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With the easy victory, however, the Hamiltonians entered with gayety
upon the next step—the Assumption of the State debts—determined to rush
it through. On the very night of the day discrimination was defeated, the
Pennsylvania delegation, on the suggestion of Robert Morris, met at the
lodgings of Representative Fitzsimons of Philadelphia to ‘consider’ the
matter of Assumption. One glance convinced the keen-eyed Maclay that the
meeting was for ratification, not for consideration purposes. ‘By God,’
swore Morris, ‘it must be done!’ George Clymer, another of the Hamilton
Reliables, bubbled with enthusiasm over the advantage that would accrue to
Pennsylvania. Maclay was embarrassed by the almost affectionate
comradery of some of his colleagues. Why should the delegation not hold
weekly social sessions and work in harmony? Fitzsimons’s lodgings would
be the very place to meet. Yes, agreed Morris, and they could have wine and
oysters.[244]
A few days later Muhlenberg, returning to Maclay’s lodgings from a
levee at the presidential mansion, declared with intense emphasis that the
State debts must be assumed—which impressed the suspicious Senator as
‘the language of the Court.’[245]
But it was not to be so simple as all that. Assumption, argued many,
would but extend the scope of the operations of the hated speculators. It
was another move to mortgage the Government to the capitalists. The
greater part of the speculating gentry were in the North; they would soon
accumulate all the State certificates of the South into their own hands and
one section would be paying taxes to increase the fortunes of a favored
class in another.
There was another reason for the revolt of the Southerners—which,
reversed, would have operated quite as powerfully on the Northerners. The
States with the largest unpaid debts were in the North, Massachusetts with
the greatest debt of all. Virginia, which led the opposition, had liquidated
most of her debt. There is nothing inexplicable in the objections of the
Virginians, who had paid their debt, to being taxed to help pay the debt of
Massachusetts and Connecticut.
This was appreciated by many in the North, and a citizen of Stockbridge,
Massachusetts, writing for a New York paper, thought it unfair. If the
‘leveling system’ was vicious as applied to men, it was quite as bad when
applied to States. Then, too, ‘the public creditors, the most opulent part, of
the community, would, by this means, be detached from the interest of the
State Governments and united to that of the general Government.’ This
aimed at the annihilation of the State Governments and the perpetuation of
the debt.[246] Thus an attack began on the general policy of funding, taking
an ugly form, appealing to class prejudices. ‘A number of drones are
brought into society and the industrious bee is forced to furnish them with
all the honey of its search.’[247]
But this opposition from the unimportant meant nothing to Hamilton. In
those days, and for many days to come, it was only necessary to know what
Oliver Wolcott[248] said or wrote to know what his master thought. Writing
his father about this time, Wolcott gives us sketchily the operations of
Hamilton’s mind. This matter of assumption was connected with ‘the
engine of government.’ Since ‘the influence of the clergy, the nobility and
the army’ was impossible, ‘some active principle of the human mind can be
interested in the support of the Government.’ It would never do to have
‘civil establishments,’ but there was an influential class in existence—the
moneyed class. They could and should be bound by interest to the general
Government. What more ‘active principle’ of the human mind than the
desire for wealth? And if the capitalists looked to the Federal rather than to
the State Governments for their money, what better ‘engine of government’
than that? ‘For these reasons,’ wrote Wolcott, ‘I think the State debts should
be assumed.’ True, it would make the debt of the United States
‘inconvenient,’ the taxes would be ‘burdensome,’ and ‘will appear to be just
only to those who believe that the good attained is more important than the
evil which is suffered.’[249]
It was fear of the effect of these ‘burdensome taxes’ on the popularity of
the Federal Government that led some men, including Madison, into
opposition.[250] Some of the Hamiltonians were alarmed, fearing that ‘such
bold politics are unfitted to ... the infant resources’ of the young Republic.
[251] Every enemy of Assumption was not hostile to the central
Government, but all who were jealous of the sovereignty of the States were
in opposition. Rufus King, the brilliant and virile Hamiltonian leader in the
Senate, was convinced that in New York ‘the anti-federalists think that the
advantages to be derived to the State from the retention of that debt are so
great and important that they stand ready to accede to any terms which the
creditors may propose.’[252] About the same time the unreconciled Patrick
Henry was writing James Monroe that ‘it seems to be a consistent part of a
system I have ever dreaded,’ and that the ‘subserviency of Southern to
Northern interests are written in Capitals on its very front.’[253]
Such was the atmosphere in which the second battle began.
