Borders as Territorial Marker: Understanding the Predatory Practices of

Nations in South Asia

Sajal Nag

Nations are fiercely territorial. Like predators it marks its territory and obsessively protects it.
Predators in jungle search for area which is its absolute domain and where its authority is
unchallenged. Its domain is marked by scratching the soil or spraying its unique scents such
as pheromones secreted by the skin glands of several mammals in the plants of the area.
When other predators notice the marks or the sniff the smell they avoid the territory unless
they are in a mood to challenge the predator. If a warning does not deter intruders, combat
and chases will ensue. Many different species exhibit territorial behaviour, because it offers
several advantages to the territorial animal. An animal which has a “home ground” can
develop reflexes based on its surroundings. Thus it can react quickly to dangerous situations
without having to actively seek hiding places or defensible ground. By spacing out potential
competitors, territoriality also prevents the depletion of an area’s natural resources. This
regulation of population density may also slow down the spread of disease. Territoriality is
the behaviour by which an animal lays claim to and defends an area against others of its
species, and occasionally members of other species as well. The territory defended could be
hundreds of square miles in size, or only slightly larger than the animal itself. It may be
occupied by a single animal, a pair, family, or entire herd or swarm of animals. Some animals
hold and defend a territory year-round, and use the territory as a source of food and shelter.
Other animals establish a territory only at certain times of the year, when it is needed for
attracting a mate, breeding, and/or raising a family . It is this marking that creates borders.
While marking of territory by humans has been heard of, marking of territory by a state is
coeval with the rise of nation-states which is a modern historical phenomenon.

Border as Territory Marking

In pre modern states borders were only notional, fluid, flexible and vague. There was only
frontier which was unspecific and un-demarcated. In fact polity was often superstructural and
not territorially correspondent. Either it is tribal chieftaindom, a kingdom or an empire, the
territorial limit of such a organisation was always subject to expansion or contraction. A war
or a conflict between states could easily change the territorial area of a state. Most of these
states were not based on ethnicity or culture which could define a territory. In fact it was the
other way round. Prolonged living in a territory could throw up common cultural traits,
syncretic and cosmopolitan states.
'Frontier' has been used to signify a frontier line without width and precisely marking a state's
external limits. It was also meant a frontier zone of varying width, of areas beyond and
within, along the line. The utilization of the word frontier as covering lines, zones and land
and both for a state by itself as well as contiguous states, has become so entrenched in

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practice that it seems best to accept it as an all-purpose word. Although it is now widely
accepted that each frontier is intrinsically unique so defies simpler categorization, there have
been various attempts to classify so-called 'frontiers'. As early as 1907 Lord Curzon
distinguished between 'frontiers of separation' and 'frontiers of contact.' 1 a contrast that
geographers subsequently developed. From the later Middle Age onwards, however, a
growing concept of territorial sovereignty conferred a more territorial definition upon
political borders. This gradually heightened the importance of the boundaries of the
kingdoms at the expense of other divisions; local, pacific boundaries eventually merged with
militarized state frontier defence into a single concept of sovereign divisions between states .
There is a preliminary matter of vocabulary used by political geographers about three words
are in common use-' Frontier' , 'Boundary' and 'Border'2 and a fourth term-'march'-which are
applied to these outer limits. 'Frontier' is a word with the widest meaning, although it's
original meaning was military-the zone in which one faced the enemy. In contemporary
usage, it can mean the precise line at which jurisdictions meet, usually demarcated and
controlled by customs, police and military personnel. 'Frontier' can also be referred to a
region, as in the description of Alsace as the frontier region between France and Germany. In
this sense it is the equivalent of the archaic 'march'. Even more broadly, 'frontier' is used in
specific cases to refer to the moving zone of settlement in the interior of a continent and was
used in this sense in Turner's famous classic, The Frontier in American History.3 The term
'border' can be applied to a zone, usually a narrow one, or it can be the line of demarcation-
the border between England and Scotland is both. The word 'boundary' fringe the boundary,
are called border. Again when we talk of boundary we refer to land, maritime and air
boundaries, although it is land boundary, which is often used to mean what we generally
understand by boundary. is always used to refer to the line of delimitation or demarcation and
is thus the narrowest of the three terms. 4'Border' has had a history similar to frontier has been
an equal all embracing term and can now be accepted as the synonym of frontier. One can use
it more specifically as borderline, border zone, borderland, and etc. Unlike the above two
terms, 'Boundary' has a fairly well accepted meaning. It is a line without width, often having
endured the process of demarcation and thus the equivalent of the 'frontier line'. If its status
has to be indicated, one may qualify it as 'demarcated boundary', 'undemarcated boundary'
etc.5 Boundary represents the line of physical contact between states and affords opportunities
for cooperation and discord. Boundaries are the frameworks of the nation. At this juncture, it
would be pertinent to note, the definition of boundary, frontier and border and more
particularly, the distinction between the three. V Adami, defined boundary as "that line which
marks the limits of the region within which the state can exercise its own sovereign rights." 6
A frontier on the other hand signifies a zone or region having width as well as length,
whereas a border denotes a line.7

The foundations of nation-states were ethnicity, nationality or a cultural area which required
bordered zone so that other ethnic, national or cultural groups does not infiltrate. Therefore
borders and nation-states are coeval and coterminous. Nations therefore develop predatory
behaviour to define its exclusive territory where only its own constituents could thrive.
Without territory nations do not exist. Borders mark the area where a particular nation is
active and alive. The identities of the nations begin in borders and the power of its state is

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manifested in border. Hence borders are the margins within which nation-state exercise its
control and hegemony. It is in a border that where a nation begin and end too. Bordering a
territory is an attempt to fence a national and ethnic area. The premise being each fenced
territory contains a people of same culture and ethnicity. The existence of border disputes
shows territories have overlapping ethnic and cultural groups. It is a resistance against
ghettoisation and exclusivity. It goes against the theory of nation. It indicates existence of
heterogeneity, multiplicity of culture and actually is a subversion of theory of nation. It
proves that two nation theories like propounded by the British as well as political parties in
colonial India were wrong and partition have failed to create nations.
There are ideas and imaginations of stateless nation and territory-less nation where a nation
has not been able to establish its own state or a claimed nation is submerged within another or
multiple nations and yet to find a defined territory. But a territory or national area without a
national state is always a dream unfulfilled. “A border have three elements: legal borderline
which simultaneously separates and joins states, the physical structure of the state which exist
to demarcate and protect the borderline, composed of peoples and institutions which often
penetrated deeply into the territory of the state and frontiers, territorial zones of varying width
which stretch across and away from borders within which people negotiate a variety of
behaviours and meanings associated with their memberships in nations and
states.”8Conceptualizing the Borders, Ranabir Samaddar uses the metaphor of ‘Wall’ for
borders. He shows how from ‘walled city’ to walled nations, territories have been demarcated
for exercise of power.9 Using a Foucauldian concept Samaddar called wall an ‘apparatus.’ It
is an apparatus of border control which is a ‘busy, noisy, multicultural zone occupied by
official, revenue officials, soldiers and civilians from all over.” 10 The wall is also an event
which erases the earlier memories and earlier connections, earlier histories and itself become
a site of displacements, an apparatus which is neither an object nor a subject but the indicator
of a void.11 The existence and consciousness of nations, communities, races, castes and
classes are both defined and divided by borders which created a variety of consciousness
about ‘self’ and the ‘other.’12

The European views on borders is that states establish borders to secure territories which are
valuable to them because of their human or natural resources or because they have symbolic
or strategic importance to the state. These borders are signs of the eminent domain of the
state, are markets of the secure relations it has with its neighbours or reminders of the
hostility that exists between states. 13 In this sense borders are separate but related to the
political structures and therefore dependent on each other for power and strength. 14 This is not
applicable to non-European countries especially south Asia which were zones of waves of
migration and movements all along history where people not just migrated but became rulers.
This is the reason institution of borders are fluid and create more problem in the Asian and
African countries in comparison to Europe where borders are more rigid. In Europe, borders
are built to prevent outsiders from entering while in non-European countries it is prevent
people from going out implying it is to encircle the people and create the nation. It is the
markers of identity both national and state identity. Moreover in the former colonies borders
are colonial in nature and created artificially by the colonial states in order to divide rather
than unify people. This is the reason borders are sites of acute acrimony in the former

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colonies. There are no states in Africa which does not have a border issue with its neighbour.
In South Asia borders are known for their disputes. This had to do with its colonial origins.

Colonial Context Indian Border

Two hundred years of colonial rule, the clinical experimentation of divides et empera, the
nature of appropriation of the nationalist discourse and the communal mobilization had
succeeded in dividing India even before it was free. But imagining two separate nations and
actually carving out two separate national territories out of a single space was a different task
altogether. The accomplishment of this arduous task was assigned to Sir Cyril Radcliffe who
was to head a Boundary Commission constituted on June 30 1947 vide order no D50/7/47R
by the Governor General. The terms of reference of the commission were “to demarcate the
boundaries of the two parts of Bengal on the basis of ascertaining the contiguous areas of
Muslim and non-Muslim. In doing so it will also take into account other factors.” 15 There
were two such commissions – one for Bengal and the other for Punjab which were to be
divided. The other members of the Bengal Commission were Justice Bijan Kumar
Mukherjee, Justice C K Biswas, Justice Abu Saleh, Muhammed Akram and Justice S R
Rehman. The time given to the commission was short and even its composition was not
representative. The making of the Indo-Pakistan boundary, a process that took six weeks and
was headed by a British lawyer with no relevant skills in boundary-making was fraught with
potential dangers because of ‘the complexity of nationalist dealings with the colonial power
structures’16 combined with the ramification of ‘British imperial decline.’17 Britain was
concerned with preserving its reputation during this vital time of handing over power.
Financially broke and emotionally battered following the Second World War, this was a
crucial period from which it was important that Britain emerged with its reputation intact and
to present an orderly withdrawal from India rather giving the impression that it was forced to
quit India. This was after all the ‘jewel in the crown’ of the British Empire and it would
eventually set the pace of decolonisation in other colonies seeking independence. 18 ‘It was
not the location of the Radcliffe boundary but the flawed process of partition that caused the
terrible violence of 1947’ because it done with ‘haste, a veneer of order, a concern for
international reputation and a conscious presentation of the process as one for which South
Asians bore primary responsibility.’19 For the British who were represented by Radcliffe
partition was only a matter of cartography. Maps were always important to the imperial
power, not just for mapping the terrain they ruled but also as a means of imperial control. The
colonial obsession with collecting and documenting the landscape and its people is illustrated in
volumes such as, The Imperial Gazetteer of India, Atlas (1909 and 1931). The maps in the
Gazetteers highlight the ‘prevailing’ races, languages and religions of India. In reality these were
never fixed, but the repercussions of British rule were that these identities became increasingly
defined and rigid which was never considered by either the colonial state or the boundary commission
and should have formed the historical context of partition. The boundary award in the aftermath of
partition was therefore a source of acute confusion and a trigger for violence. The commission tried to
carve out exclusive territories of a particular religious group out of an overlapping ethnic mosaic.
Therefore a panic was created among the minorities who lived in a primarily majority area triggering
shockwaves and migratory impulse. Many people even resisted migration despite the trigger and
wanted to stay put in their ancestral land. For example in Lyallpur the sizable Sikh population

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migrated to India only in September 1947 after appeals made by the Sikh leader, Master Tara Singh
and the West Punjab Governor, Sir Francis Mudie; others saw the migration as a temporary measure
due to the uncertainty and had planned to come back to their ancestral lands. Even the leadership of
the two countries had anticipated that the refugees would return to their homes once the situation had
improved.

Moreover the terms of reference of the commission did not specify its assignment vis
a vis areas outside Bengal. This had multiple ramifications. For example Sylhet was
administratively a part of Assam but the Boundary commission found it imperative to
deliberate on it for partition. There were princely states like the twenty five Khasi states or
the state of Coch-Bihar, Rangpur, and Tripura where Paramountcy had lapsed and the states
were given the option to decide their future but which could not escape being affected by the
partition. Some of these states were planned to be partitioned even before they had actually
decided on joining or not joining either of the dominions. The Commission was dealing with
real people but the terms of reference of the commission was to partition territories based on
the religious affiliation of the people without taking into account their will. Hence they set
out to do its job by simply drawing a line on the map. But it map represented only a virtual
world. Borders could be drawn in land while a huge portion of borders were watery meaning
the line went through rivers and demarcation could not be done on water. Not only water was
flowing but even rivers were constantly shifting its course which created a problem when the
functionaries set out to implement the boundary award. The Bengal Boundary Commission
had omitted to specify their definition of a river border, which created uncertainty in the
minds of the state officials who were required to establish the border. 20 It created different
types of problems. Firstly, it defined river channels as boundaries without defining whether
the political boundary would follow any particular bank of the river, or its mid-stream, or the
deepest line (thalweg) of the channels. 21 Secondly, rivers of this deltaic plain follow a
wandering nature of excessive zigzagging and meandering, in addition the commission
worked on a decade's old map. 22 Almost all the rivers of this region flow over the flat alluvial
plains and are subject to seasonal flooding, excessive meandering and shifting of courses.
Because of frequent river course change, it is almost impossible to identify the exact location
of a water course on the ground with a decade old map. Therefore, it created a situation
where location of some channels in the map differed from the ground. 23 Thirdly, Radcliffe
did not elucidate the fate of chars, which are a common feature of all large rivers of Bengal. 24
The River Padma, which divided Murshidabad and Rajshahi, was dotted with silt banks and
islands that are inherently unstable and which are known as chars. 25 One day a small char
may appear in the middle of a river and grow rapidly, surprisingly, next year it may be
washed away. Some chars in this river were so large that they had whole villages built upon
them, and the people who inhabited these little islands became victims of a protracted tug of
war. Both the countries were very much concerned to establish control over the undemarcated
chars. For example, Taradhar char in the Ichamati River became a flash-point as each side
forcibly tried to claim it. 26 Finally, there was difficulty in defining the main channel in c/iar-
filled rivers. These problems created antagonism between India and Pakistan, until finally
both agreed to set up a boundary disputes tribunal. Even now, river borders are a major
source of multiple problems, confusions and border skirmishes in different parts of the whole

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Bengal border either at local or state level. 27 It also created a number of enclaves – a patch of
land which was officially designated as part of India or Pakistan but remained in the
possession of the other country. There are forty three such enclaves belonging to India but
controlled by Pakistan and later by Bangladesh and over forty seven enclaves belonging to
Bangladesh, but controlled by India. In total there are 161 such AP in the 4096 kilometers of
border between India and Bangladesh, of which 6.5 kilometer are yet to be demarcated. Of
these 111 enclaves are Indian territories (17158.1 acres) but are in the control of Bangladesh.
As against this there are fifty one Bangladeshi enclaves (7110 acres) which are under Indian
control. These enclaves are like islands surrounded by foreign and sometime hostile country
all four sides without any access to their own country. Incomplete demarcation created these
problems of enclaves. The population figures of these enclaves are not available as no access
to the Indian enclaves in Bangladesh territory has been provided by Bangladesh for Census
operations.28 It took almost seventy years before the problem of adverse possession was
somewhat resolved in 2014. Such was the complication that the Radcliffe line created. It was
such a ‘line’ which created partitioned territory, created nations, divided homes, cut off
people from their livelihood and left behind a permanent source of conflict in the long run but
resulted in violent outburst as soon as the award was declared.

Border as land grabbing

Following the constitution of the Boundary Commission, both the Congress and the Muslim
League presented their arguments for their demanded territory. The Muslim League was the
sole representative for Muslims. Both the leading parties, especially the Muslim League, tried
to achieve as much territory as possible with their reasoning based either on 'communal' or
'geographic contiguity' or on the 'other factors' ground. The Muslim League demanded 75
percent of the area and 83 percent of the population. 29 They used the term 'contiguity' to claim
Hindu- majority areas which were not contiguous to other Hindu-majority areas in Bengal to
go with East Bengal. Following those criteria, the Muslim League claimed Chittagong Hill
Tracts, Darjeeling and Jalpaiguri, Gopalpara and Garo hills where Muslim majorities were
comparatively lower. However, the Muslim League claimed some other territories on the
basis of a variety of other factors. For example, the Muslim League demanded that East
Bengal must be given a share of the provincial revenue proportionate to its share of Bengal's
population, and this could only be achieved if Calcutta port was assigned to East Bengal
(Reports of the Members and Awards of the Boundary Commission, 1950). Similarly, it
claimed the industrial part of Calcutta which contains only 23 percent Muslims in the local
population. The League argued that the non- inclusion of this part would jeopardise its
economy because its economy depended on East Bengal's jute, and its food supplies also
came from the same area (Tayeeb, 1966). Therefore, the Muslim League tried to utilise all
available grounds to achieve as much territory as possible, it claimed all the Muslim majority
districts and overstretched the communal criteria. Differences existed among the spokesmen
for the Hindu interests, and four parties including the Congress, jointly presented the Hindu
case before the Boundary Commission. The Congress claimed 50 percent of the area and 47
percent of the population, which was relatively modest considering the Muslim League's

6
demand. It claimed all of the Hindu majority areas including the western part of Faridpur,
Jessor, Nadia, Murshidabad and the greater part of Dinajpur districts, abjuring the Muslim
majority there, to secure a broad protecting belt for the Calcutta-Burdwan industrial districts
of West Bengal (Chatterji, 1999; Tayyeb, 1966). Again, Murshidabad was strategically quite
important since the Ganges River flows through it, and its distributaries, the Hooghly River,
originates from there. Thus, not only for the retention of the Hooghly River and its adjacent
industrial areas and Calcutta port, but also to have greater access and control over the Ganges
water, the Congress wanted this district to merge with India ( Map 2.3). Likewise, both the
Muslim League and the Congress claimed the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) which are
inhabited by indigenous people and had neither a Muslim nor Hindu majority. During the
time of partition the whole Bengal was economically very integrated. West Bengal was the
industrial centre, while East Bengal was its hinterland. It possessed nearly a third of all of
India's major industry, concentrated in Hooghlyside (Spate, 1947). On the other hand, there
was no industry in East Bengal and no significant resources for industrial development except
raw jute. With such economic consideration, both the Congress and the League were
desperate to obtain Calcutta port and the Hooghly industrial area. Similarly, the Muslim
League claimed the northern part of Bengal because of its rich tea gardens. However, the
Muslim league's demand in Bengal undoubtedly signals that its goal was to achieve as much
territory as possible. Similarly, the Muslim league's demand for communal territorial
sovereignty was replaced with the demand for economically strong territory and strategic
benefit. Likewise, Chatteji (1999) argues that internal politics within the Congress shaped its
territorial demand for West Bengal. She explains that at least some Congress members seem
to have been keenly conscious of the part which the border line would play in determining
who would capture power. Therefore, the Hindu and Muslim cases presented before the
Boundary Commission reflected concerns and aspirations that had little to do with a
communal vision of the welfare of the 'communities'. However, such preferences or
economic aspirations of the Congress and the Muslim League could result in a partition
demand, if there was any priority given to expressing the wishes of the people. Throughout,
the Boundary Commission's members tried to establish the claims of the respective political
parties, as two of each were nominated by the Congress and the Muslim League. Ultimately,
the Commission failed to agree upon the best way to divide the united Bengal which,
eventually, led Radcliffe, the Chairman of the Commission, to take the responsibility of
bisecting Bengal (Partition Proceedings, 1950). Astonishingly, Radcliffe drew almost 4000
km of international border within six weeks which did not contain any particularly natural
border and had never been an international border. Although the award was prepared on
August 12, it was not announced until the August 17, after the independence of India and
Pakistan. According to East Bengal Land Records and Survey (1951), out of the total 257478
sq km land of the old province of Bengal, the newly created province of East Bengal received
a 130383.19 sq km area, which is almost 50 percent of the undivided Bengal and, in addition,
12393.15 sq km from Assam (a major portion of the then Sylhet district). East Bengal
contained a population of 39.11 million, of which 11.4 million (29 percent) were Hindus. On
the other hand, West Bengal received an area of nearly 72520 sq km with 21.19 million
people, of which nearly 5.3 million, or 25 percent of the total population, were Muslims.
Therefore, the ratio of the majority to minority population in both parts was not similar, and

