Digital Merger Control:

Adapting Theories of Harm

Viktoria H.S.E. Robertson

@VRobCompLaw

OECD COMPETITION COMMITTEE, 16 JUNE 2023

Introduction

Why have not more digital mergers been challenged?

1. No competition problem

2. No jurisdiction

Turnover thresholds Transaction value thresholds

Market share thresholds Referrals EU Member States  Commission

3. No appropriate theories of harm

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Digital Mergers in Europe

69 national European digital & tech

merger cases, by theories of harm
Only horizontal theories of harm

3% Horizontal and vertical theories of harm

7%
4%
Horizontal and conglomerate theories of harm
4%
44% Horizontal, vertical and conglomerate theories
12% of harm
Only vertical theories of harm

26% Vertical and conglomerate theories of harm

Only conglomerate theories of harm

Source: Robertson, Report to the

European Commission (2022)
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Status Quo: Horizontal Concerns

Case Study 1: Same Digital Case Study 2: Assuaging

Merger – Different Assessments Horizontal Concerns

 eBay/Adevinta (2020/2021)  Presence of Big Tech

• Axel Springer/Concept Multimédia (FR
• AT 2018)
• DE • DPG/Sanoma (NL 2020)
• UK • Booster/Liftoff (IRL 2021)
• Turnitin/Ouriginal Group (ES 2021)
 Digital market characteristics
• Merger prevents tipping (Axel
Springer/Immowelt, DE 2015)
• Multi-homing of users (Axel
Springer/Immowelt, DE 2015; Parship, DE
2015; Glovoappro/Foodpanda, RO 2021)

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Status Quo: Vertical Concerns

Case Study 3: Input Foreclosure Case Study 4: Access to Data

in Meta/Giphy Through Vertical Integration
 Input foreclosure  Rockaway Capital/Heureka (CZ
• (i) ability and 2016)
• (ii) incentive to engage in foreclosure,  Sully System/CENEJE (SI 2018)
• (iii) effects on downstream competition  Sanoma/Iddink (NL 2019)
 UK (2022)  divestiture  Uber International/GPC Computer
 AT (2022)  access requirement Software (UK 2021)
 esure/Gocompare.com (UK 2015)

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Status Quo: Conglomerate Concerns

Case Study 5: Bundling Case Study 6: Are Conglomerate

Strategies Theories of Harm Enough?

 Frequently  post-merger bundling  Greek Delivery Hero case (2022)

no credible threat to competition  Assessed purely in relation to
 Axel Springer/Concept Multimédia conglomerate concerns (!)
(FR 2018)  Required commitments
 Sanoma/Iddink (NL 2019)
 Blackbaud/Giving (UK 2017)

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Conclusions

 Traditional theories of harm remain focal point of substantive assessment in digital

mergers
 Possible to adapt traditional theories of harm to digital market environments
 But  in practice, there appears to be a limit where ecosystem theories of harm
would need to be fully incorporated
 Going forward, focus on:
1. Digital ecosystem theories of harm
2. Data advantages
3. Coherent interaction between merger control &
control of market power

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 Competition Law and Digitalization Group

Welthandelsplatz 1, 1020 Vienna, Austria

UNIV.-PROF. MAG. DR.

VIKTORIA H.S.E. ROBERTSON,
MJUR (OXON)

T +43-1-313 36-6630
viktoria.robertson@wu.ac.at
www.complawhub.eu

@VRobCompLaw

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