VIII
IX
XI
As Hamilton surveyed the wreckage of the field, he saw an opportunity.
There was another bitter battle pending over the selection of the site of the
permanent capital. Might he not bargain a bit and trade enough votes for
Assumption? The site of the capital was a matter of indifference to him. No
sentimental ties bound him to any State or community. No dust sacred to
him rested anywhere in American soil. He was ready to go with any group
that could contribute enough votes to make Assumption sure. Philadelphia
—New York—the Susquehanna—Baltimore—the Potomac—a mere
bagatelle to him. In the fact that it was more than that to others he saw his
chance. Could the Virginians or the Marylanders who had opposed
Assumption pay him in votes for a capital at Georgetown, or even
Baltimore? Could Robert Morris whip the stubborn Pennsylvanians into
line for a capital in Philadelphia or on the Susquehanna? True, Washington
favored Georgetown, but that meant nothing to Hamilton if Georgetown
could not bring Assumption. It is a myth of history that he was tenderly
considerate of the wishes of his chief: the facts to sustain it do not appear.
Far more important to him was the fact that Madison and Carroll favored
Georgetown. They had votes.
The intense bitterness over the struggle called for infinite diplomacy and
sagacity in negotiation. The papers of the country were filled with ill-
natured letters on the fight which was no more in evidence in Congress than
in the bar-rooms of the competing cities. Ames, like Hamilton, cared little
about the site if he could but get Assumption, and was disgusted with the
‘despicable grogshop contest, whether the taverns in New York or
Philadelphia shall get the custom of Congress.’ Sedgwick had become a
‘perfect slave to the business,’ and ‘Goodhue frowned all day long and
swears as much as a good Christian can....’[273]
By early June the bargaining stage had been reached. One day Tench
Coxe, of the Treasury, and Jackson, one of Washington’s secretaries, called
at the lodgings of Fitzsimons and Clymer with the bald proposition to trade
the permanent residence to Philadelphia for enough Pennsylvania votes to
pass Assumption. Taking this as a hint from Hamilton, Robert Morris wrote
him that early the next morning he should be taking a walk on the Battery,
and if any propositions were open he would be very glad to have the
Secretary of the Treasury join him in his constitutional. Thus, long before
many of the statesmen had enjoyed their coffee, Hamilton and Morris paced
up and down at the deserted Battery. With Walpolean directness, Hamilton
went to the point. He needed one vote in the Senate and five in the House.
If Morris could assure him these, he could give assurance, in return, that the
permanent residence would be given to Germantown or the Falls of the
Delaware. Morris promised to consult his colleagues—but how about the
temporary residence for Philadelphia? After thinking it over, Hamilton sent
word that he would not think of bargaining on the temporary residence.[274]
For several days these negotiations continued. The Pennsylvanians moved
with a deliberation that tried Hamilton’s patience. A few days later he
threatened his Philadelphia friends with the possibility of the New-
Englanders going to Baltimore or the Potomac.[275]
Meanwhile, Hamilton had been thinking seriously of Jefferson. They
met as strangers, knowing one another well by reputation. Their feelings
were friendly. There were innumerable reasons why they should ultimately
fly at each other’s throats, but that was in the future. One June day they met
at the presidential mansion on Broadway, and, leaving at the same time,
Hamilton saw his opportunity.
There was a picture for an artist to paint—Hamilton and Jefferson, arm
in arm, walking along Broadway discussing the possibilities of a bargain.
With all the persuasiveness of his eloquence, Hamilton dwelt on the very
real danger of disunion if Assumption failed. With subtle diplomacy he
seemed to throw himself trustfully on Jefferson’s mercy. A great struggle
for independence—a promising young nation—and was all to be lost? The
South wanted the capital, the North wanted Assumption—could there not be
a common meeting-ground? Jefferson would see.