7
Muslim to non-Muslim ratio was higher in East Bengal. However, Radcliffe tried to create a
sense of balance based on land-population ratio in both parts Beginning from the south west,
Radcliffe allotted non-Muslim Calcutta, Hooghly and 24 Pargona (name of a district) to
India. However, Muslim majority areas like Murshidabad, part of Nadia, and Jessore were
also added to India, thus, more than a million Muslims were segregated from Pakistan. In
contrast, non-Muslim majority Khulna and part of Malda were included with East Bengal. In
the North-West, Dinajpur district was divided into two parts where the non-Muslim part was
left to India. However, giving a portion of Dinajpur to East Bengal, Radcliffe disrupted West
Bengal's continuity with Darjeeling, Jalpaiguri and other North-Eastern parts of India. In the
extreme North, Rangpur was a Muslim majority area and Jalpaiguri a Hindu majority district,
even though five southern Thanas of Jalpaiguri were included with East Bengal. In this
region, the boundary did not follow any 'communal criteria' and some Hindu majority areas
were included to East Bengal, hence creating three meanders in the border without significant
importance (Map 2.5). However, the eastern border followed quite logically although at the
eastern edge the boundary excluded a small Muslim majority portion of Sylhet to India
without any rationale. The southward boundary from Sylhet logically followed the communal
ground. At the southeast, the CHT was awarded to East Bengal, even though its inhabitants
are indigenous people. Map 2.5 shows that Radcliffe did not follow any criteria of communal
majority and geographical contiguity in a noticeable portion of the bordering areas. Only 26
percent of the borderline separated a Muslim majority area in East Pakistan from a Hindu
majority one in India, and an additional 15 percent separated a Muslim majority area in East
Pakistan from a Christian or Buddhist majority area in India. 30 Again, Hindu majority areas in
East Bengal and Muslim majority areas in West Bengal are examples of imprecise use of the
guidelines for partition and of neglect of the sociospatial milieus of those areas. Similarly,
Muslim majority areas in both sides of the border or Hindu majority in both sides of the
border are also noticeable in sections of this border. The arbitrary boundary line mostly
disrupted road and railway systems that existed in the northern part of the undivided Bengal
and Assam. Besides, this line not only fragmented Bengal, especially the border in north
Bengal, it not only disrupted Assam's economy but also made it almost remote from the
mainland of India. If we consider the map, Assam became almost totally foreign country
locked after partition, and received only a very narrow strip to reach mainland India through
the Siliguri corridor. This could have been easily broadened by keeping East Bengal's
territory south of the communication lines. This could have been compensated by inclusion of
some other Muslim dominated parts which had been placed in West Bengal. Thus, Radcliffe
line not only affected both sides of Bengal, it created grave ramifications for Assam. Hence,
the tactical term 'other factors' was vague, which not only helped the Congress and the
Muslim League to generate litigious territorial claims, but also allowed the Chairman to have
enormous leeway. Nevertheless, the reaction to Partition was furious. 33 Not only political
parties were angry with the award, the mass people were also frustrated, especially in both
Punjab and Bengal. The people of Murshidabad and CHT raised Pakistan and Indian flags
respectively during 14/15 August but they found themselves coupled with the wrong country
following the after declaration of the Radcliffe award. As a result, there was a feeling of
betrayal among the people of the Muslim and Hindu majority districts, as they were excluded
from majorities and included with minorities. People were leaving due to uncertainty, a large

8
number of killings took place and the minority communities of both sides were uprooted and
forced to seek refuge elsewhere. It is probable that Mountbatten knew how unpopular the
award would be, and therefore did not immediately declare it when it was completed on 13
August. He decided to delay it for two days to allow the transfer of power ceremonies to
proceed smoothly on 14 August for Pakistan and 15 August for India. Similarly, Radcliffe
knew what he had done and started to pack his bags and leave with equal haste. Jalil (2006b:
07) quotes Radcliffe's letter to his stepson on 14 August, 'There will be roughly 80 million
people with grievance who will begin looking for me. I don't want them to find me.' He was
so worried about being assassinated that a complete search of the airplane had to be
conducted before it took off on August 15, hours after India achieved its independence. Thus,
I argue the partition process was not a systematic procedure according to concrete principle,
but rather developed haphazardly through makeshift procedures. Above all, creation of the
Bengal border was a collective error by Mountbatten, Radcliffe, Jinnah and Nehru. Although
partition had been considered as the solution of communal crisis, ultimately it aggravated the
communal clash by creating a border unacceptable to all. In the end, about 12 million people
fled the borders as the partition became a reality, a migration dominated by terror and
violence (Jalil, 2006b). Approximately one million people died in the initial weeks of
independence

A ‘line’ as ‘border’

Drawing of lines as borders was a European concept. In most of pre-colonial non-European

world there existed the traditional concept of natural frontier. The colonial state in course of
their empire building introduced the concept of ‘line’ as border to demarcate geographical
areas as political boundaries. Thus during the course of colonial period we have a number of
such lines like, Radcliffe Line, Creek Line, Durant Line, McMahan Line, Johnson Line,
McCartney Line and so on. In fact even within India there were Inner Line and Outer Line
which demarcated some of the tribal areas from the plains. Ironically, the lines that
demarcated the political boundary of India with its neighbours have since been a perennial
source of tension instead of resolving the problem. The line that divided the Indian
subcontinent into India and West and East Pakistan (later Bangladesh) was the Radcliff Line.
When the proverbial red pencil of Cyril Radcliffe was moving in zigzag movements to create
new nations on that hot summer in Raisina Hills, he did not think he was dividing a people.
To him it was just a line. For example the first sentence of his report read, “a line shall be
drawn along the boundary between the thana of Phansidewa in the district of Darjeeling and
then Tetulia in the District of Jalpaiguri from the point where the boundary meets the
province of Bihar and then along the boundary between thanas of Tetulia and Rajganj.the
thanas Pachagar and Rajganj and thana of Pachagarh and Jalpaiguri and shall then continue
along the northern corner of the thana Debiganj to the boundary of the state of Cooch Bihar.
The district of of Jalpaiguri as lies north of this line shall belong to West Bengal but the thana
of Patgram and any other portion of Jalpaiguri district which lies to the east or south shall
belong to East Bengal.”31 This was how Sir Cyril Radcliffe created the nation of East
Pakistan by the stroke of a red pencil. The second paragraph starts with, “a line shall then be
drawn from the point…” and third para, “the line shall run along the boundary between the

9
following thanas….”32 and so on. Similarly most of the paragraph starts with “a line should
run” and the “the line should then turn.” No where did the report mention any ‘people.’ It was
this ‘running’ and ‘turning’ ‘line’ that divided a people and created nations. The Radcliffe
line spread through the Rann of Kutch in Gujarat to the international border in Jammu in
Jammu & Kashmir, dividing India and Pakistan into two different countries.

This line in the map was often cartographic rather than real. In implementing this
cartographic mess, the borders became a zone of land grabbing for the respective countries.
When the post colonial state took over power from the colonial masters in August 1947, India
was in a terrible shape. There were communal riots, partition and partition related
displacements, a huge population was to be saved from fratricidal violence and rehabilitated.
There were secessionist movements from the Princely states, tasks regarding division of the
land, property and even the personnel between the two partitioned states. In such a situation
fencing or demarcating the border could not be undertaken. Hence the administration used the
twin concept of ‘actual border’ and ‘notional boundary.’ The concept was originally invented
by the colonial administration in the final days of their rule. 33 “This had to do with
preparations for divisions of the spoils that commenced well before the actual partition.
Administration and politicians needed to agree on a rough (notional) idea of where the
Boundary Commission was likely to fix the border and proceed on the assumption. But the
concept took on a new significance when it became clear that the decision of the boundary
commission would not be made public till after India and Pakistan became independent states
on 14th and 15th August 1947. Therefore the governments of East and West Bengal were
instructed to take charge up to the notional repeat notional boundary pending publication and
implementation of the Award (Boundary Commission’s decision.). It created a lot of
confusion among the people who were neither asked for their opinion (Referendum was held
only in Sylhet district of Assam and North Western Frontier Province) nor informed properly.
Hence the people of Murshidabad, with an overwhelmingly Muslim majority raised the
Pakistani flag thinking they were a now a district of East Pakistan and amazed to find
themselves a part of India later. Similarly the Chttagong District, 98% of whose population
was non Muslim gained as district of India independence and raised the Indian flag only to be
transferred to Pakistan subsequently. After independence India had the following border
along its north eastern frontier. Goalpara (Assam) – Rangpur (East Pakistan) Sector: Garo
Hills (Meghalaya) - Mymensingh (East-Pak) Sector145 miles of United Khasi-Jaintia Hills
(Meghalaya) - Sylhet (East Pak) Sector: 80 miles of Cachar- Sylhet Sector: Patharkandi
(Assam) – Kulaura (East Pakistan) Sector Tripura – East Pakistan Sector: Mizo Hills -
Chittagong Hill Tracts Sector. As many as five districts of the state of Meghalaya – West
Garo hills, South Garo hills, West Khasi hills. East Khasi hills and Jaintia hills share border
with Bangladesh. There is Balat-Sunakganj border and Tamabil (Dawki) on Umngot river is
the border. The village Muktapur is located in the international border where population is
War-Khasi, Bengali (Hindu), Patra and Garo as well as ex tea garden population. In Assam
border is shared in Dhubri, Cachar and Karimganj. In Ramraikuthi in Dhubri in Assam where
gates are opened for villagers to go out to cultivate their land.34

10
 But bordering the nation did not end there. After independence both the Indian and
Pakistani governments asked its district administrators to take control of its border. In the
remote areas and hilly regions where no demarcation was done the task of marking the
borders was left to the Deputy Commissioners. In many cases the overzealous district
administrators tried to prove their patriotism by fixing the border much beyond the notional
boundary and thereby occupy as much land as possible for his country. This was possible
because there in these remote mountainous regions there were no representative of the
opposition to resist their move. This happened in the north eastern sector of the international
boundary.

Again there were some land deals between the new Indian government and its
friendly neighbours around the same time. Under the provision of the Act XLVII of 1951 the
boundaries of the state of Assam were altered consequent on the cessation of strip of territory
to the government of Bhutan. The strip of territory consisted about 32 square miles of
Dewangiri Hill Block on the extreme boundary of Kamrup district. 35 The strip of land was
covered with forest and only sparsely populated by the Bhutanese. Under the provision of
Article 3 of the constitution the legislative Assembly of Assam on the recommendation of the
President of India passed a bill as proposed by the Parliament and effected its concurrence for
its onward action for peace and prosperity of both Indian and Bhutan. On August 28 1949 the
then ruler of Cooch Bihar entered into an Agreement of Merger with the Government of India
and eventually merged with West Bengal in 1950. Similarly while drawing the boundary
between the two countries, the British handed over the Kabaw Valley of Manipur to Burma in
1889 which later ratified by Indian government in 1948 leaving the Manipuris complaining
that their land was given to Burma.

Bordered from all sides

Creating line along the partitioned area was not the sole border. Once the nation was created
the state tried to cordon it from other neighbours as well by bordering itself. Needless to say
with these neighbours, India had so far open access to each other. In Arunachal Pradesh the
whole length of about 217 km of international border with Bhutan is shared by the western
districts of Tawang and West Kameng. It is cohabited by Bhutanese on the one hand and
Monpas and Sherdukpens on the Arunachal side. In Tawang fronter the Monpas from Mukto,
Limla nd Zemithang administrative circles of Tawang district from the Kalakrang
(Kalegthang) administrative circle of the West Kameng district and the Sherdukpens from the
Rupa area of West Kameng of Arunachal Pradesh visit commercial spots of Bhutan like
Merak, Sapteng, Bleting, Buri Dudungkhar and Zianglum. In Assam side the Bhutan frontier
are connected through Duars. The bordering areas are Bijni, Chapakhamar, Chapaguri, (in
Chirang district), Buxa in (Buxa district) and Ghorkhola in Kamrup and Kalling and Burigma
in Darrang. Bhutan and India signed their first treaty in 1865 which was renewed in 1910.
The Indo-Bhutan treaty was revised in 1949 with a new clause that India would assist Bhutan
in foreign relations. Diplomatic relations between India and Bhutan were established in 1968
with the appointment of Resident Indian representative in Bhutan. On February 2007 the
India-Bhutan Friendship Treaty was substantially revived and Article 2 in the 1949 treaty
which Bhutan was uncomfortable with was amended. The monarchy of Bhutan shares 669

11
km of border with Assam, Arunachal Pradesh and Sikkim. Sikkim has 32 kms of border with
Bhutan. The established gateway to Bhutan from Assam is the gate at Samdrup Jongkhar.
The Indian side is the Baksa district of Assam. There are a number of small villages like
Nanke Darranga, Sashipur and Darranga Mela Bazar inhabited by different ethnic groups of
mixed population. Arunachal Pradesh share abouot 520 kms with Myanmar and state of
Mizoram 510 kms. Manipur and Nagaland shares 398 and 215 kms respectively with
Myanmar. The easternmost post is Nampong in Changlang district the Arunachal-Myanmar
border in the Stillwell Road. The border gates are opened one day in the week when there is a
market.Nagaland-Myanmar have an open border. There are one million Nagas in Myanmar
and four million Nagas in India divided by the border. On Mizoram the border crossing is in a
place called Zokhawthar, a place is quite unknown while Moreh in Manipur and Pangsao in
Patkai range in Arunachal Pradesh is well known. Rih is the place on the Myanmar side. The
border is demarcated by the Tiau river. Chins from Rih cross over the bailey bridge over Tiau
river to come over the Zokhawthar. It is understood that round the Myanmarese border post
of Rih on the other bank of Tiau in Myanmar are a number of Mizo villages. 36Anglo-Nepal
war of 1815 was followed by Anglo-Nepal Treaty of 1815. Following independence of India
there was a trilateral agreement between India, Nepal and Britain by which four Gorkha
brigades were transferred to India. The greater Nepal concept extended from Tista River in
the east to Kangara across the Sutlej River in the west as well as further south into the Terai
plains of Himalayas and north of Himalayas. Nepal shares 1747 kms of border with India. In
the west Bengal-Nepal border is Naxalbari (Panitanki)-Kakarbhitta route. The border is
marked by river Mechi. Indian bank of Mechi river is known as Panitanki and Nepal side is
known as Kakarbhitta. China has claim over Tawang and even briefly occupied the region in
1962. In the interior of Tawang there were four lesser known tribes like Magopa,
Luguthangpa, Thingbupa and Pangchenpa who were unknown until an anthropologist worked
on them recently.37

Border as Barrier

Initially the newly created international border between India and Pakistan in reality meant
little to the people, until it began to limit and restrict people’s movement. In fact even after
partition and formation of two nation states boundary demarcation took time to be
implemented. Before the boundaries determined by the Radcliffe Award could be
demarcated, certain disputes arose out of the interpretation of the award which required to be
resolved before the border was demarcated. In fact the early years the border was quite
porous and there was much more flexibility in movement of people. 38 People were coming
back and forth to make arrangements for their processions and properties until the permit
system was introduced.39 Following partition, the Home Ministries of East Pakistan and West
Bengal issued joint instructions to their border officials in May 1948 to write a joint report on
the factional position as it stood after partition. Soon after this, in December 1948, the Prime
Ministers of India and Pakistan gave the formal go-ahead for demarcation.2 For the purpose
of demarcation, the border was divided into provincial segments and their procedures and
arrangements differed.40 To determine the West Bengal-East Pakistan border, they completed
an aerial survey border and prepared a map on that basis. It was decided to demarcate on the

12
ground using the survey staff of the two provinces, and to jointly mark the border by
permanent pillars erected jointly by them. Parallel procedures were worked out for other
provincial segments of the border; however, progress in the demarcation process was
disappointing due to different factors. Uneasy and hostile relations between the two states
were the foremost obstruction to a smooth demarcation process. Moreover, quarrels between
the survey teams of both countries on contradictory territorial claims interrupted the
demarcation process. For example, Schendel (2005) 41 explains, during demarcation
operations on the Assam border in 1951, while the representatives of the Assam Survey were
leaving Sunamganj sector, after a joint survey with the Pak Survey team, they obliterated 14
boundary marks and demolished 5 out of 14 pillars in the northern border of Sunamganj For
example, Schendel (2005) 42 explains, during demarcation operations on the Assam border in
1951, while the representatives of the Assam Survey were leaving Sunamganj sector, after a
joint survey with the Pak Survey team, they obliterated 14 boundary marks and demolished 5
out of 14 pillars in the northern border of Sunamganj. Eventually, this escalated tensions
between the states, resulting in suspension of border demarcation in the Assam-East Pakistan
segment for a year. Besides, in many areas the survey teams were attacked by the local
inhabitants. Also, lack of information about the border area complicated the demarcation
process. Whenever the survey teams went to the borderland, they felt the full weight of local
public opinion and they could not work without the protection of armed guards. On the other
hand, when a group of West Bengal surveyors, escorted by the East Pakistan police, were
proceeding along the Rajshahi border, villagers assaulted them and refused to let them take
the goods they were carrying back to India (Schendel, 2005). 43 Therefore, only 20 percent
and 66 percent of the total borders were demarcated, respectively, within 6 and 18 years of
independence. When Bangladesh emerged onto the scene in 1971, almost one-third of the
border was yet to be demarcated. it was considered that the 'friendly governments' of
Bangladesh and India would sincerely resolve all the differences and disputes in
implementing the Radcliffe award and demarcating the border. Indira Gandhi and Shekh
Mujibur Rahman, the then leaders of India and Bangladesh, also signed an agreement
concerning the demarcation of the land boundary and related matters which is widely known
as the 1974 Land Boundary Agreement (LBA). Furthermore, a Joint India-Bangladesh
Guidelines for Border Authorities was prepared by the two governments in 1975, which is
widely known as the Boundary Guideline. The Boundary Guideline took different ongoing
border incidents and pending final settlement of the borders into account. The Guideline
referred to routine joint inspections by the respective Directors of the Land Records and
Surveys and the Border Security Force Officials of either country of any portion of the
boundary. According to the border Guideline, wherever the boundary pillars are missing and
misplaced, they should be replaced as early as possible. It also suggests an annual inspection
of the pillars (February-March) jointly by the Border Security Force (BSF) and the
Bangladesh Rifles (BDR). Besides, Satyasdhan Chakraborty in a discussion in the Indian Lok
Sabha (the lower house in the Parliament of India) identifies that the LBA provides particular
and clear instructions for accurate demarcation of the remainder of the border in all segments,
and a framework for the resolution of all disputes related to demarcation (Bhasin, 2003, vol.
1). It is noteworthy that despite the high priority set on accomplishing border demarcation,
only 3315 km border had been demarcated from 1972 to 1981 i.e. just 245 km of border had

