords upon the
Tagus, and their number,’ &c.

[128] They had been at Arganda behind the Tajuna on the previous day, when Hill
was still thinking of defending the line of the Tagus. See Diary of Leach, p. 287.

[129] Jackson to D’Urban, October 27: ‘Keep your patrols on the Tagus as long
as they can with prudence stay there, with orders to follow the march of your main
body.’ On the next day the order is varied to that quoted above.

[130] Owing to disgraceful carelessness on the part of a brigadier of the British

2nd Division much of the boat-bridge of Fuente Dueñas (which had been brought
over to the north bank) had not been burnt when the troops retired. Many boats
were intact; some of the French swam over, and brought back several of them.
(D’Urban MSS.)

[131] Wellington to Hill, Cabezon, October 27. Dispatches, ix. pp. 518-19.

[132] See for this Wachholz (of the Fusilier brigade), Schepeler, Purdon’s history
of the 47th, &c. Wachholz’s Brunswick Company straggled so that of 60 men he
found only 7 with him at night. Several were lost for good. Wellington put the
colonel of the 82nd under arrest, because he had lost 80 men this day.

[133] D’Erlon’s old division now commanded by this brigadier.

[134] Always a reckless falsifier of his own losses (he said that he had only lost
2,800 men at Albuera!), Soult wrote in his dispatch that he had only about 25
wounded at the Puente Larga. The figure I give above is that of the staff-officer
d’Espinchel, whose memoirs are useful for this campaign. By far the best English
account is that of H. Bunbury of the 20th Portuguese (Reminiscences of a Veteran,
i. pp. 158-63). I can only trace three of the five French officers in Martinien’s lists—
Pillioud, Caulet, Fitz-James, but do not doubt d’Espinchel’s figures though his
account of the combat is hard to fit in with any English version. He speaks with
admiration of the steadiness of the defence.

[135] All this from Soult’s dispatch to the King of October 31, from Valdemoro, and
Jourdan’s to Clarke from Madrid of November 3rd.

[136] See Diary of Swabey, R.A., p. 428, in Journal of the Artillery Institution, vol.
xxii.

[137] The importance of the second evacuation of Madrid is brought out by no

historian of the war except Vacani, vi. pp. 188-90. Napier barely mentions it. A
curious story of the fate of certain English prisoners of Hill’s army, who were
forgotten in prison, and came out again to liberty when the French army moved on,
may be found in the autobiography of Harley of the 47th Regiment.

[138] Napier (iv. p. 373) says that Joseph left a garrison and his impedimenta in
Madrid—I can find no trace of it in the contemporary accounts, e. g. of Romanos
(Memorias de un Setenton) or of Harley who was about the town during the
second week of November. Vacani distinctly says that Joseph had to take on even
his sick (vi. p. 190). Cf. also Arteche, xi. pp. 309-12.

[139] Napier, iv. p. 373, says that Joseph went by the route of Segovia to Castile.
I cannot think where he picked up this extraordinary idea. Jourdan’s dispatch of
November 10 from Peñaranda gives all the facts. It was on the 5th, near
Villacastin, that Soult told Joseph that Hill was about to be joined by Wellington
and that the two might crush him. The King at once sent orders to Drouet to come
up by forced marches from Madrid. The Army of the Centre started next day.
Palombini did not get off till the 8th (Vacani, vi. p. 190), but the head of the column
reached Villacastin that same day.

[140] Wellington to Hill, November 3. Dispatches, ix. p. 532.

[141] His first definite information as to this was from a Spaniard who on
November 4 saw 3,000 French infantry marching through Torquemada towards
Burgos (Dispatches, ix. p. 544). Even so late as November 8th he did not rely on
this important news as correct.

[142] From Rueda, November 5, morning. Dispatches, ix. p. 537.

[143] They had really not the 50,000 on which Wellington speculated (’45,000
men I should consider rather below the number’ (Dispatches, ix. p. 544) ) but
60,000 or very nearly that number. But, on the day when Wellington was writing,
their rear had not even started from Madrid, and Soult’s 40,000 men were strung
out all along the road.

[144] As a matter of fact, using the best map of 1812 available to me (Nantiat’s), it
would seem that the line Rueda-Fuentesauco-Salamanca is about 50 miles, that
by Rueda-Nava del Rey-Pitiegua-Salamanca about 55 miles, while the route
suggested for the French, circuitous and running in more than one place by
country cross-paths, is over 65 miles long, not to speak of its being a worse route
for topographical reasons.

[145] An under-estimate by several thousands. Wellington did not know of

Aussenac’s brigade from Bayonne, over 3,000 men, which had now been attached
provisionally to the Army of Portugal.

[146] The total which marched was 60,000, so Wellington was even more correct
than he supposed in his notion that 45,000 was too small a figure.

[147] Wellington to Lord Bathurst, Pitiegua, November 8. Dispatches, ix. pp. 544-
5.

[148] Dispatches, ix. p. 520.

[149] Wellington to Hill, Rueda, November 5. Dispatches, ix. p. 537.

[150] Ibid., p. 539.