A dinner at Jefferson’s table in the house on Broadway. Men from the
South about the board. The topic—the pending bargain. A little later,
Hamilton was informed that an agreement could be reached. The word was
passed along the line. Even Madison satisfied himself that, since
Assumption could not be prevented, the bargain might as well be made—
but if there had been no bargain there would have been no Assumption. A
few nights later the Pennsylvania delegation entertained both Hamilton and
Jefferson at dinner. The latter impressed one guest with his ‘dignity of
presence and gravity,’ Hamilton with his ‘boyish giddy manner.’ Whatever
may have been the cause of the gravity of Jefferson, there was reason for
the giddiness of Hamilton—he had won![276]
XII
The attempt of Jefferson in later life to explain his part in the bargain
over Assumption, with the assertion that he had been deceived by Hamilton,
is in the nature of an alibi created after the crime. He was not a simple-
minded rustic, and his correspondence previous to the bargain shows that he
had given serious consideration to Assumption. He had been in daily
contact with Madison who had led the fight against it. A meticulously
careful student of the press, he unquestionably was familiar with every
objection to Assumption and funding which he afterward offered. He had
undoubtedly read Madison’s argument which had been published a month
after he reached New York. As late as June 20th, he was writing Monroe
that, unless the quarrel over Assumption and the residence was settled,
‘there will be no funding bill agreed to, our credit will burst and vanish, and
the States separate, to take care, every one of itself.’ Much as he would
prefer that the States pay their own debts, he could see ‘the necessity of
yielding to the cries of the creditors ... for the sake of the Union, and to save
it from the greatest of all calamities, the total extinction of our credit in
Europe.’[277] Here was justification enough for his action without resorting
to the fanciful story of his deception by Hamilton. ‘The question of
assuming the State debts has created greater animosities than I ever yet
saw,’ he wrote Dr. Gilmer a week after his letter to Monroe.[278] Thus he
knew precisely how the lines were drawn. Perhaps he did not appreciate at
the moment the political advantage of appearing on the side of the
opposition,—but he was not deceived. Nor was Madison imposed upon. He
accepted the bargain because ‘the crisis demands the spirit of
accommodation,’ albeit he wished it ‘considered as an unavoidable evil and
possibly not the worse side of the dilemma.’[279]
With many, however, the triumph of Assumption meant placing
Hamilton and his followers in an impregnable position; this, too, was the
idea of the Hamiltonians and great was their rejoicing. When the measure
passed the Senate, members of the lower House were packed behind the
iron railing, the smiling faces of Ames and Sedgwick conspicuous among
them. To the extremists in the opposition it seemed the end. ‘I do not see
that I can do any good here and I think I had better go home,’ wrote Maclay.
‘Everything, even to the naming of a committee is prearranged by Hamilton
and his group of speculators.’[280] And the Hamiltonians, who had raged
over the satirical article on the birth of Assumption, made merry over a
verse in Fenno’s journal:
PREMONITIONS OF BATTLE
H AMILTON was at the high tide of his popularity and power when
Congress next convened in Philadelphia. His funding system had
established the Nation’s credit, and the genius and daring of the
brilliant young man of thirty-three were on every tongue. The ‘Maryland
Journal’ claimed ‘respectable authority’ for the assertion that in Quebec he
was ‘supposed equal to the celebrated Mr. Pitt, and superior to the Prime
Minister of any other court in Europe.’[282] Among the merchants and
people of wealth and property he was acclaimed the savior of the State.
Everywhere he was the idol of the aristocracy.
And, in the saddle, he was riding hard. Although his was the second
position in the Cabinet, he thought of himself as the Prime Minister.
Washington was a constitutional monarch. The other members of the
President’s official family were his subordinates. His policies were the
policies of the Government, and to question them was hostility to the State.
In the Cabinet meetings his manner was masterful to a degree. Considering
himself Prime Minister, he felt no delicacy about interfering in the
departments of his colleagues. Even Knox, who adored him, resented his
determination to make all the purchases for the Department of War. When
the War Secretary resisted, Hamilton had a compliant Congress pass a law
giving him that privilege—an absurdity that continued as long as he was in
the Cabinet.[283] The soft-spoken, mild, and courteous Jefferson, who
preferred the ways of conciliation and persuasion, observed the dictatorial
airs of his masterful young associate with a surprise that hardened to
distaste.
But the feeling awakened among the masses by the failure to
discriminate in the matter of the securities, and by Assumption, was
increasing in intensity. The common soldier had not profited by these
policies. The farmer and the mechanic could see no benefit to themselves,
but among speculators, some of them members of Congress, they observed
evidence of new-found wealth. These were building finer houses, riding in
coaches where they had previously walked, and there was an ominous
rumbling and grumbling beneath the surface, to which the Hamiltonians
were oblivious or indifferent. After all, this was merely the whining of the
ne’er-do-wells of the taverns and the illiterates of the farms.
The work was only begun, and there could be no turning back now. The
assumption of the State debts called for the tapping of new sources of
revenue. This would increase the burdens of the people, but what would
they have? They could not eat their cake and have it too—could not have a
strong government without paying the price. Utterly unmindful of the
complaining of the people of no importance, Hamilton turned resolutely to
his task and prepared his excise tax for the consideration of Congress.