13
been demarcated within 10 years of Bangladesh's independence (Bhasin, 2003a). Finally, it
has taken three decades to demarcate all of the borders; however, 6.5 km remain to be
demarcated (Bhasin, 2003a). The un-demarcated border is spread over three sectors: 1.
Daikhata in West Bengal-Bangladesh sector 1.5 km 2. Muhuri River (Belonia) in Tripura-
Bangladesh Sector 2.5 km 3. Lathitilla-Dumabari area in Assam-Bangladesh Sector 2.5 km
The Agreement itself clearly explains the probable solution regarding the aforesaid case of 2
and 3. In spite of this, contradictory technical positions between India and Bangladesh have
affected demarcation of these stretches. First of all, people living in the border land had no
sense of international borders as they had never experienced this phenomenon before. As,
William Van Schendel (2005: 118) enlightens, 'It was a fine day for soccer, and the boys of
Lamazuar crossed the river to play a friendly match in the next village. They had done so
many times before. Only this time it was early 1948, and Partition had turned the village river
into an international border between India and Pakistan. The entire soccer team was arrested
and thrown in jail'. Such incidents were very frequent in the fringe areas after partition. It was
very strange to these people that friends, neighbours and relatives became alien, and that any
visit to them was crossing the border. However, these impoverished people learned gradually
what the new border often meant measurable suffering. However, such guarding was not in
place all through the border, and a large portion of the border was unguarded. Therefore,
'large numbers of refugees crossed the open border in search of safety and better life, notably
Hindus fleeing from Pakistan and Muslims from India. Apart from refugees, there were
numerous cross-border settlers, for example, women who married a husband across the
border or children who went to school or college across the border and then found a job in
that country.' (Schendel, 2005: 119) 44
By an agreement concluded in Delhi on December I4, I948, at an Inter-Dominion
Conference between India and Pakistan, the two Dominions agreed that a tribunal should be
set up not later than January 3 I, I949, for the adjudication and final settlement of the disputes
and thereafter for demarcating the boundary. The Honorable Algot Bagge, former member of
the Supreme Court of Sweden, was appointed chairman and two high-court judges, the
Honorable C. Aiyar and the Honorable M. Shahabuddin, were nominated by India and
Pakistan respectively. It was laid down as a part of the Delhi Agreement that "after the
Tribunal had adjudicated upon the disputes, the boundaries shall be demarcated jointly by the
experts of both the Dominions. If there is any disagreement between the experts regarding the
actual demarcation of the boundary 'in situ,' such disagreement shall be referred to shall be
demarcated finally in accordance with such decision." 45 The first, informal meeting of the
Bagge Tribunal was held in Calcutta on December 3, I949, and it was decided to designate
the Tribunal as "The Indo-Pakistan Boundary Disputes Tribunal." From December 5 to i6
further sittings were held in Calcutta, and the first two of the four disputes2 referred to the
Tribunal, concerning the boundary between West Bengal (India) and East Bengal (East
Pakistan), were taken up. From January 5 to I2, I9 the Tribunal sat in Dacca, and the
remaining two disputes, concerning the boundary between East Bengal (East Pakistan) and
Assam (India), were considered.3 The decision of the Tribunal was announced at the end of
February, 1950. The date of demarcation of the boundary between West Bengal and East
Bengal was extended to August 5, I95I, but the work could not be completed even within that
period. The aerial survey along the boundary began on January 5, 1951, was finished in

14
December of that year; the Air Survey Company, London, which undertook the task, is to
submit a detailed map to the governments of India and Pakistan. The hydrographic survey to
determine the midstream of the Ganges and its distributary - the Mathabhanga, which form
parts of the boundary, has also been completed. Of the 890 miles of boundary between East
Bengal and West Bengal, about 265 miles had been reconnoitered, and I04 miles demarcated,
by September, I95I.4 The experts from the two countries would meet later to draw the line on
the map, and thereafter the final demarcation on the ground could be made. But in spite of the
Tribunal's decision, the boundary between Assam and East Bengal remains to be demarcated,
since India raises objections regarding the interpretation of that part of the award.
Initially the demarcation of border was through concrete pillars and establishment of Border
Out Posts (BOP). Fencing along the India-Pakistan border began in the late 1980s in the state
of Punjab in the wake of the unrest in Punjab on the demand of Khalistan. The Indian
government installed barbed-wire fences and gates along the 553-km (343-mile) international
border. The fences restricted access to 21,300 acres of farmland. In 1994, India began
construction of fences along the border of Jammu and Kashmir. The Line of Control (LoC)
barrier's construction began in the 1990s but slowed in the early 2000s as hostilities between
India and Pakistan increased. After a November 2003 ceasefire agreement, building resumed
and was completed in late 2004. The India-Pakistan border is also guarded by laser fences. A
laser wall is a mechanism to detect objects passing the line of sight between the laser source
and the detector. A laser beam over a river sets off a loud siren in case of a breach. The
project under CIBMS is meant to be one of the many high tech state-of-the-art surveillance
technologies to be incorporated. These include infrared and laser beam based intruder alarms,
thermal imagers, advanced fence and ground sensors. Protective earth walls along with
bullet-proof metal shields were put up as defenses against fire. Work began under cover of
darkness and fog in January this year, and remained undetected for the next four months.
Almost 15 km of the fence was completed before the monsoon set in.
Similarly the fencing of the 4,097-km-long border between India and Bangladesh began
in 1986. The work began at Satrasal, the starting point of the 1,500-km-long Assam-
Bangladesh border. Until then it was the pillars and BOPs which managed the border. The
fencing was constructed to limit illegal migration and smuggling. The government of India
sanctioned the construction of border fencing with floodlights in two phases. All the ongoing
works were to be completed by March 2024. The total length of the Indo-Bangladesh border
is 4,096.7 km, out of which 3,180.653 km has already been covered by physical fencing. The
remaining about 916.047 km was proposed to l be covered by physical and non-physical
barriers by March, 2024. India was erecting a new non-cut 'steel fence' to plug vulnerable and
infiltration-prone patches along its sensitive border with Pakistan and Bangladesh . The
Standing Committee of the Rajya Sabha on Borders was apprised that on a 423.34 km stretch
along India-Bangladesh Border, construction of any physical barrier was not feasible due to
geographical constraints like riperine area, low-lying area, nala area etc and some problems like
habitations within 150 yards of the border, pending land acquisition cases and protests by the
border population. The Committee further learnt that, in this stretch, the Ministry of Home
Affairs proposed to deploy technological solutions which include deployment of cameras,
sensors, radars, lasers and High Mast Light. It was further stated that, presently, available
technologies are being tested through a pilot project. 148 villages are located completely ahead of

15
the fence while 137 are located partially ahead of the fence. The Ministry also informed that there
are 126 houses that touched the zero-line. The BSF had requested the MHA to shift the villages
ahead of the fence to the hinterland. However, the Ministry is examining the possibility of
shifting the fence ahead of the villages instead of shifting the villages. The Committee feels that
the issue of shifting the villages or the fence is an intricate one and the Ministry must not adopt a
one-size-fits-all approach on this issue. The Committee feels that the Ministry must try to shift
the fence in as many areas as possible to prevent any inconvenience to the people. However,
wherever the houses are located right on the International Boundary line, the Ministry will have
to shift them to the hinterland and rehabilitate the affected households. The Committee
recommends that the Ministry should carry out a review of all such areas within six months and
come up with specific solutions in all such cases. The Committee desired to be apprised about the
progress in this regard. The Committee also noted that while rehabilitation and resettlement of
displaced people does not come under the purview of BADP Guidelines, the BADP funds can be
utilised to create social infrastructure. The Committee feels that the people residing on the border
line will be willing to shift easily if they are provided with proper housing and other facilities.
The Committee therefore, recommends that the Ministry should persuade the State Government
to provide BADP funds for community housing projects, which fall within the definition of social
infrastructure, in the hinterland and shift all the households living beyond the fencing into such
buildings. Along with border fencing, there were installation of floodlighting and construction of
roads along IPB. Specialized forces were raised for border policing. On India-Pakistan border,
2003.06 km (out of a total sanctioned length of 2063.06 km) has been covered by fencing and the
remaining 60.00 km of fencing is proposed to be erected. The work of installation of floodlights
along the 2043.76 km of the India-Pakistan border is under progress out of which 1943.76 km has
been completed.2.8.2 The Ministry in its Annual Report for the year 2016 stated that 118 km of
floodlights are nonfunctional due to damage caused by floods. The Committee sought to know
the steps being taken to repair 118 km of floodlights that are non-functional due to damage
caused by floods. The Ministry submitted that the work of restoration of damaged floodlights was
started by the CPWD in August/September, 2015 and is likely to be completed by March, 2017.
Presently, the area is being guarded by physical presence along with use of search light/ night
vision devices etc.2.8.3 The Committee recommends that there should be regular maintenance of
flood lights so that damage is minimal. In the flood prone areas, pre-emptive and protective steps
should be taken to ensure that flood lights are not affected. The Committee hopes that the work of
restoration of damaged flood lights, entrusted to CPWD, would have been completed as per target
by March, 2017.2.8.4 The Ministry also apprised the Committee that, on the entire India-Pakistan
border, it has completed infrastructure works in almost all sectors except for a small part of the
Gujarat sector which suffers from persistent water logging. However, a pilot project for
construction of roads, fence, and installation of floodlights along the length of 1 km of water
logged area by using improved technology was sanctioned by the Ministry which was completed
on 31st December, 2014. Subsequently, the estimate for balance stretch was prepared by the
construction agency concerned and the same was under examination of Technical Committee
headed by the DG, CPWD. Meanwhile, a High Level Committee (HLC) under Chairmanship of
Shri Madhukar Gupta, retired Home Secretary had recommended that requirement of fence, roads
and floodlights along IPB in Gujarat may be reviewed and the balance work may be dropped. The
HLC suggested the use of an alternative cost effective way for surveillance in this stretch. The
Committee takes note of the recommendation of the High Level Committee to drop the balance
work of construction of fence, roads and floodlights on India Pakistan border in Gujarat and look

16
for an alternative cost effective way of surveillance. The Committee feels that significant amount
of time has been wasted on this small stretch of border in Gujarat which suffers from persistent
water logging. The Committee recommends that early efforts may be made to put in place a cost
effective alternative mechanism for surveillance in this stretch. There should be no further delay
in this regard. Advanced technological solutions may be considered for this purpose. The
Committee also visited the India-Pakistan border in Rajasthan State and had first-hand
information about the fencing that got seriously affected due to the phenomenon of shifting sand
dunes on the Rajasthan border. The Committee discussed this matter with the CPWD and they
submitted that they were working on finding a solution to this problem. The MHA informed that
CPWD has been asked to carry out Geo-Technical survey in the Bordering area of Rajasthan
while the Ministry was also examining the possibility of a study to be done by a premier agency
like IIT for this purpose.
The Committee finds that the fencing in the Thar Desert region of Rajasthan Border area has
proved to be ineffective in serving its intended purpose due to the problem of shifting sand dunes.
The Committee also notes that the MHA is examining the possibility of conducting a study
through a premiere agency like IIT. The Committee is also aware that BSF is considering the
option of dense plantation in Jaisalmer Border area to stabilize sand dunes. The Committee in
this connection would like to draw the attention of the Ministry to a fence erected by the USA, on
its border with Mexico having geographical terrain similar to Thar Desert, which can be
repositioned mechanically to appropriate border line and in effect floats on top of the shifting
sand dunes. The Committee recommends that the MHA should form a working group or a
Committee comprising of technical experts to examine all the possible solutions to this problem.
The Committee desires to be apprised of the progress in this regard. The Ministry of Home
Affairs furnished the following details about deployment of Border Guarding Forces (BGF) on
six different borders of the Country:46

Border Guarding No. of No. of Border

Border Force Battalion Out Posts
s

India-Bangladesh Border Security Force 82 1011

(IBB)
India-Pakistan (IPB) Border Security Force 57 656

India-China (ICB Indo-Tibetan Border Police 32 172

India-Nepal (INB) Sashastra Seema Bal 31

473

India-Bhutan (IBhB) Sashastra Seema Bal 16 157

India-Myanmar(IMB) Assam Rifles 15 83 (CoBs)*

*COBs: Company Operating Basis

17
There are approximately 45 battalions of the BSF (about 725 BOPs) and 30 battalions of
BDR (about 650 BOPs) deployed to guard the border. BOPs (normally comprising 20-25
persons) are constructed all along the border to promote a sense of security amongst the
border population and prevent trans-border crimes. As against 25-30 kilometers (inter-BOP
gap of 3-5 kilometers with fencing) of area covered by a BSF battalion on the Punjab border.
The Government of India has several agencies devoted exclusively for surveillance and security
of the border areas. These agencies are National Intelligence Grid (NATGRID) Multi-Agency
Centre (MAC) National Counter-Terrorism Centre (NCTC).

Mechanism against Intrusion, Trespass and Trafficking

It is often thought that since border of a nation lie in far-away from the capital and in flung
areas, state control is lax there and is peaceful. On the contrary borders are generally the site
of perpetual conflict and violence. Even when rests of the country are peaceful, borders are
experiencing constant warfare of various kinds. It is in the borders that nation-states post
most of its army to guard its territory to prevent trespass and intrusion. For example while
Bangladesh and India had have a general peaceful co-existence since 1971, there were
innumerable instances of exchange of fire between border guards, unrecorded invasions,
countless number of unsung casualties, daily game of cat and mouse of people trying to sneak
in and sneak out and the guards trying to catch them, struggle between fenced out villagers
and their fenced in lands, smugglers trying to smuggle their merchandise and bribed border
army pretending not to have seen anything. The Indo-Bangladesh border management has
become one of the most serious challenges to India's national security due to influx of illegal
migrants, migration caused violent, terrorism, insurgency movements and their trans-border
network. Secondly, the spreading of small arms throughout the states of North-East India and
from there to other parts of India, the border crime, illegal border trade, trafficking of drugs,
human and animals. Environmental degradation, socio-cultural problems, scarcity of water
food and other human needs and human rights violation, on other hand has made this worsen
It is a present day cliché to say that with liberalization and globalization borders are
increasingly becoming obsolete 47and today’s people are global citizens. Nothing can be
farthest from truth which is testified by the developments in Trump’s America. 48 As soon as
he took over as the President of United States he ordered the closure of borders with its South
American neighbours and launched a tirade against immigrants. ‘The border remained a
highly emotive issue in South Asia too. It’s very location is contested in many places and
there are groups who refuse to accept its legitimacy. The new border created a volatile region,
linking India, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Burma, that has experienced wars, border conflicts,
regional revolts and many forms of everyday resistance. Such is the dominance of nation and
nationalism in the history of mankind from the eighteenth century. Ironically the twentieth
century, just a century subsequent to the period of nationalism, also has been seen as the
period of decline of nations. While some saw it as a crisis period of the polity that developed
on the entity of nation called nation-state49 others saw it as the period of its decline and
formation of post-states as well. 50 The story of this region does not support the idea that the
world is becoming borderless as it globalizes.’51 Even when nation as a concept is
increasingly being critiqued, neither nations nor borders have become irrelevant and these
seemed to become more and more fortified.

18
Borders mark the extremities of state power. Borders are sites and symbols of power. Borders
are also the place where state is subverted; it is in the borders where greatest abuse of state
power takes place.52 “A border have three elements: legal borderline which simultaneously
separates and joins states, the physical structure of the state which exist to demarcate and
protect the borderline, composed of peoples and institutions which often penetrated deeply
into the territory of the state and frontiers, territorial zones of varying width which stretch
across and away from borders within which people negotiate a variety of behaviours and
meanings associated with their memberships in nations and states.”53

There were as many as 53 recorded clashes between Bangladesh Rifles and

Border Security Force of India in a span of just Sixteen months in 2000-01.54 In 2008
alone Fake Indian Currency Notes amounting to Rs. 18,71,500 were seized along this
border.55 Rs. 28,43, 30, Rs 32,26,900 and Rs 36,61,800 were seized in
2009,2010,2011 respectively. 10 illegal arms were seized in 2008, 65 in 2009, 70 in
2010 and 42 in 2011 (up to October). More than 53 anti-Indian elements were arrested
in the same border from 2008-2011. In an official communiqué sent to Dhaka recently
the Union Home ministry cited fires where over 200 BSF troopers were injured in
attacks along the border since 2011. Two BSF personnel were also killed at this
eastern frontier during the same period. According to the official reports 147 BSF
personnel were injured and one was killed in 2011 where as 54 troopers were injured
and one was killed in 2012. In an official communiqué sent to Dhaka recently the
Union Home ministry cited fires where over 200 BSF troopers were injured in attacks
along the border since 2011. Two BSF personnel were also killed at this eater frontier
during the same period. According to the official reports 147 BSF personnel were
injured and one was killed in 2011 where as 54 troopers were injured and one was
killed in 2012. According to home ministry reports BSF troopers are generally
attacked by the drug peddlers and other anti social elements during the night time
hence night patrolling along the border was essential.56 (Seven Sisters post, 27, June
2012, p.5) One of the major problems of the border during the pre-2015 years was the
regular casualties because of police action against alleged smugglers and petty criminals
which also included the controversial 2011 Felani Khatoon case when Khatoon, a teenager
was shot dead allegedly by a BSF official. Recent reports by the human rights group Odhikar,
however, have said the border killings have continued despite the settled nature of the India-
Bangladesh border.57 According to its latest report published in June, Odhikar has recorded at
least 25 deaths in Bangladesh because of firing by the BSF. The Indian official consulted for
the story also reminded that there were Indian casualties too in the recent past. Odhikar’s
report mentions at least 45 cases where citizens of Bangladesh were killed or injured. At least
three were abducted, alleges the organisation. The group also holds BSF responsible for the
death of a teenager inside Bangladesh territory in recent months. The report shows killings
were highest in January when 13 individuals died in BSF firing. The second highest was in
June with six deaths. There is a higher instance of border killings before festivals in
Bangladesh which sees an increase in supply of animals from India to Bangladesh. The
Ministry of Home Affairs has ordered for strict action against those found to be indulging in
cattle smuggling ahead of Eid later this month, when demand for sacrificial cattle is expected

19
 rise across the border. Odhikar says that most of such killings are because of the controversial
“shoot at sight” policy followed by the Indian forces. The latest killing took place on Saturday
in Indo-Bangla border of Sylhet when Indian locals allegedly fired upon intruders in an
agriculture field killing one person on the spot.

There has been an increasing incidence of killing on the borders of India and Bangladesh as
reported by the Human Right Agencies and Consultative Agencies. In 2019 itself at least 38
Bangladeshi citizens were shot down by Border Security Force of India which is triple than
the number killed in the previous year. The Bangladesh authorities suspected that due to the
pressure of NRC in Assam there could have been reverse migration of former immigrants to
Bangladesh who were perhaps suspected to be infiltrators by the Indian BSF and fired upon.
Another agency suspected that this mass killing by BSF was to avenge the death of few of
their colleagues by the Bangladesh Rifles. The BSF refuted the theory and said the deaths
were the result of increase in cattle smuggling along the Indo-Bangladesh border. In joint
action by India and Bangladesh the forces have entered deep into the Bangladesh land – up to
10-12 kms, to capture the smugglers.
In 2018 more than 40 thousand cattle have been captured by the BSF which has been reduced
to 31 thousand in 2019 due to the proactive measures of the BSF. This has made the
smugglers desperate which is the reason for increase in their activity. In 2018 there were 18
deaths of infiltrators which has gone up to 38 in 2019. As a result the desperate smugglers are
inventing newer methods of cattle smuggling.58

According to home ministry reports BSF troopers are generally attacked by the drug peddlers
and other anti social elements during the night time hence night patrolling along the border
was essential.59 Borders are also are sites of extensive commerce. Right from currency to
cattle, gold to gun everything is sold and bought in Indo-Bangladesh border. Due to its illegal
nature of trade, the actual volume of trade in monetary value is not available. Often border
has been the site between the two countries to compete for land grabbing, each one trying to
oust the other from frontier territory and occupy it as its own land. There was one major war
in 2001 on the border with Bangladesh. Even when formal wars were there between India and
Pakistan in 1965 or 1971, it was the people of borders who experienced violence, death, rape,
displacement, expulsion, extortion and such atrocities more than people of the mainland. The
greatest human right abuse also happens in the border areas as even an army constable is
mighty and empowered to shoot anyone. There is section 144 promulgated twenty four hours
and shoot at sight orders are there for anybody trespassing the border.