[151] I cannot find the details of the marching orders of the divisions; but from
personal diaries I seem to deduce that the 5th and 7th Divisions marched by
Alaejos, the 1st and 6th by Castrejon and Vallesa, while the cavalry not only
provided a rearguard but kept out flank detachments as far as Cantalapiedra on
one side and the lower Guarena on the other.

[152] All this from the detailed routes of march in the dispatches of Jackson (Hill’s
Q.M.G.) to D’Urban on November 4-5-6.

[153] See his dispatch of November 8 from Flores de Avila.

[154] For an adventure with these rascals, who threatened to shoot one of Hill’s
aides-de-camp, see Schepeler, p. 691.

[155] The ground on which Del Parque had fought his unlucky battle in 1809.

[156] These movements from Jourdan to Clarke, of November 10, and Soult to
Clarke of November 12.
[157] See the Notes of the Baden officer Riegel (vol. iii. p. 537), who complains
bitterly of the piercing north wind, and the lack of wood to build fires.

[158] D’Espinchel (ii. p. 71) says that the voltigeurs got within the walls, but were
expelled on each occasion. The English narratives deny that they ever closed, or
reached the barricades.

[159] Soult to Joseph, 8 a.m. on the 11th, ‘bivouac sur la hauteur en arrière
d’Alba de Tormes.’

[160] General Hamilton’s account of the business (Dispatch to Hill, Wellington

Dispatches, ix. p. 558) is very clear. There is also a good account of the Alba
fighting in Colonel Gardyne’s excellent history of the 92nd.

[161] All their names verifiable from Martinien’s admirable lists of ‘Officiers tués et
blessés.’

[162] See Jourdan’s Mémoires, p. 441, for the meeting.

[163] Wellington to Hill, November 10, 4.30 p.m. (Dispatches, ix. p. 549).

[164] Same to same, November 11 (ix. p. 550).

[165] Same to same, pp. 550-1.

[166] Jourdan to Joseph, head-quarters at Peñaranda: early on November 12.

[167] Soult to Joseph, night of November 11, from the bivouac behind Alba de
Tormes.

[168] As the table of the French Armies of Spain for October 15 in the Appendix
shows, the Army of the South had on that day 47,000 men under arms (omitting
‘sick’ and ‘detached’), the Army of the Centre 15,000, the Army of Portugal 45,000
(including Aussenac’s brigade and Merlin’s cavalry, both attached to it
provisionally). This gives a total of 107,000, without sick or detached. The Army of
Portugal may have lost 1,000 men in action at Villadrigo and Villa Muriel, &c.: the
Army of the South not more than 400 at the Puente Larga, Alba de Tormes, &c.
The Army of the Centre had not fought at all. A deduction has to be made for
Soult’s very large body of men attached to the Artillery Park, and for a smaller
number in the Army of Portugal—say 3,000 men for the two together. Souham had
left a small garrison at Valladolid—perhaps 1,500 men. If we allow 5,000 men for
sick and stragglers between October 20 and November 12 there must still have
been a good 90,000 men present. Miot (who was present) calls the total 97,000 (iii.
p. 254), making it a little too high, I imagine.
[169] Maucune and Gauthier (late Chauvel). See Wellington Dispatches, ix. p.
556.

[170] Souham naturally expressed his indignation. See Miot, iii. p. 252-3.

[171] D’Urban reports on November 12th: ‘Enemy’s troops in continual

movement, and he made a careful reconnaissance of the river from Huerta to
Exeme [above Alba].’ On the 13th he writes: ‘The enemy moved all his troops
between Huerta and Alba by his left into the woods behind Exeme on the high
road to Avila. From thence he can either go in that direction or cross the Tormes by
fords above Alba bridge.’

[172] This fact, very important in justification of Wellington’s long stay on San
Cristobal, is not mentioned in any of his dispatches. But there is a full account of
the skirmish in the Mémoire of Colonel Béchaud of Maucune’s Division, printed in
Études Napoléoniennes, iii. pp. 98-9.

[173] The reconnaissance was executed by Leith Hay, who found the French
flank at Galisancho and reported its exact position. See his Narrative, ii. pp. 99-
100.

[174] Details from Foy’s Vie militaire, ed. Girod de l’Ain, p. 118, and Béchaud
(quoted above), pp. 99-100.

[175] His original intention to attack is clearly stated in Dispatches, ix. p. 559, and
the statement is corroborated by D’Urban.

[176] D’Urban, an eye-witness, thinks that Wellington ought to have called up Hill
and attacked, despite of all difficulties. ‘Lord Wellington arrived upon the ground at
about 12 noon, and at first appeared inclined to attack what of the enemy had
already passed, with the divisions and cavalry on the spot. The success of such a
measure appeared certain, and would have frustrated all the enemy’s projects.
However, his opinion changed: they were allowed to continue passing
unmolested.’

[177] Mémoires, p. 448. Cf. also Napier, iv. p. 381, who seems to share the idea.
‘Why, it may be asked, did the English commander, having somewhat carelessly
suffered Soult to pass the Tormes and turn his position, wait so long on the
Arapiles position as to render a dangerous movement (retreat in face of the enemy
and to a flank) necessary?’

[178] This horrid reminiscence I found in the unpublished letters of Hodenberg of

the 1st Heavy Dragoons K.G.L., which I reprinted in Blackwood’s Magazine in the
year 1913.