II
IV
But the battle was not yet won. The conflict was transferred to the
Cabinet, for Washington was not at all convinced that there was no
constitutional prohibition. Not only did he withhold his signature till the last
minute, but there are reasons to believe that he had a veto in mind almost to
the end. For Madison, with whose part in the framing of the Constitution he
was familiar, he had a profound respect. Having discussed the bill with
Jefferson informally, Washington requested written opinions from both
Jefferson and Randolph, the Attorney-General. Both were in complete
accord with the conclusions of Madison. The opinion of Jefferson,
expressed with all his force of reasoning, was a powerful challenge to the
doctrine of implied powers.[301]
It was at about this time that Washington summoned Madison to the
Morris house, which served as the Executive Mansion in Philadelphia, to
invite a fuller expression of his views. The great man listened in silence,
and Madison thought with sympathy, while the little giant of the
Constitutional Convention, out of the wealth of his learning and experience,
poured forth his reasons for opposition. Not once, but several times, the
little figure of Madison must have been seen entering the Morris house in
those days of suppressed excitement, for there were numerous conferences.
As the ten-day period followed for the affixing of the presidential signature
was drawing to an end, and Washington requested his friend to reduce his
objections to writing, Madison assumed that it was a veto message he was
asked to frame. Nor was it a far-fetched assumption, for on more than one
occasion the President had made use of Madison’s pen.[302]
Meanwhile the Hamiltonians, at first puzzled, became alarmed. From the
temper of their talk in Philadelphia, Madison was convinced that in the
event of a veto they were ready for open opposition to Washington, backed
by the wealth and influence of the powerful.[303] Ugly, silly stories,
reflecting upon the great personage on whom the Hamiltonians found it
profitable to claim a monopoly, were set afloat. Fisher Ames gave currency
in Boston to the theory that Washington was influenced by the fear that the
establishment of a financial capital in Philadelphia would prevent the
removal of the political capital to the banks of the stream that washed the
boundary of Mount Vernon.[304] If some discretion was used in
Philadelphia, where the grumbling was confined to the fashionable
drawing-rooms, no such circumspection was observed in New York, where
the meanest motives were ascribed to the President, and among the
speculators and Tory sympathizers open threats were made. Madison heard,
while there a little later, that ‘the licentiousness of [these] tongues exceeded
anything that was conceived.’[305] This struggle marked a definitive break
in the relations of Hamilton and Jefferson. The dictatorial disposition of the
former would brook no opposition, and he was temperamentally incapable
of a differentiation between political opposition and personal hostility. The
fact that Jefferson, in response to a command from Washington, had written
an opinion against the Bank could bear only one interpretation—‘asperity
and ill humor toward me.’[306] The fact that Washington accepted
Hamilton’s view, did not, however, shake Jefferson’s faith in the President,
and in defeat nothing so ill-tempered escaped him as flowed in a stream
from the Federalists when threatened with defeat. Within a month after
Hamilton had won his fight, Jefferson, in commenting to a friend on what
he conceived to be a dangerous trend, wrote that ‘it is fortunate that our first
executive magistrate is purely and zealously republican’—the highest praise
he could bestow.[307]
The press was not verbose in its comments on the bill, albeit Freneau
fought it in the ‘Federal Gazette.’[308] The ‘Pennsylvania Gazette’ was
ungraceful in defeat. Denouncing the Bank as ‘a proposition made to the
moneyed interest,’ it commented on its ‘preparations to subscribe,’ and
found ‘the terms ... so advantageous that no equal object of speculation is
perhaps presented in any quarter of the globe.’[309] Fenno offered his best
in a verse:
Thus the First Congress closed its labors with no little rhapsodizing in
the press over the results. A New York paper offered an epitaph of
glorification,[311] which a Boston paper condensed into the simple
comment that it had ‘established public confidence and credit, reconciled
the jarring interests of discontented States, and cemented the people in the
bonds of harmony, peace and love.’[312]
One man, at least, had cause for jubilation. In two years Hamilton had
risen to a position of commanding power, proved his genius in constructive
statesmanship, accomplished everything he had set out to do, made himself
the idol of the wealthy and the powerful, the recognized leader of the
influential commercial class, the acknowledged head of a brilliant and
militant party. His friends were comparing him to Pitt, then in the heyday of
his power—and he was only on the threshold. So great was the enthusiasm
in commercial circles that he made a special trip to New York to accept the
homage of the Chamber of Commerce at a reception, to linger a week
among his worshipers, and to return to Philadelphia reinvigorated by the
wine of idolatry pressed to his lips.[313] At that moment he was on the top
of the world.