Fake Indian Currency Notes (FICN)

When the Committee sought to know about the smuggling of FICN notes on various borders and
about measures which are being taken to curb this menace. The MHA submitted the following
details of FICN seized along the respective borders during the last three years:

Border 2014 2015 2016

20
 (Amount in Rs.) (Amount in Rs.) (Amount in Rs.)

1,79,20,000 6,56,500 0
India-Pakistan border
India -Bangladesh 1,94,52,000 40,69,800 1,26,56,000
border
India -Nepal border 5,83,700 13,16,500 6,89,050

India -Bhutan border Nil 4,61,955 1,84,500

India -Mayanmar 5,220 2,36,000 1,00,000

border
India -China border Nil Nil Nil

Drug Trafficking in Border States

India has been enduring the menace of drug trafficking for many decades. The Ministry of
Home Affairs reported that on the Western border, South West Asian (SWA) Heroin gets
trafficked into J&K and Punjab. Some instances of trafficking through Rajasthan and Gujarat
have also been reported. The component of SWA Heroin is almost 35-40% of the total
seizures of heroin in India. This entire heroin reaches the states through land border or by
road, concealed inside consignments carried by trucks. Seizures from consignments in the
goods trains have also been reported. In 1972, both Bangladesh and India identified
smuggling, trafficking of illicit arms and ammunition, robbery, cattle lifting, and kidnapping
as major threats to national security. However, over time, human trafficking, arms and drugs
trafficking, and illegal trading have become the major concerns for both countries.60 The
Ministry informed the Committee that the Eastern States of West Bengal, Tripura,Meghalaya,
Assam and Mizoram share a land border with Bangladesh. Dawki-Tamabil, Agartala-
Akhura,Balat-Moheshkhola, Nulgiri-Langleh,Dawki-Bholaganj, Baghmara, Rongra, Bildova,
Simsang River, Bhanga, Mukamtilla are the major points through which drugs are smuggled
into Bangladesh’. The Indian side alleges that ‘bottles of psychotropic cough syrup, cattle,
drug and narcotics, small arms, onions, animal hides, gold and other precious metals, etc.,
travel across the borders and illegally exported to Bangladesh. It is estimated that 1.5 million
cows, worth almost US$500 million, are smuggled into Bangladesh annually61 Over 4100
people were arrested for cattle smuggling at the Assam-Bangladesh border in 2021.62Cattle
smuggling in the state of Meghalaya has resurfaced and is increasing in East Khasi Hills,
West Jaintia Hills and East Jaintia Hills districts, which share their borders with
Bangladesh.63. Prior work confirmed that smuggling is an important economic activity all
along the Indo-Bangladesh border.64 In an exclusive interview, the former director general of
the BGB recognized the fact that illegal drugs, especially phensedyl, flows are a grave
national problem.65 In an illustrated survey conducted by BGB in 2006 respondents, around
82.61% of unemployed youths and 28.21% of poor people are involved in illicit economic
activities in the border areas.66 Also, 4.44% of women and 3.70% of children are involved in
illicit border trade respectively. Smugglers have invented a very ingenious way
of dealing with the security forces that is trying to obstruct their activity-by cutting the
barbed wires. Barbed wire spreads over a longer distance and passes through no man's
land, which may not be under, direct observation of security forces. 67 (
In Recent times the trafficking of cough syrups and pain killer injections remain the core issue
between India and Bangladesh. Cough syrups are used as intoxicants in the absence of alcohol in

21
Bangladesh as sale and consumption of alcohol is banned in that country. The trafficked Codeine
Based Cough Syrups, especially brands like Phensedyl, Corex, Recodex etc., are diverted from
pharmaceutical usage to illicit channels. These are mainly trafficked from the states of UP/Bihar
to further east and north-east and through IBB they reach Bangladesh. Trafficking of synthetic
drugs to and from Myanmar and from the North-Eastern states to West Bengal and Bangladesh is
also reported. There are also reports of trafficking of Cocaine from Bangladesh to India. The
traffickers use Bangladesh route to get cocaine inside India from where it is further trafficked to
other countries. The Committee gathered from the evidence available that the following factors
are responsible for drug trafficking: (i) Easy availability of drug couriers in the border villages.
(ii) Cultivation of fields right up to zero line on both sides of border. (iii) Riverine nature of some
segments of the IPB. (iv) Well knit smuggling syndicates to transfer the consignments upto
International market. (v) Easy rail and road connectivity and robust communication system. (vi)
Indian jails are the preferred place for these people to develop new networks/contacts among each
other. (vii)Availability of SIM cards (both Pakistan & Indian) to smugglers near the border areas
for communication.

The Ministry of Home Affairs informed that to control this menace the Border Security Force has
been given the powers under the NDPS Act, 1985 for drug enforcement. The Ministry submitted
that installation of CCTV cameras can address this menace and MHA is in the process of
deploying technology solutions along vulnerable segments of the India-Pakistan border. The
Standing Committee of the Rajya Sabha on border areas noted the rampant drug trafficking
problem in border areas especially along the India-Pakistan border in Punjab and J&K, and feels
that, despite huge amount of seizures of drugs, the Government has comprehensively failed to
address this issue. The Committee recommends that the Ministry must make serious efforts to
completely prevent the flow of drugs from across the border by adopting a zero tolerance
approach in vulnerable areas. The Committee is anguished to know that cultivation beyond
fencing was helping the drug couriers to transfer drugs from across the border to the hinterland.
The Committee is given to understand that persons going beyond the fence find the packets that
come from across the border in their fields and throw them across the fence on the Indian side
which are collected by drug couriers during the night. The Committee recommends that the
Ministry must instruct BSF to create anti-trafficking teams of 4-5 personnel in every Company
who must scan the area beyond the fence every day in the morning before the farmers are allowed
to pass through the gates and also scan the area on the Indian side of the fence during the evening
after all the farmers have returned from the fields. These teams must also be tasked with the duty
of surveillance of the area under the command of the respective companies during night with
Hand-held thermal imagers from the BoPs and should be encouraged to launch operations in case
of detection of any suspicious movement near the fence. The Committee also recommends that
BSF personnel must be directed to frisk all the persons going beyond the fence for any purpose
both while going and returning.

Infiltration and Cross-Border Terrorism

The Committee sought to know about the increasing trend of attacks on the establishments of
Armed Forces in recent times and the reasons why intelligence inputs regarding these attacks
were not received by the IB. The Home Secretary replied that MHA was not the sole agency for

22
intelligence gathering and Ministry of Defence also has its own intelligence agency and both
make a collective effort to gather and share intelligence. The Committee also enquired as to why
no post-facto analysis of intelligence failure was done after the Pathankot attack and why the
Government failed to learn from the past failures as the terrorists perpetrated successive attacks
during 2016. The Ministry, in its written replies, submitted that after the Pathankot terrorist
attack, Ministry of Defence had constituted a four member committee comprising senior officers
from Army, Navy and Air Force to review security arrangements of Defence installations in the
country. Security guidelines have been issued based on the committee’s report and the
investigations of Pathankot, Uri and Nagrota attacks have been handed over to NIA for
investigation. The Committee takes note of the fact that more than a year has passed since the
Pathankot attack occurred; however, the investigation of that attack has not been completed by
NIA. Moreover, no analysis seems to have been done into the failure of the intelligence agencies
to provide credible and actionable inputs regarding the attacks at Pathankot, Uri, Pampore,
Baramulla and Nagrota. The Committee feels that these attacks have exposed the deficiencies
ofour intelligence agencies. The Committee, therefore, recommends that the Ministry should
instruct the NIA to complete the investigations of these attacks at the earliest so as to identify the
loopholes in the intelligence setup in the border areas. Several Members of the Committee, during
the deliberations on Border Security, expressedconcern on the substantial rise in the number of
terrorist incidents and infiltration attempts in J&Kborder areas during 2016 which can be
gathered from the table below:

S.No . Incidents 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

1 Terrorist 1 220 170 222 208

violence 322
incidents
2 Civilians 15 15 28 17 15
killed
3 Security 15 53 47 39 82*
Forces
killed
4 Militants 72 67 110 108 150
killed
5 Infiltration 264 277 222 121 364
Attempts
6 Net 121 97 65 33 112
Infiltration
(Estimated)

Some Members of the Committee, during the deliberations, felt that the increase in the number of
infiltration attempts was primarily due to breakdown of ceasefire on the India-Pakistan border.
The Home Secretary, during the Committee’s meeting in which Nagrota attack was discussed,
submitted that increased incidents of infiltration have been reported in 2016 and efforts are being
made to contain infiltration to the extent possible. One of the Members enquired about the efforts
being made by the BSF to stem the flow of infiltrators and how many attempts were foiled by
them in the recent years. DG, BSF replied that after the Pathankot incident, there have been a
number of infiltration attempts on the International Boundary where BSF is exclusively deployed
and no infiltration attempt has been successful. He also informed the Committee that the BSF had

23
recently neutralized 3 infiltrators who crossed over from the other side through a tunnel. The
Committee feels that such a huge rise in the number of infiltrations justifies the apprehension that
the Indian Army and the BSF may have failed to foil some of these attempts. The Committee
recommends that the Government must carry out a thorough investigation into the sudden spurt in
the increase in the infiltration attempts along the LoC from across the border and find out the
vulnerabilities along the LoC that are being apparently exploited by the infiltrators. The
Committee also notes that there has been an increasing number of incidents of infiltration through
tunnels from across the border. The Committee feels that in future this might become a major
modus operandi of the infiltrators and the Government must take proactive measures to foil such
attempts. The Committee recommends that the Ministry must explore technological solutions for
tunnel detection in border areas and should, in this regard, seek the help of other countries which
have successfully developed tunnel detection systems.

Border as Sites of Power Demonstration

Since the early part of summer this year (20230, similar exchanges of fire have been under
way all along the 185-km international border that stretches from Paharpur along the
boundary with Punjab to the start of the LoC, north of Akhnoor. While in January this year,
Pakistan Rangers and troops set off just 231 rounds of machine gun and heavy-calibre fire,
the figure for August has been upwards of 300,000 (see table). However, the fighting claimed
relatively few casualties. So far, one BSF soldier and two civilians have been killed, while 40
people have been injured. But the exchanges of fire, as well as attempted attacks on Indian
forward positions, have been steadily escalating, mirroring a general intensification of
conflict throughout Jammu and Kashmir. The escalation of hostilities by Pakistan began after
India decided to build a counter-infiltration fence early this year. A similar effort had been
made by India in 1994, but was stopped in the face of Pakistani fire. However, when the
BSF's Director-General Gurbachan Jagat took office last year, his long years of experience as
Jammu and Kashmir's police chief led him to revive the idea. This time, the BSF took on the
job itself. Its troops were used to do much of the foundation work, thus ensuring complete
secrecy. When more workers were needed, they were brought in from Orissa and Madhya
Pradesh. Protective earth walls along with bullet-proof metal shields were put up as defences
against fire. Work began under cover of darkness and fog in January this year, and remained
undetected for the next four months. Almost 15 km of the fence was completed before the
monsoon set in.

It is not hard to see why the new fence is so important to India, while being a real threat to
Pakistan. For one, both National Highway 1 and the Pathankot-Jammu rail line are only a few
kilometres from the border. With the fence in place, the kind of sabotage enterprises and
terrorist attacks that have been taking place regularly since 1994 would become extremely
difficult to carry out. Pakistan would also find it difficult to push espionage operatives across
the border, while Indian intelligence would have no difficulty in identifying them. Also
significantly, the fence would make an important symbolic point. India argues that the
southern frontier in Jammu and Kashmir is a border, because it has remained unchanged ever
since the accession of the state. Pakistan accepted this position until the rise of insurgency in
the late 1980s. It now describes the border as a "working boundary".

24
GIVEN the stakes at hand, perhaps it is not surprising that the fighting has been intense. On
May 19, just after fencing work had been completed on that stretch, a 10-man Pakistan
Border Action Team made up of army commandos and irregulars planted demolition charges
near Nursery Post. However, the explosion, which occurred a few kilometres from the post,
caused little damage, and the fence was repaired in a very short time. At the end of August,
more direct means were used. On the night of August 31, Nursery Post faced sustained fire
from 9 p.m. through 3 a.m., with some 3,500 rounds hitting its defenses. In the end, the BSF's
39 Battalion hit back using high explosive rounds to silence the guns firing at it from the
Kamor forward post and Galar Tanda, just across the border. Since then, each round from
across the border has provoked a sharp response, and at least five Pakistan Rangers have been
killed. Civilians have, inevitably, also faced the consequences of this firing. Last month, 20-
year-old Surjeet Singh was injured by a 14.5 mm shell that ricocheted off his home in Jasso
Chak, 500 metres from Pakistan's Rangoor Post. Although both the BSF and the Pakistan
Rangers have traditionally observed a harvest-time truce, allowing farmers on both sides of
the border to go about their work, Jasso Chak residents have not worked on their lands for the
last two months. Children have abandoned the local primary school and walk 7 km each day
for their education. "Since we cannot collect grass from the border," said village numberdar
Banarasi Lal, "we have to purchase fodder. I've spent at least Rs. 1,500 this summer." Worst
of all, say residents of Jasso Chak, they face social isolation. "Not one of our boys has been
married for the last four years. Nobody wants to send their daughters here," says the
numberdar.

There is, however, a curious ambiguity in local responses to the conflict. Plush farm houses
appearing at regular intervals across rural Samba are the wages of the region's vibrant, but
illegal cross-border trade. Gold, silver and liquor, the traditional commodities handled by
border smugglers, have been displaced by a single, more sinister substance - heroin. Paid
through hawala transfers to traders in Karachi and Lahore, the heroin trade helps turn cross-
border terrorism into a self-financing activity. Pakistani smugglers are allowed to operate
their drug businesses if they pay for weapons and explosives, while their Indian counterparts
are told to carry explosives across the border along with their heroin consignments. Earlier
this year, the BSF recovered explosive devices from three border smugglers - Kuldeep
Kumar, Balkar Singh and Surinder Singh. This was a sign that hard cash, and not faith, drives
terrorism in this area.

But the price of stopping infiltration is not small. The 180-km stretch of the fence along the
Jammu frontier will cost an estimated Rs.86 crores, or approximately Rs.46 lakhs a km. Each
of the nearly 450 km length of the fence in Punjab cost upwards of Rs.22 lakhs; and the
stretch in Rajasthan, which was built across shifting sand dunes, will cost considerably more.
"The point," says Jammu and Kashmir Police Superintendent of Police Manisha Kumar,
responsible for security on the border, "is that we can't afford not to act." The point was
driven home on August 23, when three soldiers were killed by terrorists at Sapuwal, just 6 km
from the border. The terrorists, equipped with assault rifles and explosives, were holed up in
a nursery just off the national highway - only a few metres from the area where the Sealdah
Express was bombed early last year. "Any major build-up in Jammu," says Vijay Raman, the
BSF Inspector-General in charge of the Jammu frontier, "will have terrible consequences. We
just can't afford to have our main lines of communication come under continued assault. We
have to stop Pakistan's diplomats coming through this channel."

25
A few hundred kilometres to the south, officials agree with this view. "While the Punjab
Police did a fine job fighting terrorism," says A.S. Aulakh, BSF Inspector-General, "the fact
is that the fence played a key role in ensuring that more terrorists could not come in to replace
those eliminated in combat." Of the 554 km of the Punjab frontier, 469 km are covered by
three layers of barbed wire, supplemented by rolls of razor-sharp concertina wire and high-
voltage cobra wire that can be fatal on contact. On either side of the fence run pillar after
pillar of floodlights. The electricity bill for the Punjab frontier alone runs to Rs.5 crores a
year. But that amount, officials point out, is nothing compared to what India has had to pay
for fighting terrorism in the state for a decade.

The fence has not made cross-border infiltration impossible. The dense growth of elephant
grass around the river Ravi, for example, makes construction impossible and movement easy.
BSF officials are now encouraging farmers to reclaim marshes in areas like the Kassowal
Bulge in the Dera Baba Nanak area. But crossing into India through conventional means has
certainly become a hugely hazardous enterprise. Last summer, BSF troops at the Chandigarh
forward post discovered a tunnel running from the Pakistan side of the border to almost under
the fence. Believed to have been dug by a well-known smuggler, Isaac Masih, the sheer scale
of the tunnel work indicated just how desperate Pakistan was to re-activate its routes into
Punjab. As things stand, Indian intelligence is able to push its agents into Pakistan, while that
country's sources of information on military movements inside strategically-important Punjab
have all but dried up. "Every time we hold meetings with the Rangers," says BSF
commandant Surinder Kumar, "they complain that the lighting intrudes on their privacy. I
don't know what they want privacy for on the border, but the complaint indicates
desperation."

As in the Samba sector in Kashmir, much cross-border movement in Punjab depended on

traditional smugglers. Two decades ago, such smuggling activity was treated with indulgence
by border guards in both India and Pakistan. After prohibition was imposed in Pakistan by the
Zia-ul-Haq regime, liquor revenue receipts in (Indian) Punjab doubled. Since it was unlikely
that the State's residents had started drinking twice as much overnight, it was evident that tens
of thousands of cases of liquor were making their way across the border. In return, smugglers
brought gold, electronic equipment and dry fruits. "There was even a certain moral discipline
to the whole thing," recalls one old-time BSF officer. "There would be no smuggling on
Tuesdays, holy to local Hindus, or on Thursdays, the day of Muslim Pirs." Today, the trade
continues through the customs post at Wagah, using passengers travelling on the Samjhauta
Express; but the movement of arms and explosives has dried up.

But this is not the situation in Jammu. When the monsoon slush dries up through September,
work on the fence will begin again. Workers are already fixing cables for floodlights around
Nursery Post, and generators are being purchased to power the fence. Over 300 trucks were
needed to bring in material for the fence work already completed - an indicator of the scale of
work that lies ahead. By the end of this year, BSF officials hope to add at least another 10 km
of fencing to the 15-km stretch already erected. "Whatever the odds, we will get the job
done," says 39 Battalion Commander D.S. Randhawa. His counterpart across the border must
share the sentiment - the other way around. In mid-August, Mohammad Ilyas Jhanjua,
Commander of the 2nd Wing of the Chenab Rangers, was relieved of his command for his
failure to stop the Indian fencing work. Local residents too are bracing for battle. "We have

26
seen tank battles in 1965 and 1971," says Waryam Singh, an elder from Jasso Chak. "This is
nothing," he adds.

A few kilometres from Jasso Chak lies the shrine of Chamliyal. Each summer, thousands of
Muslim pilgrims from Pakistan wait across the border to make offerings of earth, reputed to
cure skin ailments, and holy water, to be shipped across the border by the BSF. Hindu
pilgrims from Jammu, in turn, wait for the Rangers to send across the traditional offering of a
holy shroud. When the Rangers sought to put an end to the practice in 1998, arguing that such
Sufi traditions had no place in an Islamic state, village residents complained that their cows
had run dry. Local pressure forced the annual border crossing to resume. When, or if, India
and Pakistan ever make peace, the fence will be an abiding monument to the most bitter
conflict of the second part of the 20th century: one that the region's people - the experience of
Chamliyal seems to suggest - seem certain, serves no purpose at all.

In June 2002 however the problem of AP sparked off a violent confrontation between India
and Bangladesh indicating the delicate nature of the Problem. In the Pyrdwah village of
Bangladesh, inhabited by Khasi tribe on the border of Meghalaya state, which is under the
adverse possession of India, was attacked by Bangladeshi peasants aided by the Bangladesh
Rifles. These intruders tried to illegally construct roads and erect structures in the village
which was sought to be stopped by the Indian Border Security Force. But while the intruders
withdrew from this area they attacked the Indian forces in another AP in the Assam-
Bangladesh border – Mankachar killing a number of Indian soldiers. This sparked off a
violent encounter between the two armies threatening a full scale war. The timely diplomatic
initiative restored peace the tension in this area continued for a long time compelling the two
governments to strengthen their deployment in the region.

The course of events went as follows. Pyrdwah was a disputed territory and was under the
possession of East Pakistan from 1960s. The Indian forces took possession of it during the
1965 war with Pakistan. This was the place from where during the war of liberation in 1971
the Bengali freedom fighters with the active support of the Indian military carried out several
operations against Pakistani forces. After the emergence of Bangladesh, it claimed that
Pyrdwah be returned to Bangladesh as per the Indira-Mujib Pact of 1974. Both India and
Bangladesh had agreed to settle the dispute through the institutional mechanism of Joint
Working Committee on boundary disputes. In July 1999 the BSF had allegedly detained a
large Bangladesh Rifles patrol when the latter entered the area to check the pillars. There was
also a brief exchange of fire between the two border forces in 2000 which was normalized
after a Deputy Director General level meeting. The Pyrdiwah issue came up once again at the
Director General level meeting of the two border forces hold in New Delhi on April 2, 2001
which was inconclusive. On the night of April 15-16 2002 troops of Bangladesh Army and
Bangladesh Rifles after violating the international border laid a seize to Pyrdiwah situated
around 5 km from Dawki. The Bangladesh troops took the entire BSF outpost with 32 BSF
men and one Assistant Commandant S S Rawat. There was heavy exchange of fire between
both the security forces. Backed by the Bangladeshi forces, more than one thousand
Bangladeshi residents entered Pyrdiwah village and ransacked it. The night-long plunder and
attack by the Bangladeshis compelled the Pyrdiwah villagers – mostly Khasi and Santhal

27
tribals, to vacate the village and take shelter in the jungle. The BDR’s contention was that
Pyrdiwah was India’s adverse possession so it needed to be taken back. As the BSF men
remained trapped at Pyrdiwah, reports that Bangladesh was amassing BDR reinforcements
along the border and that the Bangladesh Army was also being alerted for the next course of
action. The Indian response was slow because neither the intelligence nor any tension was
there to anticipate the trouble. As they realized the situation a decision was taken to attack
Boraibari in Mankachar, 300 Km west of Pyrdiwah which was a Bangladeshi adverse
possession “to ease the pressure on Pyrdiwah and divert Bangladeshi army’s attention to a
new site.”68 Once it was decided to attack Boraibari, the BSF’s deputy commandant B R
Mondal was asked to lead the charge. Mondal was in the area for a long time and had
developed a good rapport with the villagers on both side of the border. But he was perhaps
too complacent about his familiarity with the people and the terrain of the region. But he had
not reckoned with the changed sentiments on the other side. As he moved into the territory he
and his fifteen member team was taken hostage by a combined group of Bangladeshi
villagers and BDR troops then killed in cold blood. It seemed a full-fledged war with
Bangladesh was on the verge of breaking out. In addition to the killing of 16 BSF troops in
Mankachar, the Bangladeshi troops also took over two hundred acres of Kakripara in the
Assam-Meghalaya border. Five civilians were seriously injured and one civilian died on the
spot due to mortar shelling. Fear psychosis among the villagers along the Assam Meghalaya
border mounted. Panic stricken villagers numbering 50,000 moved towards the safety of Garo
hills sector. There was a wave of displaced persons from these villages to the nearby Indian
outposts. Flag meetings were immediately held and trade and commerce suspended. A
hurried and hectic diplomatic parley was able to ease the situation and maintain status quo.

Human Trafficking

Trafficking of women and children is not only a major concern in Bangladesh; the issue is already
considered as a regional problem in South Asia. According to the Centre for Population and Health's
(ICDDRB) study (2001), the number of trafficked women and children in Asia, particularly in South
Asia, has increased alarmingly over the last two decades. In view of that, trafficking was listed at the
top of the agenda for the ninth South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) Summit
of the heads of governments of participating countries, held in the Maldives in 1997. However, most
of the reports of United States agency for international Development (USAID), Action Against
Trafficking and Sexual Exploitation of Children (ATSEC), Bangladesh National Women Lawyers
Association (BNWLA), and Integrated Community and Industrial Development Initiatives (INCIDIN)
inform of a significant increase in the number of Bangladeshi children and women in recent years
who are being trafficked into India and other countries. Estimates cannot easily be tested though,
because of the clandestine nature of trafficking, but USAID estimates that 10,000 to
20,000Bangladeshi women and children are trafficked per year. Trafficking occurs both within
Bangladesh and across its borders into India, Pakistan, andMiddle Eastern countries - primarily Dubai
and Kuwait. Additionally, research carried out by the BNWLA has shown that the enclaves on both
sides have been used as recruitment and collection sites by traffickers (ICDDRB report, 2001).
Geographically, India has boundaries with all the South Asian countries and it is the destination and
transit for all trafficked women and children of this region. Therefore, all Bangladeshi and Nepali

28
women and children are trafficked through the Bangladesh-India and India-Nepal border (Table-3.1).
Again, Bangladeshi children are also trafficked to Dubai via India. The activities of trafficking from
Bangladesh to anywhere else using India as a transit point. Again, a large number of Bangladeshi
women are involved in the sex trade in India, mostly in the brothels of Kolkata, Mumbai, and Delhi
(ICDDRB,2001). There are large networks of traffickers working at the national level and across
borders. Normally, a group of traffickers collects victims from Bangladesh and hands them over to
their counterparts in India or Myanmar. There are as many as 18 routes in the India-Bangladesh
border for the traffickers to continue their activities. Therefore, for entering India through Kolkata, the
two most common routes are the Benapol border at Jessore, from whence almost 50percent of the
trafficking takes place (Policy Research for Development Alternatives, 1999).The findings of the
study by Shamim and Kabir (1998) indicate that the Northern region is the most vulnerable area for
trafficking, with a large number of upazilas (sub-districts) and districts having common borders with
India. Rajshahi and Dinajpur are the most vulnerable among the whole border districts. Since there is
no agreement between the countries to tighten the borders, it unfortunately permits traffickers to
traffic women effectively and freely (OXFAM, 2000). On the other hand, police also have little power
and do not have the authorisation to work with border related issues. In reality, as Wong Robert, US
Department of State Chief Political Officer, argues in an interview with Jeniffer Cecilia Emling
(2005), it would be more beneficial for the country, and the problem as a whole, i f the local police
would work with the Bangladeshi people to deal with female-trafficking related issues. During the
ninth SAARC Summit, the Heads of State or Government pledged to coordinate their efforts and take
effective measures to address this problem, although the BDR and the BSF do not have any joint
action programme to prevent trafficking.

Illicit arms
We can divide the Bangladesh-India border into two segments to examine arms trading, i.e. the
Bangladesh-West Bengal and Bangladesh-North East India borders respectively. 69 I fwe consider the
West Bengal-Bangladesh border, there it is a case of one-way movement of weapons, i.e. West
Bengal to Bangladesh. The most frequently used land borders bthe underworld network of smugglers
are the Bangladesh south-west borders of Shatkhira, Bhadiali, Madra, Keragachi, Hijoldi, Borali,
lessor's Shikarpur, Mashila, Jenidah, Mahehpur, Chuadanga (Jibonnagar), Meherpur (Ganguni),
Kushtia (Daulutpur) (Janakantha, 09 August, 1996; The Daily Star, 14 July, 2001). On the other
hand, the recovery of 5 tons of Sulphur at the Benapole border indicates the worrying size of such
trade which can be used to make explosives (The Daily Star, 06 November, 1999).Among the
bordering districts, Rajshahi and Chapai Nawabgonj are the major corridors for arms deals (The Daily
Bhorar Kagoj, 29 January, 2001).On the other hand, the North East India-Bangladesh border faces
mainly two directional movements of arms, intensive networks among the arms traders and users, and
th weapons are sophisticated. AK-47 rifles, mortars and grenade launchers are the mainstay of ethnic
conflict in North East India (Neporam, 2004). Moreover, insurgent groups in North East India are not
only user of arms; they sell weapons to generate their funds as well. Thus, sixteen north-eastern
districts of Bangladesh, especially the frontier districts are flooded with illicit arms (The Daily Star,
19 October, 2000). Conversely, Mizoram province of North East India and Bangladesh's CHT are two
important transit points and routes for arms, where Myanmar rebels are also intrinsically involved. In
Bangladesh, small arms were used intensively during the war of independence in 1971and then by
CHT insurgents (until 1997). On the other hand, small arms are used in Bangladesh for political
violence. In comparison to most South Asian countries, the small arms problem in Bangladesh
remains modest (Small Arms Survey, 2001). In the case of Bangladesh, the use of arms has spread
more widely in any disagreement between political parties in power and in the opposition.

29
Insurgencies over the past decades in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, and across borders in the Indian
north-east and Myanmar – have also increased the availability of guns. It is difficult to ascertain the
number of weapons that come across the border into Bangladesh. However, the Small Arms Survey –
2001 estimates that 600-700 weapons enter into Bangladesh from India and Myanmar each month.
In this region, such trading has reached a two or three-directional arrangement, i.e. Bangladesh-India-
Myanmar. Cox's Bazar, the coastal town in Bangladesh profit especially from the small arms trade
which in by sea; it is linked with a network of local arms bazaars in the borderland, for example the
'trijunction point' (Map 3.3) where India, Myanmar, and Bangladesh intersect (Schendel, 2006). It is
widely acknowledged that there is a significant arms pipeline of sophisticated weapons from islands
off Thailand to the north-east of India that travels through Bangladesh's Cox's Bazaar and the CHT
(Bhaumik, 2002; Nepram, 2004).However, the intensity of availability of arms in South Asia is due to
the cross-roads therforr famous drug trafficking routes. Afghanistan and Myanmar are notable
examples of arms and drugs nexuses. Moreover, from the middle of the 1990s, ethnic separatists in
India's northeast are taking the shelter of drug mafias as a quick tactic to raise funds. Thus, the geo-
strategic location of Bangladesh between two drug zones and ethni struggles and huge permeable land
borders with North East India and Myanmar also makethe country a transit route for drug trading.

Cattle smuggling
When the Committee sought to know the primary reasons for proliferation of cattle smuggling
along IBB, the Ministry replied that following factors are attributed to cattle smuggling:
(i) Densely populated areas and presence of nearly 300 villages within 150 yards of the
International Boundary.70
(ii) The cattle seized by the BSF are handed over to the Custom authorities who dispose them off
by auction and very often the cattle so auctioned find their way back to the smugglers.
(iii) A section of local population in the bordering districts is deeply entrenched in smuggling
activities.
The Ministry articulated that no authentic figures were available about the number of cattle being
smuggled out of India. It, however, provided the following details of cattle seized by the BSF
during the period 2012 to 2015:-

Year Cattle seized by BSF

2012 1,20,724

2013 1,22,000

2014 1,09,999

1,53,602
2015
2016 1,46,967
(Upto Oct, 2016)

The Ministry also informed that cattle-smugglers and their agents from Haryana, Rajasthan, MP,
Andhra Pradesh, Jharkhand, Bihar & WB and local carriers are the main perpetrators and some
section of the border population also finds smuggling a source of livelihood. The most affected
areas of cattle smuggling are Nadia, Murshidabad, Malda, Dakshin Dinajpur, Uttar Dinajpur,
Raiganj, Silliguri in the State of West Bengal and Dhubri in Assam. Smugglers invent newer

30
methods of smuggling cattle into the other side of the border. Cattles are tied with a tall
bamboo which is then bounced to the other side of the border. While the bamboo remains in
Indian side the hanging cow is flown to the other side. Sometimes cattle are being floated in
the river on banana logs. Sometimes they now attach bombs with the cattle which explode
when BSF attempts to capture the cattle. Sometimes they are even inserting calves insider the
body of a dead cattle and float them in the river in such a way that the calf could breathe and
found alive when it is received by the recipient.

The Committee also discussed the issue of cattle smuggling in its meeting held in Kolkata during
its study visit to IBB. BSF representative asserted that no restriction of cattle movement up to
haats in border areas, inadequate legal deterrence, adoption of non-lethal strategy along IBB and
no provision to send the seized cattle back to hinterland are other major reasons for proliferation
of this illegal activity. He informed that BSF had taken several measures like use of fast
patrolling boats in riperine areas, augmentation of strength at vulnerable areas, construction of
ditch in fenced or unfenced patches along border, strengthening of existing fences with GI pipes,
intensified day and night patrolling, joint and special operations with sister agencies, and use of
advanced surveillance equipment and intruder alarms systems. The Chief Secretary, West Bengal
Government informed the Committee that there were 15 cattle haats situated within 8 km from
IBB that were very old and were sanctioned long time ago. A haat in Murshidabad had been
shifted while steps were being taken to shift the others.2.6.6 The Committee is distressed to note
that despite several measures taken by the BSF the problem of cattle smuggling persists along
IBB. The Committee is particularly anguished to note that the West Bengal State Government has
failed to implement its own order dated 01.09.2003that outlaws existence of any cattle haats
within 8 km of border area. The Committee recommends that the State Government of West
Bengal should take steps to cancel the licenses of all cattle haats that are illegally functioning
within 8 km of border area and hold the officials responsible for illegally issuing/renewing
licenses to these haats. The Committee also recommends that mass movement and trading of
cattle should be prohibited within 15 km of the border and steps may be initiated to move all
cattle haats located within 15 km of the border to the hinterland.2.6.7 The Committee notes that
the auction of seized cattle by Customs officials is misused by the cattle smugglers who keep
buying the auctioned cattle again and again. The Committee, in this regard, recommends that
auctioning of seized cattle must be banned in the states bordering IBB and Customs Department
may be requested to arrange for transportation of the seized cattle to states other than the border
states and hold auctions there. The Committee also recommends that the Ministry must pursue the
Customs Department to raise the minimum bench mark price of the seized cattle to prevent their
re-selling to the persons involved in smuggling of cattle and also make it mandatory for cattle
auctioneers to submit their Pan Card and Aadhaar Card details while bidding.2.6.8 The
Committee also learnt about the involvement of the local people living near the border in cattle
smuggling and feels that lack of any legal deterrence and ineffective law enforcement seem to
have emboldened such persons. The Committee, therefore, recommends that the West Bengal
State Government should be requested to take strict action against persons who are known or
suspected to be involved in cattle smuggling.2.6.9 The Committee agrees that mass movement of
cattle occurs from all the states towards West Bengal and Assam and once they reach the border
areas it becomes extremely difficult to stop their movement across the border. The Committee
feels that Police forces of various States have failed to stop this mass movement of cattle to

31
border states and West Bengal Police has failedto intercept or stop the movement of the cattle.
The Committee feels that there is a wide and deeply entrenched nexus due to which this menace
has proliferated and the Government needs to strike at the roots of this nexus if it has to
completely curb this problem.

Ceasefire Violations

There was a significant spurt in ceasefire violations during 2016. The Ministry, in its reply to
Parliamentary Question in Lok Sabha submitted that after surgical strikes, 27449 people in J&K
were temporarily shifted to safer places/locations out of which approximately 6 thousand persons
stayed in relief camps and the remaining stayed with their relatives. The majority of the people
have since returned to their homes. At present, about 220 families comprising of around 700
persons are in 3 relief camps. The details regarding the number of ceasefire violations during the
last 5 years are as under:

Number of Ceasefire violations

Year Along the Line of Control in the Along the International Border
State of J&K under operational in the State of J&K under
control o Army operational control of BSF

2012 93 21

2013 199 148

2014 153 430

2015 152 253

2016 216 (till 26th November) 221 (till 30th November)

The Committee is constrained to note that, after the 1971 war, the present is the most vulnerable
period for the borders of the country. There have been a large number of cease fire violations and
several jawans and civilians have been killed. According to some reports, more than a hundred
cease fire violations took place within a span of two months in 2016 and the year 2016can be
considered as one of the most vulnerable periods. The Government should find a way to prevent
the frequent and persistent violations of ceasefire including using diplomatic channels.
Ultimately, the answer lies in diplomacy. During cease fire, the worst sufferers are the people
living in the border villages. The questions are where will they go and where will they earn their
living. The country today appears to have internal refugees and internal migrants. The only way
the country can restore the ceasefire is to go back to a situation where both India and Pakistan
agreed to observe the ceasefire. For more than a decade, the ceasefire held good. But now, from

32
both sides, the ceasefire appears to be virtually dead on the LoC. The Committee strongly
recommends that the government should make every effort, including activating diplomatic
channels, towards preventing ceasefire violations and restoring the situation of a genuine
ceasefire.

Border as marker of citizenship Violation of Citizenship Right

Borders are also the place where citizenship is always in on test. The state is suspicious of
foreign national infiltrating and is constantly frisking examining peoples’ citizenships. But
the compulsions of a marginal region compel people of bordering countries to gather and
often trespass due to commercial and survival needs. The state thus erects ‘panopticons’ like
watch towers to monitor infiltration of foreign nationals but also its own people so that they
don’t cross over to the other area. Borders are also mysterious places. There is immense
curiosity to see what is happening in the other side. This is because there is a belief that
‘strange’ people live on the other side. This is the reason often people from once side wander
into the other side ignoring the prohibitory orders. It is also interesting that in the borders
where symbols of state and nationhood are the strongest are also the place where state and
nationhood are the weakest. For example there was newspaper report that in the East Jaintia
hills-Bangladesh border villages, people were using Bangladeshi currency for buying and
selling as Indian currency was not available. 71 This had forced the National Human Right
Commission to intervene and direct the state government of Meghalaya to redress the
grievances of the concerned villagers of Huroi, Hingari, Lailong, Lejri and Baskuna. On
enquiry it was found that is quite a common thing in the border areas all the time. The uses of
Indian currency by Bangladeshi border villagers are quite common.

Due to partition the crops that have grown by the Indians were rotten into Pakistan territory
as there was none to buy them and consequently the people of border ‘elakas’ were crying
out of discontent. Not only the Pakistanis refused to buy the product of the Indians but also
when the Indian people happened to passed through their territories, the Pakistanis used to
arrest them, looted and harassed them in many ways. 72 People were making constant request
to the Government to open up an alternative motorable road connecting Dawki with Cachar
district. But due to the Government’s inability to open that road the people who were mainly
cultivators in Cachar district were forced to pass through the Pakistan territory. On account of
the lack of communication and also due to the fact that no other people except the Pakistan
were buying the produces, it created huge trouble as they were left to the mercy of the
Pakistanis to treat them in awful manner.73

A report was also submitted by the Sirdars of Mawlong on 16 th January 1950 that the Military
personals were also prohibited Indian people to do business with the Pakistanis in the bazar
that were in even Indian dominion also were also beaten Pakistan national from purchasing
and selling things without people in aforesaid bazar. Rice was available in aforesaid bazars
from Pakistan people coming to sell there at a cheaper rate and better than Shillong rationing
rice.74

33
The villages in the border areas were also not free from severe natural calamities like flood
erosion earthquake and so on. A letter of Dr. B.N. Bezbarua, who was a civil surgeon, on his
tour to the border areas from united Khasi-Jaintia hills to Garo hills covering 250 miles
during the year 1951 reported that the whole border had been infected with Cholera even
including the most interior places.75 Many people were reported to be died with Cholera. It
was stated that the outbreak of the disease had been started from Sunamganj subdivision and
the places like Renzu, Barsera and BangalBhetta were slightly affected. In-fact the police
A.S.I who was attacked with Cholera in Barsera village was expired of double Pneumonia. 76
Excessive rain-falls has rendered the highlands barren near Cherrapunji, Mawsynram
etcetera. During the monsoon after heavy rains the small rivulets and streams came in spate
dislocating communication from village to village which causes much inconvenience to the
people in carrying on trade marketing and other day today activities. Apart from that the
incidence of diseases also been recorded in various government files. Report says about the
existence of cases like fever, joint pains, stomach disease, body swelling etc. 77The following
table is showing the number various diseases that were reported by the villagers of the Khasi-
Jaintia hills during the year 1952.78

In addition, there were instances of death of many people in the border areas due to
starvation. A public meeting was held at Nongstoin, District of. Khasi & Jaintia Hills under
the All-Peoples Welfare organisation on 10 th December 1956. The meeting was presided by
U. Wilson, the leader of the Eastern India Tribal Union while addressing the meeting
criticised the Congress and Assam Govt. alleged exploitation of the Tribals, The number of
Pak forces at the Mymensingh border of Garo Hills increased by about 4 platoons at Dec
1953, In Oct 1953 total strength stood at 7 platoons spread on 23 border camps. 79 In Nov
1953 increased by 2 platoons and about 105 Ansars were helping the regular force. Thus, the
systematic increase of Pak force on the South East region of Garo Hills between Baghmara
and Mahadeo made them most strong and powerful. 80 Conversion of non-Muslim to Muslims
became very common in the border areas during the subsequent years after the
partition.81After scrutiny of government records it has been found that more than 5 Garo
women of Gobrakura, dist. Mymensingh was forcibly converted to Islam by E.P.P.P. The
ambiguous field study finds that the Pakistan forces of the border camp used to marry the
Garo girls by force or by any means and then forces their guardians to become Muslim. 82 On
18-3-1952, the E.P.P.P abducted the wife of Taruni Kapali of Deaola, PS. Mymensingh. She
was in advance stage of pregnancy. On the next day, she was found unconscious and later
died in Mymensingh Civil Hospital while giving birth to a dead child.83

What the tribals have come to call “the first riot” began in December 1964, when hundreds of
landless people were dumped in the Garo areas of North Mymensingh. Just where these
people came from and how they got there was not entirely clear. 84 They resorted to thievery
and then they began to terrorise the people among whom they had been dumped. The Garos
tell frightening stories of seeing the fires of refugee camps and of hearing cries coming
through the night as “Pakistan Zindabad”. Animals and grain were stolen; some houses were
burned; women were raped; some people were beaten; a few were killed. Terror spread
through the settled villages in north Mymensingh.85

34
The people living in the border lands exist below poverty level and the principal economic
activities include agriculture, wage labour and trade. In many places, the border separated the
peasants' homesteads from the plots which they cultivated; therefore, cross border holdings
created a problem both for land holders and state officials. Although both the governments
permitted movement across the border for such land holders, yet they also suffered from
robbery and sometimes were assaulted by security guards. But the introduction of passports
since 1952 has restricted movement and cultivators have lost their hold over lands across the
border. The peculiarities of the border in certain places also made things difficult for the
agricultural wage labourers. On April 25, 1948, the West Bengal police fired upon some
wage labourers of Rajshahi, from East Pakistan, when they crossed the border for harvesting
a piece of char land which was under the criminal jurisdiction of Murshidabad, but its
khasmahal (revenue management) was being carried on by the Collector of Rajshahi.
Government Press reports outlined the ongoing dispute over territorial jurisdiction, and
accused each other of illegal actions. (Roy, 2006) The border also cut many villagers off from
the markets that served them. Thus villagers had to cross the border to purchase goods they
needed. Also, a prominent feature all over the densely populated borderland was a system of
interlocking village markets (hat). Inhabitants from many surrounding villages visited these
markets at least two or three times a weeks to sell their products and buy whatever they might
need. But, there was uncertainty, robbery and harassment, thus, such cross border markets
could not be sustained. As a result, cross border demand for products and food grains
introduced smuggling as a lucrative business in the transitional zone. However, the above
mentioned sufferings in the border areas have not alleviated even after the independence of
Bangladesh. These people remain living under same uncertainty, feel assaulted and are
threaten in the continuation of their daily life

Problem from Fencing

As per agreement, extensive fencing of the border by barbed wire by was undertaken by the
two governments. As per international covenants the fencing were to be constructed 150
yards from the zero line on both sides. The problem in the Indo-Bangladesh border in north
east India emerged from the fact that unlike other zones, the border line passed through the
thickly populated habitation. The line had divided not just villages and lands but even houses
where one part of the house fell in India and other in Bangladesh. The case of Hilli is just one
example. This made the construction of ten feet high barbed wire fencing 150 yards away
from the actual border very difficult. The fencing would cut families from their villages and
families from their lands. In most severe case certain families were placed between the
barbed wires. A huge number of families remained in this part of the fence while some
households were left in the other side of the fence. Since it was a heavily guarded
international border with very high barbed wire fencing, there were no ways these families
could maintain their kinship ties and since they do not have any other means of livelihood
they could not leave their ancestral land and shift to some other land. The company which
was responsible for the construction of the fencing were very ruthless in pursuing their work.
They refused to entertain any complain or represent these ground realities to the higher

35
authorities. A significant number of families were fenced out from their farm lands. They
remained in part of the fence while their lands were left out in the other side of the fence. Cut
off from their subsistence they led a huge resistance movement in Assam border. The state
responded by asking the construction company to open a small gate in the fence through
which the farmers could have access to their farm lands. Accordingly small gate was opened
every few kilometers in the fencing which is manned by the Border Security Forces. The gate
opens at morning five and closes at five in the evening. The farmers are issued identity cards
which are to be shown to the BSF guard on duty for passing through the gate. The villagers
use this identity card and gate to go for cultivation in the morning and return in the evening to
their homes. Loss of identity cards could lead to harassment or denial access to their own
lands. According an survey about 448 families are living as living between the barbed wire
fences in the Assam-Bangladesh border. Since they live in no-man’s land they are considered
state-less. Among them 179 families are in Cachar, 144 in Karmganj and 125 families in
Dhubri. A total of 3093 person’s citizenship is thus determined by the barbed wire.
Interestingly in a written reply to in the State Assembly the Assam Accord Implementation
Minister Himanta Sharma stated that these families were ‘comfortable’ with these
arrangements. At night when they return to their homes outside the fence they are stateless
persons but when the gates are opened from 6to 7 am, 9 to 10 am, 2 to 4 pm and 5 to 7 pm
these families have access to the mainland and then they become Indian citizens. While
farmers gain access to their lands through these lands, students go to their schools and
colleges and patients to the clinics and hospitals during these times. Arrangements have also
been made for buying and selling of essential goods for these fenced out citizens according to
the minister. The minister informed the house that for the rehabilitation of these fenced out
people in Karimganj and Dhubri new land have been acquired in Jalalpur and Natunpur
mouza. Moreover under the Indira Abas Yojana an amount of Rs. 32,255 lakhs was
sanctioned in 2011 for the construction of houses for these displaced persons. 86 However
pressurized by these affected peasant and tribal families the Indian government requested to
its Bagladeshi counterpart to relax the 150 yard norms in certain areas and allow erection of
fence on the zero-line. Once it is permitted the five Km fencing in Sabroom of Tripura could
be completed. Fencing on the Zero line at Mohanpur in West Tripura and Kailashahar in
Unokuti districts have already been completed.87 The dispute in fixing the fencing in
Amlighat, Srinagar, Chhotokhil, Vaishnavpur and Kathaltali in Sabroom (Tripura) and
Khagracheri (Bangladesh) were also amicably settled. 88 The border fencing between Burma
and India has started recently in which India is likely to turn 3,500 fertile acres into “No-
Man’s Land” on its eastern border with Myanmar as construction of a fence has started
between the existing border pillars demarcating the two neighbouring nations. It is dividing
the Naga areas of India and Myanmar. The fencing is going ahead despite an agitation by
Naga villagers who said the move will affect their livelihood as the area has been used by
them for years. The district administration, located in the border town of Noklak, has begun
preparations to seal off farmers’ passage to the 3,500 acres of land. The Naga Village
Councils of the area insist that the fencing between existing border pillars 139 and 146 will
leave 10,000 villagers belonging to the Khiamniungans Naga tribe, living on both sides of the
border, without a livelihood.89

36
The border fencing created in the borderland of Karimganj district of Assam has been
limiting the citizenship rights of the people living outside the border fencing since its creation
in this borderland.90 Under the strict border rules, such as restriction in movements, restriction
in availing the welfare services etc., the social, political, economic and civic life of the Indian
fenced out communities have been getting ruptured. In one hand when the situation created
due to the border fencing displaced many families from their place at the same time there are
many families who are still living a restricted life outside the border fencing under the strict
surveillance of Indian Border Security Force. These families who are still living outside the
border fencing in Karimganj District of Assam are one of the most disadvantageous sections.
Economically, they do not have that capability to move inside the border fencing and to settle
down in the mainland with their family, so they do not have any other option but to live
outside the border fencing and now they are being excluded from different citizenship rights
in different ways. In political and legal theory, citizenship refers to the rights and duties of the
members of a nation state (Scott & Marshall, 2009, p. 80). Citizenship has traditionally
referred to a particular set of political practices involving specific public rights and duties
with respect to a given political community (Bellamy, 2008, p. 3). Now if we look at the
political involvement of the people living outside the border fencing, it is merely negligible.
They are never considered as active member and always keep isolated from any political
activities. Presently they are fenced out so they are hardly informed about the meetings of
local level Government.
One of the interviewee2 from Jarapata village mentioned,
The Panchayat members and the Panchayat President will conduct the village meeting with
their own people; they even don’t bother to inform us about any such village meetings. As we
are living in this side of fencing so they will never come and announce about such meetings
as if we are not the part of their society Generally, these meetings are organised on monthly
basis in the presence of all the voters and the adult members of the villages. But since the
creation of the border fencing, nobody is bothered to inform the people who are living outside
the border fencing, not even the officials of the local Governments. Similarly the people who
are living outside the border fencing are not even bothered about the contesting candidates
and the final result of the election. as the responsible citizen of India.
As village wise the numbers of families living outside the border fencing is comparatively
very less in numbers after the displacement happened since last few years, the election
contesting candidates are also do not bother about the numbers of votes from the fenced out
villages. It is not a matter for the contesting candidates even if the fenced out villagers do not
cast their votes, so the villagers never get the attention from any political groups. As a result
of that the people are also deprived of Government welfare services. Another
interviewee3fromLatukandi village stated, I have been refused Indira Awas Yojana (A
housing scheme of the Government of India)as I am living outside the border fencing. The
panchayat member asked me to show my own land inside the border fencing, but how is it
possible for me to purchase another piece of land to get the government facility when I am
dying of poverty Similarly, another respondent4 from Govindapur told, We don’t have
electricity, proper drinking water, where as just in the other side of the fencing people have
electricity and all other facilities…we have been told that as we are living outside the border
fencing so we cannot get electricity The local level Government that is the ‘Village
Panchayat’ is responsible to ensure different services under the Government welfare
programme and schemes. During the implementation of programmes and schemes, the
negligence and biasness of the local level Government is depriving the fenced out Indian
families from the basic citizenship rights. It is important to mention here that fenced out
Indian villagers in Karimganj district of Assam are living in the borderland without the
availability of electricity, without proper sources of drinking water, road connectivity and

37
without any educational and health institutions. All such basic needs are denied by the local
government by saying that as their houses are outside the border fencing now, so it is not
possible to sanction those services to them. The local Governments have decided their own
rules and that results in endless sufferings for the fenced out border villagers. It is not like
that the border villagers never challenged the local and the district authority or ask for
rehabilitation and compensation but everything went in vain as no proper steps have been
taken in this context.
Citizenship is not just the meaning of residing in a particular territory and to obtain some
identity cards. It postulates the relationship of belonging to a State birth or by choice and at
the same time to continue that relationship of belongingness. It is not just the sense of
belongingness, there is something emotional and spiritual meaning attached to it (Singhvi,
1988, p. 3). Due to the border fencing, the idea of insider and outsider again developed
among the community people of the same country who are living in two different sides of the
border fencing. One respondent5 from Jarapata said, Our friends and relatives hardly visit us
because of the restrictions and required formalitie sat the border gates. With time everything
is changing for us, now our relationship is not that trustworthy as it was before with our
neighbours from the other side of the fencing.
Again from Deotoli another interviewee6 stated,It feels very painful when knowing the actual
facts also many of our own people living at the other side intentionally call us Bangladeshis
as just because we are located outside the border fencing now
Gradually, the strong bonding which existed before is now becoming an illusion for the
villagers of two sides of the fencing. The sense of belongingness among the community
people is no more prevailing as stronger as before it was. Unfortunately, the fenced out
community people are getting deprived of the social status and recognitions. Even many
people started recognising them as the Bangladeshis just because they are living outside the
border fencing. The huge structure of the border fencing is not only weakening the age old
sense of belongingness but also diminishing the emotional attachments among the people.
Because of people’s habitation in the geographical location since long time, still there are
many border villages where people are living till the arbitrary line of partition drawn by Cyril
Radcliffe in 1947. This actual line of partition is also known as the zero line which is
demarcated by border pillars. After the creation of the border fencing, those people who were
living till the partition line in the border villages in the Indian side are now trapped within the
line of partition and the border fencing. It is estimated that approximately 90,000 people in
149 villages got directly affected who were trapped in this geographical location along the
Indo-Bangladesh borderland (Prakash & Menon, 2011, p. 34). According to the information
from the office of the Deputy Commissioner of Karimganj district of Assam, a total of 362
families were fenced out when the border fencing was created during the initial phase.
According to the news media reports, even a few years ago there were 156 numbers of
families who were living outside the border fencing in Karimganj district of Assam (The
Times of India, May 9, 2012). But when the field study was conducted in the year 2014, it
was found that the remaining numbers of households living outside the fenced out land
dropped down to140. Similarly in other States also thousands of families got affected due to
the creation of the border fencing. The study conducted by ‘Indo-Bangladesh border fencing
affected Resettlement Demand committee of Mizoram’ revealed that the Indo-Bangladesh
border fencing will displace a total of 5790 Chakma tribal families that is a total of 35,438
people from 49 villages (Chakma, 2007, p. 411).
Similarly in Tripura, it was estimated that 7,123 families will be adversely affected by the
border fencing (Das Gupta, 2010, p. 276) and finally 35,000 people were evicted from their
home due to the fencing and 11,375 hectares of cultivated land fell outside the border fence
in Tripura (Subramanian, 2016, p. 141).To protect the territory, to prevent the illegal

38
migration or as a security measures whatever the purpose of the border fencing are, the
creation of such defensive structure severely affected the border villagers. It is not
exceptional even at the India–Pakistan border. It was observed that after the creation of the
border fencing in India–Pakistan border huge numbers of border villages were got affected.
The military border fencing separated 15,000 people from their land in Jammu and Kashmir
State in 2009 (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre,2010). The displacement of people
refers to the forced movement of people from their locality or environment and occupation
activities. It is a form of social change caused by a number of factors and the most common
being armed conflict. Natural disaster, famine, development and economic changes may also
be a cause of displacement (United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural
Organization [UNESCO], n.d.). After the creation of the border fencing in Indo-Bangladesh
borderland, the Indian families trapped between the actual line of the partition and the Indian
border fencing had started facing different problems. The emerging challenges and
restrictions due to the border fencing forced the families to be displaced leaving behind their
own land, property, home and their own community.

Women and Border

The present survey, then, finds that women are engaged in the cross-border illegal trade to a
much lower degree than men. However, rural, illiterate and poor young girls and women are
often trafficked with the help of local women. 91 There were public health risks of HIV/AIDs
because of the growth of the cross-border sex trade. Many (mostly) Bangladeshi women are
enticed annually out of the country by traffickers.92 Because of the vast and porous land
border between Bangladesh and India, Bangladeshi women and children are trafficked to
North East and were further seemed to be engaged in the sex trade in Shillong, Mizoram and
Silchar.93 While a lot of the women are in prostitution because of poverty, lack of education
or because their husbands have abandoned them or died and they have children to bring up,
several young girls, particularly from Bangladesh, have been duped by members of their own
community who promise them jobs in India or marry them and bring them to India and then
sell them. Bangladeshi women who have made good money and are now ‘madams’ return to
their villages looking prosperous and persuade families to send their children promising
wealthy grooms or jobs.So, round the year, young girls and boys from both countries sneak
across the border smuggling and looking for work. From smuggling to the sex trade seems to
be the natural order of transition for many young girls, and boys who become pimps. Those
trafficked from Bangladesh are sold in the red light areas of India in and around Murshidabad
in West Bengal, Kolkata, Delhi and Mumbai. However, there are figures on the number of
girls rescued. Sen says 500 girls are rescued every year, largely from Mumbai but also Delhi.
And their numbers are increasing. While there has been a decline in the number of girls
trafficked from Kathmandu, a substantial number of girls are from Bangladesh. Within India,
most girls are trafficked from West Bengal and Andhra Pradesh.94

There are three categories of illegal migrants from Bangladesh. Those coming in search of
work and then being exploited; those being trafficked for sex work, very often in connivance
with people from the village who even marry the girl, take her to India and then sell her;
women who have been abandoned by their husbands and enter prostitution to support their
children. There are also many children who stray across the border and are caught.

39
Traffickers have political clout, social reach and economic power and manage to get away
even when caught. There are at least two instances of village elders approaching the rescued
girls’ parents and offering them huge sums of money to drop the case against the
traffickers.Though it often takes years to rescue a trafficked girl, the challenge is in
rehabilitation. However dehumanising the work of the sex worker, after three to four years
under the arclights of the big city and the money earned, many girls find it difficult to settle
back into the humdrum of village life or even an arranged marriage. Making gamchchas
(towels) or rolling beedis is not monetarily rewarding. Jyoti, who was abandoned by her
husband and has three children, says: “I suffered violence in my marriage and I continue to
suffer violence in this work. But at least I have the satisfaction of earning enough money to
educate my children.” Sanjog has studied 250 women and children who were rescued and
sent home.In the case of rescued young boys who have been trafficked for labour too, sheer
poverty forces them to re-enter the workforce. An estimated 20% are re-trafficked or migrate
again in search of work. Many felt their rescue was a form of punishment. Rescued children
need to be put into school and provided skills that will enable them to stand on their own feet.
Prostitution has become a booming business on the 151-km India-Bangladesh border. Many
of the women, abandoned by husbands or trafficked across the porous border, have entered
the trade and continue in it because it provides a steady income. Clearly, the challenge is
rehabilitation, not rescue. prostitution and smuggling flourish on the India-Bangladesh
border, particularly in Murshidabad sector, and have become a booming business. Travelling
across the 151 km of border in this district you see small shacks dotting both sides of the road
leading to the Farrakka Barrage. Young women sit in front of their huts preening themselves
and soliciting clients. Trucks stop by for a quick meal and some fun. Despite some solid
looking fencing, the border is largely porous with several illegal points of entry for
traffickers, migrants and smugglers. At Shamsherganj too, also in Murshidabad district, there
is a thriving red light area on the riverfront.

Making of Disputes

When Pakistan was created there were a number of disputed areas in the Eastern sector which
was in East Pakistan present Bangladesh region. The region includes desert lands, plains,
numerous mountain ranges, rivers, wetlands, jungle terrain, large estuaries, Charlands,
enclaves and shared aquifers and has various climates, with a remarkable biological diversity.
The border goes through the middle of several villages, rivers, mountains, Charlands,
agricultural lands, and public institutions.95 The border dispute between the two countries was
in 25 points in West Bengal, Tripura, Meghalaya and Assam - of which India adversely
possesses 1,165.49 acres of Bangladesh land at 18 points. 96 On the other hand, Bangladesh
adversely possesses 1,880.81 acres of India's land at seven points. There is serious acrimony
over three patches with a total of six kilometers. The Land Boundary Agreement between the
two countries in 1974 laid down procedures for joint demarcation of boundaries. Although
the survey authorities of the two countries have completed demarcation of over 4000
kilometers of the India-Bangladesh boundary they have not been able to resolve differences
in demarcation of approximately 6.5 kilometers of land boundaries in the states of Tripura,
West Bengal and Assam.97 The two countries have set up two Joint Boundary Working

40
Groups to resolve all pending issues relating to the implementation of the land Boundary
Agreement of 1974 including exchange of enclaves.
Then there are Enclaves or Adverse Possessions areas. Enclaves are isolated strips of
land or villages, which are surrounded on all sides by the neighbouring country. On the map
at least the rest is well defined and one can make out which area belongs to whom. Out of the
three patches the first is near Muhuri River at Comilla district of Bangladesh adjacent to
Tripura state in India along the Indo-Bangla border. Both the Radcliffe line of 1947 and
Indira-Mujib Pact of 1974 agreed that the boundary should be the mid-point of the river. But
the disputes persist at least in two kilometer area of this river where Bangladesh insists on
keeping the river completely in their territory. For the villagers and fisherman, the riverbed is
important for their survival and that is the bone of contention for both sides.

The second area of dispute where the joint survey team has not been able to find out a
mutually agreed path is another small place called Lathitilla in Karimganj district of Assam
which is inhabited by Manipuri people but they have been paying taxes to Bangladesh out of
compulsion. Interestingly, the original map, prepared during the British time is reportedly
missing and hence no settlement could be done without it. 98 The Indian authority has been
insisting that the Bangladesh must show the original map likely to be available in Sylhet
District Archives.

The third area of dispute lies in the Bangladesh-West Bengal border and the root of
dispute is the change of the course of a small river. In other words along the 4096 km of
international boundary with Bangladesh three stretches involving six km are yet to be
demarcated. These un-demarcated stretches included 1.5 km at the Muhari river in the
Belonia (Tripura) section, 3 km in the Lathitila-Dumabari sector (Assam, Karimganj) and
another 1.5 km in Daikhata area (Cooch Bihar,Norh Bengal).

In West Bengal it was in the South Berubari zone of Cooch Bihar and in Assam it was in the
Lathitilla—Dumabari area. In the 1974 agreement it was decided that Indian would retain
South Berubari Union No.12 and the adjacent enclaves measuring an area of 2.64 Sq. Miles
and in exachange and in exchange Bangladesh would retain the Dahagram and Angarpota
enclaves. India would lease in perpetuity to Bangladesh an area of 178 metres x 85 metres
near 'Tin Bigha' to connect Dahagram with Panbari Mouza (P.S. Patgram) within Bangladesh.
As far as Lathitilla-Dumabari was enclaves were concerned it was decided the route of
boundary in 1974. It was agreed that from point Y (the last demarcated boundary pillar
position), the boundary should run southwards along the Patharia Hills RF boundary up to the
point where it met the western boundary of Dumabari Mouza; hen, along the same Mouza
boundary up to the tri-junction of Mouzas Dumabari, Lathitilla and Bara Putnigaon through
the junction of the two Mouzas Dumabari and Lathitilla. From this point it shall run along the
shortest distance to meet the mid-stream of Putni Chara. Then it shall run generally
southwards along the midstream of the course of Putni Chara at the time of demarcation, till
it meets the boundary between Sylhet (Bangladesh) and Tripura (India). The last issue was
the case of Hilli in Malda District of West Bengal which is located right on the border and
row of houses in the town having their front doors in India and their rear doors opening on
the railway platform of Hilli station in Bangladesh.
41
 The exact nature of the disputes was therefore of three areas: demarcation of land
boundary, demarcation of riparian boundary and of adverse possession. Demarcation of land
boundary was on many sectors e.g. the Mizoram-Chittagong sector, Tripura-Sylhet sector,
Bhagalpur Railway sector, Sibpur-Gaurangala Sector, Beani Bazar-Karimganj sector and the
remaining part of Tripura-Noakhali-Commilla sector. The demarcation in the first two sectors
was to be based on historical records but since no records acceptable to both the parties were
available the demarcation could not be completed. The demarcation of Bhagalpur Railway
Line was also awaited as the agreed principle of constructing the boundary at a distance of 75
feet parallel to the toe of the railway embankment towards the east could not be agreed upon.
In the Sibpur-Gaurangla sector a similar acceptable principle as the basis of demarcation
could not fixed.

In the Indira-Gandhi-Mujibur Rahman Agreement of 1974 agreed that demarcation

should be implementation in continuation of the process that had started in 1951-52 on the
basis of District Settlement Maps of 1915-1918. In the Beani Bazar-Karimganj sector the
dispute was over demarcation through Umapati village. The 1974 treaty agreed to continue
the demarcation on the basis agreed upon earlier, leaving Umapati village within India. the
demarcation of boundary between Tripura on the one hand and Noakhalai-Comilla on the
other was completed except some areas which was disputed. Hence the disputed sector was
left untouched until the 1974 agreement where it was resolved that the demarcation would be
completed on the basis of 1892-94 maps of Chakla-Roshanabad Estate, erstwhile integral part
of Tripura, and the District Settlement Maps of 1915-18 for areas not covered by Chakla-
Roshanabad maps.

The Second disputes were on demarcation of 781 km riparian border. In a land like
Bengal which is crisscrossed by network of rivers, streams, canals, lakes, wet and marshy
lands some portion of the border fell on water bodies too. However, drawing border over
water was not only tough it was tougher to maintain it as it was fluid. There were dispute
over Hakar Khal, Baikhari Khal, Muhuri River, Fenny River and the dispute arising over the
Chittangong-Tripura border from Fenny river issue. While demarcation of border on land
could be resolved easily and fixed permanently, it was not easy to demarcate boundary over
water bodies like river, stream and wetlands which were moving and could not fixed. Out of
the three patches the first is near Muhuri River at Comilla district of Bangladesh adjacent to
Tripura state in India along the Indo-Bangla border. Both the Radcliffe line of 1947 and
Indira-Mujib Pact of 1974 agreed that the boundary should be the mid-point of the river. But
the disputes persist at least in two kilometer area of this river where Bangladesh insists on
keeping the river completely in their territory. For the villagers and fisherman, the riverbed is
important for their survival and that is the bone of contention for both sides.

The dispute over demarcation through Hakar Khal was resolved in the Nehru-Noon
agreement of September 1958 which decided the demarcation through Hakar Khal should not
be equated with the riparian demarcation over Ichamati River. It should be treated as a
separate unit. Similarly the dispute over Baikari Khal was sought to be resolved in the 1974
agreement as per agreement reached between the Directors of Land Records and Surveys of
West Bengal and erstwhile East Pakistan.

42
 The border over Muhur rivier in the Belonia (Tripura) sector had to be demarcated
along the mid-stream of the course of river. Moreover the boundary was to be a fixed one.
Interestingly in the 1974 Agreement, the two governments agreed to raise the embankments
on their respective sides with a view to stabilizing the river in its current course to have a
fixed border over water. Over Fenny River a similar decision was to draw the border along
the mid-stream of the course of that branch of the Fenny River indicated as the Fenny River
on Survey of India Map Sheet No. 79MI15, 1st Edition 1935, till it joins the stream shown as
Asalong C on the said Map. From that point on, downstream, the boundary should be
demarcated along the mid-stream of the course of the Fenny River at the time of demarcation
of the boundary. The boundary in this sector too would be a fixed boundary. To determine the
border between the rest of the Tripura-Chittagong Hill Tract sector the boundary had to
follow the mid-stream of that branch of the Fenny River, from where the boundary would
follow the mid-stream of the eastern-most tributary. From the source of this tributary, the
boundary would run along the shortest distance to the mid-stream of the stream marked
Bayan Asalong, and thence would run generally northwards along the mid-stream of this
river till it reached its source on the ridge From there it would run along the crest of this
ridge up to Boghoban Trig Station. From Boghoban Trig Station up to the tri-junction of the
Bangladesh- Assam-Tripura boundary (Khan Talang Trig Station), the boundary would run
along the watershed of the river systems of the two countries. In case of any difference
between the map and the ground, the ground shall prevail. The boundary will be a fixed
boundary in this sector. The Map agreed by both parties in the 1974 agreement would be the
guiding document.

The third disputed area was the existence of a number of enclaves of one country in
possession of another country known as Adverse Possession. There were a number of such
small enclaves, 161 to be precise, in adverse possession on both sides of the border, mostly in
the Cooch Behar subdivision of West Bengal and Rangpur division of Bangladesh. Some
were in north East India, along the Assam-Meghalaya-Bangladesh sector.

During the May 16, 1974 the two nations re-identified the problems relating to the boundary
and resolved to settle the issue by proper demarcation, erecting of posts/fences and even
exchanges of lands to settled disputed issues. It found that major problem arose because the
international boundary being was left without demarcation in many areas, for instance, in
Assam and Tripura. In many areas, territory cartographically shown in the possession of one
was in reality, de facto possession of the other. Therefore the land boundary between India
and Bangladesh in the above mentioned areas had to be demarcated in the manner agreed
upon by both the parties mentioned above.99

The Points of Agreement in the Protocol of 2011

The Government of Assam published an official declaration on the clauses of the

Agreement.100 The two governments agreed that there were four disputed zones along the
Indo-Bangladesh border. There were Palathal-Madanpur region, Noyagaon-Niyamura region,
Lathitila-Dumabari region and Boraibari-Thakurianbari region. When ratified by the

43
Parliament of the two countries and implemented Bangladesh would own the 111 Indian
enclaves that lie in its territory with an area of 17,160 acres while 51 Bangladeshi enclaves
stretching acres 7,110 acres will merge with India. The two countries carried out a joint
survey along the border in July 2011 and conducted a headcount determining that 51000
people lived in the 162 enclaves that would change hands once the border pact took effect.
Under the 2011 agreement families living in the 162 enclaves locally known as Chhit or
Chhitmahal would be asked to choose their nationalities. For instance a man living in an
Indian enclave in Bangladesh could opt for Bangladeshis citizenship and stay on in that
enclave once it is handed over to Bangladesh. Or he can leave the enclave and come to India
and become an Indian citizen. In that case he will be allotted a plot in India.

Palathal-Madanpur region: these two areas are actually two tea estates. Madanpur tea
estate remained in India during partition but Palathal went to Pakistan. When Bangladesh was
formed Madanpur became a part of Bangladesh. Since then people of the estates including
the plantation labourers were given Pakistani and eventually Bangladeshi citizenship and
were granted other facilities by the respective governments. During the land survey in 1976
Bangladesh asked India to surrender its claim over the land. In fact during the survey it was
found that the actual land under Bangladeshi occupation was 455 acres. Accordingly the
Government of Assam surrendered its claim over the land. Thus while erecting barbed wire
to demarcate the boundary India did it within 2000-1200 meter within Indian territory.
According to the current agreement out of the 455 acres of land, Bangladesh agreed to
surrender 380.50 acres to India and thereby allowed India to erect its barbed wire 2000-1200
meters within Bangladeshi territory.

Nayagaon-Niyamura: Dispute over this region arose due to faulty erection of barbed wire.
While erecting the barbed wire boundary, the Indian agencies did it 145 acres within India
which meant that 145 acres of Indian land was left outside the Indian boundary. Along with it
an Indian village named Govindapur was also left outside the Indian boundary. Seeing the
opportunity Bangladesh occupied the land and claimed its right over the territory. By the
bilateral agreement Bangladesh was made to withdraw its claim over the land and India was
permitted to re-construct its boundary demarcation including the left out area. Govindapur
village was to be returned to India. Similarly the village of Nayamora which was left outside
the boundary fence would be brought back within Indian Territory.

Lathitila-Dumabari region: During partition neither country succeeded in finalizing an

agreeable boundary. As a result the area remained disputed since then. During the 1974
agreement the two governments agree to find an amicable solution to this dispute but nothing
happened till now. The disputed land in this region was about 804 acres. Due to the disputed
nature of boundary, boundary demarcation with barbed wire could not be completed. During
the current negotiations the government of Bangladesh agreed to retain only 90 acres of land
while transferring the residual 714 acres to India. In other words Bangladesh gave up its
claim over 90% of this disputed land and retained only 10% of the disputed territory for
itself. The government of India would now be able to establish its sovereignty over the land
and erect barbed wire along the boundary.

44
Boraibari-thakurianbari region: During partition 193.85 acres of territory in this region
had been gone to East Pakistan ignoring the claim of India. This resulted in a dispute over
this territory. In the area there were 250 households who were living as Pakistani citizens
despite being Indians. During boundary demarcation too this 193.85 acres of territory was left
within Bangladesh. The current agreement decided to establish this fence as the true
boundary between the countries which meant the territory has now been permanently given to
Bangladesh by surrendering Indian claim over it. The government of Assam claimed credit
that by the current agreement, it had been able to bring back 1239’5 acres of Indian land back
to India once the Agreement was ratified by the Parliament. It of course did not specify how
much land it transferred back to Bangladesh.

As far as Bengal was concerned the Teen Bigha corridor, a piece of 178 x 85 meter territory
granted to Bangladesh in perpetual lease by India in 1974 to have access to the people of
Bangladeshi enclave who were cut off from the mother country by Indian territory was
allowed to be open for twenty four hours. Earlier the access was restricted to certain hours in
the day. The issue of enclave is a result of Radcliffe line. After Bangladesh emerged, Prime
Minsiters Indira Gandhi and Mujibur Rehman signed an agreement aimed at putting into
effect the demarcation of boundaries on selected patches of territory on March 16, 1974.
Under the Accord India was supposed to lease in perpetuity to Bangladesh and area of
178x85 square meters in Tin Bigha to connect the Dahagram-Angapota enclaves to the
mainland in exchange of Bangladesh’s South Berubari. South Berubari was handed over of
India almost instantly but the people in Dahagram- Angapota remained virtually stateless due
to absence of unfettered access to the mainland. The handing over of the piece of land was
delayed abnormally due to prolonged constitutional and legal controversies in India that
resulted in adverse public reaction. On October 7, 1982 the two countries signed another deal
which too failed to resolve the issue. On June 1992 the people of the two enclaves were able
to move though the corridor for 12 hours a day between July 1996 and September 2011. But
even after getting the 12 hours access the people remained virtual captives. Most of the
children were forced to abandon their education, many died due to a lack of timely health
care. The mainlanders refused to even enter into matrimonial relating with enclave
inhabitants. Naturally the people of Dahagram and Angapota were euphoric over the
development. Under the protocol singed on September 6, the transfer of enclaves and
demarcation of 6.5 km of land boundary between the two countries have been agreed upon.
But except the24 hour access through the teen bigha corridor not much progress has been
achieved on the issue.101

According to the terms of the agreement Bangladesh had agreed to concede the seven areas
of land under adverse possession located in the state of Meghalaya. According to the official
statement “in respect of the seven areas where joint survey was conducted on the adverse
possessions of lands by India and as per protocol, these lands will be retained by India,
whereas in one area which was under adverse possession of Bangladesh, the land will be
retained by Bangladesh.”102 The areas which Bangladesh conceded to Meghalaya (India) were
Lungkhat I, II and III, Pyrdiwah, Tamabil and Naljuri I and II. It mentioned that ten areas
claimed to be under adverse possession of India in Meghalaya included Pyrdiwah, Lynkhat I,

45
II, III, Kurinallah, Tamabil, Naljuri I, II and III, Rongkhon, Amjalong, Amki and Muktapur.
On areas namely Amki, Amjalong, Rongkhong, Kurrinallah and Muktapur joint survey was
not undertaken because of the fact that it was not possible to establish India’s legal rights,
physical possession or cultivation in these areas.” 103 Again if, as a result of exchange of
enclaves, India had to hand over any excess land to Bangladesh then it would not demand any
compensation from Bangladesh. The Home Minister P Chidambaram clarified that during the
exchange of enclaves no one would be imposed with any citizenship. The residents would be
given the option to choose citizenship of either country. For example the existing 37,379
people who live in Indian enclaves of Bangladesh would not be forced to accept the
citizenship of Bangladesh. If they desire they would be granted the Indian citizenship
provided they opt to live in India permanently. However the right wing Indian political party,
the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has opposed the proposal of giving Indian citizenship to
Bangladeshis who lived in India for so long. The party asserted that with the final transfer of
the enclave the citizens also have to adopt Bangladeshi citizenship. 104 The party was also
critical of the proposal of keeping the Teen Bigha corridor open all the time as it would
increase incidence of illegal immigration, smuggling and trafficking.

Conclusion

Bordering a territory is an attempt fence a national and ethnic area. Therefore nation making
and border making are simultaneous process. Borders are created on the premise being each
fenced territory contains a people of same culture and ethnicity. The corollary is that the
existence of border disputes is proof that territories have overlapping ethnic and cultural
groups and are therefore heterogeneous. Heterogeneity is against the principle of nationhood.
Take the case of India and Pakistan. India has no problem with its western border except for a
small patch called ‘the Sir Creek' in the Rann of Kutch.105 There are no disputes over land or
adverse possession problem. But in the Bengal sector there were immense problem of
separating Hindu areas from Muslim areas. At every step it was found to separate Hindu
areas from Muslim areas. Despite the claim of Hindus and Muslim being culturally different
and co-habitation impossible, their habitats were actually merged and syncretic. It proved that
the Hindus and Muslim were not residentially and culturally segregated as was claimed by
political leaders and therefore proved the hollowness of the two nation theory. Nation
building therefore depended on first creating that nation that did not exist and border
demarcation therefore had to be carefully carried out to create that nation of Hindus or nation
of Muslims on which principle the country was partitioned. It indicated existence of
heterogeneity, multiplicity of culture and actually is a subversion of theory of nation. It goes
against the very theory of nation. The prevalence of disputes in border proves that two nation
theories are wrong and partition has failed to create nations. Border demarcation was
therefore increasingly becoming a process of forcefully segregating the Hindus and Muslim
and creates exclusive spaces. Border making was an endeavour towards ghettoisation and
building exclusivity. It was praxis of undoing history. It was an effort to erase history and
construct new history.

46
47
1
Anssi Paasi, and David Newman (1998), "Fences and Neighbours in the Postmodern World: Boundary Narratives in
Political Geography," Progress in Human Geography, 22 (2): Pp.186-207.

2
Anssi Paasi, and David Newman (1998), "Fences and Neighbours in the Postmodern World: Boundary Narratives in
Political Geography," Progress in Human Geography, 22 (2): Pp.186-207.

3
Fredrick Jackson Turner, The Frontier in American History, New York: Dover Courier Publications. (1996).

4
Daniel Power, and Naomi Standen (Eds.), Frontiers in Question: Eurasian Borderlands (700-1700), New York: St.
Martin's Press Inc. (1999), Pp. 13-14
5
Surya P Sharma, , India's Boundary and Territorial Disputes, New Delhi: Vikash Publications. (1971); Surya P Sharma,
International Boundary Disputes and International Law 1, Bombay: NM Tripathy Pvt. Ltd . (1976); T S Murthy, Frontier
Change Concept, New Delhi: Patil and Patil Publishers, (1978), Pp. 1-6, 12, 17
6
Vittorio Adami, National Frontiers in Relation to International Law 3, Tr. By TT, London: Behrens. (1927),

7
LKD Kristof, "The Nature of Frontiers and Boundaries," Annals of the Association of American Geographer, XLIX (49):
(1959), Pp.269-271.
8
Thomas M Wilson and Hastings Donnan, ‘Nation, State and Identity at International Borders’ in Border Identities:
National and State at International Frontiers, Cambridge University, Press, ,Cambridge, 1998, , p.9

9
Ranabir Samaddar, “The Wall is an apparatus,’ paper presented in a Seminar on ‘Mapping Borders: Inside-outside
Perspectives,’Kathmandu, Nepal , August 30-1 September 2003.
10
Ranabir Samaddar, “The Wall is an apparatus,’ paper presented in a Seminar on ‘Mapping Borders: Inside-outside
Perspectives,’Kathmandu, Nepal , August 30-1 September 2003.
11
Ranabir Samaddar, “The Wall is an apparatus,’ paper presented in a Seminar on ‘Mapping Borders: Inside-outside
Perspectives,’Kathmandu, Nepal , August 30-1 September 2003.
12
Tapan Bose, ‘The Primary Border,’ in paper presented in a Seminar on ‘Mapping Borders: Inside-outside
Perspectives,’Kathmandu, Nepal , August 30-1 September 2003.
13
Thomas M Wilson and Hastings Donnan, ‘Nation, State and Identity at International Borders’ in Border Identities:
National and State at International Frontiers, Cambridge University, Press, ,Cambridge, 1998, , p.10.
14
Thomas M Wilson and Hastings Donnan, ‘Nation, State and Identity at International Borders’ in Border Identities:
National and State at International Frontiers, Cambridge University, Press, ,Cambridge, 1998, , p.10.
15
Report of the Bengal Boundary Commission, Radcliff Report) 1947, Appendixes in Verinder Grover and Ranjana Aurora
(ed), India 50 years of Independence, vol.1, Deep & Deep, New Delhi,1997, pp.313-314
16
Lucy Chester, Borders and Conflict in South Asia. The Radcliffe Boundary Commission and the Partition of Punjab,
Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2008 p.1 also see the review of the book Pippa Virdee, review of Borders and
Conflict in South Asia. The Radcliffe Boundary Commission and the Partition of Punjab, Manchester University Press,
Manchester, 2008 in URL: http://www.history.ac.uk/reviews/review/995
Date accessed: 19 October, 2012

17
Lucy Chester, Borders and Conflict in South Asia. The Radcliffe Boundary Commission and the Partition of Punjab,
Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2008 p. 3
18
Lucy Chester, Borders and Conflict in South Asia. The Radcliffe Boundary Commission and the Partition of Punjab,
Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2008 p. 3
19
Lucy Chester, Borders and Conflict in South Asia. The Radcliffe Boundary Commission and the Partition of Punjab ,
Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2008 p. 3
20
Nafis Ahmad, The Indo-Pakistan Boundary Disputes Tribunal, 1949-1950, Geographical Review , Jul., 1953, Vol. 43, No.
3 (Jul., 1953), pp. 329-337
21
Nafis Ahmad, The Indo-Pakistan Boundary Disputes Tribunal, 1949-1950, Geographical Review , Jul., 1953, Vol. 43, No.
3 (Jul., 1953), pp. 329-337

22
Nafis Ahmad, The Indo-Pakistan Boundary Disputes Tribunal, 1949-1950, Geographical Review , Jul., 1953, Vol. 43, No.
3 (Jul., 1953), pp. 329-337

23
Nafis Ahmad, The Indo-Pakistan Boundary Disputes Tribunal, 1949-1950, Geographical Review , Jul., 1953, Vol. 43, No.
3 (Jul., 1953), pp. 329-337

24
Nafis Ahmad, The Indo-Pakistan Boundary Disputes Tribunal, 1949-1950, Geographical Review , Jul., 1953, Vol. 43, No.
3 (Jul., 1953), pp. 329-337

25
Nafis Ahmad, The Indo-Pakistan Boundary Disputes Tribunal, 1949-1950, Geographical Review , Jul., 1953, Vol. 43, No.
3 (Jul., 1953), pp. 329-337

26
Nafis Ahmad, The Indo-Pakistan Boundary Disputes Tribunal, 1949-1950, Geographical Review , Jul., 1953, Vol. 43, No.
3 (Jul., 1953), pp. 329-337

27
Nafis Ahmad, The Indo-Pakistan Boundary Disputes Tribunal, 1949-1950, Geographical Review , Jul., 1953, Vol. 43, No.
3 (Jul., 1953), pp. 329-337

28
Statement of Union Minster of State for External Affairs, Vinod Khanna in the Rajya Sabha, Unstarred Questions no.
3660, April 24, 2003, http://164.100.24.219/rsq/quest.asp?qrep=80014.
29
O H K Spate, 'The partition of India and the prospects of Pakistan', Geographical Review, vol. 38, no. 1, 1948, pp. 5-29.
Cited in Hosna Jahan Shewly, (2008) Border management and post - 9/11 state security concerns: implications for the
Bangladesh-India border, Durham theses, Durham University. Pp. 27-29 Available at Durham E-Theses
Online:http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/2231/

30
WV Schendel, lThe Bengal borderland: beyond state and nation in South Asia',Anthem Press, 2005,
31
Lucy Chester, Borders and Conflict in South Asia. The Radcliffe Boundary Commission and the Partition of Punjab ,
Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2008 p. 3
32
Lucy Chester, Borders and Conflict in South Asia. The Radcliffe Boundary Commission and the Partition of Punjab ,
Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2008 p. 3
33
Willem Van Schendel, The Bengal Borderland: Beyond State and Nation in South Asia, Anthem Press, London, 2005, p.
48
34
Bibhash Dar, Ganesh Chandra Ojah, International Boundaries in North East India: Community, Culture and Stress,
Lakshi Publishers and Distributors, Delhi, 2014, Pp 51-2

35
Satyendra Prasad Deka, Indo Bangla Land Transfer Agreement,’ in The Assam Tribune, 26, September, 2011 p.6
36
J T Jacob, India Myanmar Borderlands: Guns, Blankets and Bird Flu, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New
Delhi, 2010.
37
Bibhash Dhar, Transhumans of Arunachal Himalaya: The Pangchenpas and the Thingbupa, Geophil
Publishers,Guwahati, 2009.
38
Vazira Fazila-Yacoobali Zamindar, The Long Partition and the Making of Modern South Asia: Refugees, Boundaries,
Histories (New York, NY, 2007).
39
Lucy Chester, Borders and Conflict in South Asia. The Radcliffe Boundary Commission and the Partition of Punjab ,
Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2008 p. 3

40
WV Schendel, lThe Bengal borderland: beyond state and nation in South Asia',Anthem Press, 2005,

41
WV Schendel, lThe Bengal borderland: beyond state and nation in South Asia',Anthem Press, 2005,

42
WV Schendel, lThe Bengal borderland: beyond state and nation in South Asia',Anthem Press, 2005,

43
WV Schendel, lThe Bengal borderland: beyond state and nation in South Asia',Anthem Press, 2005,

44
WV Schendel, lThe Bengal borderland: beyond state and nation in South Asia',Anthem Press, 2005,

45
Nafis Ahmad, The Indo-Pakistan Boundary Disputes Tribunal, 1949-1950, Geographical Review , Jul., 1953, Vol. 43, No.
3 (Jul., 1953), pp. 329-337
46
Government of India, Department related Parliamentary Standing Committee on Home Affairs, ‘Border Security:
Capacity Building Institutions, 203rd Report Presented to Rajya Sabha on 11th APRIL 2017, Rajya Sabha Secretariat, New
Delhi, April, 2017, p 2

47
Thomas M Wilson and Hastings Donnan, ‘Nation, State and Identity at International Borders’ in Border Identities:
National and State at International Frontiers, Cambridge University, Press, ,Cambridge, 1998, , p.1
48
As soon as Donald Trump assumed the office of President of USA he ordered the closure of borders with Mexico, Cuba
and other South Amercian nations to prevent infiltration of illegal immigrants from those countries.
49
John Dunn, Contemporary Crisis of Nation-State, Blackwell, oxford, 1995;
50
Machael Mann, The Rise and Decline of the Nation-state, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1990. Mathew Horsman and Andrew
Marshall, After the Nation-State: Citizens Tribalism and the New World Order, Harper Collins, London, 1995.

51
Prasanta Sahoo, ‘Indo-Bangladesh Land Border Management: Challenges Before India's National Security,’ Unpublished
Ph D Thesis, Divisions of South Asian Studies, Centre for South, Central, South East Asian, South West Pacific Studies,
School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, 2009, p.1.

52
Thomas M Wilson and Hastings Donnan, Borders: Frontiers of Identity, Nation and State, Berg, Oxford, New York,
1999, p.1
53
Thomas M Wilson and Hastings Donnan, ‘Nation, State and Identity at International Borders’ in Border Identities:
National and State at International Frontiers, Cambridge University, Press, ,Cambridge, 1998, , p.9

54
‘Unquiet Borders,’ Editorial in Economic and Political Weekly, April 28-May 5, 2001. p.1364
55
The data here and below are sourced from The Sentinel, Silchar and Guwahati, 3 February 2012, p.1
56
Seven Sisters post, 27, June 2012, p.5 Seven Sisters post, 27, June 2012, p.5
57
https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/deaths-on-indo-bangla-border-due-to-anti-crime-operations-officials/
article32054833.ece
58
সীমান্তে অপরাধ কমলেই প্রাণহানি বন্ধ হবে, যুক্তি বিএসএফের, শুভজ্যোতি ঘোষ
https://www.bbc.com/bengali/news-55399529?
fbclid=IwAR01vG5GMoZRHzzPhNJyvJj-9s5EPe9SJ2om9BTKgGnOXY8-4t40BfSKz8A

59
Reported in Seven Sisters Post, Gauhati, 27 June 2012, p. 5.
60
Hosna Jahan Shewly, (2008) Border management and post - 9/11 state security concerns: implications for the
Bangladesh-India border, Durham theses, Durham University. Pp. 67-68 Available at Durham E-Theses
Online:http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/2231/
61
Statement by BSF Praveen Kumar of Yakubnagar BOP, Dhramanagar, Tripura. Interviewed by the author on 24 th
December 2021 at 3.30 pm , Firdosi Akhtara Basid, Passive Victims, Partition and the Tribes of North East India, Ph D
Thesis, Assam University, 2023

62
EastMozo, https://www.eastmojo.com/assam/2022/01/26/over-4100-people-arrested-for-drug-cattle-smuggling-in-assam-
in-2021-guv/
63
Statement issued by BSF, Meghalaya Frontier, https://nenow.in/north-east-news/meghalaya/cattle-smuggling-has-links-
with-drug-smuggling-in-meghalaya-claims-bsf.html
64
Op. Cit. Van Schendel (1993), pp. 25-38
65
North East News. https://nenow.in/north-east-news/meghalaya/cattle-smuggling-has-links-with-drug-smuggling-in-
meghalaya-claims-bsf.html
66
Op. Cit. Saleh Shahriar, Lu Qian &Sokvibol Kea (2019), pp. 11-13
67
Krisna, Kulbir (2001), "Policing the Indo-Bangladesh Border," Strategic Analysis, XXV(5): 665.; Dutta,Shekhar (2000),
"Contemporary trade: north-eastern region and Bangladesh:Economic impact of exposed Indo-Bangia Border: a case study
of Karimganj region,"Chapter IV, in Gurudas Das and RK Purkayastha (Eds.), Border Trade: North-East Indiaand
Neighbouring Countries, New Delhi: Akansha Books, 1495-1516, 58-96).
68
I G Gaur, IG BSF in Outlook, May 7, 2001, pp23-24
69
Hosna Jahan Shewly, (2008) Border management and post - 9/11 state security concerns: implications for the
Bangladesh-India border, Durham theses, Durham University. Pp. 69-71 Available at Durham E-Theses
Online:http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/2231/
70
Government of India, Department related Parliamentary Standing Committee on Home Affairs, ‘Border Security:
Capacity Building Institutions, 203rd Report Presented to Rajya Sabha on 11th APRIL 2017, Rajya Sabha Secretariat, New
Delhi, April, 2017, p 2
71
‘NHRC direct EJH dist admn to address border villagers plight,’ in The Shillong Times, 1st March 2017, p.1
72
Office of the Director of Agriculture, Assam. Memo No.VIA-182/11038, 16 th February, 1950; File No. TAD/159/40/50,
Assam Governor’s Secretariate, Military Secretary’s Office, TAD Department, development Brunch. Dispur, Guwahati-6,
p.1, SAA cited in Firdosi Akhtara Basid, Passive Victims, Partition and the Tribes of North East India, Ph D Thesis, Assam
University, 2023

73
Assam Governor’s Secretariat, Military Secretary’s Office, Tribal Area Development Department, DEV Branch, on the
subject “Reorganization of the economy in the Southern slope of the united Khasi-Jaintia Hills districts” File no- TAD(K-J)
40/50, p. 1-5, SAA; Office of the Director of Agriculture, Assam, Memo No. VIA-182/11038, 16 th February., 1950.
Shillong. cited in Firdosi Akhtara Basid, Passive Victims, Partition and the Tribes of North East India, Ph D Thesis, Assam
University, 2023

74
Ibid. pp. 5-8
75
“Report in respect of epidemic disease throughout the border areas of the united Khasi-Jaintia hill districts and the causes
connected there in”, can see, copy of latter dated 8.1.1952 from Dr. B.N. Bezbarua, K&J hills, Shillong; File. No.
TAD/PH/2/52. P.2, Assam state Archive, Dispur, Guwahati-6, SAA cited in Firdosi Akhtara Basid, Passive Victims,
Partition and the Tribes of North East India, Ph D Thesis, Assam University, 2023
76
Ibid. p.2
77
Memo No 4/57, date 13.1.57, informs about the death of Maujing Marak who was suffering from fever for about two
weeks prior to her death, Dangdin Sangma an old widow of Sooling was suffering from fever body joint pains etc prior to
her death, Dandrak Marak of Koraibari was suffering for a long time for stomach disease pains and one disease outside the
stomach called ‘Baima’ from which he was suffering for 15-16 days prior to his death, U Lassia Sangma of Karaibari about
one month prior to his death was suffering for body swelling seemed to be contained water inside the stomach; File no:
TAD/CON/8/59, Assam Secretariate, Tribal Area Development, Confidential files, Guwahati, Dispur. SAA cited in Firdosi
Akhtara Basid, Passive Victims, Partition and the Tribes of North East India, Ph D Thesis, Assam University, 2023

78
Ibid. p.2
79
File No. C/13/54/142, Part-2, “Incidents on Garo Hills-Mymensingh Border”, Home Confidential Brunch, Assam State
Archive, Dispur, Guwahati-781005, p.2, SAA cited in Firdosi Akhtara Basid, Passive Victims, Partition and the Tribes of
North East India, Ph D Thesis, Assam University, 2023

80
Ibid. p.3
81
Statement given by Bitila Sangma Begum, Village Lukairchar, Mahendraganj, West Garo Hill District, Meghalaya.
Interviewed by on 12-October-2021 at 4 pm, cited in Firdosi Akhtara Basid, Passive Victims, Partition and the Tribes of
North East India, Ph D Thesis, Assam University, 2023 cited in Firdosi Akhtara Basid, Passive Victims, Partition and the
Tribes of North East India, Ph D Thesis, Assam University, 2023

82
Statement given by Manisha Nokrek,Berengipara, Dalu, South Garo Hill District, Meghalaya. Interviewed by the author
on 18- October-2021at 3.30 pm Firdosi Akhtara Basid, Passive Victims, Partition and the Tribes of North East India, Ph D
Thesis, Assam University, 2023

83
Copy of letter No. (Confidential) 645/con, dated 7-5-54, from the District Magistrate Mymensingh (East Pak) to the
Deputy Commissioner Garo Hills, Tura, Meghalaya. Home Confidential Branch, Assam State Archive, Dispur, Guwahati-
781005, p.1, SAA cited in Firdosi Akhtara Basid, Passive Victims, Partition and the Tribes of North East India, Ph D
Thesis, Assam University, 2023

84
File No. 20/PLB/47/64, “Incidents in Sylhet border 1964”, Political Department, Assam State Archive, Dispur, Guwahati-
781005,(File does not contain page number), in Firdosi Akhtara Basid, Passive Victims, Partition and the Tribes of North
East India, Ph D Thesis, Assam University, 2023

85
Ibid. ((File does not contain page number)
86
Report in Dainik Yugashankha, Silchar and Gauhati, 16 march 2012, p.1
87
‘Bangladesh allows fencing on Zero line in Tripura,’ in Eastern Chronicle, Silchar, April 11,2012, p.4
88
‘Progress in border land row,’ in the The Telegraph, Guwahati, 19 April, 2012, p.16
89
Shillont times, 3rd January 2017, p. 7

90
Abhimanyu Datta, ‘Barbed Wire Border Fencing,’ India Quarterly, March 2018, Vol. 74, No. 1 (March 2018), pp. 42-60
91
Statement supported byBSF Praveen Kumar,Yaqoobnagar Border Out Post, Dharmanagar, Tripura. (Interviewed on 24
December 2021). BSF Nasir Uddin, Bhanga Border Out Post, Karimganj, Assam. (Interviewed on 10- March 2021).BSF
Pawan Kumar,Mukamtilla Border Out Post, Patharkandi, Assam. (Interviewed on 20 March 2021), BSF Sravan Kumar,
Baghmara Border Out Post, Baghmara, South Garo Hill District, Meghalaya. (Interviewed 7-October-2021). Firdosi
Akhtara Basid, Passive Victims, Partition and the Tribes of North East India, Ph D Thesis, Assam University, 2023
92
Delwar Hussain (2013), Boundaries Undermined: The Ruins of Progress on the Bangladesh-India Border, Oxford
University Press, New Delhi-110 001, p.77-85
93
Op. Cit. p. 15
94
Infochange News & Features, May 2011

95
Prasanta Sahoo, ‘Indo-Bangladesh Land BorderManagement: Challenges Before India's National Security,’ Unpublished
Ph D Thesis, Divisions of South Asian Studies, Centre for South, Central,S(outh East Asian, South West Pacific Studies,
School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, 2009, p.2.
96
The issue of Adverse Possession is discussed in an article by this author entitled, Abandoned by Nations: Partition,
Boundary Making and Adverse Possession in Post Colonial South Asiaa, forthcoming.
97
Kulbir Krishnan, “Policing the Indo-Bangladesh Border, Strategic Analysis, Delhi, vol xxv, no.5, August 2001, p.665.
98
Shantanu Nandan Sharma, ‘Questionable Possessions,’ in North East Sun, May 1-14, 2001,p.14
99
Text of the Indira Gandhi-Sheikh Mujibur Rehman Agreement, May 16, 1974. New Delhi.
100
The Views of the Assam Government over the Agreement signed between India and Bangladesh on 6 September 2011,
published in the Sentinel, Guwahati and Silchar, 23 September, 2011, p 8
101
Harron habib, ‘Freedom from Virtual Captivity,’ in the Hindu, November 3, 2011, p.6.
102
‘Bangladesh Concedes 7 spots of adverse possession,’ in The Sentinel, Guwahati and Silchar, 10 September, 2011, p.3
103
Statement by Chief Minister Mukul Sangma in The Sentinel, Guwahati and Silchar, 10 September, 2011, p.3
104
‘Ekhono Mot Den ni Mamata, Dhitmahal niye Satarka Delhi,’ in Anandabazar Patrika, Kolkata, 26 January, 2012, p, 1.
105
Other disputes were in the Kashmir sector which has a completely different history and context.